

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SEAFORTH CANADA

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R. H. ROY



THE SEAFORTH HIGHLANDERS OF CANADA

1919 / 1965


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Dr. R. H. Roy, C.D., B.A., M.A., Ph.D., F.R.Hist.S., is an Associate Professor of Military History at the University of Victoria. After six years service in Canada and overseas, he attended the University of British Columbia and the University of Washington where he specialized in Canadian History.

As a veteran and professional historian, Dr. Roy writes with both feeling and authority about a regiment and a corps with whose actions he was familiar. As an infantry officer in a Highland regiment, and as one who has fought in the Italian and Northwestern Theatres of war, the author displays a sympathy and understanding for his subject which will appeal to all who served in the Canadian Army Overseas.

Dr. Roy is the author of **Ready For the Fray, Sinews of Steel,** and numerous articles on military and Canadian history and other topics.

Almost sixty years have passed since the Seaforth Highlanders of Canada was authorized as a regiment in the Canadian Militia. This volume covers the story of the regiment from the time it returned home in 1919 up to the present day.

It is a story of sacrifice. During the 1920's the Canadian people were uninterested in military affairs. When the danger of war began to threaten the world in the 1930's, Canada was in the midst of an economic depression which did not perimt her to rearm or revitalize her tiny army forces.

Despite the difficulties the spirit of the Seaforths shone brightly, and when war came it was chosen to serve in the 1st Division. After intense training in Great Britain, the regiment was among the first to storm the shores of Sicily. For the next two years it fought in most of the major battles, gaining a distinguished reputation as one of the finest regiments to serve overseas.

DUST JACKET by Cy Connorton

The Seaforth Highlanders of Canada



Field Marshal H.R.H. The Prince Philip, Duke of Edinburgh, K.G., K.T., G.B.E.

Colonel-in-Chief The Seaforth Highlanders of Canada 1967 -



The Seaforth Highlanders of Canada

1919-1965

by

Reginald H. Roy, C.D., Ph.D., F.R.Hist.S.

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Dedication

by

Major the Rev. R. C. H. Durnford, DSO, CD

Canadian Chaplain Service

Having served with you in strange places,
in peaceful days and in the stench of war,
it has been my greatest privilege to have known
your courage and your brave unselfishness—
to have been your friend.
How glad I am to have this opportunity
to dedicate this book to you—"the Cuidichans"—
the splendid men, dead and alive, who are the Regiment.

THE SEAFORTH HIGHLANDERS OF CANADA

1919 / 1965

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Author's Preface

In 1920 Mr. Bernard McEvoy and Captain A. H. Finlay, MC, wrote the History of the 72nd Canadian Infantry Battalion, Seaforth Highlanders of Canada. *Almost fifty years have passed, and in that half century the regiment has added to the renown it gained in Flanders by its victories in Sicily, Italy and North-West Europe. A history of these fifty years has been long overdue. Several attempts to write the regiment's history were made after the Second World War but, for a variety of reasons, it was never completed. Fortunately I was permitted to see the manuscript written by Major J. D. Pierce which is now in the regimental archives. Professor R. L. McDougall, presently of Carleton University, spent almost two years of his spare time preparing chapters covering the period from the Sicily landing to the Ortona battle. Dr. McDougall, whose research led him to the Army Historical Section as well as to numerous tape-recorded interviews with Seaforth veterans, graciously permitted me full access to the material he had gathered as well as the use of the narrative he had written. Both men served in action with the Seaforths, and I am indebted to them.*

The major source of information for this history was the regiment's war diary with its various appendices. As the name suggests, this was a brief, daily account of the unit's activities from the time the overseas battalion was organized until it was disbanded. Although the bulk of this history deals with the Seaforths in action, it will be appreciated that, for a better understanding of its accomplishments, one cannot isolate it from the brigade or division in which it fought. Fortunately I was able to examine the war diaries of the 2nd Canadian Infantry Brigade and the 1st Canadian Infantry Division. More particularly I was able to obtain a copy of the brigade's Intelligence Log which gives a minute by minute account of all messages received

and sent at Brigade Headquarters. I have relied heavily on this source, together with the maps, codewords and operation orders which accompanied the diary, as one of the key authorities for my description of the Seaforths in battle.

Neither the war diaries nor the message logs, however, can penetrate the fog of battle which frequently occurs once the battalion has been committed to action. Wireless sets break down, signallers are killed, and at times commanding officers and even company commanders must operate as best they can without having available to them complete knowledge of the successes or failures of their men engaged in close contact with the enemy. The Hitler Line battle was one such occasion, and here, as in Ortona and elsewhere, the subalterns, sergeants and corporals carried on the attack in the finest traditions of the regiment. In such cases I have had to rely on eyewitness accounts by the men who took part in these battles and who have been kind enough to write or tell me about their experiences. I regret very much that I have not been able to get more accounts of this type, especially from non-commissioned officers. These accounts, where possible, have been checked against other written and verbal sources for accuracy, for it is now about twenty-five years since the events described have taken place. I have found that veterans' memories of certain battles or incidents remain quite vivid despite the passage of time. Their account may cover only a few hours or a very small sector of the battlefield, but when gathered together and used with discretion, the historian can have no better source for the colour, excitement and tragedy on the battlefield.

Aside from the gratitude I owe the veterans of the regiment who have permitted me to interview them either personally or by letter, a number have been kind enough to lend me their diaries and journals, or the letters which they sent home from overseas which, fortunately, their wives or mothers kept. Among the former the diary kept by the padre, Honorary Major Durnford, deserves special mention as does that kept by Colonel J. D. Forin. Both men made copious entries which provided much background material. The Diary of "C" Company, which Brigadier D. M. Clark brought to my attention, was made available to me by Sergeant-Major McKim, now Inspector McKim of the R.C.M.P. It was started early in 1944 and was kept up by several non-commissioned officers in the company until the end of the war. Other veterans who have lent me private letters, maps, photographs, newspaper clippings, notebooks and other valuable supple-

mentary sources of information are too numerous to mention individually, but where appropriate their contributions are mentioned in footnotes.

Although the regimental archives of the Seaforth Highlanders of Canada provided most of the information upon which this history is based, additional material at the Directorate of History, Canadian Forces Headquarters, Ottawa, was made available to me by Colonel C. P. Stacey and Dr. S. F. Wise. The military archives at the Directorate are a veritable gold mine for the historian of any regiment. Here I examined the diaries of other battalions in the brigade as well as artillery, armoured and other units supporting or working with the Seaforths. Located in the Directorate, too, are the citations for awards, brigade and divisional accounts of battle, operation orders at all levels, the most complete set of maps available of Canadian theatres of war, and so forth. During the past three years I have sent seemingly innumerable requests for additional information to Dr. Wise and Mrs. Alice Sorby. In every case the response has been prompt and generous. I would be remiss if I did not acknowledge the assistance given me when doing research at the Directorate by Warrant Officers A. A. Azar, CD, and P. R. Marshall, CD. At times, I fear, I have tried their patience, but they have neither complained nor let me down.

Of all the "private archives" relating to the regiment which have been opened to me, there has been none so valuable as that in the possession of the present Honorary Colonel of the regiment, General J. A. Clark. For over half a century General Clark has been intimately connected with the Seaforths, and it is only when one reads through the thousands of letters and documents in his personal files that one can appreciate the tremendous amount of work he has done over the years for the benefit of the regiment he once commanded. His interests touch every aspect of the regiment's life, and the records he has kept have been of great value. Aside from making his files available to me, General Clark has provided me with much information about the pre- and post-war years of the regiment, and in many ways he has extended me courtesies which have been both helpful and warming.

The History Committee of the regiment, under the chairmanship of Brigadier H. P. Bell-Irving, has provided the essential link between the historian and the regiment. Aside from its numerous tasks, it arranged for meetings between myself and Seaforth veterans at which the first draft chapters would be read, criticized and im-

proved. Lt-Col. D. I. Fairweather and Pipe-Major E. Esson both gave generously of their time to arrange these meetings, and I am much in debt to the Committee for these and other means of becoming acquainted with former Seaforth officers and other ranks whose names appear in the pages of this history. The cooperation and assistance given me by Brigadier Bell-Irving and his Committee left little to be desired. The regiment owes a debt of gratitude to this group of men who have borne so much of the burden during the months this work has been underway.

Most regimental histories have been concerned almost exclusively with a description of the unit in battle. The reader will find that most, but by no means all, of this history deals with the Seaforths from the time it lands in Sicily until its triumphant entry into Amsterdam on VE-Day. Several chapters describe how the raw militia unit was trained in England to take its place in the defence of Great Britain. Two chapters describe the regiment during the decades prior to and after the war. The story of the pre-war years, especially, relates something of the struggle for existence which engaged the Seaforths as well as other Canadian militia units during the 1920's and later the Depression years. Although sometimes scorned as "Saturday night soldiers", the militiamen were to be the backbone of the wartime Canadian Army. The Seaforths alone were to provide an amazing number of senior officers for the army, of whom Major-General B. M. Hoffmeister was an outstanding example. These officers, non-commissioned officers and men, all of whom were volunteers and all of whom remained in the militia at considerable sacrifice, were the first to respond to the call to arms in 1939. They were among the first to go overseas, they were the first to be forged into an efficient fighting formation, and they were the first to take part in the invasion of Italy. Because of their willingness and their ability, they were also the first to be tapped to provide the trained leadership needed for the divisions which followed in their wake.

The role played by the militia during the war has yet to be told, but something of their pre-war struggle and the neglect of the militia units by the federal government may be gathered from these pages.

During the war the Seaforths were soon trained to professional standards, and certainly by the time they crossed into Italy they had reached a level of competence which would compare favourably with any similar unit in the German forces which opposed them. By the

time of Ortona and the Hitler Line, the Seaforths could be counted among the finest battalions in the Eighth Army. Military efficiency was a prerequisite for this high standard, but hand in hand with efficiency and experience went esprit de corps *and regimental pride which gave the unit that elan in battle so characteristic of all first-class fighting units.*

Much more could be written about the Seaforths than appears within the pages of this book. In general I have tried to focus my attention on the regiment rather than the individuals in it, and have used eye-witness accounts of battle to exemplify what others were experiencing rather than the individual himself. I have attempted to write this history so that it will be as understandable to the veteran as to his family. It will suffice if the latter will appreciate all the more clearly why the veteran is proud to say: "I fought with the Seaforths".

In concluding this preface I should like to express my thanks to Mrs. Mary E. Adamson who, over the years, has done much of the typing and proofreading of the book. I must also express my appreciation to my wife Ardith and daughter Franklyn for their patience over the years when part of the house became a sort of "tactical headquarters" which, all too frequently, took up time which properly should have been spent with them.

University of Victoria.
Victoria,
British Columbia

R. H. Roy

Table of Contents

Dedication v

Preface vii

Foreword xv

Introduction xvii

CHAPTER

I The Inter-War Years 1

II The Call to Arms 41

III On Guard in England 71

IV Preparing for Battle 109

V Combined Operations Training 133

VI The Campaign in Sicily 157

VII Southern Italy 203

VIII From the Moro River to Ortona 235

IX The Spring Campaign: The Hitler Line . . 273

X Through the Gothic Line to San Fortunato Ridge 311

XI Fighting in the Po Valley 349

XII The Battle of the Rivers 375

XIII The Campaign in The Netherlands . . . 411

XIV The Post-War Era 447

List of Appendices

APPENDIX		
"A"	Battle Honours	471
"B"	Fatal and Non-Fatal Casualties and Prisoners of War	472
"C"	Awards and Decorations	511
"D"	Colonels-in-Chief, Honorary Colonels, Honorary Lieutenant-Colonels and Commanding Officers, 1920-1965	515
"E"	The 2nd (Reserve) Battalion, of the Seaforth Highlanders of Canada	518
"F"	The Seaforth Cadets	522
"G"	The Seaforth Association	528
"H"	The Women's Auxiliary	531
"I"	Strength State, 1921-1939	536
"J"	Regimental Sergeant-Majors and Pipe-Majors, 1920-1965	537
"K"	Nominal Roll	561

Maps

MAP		
1.	Sicily, July-September 1943	Next to page 203
2.	Pursuit to the North, September-October 1943	Next to page 235
3.	From the Moro River to Ortona, December 1943	Next to page 273
4.	The Hitler Line—May 1944	Next to page 311
5.	The Gothic Line	Next to page 349
6.	The Savio River Crossing October 1944	Next to page 375
7.	The Battle for the Rivers	Next to page 411
8.	The Campaign in the Netherlands	Next to page 447

Foreword

by

MAJOR-GENERAL G. R. PEARKES, VC, PC,
CC, CB, DSO, MC, CD, LLD

When the call to arms came in September, 1939, it was my great pleasure as Brigadier 2nd Canadian Infantry Brigade—later Divisional Commander—to have under my command the Seaforth Highlanders of Canada. In the anxious years which followed, I saw the battalion develop into one of the finest in the Canadian Army in England. In Sicily, Italy and The Netherlands, all ranks contributed to the magnificent record of the Seaforths in battle. Forged in war and upheld by a spirit of sacrifice in peace, the *esprit de corps* of the regiment shines like a beacon through the chapters of this book. Theirs is a story of achievement second to none, and I congratulate the regiment for the service which it has rendered the nation during the past half century.

GEORGE R. PEARKES

Introduction

by

Brigadier-General J. A. Clark,

CMG, DSO, VD, CD, QC

Honorary Colonel of the Regiment

I am indeed honoured to have the privilege of writing the "Introduction" to this all important record of the Seaforth Highlanders of Canada from the end of the First World War.

As an original member of the Regiment I feel that the history would not be complete without a brief reference to events which were not recorded in the earlier history, "72nd Seaforth Highlanders of Canada", by Bernard McEvoy and Captain A. H. Finlay, MC.

Following the departure of Colonel Leckie with 25 officers and 514 other ranks which were incorporated into the 16th Battalion, Lt-Col. J. S. Tait carried on as Commanding Officer until he was appointed Second in Command to Lt-Col. Tobin, (a Seaforth Major), in the 29th Battalion. Major G. H. Kirkpatrick then took command until he was appointed to command the 11th C.M.R. Following Colonel Kirkpatrick's departure, I took command. I recruited on a peace-time basis and trained the unit in the evenings. In addition, guards were mobilized for duty at Nanaimo, Siwash Rock, the Oil Tanks and Point Grey. Strength from these sources was such that an overseas battalion, the 72nd, was authorized with myself as Commanding Officer. The original authorization stated that the unit would be used to supply drafts for units already overseas. In addition to this condition, the then Brigade Commander stated that there was no significance in the fact that the unit was given the number 72nd

and that it would be recruited from all units in the province. In the light of these limitations the question has been asked, how did it come about that this unit, following its major contribution to the 16th Scottish, become the only unit in the Canadian Corps with its own militia number and its own regimental uniform? Shortly after I was confronted with these problems, the Honorary Lieutenant Colonel J. W. Stewart invited me for lunch and asked, "what uniform are you going to wear?" I replied, "I hope we are going to wear our own, but the Government has said it will not provide any more Highland uniforms." He said, "of course you will wear your own uniform, if the Government won't pay for it I will." I returned to my headquarters and a very busy quartermaster's staff prepared a size roll for 1140 uniforms. About midnight a cable with size rolls was sent to Moore, Taggart in Glasgow ordering the uniforms. The order was accepted and the uniforms supplied within six weeks. By that time the unit was recruited to full strength and the right to wear the uniform was never challenged. Government policy changed and we were not required to furnish drafts. After numerous inspections by high ranking officers, including His Royal Highness the Duke of Connaught, the unit was selected as one of the 4th Canadian Division. Later in 1917 when it was found that British Columbia could not reinforce nine British Columbia units then serving in the field, six were assigned to other provinces but the 72nd, along with the 7th and 29th, remained as British Columbia units.

A further word regarding J. W. Stewart is appropriate. It was he who proposed, raised and commanded the first Canadian Railway Battalion. It was such a success that twelve Railway Battalions were raised and served under his command in France. He worked such wonders in battlefield railway construction that in 1918 he was appointed Director-General of Construction for the British Army with the rank of Major General. General Stewart continued as Honorary Lieutenant Colonel until 1925 when he was appointed Honorary Colonel, which appointment he held until his death in 1938.

Other events which stand out in my mind and which were of assistance in both training and recruiting were the visits of His Royal Highness The Prince of Wales, his appointment as Colonel-in-Chief of the Regiment, official approval of our colours and battle honours, the erection of the Seaforth Armoury, the presentation of colours by His Royal Highness Prince Philip in 1962 and his appointment as Colonel-in-Chief in 1967. The author has made reference to the

appointment of His Royal Highness The Prince of Wales as Colonel-in-Chief of the Regiment. I would like to quote the following letter which was not available to the author:

"On the train,
Cape Province,
South Africa,

July 25, 1925.

Dear Colonel Wilson,

Thank you very much for your letter. I am delighted my appointment as Colonel-in-Chief of the Seaforth Highlanders of Canada has appeared in the "Canada Gazette". I am very proud to be closely associated with such a fine regiment, and shall be very grateful for the Pipe Banner which I much look forward to receiving.

With best wishes to you and all ranks of the Regiment,

Believe me

Yours sincerely

'Edward P.
Col-in-Chief'

Lt.-Colonel A. D. Wilson,
1st Battn. "The Seaforth Highlanders of Canada
Vancouver, B.C."

When the Prince of Wales visited Vancouver in 1927 it was most significant that he landed in Quebec wearing the uniform of a Seaforth Highlander. This was a unique compliment to this Regiment as royalty normally wore naval uniform or the uniform of a Guards' regiment when entering one of the Dominions. He visited Vancouver on the 17th and 18th of August, 1927. The Regiment supplied a Guard of Honour of 3 officers, 100 O.R.'s and Pipe Band, in pre-war Review Order, with the King's Colour. Captain J. Duns, M.M. commanded the Guard with Lieut. J. M. S. Tait as Subaltern, and Lieut. E. D. Woodburn carrying the Colour. Following the royal salute the guard was inspected by His Royal Highness accompanied by the Guard Commander and Lt-Col. A. D. Wilson, D.S.O., V.D.

On the evening of the 17th of August, Maj-Gen. J. W. Stewart gave a dinner at his home in honour of the Prince of Wales and His Royal Highness Prince George (afterwards George VI). On the same evening the officers of the Regiment gave a ball at the Hotel Georgia, a newly constructed hotel, in honour of His Royal Highness.

Supplementing the author's remarks relative to the armoury and with a view to establishing beyond peradventure that the armoury was approved by Parliament for the Seaforth Highlanders of Canada, I refer to a request by the Prime Minister, the Right Honourable R. B. Bennett, under date of the 31st of March, 1934, that I give him a confidential report on the armoury situation in Vancouver. This was done and under date of the 16th of May, 1934 the Prime Minister replied in part, "we propose to do what we can to deal with this matter, but just how I am not quite clear". Fortunately for the Regiment, Colonel the Honourable Donald M. Sutherland, D.S.O., was Minister of Defence. He assured Parliament that an armoury for the Seaforths was a vital need and that no unit in Canada was more deserving. In a letter dated the 14th of March, 1934 to myself the Minister said in part, "I do not need to be convinced, because, as I said in the House, I regard the case of the Seaforths as one which should be considered first, as far as armoury accommodation goes in Canada at the present time". Under date of the 19th of June, 1934, the first reading was given to Bill 113, "An act to provide for the construction of Public Works". Item 174 read as follows: "Vancouver, B.C.—Armoury for Seaforth Highlanders—$240,000.00". Parliment approved the item. I wrote appropriate letters of appreciation to the Prime Minister and to the Minister of Defence. The Minister of Defence replied in part, "It was a great pleasure for everyone connected with the Department to have the item for the Seaforths put through". In the absence of the Prime Minister, Sir George H. Perley acknowledged my letter in part, "I feel sure that Mr. Bennett will be very glad to know that you and your associates are pleased with the arrangement that has been made for building an armoury in Vancouver. When it is finished, I hope that you will find it most useful and adequate for the purposes of the Highlanders".

It was indeed an excellent armoury in every respect. The Superintendent of Construction, Mr. Walter Douglas, had been a Regimental Sergeant Major of the 2nd Reserve Battalion during the Second World War. It is believed that he personally inspected all materials entering construction as well as keeping a close watch on the quality of workmanship. The Regiment is greatly indebted to him.

The future Field Marshal Edmund Ironside, a former G.S.O. 1 of the 4th Canadian Division, a great friend of the 72nd, on his return from India visited the Regiment and passed the remark, " this is the finest single unit armoury in the British Empire".

As stated in the text, the official opening of the new armoury was planned with great care. It was preceded by the trooping of the Colour for His Excellency the Governor General Lord Tweedsmuir. The trooping was performed on the parade square in the presence of a very large gathering. There were four guards, each with a Company Commander and two subalterns, and 50 other ranks in pre-war Review Order. In addition, there was a fifth guard composed of veterans of the Seaforth Association commanded by Captain H. T. Skelly. These quards were very carefully trained over a long period of time, the R.S.M., Tom Anderson, once more performing a great service. The Commanding Officer, Lt-Col. J. R. S. Lough, was in command with Captain James Creighton as adjutant. These officers were mounted on a pair of matching Bay horses. This was the last time mounted officers appeared on parade in the Regiment.

The performance of the guards on this occasion was one of the most impressive in the Regiment's history. The guard provided by the Association was outstanding. Tears rolled down Lady Tweedsmuir's cheeks when she saw and watched that guard.

Following the trooping, the unit and guests moved into the armoury where Lord Tweedsmuir in a brief address formally declared the armoury open. This was followed by receptions in the officers', sergeants' and men's messes.

Following the Second World War items calling for special comments were the presentation of colours by His Royal Highness Prince Philip on the 3rd of June, 1962 and his appointment as Colonel-in-Chief on the 7th of April, 1967.

My files relative to each of these events are enormous, but I shall attempt to limit my remarks to essentials. When it was announced that the Second Commonwealth Study Conference, presided over by His Royal Highness, would visit Vancouver, the Commanding Officer made application through the proper military channels for the presentation of the Colours by Prince Philip. The application was favourably considered by Area Headquarters and the G.O.C., Western Command, but the Hospitality Committee in Ottawa regretted that the invitation for His Royal Highness to present our new Colours on the 3rd of June "must be declined". The chairman of the Commonwealth Study Conference was the Right Honourable Vincent Massey, former Governor-General of Canada and the vice-chairman was Vacy Ash, the President of Shell Oil Company. I discussed the mat-

ter with both of these gentlemen and found that Sunday, the 3rd of June was an off day for the Conference. Both intimated willingness to attend the presentation if arranged and also expressed a desire that the members of the Conference should be invited. I thereupon communicated with Mr. James Orr, His Royal Highness' secretary and under date of the 28th of February, 1962 I received a letter from him in part, "The Duke of Edinburgh would be very pleased to present the new Colours to the Seaforth Highlanders of Canada on the 3rd of June". Tremendous preparations followed, particularly by Lt-Col. D. I. Fairweather and all ranks of the Regiment.

The presentation ceremony reflected great credit on all ranks, ably described in the text and in Prince Philip's address. Immediately following the presentation I had the honour, with Her Majesty's permission, of having Prince Philip as my guest at a luncheon in the Faculty Club. By an extraordinary coincidence the number attending the luncheon was 72, an historic number. The guests included an ex Governor General, the Right Honourable Vincent Massey; the Lieutenant Governor, Major General George Pearkes, V.C.; Vacy Ash; the Chancellor of the University, Mrs. Ross, and her husband an ex Lieutenant Governor, Colonel the Honourable Frank Ross, C.M.G., M.C.; the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and former chancellor, Brigadier Sherwood Lett, C.B.E., D.S.O., M.C.; the President of the University, Colonel Norman A. M. MacKenzie, C.M.G., M.M.; the ex commanding officers; the serving officers of the Regiment and other guests of distinction.

Excerpts from a few communications should be made available to all ranks of the Regiment, past, present and future. Her Majesty's secretary wired the Commanding Officer:

> "The Queen deeply appreciates the kind message of loyal assurances which you sent to Her Majesty on the occasion of the presentation of new Colours to the Seaforth Highlanders of Canada by the Duke of Edinburgh. Please convey an expression of Her Majesty's thanks to all ranks."

His Royal Highness Prince Philip sent the following message:

> "Heartiest congratulations on a first-class Parade. The bearing and smartness of all ranks who took part, including the old Comrades, was a credit to a great Regiment with an old and famous name. I am sure your new Colours will be a source of inspiration to the Regiment in the years ahead."

The following excerpt from a letter written to myself by that very distinguished soldier, Sherwood Lett, should be read and reread by all ranks:

> "I have a somewhat intimate . . . knowledge of the post-war history of the Infantry Regiments in Canada, and have known of their difficulties and struggles to survive the post-war apathy to Militia service.
>
> Apart from the moving ceremony itself on Sunday, I could not help feeling that something was happening to the Seaforths of the present and the future. The sincerity of the young troops, and the spirit of earnestness of all who participated, was not a result merely of the weeks of practice for perfection. It seemed to me to show that somewhere along the way, a new generation of Seaforth Canadians had been brought to realize and appreciate the traditions of loyalty and service and sacrifice for which the Regimental Colours stand. I am sure those sentiments so excellently and so dramatically renewed on Sunday, will outlast even the threads of the new Colours."

Mrs. Eric Hamber, widow of the former Lieutenant Governor and Honorary Colonel of the Regiment, who gave wonderful support to the Regiment and particularly the overseas unit in the Second World War, commented:

> "The presentation of colours on Sunday was a great success . . . It was a most impressive ceremony, a day long to be remembered and you can well be proud of your Regiment.
>
> It must have entailed a tremendous amount of planning and if you would accept the enclosed to help defray a portion of the expense it would make me feel I had taken some small part on this very special occasion."

Mr. Vacy Ash borrowed the C.B.C. film of the presentation and showed it in the Officers' Mess of the 48th Highlanders to the St. Andrews Society of Toronto.

The next great event with which I was personally concerned related to the appointment of His Royal Highness Prince Philip as Colonel-in-Chief.

Following the appointment of His Royal Highness Prince Philip as Colonel-in-Chief of the Queens Own Highlanders an application was made through the proper channels for his appointment as Colonel-in-Chief of this Regiment. A reply was received "that the Army Council had the matter under review with a view to establishing a set of criteria to be applied which would ensure that the dignity of this appointment is maintained. . . . The Army Council has decided that

as a first prerequisite, a unit applying for a Colonel-in-Chief appointment should be due to celebrate its centenary in the very near future, unless there are very special circumstances which would warrant it being considered earlier".

Many letters were written, many interviews followed, in all of which "very special circumstances" were emphasized. Ultimately, senior officers in the Department of Defence endorsed the Regiment's application and a recommendation for the appointment was forwarded by the Minister of Defence. Under date of the 7th of April, 1967 Her Majesty appointed His Royal Highness Prince Philip Colonel-in-Chief of the Seaforth Highlanders of Canada.

I cannot conclude these remarks without an expression of deep appreciation for the advice, co-operation and generosity of our former Honorary Colonel H. R. MacMillan. He has been a tremendous asset. He continued his active support long after he ceased to be Honorary Colonel.

I repeat that I feel highly honoured at having been permitted to write this Introduction. It is impossible to give proper expression to my great pride in having been associated with the Regiment for the past fifty-eight years. It has proven itself in both war and peace. Sir Arthur Bryant's remarks in dealing with the Diaries of Field Marshal Viscount Alanbrooke in "Triumph in the West" might have been written for this Regiment:

> "It has been discipline, training, above all esprit de corps which, superimposed on certain basic and hereditary dispositions in our people, have enabled British soldiers to achieve the impossible when all the odds seemed against them."

The history, ideals and traditions are the responsibility of the officers, non-commissioned officers and men of the Regiment. I feel confident that they are in safe hands.



CHAPTER I

The Inter-War Years

On 20 June, 1919, Vancouver was en fete, and the crowds that lined the city streets were in a happy, expectant mood. Almost five years had gone by since Lt-Col. R. G. Edwards Leckie had offered the city's 72nd Regiment Seaforth Highlanders of Canada for overseas service. The long war years had dragged on interminably, and the price of victory had been paid in full by thousands of young men who left to join the various Canadian Expeditionary Force battalions formed in the province as the call for more and more soldiers came from the Western Front. About eight months previously the city had celebrated the glorious news that an armistice had been signed. The months between the end of the war and the homecoming of the 72nd Battalion, Canadian Expeditionary Force, seemed tremendously long. Even after the Armistice letters had reached the city describing the unit's last actions at Valenciennes, St. Saulve and Onnaing which had brought them to within a few miles of the border of Belgium. The battalion was proud of its record and the battle honours which it had won. But these honours were won at a high cost. By 11 November, 1918, 33 officers and 600 other ranks had been killed in action, and a further 68 officers and 1,814 other ranks had been wounded. Over 300 men in the battalion had been awarded decorations ranging from the Distinguished Service Order to Mention-in-Despatches, but this obvious and outward recognition of bravery did not dispel the fact that, of the 3,791 officers and men who passed through the battalion, 2,515—or almost two-thirds—of them had been casualties.

It is little wonder, then, that when letters were received describing the 72nd's move to Mons in December, the presentation of the Regimental Colours to the unit by the Canadian Corps Commander in April, 1919, and ultimately the embarkation from Le Havre for England in May, the wives and mothers of these veterans waited with an impatience tempered with the realization that at least their men were free from danger. The mayor had declared 20 June to be a civic holiday, banners and flags decorated the route the battalion would march on its way from the Canadian National Railway depot to the Seaforth Club on Pender Street, and preparations were made to give the men the warmest welcome possible.[1]

The enthusiasm of the crowds reached its peak when the C.N.R. train, its windows lined with troops, drew towards the station. Within minutes the veterans were engulfed in a noisy, emotional welcome which cannot be described but was never to be forgotten by the participants. Shortly before noon the unit formed up and with the pipes and drums playing at the head of the column, the 72nd Battalion marched through wildly cheering crowds through downtown Vancouver and came to a halt in front of the Seaforth Club. A word of command and the straight ranks broke as the men dispersed. Later, after a reception in the evening, they were formally dismissed for the last time.

To understand the position of the regiment at this period it is necessary to go back in time to the pre-war era. In 1909, a group of prominent men in Vancouver of Scottish extraction had approached the Department of Militia and Defence to approve the creation of a highland regiment in the city. In November of the following year authorization was received from Ottawa to form such a unit, and early in 1911 a Militia Order gave official life to the 72nd Highlanders of Canada.[2] Shortly thereafter, having obtained the consent

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[1] Brigadier-General J. A. Clark, who had commanded the 72nd Battalion, C.E.F., and then the 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade in the last months of the war, had returned to Vancouver before the battalion and was in charge of the homecoming arrangements.

There was considerable labour unrest in the city at the time, and evidently the mayor was not only anxious to proclaim a holiday, but felt that the parade of the veterans would have a beneficial effect on the unruly element on the fringes of the labour movement.

[2] Militia General Order No. 18, dated February, 1911. See also B. McEvoy and A. H. Finlay, *History of the 72nd Canadian Infantry Battalion, Sea-*

of the Seaforth Highlanders in Scotland and the permission from His Majesty, the 72nd Highlanders were affiliated with the British regiment and its title was changed to the 72nd Seaforth Highlanders of Canada.[3] This affiliation, which continues to this day, was a source of great pride to the Canadian regiment, and as might be expected, the newly organized unit patterned its dress and badges as closely as possible to that of the imperial regiment.

Under the guidance of Lt-Col. R. G. E. Leckie, the first Commanding Officer of the 72nd Seaforth Highlanders of Canada, the unit flourished. By August, 1914, it was as well trained as any militia unit in the province and eager to be mobilized for war when the empire was threatened by the German-Austrian alliance.

Although the actual date of the outbreak of hostilities came as a surprise, the increasing naval and military preparations by a bellicose Germany had created a growing apprehension in Great Britain and her empire. In the first decade of the new century, Canada had begun to pay more attention to her own defences. Prior to the outbreak of war, mobilization plans had been prepared in Ottawa. The Canadian Permanent Active Militia, as the regular forces were termed, was small in size. Thus should the Canadian government decide to send a force overseas, it was planned to mobilize certain Non-Permanent Active Militia units throughout the nation and send them to Great Britain to support the imperial war effort. Although the plans covered all aspects of the recruiting, clothing, equipping and concentration of the selected militia regiments, Colonel Sam Hughes ignored the prepared mobilization orders and substituted his own ideas instead. Rather than call upon a limited number of regiments to fill their ranks and take their place as part of the overseas contingent, he decided to accept drafts of men from a large number of the militia units which offered their services. These drafts, in turn, were sent to Valcartier Camp near Quebec City. There they were molded together to form new Canadian Expeditionary Force battalions, each of which was numbered.

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forth Highlanders of Canada, Vancouver, Cowan and Brookhouse, 1920, for further details regarding the origin of the regiment. M.G.O. No. 18 gave the official date of authorization as 24 November 1910.

[3] Militia General Order No. 74, dated April, 1912. In December, 1912, M.G.O. 229 redesignated the unit as the "72nd Regiment Seaforth Highlanders of Canada".

When Lt-Col. Leckie[4] offered the 72nd Regiment, Seaforth Highlanders of Canada for service, both he and the men in the unit expected that their regiment would be authorized to recruit to war strength and be sent overseas as a C.E.F. unit with its own dress, badges, title and traditions intact. Had such been the case, the major change would be the change in status only, that is, from a militia to an overseas regiment. So strong was the desire of both officers and men to get overseas, however, and so determined was the Minister of Militia and Defense to have his own way, that when the call came for the regiment to provide only a limited portion of their number to form part of one of the overseas battalions, it was accepted with alacrity. Consequently the 72nd Regiment provided 25 officers and 514 other ranks to the 16th Battalion, (The Canadian Scottish) Canadian Expeditionary Force. Lt-Col. Leckie was given command of the 16th Battalion which sailed in the first contingent to leave Canada. During the war it was to acquire an enviable record in the battles fought by the Canadian Corps.

While the first contingent was preparing itself for action, the 72nd Regiment continued to carry on its militia functions in Vancouver. During this time the 72nd sent drafts of men to the 29th and 47th Battalions, and also to the 11th Canadian Mounted Rifles—a battalion which went overseas as infantry despite its name.[5] In May, 1915, a further offer was made by the 72nd to raise an overseas battalion, and a few weeks later, much to the joy of all ranks the offer was accepted. When authority was received to form the 72nd Battalion,[6] Canadian Expeditionary Force (Seaforth Highlanders of Canada) its new Commanding Officer, Lt-Col. J. A. Clark was

[4] On 4 August the battalion was on parade. Lt-Col. Leckie addressed the unit stating his desire to offer the services of the regiment for overseas duty. His eloquent appeal met with a spontaneous demonstration by all ranks who wished to volunteer.

[5] Twelve officers and 305 men went to the 29th Bn., (commanded by a former Seaforth, Lt-Col. H. S. Tobin) seven officers and 361 men went to the 47th Bn., and five officers and 105 men went to the 11th C.M.R. (commanded by a Seaforth officer, Lt-Col. G. H. Kirkpatrick) (McEvoy & Finlay, *op. cit.*, p. 13).

[6] The 72nd Battalion, C.E.F. was the only battalion to have its militia number correspond with its C.E.F. number. Through the efforts of Lt-Col. Clark and the great generosity of Mr. J. W. Stewart, who became the Honorary Colonel, every man in the battalion was outfitted in the Seaforth uniform —including the kilt.

determined that it should live up to the hopes and expectations of the men who had worked so hard to organize the militia unit five years earlier. Altogether a total of 34 officers and 1,243 men came from the 72nd Regiment to the C.E.F. battalion which was to represent it in action overseas. By this time, the militia unit was really acting as a recruiting depot even though its name belied its actual function on the Militia List. Before the end of the war, the 72nd Regiment, in another major effort, supplied 17 officers and 866 men to the 231st Battalion, C.E.F.

The history of the 72nd Battalion, C.E.F., in the Great War has already been written and it is not the intention here to recount again the magnificent accomplishments of that unit nor of the other battalions to which the 72nd Regiment sent officers and men. It is obvious, however, that in the post-war era, a considerable amount of difficulty was going to be encountered if the Canadian militia units were to continue to foster the regimental "family" traditions which were such a source of strength before and during the war. The feeling of belonging to a regiment and the sense of pride in it had come to the Canadian militia through long association with the British army in earlier centuries. This, in turn, was responsible for the regimental *esprit de corps* which could be called upon in times of peril or discouragement to perform that extra effort, to march that extra mile or to capture yet another trench. This spirit, which was reflected in the elan of the regiment both on parade and in the field, was fostered in a variety of ways, all designed to emphasize the uniqueness of the regiment. The regiment's title, badges, tartan, dress, marching songs, mascot, alliances, history, battle honours, and so on were all part of a conscious effort designed to strengthen the bonds of the regimental family. It gave the new recruit a sense of pride in that he immediately shared in the past honours won by his regiment in action. It was a means, too, of holding on to the recruit over the years since, if the regiment had this spirit, there went with it a camaraderie which was far stronger than any found in most civilian clubs or societies. In brief, the regiment's *esprit de corps* in peacetime for Canada's voluntary militia units was a potent method of holding its officers and men tightly in an open hand, and as such, as shall be seen, the attention sometimes paid to matters affecting the unit's colours or honours were taken very seriously indeed.

In 1919 and early in 1920, therefore, both the military authori-

ties in Ottawa and men concerned with the continuation of the militia regiments were busy at work. As a result of the representations made to Ottawa by those interested in militia affairs, and especially owing to the general desire to have the honours won by the Canadian Expeditionary Force perpetuated by the various militia regiments, the Chief of the General Staff, Major-General W. G. Gwatkin, CB, CMG, was instrumental in having Major-General Sir William Otter, KCB, CVO, appointed as the chairman of the Committee on Militia Re-organization. This Committee had as its task to

> consider and report how best to give effect to the proposal that, with a view to preserving their traditions and identity, the several units (especially the Infantry Battalions) of the Canadian Expeditionary Force, which served at the front, should be incorporated in the Canadian Militia: this without avoidable increase of establishment, without prejudice to the divisional system of organization, and with due regard to the services which at various times, both before and during the war, the militia itself has rendered.[7]

The "Otter Committee", as it was termed, did not lack advice, but very frequently the advice from one source conflicted with that from another. The 72nd Regiment was a case in point.

Few Great War veterans would deny that the 16th Battalion (Canadian Scottish) C.E.F. had a magnificent record. Since the 72nd Regiment had contributed so heavily to its original formation as well as providing periodic reinforcements to it in France, it was natural that there should be a strong desire to have it perpetuated by the Seaforths. Among those who desired this was Brigadier-General J. A. Clark who had been in the 72nd Regiment when it was formed and who commanded its overseas battalion during most of the war. Assuming that the decision would rest primarily with the former commanding officers of the C.E.F. Battalion, he approached the three officers who had commanded the 16th Battalion overseas: Lt-Col. (later Major-General) R. G. E. Leckie, CMG; Lt-Col. (later Colonel) J. E. Leckie, CMG, DSO; and Lt-Col. (later Colonel) C. W. Peck, VC, DSO. Clark proposed that, since the 16th Battalion had no official "home", the Seaforth Highlanders would be more than pleased to perpetuate it by forming a two-battalion militia regiment (the Seaforth Highlanders of Canada) whose first battalion

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[7] C.E.F. Routine Order 1913, 23 April 1919. See also Colonel J. Sutherland Brown, "Military Policy of Canada, 1905-1914, and Suggestions for the Future", in *The Canadian Defence Quarterly*, Vol. I, No. 4, pp. 18-32.

would be known as, and would also perpetuate, the 16th Battalion, C.E.F., and the second battalion the 72nd Battalion, C.E.F. There was general agreement on this, and when the Otter Committee sat in Vancouver to discuss militia matters, Clark, acting as spokesman for his brother commanding officers, suggested this arrangement to it.[8]

No firm decision was made at the time. In Victoria, however, there was a group of ex-officers equally anxious to perpetuate the 16th Battalion for the militia regiment which was to be formed in the island city. The Chief of the General Staff, Sir Arthur Currie, had commanded the pre-war highland militia battalion in Victoria (the 50th Regiment, which wore the Gordon tartan) and one of the former commanding officers of the 16th Battalion, Lt-Col. "Cy" Peck, was a resident of that city as well as a Member of Parliament. Currie, it is thought, preferred to have the 16th Battalion perpetuated in conjunction with the 50th Regiment rather than the 72nd Regiment, a preference reinforced, perhaps, by the keen inter-city rivalry which was reflected in their respective militia battalion competitions. Apparently, when it became evident that the 72nd Regiment was not to inherit the honour of perpetuating the 16th Battalion, Lt-Col. Peck did everything in his power to make sure, at least, that it would be perpetuated by a British Columbia unit, and Victoria was chosen ultimately as the logical "home" of the 16th.

The Otter Commission made no formal report. Rather its findings and recommendations appeared by means of a series of Militia General Orders which determined once and for all the "marriage" of the pre-war militia units with their traditions and the overseas battalions and their hard-won battle honours. By General Order No. 232 dated 1 December, 1920 it was formally announced that the 72nd Regiment (Seaforth Highlanders of Canada) was disbanded and reorganized as the Seaforth Highlanders of Canada to take effect as of 15 September, 1920. The 1st Battalion of the regiment was to perpetuate the 72nd Battalion, C.E.F. (Seaforth Highlanders of Canada) and the 2nd (Reserve) Battalion, was to perpetuate the 231st Battalion, C.E.F.[9]

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[8] Personal interview, Brigadier-General J. A. Clark; also letter dated 30 October 1919, from Mr. H. O. Bell-Irving to Sir Wm. Otter, a photo copy is in the Regimental Archives of the Seaforth Highlanders of Canada. Mr. Bell-Irving was one of a group of distinguished men who were instrumental in forming the pre-war regiment.

[9] General Order 30, dated 15 March 1920, had given official sanction to the

It might be well at this point to describe the background to the battle honours granted to the Seaforth Highlanders of Canada. Although these were not forthcoming for another decade after the events described above, the granting of them was determined in large part by the regiment's claim to its wartime "geneological tree".

An infantry regiment carries its battle honours on its regimental colour, and perhaps of all the items held in the custody of the regiment, nothing is more sacred to it than the colour. By 1919 the Seaforths were in possession of several colours. The oldest was the stand of colours which were donated by the Imperial Order, Daughters of the Empire and presented to the 72nd Regiment by the Duke of Connaught in 1912. In 1914 these were deposited in St. John's Church, Vancouver. During the war, while the 72nd Battalion was still in France, the Commanding Officer made arrangements to secure "a stand of colours designed after the original colours with the exception that autumnal tinted maple leaves were entwined with the Union wreath which appeared on the old colours."[10] This stand of the King's and Regimental Colours was presented to the Battalion at a formal ceremony by Lt-Gen. Sir Arthur Currie on 1 April, 1919. The battalion, as with other C.E.F. battalions, also received a King's Silk Union flag from His Majesty King George V. None of these colours to date had emblazoned on them the battle honours won by the overseas battalions perpetuated by the Seaforth Highlanders of Canada, and consequently all ranks were anxious to display the colours to the best effect.

In 1925 a Battle Honours Committee was formed by the Department of National Defence to decide upon the allocation of battle honours to the reorganized militia regiments. Generally speaking,

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reorganization and redesignation of the regiment. The Seaforth Highlanders of Canada were to form part of the 23rd Infantry Brigade. Other units in the brigade were the 1st British Columbia Regiment (Duke of Connaught's Own Rifles), the Vancouver Regiment, and the Westminster Regiment. The Irish Fusiliers of Canada, also localized in Vancouver, was attached.

[10] Seaforth Archives, Historian's File: "Colours," Letter, Commanding Officer, Seaforth Highlanders of Canada to the Minister of National Defence, 6 July 1936. General Clark suggested the wreath which included the maple leaves as he wanted a distinctive Canadian emblem. This deviation from the regulations was unusual, but Clark's insistence won the day. The Union wreath entwined with maple leaves was to be adopted

regiments were allocated their major and minor honours[11] according to the claims they could submit through the overseas battalions they perpetuated. In the case of the Seaforth Highlanders of Canada, the claims to the honours of the 72nd and 231st Battalions, C.E.F., were obvious, and when the former Commanding Officers of these units were consulted a list was drawn up on which the regiment and the Committee could agree. However, difficulties arose when the Seaforth officers claimed the honours won by the 16th Battalion (Canadian Scottish) C.E.F. in the early months of the war. The regiment's claim was based on the fact that the 72nd Regiment had supplied 25 officers and 514 other ranks to the 16th, and as this constituted over half the original wartime strength of the C.E.F. battalion, it was felt that suitable recognition should be received by the Seaforths even though the 16th Battalion was perpetuated by the Canadian Scottish Regiment in Victoria.

For the next several years the fight for this recognition was waged by General Clark, representing the Seaforths on the one side and by Colonel W. H. P. Elkins, the Chairman of the Battle Honours Committee, on the other. Fortunately General Clark had been elected a Member of Parliament and consequently he was frequently in Ottawa where he could promote the interests of the regiment. By 1928, after long drawn out arguments and counter-arguments, the regiment was informed that "Ypres, 1915" and "Festubert, 1915" had been accredited to them, but as Brigadier General Clark had written to Lt-Col. A. D. Wilson six weeks earlier: "I might add that we would not have secured the right to Ypres, 1915 had I not been on the ground (in Ottawa) because I saw the list a short time ago and this was omitted; they did not intend to give us any credit for having furnished officers and men to the 16th Battalion."[12]

Although the Committee was willing to yield on that point, it required a far greater effort to get them to agree that the Seaforth

officially by the Department of National Defence for all Canadian infantry regiments.

[11] Of the honours granted, ten were permitted to be embroidered on the regimental colour. These represented the ten most important battles in which the regiment's overseas battalions took part.

[12] Regimental Archives, Seaforth Highlanders of Canada (henceforth cited as Seaforth Archives), Letter, General J. A. Clark to Lt-Col. A. D. Wilson, 29 March 1928. (File: "Regimental Colours").

deserved the honour "France and Flanders, 1915-1918" rather than "France and Flanders, 1916-1918" which the Committee was determined the regiment should not have. The Chairman wrote on the subject in part as follows:

> . . . the Committee consider that the Seaforth Highlanders are to some extent justified in feeling that some hardship will be inflicted upon them in that their honours will not carry the year date 1915 after France and Flanders but at the same time the Regiment will receive recognition for its original contribution to the 16th Battalion by the proposed award "Ypres, 1915" and "Festubert, 1915". The Committee feel that it is impossible to consider different awards for different degrees of effort. They regret, therefore, that they are unable to recommend any change in the existing method of award of Honours.[13]

This refusal to accede what the regiment considered to be rightfully theirs was not accepted by the Seaforth, and in Ottawa General Clark, a lawyer by profession, was not a man who was easily discouraged. Time and again he hammered home his theme that the Seaforths' contribution to the 16th Battalion was unusually high, and to back up this argument, he had the support of the wartime and post-war Commanding Officers of the Canadian Scottish Regiment in his claims. Clark even brought his arguments to the Committee personally when he attended its thirty-third meeting in June, 1928, as well as later meetings. Later in the year he approached the Defence Council. It was in June, 1929, that he was advised[14] that the Seaforths would be permitted to have "France and Flanders, 1915-1918", and at the same time a letter to the regiment suggested that a final selection be made of the major and minor honours now available to them. Since no honours were granted until all militia regiments were satisfied, it had taken the Committee over five years to publish their findings. In January, 1931, however, the Seaforths were awarded the following honours, with those in block letters being the major honours carried on the colours:

> YPRES, 1915, 1917; FESTUBERT, 1915; SOMME, 1916; Ancre Heights; Ancre, 1916; Arras, 1917, 1918; VIMY, 1917; PASSCHENDAELE; AMIENS; Scarpe, 1918; DROCOURT-QUEANT; Hindenburg Line; CANAL DU NORD; VALENCIENNES; Sambre; FRANCE and FLANDERS, 1915-1918.[15]

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[13] Seaforth Archives, Letter, Chairman, Battle Honours Committee to the Adjutant General, 23 June 1928.

[14] Letter, Adjutant General to Brigadier-General Clark, 27 June 1929. (Letter in possession of General Clark.)

[15] General Order No. 5, 1930, Appendix, dated 15 January 1931.

By the time the Seaforth Highlanders finally received official notification of its battle honours, the regiment had completed almost ten years of existence since it was reorganized after the Great War. We must now return to those early years and examine the unit from the time of the appointment of its first post-war commanding officer until the end of the 1930's.

When the overseas battalion returned to Vancouver in 1919, there was in existence the Seaforths Overseas Club. This was formed after the armistice was declared in 1918 by officers of the regiment who had returned earlier for medical reasons and other causes. The object was to have a comfortable club for returned Seaforths and to have it in operation before the return of the battalion. The old Twigg House at 1255 West Pender Street was selected — a comfortable and roomy old residence which the club managed to lease for several years. It operated as a residential and lunch club quite successfully at first, but as men began to find steady jobs, leave town, married or found new interests, attendance began to dwindle.[16]

For almost a year after the overseas battalion was dismissed, the regiment was more or less in a state of suspended animation until the Otter Commission had completed its work. One can well imagine that the future of the regiment was frequently discussed in the club rooms, but until the regiment was reorganized in 1920 and its first post-war commanding officer, Lt-Col. G. H. Kirkpatrick, DSO, was appointed, little could be done. Once formal notice was received from Ottawa that he was to command, however, Kirkpatrick, backed by many of the Seaforth officers who had served overseas, began to approach the innumerable problems which beset all militia units at this time.

First in this list was the matter of an armoury. Prior to the war the 72nd Regiment had used the Hoffmeister Building as an armoury and later during the war it had secured the old Vancouver Club as its headquarters. A little-used area at the north end of Burrard Street served admirably as a parade ground. Early in 1920, as attendance at the Seaforth Club began to drop, an arrangement was made whereby the Seaforth Club was leased to the Public Works

[16] Seaforth Archives, "Kirkpatrick Memoirs". The club ceased to exist in February, 1920, and its work was assumed by the Seaforth Association. Approximately the same idea was attempted in 1946, with the same result.

Department for use of the Seaforths as an armoury.[17] It had 7,000 square feet of space, and ultimately it was to contain lecture and assembly rooms, officers' and sergeants' messes, battalion and company orderly rooms, band room and a part of the quartermaster stores. A caretaker lived in this building also.

Lt-Col. Kirkpatrick, hearing a rumour that the Militia Department had secured the Horse Show Building for military purposes, immediately put in a bid for space in it also, adding: "I shall be glad if the fact is borne in mind that Drilling Space will be required for the Battalion two evenings weekly during the winter months. . . ."[18] This request was turned down, but in June he again wrote to the Headquarters of the Military District in Esquimalt asking that the E. P. Davis house at 1117 Seaton Street be secured for the Seaforths when it was vacated in December. This property was only 300 yards away from the Twigg house, and moreover it had a large government building at the rear of the property. These two buildings could be used to house the bulk of the quartermaster stores, regimental institutes and lecture rooms.[19] As Lt-Col. Kirkpatrick pointed out, neither of the two properties by itself was sufficiently large to house the entire battalion and one of the many drawbacks to this arrangement, which was agreed on, was that the regiment was to be separated for the next fifteen years.

Equally important was the lack of an adequate drill hall. During the winter of 1921-1922 the regiment, still small in numbers, had use of the Artillery Armoury at Gilford and Georgia Streets, but in the spring of 1922 this was discontinued, and for a short time company parades were held in the "drill shed" at the Regimental Institute on Seaton Street. In the fall, however, permission was received by the regiment to use the drill hall of the Beatty Street Armoury which was used by three other regiments as well. This meant that for one or two evenings a week the regiment, or part of it, would fall in at

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[17] Department of Public Works Lease No. 12617, dated 1920. (Copy in possession of General Clark.)

[18] Seaforth Archives, File: "L—II", Kirkpatrick to Headquarters, Military District XI, 10 May 1920.

[19] Seaforth Archives, File: "Administration—V", Letter, Lt-Col. Kirkpatrick to H.Q., M.D. XI, 18 June 1920. The building at the rear was built during the war by the government. The combined annual rent for both properties was $3,300.

the Beatty Street Armoury and use the drill floor there. It can be seen that the arrangement of the armoury accommodation for the Seaforths was awkward from many points of view. As early as December, 1922, Brigadier-General J. M. Ross, the District Officer Commanding who inspected the regiment, reported to Ottawa that the unit had inadequate training facilities, but it was not until the regiment itself (with a mighty assist from its honorary colonel and lieutenant-colonel) began to work towards the construction of a new armoury was there to be any improvement.

Permission to use the Beatty Street Armoury did have one good result, however, since it permitted the *pro tem* drill shed on Seaton Street to be converted into an indoor rifle range which could be used during the winter months.[20] This was used in the years to come not only by the militiamen, but by the civilian rifle associations associated with the unit. The regiment's rifle association, under the joint direction of Major R. M. Blair and Lt. J. B. Stevenson, also made use of the indoor range during the winter, and when the good weather came, most associations used the Richmond Ranges and later the Blair Ranges.[21]

While making arrangements to secure quarters for the regiment, Lt-Col. Kirkpatrick was also busy drawing up a slate of officers prior to starting active recruiting. Major A. D. Wilson, DSO, became the second-in-command and Captain J. R. S. Lough, DSO, MC, the adjutant. To command the four companies Majors S. B. Birds, DSO, MC; R. M. Blair; J. Hamilton, MC; and W. G. McIntosh, MC, offered their services. Among those below field rank were Captains J. M. Reid, MC; W. C. Ross, MC; I. A. Mackenzie;[22] A. C. Lumsden; Lieutenants J. B. Stevenson; C. C. Ferrie; H. C. Gell, MM; F. W. Spooner, DCM, MM; and F. F. Taaffe, to mention but a few. Most of the officers had overseas experience, but there was a good sprinkling of young men who had not.

In the latter part of 1920 and during 1921, Lt-Col. Kirkpatrick

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[20] Firing at the indoor ranges was a great attraction for the cadets as well. (Interview with Major-General B. M. Hoffmeister by author, 25 August 1966.)

[21] The first outdoor shoot was carried out in the summer of 1922. Major Blair was captain and Lt. Stevenson was secretary of the Seaforth Rifle Association at the time. Blair was an outstanding shot.

[22] He was to become the Minister of National Defence.

was pushing ahead with the reorganization of the Seaforths while carrying on a paper war with District Headquarters. Not only in these years, but for the next two decades, administration put a tremendous strain on the time and energy of militia officers. Despite the fact that it was a Non-Permanent Active Militia unit, it is not unrealistic to judge that militia units must have had 70 percent of the administrative duties of a permanent force regiment. Every item on charge from gaiters to machine-guns had to be accounted for, checked, registered in books, signed in and out when moved, examined, cleaned, packed, condemned, or inspected. Every round of ammunition had to be accounted for, the empty casings collected and returned, the expenditure approved, the boxes stored, and so forth. Reams of paperwork could and did pass back and forth between the unit and District Headquarters over the loss of a bayonet, and there is little doubt that if one cost-accounted the administrative work involved in such a deficiency, a $2.50 bayonet or $7.50 compass could easily quintuple its value if one considers the officers' time in tracking it down, pinning the responsibility for loss where possible, holding a court of inquiry and ultimately, after submitting the court's findings in triplicate, "writing it off the ledger".

Originally, when the regiment was first reorganized in 1920, the government authorized the permanent employment of an officer who would be both Adjutant and Quartermaster, a Warrant Officer who assumed the duties of Regimental Sergeant-Major and Regimental Quartermaster-Sergeant, and a Sergeant who would act as a Battalion Orderly Room Clerk. In November Company Sergeant-Major J. A. Little from the Royal Canadian Regiment was detailed for duty with the Seaforths to assist with reorganization, but the whole scheme fell through within a matter of months. It was held by Ottawa that a militia unit did not require the assistance of permanent force officers or non-commissioned officers to relieve the burden of administration. As shall be seen, this was a false economy. Since the Seaforth Highlanders met only once or twice a week, and at that for only a few hours, this brief weekly training period could have been far more profitably employed in training than in chasing paper from one basket to another. The net effect of this paperchase was stultifying, wasteful and burdensome.

The parsimony of the government towards military affairs which was just beginning to be experienced in 1921 was the result of a

public attitude which, in turn, had a strong effect on recruiting men for the regiment in the early 1920's. The attitude can be described as being both anti-military and apathetic towards all matters concerning national defense. It was most understandable. For over four years Canada had been at war, and during these years about 60,000 Canadian soldiers had been killed in action and more thousands had been wounded. The country had strained itself economically, financially, and emotionally, and as a result public interest in the militia was very low.

When the veterans returned home, they too brought with them an intense desire to return to their former civilian life, to leave the discipline and regimentation of the army behind them, and to shut out the memories of trench warfare on the Western Front. Of greater weight, however, was the feeling that since the Allies had conquered and the mighty German and Austrian Empires were crushed, what possible threat did Canada face which called for a resumption of military training? Russia, torn by revolution, was in the hands of the Bolsheviks and was left to stew in its own juice. To the west lay Japan, a friendly power and China, a weak one. To the south was the United States, a peaceful nation and recent ally. The Atlantic coast was guarded by the navies of allies. Canada, in brief, seemed to be in the happy position of living in a fireproof house far from the flames of war, and this attitude was to remain predominant for the next decade and a half.

Under these circumstances, therefore, it is understandable why recruits were hard to find and at first hard to keep. Among the first to enlist were bandsmen, and those given regimental numbers 1 and 2 were Privates J. Gillies and H. Slatter, both of whom were promoted to Sergeant-Piper and Band Sergeant, respectively, on the same day.[24] Both men had extensive service before the war. Gillies had joined the Scots Guards in 1892, served in the South African War, and as senior pipe-major in the Scots Guards commanded the massed pipe band at the funeral of King Edward VII. In 1911, after further service, he came to Canada and joined the 72nd Regiment and went overseas in 1916 with the 72nd Battalion, C.E.F., as pipe-major. Following the war he became pipe-major of the reorganized

[24] Seaforth Highlanders of Canada, Daily Orders, Part II, No. 1, 24 February 1921. Gillies, in 1902, was promoted to pipe-major when he transferred to the 3rd Battalion, Scots Guards.

regiment and ultimately became a Warrant Officer, 1st Class. Gillies was not only an outstanding soldier but he was an example to all ranks and was universally respected. Under him the pipe band was recognized as one of the finest in Canada. Long before he relinquished his warrant in 1937, he had become the senior pipe-major in the British Empire. His skill with the pipes he taught to others, and the numerous cups and shields won by the pipes and drums under his direction attest his ability and service.

Bandmaster Slatter, formerly with the Grenadier Guards, had also served with the pre-war regiment, and in 1916 he went overseas with the 11th C.M.R., C.E.F. By May, 1920, about forty bandsmen were practising, and soon the Seaforth brass band, as well as those of other units in Vancouver, were giving band concerts in the park and playing at other public functions as a means of attracting recruits.[25]

If recruiting was difficult in the early years, it was nevertheless selective, a policy which was to benefit the unit each successive year. One senior officer, recalling those years, wrote:

> In the early days of 1921 and 1922 our strength was so weak that we were ashamed to march out on the streets. When at the Horse Show Building we marched out in the West End in the dark, which was hard on the band. Once in desperation, we ran a full-page advertisement in the daily press for recruiting purposes. It cost a lot of money and the results were practically nil.
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> One step was taken which was to have great results in the future. There was a definite idea everywhere that there would be no more wars for a very long period, and that the militia was a useless expense. The results of this was that all units, including our own, were having a desperately hard job to get recruits. Finally some of the other units fell back upon their old veterans of the last war and in order to entice them to re-enter the ranks had to set up wet canteens. This was practically universal with the other units but we refused to join the movement on the ground that we wanted the young men of decent family and that the wet canteen and a majority of ribboned veterans would deter the very men we wanted. At first the other units benefited as to numbers enrolled, but found that the veterans would not readily turn out for drill parades, but only for "shows" that they enjoyed. We had a smaller enrolment but they were good for all parades and as a result in the long run were better trained, and finally, in greater strength than the others. The final result

[25] J. R. Peebles succeeded Slatter in 1923. Later in the decade, owing to difficulties with the musicians' union, the band went out of existence. It was reorganized in 1935 by A. V. Cashmore.

was seen a few years later in the steady procession of the years in which the Seaforth took all available regimental awards for efficiency.[26]

Recruiting for the regiment, although localized in Vancouver, was carried on in adjacent areas as well, with a good representation coming from North Vancouver.[27] These officers and men, it should be noted, were willing to come the extra distance by ferry. Various suggestions were made to increase the unit's strength. One N.C.O., Company Sergeant Major John Cuthbert of "D" Company, proposed that one good means of recruiting might be to have a dance with everyone wearing the white shell jacket and kilt, and that each member of the unit be given an invitation for a friend whose interest could be heightened by association. This proposal seems to have been suggested, at least in part, for Smoking Concerts became a customary feature in the inter-war years. All ranks were invited and were asked to bring as guests prospective recruits. Another attraction, although a modest one, was the fact that all members of the N.P.A.M. with six months' service were exempt from paying the poll tax as long as they remained in the militia.

One thing that no Commanding Officer could use as a lure in the inter-war years was money. Actually to be a member of the militia meant that one sacrificed his time without any expectation of remuneration. Generally speaking, the militiaman might attend one or two evening parades each week, and he would be paid a day's wage $1.10) for two week's attendance. However, when he was attested, he was required to sign over his money to a general regimental fund, and it was only when he went to summer camp for training that he could keep the small amount he was paid for spending what was usually his vacation, or part of it, on military training. Thus when Lt-Col. Kirkpatrick wrote towards the end of his command that ". . . recruiting for the militia in this province since the war has been an uphill job all the way . . .," he wrote from the heart.[28]

Before Lt-Col. A. D. Wilson, DSO, VD,[29] took command of the

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[26] Seaforth Archives, File: "Personal Accounts, 1919-1939", an unsigned MS, probably that of Lt-Col. Kirkpatrick.

[27] *Ibid.*, File: "Letters—II", Letter to Commanding Officer, 30 March 1922.

[28] Seaforth Archives, File: "Administration—V" Letter, Kirkpatrick to District Officer Commanding, Military District XI, 23 June 1924.

[29] Lt-Col. Wilson, 44 years old at the time, had served with the regiment before and during the Great War. In 1934 he was given command of the 23rd

regiment in 1924, the strength of the regiment had started to climb. This steady improvement helped to fill up the various components of the Seaforths. In the 1920's the training establishment called for a total of 541 all ranks. Although subsequent Militia Orders[30] were to reshuffle the establishment slightly, up until the major reorganization of the N.P.A.M. in 1936 a battalion was to consist of a battalion headquarters, a headquarters wing and four companies. The headquarters wing consisted of wing headquarters with four groups, the first comprising signallers and scouts, the second machine-gunners, the third administrative personnel and the fourth transport personnel. Each company had a company headquarters and four platoons, and each platoon had a headquarters with four sections. Each platoon had approximately 28 men and each company at full strength would total 118 officers and men.

Although the full establishment of the battalion was over 500, there were several factors which prevented the Seaforth Highlanders of Canada from reaching that figure at any time in the inter-war period. Both for the purpose of training and the issue of clothing and equipment, all N.P.A.M. units were classified by a scale ranging from "A" to "E". Only "A" class units were permitted to recruit to 100% of their peace establishment and were issued with their full scale of uniforms and equipment. This category was reserved for specialist units. Those classified as "B" could recruit to 75% of their establishment and receive 80% of their clothing and equipment, while "C" category units could recruit to 50% of their strength and have 55% of their clothing and equipment. Not until the spring of 1928 was the Seaforth's classification raised from "C" to "B" category,[31] but it should be noted that it was to retain this high standing right through the years of the depression.

Another factor which affected the regiment's strength, of course,

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Infantry Brigade with the rank of Colonel. In 1940 he was to command the regiment's reserve battalion, and later he was the first commandant of the Gordon Head Officers' Training School.

[30] See Militia Order No. 93, 1920, and later General Order 242 of 1921 and General Order 4 of 1926. The description given in the text is the one which lasted from 1926 to 1939.

[31] See *The Canadian Seaforth,* Vol. IV, No. 3, April 1928, p. 3. No matter how high the category, it should be understood that the number of men trained was determined annually by the money available to the Department of National Defence.

was the competition offered by other militia units, both infantry and otherwise, in Vancouver and the surrounding area. The Seaforth was but one of four infantry battalions of the 23rd Infantry Brigade, and although Vancouver, with its population of 125,000 was the largest city in the province, it was difficult for all units to get men.

A variable which had an ever-present impact on the regiment's training and strength, of course, was the annual militia vote passed by the House of Commons. This shall be dealt with more fully below, but it is true to say that to the extent the government limited the funds allotted to the armed forces, to that extent were the difficulties of all phases of the regiment's life increased, and this included gaining and retaining both N.C.Os. and men.

One source of pride and strength of the regiment lay in No. 72 The Seaforth Highlanders Cadet Battalion. This corps was formed in 1913 under the enthusiastic guidance of Lt. B. W. Browne.[32] He became its first Cadet-Lieutenant-Colonel. It was composed of young men between the ages of 14 - 18 years, and the boys in the corps were taught such things as physical training, signalling, rifle shooting, fencing, first aid and leadership. Since it was organized, the Cadet Corps had had an average annual strength of 116, but in the immediate post-war months this average dipped considerably.[33] The cadets were dressed in complete Highland uniform consisting of a Glengarry cap, blue doublet jacket, a kilt of the same tartan as the regiment, hair sporran, diced hose, white gaiters and black shoes. As with the regiment, a large porportion of the cost of the cadets' uniforms as well as their band instruments was borne by private donations and financial grants raised by the honorary colonels and lieutenant-colonels, but the expense was well worth while. The close association with the regiment meant that many of the boys absorbed much of the regimental spirit, and consequently many enlisted in the unit as soon as they were of age. By 1924, the cadets were training twice a month at the Drill Hall on Seaton St. and were well on their way to becoming one of the smartest cadet battalions in the province.[34]

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[32] Later Major-General B. W. Browne.

[33] Seaforth Archives, File: "Cadets—VI", Letter, Director of Physical Training & Cadet Services, D.M.D. to D.O.C., M.D. XI, 17 November 1921.

[34] "I inspected your Cadets last night," wrote the District Officer Commanding to Lt-Col. Wilson, "and wish to tell you I do not think I have ever seen a better cadet unit. They were extremely smartly turned out and their drill

Their pride in their uniforms and their own pipes and drums was as strong as that of a Scots Guardsman, and their youthful exuberance, when properly channelled and controlled, had tremendously beneficial results. Some idea of their value to the regiment might be gained by looking ahead to the Second World War. During the war, an estimated 505 former cadets enlisted voluntarily. Of these, 160 received commissions, 30 were decorated, 20 were mentioned in despatches, 30 were killed in action and 180 were wounded.[35] This was a remarkable record, and is only indicative of the solid contribution made to the Canadian Army by former Seaforth Cadets whose early direction and training received thousands of hours of attention through voluntary time by the regiment's officers.

Another means of fostering the regimental spirit was through the reserve battalion and the Seaforth Association. The 2nd (Reserve) Battalion of the Seaforth Highlanders of Canada had been authorized in 1920 by Militia General Order No. 18. Persons could become members of this battalion provided they had attended three years of training with the militia battalion, or if they had equal length of service during the late war with His Majesty's Forces. The drill and training of the reserve battalion was completely voluntary "at no expense to the public". In an emergency, the reserve was liable to be called on for active service. In practice, the reserve unit was a "paper battalion", but one which, nevertheless, stood ready to offer the wide military experience of its members should the occasion arise.

The regiment was also assisted during the late 1920's and 1930's by the Seaforth Association. In May, 1927, this association was reorganized with Captain F. R. Glover as president and General Clark as honorary president. Membership fees were only $1.00 per annum, and at a series of business and social meetings the Association began to shape its future support of the regiment and of those who had served in it. In the same month of its reorganization 75 members turned out to parade with the unit at its annual church parade. By 1929 the Association had a membership of 381,[36] and in the next

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and discipline was very good." (Seaforth Archives, File: "Cadets—VI", Letter, Col. J. M. Ross to Lt-Col. Wilson, 8 May 1926.) The cadets held their brief summer camp usually at the "Plains of Abraham", in West Point Grey.

[35] Information from Seaforth Archives, File: "Cadets—VI".

[36] Seaforth Archives, File: "Seaforth Association", Minutes of the Annual Meeting of the Seaforth Association, 17 May 1929, *et seq.*

decade it was to carry out a number of activities. Members attended the annual regimental picnic, visited sick veterans in the hospital or in their homes, provided Christmas cheer to needy families, paraded with the regiment on special occasions, provided wreaths on the regiment's annual Vimy Day Remembrance service, and in general it served to assist the Seaforth veterans while providing moral and sometimes financial help to the regiment itself.

While the strength of the regiment was climbing steadily during the tenure of command of Lt-Cols. Kirkpatrick and Wilson, it was to reach its peak strength before 1939 of 333 all ranks during the years when Lt-Col. R. M. Blair was the commanding officer. Blair's second-in-command, and successor as commanding officer, was Major R. W. Brock,[37] a soldier and scholar who was also the widely respected Dean of the Faculty of Applied Science at the University of British Columbia. These two outstanding men directed the fortunes of the regiment in a period which saw the peak of the boom period in the late 1920's and the onslaught of the depression in the early 1930's. Just as they were able to build on the solid foundation laid by their predecessors, they, in turn, and those who followed them, were able to lean heavily for advice and support on the honorary colonel and honorary lieutenant-colonel.

In July, 1924, Major-General J. W. Stewart, CB, CMG,[38] and Brigadier-General J. A. Clark, CMG, DSO, VD, were appointed Honorary Colonel and Honorary Lieutenant-Colonel, respectively, of the Seaforth Highlanders of Canada. All too often many younger members of the regiment believe that honorary ranks within the unit signify a maximum of rights and a minimum of responsibilities. This belief is sometimes based on the rather infrequent appearances of such men except in cases of formal and important regimental functions. Actually the choice of a gentleman to serve as an honorary colonel or lieutenant-colonel is a matter of grave concern for the senior officers of the regiment, for not only does the regiment present to him the highest honour it can bestow, but it depends on them to carry out the numerous tasks they may be asked to undertake. Financially these men are often indispensable, and this was especially

[37] Lt-Col. Brock assumed command November 1, 1933. This well-liked officer and his wife were killed in an aeroplane accident in 1935.

[38] Major-General Stewart had been the Honorary Lieutenant-Colonel of the regiment from 1915 to 1924.

true during the depression years when the strings of the government's purse were drawn tight. Sometimes financial aid might be made directly by the honorary colonel in the form of prizes, trophies, gifts of musical instruments to the band or the provision of certain articles of dress to the cadets. Where large sums were required, an honorary colonel might give of his service and experience on committee work to raise the required amount. The honorary colonel served to bring about a closer liaison between the regiment and influential men in the city or province.[39]

The year following the appointment of Stewart and Clark, the regiment was delighted to hear that H.R.H. Edward, Prince of Wales, was to be their Colonel-in-Chief. This popular heir to the throne held the same position with the affiliated regiment, the Seaforth Highlanders, and when he visited Vancouver in 1919, a Guard of Honour of veterans who had served with the 16th and 72nd Battalions, C.E.F., turned out to meet him. They all were fitted with the pre-war full dress of the 72nd Regiment, Seaforth Highlanders, and their smart appearance on parade had resulted in many favourable comments both from His Royal Highness and the large crowds which turned out to welcome him. Later, with the enthusiastic consent of the Prince of Wales, a formal request was made through the Canadian government to gain royal approval for his appointment. The exchange of formalities back and forth involved the Department of National Defence, the Governor-General, the War Office, and ultimately His Majesty the King. Not until March, 1925, however, was word received that the Prince of Wales was permitted to accept the appointment which was confirmed in The Canada Gazette in May of the same year.[40] Thus began a happy and proud association with the future monarch of Great Britain which was to continue for over a decade.

The Prince of Wales was not the only distinguished personage for whom the regiment was called upon to provide a guard of honour. In 1922, for example, a guard of three officers and 100 other ranks was provided for the visit of His Excellency the Governor-General, Baron Byng of Vimy, the former commander of the

[39] See Appendix "D" for a list of the regiment's honorary colonels and lieutenant-colonels.

[40] Seaforth Archives, File: "Letters—II", Letter, A.A. and Q.M.G., M.D. XI to Commanding Officer, Seaforth Highlanders of Canada, 16 March 1925.

Canadian Corps, familiar to many veterans in the unit. On this occasion, as on that in July, 1923, when President W. G. Harding visited Vancouver, one quarter of the guard was provided by the Seaforth Highlanders of Canada, the remainder being made up from the other regiments in the 23rd Infantry Brigade. In 1927 the regiment itself provided the full guard when their new Colonel-in-Chief, the Prince of Wales, again visited the city, and repeated the task in 1932 when the Governor-General came to Vancouver to open the Pacific National Exhibition.

These were colourful affairs, carried off with a dash and an elan which bespoke the men's pride in their unit. At the same time it should be remembered that these were voluntary parades, usually "at no expense to the public". On the latter occasion, for example, Major J. R. S. Lough, DSO, MC, VD, was Guard Commander, Lt. W. G. H. Roaf[41] was his Lieutenant and Lt. M. J. Griffin carried the King's Colour. These gentlemen put in hours of practice with the guard before the event, and Regimental Sergeant-Major Tom Anderson trained the guard for weeks before the event took place. Anderson, who had served overseas during the war and later with the Calgary Regiment, had joined the Seaforths in 1923 and was Acting Regimental Sergeant-Major in 1926.[42] It is said with good reason that the non-commissioned officers form the backbone of any regiment, and in the case of the Seaforths it was Anderson who stiffened the vertebrae. A stern, demanding man whose voice and bearing could, if necessary, cause considerable apprehension among the junior officers as well as the other ranks, he was one of a number of senior warrant

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[41] Roaf had enlisted as a private in January, 1927—the 500th recruit since the reorganization of the regiment. He was made a Provisional Lieutenant in 1927, along with P/Lt. C. C. I. Merritt and B. M. Hoffmeister. The 1,000th man to enlist was Pte. H. W. Morey. When a man left the regiment, of course, his regimental number could not be re-assigned to another private. Thus although 1,000 men had enlisted by November, 1931, the unit's strength was about 260, an indication of the turnover within the regiment in the period from 1920 to 1931.

[42] Anderson and Pipe-Major Gillies both received their Warrant Rank Class I on 25 April 1927. Anderson's son was to become the Commanding Officer of the regiment in 1966. Another outstanding Warrant Officer in the regiment at this time was R.Q.M.S. "Tom" Alexander. A former cadet and officer said of him: "He was one of the finest fellows I've ever known—fair, generous, and a great character." (Interview with Maj-Gen. B. M. Hoffmeister by author, 25 August 1966.)

and non-commissioned officers whose devotion to the regiment was responsible for maintaining its reputation for smartness and efficiency during the 1930's. Under his gimlet eye the newest recruit learned to present himself for parade dressed exactly as the regulations demanded, and woe betide the private in uniform even after parades who might be caught slouching about on the streets en route home. For special parades such as a guard of honour, much depended on the R.S.M., not only as a drill instructor but also for the way he handled his job. The orders and instructions he might yell out on the drill floor were directed at volunteers, and the many extra hours of work the men put in were performed without pay.

By the end of the 1920's and during the 1930's, the regiment began to show the fruit of the endeavours of those who put in so much time and effort in the years after its reorganization to make it one of the best infantry units in the district. The *raison d'etre* of the Seaforth Highlanders of Canada was to serve the nation in a military capacity in a time of emergency. This meant that the training of the regiment was of primary concern to all ranks once the strength of the unit began to swell. During the entire inter-war period, the regiment had only the equipment used in the Great War with which to train, and indeed only a limited amount of this. The bolt-action Lee-Enfield rifle, the Lewis machine-gun and two or three Vickers machine-guns constituted the variety of weapons on issue. There were no grenades, mortars, submachine-guns, gas masks or similar items available. There were no military vehicles of any sort, and the web equipment worn was the 1908 pattern which the Highlanders were to wear even after the declaration of the Second World War. Those in the specialist platoons were no better off. The signallers, for example, had a few Lucas lamps, D III telephones and Fuller phones, together with some telephone wire and one or two heliographs. These latter instruments had been useful for sending messages in morse code by reflecting the suns rays on a mirror across the sunny veldt of South Africa. The stetcher bearers did have some stretchers and a minimum of medical apparatus with which to train, but they, as with the other sections and platoons, had to have a very colourful imagination if they were to benefit from their training.

The reason for the failure to give the militia units new or modern equipment during this period was, paradoxically, the success gained by the Allied forces in the Great War. The victory of 1918 had

resulted in the utter defeat of the greatest threat to world peace, the German Empire, and certainly in the 1920's there appeared to be at least a decade or more of peace in prospect. The rapid demobilization of the armies had resulted, and in Canada especially the security of having the Atlantic and Pacific "moats" east and west and a friendly neighbour to the south, was to lull the public into an isolationist state of mind. As a consequence, defence funds were extremely limited and as late as 1937 Canada paid about as much per capita on defence as Peru and Brazil.[43]

Training during the first five or six years was done "at local headquarters". Usually the militiamen would come to the armoury once a week at about 8 p.m. and train for two hours. The training season generally started in September, and would continue until May or June when the annual inspection by the District Officer Commanding would signify the beginning of the summer "stand-down". Fortunately the regiment had a number of officers and senior N.C.Os. who had wartime experience, and in the early years especially these men were able to impart their knowledge to the new recruits. Arms and foot drill, first aid, shooting on the miniature and service rifle ranges, map reading, military organization, signalling and weapon training were some of the subjects taught along with frequent periods for sports and physical training. The pipe and brass bands, of course, practised their musical arts separately, while the cadets came for their weekly training on a night when the senior unit was not using the quarters.

Once the regiment was fairly well organized, it had available to it, along with the other units in the brigade, the services of two or three permanent force instructors. This arrangement was improved with the establishment of Royal and Provisional Schools of Instruction by the permanent force for the benefit of the militia. A Royal School might last from three to six weeks, depending on the subject being taught and the funds available. It was held at one of the permanent force barracks, and there the militia officer or sergeant would receive a concentrated course by the best available instructors. Only a limited number could be accepted at these schools, and as promotion in the unit went to the most qualified person, usually there was

[43] Actual figures are: Peru—$1.30, Brazil—$1.31; Canada—$1.41. In the same year the per capita estimate for Great Britain was $14.14, and for France $16.79.

considerable competition to secure a vacancy. The limitation of numbers was one obstacle—the other was for the junior officer to get a release from his employer to attend the course, especially if it was a long one.

Provisional Schools were the more common. Since the facilities of the Royal Schools were limited, Provisional Schools were established at the regiment's armoury or some nearby military quarters. This school might have as instructors a permanent force officer and/or non-commissioned officer who would come to the regiment and instruct the militiamen in their own quarters. Since the militiamen worked during the day, instruction was given at night, frequently three or four nights a week for several weeks, after which the candidate would write a qualifying exam on the instruction he received. For obvious reasons these courses were popular since the teacher came to the pupil. However, most of the instructions given were theoretical owing to the limited equipment in possession of the regiment.

One of the major difficulties in training was to provide field manoeuvres for the regiment since, up to 1927, no provision was made to take the unit to a summer camp. During the first years, therefore, the Seaforth Highlanders of Canada had to confine itself to the city and its environs. This accounts for the following entry in the unit's Record Book in 1924:

> On Monday evening April 28th a Tactical Scheme was held in the area between West 37th and 41st Avenues and Granville Street and Angus Drive. The battalion paraded at 25th and Granville and moved forward as an Advance Guard, deploying into an outpost position on reaching the forward slope of West 37th Ave. The area having been recently cleared gave excellent cover for the various posts and support, and some very valuable practice was obtained. . . .[44]

In the fall of 1924 and early spring of 1925, further schemes were held in the area, but by May of 1925 the unit moved further afield as the regimental diarist describes below:

> On Sunday morning May 3rd the battalion, less bands, paraded at the Regimental Institute and marched to the North Vancouver Ferry, taking the Ferry to North Vancouver where the day was spent carrying out tactical exercises in the direction of Lynn Creek. A haversack lunch was carried and in the afternoon sports were held at Mahon Park, returning to Vancouver in the later afternoon.[45]

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[44]Seaforth Highlanders of Canada, "Historical Record Book," p. 10.

[45] *Ibid.*, p. 11. The same location was used in 1926.

Periodically the officers would go out on Tactical Exercises Without Troops (or T.E.W.Ts. as they were usually called), and there were always sand-table exercises at the armoury. There seems to be little doubt that the unit "took field work very seriously".[46]

Not until 1927 were funds made available which enabled the regiment to leave the city to attend summer camp for at least a few days. For the next twelve years, summer camp was to be a regular feature of the unit's training—indeed, it was to be the culmination of the entire training period. The first camp was a three day affair held under canvas at Mahon Park in North Vancouver.[47] Ninety-six all ranks were allowed to attend, not including the 26 cadets who came for Saturday and Sunday only bringing their own pipes and drums. In 1928 another short summer camp was held at Macaulay Point in Esquimalt, with about 150 all ranks permitted to attend.

Possibly the most interesting of a series of camps occurred in 1929, and came about as a result of a study of the Gallipoli campaign made by Col. G. R. Pearkes, VC, DSO, MC, then G.S.O. I on the staff of Military District XI. Pearkes, who was later to have the regiment under his command in the 2nd Canadian Infantry Brigade, had become interested in the Gallipoli campaign when studying the military history of the Great War, and with the consent of the D.O.C., he went to considerable trouble to arrange a combined operations exercise as part of the local militia's summer training. Ships from the Royal Navy and the Royal Canadian Navy were to take part, as well as a small body of Royal Marines. On June 11th Pearkes met with the officers of the 23rd Infantry Brigade at the Beatty Street Armoury and there outlined the plan and gave a talk on the loading and unloading of troops into boats.[48] On June 24th detailed administrative and operation orders were issued to the units from Vancou-

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[46] A remark made by Brigadier J. Sutherland Brown, CMG, DSO, D.O.C., M.D. XI in his Annual Inspection Report of the Seaforth Highlanders of Canada, 26 May 1930.

[47] It is worthwhile recording that the City Council of North Vancouver gave $20.00 worth of ferry tickets free to the regiment to be issued to Seaforth Highlanders residing in North Vancouver allowing them to attend the weekly drills. Seaforth Archives, File: "Training, Courses and Strength, VI", letter, City Clerk to Major J. R. S. Lough, 8 October 1927.

[48] Seaforth Archives, File: "Letters—III", Letter, H.Q. 23rd Infantry Brigade to C.Os. all units, 4 June 1929. This was 15 years before the Normandy landing, and about 14 years before the landing in Sicily.

ver and Victoria which would be taking part in the landings at Maple Bay near Duncan on Vancouver Island. Five days later, early on Saturday morning, the regiment embarked on *H.M.C.S. Vancouver* and, together with details from the 15th Field Brigade, R.C.A., and the 11th Divisional Signals, sailed across the Strait and landed "in the face of a hostile force" on the beach. On the following day the role was reversed. The Seaforth Highlanders of Canada and the Canadian Scottish Regiment acted as the defending force against an attack made by the other units of the 23rd Infantry Brigade and a naval detachment of sailors and Royal Marines. It is interesting to note that of the five militia regiments taking part in this combined operations scheme, it was the two Highland regiments which were to be chosen for assault landings in the war.

For three more years this type of training was to be common to the Seaforth Highlanders, with "landings" made at Maple Bay, Tod Inlet and Macaulay Point, the latter two areas being close to Victoria. In this way every hour of the three or four days allowed for summer training was used, and even the time marching to camp, short as it was, could be employed to benefit the men. Once at the tented camp at Heal's Range, the battalion would be exercised in drill, section and platoon tactics, administration, and sometimes a demonstration would be put on by a platoon of men from the permanent force demonstrating some feature in field craft. Scattered in groups would be the specialist platoons—the signallers transmitting messages in morse code by lamp or Fuller phone, the stretcher bearers working on some unwilling "casualty", the pipes and drums filling the air with their martial music as they worked singly or as a group under the sharp eye of Pipe Major Gillies, or the recently organized[49] machine-gun platoon working on their Vickers guns under Lt. H. E. F. Clark.

Generally an afternoon would be set aside for sports and a morning for church parade. In the evenings the men were usually allowed to go to Victoria, although a camp sing-song, barbecue or other entertainment might be available to keep everyone within the camp lines. It was a time, too, of inter-regimental visits among the units from Vancouver and Victoria among which there was a keen but friendly rivalry throughout the entire period.

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[49] This specialist platoon was organized in 1929. In 1933 the unit began to train a company to use these guns.

Aside from training "at local headquarters" and at summer camps, there was also much to be learned on the rifle range, Infantry Camp Schools and elsewhere. One source of instruction was the Royal Canadian Mounted Police at their barracks in Vancouver. Officers at this time had to train in horsemanship and periodically a number would try for their "proficiency in riding" certificate. The R.C.M.P. periodically put on a course for militia officers which meant they had to ride one hour a day, three days a week for six weeks. Few were able to boast a perfect attendance record, but a surprising number did bounce their way to a successful completion of the course.

During the spring, once the weather became favourable, a great deal of emphasis was placed on rifle shooting. The first outdoors shooting was carried out in 1922, the same year the indoor rifle range was opened in the Drill Shed at Seaton Street. Not until 1924 were the rifle ranges at Richmond used to any great extent. By that time, however, it had become a regular practice for men to go out to the range on Wednesday and Saturday afternoons.[50] Free transportation was provided from the British Columbia Electric Railway depot at Seymour and Davie Streets, and, of course, the ammunition was free also. One of the strongest enthusiasts and best shots was Major R. M. Blair, a "Bisley" shot since 1923, and he was especially delighted in 1927 when the federal government decided to construct and equip a new rifle range near the Second Narrows Bridge on the north side of Burrard Inlet. Beautifully situated and easily reached by bus, it was formally opened in 1930 and named Blair Rifle Range in his honour.

As has been mentioned above, Major Blair was a crack shot and had accompanied the Canadian contingent to the world famous Bisley match in 1923. His interest in and promotion of rifle shooting in the regiment bore fruit when the Seaforths won the Laurie Bugle, the "blue ribbon" event of the shooting range. It was one of the oldest trophies in possession of the British Columbia Rifle Association, and was awarded to a five-man team for the aggregate of scores of the matches included in the Grand Aggregate. The Seaforth team that

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[50] During the spring and early summer, militiamen from all the Vancouver regiments would fire their classification shots in rifle, and light machine-gun practice. Vickers gunners also practised and qualified on the ranges. The more qualified men in the regiment, the higher efficiency rating of it.

year included Ptes. J. R. Davies, W. H. Scovil, Sgt. Ian MacMillan, Lt. D. R. Blair and Major R. M. Blair.[51]

Two years later, Lt-Col. R. M. Blair made history at Bisley by being the first man in seventy years to win both the King's Prize and the Grand Aggregate. The regiment, the city, indeed all Canadians were tremendously proud of his accomplishment and on his return in August he was given a huge welcome. Later that day a civic banquet was given in his honour followed by a dance given by the regiment. Special permission was given for the free issue to the Seaforth Officers' Mess of the rifle with which he won the Bisley match, and the new rifle range was named in his honour the following year.[52] It was a glorious welcome home for a greatly admired officer.

Such enthusiasm and ability displayed by all ranks of the Seaforth Highlanders of Canada on the ranges by no means restricted intense activity in other fields. The Signal Section will serve as an example. The "Sigs", as they were usually called, started out with all the disadvantages common to the regiment as a whole, that is, it was under strength and poorly equipped. However, its first officer, Lt. H. C. Gell, MM, made up in enthusiasm what he lacked originally in both men and instruments. He attended the first visual telegraphy (V/T) course given in 1921 and received an "A" grade in the course. By 1924 he outlined the progress of the Sigs to the Commanding Officer:

> I beg to make a report of the activities of the Signal Section for the past year. The strength of the Section is now 9, of which 3 hold "A" certificates; 2 "B" certificates, 2 signalmen and the remainder are preparing themselves for the next Signalling School. The parades have all been well attended and enthusiasm has been well upheld right along.
>
> I would particularly like to call your attention to the disadvantages we are working under with the present number of telephones issued, namely 2 DIII and one exchange. The shortage of this equipment makes it impossible to make up a telephone line circuit with a working exchange, and I feel that if it were possible to increase the issue of phones to 5, greater interest would be aroused.[53]

A few more telephones were acquired, and at the Provisional School

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[51] The Canadian Seaforth, July 1927, Vol. III, No. 4, p. 1 (in Seaforth Archives, File: "Sports—III").

[52] Seaforth Archives, File: "Musketry Training—1920-1940", Seaforth Rifle Association Range Target Practice Return, 1937.

[53] Seaforth Archives, File: "Signals—VI", Letter, Lt. H. C. Gell to Commanding Officer, 9 February 1924. Gell was promoted to Captain in 1925.

of Signalling held in January, 1926, more men were able to attend to qualify for higher grades. With the assistance of such N.C.Os. as Sgt. T. Hardman, Sgt. G. W. Clapshew and Cpl. A. D. Law, Lt. Gell built up his section and its efficiency until in 1927 there were 22 all ranks in the Sigs, and in the same year the Section was awarded the District Infantry Association Challenge Cup. It was "an excellent Section",[54] wrote the District Officer Commanding, and the Secretary of the District Infantry Association added "their collective test was perfect."[55] When Captain E. A. S. Chowne[56] succeeded Gell as Signalling Officer in 1929, the Section won the Challenge Cup again, and was to repeat the performance year after year. In 1934, a year before Lt. G. T. London succeeded Chowne, the Section won the Dominion Signallers Challenge Cup which was competed for by all militia infantry and cavalry units in Canada. It retained the cup in 1935, and in the following years it was always very close to the top of the list of competitors. So enthusiastic were the men about this Section that in 1937 Captain H. B. McIntyre, who succeeded London, had C.S.M. G. W. Clapshew, Sgt. J. D. Newberry and 33 other N.C.Os. and men in his roll call book.

It is interesting to note that during the 1930's, when interest in amateur or "ham" radio stations was keen among many young men, an attempt was made by the Sigs to have a short wave sending and receiving set at the quarters at 1117 West Hastings Street. Signallers D. A. MacLeod and S. G. Cornish held commercial wireless certificates and for some eight or nine months they operated a wireless receiving set while National Defence Headquarters pondered over authorization for a transmitting set the Sigs wanted to operate. The decision, unfortunately, was adverse. It was felt that "experimental work with wireless equipment [would] be at the expense of other Signal training", and that "it would undoubtedly affect Canadian Corps of Signals Units adversely."[57] Such fatuous reasoning resulted

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[54] Annual Inspection Report for 1927. See also Seaforth Archives, Misc. File, "The Early History of the Signal Platoon" by G. W. Clapshew.

[55] Seaforth Archives, File: "Cadets—VI", Letter, Secretary Military District XI Infantry Association to Commanding Officer, Seaforth Highlanders of Canada, 5 December 1927.

[56] The "Sigs" were then nicknamed "Chowne's Cherubs".

[57] Seaforth Archives, File: "Signals—VI", Letter, A.A. and Q.M.G., M.D. XI to Commanding Officer, Seaforth Highlanders of Canada, 19 August 1935.

in the closure of the temporary wireless station which, had it been permitted to continue, would undoubtedly have resulted in the regiment having available at least one group of men trained for the equipment they were to use in the Second World War.

What has been written about the Signal Section is only indicative of the performance of the regiment as a whole. Space does not permit the full story to be told of the effort which lay behind the series of cups and shields won by the unit during the interwar years, but of the numerous awards and trophies up for competition both within the district and in the nation, the Seaforths won a surprising number. The Pipes and Drums, both under Pipe-Major Gillies and later under Pipe-Major E. Esson,[58] won the J. W. Stewart Cup 13 times out of 33 contests between 1914 and 1947. Since this cup was competed for by pipe bands from Winnipeg to the Pacific Coast and included many American competitors, and when one considers that for ten of these years the unit was on wartime service, this is a remarkable record, and does not include competitions for the Wrigley Trophy and Balderston Cup.

One of the most important and consequently most difficult awards to win was the Efficiency of Personnel Challenge Cup. This was competed for by all infantry units, it involved the entire battalion, and was a good indication of the quality of any militia regiment. The Seaforth Highlanders of Canada first won this cup in 1926-27, the first unit in the district to do so. Moreover, it won it six more times in a row, and in the 1930's it also garnered other awards competed for in tactics, machine-guns, and organization and administration.

It cannot be stressed too strongly that the cups, trophies and awards which the regiment began to win in the 1926-27 training year, and which it continued to win in the 1930's, were competed for under adverse conditions. The training facilities were poor, and on top of that in 1929 came the Great Depression. By 1930 the old drill shed used by the Seaforths was in such bad need of repairs that

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[58] Esson joined the regiment in 1924, and became Pipe-Major in 1937. Gillies, in 1926, went to Ottawa at the request of the Governor-General to play at a dinner given by His Excellency commemorating the Battle of Vimy Ridge. In 1937 Esson was the piper selected to attend the Coronation ceremonies. Both were excellent pipers, with Esson carrying on the high standards set by Gillies.

it "was on the point of collapsing and should be condemned."[59] In the same year a staff officer from District Headquarters noted of the regiment's quarters:

> This unit is greatly hampered by having an old horse stable as a Quartermaster Stores. It is neither moth proof nor sufficiently dry to ensure clothing or rifles being kept in first class condition.[60]

There is no doubt that the permanent force staff officers at District Headquarters agreed that the regiment should have better quarters. Writing in 1928, the D.O.C. noted: "Despite very inadequate facilities it [the Seaforths] attained a high standard of training. With proper accommodation it could easily double its strength."[61] Each succeeding year the D.O.C.'s report grew harsher, pointing out as forcibly as he could the general unsuitability of the armouries. In 1931 Colonel J. Sutherland Brown, the D.O.C., stated flatly that the unit ". . . has the worst quarters of any infantry unit in Vancouver and as far as I know no unit in Canada of the standing of the Seaforth Highlanders of Canada has to contend with such an impediment."[62]

What hopes may have existed to obtain a new armoury in the 1920's when the country was prosperous were dampened with the onslaught of the depression. Nevertheless, in 1931 a group of sixteen prominent citizens, including senior Seaforth officers, formed the Vancouver Armoury Association Ltd. It was felt the only way the unit would get adequate quarters was for the Association to secure the land and raise the money to construct it and rent it to the federal government so that the total cost would be amortized over a period of twenty years. This required the organization of "a body [of men] in whom the Government could have confidence [and which] would be required to assume responsibility."[63]

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[59] Seaforth Archives, File: "Letters—III", Letter, Commanding Officer, Seaforth Highlanders of Canada to Headquarters, Military District XI, 4 December 1930.

[60] *Ibid.*, File: "Training, Courses and Strength—VI", Letter, A.A. and Q.M.G., M.D. XI to Commanding Officer, Seaforth Highlanders of Canada, 30 October 1930.

[61] Public Archives of Canada, Annual Inspection Report of the Seaforth Highlanders of Canada, 1928.

[62] *Ibid.*, 1931.

[63] Seaforth Archives, File: "Letters—III", Lt-Col. Brock to Major-General Ashton, D.O.C., M.D. XI, dated 12 July 1934. The most complete file on the negotiations for financing the new armoury is in the possession of General Clark, whose activity in the matter started in 1931.

Mr. Fyfe Smith and Lt-Col. Blair were president and secretary respectively of the Association, and among the members were Mr. Austin C. Taylor, Mr. J. H. Roaf, Mr. E. W. Hamber, and Mr. W. H. Malkin. In the months which followed a great deal of work was done by the Association, the regiment and friends of the Seaforths in Ottawa. Mr. Jack McCarter, of the architectural firm McCarter and Nairne, worked on the plans of the proposed armoury, revising and refining them over the years with the help and guidance of the regimental officers. A site with ample acreage at the end of Burrard Bridge where an Indian reservation was located was considered, providing the Department of Indian Affairs could be persuaded to sell part of it.

About the time the Association was formed, the Conservative government of Mr. R. B. Bennett assumed power. Although Mr. Bennett did not approve of the original plan to construct the armoury,[64] both he and the Minister of National Defence, the Honorable D. M. Sutherland, recognized the need for it. Between 1931 and 1933, through the sympathetic offices of the District Officer Commanding, by means of private conversations between Lt-Col. Blair and friends he had in Ottawa, as well as through the untiring efforts of General Clark, what was a hope began to turn into a possibility. Then on 19 June, 1934 came the good news everyone was waiting for. In the federal government's estimates (Item 174 of Bill 113) was a vote of $240,000 for the purpose of building an armoury for the Seaforth Highlanders of Canada. The committee which had been working on the plans for the armoury turned them over to the Commanding Officer, Lt-Col. R. W. Brock, who in turn instructed the architects to make certain amendments before forwarding them for approval to the Department of National Defence.

The main amendment to the plan was a pleasant revision which came as a result of the efforts of Clark and Blair.[65] The Department of Indian Affairs was persuaded to sell part of the reservation, and four

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[64] The Association proposed to borrow money through an issue of debentures and in turn to lease the building to the Department of National Defence at a rental which would amortize the cost over a period of twenty years.

[65] Interview by author of General J. A. Clark, 3 March 1966; and interview by Prof. R. L. McDougall with Col. Blair, 13 July 1960. The vote of $240,000 covered the entire amount available for land, building, and so forth.

acres were secured at an exceptionally good price. Since double the space was available at almost half the cost of any available alternative site, more money could be spent on the armoury itself. In March, 1935, tenders were called and in May, Smith Brothers and Wilson were awarded the contract. Early in June a start was made on clearing the site and in the months which followed the building began to rise, providing, incidentally, employment for a fairly large number of militiamen who were going to use it.[66] On 30 March, 1936 the regiment and the cadets marched into their new building and every officer and man was delighted with the finished product.

The official opening of the new Seaforth Armoury[67] was planned with great care. It was to be one of the most colourful ceremonies the regiment performed in the interwar years, and one of the high points of it was to be the trooping of the Colour of the regiment and the presentation to the Seaforth Association of the silk union flag received by the overseas battalion some years previously. Both Colours now had emblazoned on them the battle honours awarded to them by the Battle Honours Committee.[68] This ancient and thrilling ceremony was performed by the officers and men dressed in their parade uniforms. In black boots, white gaiters, diced red and white hose tops, the MacKenzie tartan kilt, Seaforth hair sporran,

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[66] The superintendent of construction was Mr. Walter Douglas. He had been a pipe major with the Cameron Highlanders overseas, and later became R.S.M. of the 2nd (Reserve) Battalion, Seaforth Highlanders of Canada.

[67] It is interesting to note that this was the second building named after the regiment. In 1922 at the request of the Seaforth Chapter, I.O.D.E., the Lozells School in Burnaby was renamed the Seaforths School.

[68] To avoid confusion it should be kept in mind that the battle honours of the 72nd Battalion, C.E.F., were slightly different from those of the Seaforth Highlanders of Canada, since the latter unit perpetuated *two* overseas battalions and also had received honours owing to the men who served with the 16th Battalion, C.E.F. This silk union flag was laid up in St. John's United Church after the trooping in 1936. The regiment carried the Colours (with their battle honours emblazoned on them), which were presented to them by Lt-Gen. Sir Arthur Currie in 1919. Although not conforming precisely to the design for Colours demanded by later regulations, special permission was received from the Minister of National Defence in 1936 to carry them. (Seaforth Archives, File: "Regimental Colours", Letter The Hon. Ian A. Mackenzie to Lt-Col. J. R. S. Lough, 22 October 1936). Thus although the Colour did not conform to the standard specification, they were officially recognized and were carried on all special ceremonies and formal occasions.

scarlet doublets and white waist belts, and feather bonnets, they made a smart and stirring sight. His Excellency the Right Honourable Lord Tweedsmuir, Governor-General of Canada, was there to preside at the formalities, and every inch of the armoury itself was packed with invited guests. The trooping ceremony itself, the traditional consecration by Hon. Capt. the Rev. G. C. F. Pringle, the piping by the band and the social activities after the ceremony made it all a most enjoyable affair, and somehow seemed to confirm the reality that the armoury was actually built and finally theirs to keep.

The acquisition of the armoury was a decided help to the regiment in many ways, coming as it did in the midst of a depression. During the 1920's when the government's revenues were increasing, the possibility of war had seemed so remote that little attention and less money was paid to the nation's defence needs. During the 1930's, a decade which saw the rising threat of dictators in Europe, the requirements of the Canadian militia were put aside in the face of an overwhelming economic and social crisis which strained the decreasing government revenues to the utmost. Nevertheless, in these years the spirit of the regiment shone as never before. Both officers and men continued to sign over their pay to a regimental fund with the exception of the few dollars they received while at camp, and despite the stringencies[69] imposed on the regiment, it continued to keep up its high standards. In 1932 a circular letter from District Headquarters advised all militia units that

> Owing to the paucity of funds in this training year's vote, it will not be possible to allow car fares for candidates attending the various provisional schools of instruction.[70]

Notices were placed in Routine Orders urging all commanding officers to use military clothing to its utmost limit, and to reduce by twenty-five percent such armoury expenses as fuel, light and water. Other letters asked Lt-Col. Blair to send in "such greatcoats and trousers as are part worn and nearing the point of condemnation for

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[69] For example late in 1930, N.D.H.Q. refused to provide money to pay for transporting men, rifles and ammunition to the ranges. (Seaforth Archives, File: "Musketry Training, 1920-1940", Letter, G.S.O. I, M.D. XI to Command Officer, 13 November 1931). Later someone relented and the unit was allowed $50.00 per annum for this service, a sum which paid less than half the amount required.

[70] Seaforth Archives, Circular Letter from Headquarters, Military District XI to all N.P.A.M. units, 27 September 1932.

the purpose of issuing to unemployment relief."[71] This was one way to exchange old clothing for better and "newer" stock held by the Ordnance Corps since 1918, for owing to the poor storage facilities in the old armoury, some 80 greatcoats were "written off". Something of the parsimony of government grants to the militia can be seen in the reply to a letter written by Lt-Col. J. R. S. Lough, DSO, MC, VD,[72] in 1936. The regiment was settling into its new armoury and a sand table, used in the old armoury, had been reassembled but lacked sand. As the sand table was a valuable means of training officers in tactics, Lt-Col. Lough asked for permission to purchase some. The reply was as follows:

> With reference to your letter of the 19th November regarding a sand-table for your Armoury. Authority is granted for the purchase of sufficient sand....
>
> I do not know exactly how much sand you will require but if the cost is more than $3.50 please let me know before giving the order.[73]

It is not surprising that the Commanding Officer, thinking back on those years, was to say later that ". . . you had to pay for the privilege of being a member of the defence force of Canada."[74]

The depression had its impact on the strength of the regiment and as a result the unit's strength dropped from 30 officers and 333 other ranks in December, 1929, to 31 officers and 215 other ranks in 1935.[75] The reasons are not difficult to find. Although the regiment did what it could to assist those men in the ranks who lost their

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[71] *Ibid.*, File: "Administration—V", Letter, H.Q., M.D. XI to Commanding Officer, 3 November 1932.

[72] Lt-Col. Lough assumed command after the death of Lt-Col. Brock in an aeroplane accident in 1935.

[73] Seaforth Archives, Letter, District Engineer Officer, M.D. XI to Commanding Officer, the Seaforth Highlanders of Canada, 25 November 1936. One may assume that it was fortunate that the new armoury was not far from the beach!

[74] Seaforth Archives, Interview with Brigadier Lough by Professor R. L. McDougall, 18 July 1960. The Regiment's annual expenses averaged $6,000.00. It received between $3,300 and $5,500 from the government. The difference was made up by officers and men signing over their pay, and by voluntary donations from patriotic men in the community. Additional costs for Highland dress, etc., are not included in the above. Usually, therefore, there was an annual deficit of about $3,000 which had to be, and was, made up.

[75] Information supplied by the Directorate of History, Canadian Forces Headquarters. After 1935 the strength began to rise once more.

jobs, it was impossible to help everyone, and dozens of men left the city to go wherever work might be found. These losses were hard to make up, especially as the unit made it a policy not to enlist unemployed men when the depression was at its depth. For those who remained in the city and could attend parades, the difficulties increased. Many walked long distances to the armoury because they could not afford to buy extra tramcar tickets, while those who resided several miles away had to be provided tickets or they could not have continued. This, wrote the Paymaster, ". . . is one of my big problems. If we do not supply carfare, etc., we have difficulty in getting men on relief to parade and we need every man."[76] It was not easy for the junior officers either. The expense of outfitting a Highland officer in the various uniforms required by his rank was high, and the officer had to pay for his own clothing since the government did not supply it.

There were times, during these years, when the regiment came close to being called out in aid of the civil power. As early as 1931 special care was taken by the Regimental Quartermaster Sergeant, "Tom" Alexander, to remove and keep in a secure place the locks of Vickers and pinions of Lewis guns. This followed the receipt of a confidential letter from District Headquarters stating that "Warning has been received that an element exists in Vancouver which might go to considerable lengths in an effort to obtain machine-guns."[77] In the following year the unit was advised to be on guard against enrolling members of one of the local radical groups in the Rifle Association since information was received that the men had been urged to join in order to get instruction in the use of weapons for purposes unrelated to mere target practice.[78] In the spring of 1934, and for several months of 1935, extra caretakers were hired for the armouries to be on duty day and night to guard against any attempt to gain weapons or perhaps take over the buildings. For unemployed men, cold, miserable and hungry in the damp winter weather, the thought of large,

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[76] Seaforth Archives, File: "Administration—IX", Letter, Major F. F. Taaffe to District Accountant, M.D. XI, 23 March 1936.

[77] *Ibid.*, File: "Administration—I", Confidential letter to all N.P.A.M. units in the Greater Vancouver area from A.A. and Q.M.G., M.D. XI, 5 March 1931.

[78] Seaforth Archives, File: "Letters—IV", Secret Letter, G.S.O. III, M.D. XI to Captains, all Rifle Associations, M.D. XI, 16 December 1932.

warm, sometimes vacant government buildings must have been tempting.

Depression or not, the regiment continued as best it could to ensure that all ranks enjoyed both the sports and social activities which had become almost customary since the unit was reorganized. Basketball, volleyball, badminton, tennis, and softball teams had been active since the early 1920's, and the Inter-Regimental Athletic Association, formed in 1922, arranged the best teams to compete with each other within the garrison. Socially, too, the Seaforths continued to carry on with a number of functions which were established in the immediate post-war years. The annual regimental picnic to Bowen Island was one of the most enjoyable affairs in which all ranks with their families took an active part. The Burns Dinner held by the Sergeants' Mess, the Regimental Dinner held by the Officers' Mess which commemorates the Passchendaele battle, and the Seaforth Association Dinner held to commemorate the battle of Vimy Ridge were outstanding affairs within the regimental family. There were also numerous dances arranged both by the regiment and by sub-units within the regiment. The facilities in the new armoury permitted the latter to be held there without the need for renting a hall except for some major formal affair, which might be held in the ballroom of the old Vancouver Hotel.

It would have been difficult, but not impossible, for any of the officers and their ladies who danced in the Vancouver Hotel to celebrate the New Year of 1936 to believe that within a few years the polished floors would be walked on by soldiers in a uniform they had not seen, or that at the main entrance there would be sentries whose arms and equipment were far different from that issued to any Seaforth militiamen going to summer camp. Nevertheless, as the gloom of the depression began to lift slowly from the nation, those who were aware of the events beginning to unfold in Europe and Asia could hear the faint sound of the drums of war beginning to beat overseas. All too soon this sound would increase in volume and the Seaforth Highlanders of Canada would be called upon once again to live up to their regimental motto: "Help the King".

CHAPTER II

The Call To Arms

In 1936 the Canadian militia was reorganized, and it was a reorganization which was long overdue. In the immediate post-war years militia regiments of all types were organized on a haphazard basis until by 1935 there were about 35 cavalry and 135 infantry battalions, not counting units of other arms of the service. These had been grouped into eleven infantry and four cavalry divisions, an unrealistic organization reflecting the concept of Defence Scheme No. 1 which saw the United States as the only major power which could or might conceivably invade Canada. The idea that the United States might attack Canada had brought in its wake the belief that Canada should be able to call upon a large number of infantry militia units to rush to the defence of the border, and it also provided arguments for cavalry officers wishing to retain the horse in spite of the increasing use of automobiles and the proven use of tanks.

This exceptionally large and unbalanced militia force was both inefficient and impractical. In almost every regiment the commissioned ranks were filled while there were usually large gaps among the other ranks. As a result, as one author pointed out, there was in Canada about one officer for every seven militiamen.[1] Another consideration was the fact that many of the militia battalions carried on the Militia Lists had been unable to maintain either their numbers

[1] Thomas Wayling, "The Brass Hat Parade or What Price Disarmament" in *The Canadian Magazine,* Vol. LXXX, No. 5 (November, 1933), pp. 1, 28-30.

or enthusiasm and had become almost inactive. Their existence was a drain on the extremely skimpy funds allotted for defence purposes, for the maintenance of inefficient units bore all the more heavily on those regiments such as the Seaforth Highlanders struggling to uphold higher standards.

The nation, in brief, had been allowed to drift in so far as military affairs were concerned. As one military historian wrote:

> At no time since 1919 had the Dominion had a genuinely realistic defence policy; the variations as between successive ministries had been simply varying degrees of neglect. In the absence of an immediate crisis, the country's political leaders, the members of Parliament generally, and the public at large had all been indifferent to the matter.[2]

This indifference had led to a startling and dangerously low level of defence capability on the part of the militia. In July, 1936, Lt-Col. E. L. M. Burns noted that

> In Canada there is not a single tank, there are only two experimental cars, no anti-tank guns, no modern anti-aircraft guns or predictors, nor any infantry mortars, nor any of the new Bren light machine-guns; our gas-masks are war relics, unfit for use—in short, we are hardly better armed than the poor Ethiopians, and we should fall easy victims, as they did, to attack by an enemy provided with modern weapons.[3]

Plans for the reorganization and modest modernization of the militia had been the concern of the Department of National Defence for some years, and by 1936 it was decided to reduce and co-ordinate the existing units into a more realistic grouping of six infantry and one cavalry divisions. The concept of a possible invasion from the south, which apparently existed only because a defence force had to plan to defend something, was scrapped and happily forgotten. The 135 infantry regiments were cut down to 91, and of these six were converted to tank regiments — but without tanks.

For the Seaforth Highlanders of Canada, the reorganization brought about a modest degree of change. The 2nd (Reserve) Battalion was abolished in December, 1936, and to replace it and other reserve battalions there was constituted a national Reserve Corps of Officers. However, permission was received to form a Reserve Regimental Depot consisting of an Officer Commanding, Adjutant,

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[2] C. P. Stacey, *The Military Problems of Canada,* Toronto, Ryerson, 1940, p. 99.

[3] Lt-Col. E. L. M. Burns, "The Defence of Canada," in *The Canadian Defence Quarterly,* Vol. XIII, No. 4 (July, 1936), p. 391.

Quartermaster and attached Medical Officer. Officers who had been in the 2nd Battalion would be placed in the Corps Reserve and attached to the Regimental Depot if age and health permitted.[4] All the former N.P.A.M. Headquarters of Infantry Brigades were disbanded and reorganized with the result that the Seaforth Highlanders found itself in 1937 as part of the 14th Infantry Brigade. Within the regiment itself the reorganization, based on the British model, had the effect of reducing the companies from four to three platoons. The idea behind the change was to give the units both more firepower and more manoeuvrability. What had been Headquarters Wing now became Headquarters Company with six specialist platoons to deal with signalling, anti-aircraft protection, mortar support, universal carrier support, pioneer duties and administration. This also meant that "D" Company, which since 1933 had been a merged group of men trained primarily as Vickers machine-gunners,[5] reverted to its infantry role as the heavier weapons were withdrawn early in 1937. This left the Lewis machine-guns, issued on a two-per-company basis,as the sole automatic weapons on charge to the unit.

The streamlining of the Seaforth Highlanders of Canada, and the Canadian militia in general, was carried out against the background of a rising debate over the role of Canada's defence forces in any future war. This debate, especially those arguments favouring the isolationist point of view, had been going on in a modest way since the last war, but had become more bitter as the depression era replaced the booming 1920's. In 1930, for example, Mr. Arthur Morgan, writing in the November issue of *The Nation,* stated that "Canada does not need or desire the protection of Great Britain," and added that he did not think "that protection would be of any considerable practical value." He pointed out that "The only wars in which Canada has been engaged have resulted from her connection with Great Britain." He felt that since Canada had no voice in British foreign policy she should not contribute to imperial defence and suggested that Canadian sacrifices in 1914-1918 more than paid any debt owed by colonial Canada for previous British support. He added further that "every Canadian knows, although few would

[4] Seaforth Archives, File: "Reserve Battalion—II," Confidential Circular Letter, H.Q., M.D. XI to all C.O.'s, 30 December 1936.

[5] The regiment had been issued with Vickers machine-guns in 1929.

admit it, that the United States would not stand idly by and allow an invasion of the Dominion."

The argument that Canada, blessed by geographical isolation from the powder kegs of Europe and by a powerful friendly neighbour was widely used by those advocating further defence cuts. Professor Bright, in an article in the *Queen's Quarterly,* expressed the views of many when he said that "In any future European war our [Canadian] contributions would consist in loyally imposing such economic sanctions against the aggressor as were agreed upon by the League [of Nations]."[6] The Socialist point of view was much more direct and vehement, and articles in *The Canadian Forum* lashed out time and again against any defence expenditures. One author, writing in February, 1937, stated that "In a rapidly re-arming world we have, we are told, to protect our own shores. This is humbug." After assuring his readers that Canada was safe behind the American shield, he continued:

> Is it too late for Canada to escape entanglement in this gigantic folly? Every British armament order accepted and fulfilled, every new Canadian tank or uniform, every speech which advocates the defence of our shores or of democracy or, we might add, of the Soviet Union, is really a contribution to the defence of a world order which is indefensible. Military isolation from Europe is, under such conditions, a policy not of cowardice but of common sense.[7]

These views, and there were many such expressed among Vancouver's unemployed, were not entirely those of the Liberal government which replaced Mr. Bennett's Conservatives in the 1935 elections. The Liberals came to power at a time when the weight of the depression began to lift very slowly in Canada but when events overseas began to present an ominous picture which darkened with each year. Two years earlier Adolph Hitler had seized power in Germany, and in rapid succession Germany had withdrawn from the League of Nations, reoccupied the Rhineland, denounced the Locarno Pact and in 1936 the Berlin-Rome Axis had been formed between Hitler and Mussolini. Within a few weeks of the Canadian election, the Italian dictator had sent his troops into Ethiopia and by the following year that African state had fallen under Fascist domination. In the

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[6] Col. W. D. Murdoch and Prof. A. A. Bright ,"The Army at Bay," in *Queen's Quarterly* (Winter, 1936-1937), p. 398.

[7] "Folly of Canadian Rearmament," in *The Canadian Forum,* Vol. XVI, No. 193 (February, 1937), pp. 6-7.

summer of 1936, the Spanish civil war had broken out and was to continue to capture the headlines almost up to the beginning of the Second World War. In Asia, meanwhile, Japanese troops were systematically boring into the heart of China, a country already sorely racked by internal dissension and made miserable by its seeming inability to achieve any sort of stability.

But of all the dangerous spots which were beginning to flare up in the world, the growing might of Nazi Germany coupled with the cynically opportunistic diplomacy of Hitler was causing most concern to the Great Powers in Europe. By 1938 Hitler felt strong enough to invade and annex Austria, and in September of that year there occurred the first major crisis over Czechoslovakia. In the cinemas of Vancouver at the time newsreel after newsreel showed the steel-helmeted storm-troopers of Germany marching in massed formation at the annual Nazi functions in Berchtesgarten, or the short, stocky Japanese soldiers pressing forward over the smoking ruins and rubble of a Chinese town. Other films pictured spear-waving Ethiopians gesticulating against Italian aircraft swooping down to destroy native villages, or the bombardment of Loyalist trenches by the artillery of Generalissimo Franco.

In the late 1930's, in brief, the international situation was slowly worsening despite the best efforts of the League of Nations, and by 1936 even Canada began to feel the need to re-examine her defences. The reorganization of the militia was the result, but the defence policy of the nation was not clearly revealed. The overlapping issues of Canada's defence and external policies took up a good share of the debates in the House of Commons in 1937, debates which were closely followed by veterans and militiamen as well as by the very few permanent force soldiers.

In 1937 the defence estimates were increased slightly in a belated attempt to repair the neglect of the past fifteen years. The condition of the Permanent and Non-Permanent forces was shocking, and bordered on collapse. There was not a single modern anti-aircraft gun, and ninety minutes' firing would have exhausted Canada's stock of field gun ammunition. There were no modern tanks, armoured cars or tractors, and only in 1936 had there been at least an attempt to form an armoured fighting vehicle school, and even as late as 1939 this centre had only a few British-made armoured carriers available for training. Most Canadian militiamen had no ex-

perience whatsoever with modern weapons, and so restricted had been the number of days permitted the militia battalions at camp that no senior officers in Canada had manoeuvred modestly large numbers of soldiers in the field since the Great War.[8]

Despite the crying need for money sufficient to keep the armed forces in existence, there were those in parliament whose idealism and isolationist sentiments acted as a smokescreen to the realities of political events in Europe. They saw anything connected with the armed forces in terms of war profiteering, and in a time of economic distress, they hammered upon the $2,000,000,000 war debt upon which Canadians were paying interest at the rate of $158,000,000 a year. The proposed $35,000,000 defence estimate—an increase of $11,000,000 over the previous year—they opposed on the grounds that the government should use the money to relieve the poverty, malnutrition and social insecurity which was evident everywhere.

To these arguments the prime minister replied that if Canada was to have any defence at all, the navy, army and air force must be given some financial help as they were quite literally on the point of breakdown. He was not particularly fond of spending any money on the armed forces himself, and naturally he reiterated time and again that Canada and Canada alone would decide the amount of aid she would contribute to imperial defence in case of war. To further soothe the nerves of those with memories of the conscription crisis of 1917, he said:

> I might be entirely wrong but I doubt very much whether the British Government itself will ever again send an expeditionary force to Europe. I think it is extremely doubtful if any of the British Dominions will ever send another expeditionary force to Europe. Were war to come suddenly I think we would find that the conditions of a world conflict would be so different from what they were in the last war that anything in the nature of expeditionary forces to be sent from one continent to another would occasion a great deal more than second thought.[9]

Despite Mr. King's massive misjudgment regarding the future of international events, the increased funds allotted to Canada's armed forces were most welcome. Proportionately, the air force and the navy were the chief beneficiaries, but the permanent and non-permanent militia units were helped somewhat as well. Many mem-

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[8] See C. P. Stacey, "Canadian Defence Policy" in the *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science,* November, 1938.

[9] The Prime Minister, speaking in the House of Commons, 25 March 1937.

bers of the Seaforth Highlanders found work when the federal government began to improve coastal defences, especially by constructing artillery fortifications at Stanley Park and air force facilities in the West Point Grey area. Although all Seaforths still gave their pay to the regimental fund, the strength of the unit began to increase in these years also. The Pipes and Drums, together with the recently reorganized Brass Band, were instrumental in rousing up a martial spirit wherever they played, and the stirring spectacle of the regiment in their full dress uniforms when they took part in Vancouver's Civic Jubilee in 1936 or when they turned out for the occasion of the visit of King George VI and Queen Elizabeth in May, 1939, all helped to present the Seaforths in a most attractive light.

It was during Lt-Col. J. R. S. Lough's[10] command (1935-1938) that the Seaforths put on their first Military Tournament in their own armoury,[11] a display which was to gain them a great deal of favourable publicity and which served to attract more recruits to the regiment. The Tournament was a success in every way. Everyone in the regiment was involved, from the Commanding officer to the newest cadet. The show was to be an exhibition of the military and athletic activities of the Seaforths, and the entire production of it from lighting and scenery to the direction and public address system was handled by the men in the unit. Spectators were packed into seats in the balcony and around the sides of the parade square, and the number of distinguished guests who attended the opening night ranged from His Honour Lieutenant-Governor Eric W. Hamber[12] to the commanding officers of other militia units in the city anxious to see and enjoy the spectacle. The crash of the drums and shrill call

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[10] Lt-Col. J. R. S. Lough, DSO, MC, VD, enlisted in 1906 in the Queen's Edinburgh Rifles and later served in the King's Royal Rifle Corps before coming to Canada. After a distinguished war service, he joined the Seaforth Highlanders of Canada in 1920. He was second in command at the time of Lt-Col. Brock's death. Lt-Col. Lough received high praise from the Commanding Officer of the 2nd Battalion, Canadian Scottish Regiment, Lt-Col. W. Bapty, who wrote in August, 1936: "You have set a high standard in the Seaforths and their present Commanding Officer is known as one of the best soldiers and the best Commanding Officer in the West." Coming from this source, this way high praise indeed—but well deserved.

[11] Earlier and smaller Tournaments had been put on in the old Vancouver Athletic Club Gymnasium at 5th Avenue and Hemlock Street.

[12] He was to become the Honorary Colonel of the regiment in October, 1938.

of the pipes under Pipe Major E. Esson[13] started the show, and for the next two hours the regiment performed its best. Athletic events by the cadets, highland dancing, demonstrations by the specialists platoons, "Retreat" beat by the Pipes and Drums, drills carried out even to R.S.M. Anderson's approval and a colourful tableau at the end had the crowd on its feet applauding for more. It was a "sell-out" display, with many purchasing standing room on both nights. So successful was it that the tournament was put on in 1939, with a similar result.

The Military Tournament, the visit of the regiment to Seattle to take part in the Washington State Military Jubilee,[14] the tremendous effort put on by the regiment during Their Majesties' visit to Vancouver in May, 1939 and the various other public functions in which the Seaforth Highlanders of Canada were called upon to take part all took place against the growing threat of war in Europe. Thus, although the scarlet tunics and swaying kilts of the men on ceremonial parades drew many compliments, the essential function of the regiment was never forgotten. Although they lacked modern weapons, the Seaforths were very efficient with those they had, and if most of the officers had never seen a tank they tried as best they could to consider their impact on manoeuvres during summer camp. The regiment was fortunate in that it had good officers. It was also fortunate that, in 1938 for example, Captains A. J. Creighton and C. C. I. Merritt and Lieutenants M. J. Griffin, T. L. Brock and D. M. Clark were graduates of the Royal Military College in Kingston. This leavening of highly trained officers, coupled with the experience of the senior officers and enthusiasm of the others, was a major factor in maintaining the *esprit de corps* of the regiment during the difficult days ahead.

During the summers of 1938 and 1939 the Seaforths were allowed to take more men to camp, and they were permitted to be in camp for an entire week. The camp at Sidney in 1938 was a modest

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[13] Esson had recently returned from the Coronation Ceremonies in London. He and Lt-Col. Lough had both gone to England and had spent several days with the affiliated regiment.

[14] During the 1930's Seaforth officers were invited to attend manoeuvres of the 161st Infantry Regiment of the Washington National Guard. American officers were invited by the Seaforths to attend their summer camps at Vernon and Sidney.

one compared to the large concentration of all militia units at Vernon in the summer of 1939. Here for the first time since the war the infantry, cavalry and other supporting units gathered together to engage in fairly extended field manoeuvres. In a sense it represented the epitome of inter-war training at least in numbers and scope. The lines of tents drawn up along the slopes of Mission Hill, the sounds of the pipes, trumpets and bugles of the various bands, the swarms of khaki-clad militiamen on the streets of Vernon in the evening, and the marching columns of armed men out for route marches during the day, all gave an exceptionally martial air to the otherwise peaceful area. The size of the camp and the number of men from the other supporting arms of the service gave most of the Seaforths an inkling of the variety of troops which went to make up an army, but if one examined the scene more closely, and attempted to compare this force with a similar reserve force training in Europe, the difference was enough to dismay a professional soldier.

In Vernon the cavalry units still trained with horses, and indeed even in the summer of 1939 there were scarcely more than a dozen tanks in all of Canada, and these were obsolescent. The Royal Canadian Corps of Signals was still working with field equipment which was out-dated for the most part, and their shortages were so great that even before embarking for overseas later in the year recruits were using branches from fir trees for flags to practice semaphore signalling. A rare sight in camp was a military vehicle of any sort, and a tracked vehicle probably did not exist in the entire district. Grenades, mortars, anti-tank guns and automatic weapons, except for the Lewis and Vickers guns, were things one read about but did not see. The webbing the men wore was the 1908 pattern, and the Lee-Enfield rifles were the same pattern as used in the Great War.

The Seaforth Highlanders of Canada at this time was the most efficient regiment in Military District XI, and unknown to the men at the time the regiment was already marked as one which would be chosen to form part of the 1st Division to go overseas should war be declared. But despite the cups, trophies and awards it had won in the past two decades for everything from rifle shooting to signalling, it was a regiment strong in spirit but weak in the practical knowledge of warfare as it was being fought in China, Spain and elsewhere. The officers, N.C.O's. and men of the Seaforths had sacrificed much over the years to build and maintain the reputation it had by 1939, but

there was a limit reached beyond which it could not advance without government aid. This had been withheld in the 1920's as being unnecessary and in the 1930's as being impossible owing to the prior needs of those in economic distress. The time was close at hand, however, when the nation would lean almost entirely on the militia to fulfil its military promises overseas.

The summer of 1939 had been hot, with forest fires consuming thousands of acres of trees. Further afield there was considerable talk about the first trans-Atlantic air mail flight from the United Kingdom in August. Pictures taken in Great Britain appearing in the local papers showed British conscripts being drilled by sergeants in the new army camps built under the direction of Mr. Hoare Belisha. The camps looked comfortable, which resulted in many old-timers claiming that the army was getting soft. In August, too, Sir Thomas Inskip, the Dominions Secretary, was quoted as saying that war was unlikely, while Col. J. M. Patterson of the New York *News* went so far as to bet five to one against war being declared in 1939. Newspaper editorials came to the conclusion on the domestic scene that times were getting better and prices were creeping up. Bacon was 27 cents a pound, coffee approximately the same, and a man's suit cost $25.00. Those who were unemployed, however, were happy that a pound of sausages cost only eight cents and flour half that much.

It was a very uneasy summer also, for all during the year "Der Fuehrer" had added one provocation to another to those countries bordering Germany. In January he had demanded the return of the German colonies and in February he had sent more "volunteers" to Spain. In March Czechoslovakia had been completely occupied and in April Hitler had spurned President Roosevelt's plea for peace. Italy, in the same month, invaded Albania, while in July Danzig, the spark which was to set Europe in flames, began to clamour for a return to the Reich in the classic pattern which Hitler had found so successful in previous years. By the third week of August another major crisis was boiling up, for along with the Danzig problem came reports of an increasing number of incidents along the German-Polish border. On 1 September Nazi Germany hurled its forces into Poland. Two days later Great Britain declared war. The incredible had happened.

The war came as no surprise to the officers and men of the

Seaforth Highlanders of Canada. For months it had seemed a matter of when, not if. In Canada, plans had been made anticipating such an eventuality, and although Canada did not declare war formally until 10 September, the Militia Act made provision for calling out details of the militia regiments prior to the actual declaration of hostilities. Thus at 0730 hours on 26 August 1939, the first "wartime" guards were mounted at the Seaforth Armoury, and a request sent to permit an increase in the guard from six to 12 men.[15]. Permission was given to recruit 24 other ranks to guard the armoury almost immediately, and Lt-Col. T. S. Leslie, Lt-Col. F. F. Taaffe, Major D. M. Johnstone and R.S.M. Thomas N. Anderson were also called to duty. Battalion Headquarters immediately went on 24-hour duty, and the small staff made preparations against the unit being called upon for active service. In the Quartermaster Stores Major Johnstone directed the packing and sorting of peacetime stores and made arrangements to accept incoming stores and equipment should the Highlanders mobilize.[16] A few days later a secret letter from District Headquarters was sent to the regiment indicating that, in the event of mobilization, the Commanding Officer could recruit from any area of the province except the Kootenays. This letter was scarcely filed when, at 1500 hours on 1 September, a telegram from the District Officer Commanding ordered the Seaforth Highlanders to mobilize.

News that the regiment was to recruit an active battalion reached the Seaforths in a variety of ways. Plans had been laid well beforehand that if mobilization was ordered, the word would be spread around the city by phone messages, with the Commanding Officer phoning his company commanders, the Adjutant and the Regimental Sergeant Major calling the senior N.C.Os. and so on down through the ranks until each private was contacted. These calls reached Seaforths in all walks of life. Hugh Caldwell, a recruit instructor, was a milkman; H. P. Bell-Irving was a businessman; Howard Eggie was a service manager for a business machine company; B. M. Hoffmeister was a sales manager; and so on it went.

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[15] Seaforth Archives, File: "Training, Courses and Strength, XIII", Letter, C.O., Seaforth Highlanders of Canada to H.Q., 14th Infantry Brigade, 28 August 1939. One of the first sentries on the Armoury, Pte. T. Taylor, later became Regimental Sergeant Major overseas.

[16] *Ibid.*, same to same, 28 August 1939.

Thus when Lt-Col. Leslie[17] took over the parade he had called on the evening of 1 September and announced the order to mobilize, there were 30 officers and 260 men in attendance at the armoury, and the great majority were able to step forward to signify their willingness to serve overseas.

From all ranks and from all parts of the city, the response to the call for volunteers was good. There were no long queues of men trying to join up, nor was there the wild excitement and patriotic displays which were a feature of the beginning of the Great War. Rather there was a movement of men who came to the armoury to enlist as the weeks went by. Those who were young and without responsibilities of caring for a family made their decision on the spot. The chance of getting overseas, the sense of adventure, the feeling of duty, the belief that the evil of Nazism had to be stopped, and for some the knowledge that at least the army clothed, fed and paid its soldiers all combined with dozens of other reasons to build the strength of the active battalion.

Those who volunteered for active service from the N.P.A.M. battalion—and the majority of them did—were the first in uniform. They had to turn in their white gaiters, white waist belts, sporrans and diced hose to the Regimental Quartermaster Sergeant, Charles Dawson, and were given khaki hose, spats and khaki webbing in return. Instead of the sporran the men wore the khaki apron on parade. The remainder of their dress—the khaki tunic[18] and glengarry bonnet[19]—made their appearance very similar to the Seaforths

[17] Lt-Col. T. S. Leslie, ED, assumed command on 1 April 1938. A veteran of the Great War, he was 56 years old and thus command of the overseas battalion was to fall to Lt-Col. J. B. Stevenson, ED.

[18] On the tunic all ranks wore the regimental collar badge—"in gilt, a Cougar, standing". (General Order 111, dated 15 July 1923.)

[19] Officially the regimental cap badge is described in General Order No. 111 of 1923 as: "In silver, a stag's head, with the letter 'L' and a coronet, set between the antlers, the whole resting on a scroll bearing the Gaelic motto 'CUIDICH'N RIGH'." The shoulder badge was described in General Order 94, of 15 June 1928, in these words: *"In Gilt,* the title 'SEAFORTHS' in half inch letters in the form of a quarter circle." Other ranks wore the same, but in brass. The hat badge supplied to the unit before and during the war did not conform to that worn by the affiliated regiment, and despite unending correspondence over a decade, the Seaforths were unable to have the badge they wanted issued to them. Consequently, the Seaforths had their badges privately manufactured to ensure its conformity with the "imperial" Seaforths.

who had joined the 72nd Battalion, C.E.F. The peacetime ceremonial uniforms were packed away, and among other things the Quartermaster Stores had to prepare for was the arrival of the equipment and new uniforms which were to make their appearance shortly before the unit went overseas.

For quite some time, however, there were many men who were enlisted in the active battalion for whom no uniforms were available, and for weeks these men appeared on parade in their civilian clothes. As the weather got colder, local businessmen provided boots and overcoats until the service issue was available. Only gradually did army shirts, socks, sweaters and other necessary items arrive in the Q.M. stores, and only slowly were the steadily increasing members of the battalion transformed from a civilian to a military appearance.

One of the busiest spots in the armoury during these early weeks was the recruiting office and the Battalion Orderly Room where Captain George Clark, the Adjutant, strove to control the mass of paper work which flooded onto his desk. By mid-September 308 men had been attested, 217 were awaiting medical examination and two dozen others were in the attestation stream. Majors D. M. Meekison and W. I. MacKenzie, both Medical Officers, probed and prodded seeming acres of naked flesh day after day. A fair number were rejected on medical grounds—but as the commanding officer stated later: "We had lads there who put on four pounds in a couple of weeks—they just hadn't been eating. . . . These were boys who had just left home because there wasn't enough to go around at home, and they were out to rustle for themselves. They joined up and we fed them, and clothed them, and they were good men."[20] Both medically and militarily the Depression had left its mark. There were no medical supplies, so "a medical sergeant went down to the Medical-Dental Building and he came back with a cartload full of [drug] samples which were put in a cupboard in the gymnasium."[21]

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[20] Seaforth Archives, File: "Interviews", Interview between Prof. R. L. McDougall and Brigadier J. B. Stevenson, 25 August 1961. A fair number of recruits came from the United States, and many, both from Canada and the U.S.A., had had military experience in the Spanish Civil War, various Central and South American revolutions, etc.

[21] *Ibid.*

As recruiting continued, the armoury gymnasium itself was put to other uses. Lt-Col. Stevenson described the situation as follows:

> We turned the Gymnasium . . . into a cookhouse. We fed them by drawing rations from Victoria—according to the book. There were so many men that we sent over to Victoria for First World War cookers. We stood them up at the back of the armoury . . . and I got some old First War army cooks. . . . The chaps came in and sat down and got their meals, but there was no place for them to sleep. So with the help of the Mounted Police . . . we borrowed 80 cots and put them all in the gallery, so the men slept there.[22]

The men who ate and slept at the armoury were for the most part recruits who did not live in the city. Those who did, slept and ate at home and were given a subsistence allowance of eighty-five cents a day. The Seaforths, because they were being recruited to full strength and obviously going overseas, were able to attract into the active battalion a number of experienced men from other units in the city. These men, despite their previous regimental affiliations, soon came to have as much pride in their new unit as the oldest veteran, and moreover added to the proportion of men with militia experience in the regiment, which had a beneficial effect.

To a casual visitor, the scene which presented itself inside and outside the armoury in the early months of the war must have appeared confusing. Some men were in civilian clothes and some were uniformed. Some were living in the armoury but the great majority went home providing they were not on guard duty. Behind the armoury, across the parade square from the field cookers, carpenters were beginning to erect the first of over two dozen long, single-storied huts in a style which might best be described as army functional. Generally, too, one would see one or more pipers nearby tuning their pipes, a mysterious and profound ceremony during which the pipers seemed to be in deep communication with all the pipers who had passed on before them. Across the street from the armoury, and further away at Kitsilano Beach, officers and sergeants could be seen drilling and lecturing their platoons. Owing to the lack of modern arms, usually the N.C.O. could only describe the weapon from what he had read about it himself. However, the area was a good one for lecturing on map reading and taking compass bearings, and for the signallers the stretches of open beaches

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[22] *Ibid.*

meant that they could practise their arts almost as if they were at a summer camp.

In the Orderly Room the new Adjutant, Captain W. S. Murdoch and his assistants had a tremendous job to accomplish. Beyond the routine work was the task of preparing documents for the active service battalion. This battalion became a separate entity immediately after Canada declared war on 10 September. Volunteers for this battalion, whether they came from the N.P.A.M. battalion or directly from civilian life, all had to be attested and a complete set of new documents made out for each man. Since the army seemed to require several copies of everything, and at the same time were most reluctant to provide typewriters or carbon paper, the scope for frustrations in the Orderly Room was unlimited. Fortunately Captain Murdoch was more than able to cope. By the end of the month 787 men had been attested in the Canadian Army Service Force battalion, Lt-Col. J. B. Stevenson had selected and published his slate of officers, Battalion Orders were being published, and files were beginning to be so organized that when the first of the inspecting officers came around awkward questions regarding numbers, qualifications and organization could be answered smoothly.

On 21 September the official word came through that the Seaforths were to be part of the overseas force. A little more than a week later, the battalion was able to report that not only had it reached its war establishment strength, but it had filled the ranks of its first line reinforcements which would accompany the unit overseas. By this time, too, the bulk of the paperwork was over. Officers, N.C.Os. and men were allotted provisionally to the various companies, a training schedule was established to teach the raw recruits something of military drill and discipline, and the Regimental Depot was well established under the command of Lt-Col. Leslie. During these weeks route marches, led by the Pipe Band, through Vancouver and to the Blair Range gave the battalion some diversion, while shooting at the ranges, both with rifles and the few machine-guns in the unit's possession, provided for some men the first experience they had ever had with weapons. Inter-company and inter-regimental sports, daily physical training, foot and arms drill, simple field exercises and lectures took up most of the training syllabus during these weeks. But if uniforms were scarce and instruction still basic, the morale of the unit remained high. The Seaforths

were going overseas and weapons were sure to be provided. Early in November Platoon Sergeant-Major R. W. Hardy, recently back from a course at Esquimalt, was able to tell what he had learned about the new Bren light machine-gun,[23] and if this was an indication of what the battalion could expect in the future, perhaps there might be some opportunity of coming to grips with the enemy on equal terms.

Meanwhile there was much to learn.[24]. Day by day the new recruits progressed in their drill until they reached the point where company drill could be attempted without chaotic results. Dribbles of clothing and equipment came to the Quartermaster stores, and the recruit began to learn that three of his closest allies in the unit could be the Quartermaster Sergeant, the Sergeant Cook and the Pay Sergeant. If it was profitable to be friendly with these N.C.Os., it was wise to be attentive to the orders of the platoon sergeant, the company sergeant major and above all, of the Regimental Sergeant Major. These gentlemen, the recruit found, seemed to wield far more power over him than the officers, and their vocabulary at times was enough to make his hair stand on end should he appear on parade with even one unbuttoned pocket.

The recruits were also learning to understand and to speak a military jargon which became part of their own conversation. Since the services used the 24-hour clock system, one referred to ten hundred hours rather than 10 a.m., and to 2200 instead of 10 p.m. He learned never to refer to his rifle as a gun, and to be wary if someone asked him to go to the quartermaster stores for a repeating bayonet. If there was to be a short-arm inspection he soon realized that neither a revolver nor service knife was involved. The recruit found, too, that the army abbreviated everything it could. Thus if someone mentioned that the C.O. and I.O. left the B.O.R. to go to the Q.M. on an inquiry about "G1098" stores, he mentally translated this as meaning that the Commanding Officer and Intelligence Officer left the Battalion Orderly Room to go to the Quartermaster on an en-

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[23] On 12 November Lt. H. P. Bell-Irving with Sgts. Vance, MacNutt and Biddlecombe left for England to take a small arms course at Hythe. They were the first in the unit to leave for overseas.

[24] "To assist us," wrote one veteran, "we had instructors from the P.P.C.L.I. One old soldier whom we all knew well, Sgt-Maj. George White, proved to be invaluable to us." (Letter, Mr. Gordon Barr to author, 9 June 1966.)

quiry about the stores an overseas battalion should have. He was beginning to learn the different pipe tunes as well, and found that these rather than bugle calls were used to warn both officers and men for duty. Quite possibly the recruit might be surprised at the number of parades—meal parades and pay parades, medical parades, defaulters parades, muster parades and church parades. In fact there seemed to be someone calling for a parade all the time, and the recruit learned he was expected to be there on time and shining.

While absorbing some of the customs of military life, there was also growing within the recruit something which he himself would have found difficult to describe—that is, a pride in his regiment which, in a way, was a reflection of the collective pride of all the men in it. He was a volunteer, and the choice of the Seaforths was his. A variety of things may have shaped the selection he made—Scottish ancestry, family tradition, the attractive Highland dress, or he may have heard about and admired the enviable reputation the regiment had gained during the Great War and peacetime years. Whatever his reason, the recruit was made welcome, and in a dozen ways he absorbed the *esprit de corps* of the unit and, indeed, gave it strength. The regimental spirit which was blossoming in these early months was never lost in the years to come. For years there had been a saying in the militia unit: "Once a Seaforth, always a Seaforth." This feeling of belonging to the best platoon in the best company in the best regiment in the Canadian Army was absorbed by the recruit in a surprisingly short time, and the new battle honours and awards for bravery which were ultimately to come to the Seaforths had their origin, in no small measure, in this sense of regimental pride and camaraderie developed in the recruit.

During September and October the Seaforths had had various inspections from the District Officer Commanding and his staff, but during the second week of November Lt-Col. Stevenson had a series of mornings put aside for battalion drill. The reason for this became apparent when on 13 November the unit was inspected by the General Officer Commanding, 1st Division, C.A.S.F., Major-General A. G. L. McNaughton, CB, CMG, DSO; Brigadier J. C. Stewart, the District Officer Commanding, and the commander of the 2nd Canadian Infantry Brigade, Brigadier G. R. Pearkes, VC, DSO, MC. It was the first time many of the men had seen their divisional and brigade commanders, and for almost all ranks it was the first time they

saw the new field uniform—the "battledress"—which Brigadier Pearkes wore for that express purpose.[25] Both senior officers were impressed with the progress of the Seaforths,[26] a regiment they had known during the Great War and when they had served as staff officers at Esquimalt in the late 1920's.

It was one thing to see battledress—but it was another thing to have to wear it. If there was any one point when the morale of the regiment definitely sagged, it was when all ranks were issued with the battledress and khaki wedge caps in place of the kilt and glengarry on 16 November.[27] The new uniform went first to those still in civilian clothes, but as the days went by and additional uniforms were received, the kilt disappeared from the parade square except for those worn by the officers and pipers and drummers. Not until the regiment was in England were the wedge caps exchanged for balmorals. This was to be a decided help. So, too, was permission to wear the kilt for walking out after parade hours were over. The original issue, however, was a sad blow, and one of the difficult tasks of both officers and senior N.C.Os. at the time was to explain to the men why the new dress was more practical, while in their hearts they wished that they could retain the kilt.

By the end of November the battalion was beginning to take on a more definitive shape. If the men no longer wore the kilt, at least they were all in uniform. Company officers and N.C.Os. had been appointed and a reinforcement company formed under Major A. J. Creighton's command so that the other companies could parade at their normal complement.[28] Young recruits under 19 years of age and senior privates, N.C.Os. and officers were transferred to the strength of the Regimental Depot, a move which caused no small amount of anguish to those too young and too old to go overseas.[29] Much of this loss was absorbed by groups of men transferring from other units. The British Columbia Regiment, for

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[25] Personal interview by author with Major-General the Honourable G. R. Pearkes.

[26] McDougall-Stevenson interview, *op. cit.*

[27] War Diary, Seaforth Highlanders of Canada, 16 November 1939.

[28] Creighton had just been released from the hospital after a serious operation. An oustanding officer in the regiment, his return was welcomed by all ranks.

[29] On 23 November, 63 men under 19 years were transferred. They were known as the "Diaper Battalion". Most of them rejoined the unit later.

example, provided over 40 men, half of whom formed the Seaforths' anti-tank platoon. Smaller groups came from the Rocky Mountain Rangers, the 6th Field Company, R.C.E., the British Columbia Dragoons and other B.C. units. Before mid-December the unit's war establishment of 841 all ranks was complete, despite the losses caused through age or the medical re-boards held at the end of November.

For weeks everyone knew the Seaforths were going overseas. In November two officers and four N.C.Os. had left for the United Kingdom to gain up-to-date instruction in small arms and signalling, but when the entire division would go was unknown. Late in November the unit had an unusually large number of visits from staff officers, and finally on the last day of November an advance party left to go to England.[30] In the next two weeks the pace of the regiment quickened in every area. The Quartermaster stores issued greatcoats, webbing and other articles with an uncommonly generous hand, for as an overseas unit the Seaforths rated the highest priority. Wills were made out, paybooks issued, identification tags prepared, packing crates issued, and so forth. Decisions had to be made too regarding what items should be taken from the officers' and sergeants' messes since the reserve battalion and the Regimental Depot would remain in Vancouver while the active battalion would be overseas. There was also the question of bringing over the pipes and drums, for many of the pipers owned their own instruments and the drums were regimental property. Mr. George Thompson, DCM, and Mr. W. M. Crawford,[31] Vancouver businessmen with a strong Scottish patriotism, helped to solve this question with the result that Pipe Major Esson and the battalion as a whole were able to bring overseas the nucleus of a first rate Pipe Band. Other generous donations assured both officers and men that the Seaforths would be able to

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[30] The Advance Party, commanded by Capt. McIntyre, included Sgts. Grindlay, Whittaker and Bryant; Cpls. Blaker, Dixon, Mitchell, Roberts and Bamford; and Ptes. Beach, Horne, Lastucka, McPhather and O'Dare. It arrived in Great Britain on 17 December.

[31] McDougall-Stevenson interview, *op. cit.* Thompson had served with the 72nd Bn., C.E.F. in France and at Passchendaele had been recommended for the V.C. by the Commanding Officer. Crawford, a Scotsman from Fifeshire, came to Vancouver in 1910 and ultimately controlled the Empire Stevedoring Co. Both men had given considerable support to the regiment since its organization.

carry on their traditional reputation for smartness in dress and hospitality in their messes.

On 11 December, quite out of the blue, Lt-Col. Stevenson was told to report immediately to Halifax with the adjutant (Captain W. S. Murdoch) and a baggage officer (Lt. D. W. Davidson). Stevenson was to be in charge of all the troops on board ship. When he arrived in Halifax he found that the Seaforths had not been assigned any particular vessel. Stevenson noted a new liner in the harbour, the *Andes*. It had only recently been built for the Royal Mail Line but the Admiralty had taken it over to carry troops when war broke out. Stevenson managed to arrange for the Seaforths to be taken on board this luxury liner, and he and his two officers immediately established themselves on board.

In Vancouver, meanwhile, Major C. C. Ferrie assumed temporary command of the battalion with Major J. M. S. Tait as his second in command. The day after Lt-Col. Stevenson left, the battalion received notice that it would be leaving the city by two special C.P.R. trains on the morning of the 15th December. Lt. D. M. Clark, the Acting Adjutant, had a four-page movement order ready the next day, and early on the 15th everything was ready. It had been a hectic week, but by 0800 hours the battalion was lined up for a final brief inspection by the District Officer Commanding. The greatcoats, rifles, respirators, and large and small packs made movement awkward. Outside the armoury, in the rain, wives, sweethearts and relatives of the Seaforths had begun to gather as early as 0730 hours. An hour later crowds were lining the streets along which the regiment would march to the railway station, and city policemen were diverting traffic from the route. At nine o'clock the great doors of the Seaforth Armoury opened, and the roar of the drums echoing inside the building brought forth the Pipes and Drums playing "Scotland the Brave" as they led the khaki columns out into the street. Swinging right over the Burrard bridge, the Seaforths noted that lining the street were men from the 15th (Vancouver) Coast Brigade, R.C.A., the 1st Searchlight Regiment, R.C.A., and the 11th District Signals, R.C.C.S. Near the crest of the bridge Brigadier J. C. Stewart, DSO, accompanied by various staff officers, took the salute. At the end of the bridge the crowds thickened, and when the pipes struck up "Blue Bonnets over the Border" when marching down Granville Street, there were almost two battalions marching—one of

soldiers and one of civilians. Coming up in the rear the brass band was playing marching songs from the Great War, and the combination of the two—the shrill, defiant cry of the pipes and the solid, military sound of the brass band—brought surges of emotion to the thousands who cheered the regiment on its way. Mr. Alan Morley, a local newspaper reporter, summed up the scene on the station platform in these words:

> There was kissing and shouting and tears and brave smiling and long, long waving of hands and hearty back-slaps and shouts of "Good luck!" and half strangled "God bless you's" and more kisses and girls weeping and tucking pathetic little notes into uniform pockets to be found later, and an exchanging of souvenir badges and brooches and all the immemorial, sad, tear-dimmed ritual.
>
> And in the midst of it a few civic dignitaries and important personages looked on bewilderedly as their dignity and importance dwindled to nothing in the swelling tide of common emotion.
>
> And when it was all over, the place was empty and the streets around were filled with a thinning crowd of sad-faced men and women, some of whom had not cried before but were crying now.[32].

Shortly after ten, the first of the two special trains pulled away from the station, followed by the second within the hour. The long journey had begun, and for many of those who watched the familiar sights of the city pass by, it would be almost six long years before they saw Vancouver again.

It took five days to travel the 3000 miles between Vancouver and Halifax. For most of the men in the regiment it was the longest train trip they had ever taken. The further east the two trains went the colder it became, until by the time the battalion went through northern Ontario snow was on the ground. Periodically the trains stopped long enough for everyone to get out and either do some physical training exercises on the station platform or go on a short route march. In Winnipeg the Pipe Band of the Cameron Highlanders met the unit and led the men on a short route march. Another long stop permitted the men to see something of White River and, incidentally, pick up some liquid refreshment. In Montreal another brief march was held in ten degrees above zero weather and as the train travelled on into the Maritimes, there was no let up in the bitter cold.

At noon on 20 December the first trainload of the battalion pulled up close to the Halifax dock and the men, once again loaded

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[32] The "Vancouver Sun", 15 December 1939, p. 1.

with their gear, lined up on the platform while their train was inspected. Considering the length of time the unit was on the train, it was surprising there were no damages. A short walk through the sheds brought the Seaforths to the gangplank, while above loomed the bulky sides of *H.M.T. Andes.* As each man entered the bowels of the ship, he was handed a card showing his berthing accommodation and boat station, after which he trudged along corridors, down flights of stairs and along more corridors until he found his cabin or mess deck.

Unlike later contingents which sailed with other divisions, the Seaforths had comparatively luxurious quarters. Of some 1500 officers and men on board the *Andres,* fewer than 200 slept in hammocks.[33] "The majority of the men," wrote Lt-Col. Stevenson later,

> were in cabins—4, 6 or 8 in each, the degree of luxury depending on the class of cabin. The large crew's quarters . . . were also available as the ship's staff . . . was at a minimum. The officers, warrant officers and sergeants had the better class cabins. . . .
>
> The men were fed in the main dining salon in which had been fixed mess tables, very well arranged, and all at one sitting.[34]

The Seaforths, in brief, were almost treated like tourist passengers, and compared to later convoys their accommodation was exceptionally good.

On the *Andes* there were plenty of duties to perform. A section of signallers took over duty on the bridge, while six anti-aircraft posts were manned by 73 machine-gunners under the command of Captain W. G. H. Roaf. Almost 100 armed sentries were required for various posts throughout the day. Submarine lookouts, the inevitable fatigues and other duties gave some work to almost everyone, and boat drills, morning inspection, and some physical training provided variety for any who were overlooked. It was all new and strange and exciting, and the captain's brief but somber talk to all ranks before the ship left harbour brought home to everyone that the ocean they were to cross would be their first entry into a theatre of war. Blackout, the wearing of lifebelts, the warning not to throw anything overboard, the need to keep a sharp lookout—these were the things he stressed just prior to the *Andes* easing out into mid-harbour.

At noon on 22 December the convoy began to move past the

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[33] Seaforth Archives, File: "Commanding Officers Correspondence," Letter Lt-Col. J. B. Stevenson to Brigadier General Clark, 25 February 1940.

[34] *Ibid.*

rocky harbour coast which looked bleak through the snow flurries. The cold wind made the water choppy as the pilot-boat took off the pilot and the last of the ship's mail. As the *Andes* headed for the open sea, she and the other seven troopships took up their convoy stations while the accompanying Canadian destroyers and heavier British and French naval ships fanned out to surround them with their protection. In a very short time the coastline of Nova Scotia disappeared from sight.

With the exception of three rather rough days, the journey across the Atlantic was good. Boat drills, physical training, a few lectures and some foot and arms drill were given, but for the most part the men had plenty of time to themselves to read, write, explore the ship, or perhaps take part in one of several card or "crown and anchor" games which saw considerable amounts of money change hands. The "big game" was run by Pte. Hugh Dickey of "A" Company. Apparently his game in the recreation room was so attractive —and so profitable—that the ship's sailors and stewards were losing all their money with the result that it was finally confiscated "to keep peace on board."[35] For those who maintained their sea-legs, the sight from the deck in mid-ocean could be spectacular. One N.C.O. describes watching the British battleship at one point in these words:

> Riding in the middle of the convoy was the *Revenge* which was shipping white water from stem to stern. With her great 15-inch guns swung to starboard to counteract the wind pressure on that side, she would burrow under a giant comber and rearing up would throw great masses of green water high into the air to take another dive and come up again, would hit the descending mass of water and smash it into a mass of white foam which, in the brilliant sun of Xmas afternoon, turned into a great rainbow.[36]

The N.C.O. who wrote those words was one of those who were not affected by seasickness and who could appreciate the scene from the deck on Christmas Day. A great many of the battalion, however, were not so well disposed and their complexion turned a greyish-green colour as seasickness got the better of them. Each roll, pitch and toss of the ship was misery, and none prayed so fervently for the sight of land as those so afflicted. A first rate Christmas dinner, therefore, was heartily enjoyed by some, appreciated and kept down

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[35] Seaforth Archives, Pierce Narrative, p. 3. Dickey, it might be added, had served in the merchant marine for a number of years.

[36] *Ibid.*, pp. 3-4.

by more, but left untouched by many. Even the prospect of being served by the N.C.Os. was not sufficient to drag seasick soldiers from their bunks—indeed some would not have moved if the Prime Minister himself had waited on them.

One Seaforth who really became ill at this time was Pte. William Marshall, who came down with acute appendicitis on Boxing Day. Marshall was attended by five doctors—three from the No. 5 Field Ambulance, R.C.A.M.C., the ship's doctor and Captain A. Robertson, the unit's medical officer. This group of medical experts held a conference immediately and decided to operate. With the ship rolling back and forth the operation by Dr. Anderson was not an easy one but it was successful. One cannot help but think that Pte. Marshall must have been a welcome and interesting patient for doctors who had treated nothing more than minor cuts and seasick cases for almost a week.

Each passing day brought some change in an otherwise monotonous journey. Periodically clocks were advanced an hour, and one day the paymaster took in all Canadian money and exchanged it for British. In mid-ocean the five Canadian destroyers turned back to Halifax, but on the 28th twelve British destroyers joined the heavier British and French naval vessels which kept the convoy company. On the following day an R.A.F. flying boat flew over the convoy as it entered calmer waters near the Irish coast. The racing destroyers, the signalling back and forth among the ships, the distant sight of land and the knowledge that they would be in harbour the next day was exciting, and the actual arrival in port, as described by one of the men on board the ship, was everything one could desire:

> The morning of the 30th of December, as dawn broke, we were between the black but welcome hills of the mouth of the River Clyde. As the sun rose small white-washed cottages appeared on either bank, becoming more numerous as we reached the boom ships near Gouroch. Now all convoy ships were line astern, and as the *Andes* got to the boom opening, all our escort destroyers were lined up. Crews had dressed ship. All crews were clad in duffel coats and as each ship passed through, they gave three cheers which were heartily returned.[37]

By mid-morning the *Andes* was at anchor, and everyone who could be on deck was straining to see something of Argyllshire and

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[37] Pierce Narrative, *op. cit.*, p. 6. As the *Andes* passed through the line of naval ships, the Pipe Band played "Rule, Brittania"—a salute they had practiced on the way over. The sailors heard it and cheered it to the echo.

"gazing at the new scenes, the toy green trains, the tiny 'goods' wagons, etc."[38]. At lunch time, somewhat unexpectedly, the *Andes* was visited by a group of distinguished men who had come to welcome the 1st Division to Great Britain. Among them were the Honourable Vincent Massey, General Sir Charles Grant, VC, commanding the Scottish Command, Sir John Gilmour and others. The most easily recognized, as Lt-Col. Stevenson conducted them through the dining saloons, where the men were eating, was Mr. Anthony Eden, Secretary of State for the Dominions. All were given a spontaneously good reception.

Shortly after noon on 31 December the Seaforths left the *Andes*[39] and, as Lt-Col. Stevenson wrote later,

> Now began the most uncomfortable part of our trip. We had to wait for trains and the icy winds around the quay I will long remember. I moved the troops in the station which was a little better. The journey for the last train started just at dusk so that the landscape, snow-covered, was cheerless. Soon the blackout blinds had to be drawn and with the shaded and reduced lights inside there was not much one could do. I took the last train, [Majors] Ferrie and Tait were ahead.[40]

Among the several hundred men on the earlier train section commanded by Major Ferrie, there was one group of men who had an inward glow sufficient to overcome the bleak weather outside. That was the pipe band. "We all wondered why our Pipe Band was so enthusiastic in playing at every stop made by the train on our way to Aldershot," Ferrie wrote. "It turned out that they had raided the bar on the train and got well fortified on 'Scotland's Best'. However, it was docked from their pay and everyone was happy except the Pipe Band."[41]

The long, cold train journey from Glasgow to North Farnborough came to an end at mid-morning on New Year's Day, 1940, when everyone piled out of the carriages onto the icy, snow-covered platform. Here the battalion was met by Brigadier Pearkes, several

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[38] *Loc. cit.*

[39] In 1947 the regiment presented a plaque to the *S.S. Andes* commemorating their wartime voyage.

[40] Stevenson to Clark, *op. cit.*

[41] Letter, Ferrie to author, 27 July 1966. Pipe Major Esson's version is different. He claims he was playing in the New Year on the pipes as a good Scotsman should, when some of the train crew, in appreciation, brought up some refreshments for him and other pipers. To refuse would be discourteous, and the Seaforth pipers were all gentlemen.

staff officers from the Aldershot Command, as well as part of the Advance Party which had been getting their quarters in shape for the past week. A two-mile route march brought the unit to the Delville Barracks. Two days later a week's disembarkation leave was granted to almost everyone, so that by 4 January, except for the inevitable fatigue party, most of the battalion had left to see the sights of London, Edinburgh, and various other centres of Great Britain.

It might be well at this point to try and see Great Britain through the eyes of one of the soldiers as he made his way to London, or indeed to project this disembarkation leave and combine it with others he would enjoy in the coming year. If one takes the longer view, therefore, and combines the impression he would receive throughout 1940 and even into 1941, a more general and truer picture could be painted.

Possibly the first impact the Seaforth had of Great Britain was its comparative smallness in relation to Canada. The trains were smaller, the cars—such few as he saw on the road—were smaller, and the freight cars, or "goods wagons," seemed ridiculously small. At the same time he would be impressed with their speed and efficiency. The train taking him to London not only rattled along at a good clip, but they seemed to run with the frequency of tramcars. The money he received from the paymaster was different, naturally, and the coins much heavier. If he found it strange at first, he very soon became acquainted with its value, and found among other things that he was looked upon as being well paid, by British servicemen.

The differences in language, odd at first, were soon both understood and adopted by him. To the British gasoline was petrol, a sidewalk was a pavement, a wrench was a spanner and a truck was a lorry. The Seaforth was also to learn that "one and six" meant one shilling and sixpence, a "W.C." indicated a water closet or toilet, and a "boot" the trunk of a car. To have a "mug up" was to have a cup of tea, to be knocked up meant to be awakened, and to listen to the wireless was to listen to the radio. As time went on a wartime slang became more pronounced. A blitzed area was a bombed area, to be "pranged" was to be hit, a "flap" was a disorganized state and a "snafu" was a situation best described by the letters which formed the word—"situation normal, all fouled up."[42]

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[42] There were, of course, variations of this.

Another thing which always impressed Canadians in England was the blackout. When dusk came every light was covered or shaded, so that at night in the country, especially if it was cloudy and foggy, it could be almost literally pitch black. Any flashlight (or "electric torch") carelessly shown could bring a bellow from a "bobby" (policeman) or A.R.P.[43] warden to put out that light. Particularly during the air raids in 1940 these rules were vigorously enforced. To help overcome the difficulties of finding one's way in the city, the Seaforths noted that white paint was used to outline street curbs, cross walks, steps and entrances. Indeed measures used to counter the effect of air attacks were very evident. Barrage balloons in public parks, searchlight and anti-aircraft batteries, and windows taped with adhesive were most evident. Shelter signs were everywhere, and in time the Seaforths were to accept as quite common the sight of thousands of Londoners sleeping on the platforms of the underground railway stations. Sandbagged walls, brick shelters built in the middle of the streets, and huge water tanks created out of the cleared basements of shattered buildings were common, as were piles of rubble from bombed buildings dotting the verges of roads used to fill in bomb-craters should they occur on main highways.

Another aspect of British life new to the Seaforth, and one which became more severe as the submarine menace took its toll of allied shipping, was rationing. By the end of the year, and especially in 1941 and 1942, almost everything in Britain seemed to be rationed, and ration coupons for food and clothing were very restricted. The Seaforths felt this particularly with food. Army rations were adequate, but it took a clever cook to make an appetizing breakfast out of powdered eggs and slices of darkish bread called the national loaf. Mutton, Brussels sprouts, beans on toast and similar items might be supplemented by soggy "chips" and some "mystery" sausages (or "snorkers") at the N.A.A.F.I. canteen.[44] On furlough one could often fare better at the service clubs which were established in London and elsewhere. British Columbia House and the Beaver Club were two of the best known clubs for Canadians, and the Sea-

[43] A.R.P.—Air Raid Precaution.

[44] N.A.A.F.I.—The Navy, Army and Air Force Institute ran the men's dry canteen in most service barracks. The mystery about the sausages was their contents, reputed to consist of two thirds soybean meal and "to have been led past a steer".

forths especially took advantage of the facilities at B.C. House which Mr. and Mrs. W. A. McAdam made available for them. Meals at restaurants and cafes were expensive[45] for privates earning $1.30 a day, but even here the fare was limited. Furthermore, as additional overseas divisions arrived in Great Britain, the demand for entertainment put a heavy strain on British facilities. The result was that there were queues to be seen everywhere—to get seats in the theatre or cinema, to purchase limited stocks of such things as cigarettes, to gain entrance to restaurants, to get on a bus, and so forth. Rationing brought with it two side effects. The first, perhaps, was that parcels from home containing such hard-to-get items as razors, candy, oranges, chocolate, coffee, canned fruit, woollen goods, *et cetera* assumed more importance than ever. The second was the steadily mounting pressure on soldiers and civilians alike to economize. Signs such as "Is this Journey Really Necessary" or "Turn Off the Light" were everywhere. Every scrap of waste that could be used was collected, and the sight of someone measuring the amount of food thrown out by the cook-house was common. In time the number of miles travelled even by military vehicles was restricted, while drivers came to be very concerned with air pressure of their tyres so as to limit the wear and tear on the rubber. People collected paper, tinfoil, aluminum pots and metals of all sorts; when taking a bath there would be a sign urging the soldier to limit the hot water to four or five inches in the tub, and as time went on, there was even a limit to the hours when one could have heat in the buildings in order to save coal.

If the British were rationed in many things, the Seaforths found that they were exceptionally generous as hosts and that, as Canadians, they were made welcome both in towns and cities. There were, of course, the usual servicemen's clubs and canteens everywhere, and elaborate arrangements were made by British organizations to make Canadians feel at home. Special tours were organized to help any soldier who wished to visit the historic places of London or Edinburgh. A limited number of free tickets were made available to those who wanted to attend an opera, to listen to a concert at Albert Hall or sometimes to see one of the top shows playing at a famous

[45] Early in 1940 meals and entertainment were inexpensive compared to Canada, but from about mid-1940 onward prices went up and rationing became increasingly strict.

theatre. One could get a conducted tour of the House of Commons or the Tower of London, and there were usually invitations available through the service clubs from British families anxious to have a Canadian soldier as a guest either for a dinner or even the week-end. Despite the wartime restrictions under which they lived, the Seaforths found the British to be friendly, warm-hearted and brave people, and it was not long before an increasing number of both officers and men were applying for permission to marry.

The Seaforths were quick to adapt themselves to their new home, and the local "pub" became as dear a social centre as it was to the local residents. The rapid-fire patter of British comedians over the "Home" or "Forces" programme on the B.B.C., at first hard to understand, soon took the place of the more familiar American entertainers and were enjoyed every bit as much, if not more. The blackout, at first the object of language which would peel paint off the wall as the Seaforth stumbled and groped his way through unfamiliar streets, was ultimately accepted and coped with. Week by week the Seaforths merged more completely into the British scene. The blackout, the interminable queues, the rationing, the money, the beer and the beauty of the country—all were to become so familiar and so accepted that years later, when the Seaforth managed to get a leave from the continent, when he arrived in Britain he felt as if he had come home.

CHAPTER III

On Guard In England

The winter of 1939-40 in England was one of the coldest the country had experienced for almost half a century. For weeks the temperature hovered just above or just below the freezing point, and frequently the damp, icy winds would swirl fine snow across the parade grounds of Delville East Barracks, the new home of the Seaforth Highlanders of Canada. The new quarters were good, and compared to the conditions under which the First Canadian Contingent lived in 1915, they bordered on the luxurious. Situated about one half mile from Cove, a small town near the military centre of Aldershot, the spider huts which comprised the barracks were part of a complex of buildings which had wings or legs stretching from a central ablution building. Each wing had its own pot-bellied stove for heat. Into these went a carefully rationed amount of low quality coal, and once the black-out screens were put up at dusk, the combination of coal fumes, steam from damp clothes and boots and other odours mingled to form an atmosphere which might be termed military musk.

The combination of the bone-chilling temperature and the Spartan atmosphere brought about an outbreak of influenza which swept through the entire division. Within the regiment, one officer stated later that at one point ". . . one third of the battalion was recovering from 'flu, one third had it and one third was getting it."[1] By the last week in January the outbreak was at its peak when 267

[1] Letter, Brigadier W. S. Murdoch to author, 26 September 1966.

officers and men were hospitalized or sick in quarters. Fortunately the influenza kept the individual in bed only three or four days,[2] but with so many men affected it was not until February that a planned training programme could be followed with any degree of efficiency. An idea of how thoroughly the sickness affected the battalion may be gained from the following extract from the diary of one of the company commanders:

> A slim day of training. Much of my time seems to be taken up with arrangements for the sick, food—heat—medical care and such. There is only a skeleton of the company left for parades, and today only 1 Cpl and 2 L/Cpls. on parade—as yesterday—in addition to C. S. M. Nicholson and L/Sgt. Whittaker, the Ord. Sgt. My officers are still intact, though several from other companies have gone down. [3]

One of the major reasons for sending the division to England was to enable it to take advantage of the military training resources in the country and to provide it with the necessary equipment, arms and transport with which to train. Even before the Canadians arrived in Great Britain, arrangements had been made to send officers, N.C.Os. and men on a variety of courses at British military schools. By the third week in March, the Seaforths had sent sixteen officers and thirty other ranks to these schools. The following list of officers and men sent on courses gives some indication of the variety of skills which the battalion required.

Course	*Officers*	*Men*
Platoon Weapons	3	6
Sniping	1	—
3-inch Mortar	—	1
Bren Carriers	1	4
Range Finding	—	2
Transport Duties	1	—
Driving & Concealment	1	—
Drill Instructor	—	4
Physical Training	1	1
Anti Gas	1	1
Senior Officers Gas Course	—	1
Field Engineering	—	1
Signal Instructor	1	1
Senior Officers Course	1	—
Staff Officers Course	1	—

[2] The new "wonder drug", sulfa, was used to good effect.

[3] Diary of Major Forin, 1940: entry for 19 January 1940. (This diary is in the possession of Col. J. D. Forin, Vancouver).

Course	*Officers*	*Men*
Company Commander's Course	1	—
Officers Military Hygiene	1	—
Messing Officers	2	1
Cookery	—	4
Butchery	—	1
Pipe Majors Course	—	1

There were others not included in this list, but these skills were among the most needed if the Seaforths were to become the fully trained soldiers it was intended they should be.

Although close to the great British arms and munitions plants, the Seaforths found that many weeks and sometimes months were to go by before they were fully equipped. By 21 March, five small lorries, five carriers and fourteen motorcycles formed the total number of military vehicles held by the Transport Platoon. These were augmented by six Vauxhall passenger cars and five 30-hundredweight Bedford trucks which had been impressed for military use.[4] The Signal Platoon, commanded by Lt. H. C. Gell, was as usual one of the best trained in the battalion. Moreover Gell and his sergeant, J. D. Newberry, were training a sufficient number of reserves to ensure replacements in case of casualties. Nevertheless by the Spring of 1940 this platoon had only three D-5 Telephones, no Fullerphones, and no signals stationery. Only when they went on course did Gell and Newberry see some of the equipment which, ultimately, would be issued.

During April and May more arms and equipment had been received, especially Bren guns and Boys anti-tank rifles. By mid-May all the companies were complete in light machine-guns, and the three and two-inch mortars were issued at about the same time. It was not until 29 July, however, that the Seaforths trained for the first time with live grenades. It was almost three months later before a second suit of battledress was available to all ranks. Incidentally, it was not until 20 November that the pipers received issue pipes which were indented for almost a year previously.[5]

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[4] W.D., Seaforth Highlanders of Canada, April, 1940, Appendix II, "Inspection Report, 21 March 1940." By 30 March the unit had six Universal and two Bren Carriers.

[5] The Pipe Band took overseas the drums belonging to the regiment, and many of the pipers brought their own pipes. The new pipes and drums presented by George Thompson, Esq. of Vancouver, arrived from Scotland in

In England, and later on continental Europe, the loss of the kilt as part of the service uniform was frequently lamented. The officers and members of the Pipe Band had their own kilts. The latter wore them almost constantly but the officers donned them only on special parades or after hours for walking out. A very limited supply of kilts was available in the Quartermaster Stores, and in time an arrangement was made whereby N.C.Os. and men could borrow them for a limited period either for walking out or while on leave.

One issue from the Quartermaster Stores in January which made everyone in the unit happy was the balmoral bonnet. Another small but welcome item was the issue of the "imperial" cap badge with a square of the MacKenzie tartan to set it off. The latter came as a gift from the affiliated regiment. Even before the battalion arrived in England Lt-Col. Stevenson had received a warm letter from the Seaforth Highlanders in anticipation of the unit's arrival and offering the Canadians the facilities of their Comforts and Welfare Association.[6]. Lt-Col. Stevenson visited the Seaforths shortly after the unit arrived in England, and one result of this visit was an offer to supply the Canadians with 900 tartan patches for the balmorals. These were cut from condemned kilts and trews from the affiliated regiment's depot at Fort George. It was a very pleasing gesture on the part of the British regiment, as was their offer to share their clubs in Scotland with members of the Seaforth Highlanders of Canada. As time went on, members of both regiments were to become more closely acquainted and the friendly relationship which had existed for forty years was to be cemented more firmly.[7]

February when the battalion was at Cove. The "issue" pipes were those issued to pipe bands from government stores.

[6] Quite a few of the extra woollen socks and scarves worn by the Canadian Seaforths during the cold winter months were made by women who were members of the British Seaforths Association. The unit also received at this time six parcels of knitted goods from Mrs. Eric Hamber. The socks, Balaclavas, sweaters and other useful items were knitted by the staff of Government House, Victoria.

[7] During the year the Canadian Seaforth officers adopted the green Lovat hose and leather sporran worn by the imperial regiment as part of their walking out dress. About a year after the unit had been in Great Britain two additional distinguishing marks were added to the men's uniform. One was the cloth shoulder badge—with "Seaforth-Canada" embroidered in buff on

Late in January, 1940 when R.S.M. Maitland began to hold a series of smartening-up drill parades in anticipation of a visit from His Majesty King George VI, the battalion at least looked like a Highland unit. On 24 January the entire brigade lined up in threes along a section of the Cove - Fleet highway awaiting His Majesty, and shortly after mid-day he arrived. It was a far different display from the glittering guard of honour the regiment provided in Vancouver almost a year previously, but the battalion was as smart in its new battledress and balmorals as it was possible to be. Periodically His Majesty stopped to speak to some of the Seaforths as he walked by with his staff. He remembered the unit from his visit to Vancouver, and his remarks to Lt-Col. Stevenson at the end of his inspection were complimentary.

At the time of His Majesty's visit the Seaforth Highlanders of Canada was just recovering from its siege with the 'flu, and if the unit was to complete the individual training of the soldier, a concentrated effort had to be made. The divisional commander had laid down the end of February as the time when this phase was to be completed, but this was later changed to mid-March. Even these extra two weeks were few enough to get the men properly trained.

For the next two months the unit strove hard to prepare itself for an inspection during which it would come under McNaughton's intensive examination. Fortunately for the Seaforths and the other units in the brigade, Brigadier G. R. Pearkes was a professional soldier exceptionally well trained in his craft, and every week the Highlanders were to see him roving about, giving advice, praising those who deserved it and prodding those who needed it. "The Brigadier works us like blazes," wrote Lt-Col. Stevenson. "He is always on the go, but that is what we came for. . . ."[8] The Brigade war diarist noted that "he daily visits the ranges, lecture rooms, field craft demonstrations, anti-tank gun drill and offers his valuable advice in connection with these subjects, especially in the realm of field craft."[9] Brigadier Pearkes was not the man merely to offer advice.

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a dark blue background. The other was a two-and-a half inch square decal of the MacKenzie tartan with the regimental cap badge imposed on it. This was pasted on the left side of the steel helmet.

[8] Seaforth Archives, Commanding Officers' Correspondence, Letter, Stevenson to Brigadier General J. A. Clark, 25 February 1940.

[9] W. D., H. Q., 2nd Cdn. Inf. Bde., 20 February 1940.

On one occasion he appeared in the training area which was very wet and very muddy. There Pearkes

> . . . watched an N.C.O. demonstrating grenade throwing on a trench raid. . . . This being the general's forte, and having strong ideas on how it should be done, he handed his greatcoat to his driver and in his well-tailored barathea [uniform] got down in the mud and crawled through it to give a first class demonstration of how to raid a trench.[10]

This lesson, from a man who was awarded the VC, DSO, MC and Croix de Guerre in the Great War for his activities at the front, probably sank home very deeply in to the minds of the men who watched an expert perform.

The Seaforth also had much to learn about his craft as a soldier in the field, both at night and during daylight. One of the essentials was map-reading and using a compass, and England was an excellent training ground for both. The innumerable hedge-bordered roads with their sharp turns made it difficult at first for both drivers and motor-cyclists to find their way. Later in the year, when directional signs were removed owing to the fear of invasion, the driver of a lorry who could not read a map quickly and accurately frequently got lost. Driving at night increased the hazard, for only two, shaded pin-pricks of light were permitted from the headlights. These did little more than give warning to a vehicle coming from the opposite direction that another vehicle was on the road.

For the Seaforths who had to march—and these were in the large majority—the short five-to-ten mile route marches in the early months could be fairly pleasant affairs. During 1940 most of the platoons and companies marched in column of route.[11] Usually a company on the march would be accompanied by a piper. Marches to Aldershot, Fleet, Farnborough, Farnham and other nearby towns, or perhaps to the numerous training areas in the Aldershot area, were a pleasant relief from the lecture room or drilling on the parade square.

Map reading on these occasions was relatively simple, but more difficult were the cross-country night marches which were instituted. Usually a group of men, acting as a syndicate, were collected at a

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[10] Seaforth Archives, Pierce Narrative.

[11] The practice of marching in anti-aircraft formation became general in 1941. The three sections in each platoon marched on alternate sides of the road, separated one from the other by about 20 feet.

point and given a map, a compass, and a set of instructions. The latter was a combination of compass bearings and distances, and if the syndicate followed the various bearings for the various distances, and if it were both accurate and fortunate, it would complete its doglegged journey across fields and brooks by midnight. To avoid tempting anyone who felt he might "sling the lead" by going a short distance into the blackness and resting a reasonable time until he returned to the starting point, N.C.Os. were stationed at control points to check each syndicate through. Generally speaking these night marches created as much interest as they did frustrations.

Training in chemical warfare was stressed continuously not only in the early months of 1940 but throughout the entire year. The fear that the enemy might use gas was constant, and for months the Seaforths had to carry their respirators with them both while training and when walking out. To accustom all ranks to the respirator, once a week, for at least half an hour, every person in the battalion was compelled to wear his "gas mask". Aside from this, there were constant lectures on gas, the means of its delivery, contamination, recognition, and every other aspect of operating in battle should it be used. Despite the incessant warnings and lectures, the respirator in time became one of the most disliked pieces of equipment which all ranks were required to carry. The anti-gas cape was a close second, but it, at least, could be used as a raincape even though this was considered a misuse of equipment.

Interspersed with individual training were platoon and company schemes. In March, for example, when the fields were becoming tinted with green and the first signs of spring were noticeable, the Seaforths were given some practical training in taking over a section of trenches in the Norris Bridge area close to the Basingstoke Canal. Each company was to practice taking over, manning and guarding the trenches in somewhat the same fashion as might be done in France where the so-called "phoney war" was in progress. One officer describes his company's participation in these words:

> All the officers in the company draw denim battlesuits large enough to pull over serge battlesuits. I got out my sweater and balaclava for the tour tonight will be cold. I have drawn my battle order some days ago and sent chits to all persons concerned and by dinner time am ready to go. We fall in at 9:30 with a blue and white lantern for front and rear. . . . We proceed to Foresters Inn—Battalion H.Q. where our Platoon trucks, which pass us en route, are rendezvoused. Arrived there, we do a good

> job of unloading our equipment, Bren guns, etc.; no confusion, a minimum of noise—excellent considering it's our first experience. We earn the praise, given later, of Major Tait, who is watching. Our guides do not appear at the specified time but a P.P.C.L.I. guide does and leads us up a paved road and so into the rear of our position. There Capt. McIntyre goes ahead and takes steps to take over Coy. H.Q. We find Capt. Sutherland, P.P.C.L.I. in charge. . . . We are in position by midnight. C.S.M. Nicholson posts guards about Coy. H.Q., for the Intelligence Section are [sic] out to capture anything they can lay hands on—helmets, rifles or men. Two of our men going down to the Platoon trucks for lanterns bring back 2 Int [elligent] Sec [tion] men as prisoners. I make my rounds and find the dispositions of sections good. One patrol from each Platoon is out. We are often challenged—the men catching on to this well. We come across 2 patrols, are challenged and talk to them. On returning to Coy. H.Q. find that Brigadier and Brigade Major are making the rounds. I make after them with my 2 orderlies but cannot find them so return. I go to ration truck rendezvous and talk to subaltern and guides from Edmonton Regt. The truck presently comes through and . . . food is distributed, soup and hard biscuits being carried forward to the platoons. . . . The relieving Coy. of Edmonton Regt. comes in at 3 a.m., . . . and we go out so that we are cleared by 4 a.m. Trucks are reloaded in a wood 400 yds, in the rear and we march home.[12]

The combination of weapon training, range work, marches, minor schemes, and similar work gave the battalion little opportunity to prepare for the inspection by the General Officer Commanding on 21 March, but at that a few days on the parade square brought the unit up to snuff when Major-General McNaughton and a rather large staff appeared. The Seaforths were ready for him. Even the door knobs on the huts had been polished. The formal part of the parade, especially the march past with fixed bayonets, went off very well with the Pipes and Drums leading the 800 officers and men as they went through their drill. After that, the staff officers descended on the companies, picking out men here and there to query them on various phases of training. It was some weeks before the Commanding Officer received a detailed written report on the staff assessment of the unit, but when it came it was quite favourable. Considering the limitations imposed by sickness, weather and the lack of equipment, the battalion had progressed rapidly. Nevertheless there was no reason to relax. As one N.C.O. wrote at the time: "We have learned more than we knew there was, but principally we have learned how little we first knew. . . ."[13]

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[12] Forin diary, 15 March 1940.

[13] Sgt. F. D. Thompson, Seaforth Archives, 1939-1945 Newspaper Scrapbook.

While continuing to learn more about the military arts, the Seaforths were becoming more acquainted with British civilian life and practices as well. The "pub"—any pub—and the social life centered in it was perhaps the first institution to be thoroughly adopted by the Seaforths. The "Queen's Hotel", "The Jolly Farmer", "The Plough" or whatever the name of the pub might be, came to be as familiar to the Seaforths as it was to the locals. By this time, too, a number of men became engaged to English girls and dozens were married before the unit left for Sicily. The hospitality of the English people, especially outside the Aldershot area where troops had been stationed for a century, was reciprocated wherever possible, but sometimes the English, leading more orderly lives, must have been surprised at the actions of the Seaforths. One example might be called "The story of the pig", which Major C. C. Ferrie recalls.

> Our sergeants, as the Vimy Dinner night approached, looked for ways and means to put on their annual dinner. Rationing was in effect, as were strict regulations against the purchase of poultry and meats. They scurried around the countryside and located a farmer who would sell a young pig, at a price. It had to be very "hush, hush", however, and could not be slaughtered on the premises. The plan was to take the ration truck with four sgts. as handlers, plus the Sgt. Cook and Medical Sgt. to slaughter the pig en route. Everything worked out well. The pig was collected in the vehicle. Then the fun began. The Medical Sgt. administered chloroform . . . when they arrived on a quiet English country road. The Sgt. Cook then cut the pig's throat. Immediately the pig came to life, rushing around the truck covering all the inmates with blood and gore. Eventually he was subdued.
>
> The next question was how to dispose of the entrails. Someone got the bright idea to put them down the camp sewer. They forgot it was a septic tank system.
>
> The dinner was a great success and everything appeared to be perfect. The day following the dinner there was a blockage of the sewer system . . . and the drains opened. The report was that human entrails had been found. The police were notified and excitement reigned. The culprits confessed and shortly after all was quiet again.[14]

If Robbie Burns had been alive he would probably have immortalized the event in poetry.

Such forays were usually not so bloodthirsty, however. Indeed the number of dogs, cats and even birds brought into barracks as pets

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Sgt. Thompson was writing articles for a Vancouver newspaper about life in the army overseas.

[14] Letter, Colonel C. C. Ferrie to author, 27 September 1966.

was considerable. On one occasion some Seaforths of the Carrier Platoon found a large, white swan frozen in a pool in a field. They hacked the ice around it, carried it back to barracks and put it in a bathtub and left it to thaw out in peace. It recovered in remarkably quick time, evidently, for when the Acting Commanding Officer, Major Ferrie, was inspecting the barracks he opened the door to be met by a swan who rushed at him with wings flapping and neck outstretched in full attack. The consequence is best forgotten, except to say that the swan, under royal protection, was released.

Incidents such as these were only part of the total scene, and each veteran will have his own memory of these first months in England, of his own personal relationships with the civilian population and his fairly quick acceptance of the English way of doing things. Certainly there was much to see and much to admire, but even before Major-General McNaughton's inspection the battalion embarked on the second phase of its training which was to emphasize the group rather than the individual.

Although the Western Front continued to be quiet, and although England had not yet felt the full force of German air power, there remained within the 1st Division a sense of urgency to push training to the utmost. The long years of neglect of the militia could not be made up in a few months, and a soldier trained in his arms and basic military evolutions was only the raw material of a potentially efficient battalion and brigade. No one felt this sense of urgency more than Brigadier Pearkes, and it was his task to bring the officers and men in each unit up to a level of military competency as quickly as possible. No one knew when the division might be called upon to go to France, and no one knew better than this veteran the fate of enthusiastic amateurs at the front.

The Seaforths, therefore, along with the Princess Patricias and the Edmontons felt the weight of his hand and the bark of his voice, and for the next month or so the battalion was to train harder than ever.[15] In this era, and especially after Dunkirk, considerable stress

[15] Lt. Keen, who was in charge of the Carrier Platoon, used rather direct methods to instruct his men to drive the tracked carriers. "He sat beside the driver, and whenever a mistake was made, such as clashing gears, or crossing of wrists on the steering wheel (apt to cause broken wrists), he rapped the driver on his steel helmet with a wrench, hard enough to rattle his teeth." (Letter, A. K. Harris to author, October, 1966.)

was laid on the mobility of the unit, and much thought and experiment was given to the quickest way for platoons and companies to load lorries, speed off to a destination, debus, arrange the platoons for an attack, and then practise in the field either attack or withdrawal tactics. This sounds somewhat simpler than it was in practise, for these exercises were carried out both by day and by night, by platoons, companies and then, ultimately, battalions and brigades. Traffic problems, as the Seaforths found out, could begin even at the company level, and experiments with the logistics of bringing up reinforcements, food, supplies and other equipment called for considerable planning and practise. Training in field engineering was necessary too, and this varied from laying concertina barbed wire to assembling and launching infantry foot bridges across small rivers under the direction of the Royal Canadian Engineers.

Trench or defensive warfare was no forgotten either, but it was by no means of the passive type. On 12 April, for example, two companies marched to Pirbright, just north-east of Farnborough, and took over a complete Great War trench system form the Scots Guards. The trenches, riveted, sandbagged and with observation posts and dugouts, were arranged so that the two companies faced each other across a "No Man's Land". As one observer wrote:

> Companies relieved at night. . . . Patrolling was very active with much noise and tears, [tear] gas bombs being used as missiles on many occasions. There were two casualties. Lt. Tarbuck attempting to throw back a gas bomb found that it was rather hot and suffered a burned hand. Sgt. H. MacNutt, "A" Coy., was shot in the groin with a blank, the wad and brass piece of which penetrated rather deeply. An early patrol of "A" Coy. inadvertently gassed the inspecting party consisting of Lt-Col. Stevenson, Capt. Murdoch and Major Ferrie. Morning brought the first rum issue of the war. No regular one being available, C.S.M. Nicholson used an empty sardine can as a measure and the result . . . on an empty stomach was certainly amazing.[16]

Four days before the Seaforths started to train in the Pirbright area, the German Wehrmacht descended on Norway, while at the same time the enemy's forces swept into and overran Denmark. On 16 April the acting brigade commander, Colonel E. W. Sansom, hurried off to London. On the following day at 1600 hours all troops

[16] Pierce Narrative, p. 18. The fact that the battalion trained in this fashion says much of military thinking at the time. Doubtless the static warfare on the Western Front had much to do with it, for a year later the concept of this type of training had completely changed.

in the brigade were confined to quarters,[17] and both British Military Police and Canadian regimental police scoured Aldershot sending all 2nd Brigade men back to barracks. All leave was cancelled, and of course rumour and speculation grew by the hour.

The Seaforths soon heard that the Princess Patricias and the Edmonton Regiment were receiving truckloads of new equipment, and part of it included sheepskin coats. Early on the 18th Pte. H. Drake of the Intelligence Section, a man who spoke several languages including Norwegian, was ordered to report to Brigade Headquarters, and Captain W. G. H. Roaf was hurriedly equipped and sent to the same headquarters on attachment. There was great activity in the lines of the other two battalions, and it seemed fairly obvious that they were off for Norway. What annoyed the Seaforths was that they had received no orders to stand by or to be prepared to move. That evening, equipped in full marching order, including ammunition, the bulk of the other two battalions marched out of the barracks to the Farnborough railway station and left for an "unknown destination". All the Seaforths were on hand to see them go, but there was no denying the fact that most of them were puzzled and hurt because they were not going too. The *esprit de corps* of the battalion was high, and every officer or man in it believed that his was the best unit in the brigade and the brigade the best in the division. As such, if there was any fighting to be done, why had not the Seaforths been chosen?

For the next few days the battalion remained under twelve hours' notice to move. One hopeful sign was that the Quartermaster Stores became a cornucopia of new equipment. All the old webbing was called in and new, lighter, more comfortable webbing issued in its place. It was said at the time that it need not be blancoed or shined, but this, as it turned out, was only partially true. Camouflaged ground sheets, new style gas capes, new respirators and other items were issued as well—but no sheepskin coats. Actually the weather turned quite warm at this time, and those companies which were taken out to the ranges to practise the new battle or field firing with live ammunition found themselves perspiring in the sun after the long siege of winter. The relaxation of the twelve hours' notice to move was followed by the happy news on the 25th that one quarter of the unit would be permitted to have a seven-day furlough. On the following

[17] W.D., H.Q., 2nd Cdn. Inf. Bde., 16-17 April 1944.

day, the half empty lines of the brigade rang to the skirl of the pipes of the 48th Highlanders and the Seaforths as both bands played into camp the battalions which had left eight days previously. They had not got to Norway, much to their chagrin, but after a rather miserable rainy week under canvas in Scotland they had been ordered back to barracks.

It took a little while for the Seaforths to regain their enthusiasm for training. The opportunity for active service had seemed close. No one, at that time, would have believed another three years would go by before the battalion would be called upon to prove its worth, and even the opportunity to become far better trained for action would probably have been sacrificed in favour of action immediately.

Only a few in the battalion had a chance to fire in action at this time, and the circumstances were rather unusual. In March the 1st Canadian Division was asked to provide 13 teams of Bren gunners from the various anti-aircraft platoons in the units. Two were requested from the 2nd Brigade, and several Seaforths were among those selected. These teams were to provide protection to minesweepers, trawlers, etc., working off the East Coast of the British Isles. It was felt the teams would get actual practice in anti-aircraft work during the three to four-week trips the boats would take from London. During March and April, Sgt. F. D. Thompson, Cpl. R. McK. Clarke, L/Cpl. L. M. Garner and Ptes. F. L. Carson, J. Gibson and W. M. Laurillard were among those who took part in this scheme, and at least could claim they were closer to the enemy than anyone else in the battalion.

During April, Spring had shown itself to be on the way, but in May it really began to get warm. The inspection of the brigade by the Earl of Athlone and Princess Alice on the 4th of May was carried out under almost ideal conditions, and two days later, when two companies of the battalion were sent out to do field exercises with the 2nd Battalion, the Welsh Guards, the training and weather combined to make the outing a memorable one. This British Guards battalion had been organized almost a year previously, and Majors Forin and Hoffmeister, the two company commanders, were keen to ensure that the Seaforths would measure up as the Guards' "enemy" in the exercise. Basically the scheme was to rely heavily on the section and platoon commanders. The men carried about 50 rounds of blank ammunition, thunder-flashes and smoke bombs

while the officers had Very pistols and flares. From early morning until midnight of 7 May the "battle" raged, with the Seaforths using every trick in the book and some not in the book to worry, harass and in general dismay the "enemy" in the Frensham area. By the time the exercise was over and the two composite companies marched the 16 miles back to barracks, all were exhausted but aware that they had done well. Certainly they had impressed some of the British umpires whose report on No. 7 Platoon was exceptionally good. Part of it is given below, since it gives a good example of much of the training carried on during manoeuvres in the early summer, and at the same time is indicative of the rapid advance made by the Seaforths since they had been in England. The umpires reported on the Seaforths as they observed them from various points of vantage:

> (a) The resource and activity of the Platoon Commander was noteworthy . . . he kept the initiative throughout and chose the place of combat on each occasion. For every situation he had a simple determined plan and on two occasions he used most effective ruses. As a result of the first occasion two platoons, Welsh Guards, were occupied capturing four Seaforths, while 7 Pl. Seaforths . . . engaged the Welsh Guards Headquarters. On the second occasion, he moved his platoon from under the eyes of the Welsh Guards scouts to a new position not discovered for two hours.
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> (b) The fieldcraft, morale and spirit of the Seaforths was remarkable. They moved constantly about the area and their positions and movements were made in cover and were concealed. When they occupied a defensive position it could not be seen with the naked eye, and discipline in such positions and on the march was extremely high.
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> (c) Each individual Seaforth appeared to be a trained scout and prepared to remain perfectly still at any moment and for any time.
>
> (d) 7 Pl. engaged the enemy four times and on each occasion the Welsh Guard Umpire ruled that the Seaforths had been beaten. Despite their blows to morale with which the undersigned did not on every occasion agree, the men and their commander threw themselves freshly into their new tasks.[18]

This report by neutral observers on the Seaforths speaks for itself in so far as military training and ability is concerned, but behind this one and a half day exercise, however, there can be seen the sturdy growth of a regimental spirit and elan which would see the battalion through some very tough battles when they got into action.

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[18] W.D., Seaforth Highlanders of Canada, May, 1940, Appendix 19: Letter, Major Commanding Liaison Wing, Sandhurst to Commanding Officer, Seaforth Highlanders of Canada.

On 10 May Adolf Hitler unleashed his divisions on the Western Front. The blows fell first on the Netherlands and Belgium. German aircraft swept over the two small countries bombing civilian towns and military installations indiscriminately, while airborne troops and parachutists struck at vital points in well-planned co-operation with infantry and panzer divisions rolling over the borders. It was the beginning of the great German offensive against the Allied Forces in France. The Maginot Line was to be turned and then breached and the neutrality of small countries was of little consequence to the German leader. In the next few weeks the terrible efficiency and ruthless tactics of the German forces were to hammer steadily across the Low Countries and into Northern France, and the weaknesses of the Allied Armies which had resulted from long years of neglect were to be exposed in a disastrous light.

When the news was flashed to England the response was seen within a matter of hours. The 2nd Brigade plans for its role in the defence of England had been drawn up some time previously, and the code word "Julius"[19] was sent to all units. The Seaforths, like the other units, were put on 24 hours' notice to move. Leave was cancelled and those on leave recalled. Lorries were camouflaged and dispersed, while additional trucks and about twenty busses[20] were delivered to the unit should the Seaforths have to leave by road. Orders were given for ammunition to be issued, and all the Bren guns in the battalion were mounted at various posts to guard against enemy aircraft and airborne troops. Between 0430 and 0600 hours the entire unit was ordered to "stand-to". In the cook-house, quartermaster stores, orderly rooms and elsewhere, preparations were made to move. Later in the morning trucks, busses and cars packed with British troops filled the roads, and all during the day military convoys protected by anti-aircraft machine-gunners passed by the barracks in long columns.

While the Seaforths waited in England and stood in an anti-parachutist role, military events on the continent worsened daily. Rotterdam, subjected to a devastating air attack, was symbolic of the

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[19] W.D., H.Q., 2nd Cdn. Inf. Bde., May, 1940, Appendix I: "2 Cdn. Ifn. Bde. Instructions—G.B.I."

[20] These were civilian busses commandeered from the Aldershot and District Transportation Co. There were kept under cover in a forested area three miles away near the Bramshot Golf Course.

German determination to practice total war, and four days after the enemy had crossed the Dutch border the Netherlands' army capitulated. On 12 May German forces crossed the Meuse River at Sedan, and by the third week in May their panzer divisions were cutting through Northern France to Abbeville. On 26 May Leopold III of the Belgians ordered his disorganized armies to capitulate, and the British Expeditionary Force began its fighting withdrawal to the beaches of Dunkirk. No matter how the newspaper war correspondents might word their despatches, it was obvious to everyone that the Allied front was crumbling under the ruthlessly efficient blows of the German armies. Before the month was out, the earlier plan of reinforcing the B.E.F. in France had changed to the more obvious need of defending the British Isles.

Up to mid-May the Seaforths had never been engaged in full scale battalion exercises, and the 2nd Brigade had not the opportunity to exercise as a brigade. The pressure of events made it obvious that training on a much larger scale was necessary as soon as possible. Route marches were lengthened to 15, then to 20 miles, while increasing emphasis was also placed on moving a battalion and then a brigade in motor transport convoys. Brigadier Pearkes also worked hard to reduce the time between the issuance of orders and their execution, and this involved continual practice by the officers on schemes both with and without troops.[21]

The first major exercises of this nature were held in the third week of May when the entire brigade moved to Salisbury Plains for a week of manoeuvres. The Seaforths were under canvas near Tilshead Camp, about twelve miles north west of Salisbury. By and large it was a good week. The weather was warm, so much so that when the men were digging in the chalky ground or wiring and camouflaging their positions they stripped to the waist. Something of the work and incidents during the time on Salisbury Plain may be gathered from the extracts from the diary of one of the company commanders:

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[21] It should be kept in mind that no Canadian formation had ever had the opportunity in peacetime to train with all its vehicles, equipment and weapons, since no regiment was ever outfitted with this material. Brigadier Pearkes was the most highly trained Canadian officer of his rank in the entire division, but the stringent economies of the inter-war years meant that he had to train not only the militia officers, but he himself had not had experience in manoeuvring a modern brigade in the field.

23 May 40—We carry on with our work today inspecting the works and shelters. Ample corrugated iron, etc, is available and is freely used. A great measure of ingenuity is shown. I have not noticed a single case of indifference, slacking or such in the company. All ranks are in good spirits relishing the sunshine and good weather and the work. Today we have our own cookers and the meals are greatly improved.

24 May 40—"A" Company was chosen to move forward with "D" Company as flank protection to the Edmontons who launch an attack against a strongly prepared position, concreted and ditched, held by P.P.C.L.I. with the aid of tanks. We move . . . [and] come to rest about an hour after we start on a fixed line and take up a defense position. We are berated by Brigadier Pearkes for bringing only one pick and shovel per section whereas that is what the colonel has laid down—"Token tools" he called them. Later we fall back to a better position and dig weapon pits until after supper. Packs and all gear are brought up and we spend the night where we are. . . . this p.m. one section of No. 7 Platoon dig up three very young rabbits and treated them like new-born babies.

25 May 40—Had breakfast at 0545 hours. We marched into camp and joined the column moving out. We then marched about 10 miles to Tilshead Camp and found it hard going.

News comes that the 1st Brigade was en route to France but was turned back when Boulogne was entered and occupied by the Germans. We feel an ominous spirit in the air, hard to dispel.

Even as the 2nd Brigade was returning to Morval Barracks the possibility of sending the 1st and 2nd Brigades to France to help relieve the hard-pressed British forces was still under consideration.[22] On their arrival the Seaforths were told they were on two hours' notice to move. Trucks were loaded and the civilian busses remained on the parade square. Reinforcements from the depot had come on strength, and the quartermaster stores were in the process of receiving all the equipment necessary for the unit to take the field. All leave was cancelled, security measures were tightened, and instructions were received to dig slit trenches for anti-aircraft defence. It was a busy, active time and no one knew for sure if the brigade would be fighting on English or French soil. [23] By 28 May the battalion was up to war establishment in men, weapons and vehicles. On the same day orders arrived to move, and on the 29th the 2nd Brigade's convoy of trucks and other vehicles which stretched 14 miles from head

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[22] Col. C. P. Stacey, *Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War, Vol. I, Six Years of War*. Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1955, pp. 269 ff.

[23] The decision to retain the Canadians in Britain was made on 27 May.

to tail[24] began to move north, and security was so strict that only a few knew where.[25]

It was the longest move the Seaforths had ever made, and moreover, it was a night move under sealed orders. From 2200 hours on the 29th until 0600 hours on the 30th, the trucks and busses went almost due north until they reached Kettering, about thirteen miles northwest of Northampton. Here the battalion was to go into billets, and as an officer in charge of the advance party wrote later: "The inhabitants were most hospitable—in fact running into the street offering to take in soldiers."[26] Another wrote "The people of Kettering were very kind to all ranks, in fact over generous particularly in the preparation of tea and cakes which appeared almost as soon as the vehicles stopped."[27] In a remarkably short time the Seaforths, along with the rest of the brigade, was settled in billets and Brigade Headquarters was set up at Burdyke House in nearby Weekly. It was soon realized that the entire division had moved into the Northampton area, and further, that like the Seaforths, the other units had been organized into self-contained "battalion groups", each with supporting ancilliary troops which would be immediately ready to function with the infantry.

In this new location, the Canadians formed part of G.H.Q. Home Forces reserves. Its role was to reinforce the troops on the east coast of England between the north bank of the Thames and the south bank of the Humber in case of attack.[28] For the next few days the Seaforths were fairly busy. The billets were exceptionally comfortable—too much so, perhaps, because in a few days the unit was ordered to move to Boughton Park, the 5,000-acre estate of the Duke of Buccleugh only a few miles from Kettering. It was a beautiful, garden-like area, with sheep, cattle and deer grazing in the pastures. Great old elms and oak trees dotted the estate, while through it ran a stream flowing past fields of buttercups. Boughton House itself, a huge mansion with 56 chimneys thrusting out from its roofs, contained at the time the coin collections from the British Museum, and

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[24] W.D., H.Q., 2nd Cdn. Inf. Bde., 29 May 1940.

[25] "Lord Haw-Haw," the German radio propagandist, announced the move of "McNaughton's Flying Circus" to Northampton a day later!

[26] Letter, Brigadier A. J. Creighton to author, 5 October 1966.

[27] Pierce Narrative, *op. cit.*, p. 30.

[28] Stacey, *op. cit.*, p. 273.

in any other circumstances this stately country seat would have been a lovely spot to visit. However, the battalion had to get under canvas, dig slit trenches in case of air attack, and prepare to move at the shortest possible moment. Each morning between 0330 and 0430 hours the men had to "stand-to" in case of parachutist attack, and another "stand-to" was held at dusk. Various reconnaissances were made towards the coast in order that the routes would be quite familiar to senior officers, and at battalion and brigade headquarters everyone was working at top speed to make sure that, in the event of a parachutist attack or invasion from the sea, the brigade group would operate as smoothly as possible whatever its role might be.

The period of uncertainty in the idyllic surroundings of Boughton Park came to an end on 6 June when the unit was ordered to move south on the following day. During their stay in the Kettering area, the war in France had been deteriorating rapidly. Early in June the British Expeditionary Force was being evacuated from the beaches of Dunkirk. The hot, sunny weather which the Seaforths enjoyed under canvas extended far over the English Channel and permitted tens of thousands of exhausted French and British troops to be withdrawn across the unusually calm waters to the shores of England. In France itself, the Germans had launched an attack on 5 June against General Weygand's line, and at about the same time it was decided to send the 52nd (Lowland) and 1st Canadian Infantry Divisions to France to rebuild the core of the B.E.F.

The trip back to Aldershot was without incident. The weather was hot and remained so for days and the battledress trousers, belted at the waist and tucked into web gaiters around the ankles seemed exceptionally warm. The 6th Battalion, the Highland Light Infantry, had hurriedly evacuated Morval Barracks and the buildings were in somewhat of a mess. As one observer wrote:

> they . . . had had their kilts, etc. taken away, completely outfitted in battledress and had gone to France leaving stores and rooms piled high with puttees, old battledress jackets, old bicycles, shirts, etc. . . .[29]

Early on the 8th, the Seaforths were told to prepare for a visit from Their Majesties the King and Queen, and when the entire brigade lined up on the football field to receive Their Majesties, it seemed to confirm the rumour that the Canadians were to be sent to France. Each succeeding hour gave fresh credence to this belief and

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[29] Pierce Narrative, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

spirits began to rise considerably after the let-down of the previous day. Forty-eight hours later the unit was ordered to have its vehicles loaded, weighed and ready to leave early on the 12th.

The battalion was divided into various groups preparatory to leaving, maps of France were issued to all officers, distinguishing marks on all vehicles were painted over, and a hundred other items were attended to. Late on 11 June, Captain W. G. H. Roaf and two other ranks left as a small Advance Party for the port of embarkation. Early on the 13th the Road Party, consisting of all the unit's motor transport and carriers, followed them. Hourly the Seaforths waited for the word to go, yet at the same time everyone was keenly aware of radio and newspaper reports describing the deep German advance into France. In the camp it was quiet, especially with the familiar roar of the trucks and clatter of the carriers completely absent. Finally, on the 14th, the B.B.C. announced that the Germans had entered Paris, and two days later the return of the Advance Party and the unit's vehicles[30] confirmed the fact that the Canadians would not be going to the continent. On his return Roaf told his fellow Seaforths that his small group had been in port long enough to experience an air-raid. On the same day his small party was ordered back on the ship and was returned to England. "What we did not see," he wrote later, "by clearing out of Brest was the drivers of the 1st Canadian Infantry Division running their lorries and tractors over the ends of quays into the harbour, or into the ditches and slashing tires and igniting petrol all over them to prevent them from use by the Wehrmacht."[31]

The sense of let-down in the battalion was deep. Earlier, when the Seaforths had been left behind while most of the brigade seemed to be headed for Norway, some of the men had blown off steam in the N.A.A.F.I. canteen where for some time relations with the canteen's serving staff had been very poor. Tired of being periodically short-changed and being asked why they were in England while the "Tommy" was fighting in France, it needed only a spark to create an unfortunate situation and it was not long coming. Damage to the canteen by Seaforths and other men in the brigade was consider-

[30] The Road Party drove over 200 miles to Falmouth, loaded their vehicles on the 14th but were ordered to unload them the same evening. The Advance Party got as far as Brest, France, before being returned.

[31] Letter, Brigadier W. G. H. Roaf to author, 26 January 1967.

able. Windows were broken, chairs smashed and the piano finished up in the centre of the square being played like a harp by one of the more music-loving soldiers.[32] This time there was no physical damage to record the unit's frustration, but rather was a rash of Seaforths going absent without leave to float their sorrows away at pubs both near and distant.

It is true that, if the 2nd Brigade had landed in France as had the 1st Brigade and indeed, if the entire division had been pushed deep into France, the Canadian formation would have disappeared as a fighting force. On 17 June, Marshal Petain, the new head of the French government, requested an armistice, and five days later Adolf Hitler fairly pranced with delight when the armistice was signed at Compiegne. He had much to delight him, for within six weeks he had gained three fifths of France under his direct control. Even the Kaiser could not boast of such a victory.

The military disasters in France had a profound effect throughout the British Empire, but in Great Britain itself it seemed to wipe away much of the lassitude which had exemplified the nation even during the winter of 1939-40 when the "phoney war" was in progress. It seemed to break a spell of unreality, and no stronger, clearer call to arms was given than that of the British Prime Minister, Mr. Winston Churchill. The Seaforths were among the millions gathered around the wireless sets when he made his famous speech after the evacuation of Dunkirk. He did not mince words, but gave a sound assessment of the possibilities of invasion. "We are assured," he said,

> that novel methods will be adopted, and when we see the originality of malice, the ingenuity of aggression, which our enemy displays, we may certainly prepare ourselves for every kind of novel stratagem, and every kind of brutal and treacherous manoeuvre.

He ended with these words which were to stir the hearts of everyone who heard them—

> . . . we shall not flag or fail, we shall go on to the end, we shall fight in France, we shall fight on the sea and oceans, we shall fight with growing strength and confidence in the air, we shall defend our island whatever

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[32] Pierce Narrative, *op. cit.*, Letter, Mr. L. E. Helin to author, 13 October 1966. "It will prove increasingly difficult to keep the men interested in their training from now on," wrote the unit's Training Officer. "They all show much desire for active service." (W.D., Seaforth Highlanders of Canada, April, 1940, Appendix 51).

> the cost may be, we shall fight on the beaches, we shall fight on the landing grounds, we shall fight in the fields and in the streets, we shall fight in the hills, we shall never surrender. . . .

These were brave and inspiring words, but the strength with which to back the determination behind them was very limited indeed. There were in the British Isles at the time 28 field divisions and 15 independent brigades, but almost all were weak in men and especially equipment. Of that number there were three which were considered to be strong, but the strongest of all was the 1st Canadian Infantry Division, even though its 1st Brigade had lost over 200 of its vehicles during the few days it was in France.[33] Almost immediately it was ordered back into its G.H.Q. Reserve role,[34] and once more the Seaforths were ordered to move.

On 23 June the battalion went north to its new location at Wotton Park, a large estate north east of Oxford about half way between Bicester and Aylesbury. No tents were available at first, and the troops were ordered to dig slit trenches along the hedge rows against bombing. This was treated rather lightly at first, but three days later the unit experienced its first air raid, and although the bombs dropped over a mile away, killing a cow, the digging activity next day was remarkably enthusiastic.

In its new location the Seaforths, as part of the Canadian Force, was "to prepare itself as a hard-hitting mobile force ready to proceed North, South, East or West".[35] Within a matter of days the battalion was on duty as a Flying Column on one hour's notice to move. It was a strange week the Seaforths spent in this new location. The camp, itself, was in a lovely spot. "The trees under which our tents are pitched," wrote one Seaforth, "are elms—over 500 years old and form a double row from the gate down a straight line about a mile long to the Manor House". In the well-tended fields horses and their colts occasionally came up to the fences and men fed them lumps of sugar. The scenery, in brief, was idyllic, but there was not too much time available to enjoy it. Tents had to be set up and camouflaged, carriers and lorries were tucked underneath trees to conceal them from observation from the air, and strict orders from Brigadier

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[33] Stacey, *op. cit.*, pp. 286-287.

[34] Under General Ironside.

[35] W.D., Seaforth Highlanders of Canada, June, 1940, Appendix 18: "Minutes of Conference at 1100 hrs on 20 June 40 . . . at Farnborough."

Pearkes meant that slit trenches for everyone in the battalion had to be dug and every arrangement made either to move against the enemy or fight him in the vicinity should he attempt an attack by airborne forces.

Scarcely a week after arriving at Wotton Park the Seaforths were ordered to move once again. The plan for the defence of the United Kingdom had been revised and with it the role of the 1st Canadian Division. It was now planned to have a mobile corps north and south of the Thames, the latter (7th Corps) to consist of the 1st Canadian Infantry and 1st (British) Armoured Divisions, together with some New Zealand brigades and ancillary troops.[36] This change in plans meant, among other things, that the 2nd Canadian Brigade was to move to the Oxted-Godstone area, and for the Seaforth Highlanders, it meant another move by transport to the fields around the village of Edenbridge on the Surrey - Kent border.

The change in site was made smoothly. Lt. C. C. Tarbuck and twelve N.C.Os. left on 1 July to examine the new site, and when the battalion arrived on the following day, each company was shown to its location. No tents were available so it was a case of sleeping in the fields. Before anyone relaxed, however, slit-trenches were dug and the battalion prepared positions for all-round defence.

During the first week or so in this area the men camped under the stars, and on wet days it could be rather miserable. A former sergeant wrote later:

> "B" Company was bivouaced in a large cow pasture—no shelter whatsoever—and it poured rain, night and day. I remember trying to get some shelter under one of the vehicles, but the ground had turned to mud and I was already soaked to the skin. . . . I think my morale hit its lowest point one morning when I found myself on my knees in the middle of that soggy field trying to shave; I had a mess tin of cold water and a steel mirror propped on a bayonet stuck in the ground. The water was pouring down the mirror so I got very little reflection, and the driving rain washed the lather off my face as fast as I could apply it. A few days later we got tents, but they were brand new and leaked like a sieve.[37]

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[36] 7th Corps came into existence on 21 July, commanded by Lt-Gen. McNaughton. Brigadier G. R. Pearkes was promoted to command the Canadian division, while Brigadier A. E. Potts, CBE, ED, took over the 2nd Brigade. 7th Corps was to be prepared to launch counterattacks in support of beach divisions unable to contain invaders from the sea or the air.

[37] Letter, A. M. Millar to author, 6 November 1966. Millar was a sergeant in "B" Company at this time.

The new area in which the Seaforths found themselves was strategically important and historically interesting.[38] Fifteen miles to the north was Croydon airport on the outskirts of London. About 30 miles due south was Brighton. To the east Kent jutted into the English Channel, and 20 miles further beyond the coast lay German-occupied France. The area stretching from Brighton around the Kentish coast into the Thames was felt to be one of the most likely areas for the Germans to invade. The Seaforth Highlanders of Canada and the other former militia battalions now found themselves in a position of great trust, guarding as they did the heart of empire. Yet while they guarded they had to train harder than ever, for much would depend on their fighting efficiency should the invasion, which everyone expected, take place.

For the next several months the Seaforth Highlanders, both at Edenbridge and later at Limpsfield, a few miles to the north, prepared for their anti-invasion role as a counter-attack force. Between London and the coast the country was almost devoid of defences, but as the warm summer months went by, miles of barbed wire, road blocks and field defences were erected, while in cities and towns Home Guard and Civil Defence units were formed to help man the defences should the need arise.

A few days after their arrival in Kent the brigade was placed on an alert basis which varied only in degree until winter weather set in. Within the brigade one battalion was to be on one hour's notice to move while the others were on eight hours notice. This state of alert was rotated every few days, and in periods of great expectancy, when tide and weather conditions favoured an enemy assault, the entire force was placed on very short notice. Since an attack might come from the air as well as the sea, the Seaforths had to be prepared to defend whatever location in which they found themselves. Slit trenches sufficient to provide protection from the air raids overhead and so located as to form a defensive perimeter for the battalion were a prime consideration. So too was camouflage. The unit's 90-odd vehicles ranged in size from motor-cycles to three-ton lorries, and all had to be parked so as to blend into the country-

[38] It was also "cider" country, and the officers warned their men that the local brew was very potent. "For once they were right," wrote a Seaforth later. "We left no stone unturned and no pub unvisited in our efforts to establish their veracity."

side so that their presence would not be noticed by the stream of German aircraft which began to fly overhead en route to bomb London.

Experience on the continent had indicated the likelihood of parachutist attacks coming either at dawn or dusk, and to be ready to take care of this possibility, every man in the unit had to "stand-to" when on the one hour alert. This meant generally that at 0445 hours the men would be roused out of their tents or billets, dressed in battle order (respirator, webbing, steel helmets and gas cape but without a small pack), the platoons would form up in their areas, rolls were called and weapons inspected. After this the sections would return to their tent areas until 0545 hours when they could "stand-down ".The same thing occurred between 2100 and 2200 hours.

During the first weeks in Kent the mobile role of the unit was stressed, and numerous reconnaissances of the roads leading to various parts of the coast were made. One Seaforth N.C.O. described the unit's state of readiness in these words:

> In this area we were a flying column, complete and ready to move at a moment's notice. The weather was warm and dry allowing complete reconnaissance of all roads to the coast and those of the battalion who took part on these recces will always remember the scene which met their gaze when reaching the coast. The sea was calm with a blue haze concealing the enemy coast of France. Engineers were busy laying mines and strengthening up coastal defences, civilians were evacuated from all vulnerable coastal areas but several miles offshore, lying apparently motionless in the Channel, was the fleet, the Royal Navy, a mightly bulwark of battleships and cruisers behind which . . . we helped to prepare England for her "finest hour." That the invasion would not take place did not enter our heads and we felt we were ready. Our battalion was at strength, all misfits had been weeded out, and we were well armed, mobile, and spoiling for action. . . .[39]

It is interesting to note that while in the vicinity of Edenbridge the Seaforths were only a short distance from Chartwell, the British Prime Minister's country home. On 6 July, on one hour's notice, the unit was warned to be ready for an inspection by Mr. Churchill. The inspection was designed to show the mobility of the brigade as well as something of its anti-parachutist role, so that informality marked the inspection. A sudden downpour of rain, coupled with a "snafu" as to the rendezvous of the inspecting party,[40] resulted in a very brief

[39] Pierce Narrative, *op. cit.*, p. 34.
[40] Personal interview, Major-General G. R. Pearkes.

look at the battalion by the Prime Minister who chatted with Lt-Col. Stevenson for a few minutes before riding on to see the next unit. However Lt. J. W. Blair was given the honour of providing the guard on Chartwell Manor for two days, so that for a brief time, at least, the Seaforths had under their direct care the safety of the most important member of the British House of Commons.[14]

By the time the unit had moved to yet another area a few miles north of Godstone near Tonbridge, all ranks were quite familiar with areas the brigade might be called upon to defend either locally or further to the south and east. Route marches took the companies through a lovely countryside of lush fields, green meadows and well-tended farmlands. Small towns and villages with brick and stone houses dotted this part of Surrey and Kent, and frequently the marching men would pass some old castle or manor house whose walls echoed to ancient battle cries in by-gone centuries. Ahead of the company a piper and drummer helped to keep up the pace, and sometimes, towards the end of the day when the entire battalion was returning to camp, a lorry would pick up all the band and Pipe Major Esson would collect them at the head of the column to play in the battalion en masse.

Once back in the lines and dispersed to their tents, the men might be fortunate enough to use the mobile bath.[42] After the shower, or perhaps a good wash in a tin hand basin, the men were ready for food. For some time, especially in the field, dinner was usually stew, but as the company cooks were able to establish themselves more permanently, and as the make-shift outdoor kitchens improved, the meals became better. Sometimes one could scrounge extra eggs or butter from the local farmers, and admittedly too, sometimes the men used their skill at fieldcraft to obtain extra rations by rather unorthodox methods. After dinner, and sometimes on Saturday afternoons, there might be an inter-company ball game or perhaps a match with the Edmonton Regiment which was stationed nearby. An inter-regimental match, of course, brought out

[41] Pte. Albert Reid of "C" Company will remember his tour of guard duty there. He was fined £2.10.0 for carving his initials on one of the trees on the estate.

[42] Open as the camp was to public gaze, a minor calamity occurred in mid-July when some two dozen men, showering behind sheets of corrugated iron, were exposed in their birthday suits when the temporary structure collapsed.

plenty of men from each regiment, all rooting for their own team and shouting encouragement, advice and insults as the game progressed. There were civilian observers too, and as one officer wrote: "The English people hereabouts simply can't fathom the remarks the men shout during the game at the umpire, their team-mates and their opponents." Perhaps it is as well they couldn't.

There was not too much time available for sports, however, for both during the night and day training continued. Route marches, for example. lengthened from 15 to 25 miles, and a considerable rivalry grew up between companies and among men in the companies to see how few would fall out. Weapon training, of course, was always stressed, and so too was fieldcraft, camouflage, patrolling, and constant moves using motor transport. The speed and efficiency with which the German forces had overrun France had emphasized more than anything else the need to move a battalion, brigade or division rapidly from one point to another. To develop the best method of doing so, considering the narrow winding lanes of Kent and the probability of having to travel under enemy air attack, resulted in constant experimentation.

A typical day is described by "A" Company's commander on 7 November:

> Day of training: P.T., Anti-Gas lecture with charts by 5 Platoon[43] detail showing effects of Blister Gas; lecture in Field Engineering by Acting C.S.M. Foxcroft and in p.m. lecture in Military Law by myself with a few words about the scheme tonight; close order drill by platoon arrangements and practice in loading and unloading platoon trucks. We go on approach march tonight to same position as Bn. occupied in last week's Brigade scheme in area of Starborough Castle near Edenbridge, training in movement at night up to assembly area and en route unloading of platoon trucks. We get hot meal at 1 a.m.; form up at 2:15 for collection of ammunition, into Pl. and Coy. trucks, roll call and move off at about 2:45 to pass S.P. [Starting Point] in our proper position . . . at about 3:30 a.m. We take up reserve position in the Battalion. . . . We have tea at 7 a.m. with our haversack lunches, issued tonight, and march home—lunch being our next meal at 1200 hours. . . . Moonlight night tonight and Jerry is going backwards and forwards like a pendulum. His exhaust streaks can be seen across the sky; our A.A. [anti-aircraft] is active. . . .[44]

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[43] No. 5 Platoon was the Pioneer Platoon. One of the smallest in the battalion, it was responsible for clearing mines and booby-traps, it acted as an anti-gas and decontamination squad, etc.

[44] Forin Diary entry, 7 November 1940.

As had been mentioned earlier, the first air-raid that had come close to the Seaforths was during their week-long stay at Wotton Park in the Oxford area. In Kent, however, the battalion was located between London and the coast, and all during the late Summer and Fall the Battle of Britain raged overhead, both by day and by night. During August and September especially the raids by German bombers and fighters were almost continual as the German Air Force tried to bomb Britain into submission. At any time the "red" air-raid warning would go, and the long, eerie wail of the sirens would drone over the countryside and soldiers and civilians would head for their slit-trenches and air-raid shelters. Within minutes the drumming roar of Hurricane and Spitfire fighter aircraft could be heard as they sped upward to engage the enemy flying high overhead, his bombers protected by swarms of fighters. London, ringed with searchlights, barrage balloons and anti-aircraft batteries, was the main target, and not infrequently enemy planes would turn back and jettison bombs over the countryside before recrossing the Channel.

Almost every day some bombs fell in the Seaforths' area. The larger ones, sounding like an express train roaring through the night, would land with a thump and a bang which shook the tents and, when the troops were in billets at Limpsfield, rattled the windows or broke them. Outside, on a clear night, the men could often see the muzzle-flashes of nearby anti-aircraft batteries light the area for a moment, and their shells bursting in the sky like orange stars. Searchlights, working in pairs or larger groups, criss-crossed the sky endeavouring to pick up enemy planes, and once they located a target the gunners would hammer at it with varying measures of success.

Some idea of the Battle of Britain as seen and experienced by the Seaforths may be obtained from the following descriptions written during the time the raids were in progress. One Seaforth officer wrote in his journal the following account:

> 15 Aug.: Attended an umpire's conference at tank area and while there witnessed, from a distance, a first rate fight between German Heinkel bombers (about 17) supported by Messerschmitts, and Spitfires. We saw 4 German bombers come down . . . , 2 with smoke trailing from them. From one a member of the crew jumped at a great height; the rest . . . remained with their ships till a low height and jumped too late. The bloke who jumped sailed down swinging like a pendulum and landed not far from us. My driver and I and many more ran across the fields to where he was. . . . He had bullet wounds in his right arm, left hand and

right knee. . . . Field dressings were put on by some of the West Nova Scotia Regt. fellows. . . .

This same air battle, seen from a different angle by a Seaforth sergeant, was described by him in a letter to his father in these words:

> Last Friday I was in charge of a party guarding a gasoline-supply station in a nearby town. About 7:00 p.m. the air-raid sirens started howling and a tremendous racket of aeroplane engines was heard. I was out on the street in a split second. Directly above us was a huge flight of about 100 German fighters and bombers. Then they dropped their bombs in diving flight. The anti-aircraft guns started firing at them and kept this up for about five minutes. They quit when our fighting planes arrived. The bombs landed on a nearby airport causing huge columns of gray smoke and tremendous thuds and concussions. Our planes about fifty of them, fired at the bombers and broke up the enemy formations. With machine guns and engines roaring and bombs bursting, the din was terrific! We saw six Jerries shot down and two others run away on fire. . . . From a Jerry bomber . . . a German bailed out in his parachute and landed in a field half a mile from us.
>
> All this time, instead of the people going into air-raid shelters, they stood around the streets looking straight upwards. All of a sudden empty shell-cases started dropping all around us. The people stared for a moment to see just what it was, then as they realized bullets might be dropping also, they all rushed for the doorways. But they soon came out again. I certainly got quite a thrill out of all this. It was the first large air battle during the daytime that many of us have seen.[45]

On the day Sgt. Gibson was writing, another major raid took place over Southern England, and something of the Seaforths' reaction to the continuing Battle of Britain emerges from this extract from Major Forin's journal:

> 18 August: Another exciting day. Off with the Colonel and Coy Cmdrs. to a reconnaissance which carried us 'til noon. As we were getting into our cars (Graeme Gibson and I to mine) the Red Warning went. We followed the Colonel's car thro' Edenbridge where everyone was under cover or rushing there. The sound of aircraft couldn't be heard above the noise of the motor but we noticed the Colonel and party drew up near the Post Office and got out and peered skywards. . . . We got through Edenbridge into Marlpit Hill when lo! directly ahead of us in the middle of the main road appeared a bomb-hole with a burning gas main. I had the driver head into a side road and we hid the vehicle under a tree, and went into a field where we were able to hear a tremendous hubbub in the Heavens above; furious hammering fire of machine guns,

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[45] Sgt. J. G. Gibson to his father, 18 August 1940. This and other letters are in the possession of Mr. Gibson, and a selected number have been copied for the Seaforth Archives.

aeroplane engines racing madly, the roar and whine of diving aircraft. To our right fluttered down a Messerschmitt fighter landing at Haxted, its pilot wounded; from far left a great, pale blue Hun bomber came down straight and dead as a plummet crashing at Ide's Hill, hitting a tree and tearing itself apart, scattering bombs and terror everywhere. Behind him another bomber glided down and away to our front a Hurricane. Four men had bailed out and were in the air—3 Huns and the pilot of the Hurricane. . . . the action melted away then leaving Spitfires and Hurricanes hunting about for more prey and spotting for bailed out enemy.

About the same tale was told in the company lines—the aerial combat between our lines and Croydon reaching great intensity and many ships, mostly German, down. One came just over our lines very low and crashed some distance away—we fired on it. Another was blown apart by A.A. fire which is really good now. It was apparently almost impossible for Don Clark to keep the men in their slit-trenches so intent did they become, cheering when a Hun came hurtling down.[46]

A final extract from the diary of this Seaforth Officer gives us one more example of what many in the battalion will remember of the place and the time.

11 September: Our company camp is close by the village of Tonbridge, Kent. It has a church of stone built on the site and part of the ruins of a Saxon church. In the yard it has one of the oldest yew trees in England—over 1500 years old. It has many graves in its yard with well preserved stones. . . . Today I attended a burial in the yard. Pilot Officer Adams of the village was the man buried; his fighter plane was shot down. After killing his adversary he baled out but his parachute cords caught in the tail and he died. After a brief service in the church 8 of our Sgts. bore his flag-draped coffin to the grave side. There we four company commanders and the Intelligence Officer and Signals Officer stood and lowered it into the ground. A firing party under Sgt. Black and Cpl. Morrison . . . fired their volleys; the bugler sounded Last Post and in the interlude between that and Reveille the Pipe Major played "The Flowers of the Forest." As the last notes faded, as if by arrangement, the drone of a squadron of Hurricanes taking the air from a close-by airdrome and the red warning went with a fanfare of sirens. A fine way to finish: a fine send-off fit for a chieftain of the air.

I returned to my lines . . . and watched scores of Hun bombers pass overhead to London with a thick escort of fighters . . . and being harried by Spitfires. One big bomber came sailing down, streaming white smoke from its engines. . . . All night the most terrific A.A. fire came from London way and bombers droned back and forth Londonwards over our heads. I slept hardly a wink.

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[46] Diary extract, 15 and 18 August 1940. The unit showed its pride in the air force in a more practical way by contributing an average of one day's pay to the division's Spitfire fund. Within the division over $25,000 was raised to help buy a "Spit" for the R.A.F.

Each Seaforth who was there will have his own memory of "the blitz", as it was often called. Day or night, on exercises or in camp, the bombers kept coming and were as regularly hit and hit hard from the air and the ground. On the rare occasions when on leave in London, the men would see the thousands of people sleeping on the platforms of the Underground Railway, and also they would lend a hand to help those who were hit or trapped by bombs and falling debris. One man who was quietly doing a good job in this respect was the Medical Officer, Captain Robertson. One day the Adjutant called him in and bawled him out for being away from camp for too many nights. Robertson did not say a word. "Later," wrote the Adjutant, "a letter of commendation from a London hospital was received indicating that Capt. Robertson had been working nearly every night rendering invaluable assistance. My apologies were most humble."[47]

It was generally felt that if the German bombers managed to break down or at least noticeably lessen the British will to resist, the invasion of England would follow shortly thereafter. A very close watch was kept on German shipping and barges along the French, Belgian and Dutch coasts, and intelligence reports noted German troops training in embarking and disembarking exercises. Aware of the methods used by the Germans during their attack on Norway and the Low Countries, every rumour—most of them false—of mysterious lights, enemy parachutist landings and so forth was closely followed, and on more than one occasion a section or platoon of Seaforths was sent out to comb part of the country in their area to round up an "enemy agent" who had parachuted down during an air raid.

Possibly the danger was felt to be strongest in September. On the evening of the 7th the 2nd Brigade received the code-word "CROMWELL", the second highest state of alert which signified the strong possibility that the enemy might soon attack.[48] All units in the division were placed on four hours' notice to move, and on the 8th the Seaforth Highlanders were put on one hour's notice. All leaves were cancelled, and for the next two weeks, while London, the Midland cities and the R.A.F. aerodromes were pounded inces-

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[47] Letter, Brigadier Scott Murdoch to author, 26 September 1966.

[48] W.D., H.Q., 2nd Cdn. Inf. Bde., 7 September 1940.

santly, the Seaforths were at a very high stage of preparation ready to go in any direction.

During this period the unit moved into winter quarters, and on the 18th the various companies were billetted under company arrangements at the village of Limpsfield, not far from Westerham where General Wolfe was born. Limpsfield was a very old and very attractive village and the Seaforths were to become very attached to it. Various houses, barns and other buildings were taken over and platoons and companies soon made themselves quite comfortable.[49] A Seaforth N.C.O. described his new domestic arrangements in Limpsfield in these words:

> We are now in billets and are almost finished settling down. The small village we are in . . . is about half-a-mile from Oxted. It is a fifteen minute walk to the nearest picture show, pub and cafe. We are all quite contented and appreciate living in a real house. No. 8 Platoon is in a brick house with a large garden in the rear. There are lots of apples, tomatoes, beans, pears, cabbage, onions, turnips and other vegetables growing there. . . . The fellows play volley ball on the grass and baseball in the fields across the road. The house is gas-heated with a small coal stove for heating water. . . . There are ten rooms in the house, including the kitchen. . . . You would get a big kick out of watching the fellows dusting, washing floors, and "Old Dutching" the sink, washbasins and bath-tub.[50]

It was only three days after they had settled in when the battalion came very close to losing some men. During the early hours of 21 September a German bomber, evidently returning from London, released a bomb which came screaming down and, with a tremendous roar, landed in a field only 300 yards from "B" Company. It made a hole about 30 - 40 feet across and some 15 feet deep, throwing up huge chunks of earth, but fortunately it caused no casualties. In the weeks to come, more close misses were to be experienced, and the crash of falling roof tiles and shattered glass were to become more common.

Despite the air raids and the worsening weather, training never let up. Moves became so common that the battalion could pick itself up and be on the road in a remarkably short time. Where once the men had to be instructed how to load a lorry "tactically"—i.e., ready

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[49] Among the places where Seaforth officers were billetted was Priest Hill, the home of Sir Ernest and Lady Benn. Their hospitality to Canadians will long be remembered.

[50] Gibson, *op. cit.*, letter to his parents, 22 September 1940.

to be unloaded in action so that the most wanted items would be most available—they now did it automatically. N.C.Os. were becoming almost as proficient as their officers at observing ground and noting mentally if subconsciously the best defensive features of it. Quartermaster Sergeants were well practiced in providing meals for their companies under field conditions, and in so many other ways the rough bumps of inexperience were being ground down by actual experience.

During the Fall, too, the regiment began to have a few exercises with tanks—and these schemes gave a flavour to some of the constant training all during the autumn. Co-operation with these great, clanking machines was an art in itself, as the Seaforths were to discover, but they also began to realize too that in spite of their noise and bulk and weapons, they had their weak points as well. This was a good thing to know—especially for infantrymen.

Early in November word filtered down from Brigade Headquarters that the 2nd Canadian Infantry Brigade Group would relieve the 3rd Canadian Infantry Brigade Group in Brighton. The latter had been in that area for several weeks, and on 9 November a group of Seaforth officers went south to the coastal city to examine the quarters and positions of the Royal 22e Regiment which they would take over on the 15th.

At Brighton the officers found that the battalion would be responsible for part of the first line defence of the sea coast in the area directly in front of Brighton, together with certain positions on the Downs somewhat north and west of the city. In length the area stretched about one and one-half miles, but helping to thicken the fire-power of the Seaforths were a number of men and medium machine-guns of the Toronto Scottish. Billetting arrangements and defences varied from one company area to another, the worst positions being those out on the Downs where the wind and rain made life miserable. The defences, too, were poor. Weapon pits, sandbagged machine-gun posts, and similar field works seemed little protection indeed should the coast be pounded by enemy aircraft and ship-borne artillery prior to a landing. The mined beaches, belts of barbed wire and numerous road blocks—both ready and potential—would have stopped the enemy for a time, but not for long. As one officer wrote at the time: ". . . the immediate need here is to rebuild our posts which collapse in part every night under weather

action and to strengthen the wire. A pioneer battalion on our company front for a month is needed to do this."

The Seaforths, once settled into empty homes, hotels, barracks, golf course clubs and a variety of other buildings, soon struck up a happy relationship with the civilians in Brighton who had not been evacuated. There was a common bond of sharing the feeling of being "at the front".[51] Coupled with this, perhaps, the daily sight of the men at their posts along the waterfront and in defensive positions elsewhere further strengthened the friendship between the Seaforths and the city. What the war diarist termed as "the excellent, courteous and chivalrous behaviour of the troops throughout their stay in Brighton" was another factor which helped to bring about very cordial relations.

Sometimes, of course, these relations were strained, for some of the Seaforths strayed from the straight and narrow path. On one occasion, for example, some of the men from the Bren carrier platoon, who had been out on duty on the Downs, felt the need for extra nourishment to supplement the rations. Pte. L. E. Helin tells part of the story in these words:

> . . . being broke and half starved it was suggested that I, being a Viking Swede, should show how my ancestors used to raid the English countryside. On our patrols we had spotted a few chicken coops, so a raid was planned. This paid, like many more before and after. We were *very* successful and having a surplus of fowl we decided to go to Brighton and sell a few. Seeing how we knew many hungry beer drinkers at "The Ship," our favourite pub, and not wanting to draw attention to ourselves, we parked our Bren Gun Carrier on a back street while Myles Castle went to the pub to make a deal. Jack Partwood and I stayed with the loot which was covered with a greatcoat. Presently a constable came along and was very curious as to why we were parked there, and wanted to look at what was under the coat. Jack gave him a story about being on a special alert and that under the coat was a secret weapon.[52]

Surprisingly, they got away with it.

One group in the battalion which did a great deal to improve the already warm relations with the civilians both in Kent and at

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[51] Letter, L. E. Helin to author, 13 October 1966.

[52] One prize of war, probably a result of enemy air raids against Allied shipping in the Channel, was three barrels of wine which washed ashore. These were "liberated" by the P.P.C.L.I. who shared the contents with the Seaforths on guard duty near the waterfront, resulting in a very unmilitary but nonetheless happy "beach party."

Brighton was the Pipe Band. In Kent they had played on village greens, at hospitals, and at one time played "Retreat" for Lord and Lady Astor at Hever Castle. They were trained to perfection, and whether performing a "Retreat" as a group or playing by one's and two's on a company route march, their music was enjoyed and appreciated. In Brighton one of the favourite dance resorts of the battalion was Sherry's, and just prior to the unit's return to Limpsfield, the management of Sherry's invited as many Seaforths as could be spared to a final party. The Pipes and Drums brought their instruments and played for their hosts, while members of the unit demonstrated the foursome reel. It was a marvellous party, one which the civilians remembered and commented on for days.[53]

Two days before the Seaforths left Brighton on 6 December, Major C. C. Ferrie, ED, was informed that he was to take Lt-Col. Stevenson's place as the Commanding Officer on the latter's promotion.[54] It was an extremely popular appointment and he was besieged with congratulations from all ranks. Ferrie had served overseas with the 72nd Battalion, C.E.F., and had joined the N.P.A.M. battalion as Captain in 1920. He had served during the inter-war years without interruption, and was both respected and liked by all ranks.

The change in command in December was but one of the continual changes in personnel which had been going on within the battalion during 1940. By 15 December, for example, about a year after the Seaforths had left Canada, only 33 per cent of the officers and 45 per cent of the other ranks who had come overseas with the unit remained with it.[55] Major C. C. I. Merritt, formerly commanding "C" Company, had gone to Divisional Headquarters and so too had Lts. Danby and Malkin. Others had left for 7th Corps Headquarters, Canadian Military Headquarters and Brigade Headquarters. A few had returned to Canada to go on the staff of the 2nd and 3rd Infantry Divisions, then preparing to come overseas.

It is interesting to note in this connection that, almost from the beginning, it was the policy not to hold good officers tightly within the regimental family. If Brigade or Divisional Headquarters re-

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[53] W.D., Seaforth Highlanders of Canada, 4 December 1940.

[54] Stevenson was promoted to Brigadier to command the 1st Canadian Brigade for a brief period before returning to take command of a brigade on the Pacific Coast.

[55] W.D., Seaforth Highlanders of Canada, 15 December 1940.

quested a bright young subaltern or captain to serve as a staff learner or aide-de-camp, the Seaforths gave their best. In this way, as the years went by, an increasing number of Seaforth officers gained wide recognition either as commanding officers of other battalions, or later as brigade and divisional commanders. Indeed it is doubtful if any other overseas battalion provided as many senior officers in such a variety of senior appointments as the Seaforth Highlanders of Canada.

This constant drain had to be replenished, and during 1940 the Seaforths received junior officers both from the Holding Unit and from the Canadian Officers Training Corps. The day after Lt-Col. Ferrie took command of the battalion, for example, Lts. J. D. Pierce, J. D. Newberry, J. H. Gowan and K. S. Murdoch returned to the unit. The first three had been sergeants with the Seaforths, the fourth—Murdoch—had been a platoon sergeant major. They had been selected several months earlier as officer cadets, and they were the first to be commissioned and returned to the battalion.[56] This practice of selecting potential officers from the ranks was to be a continuous one throughout the war. It paid high dividends in leadership in the years to come.

Manpower "wastage", as it was usually termed, occurred in a variety of ways. The intensive and hard physical training which the battalion was called upon to perform resulted in many physical defects being uncovered which many of the older men had managed to hide when going through their medical examination in Canada. The long route marches, living out of doors in slit-trenches, the tough field exercises when men went for 36 or 48 hours without sleep—all called for hard, healthy soldiers, and those who were unable to keep up the pace were either sent home and discharged or posted to an occupation which did not call for such high physical standards. Many an old Seaforth veteran left under these circumstances, and it was a sad parting when they left. Nevertheless, there is no doubt whatever that only the comparatively young could carry on as infantry soldiers or officers.

If medical re-boards caused dozens to leave, many left for other

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[56] A number of platoons in the battalion when it came overseas were commanded by Platoon Sergeant Majors. This rank was ultimately dropped, and even at this time P.S.Ms. were being gradually replaced by lieutenants.

reasons. Some were misfits, and were completely unsuited to army life and discipline. Others were taken to fill the ranks of special sub-units in the division, such as the reconnaissance squadron formed to operate separately from the units in 1940. In 1940, also, a small number were being selected as officer cadet candidates, and quite naturally experienced officers and men were in strong demand by the 2nd and 3rd Divisions. There were several deserters—actually a small number considering the speed and circumstances of mobilization, as well as the lack of actual combat experience which most Seaforths expected and wanted when they joined up.

The drain of officers, N.C.Os. and men from the battalion was not easy to make up as far as experience is concerned. Generally speaking, the new replacements were willing and eager, and certainly the spirit of the Seaforths never burned more brightly. It was a happy regiment and a good one, but it was also one which could measure the progress it had made and yet realize how much more there was to learn.

By the time Christmas, 1940 approached, the Seaforths were among the most highly trained and well equipped battalion in the Canadian forces. It now possessed the arms and equipment necessary for it to function in a field role, and it had the requisite number of vehicles for its war establishment. It had in its ranks a large proportion of specialists—officers, N.C.Os. and men—who had been sent on special courses and to attend military schools, and they, in turn, were spreading the knowledge they had gained among the companies. The battalion had been shifted about so much that the movement of the unit in any direction for any distance could be carried out with easy efficiency. It had taken a year's constant work to attain this level of ability, however, and the next level to be reached would see the Seaforths play its proper role in brigade and divisional exercise.

By the end of 1940 the Seaforths were able to pick up the gauntlet. It would take extra training to fling it back in the face of the enemy with easy confidence.

CHAPTER IV

Preparing For Battle

December, 1940 was damp and cold, but the biting wind which swept over the Downs near Brighton lost some of its force by the time it reached Limpsfield where the Seaforth Highlanders were resettling themselves in their old quarters. The people in the village appeared happy to have the battalion back in the vicinity too. The billetting of about 780 officers and men in the village had been accomplished with remarkably little friction, and there is no doubt that the battalion had quadrupled the profits of some of the publicans and merchants. But the friendship which had grown up between the soldiers and civilians in the Limpsfield - Oxted area was based on far more than economic benefits or any sense of obligation to "colonial" troops by the local inhabitants. Rather it was a friendship which originated in courtesy and was stimulated by mutual respect.

Now that they were "home", the Seaforths looked forward to Christmas. Cpl. Sinclair, or "Postie" as he was usually called, had his hands pleasantly full sorting and delivering Christmas mail—there was probably no better sight than a 15-hundredweight truck pulling up to the mail room with ten of fifteen bags of parcels and letters. Months previously the regiment's Women's Auxiliary had planned to send enough cigarettes, soap, chocolate and other comforts to the overseas unit to arrive in time for distribution on the 25th. As usual the officers held their Christmas dinner on Christmas Eve, this time with Captain Morrison, the Dental Officer, padded out to bear some resemblance to Santa Claus. "Burnedge", where the Officers' Mess was located, was a blaze of light and festivity be-

hind the blackout shutters that night, but Christmas Day itself was strictly for the other ranks, which was to become a tradition in the regiment. The war diarist aptly describes the unit's first Christmas in England in these words:

> After considerable ground-work . . . it was possible for every Coy. to hold Xmas dinners for its personnel. Each one of these festivities was attended by the C.O. Many of the men were the guests for Xmas dinner of civilians resident in Limpsfield and Oxted and, in addition, a party of 25 men and 1 officer travelled to London and dined with the Agent General for British Columbia, Mr. W. A. McAdam at B.C. House. . . . At all Coy. dinners, as is the custom in this Regiment, all officers, W.O.'s and Sergeants waited upon all other ranks—the one time in the year when Private MacSnook can tell his senior what he wants and what to do. Everyone thoroughly enjoyed the occasion and had a good time. This time last year, the Regiment [sic] was aboard R.M.S. *SS Andes* with a 70 m.p.h. gale adding to the amenities of the occasion. Many officers detached from the Battn. visited the Unit, and included Maj. Roaf, Capt. W. S. Murdoch, Capt. Snyder and Lt. Danby. . . . Another welcome visitor . . . was Lt. Col. J. R. S. Lough.[1]

Both Christmas and New Year's passed off well, and the 48-hour relief from air raids on Christmas and Boxing Days was an added if unexpected fillip.

The New Year came in cold and frosty with frequent snow and icy roads. It was to remain like that all during January and February, and so slippery were they at times that periodically motorcyclists were forbidden to take their machines on the roads.[2] Accidents were numerous, and one seriously injured Captain H. C. Gell. He had served with the unit for years, but every month more and more of the old timers were leaving. By January, 1941 less than a handful of men in the battalion wore Great War ribbons on their tunics, and of these, only Lt-Col. Ferrie, L/Sgt. C. E. Whittaker and Cpl. J. A. Muir had served with the 72nd Battalion, C.E.F.

Accidents, sickness, promotions and re-postings disposed of many in the battalion who had served during the pre-war years to

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[1] W.D., Seaforth Highlanders of Canada, 25 December 1940. Incidentally Mr. McAdam was an old "Seaforth" himself.

[2] The unit had suffered its first fatal casualty in a motorcycle crash on 10 December when L/Cpl. M. Thomson died. Almost a year later, on 8 December 1941, a similar accident killed Pte. R. D. H. Fuller. He was with Field Security at the time, but "he was still a Seaforth" and was buried to the sound of the pipes. (W.D., Seaforth Highlanders of Canada, 8 December 1941.)

keep the regiment in being. But the pace of training was steadily being stepped up, and only those with a good physique could continue to serve in an infantry battalion. Something of the shape of things to come first occurred late in January. At a conference at divisional headquarters on the 12th, Major-General Pearkes announced that units were to prepare for a 60-mile route march. It was to train the battalions to store furniture, load vehicles, set up communications between sub-units, use billeting parties—in brief, to march and carry out the various administrative tasks as if the battalion would not return to its billets.

It was the longest march the Seaforths had ever attempted, and except for a handful of men everyone took part in it. Even the Paymaster and the Regimental Sergeant Major marched most of the distance, Pipe Major Esson marched the entire route as did the rest of the pipe band. The first day was not too bad, but the second leg, which ran from Reigate to Waldingham by an uphill-downhill circuitous route in the rain, was harder. The third day became an endurance test, but although the battalion transport took part in the march, very few were forced to fall out and ask to be driven. Men slogged along determined to see it through, one company competing with another as each sought to go the full distance without resorting to a lift on a vehicle. Men had blisters on blisters, swollen feet, and shoulders aching with the weight of rifles and small packs. Despite everything the Seaforths finished in fine style. They may have been dog tired when they reached Limpsfield, but they were there. One can imagine that quite a few walked somewhat slowly on the evening of the 29th to the local pub for a glass of "Ditchburn's Painkiller". This drink, a combination of Scotch with cider in murderous proportions, had originated when Pte. Ditchburn required some Dutch courage when getting several teeth extracted. Word of its volcanic qualities had spread rapidly, and if the Seaforth could afford several refills he would probably be ready to go another 60 miles the next day. If nothing else, it would have dimmed the memory of the mileage he had travelled.

During the January march the battalion had passed close to the Biggin Hill R.A.F. station where Hurricane and Spitfire squadrons were located. Everyone noted the bomb-craters in the neighborhood and the number of bombed and wrecked houses in the vicinity. In the months that followed the German Air Force con-

tinued to strike at London, the South coast and Midland cities, and during the Spring the drone of bombers and fighters overhead continued to be a familiar sound. One of the most violent raids occurred on the night of 16 - 17 April. German bombers started to come about nine at night. Within minutes groups of parachute flares, varying in number from three to a dozen, floated in the sky to the north over the Biggin Hill, Kenley, Croydon and Epsom airfields. Almost immediately red tracer shells from anti-aircraft batteries were arcing through the sky, and this colourful spectacle became brighter still when the Germans began to drop incendiary bombs interspersed with high explosives. Quite a few of these came down behind "B" Company's area. "The sight of several hundred incendiary bombs burning in the fields . . .," wrote the war diarist, "was quite impressive."[3] Although no local damage was done, London was hard hit. The Seaforths' Rugby XV had gone to the city to play the team of the Metropolitan Police,[4] and they were there during the air raid. The team spent hours helping the police and A.R.P. to extinguish the incendiaries as well as assisting them in other ways.

Air raids, which remained common during the Spring but became rarer during the Summer, did not hold up training during 1941 to the extent they had in the latter part of 1940 when invasion seemed so imminent. The Seaforths were not allowed to relax, however, and the role of the Canadian Corps continued to be "to counter attack and destroy any enemy forces invading the counties of Surrey - Kent - Sussex - Hampshire . . . which are not destroyed by the troops of South-Eastern and Southern Commands."[5] To practise the units in this role, one exercise after another was held all during 1941. Each had its own code name: "Fox," "Beagle," "Hare," "Brenda," "Waterloo," "Bulldog," "Chaos," "Beaver," and so forth, and they ranged from brigade to divisional and corps levels. Many were routine, a surprising number were interesting, and not a few were humorous in part.

One of the schemes was Exercise "Parex" on 19 May. The object was to study methods of dealing with an attack by parachutist troops directed against the brigade area. The Seaforths were to be

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[3] W.D., Seaforth Highlanders of Canada, 16 April 1941.

[4] The Seaforth team won. The unit also had a good cricket team.

[5] W.D., Seaforth Highlanders of Canada, February, 1941, Appendix 37; "Cdn. Corps Operational Role".

the enemy, with the Princess Patricias, Edmonton Regiment and Brigade Headquarters defending. The "attack" was to be made at night, and the idea was to move in on the guards, pickets, billets, and vulnerable points to cause as much upset as possible.[6] Theoretically the Seaforths created a tremendous amount of damage. The Intelligence Section under Lt. Pierce had dressed themselves in civilian clothes several days previously and had snooped around the lines of the other battalions. When the scheme started after midnight, therefore, the men were able to go straight for their objectives. Some entered too enthusiastically into the spirit of the thing. Lt. F. W. I. Merritt and his platoon raided the police and fire stations in Oxted and stole the fire engine. With Merritt at the wheel, they toured Oxted with the fire alarm clanging and in general making a devil of a racket. Accidentally someone flipped a switch on the control panel which started a pump going. Without water going through it, it burned out, and the enthusiastic subaltern was up on the carpet in front of Brigadier Potts the following day.[7] Another subaltern and his men had evidently done a good job in the Princess Patricia's lines at Godstone and were marching back to camp with the subaltern the rear. It was dark and a soldier stepped out from behind a bush and asked the lieutenant if he was a Seaforth. "Yes," came the proud reply—followed by a thud as he was knocked out by an irate Patricia seeking revenge. One can say that lessons were learned on both sides in that exercise.

A month later the battalion was engaged in a far larger scheme which took them far to the northeast. This was exercise "Bulldog" which started on 20 June. It was a very warm day when the scheme began, and on the outskirts of London the unit's vehicles were whisked through the city at high speed. The route took them through the dockside area where the appalling results of the air bombing could be seen everywhere. "Row upon row of small houses, complete except for roofs, empty and silent," were to be seen everywhere.[8] One officer noted of the same area: "There is one thing in particular I remember seeing, that is a fire truck up on the second storey of a building. How the devil it got there one wonders. The number of baths and water basins and so on hanging out from the

[6] W.D., Seaforth Highlanders of Canada, May, 1941, Appendix 8.
[7] *Ibid.*, 19-20 May 1941; Forin Diary, 26 May 1941.
[8] Pierce Narrative, p. 19.

gutted walls was an extraordinary sight."[9] There were huge open spaces where land mines had cut a terriffic swath of destruction. It was a sobering sight, and one most Seaforths had not seen concentrated in so small an area. That evening the unit bedded down in Epping Forest, close to Boadicea's Tree under which she is said to have drunk her draught of poison. Of greater interest, perhaps, was the discovery of a nearby farm where eggs could be bought by the dozen.[10] Another interesting feature was "enemy" Fifth Columnists, "consisting among others of A.T.S. girls as girl cyclists wearing shorts." "The men," wrote Lt. B. G. Parker, "are most anxious to capture some." By the 22nd the unit came into contact with the enemy, and for the next three days there was little sleep for anyone as the unit pushed towards and into Norwich. It was a demanding, fast-moving "battle." As one officer wrote later:

> When the normal marching halts were given at 10 minutes to the hour, the troops would fall down in the ditches and fall asleep. When the order was received to move we had to wake every individual and get him going. . . . Capt. H. P. Bell-Irving caused some amusement. While on the move he suddenly started lifting his knees higher and higher and then fell flat on his face. On the usual query "what happened?" he said "I dreamt I was going upstairs to bed!"[11]

By the 25th the exercise was over. A very tired battalion boarded T.C.Vs. (troop carrying vehicles) and headed south, once more being whisked through the East End of London by an exceptionally efficient police force. As the column went under the Thames via the Blackwall Tunnel, the men discharged blank ammunition and let off what remaining thunderflashes they had, making a terrific noise which had to be heard to be believed.[12] The unit was in Limpsfield before nightfall, having covered 400 miles by vehicle and by foot in the past five days.

The rapid succession of exercises, the steady emphasis on long route marches and the constant training on a brigade, divisional

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[9] Personal interview with Capt. B. G. Parker, January 1967.

[10] Letter, Capt. B. G. Parker to his wife, 21 June, 1941. This and other letters are in the possession of Captain Parker.

[11] Pierce Narrative, p. 20.

[12] The C.O. was hopping mad at this and as soon as the convoy stopped he ordered all rifles to be examined. The men expected this, however, and had had their pull-throughs out and had cleaned their rifles. No-one was nailed.

and corps[13] level was an insurance against any invasion the Germans might have launched and, at the same time, it reflected the increasing mobility of battles being fought in other theatres of war. During the first months of 1941 Allied forces had swept over the Italian colonies in North Africa, but in April German-Italian forces pushed them back to the Egyptian frontier. In March and April too, Axis forces were overrunning the Balkans, and the fall of Greece and Crete were hard blows to take. The massive use of German parachute troops in their successful attack on Crete in May had its impact on the training the Seaforths were receiving as well. Exercise "Parex" was one example, but there were many others.

The Seaforths also became more intimately acquainted with the local Home Guard Battalions as well. Men in the Home Guard were either too young or too old to fight with the regular British forces or held positions in civil life which made their occupations essential to the war effort. They were a surprising cross-section of British life—teachers, retired officers, labourers, civil servants, and so forth. Some had been colonels and generals who displayed a blaze of service ribbons on their battle tunics testifying to their service to the empire. But young or old, they had a keen spirit and were anxious to learn all they could from the Seaforths.[14]

Sometimes Seaforth officers would act as umpires between two Home Guard battalions having a "battle". Quite frequently, too, both at Limpsfield and later on the coast, a small body of Seaforths would act as German paratroopers or saboteurs and test the defences of the Home Guard. One such scheme came too close to reality. A Seaforth in "C" Company engaged in one of these exercises, relates:

> We were assigned . . . to take a town. Five or six of us were to knock out a gas works. Our weapons were pieces of chalk. We were to make a big white cross on anything we were to blow up. The Home Guard were to have blank ammunition to repel us with. Our "aircraft" was a Chevy 15-cwt Truck and our parachutes were imaginary. We were "dropped" a mile or so from the Gas Work. It was a really black night and armed with map, compass and chalk we made our way to our objective. We were having a ball marking X's on everything when one of the Home Guard spotted one of the boys and placed him under arrest. After he was taken

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[13] The Canadian Corps came into existence on 25 December, 1940.

[14] See W. A. D. Engelfield, *Limpsfield Home Guard,* London, The Whitefriar's Press, 1946, pp. 8-10 ff.

> into their H.Q., about 6 or 8 Home Guards turned out with bayonets fixed, flashlights, etc. and came looking for any other "saboteurs". . . . Well, this was real fun and we played cat and mouse for over an hour, but we lay still in an open field and were undetected. Then the guards left, except for a couple of sentries. We got together and said what a great joke it would be if we captured them and released the prisoner. We disarmed the sentries and bust into their H.Q. and captured the guards. We had them make us some tea and were B.S.-ing with them when we started to get frightened. *They* had never heard of this exercise and their rifles were loaded with the real stuff![15]

The anti-paratroop role of the Seaforths was more vividly demonstrated on July 7 when a "stick" of paratroopers dropped in a demonstration exercise over the battalion area from a Whitley bomber. For the first time everyone was able to see how rapidly these troops could land, organize themselves and go into action. Their ability to seize the initiative and overcome local resistance, if it was not organized, was frequently combined with attacks on air fields which provided landing places for airborne troops in gliders to reinforce their initial success with more men and heavier weapons.

Presumably this was behind the large working parties the Seaforths were ordered to provide to dig "Pearkes' pits" around Redhill airfield during July. These pits were five by six feet, dug to a depth of about four feet. In essence they were a narrow cross-section of a Great War trench, but without the need for revetting, duck-boards, sheet-iron and other materials used in the old trench systems. Stripped to the waist in the hot July weather,[16] the Seaforths dug dozens of these slit trenches as part of the defence of the airfield.

A few days after the last working party had completed its digging and wiring, the Seaforth Highlanders were informed they would be moving into the South Nutfield - Godstone area to take over the role of guarding the Redhill airfield. The new location was only about a dozen miles west of Limpsfield and placed the unit

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[15] Mr. L. E. Helin to author, 21 November 1966; W.D., Seaforth Highlanders of Canada, 21 October 1941.

[16] Despite the heat the humour of the Seaforths was unquenchable. A recently-joined, Oxford-educated Seaforth subaltern who had a decided British accent was returning to his working party behind a hedge when he heard one of his men taking him off with: "Now, you fellows, ah—three hearty cheers, not too loud to be vulgah, just loud enough to be heard." (Interview with Captain B. G. Parker, December, 1966.)

much closer to the towns of Reigate and Redhill. Nevertheless, the Seaforths were still very much "in the country", and the new quarters were definitely not as comfortable as those they had left. There were some Nissen huts, a few farm houses, but most of the battalion was under canvas, scattered over several miles. Moreover, August was a wet month, and the country roads leading into company areas soon became extremely muddy even though limited to unit vehicle traffic. Tons of cinders and rubble from the bombed areas of London were trucked in and dumped on these roads and footpaths, but the effect was modest. If the late Summer and Fall of 1941 had not been so wet the new area might have been more bearable, but the three months the Seaforths were stationed there were uncomfortable and boring.

During this period, while the battalion was engaged in routine training and periodic exercises, an ever-increasing number of Canadian soldiers were to be seen everywhere in Southern England. By the end of the year, three Canadian infantry (the 1st, 2nd and 3rd) and one (the 5th) armoured divisions had arrived since the previous Fall, and the grey, blue and maroon divisional patches were now mixed with the 1st Division's red shoulder patch which had been so dominant a year previously. On exercises, too, the brigades in the first division were matched with Canadian rather than British forces.

As more Canadian and other allied forces came to Britain, and as the German submarines continued to sink millions of tons of shipping, the Seaforths also felt the result of wider and tighter rationing. "Vehicle holidays", for example, became mandatory on Mondays, which meant that no vehicle was permitted to be driven for any purpose without specific authority. To conserve fuel, no fires were permitted in quarters during training hours, and constant reminders were posted everywhere to turn off lights, to limit the amount of hot water in baths, and to salvage everything from paper to pots for the war effort. The strain of war was noticeable too among the people, and by the end of 1941 everyone who could work had his and her efforts directed towards essential production of some sort. Women in uniform were everywhere—in the services, in the fields, in the factories—assuming more and more tasks formerly held by men. Great Britain was humming with an energy and purpose noticeably lacking before the blitz.

Within the battalion itself during the latter part of 1941 there

were constant minor changes going on in personnel, organization and methods of training. It was a very rare time, for example, when at least ten or twenty officers and N.C.Os. were not away on some course or other. Part of the reason was that new and better weapons were slowly making their appearance, and instructors were needed to teach their characteristics. The prime example of this was the replacement of the Boys anti-tank rifle by the 2-pr., and much later the 6-pr. anti-tank gun. In the Fall, too, the war establishment of the battalion changed for the better, with the main impact falling on the rather unwieldy Headquarters Company. It was greatly reduced, and ultimately in its place Support Company was formed around the specialist platoons which would go into action in support of the four rifle companies. The old idea of a large number of small vehicles to transport the riflemen was also changed to a smaller number of larger vehicles in the battalion. At the same time the number of universal carriers was increased to permit the 3-inch mortar platoon to use this means of transporting its weapons and ammunition rather than the previous "soft skinned"[17] vehicles.

The steady increase in the Canadian Army both at home and abroad resulted in a continued posting of Seaforth officers away from the battalion to assume command and staff appointments or to help provide experienced cadres for newly mobilized units.[18] To replace them a small but steady stream of O.C.T.U. candidates from within the battalion were sent away on Officers Training courses and, in time, many came back to the unit by way of the Holding Unit. All during 1940 and 1941 General Clark and a Selection Board of Seaforth officers had been very active in steering the most promising officer cadets available to the regiment's overseas battalion. Some of these were University of British Columbia graduates, some were young men who had trained with the

[17] This term was used to describe unarmoured vehicles of all types.

[18] Normally there were 33 officers in the battalion. On 1 November 1941 when the officers held their annual dinner, 54 Seaforth officers attended. In July 1942, Lt-Col. Tait wrote in part to General Clark: "The movement of officers who are training in staff duties of one kind or another . . . has caused such a drain that within the past nine months, 25 officers have been taken from platoons in order to fill jobs immediately senior in the regiment or elsewhere in the army." (Letter, Lt-Col. J. M. S. Tait to General J. A. Clark, 6 July 1942, in "Historian's File". This file of correspondence is in the possession of General Clark.)

reserve battalion, and others came from a variety of positions and wished to join the Seaforths. Those who passed muster were directed, in so far as it was possible, into the reinforcement stream which would land them in the Holding Unit which contained reinforcements of all ranks for the unit in the field. Names of the most promising lieutenants were also passed on directly to the Commanding Officer by General Clark, so that when replacements were needed, the Seaforth Colonel would know in advance whom to ask for. This method was not infallible, but it was surprising how much could be done on the "old boy net". Also, when (as it happened) the O.T.C. Camp at Gordon Head, Victoria was commanded by an ex-Seaforth and the Holding Unit also commanded by an ex-Seaforth, positive miracles could happen.

Of the various improvements and changes made within the battalion there was one which, although only attached to the battalion, was a most welcome addition. This was the acquisition of a Y.M.C.A. mobile canteen, the gift of the Women's Canadian Club of Vancouver. Its construction in Great Britain was arranged by the Vancouver Group, and at a formal ceremony it was turned over to the Seaforths in May. The Y.M.C.A. attended to the catering, but the truck was driven by Mrs. H. P. Bell-Irving and Mrs. D. W. Davidson. After many weary miles on a route march, or perhaps in the middle of a sports meet or while at the ranges, spirits went up when the mobile canteen hove into view with its hot coffee and doughnuts.

By October, the constant rain was making the battalion area a sea of mud, and for those still in tents—as most were—living conditions were miserable. October was cold and raw too, which lead the war diarist on the 12th to write:

> Many days like today, and sleeping out in tents, we will soon have a battalion of "frozen beef" if we don't get into billets, or at least some place where the men can get their hands warm enough to tie up their boots. The ground is all covered with white frost and in many cases the men had to chip the ice out of their wash basins before their morning ablutions.[19]

A few days later the various companies still in tents were found better quarters in private houses, barns and other buildings closer

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[19] W.D., Seaforth Highlanders of Canada, 12 October 1941.

to Godstone. The war diarist, who evidently had a sense of humour, reported the event as follows:

> "The Retreat from Ridge Green." . . . Friday, after an historic stand against the slippery and shiny enemy (MUD!) the last of the Seaforths withdrew to higher ground, just in time, before we were all nearly swallowed up by the mucky stuff. Though all men have not completely escaped from the "enemy", at least they are no longer under canvas. Now they only walk in mud. . . . They don't have to eat it and sleep in it any longer as well. Bn. H.Q. is located exactly 7 paces from the main entrance to the Clayton Arms Pub in Godstone. I know because I paced it off. (Then it's two more, after getting inside, right to the bar!)[20]

The Seaforth Highlanders, accustomed as they were to moving about, had no idea that they would only be in their new-found billets in Godstone for a matter of weeks. Such was to be the case, however, on 16 November word came that the 2nd Canadian Infantry Brigade was to relieve the 113th Infantry Brigade in the Brighton area in a week's time.[21]

The move south to relieve a battalion of the Welsh Regiment whose headquarters were at Danny Park, Hurstpierpoint, took place on the 24th and was carried out without a hitch. Danny Park, a large estate, boasted a lovely old Tudor mansion. The owner, Sir William Campion, and his family lived in one wing of the house, with the rest being occupied by Battalion Headquarters. The officers' mess was in the great hall, a vaulted oak-panelled sixty-by-forty-foot room with armour hanging up among the life-sized oil portraits of Sir William's ancestors. In this same hall was a plaque commemorating the meeting which took place there in 1918 when Prime Minister Lloyd George met with his cabinet to discuss the terms of surrender for Germany. Scattered throughout the estate were Nissen huts and tents tucked under the trees to avoid detection from the air. Six and a half miles directly to the south was the sea and Brighton, and between the Seaforths and the sea lay the South Downs, an open country of high hills and rolling farmland.

The battalion found itself responsible for the defence of a 12-mile front on the South Downs, and with the platoons scattered about on the various defence posts they inherited, it was a 22-mile drive for Lt-Col. Ferrie or anyone else to make a tour of inspection of all sub-units, billets and posts. It was a most unsatisfactory situation. Ob-

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[20] *Ibid.*, 17 October 1941. Twelve days after this move it snowed.

[21] *Ibid.*, November 1941, Appendix: "2 Cdn. Inf. Bde. Op. Order No. 1".

viously one battalion could not defend such an area strung out as it was. Furthermore, an examination of the defences taken over revealed considerable gaps in fields of fire, overly long and potentially hazardous means of communication, and roads which were in miserable condition as the winter rains churned them into a sticky glutinous mud even with modest traffic. Mud, at first, was one of the features of Danny Park as well, and tons of rubble from London had to be spread on the roads and paths in the estate before the Seaforths could walk about without wading ankle deep in the sticky stuff.

For several weeks the Seaforths dug new weapon pits, strung barbed wire and prepared and camouflaged new and better defensive sites. On 6 December word came from Divisional Headquarters that the battalion was no longer to consider itself as holding a front, but rather its task was to hold and keep open two key roads leading north and northwest from Brighton. The idea was that if the defences on the coast were pierced, and the enemy came north over the roads, they were to be stopped and held to allow the 8th British Armoured Division to come racing down from the north to fling the invaders back into the sea. This called for another revision of plans, but by January 1942, although work was still going on, the role and defences of the battalion had been fixed. The Intelligence Officer at the time commented later:

> It is a peculiar thing but after all the recces, arguments for and against positions, fields of fire, all-round-defence, etc., we actually finished up with the four companies parked where four Roman Camps had been located a couple of thousand years before. The actual entrenchments were plainly visible, and whilst we were careful to avoid actually digging directly on Roman sites, their military lessons with regard to all round defence must have been alarmingly similar to our defence against this new mobile type of war.[22]

One feature about the sweeping, rolling hills which constituted the South Downs was that it provided exceptionally good fields of fire as well as an area for field exercise and training. And at about the time the Christmas mail and parcels began to arrive at Danny Park, the Seaforths began to undergo a new and vigorous form of training which was a culmination of the hard lessons learned in Belgium, France, North Africa and elsewhere. It was called Battle Drill.

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[22] Pierce Narrative, *op. cit.*

On 6 December Major J. D. Forin, commanding Headquarters Company, arrived back in the battalion having just completed a two weeks' course in the "new" battle drill. Lt. J. W. D. Foxcroft had already returned from a month's commando course in Scotland, and another officer, Lt. D. V. Pugh, had similar training. Immediately on Forin's return, and in line with the new training policy, a regimental Battle Drill school was organized under the direction of Forin, Foxcroft and Pugh. The idea was to train six officers and men from each rifle company and eight from Headquarters. These, in turn, would pass on their training to others until the entire battalion had been instructed in its principles and purposes.

For those readers who may not have had this type of training, and in memory of those unforgettable hours of grinding effort to which all ranks were subjected, a brief description of this training deserves mention. Battle drill was designed to harden soldiers physically and so condition them mentally to battle that the platoon, company or indeed battalion would constantly be offensively minded in action. The tactics of the drill were simple and good, based as they were primarily on fire and movement. No matter what obstacle was encountered, one of a few basic drills could be adapted to overcome it, and as every private was thoroughly trained in these drills, the platoon or company commander could issue the briefest of orders with the knowledge that his instructions would be understood and properly executed. As a training method it was the best thing that had been devised and was adopted officially as standard procedure for both the British and Canadian Armies.

To harden the men to withstand the physical strain of warfare at its worst, as well as to condition them to the sounds and sights of battle, a variety of ingenious means were devised to test the soldier. For one thing almost every tactic was carried out "at the double", and whether the Seaforth was merely carrying his rifle or whether he was also loaded down with a Bren gun or 2-inch mortar, he ran up hill and down dale exercising one manoeuvre after another. "Sweat saves blood" was the war-cry. Weather was no consideration, and neither rain, snow nor hot sunshine was allowed to hamper his pace. The same was true of the terrain. He might be called on to go hand over hand up a rope scaling a steep hill or he might have to wriggle through cold, sticky mud; he might have to wade waist deep through a river holding his weapon over his head or he might

have to clatter over the rubble of bombed houses. In brief, he had to be ready to accept any conditions and carry out his part of the drill no matter what the conditions were.

In order to accustom the Seaforths to the sound of battle, those instructing in battle drill tactics made liberal use of live ammunition as well as explosive charges of various types representing anything from the explosions of shells to grenades. Bombs and tear gas bombs could also be used, and were. Part of the training usually included an assault course. This was built by the Pioneer Platoon, and consisted of a series of obstacles ranging from belts of barbed wire, thick ropes connecting trees or posts, slippery logs crossing mud or water pits, and so forth, which all ranks had to go through, over or under in a limited time carrying the weapons and ammunition they would normally take with them into battle. Cracked ribs, sprained ankles, bruised muscles and occasionally a broken leg or arm were not uncommon, but it was felt that the training was worth the small percentage of "wastage" encountered.

Something of the spirit of this training can be gathered from the following excerpts from the journal of the Seaforths' first battle drill instructor when he started his first class.

> 15 Dec. 1941: Have the pick of the officers and N.C.Os. on [our Battle Drill Course]. . . . It wasn't pleasant for them this morning but they did better this afternoon. . . . We kept them busy every minute of the time . . . the lightening and changing around of equipment has helped them. Am rather stiff myself.
>
> 17 Dec. 1941: School spent all a.m. on North Commons, about 6 miles N. of Ditchling, rolling and gorse-covered and extensive. We carried out about 3½ hrs of section in attack and assault drill.
>
> 22 Dec. 1941: Had another good day—river crossing with recce. and assault boats and clearing a wood.
>
> 23 Dec. 1941: Today we had an easy a.m. Use of assault boat drill and . . . some unarmed combat. In p.m. we dumped all the school off almost 8 mi. from home and sent them across country—N. of Downs—wet and ploughed and wooded, including a river crossing. We three instructors opposed them at points with live rounds. . . . At night had a night operation: tank hunting and destroying. . . .
>
> 24 Dec. 1941: This p.m. extensive operations on rifle range with live ammo. Rifle, L.M.G. (Bren), 2-in. mortar, A/T rifle. . . .
>
> 27 Dec. 1941: The school finished in a blaze of glory . . . the men doing a fine job. [The day] ended with a chase of the Intelligence Section falling back and a ¾ mi. run for a vital point. . . . We were going from 0930 to 1530 hrs.—no lunch—covered about 12 miles cross country—12

legs including several flanking and pincer tactics, clearing a wood, farm buildings, crossing a lake in assault boats and several minor incidents.[23]

This account of battle drill training could be multiplied several times during the Spring and Summer of 1942 when the Seaforths seemed to be engaged mainly either in running over the Downs or digging into them in a constant effort to improve their defences. Morning physical training exercises also added to the general toughening up of all ranks, and there seems to be no doubt but that the new emphasis on the strenuous life had the effect of forcing out of the battalion anyone who could not keep up the pace.

At times it was surprising who could and who could not "take it". One humorous account is given of an incident regarding Captain Lord Tweedsmuir who came to the Seaforths in mid-November and had temporary command of "B" Company. On one occasion he was leading his company up a precipitous slope of the South Downs. At the top everyone was very much out of breath, and Tweedsmuir recalls the moment when the leading soldier turned to the next man and said: "God, I thought they said these lords were decadent!"[24]

It should not be thought that battle drill training was restricted to other ranks. Everyone took part in it, and frequently switched places in the platoon. The following excerpts give yet another sample of what it was like.

> We certainly are working pretty dam hard on this battle drill and I almost felt I'd willingly die at times, running uphill with a Bren gun through heather with all one's pack and equipment on certainly poops one. And it's not just short dashes, I can tell you. . . . Although I'm a platoon commander I also take my place in the ranks at times, as does Locke Malkin.

> The instructor has never forgiven me for pulling a fast one the other day. We had just been told that if we saw "enemy" to report at once to the section leader. Our section was all completely pooped, doubling across the snow, so I shouted "Enemy half right" and of course we all dropped down and got a breather as a result. The instructor wanted to know who the hell shouted "Enemy" and where were they, etc.

> Yesterday morning . . . we spent most of the time wading one particular river, which we crossed ten times altogether. One C.S.M., Sgt.-Maj. Haddon, I'll never forget, got half way across the ice when in he went

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[23] Forin Diary, 1941—on dates shown.

[24] Letter, G. S. Gibson to author, 22 November 1966.

> trying to hold a Bren gun over his head. You can imagine what his language was like. It kept us all warm with laughter. The cold part of crossing these rivers is the waiting about afterwards. We came back by open truck soaked to the skin. The men have taken it all darn well on the whole, although they were numb with cold.[25]

In January, 1942, when the Seaforths were starting their new training, the last of the Great War veteran officers left the battalion. This was Lt-Col. Ferrie, who had served the unit long and well ever since its post-war reorganization. Lt-Col. J. M. S. Tait, ED, replaced him as Commanding Officer. Tait was the son of a former commanding officer and he, too, had served in the regiment during the 1920's and 1930's. Major J. D. Forin became second in command, and in the consequent reshuffling of officers, Captains H. P. Bell-Irving, Lord Tweedsmuir, D. M. Clark and A. S. Campbell were appointed to command "A", "B", "C" and "D" Companies respectively. Lts. J. H. Gowan and J. D. Pierce were Adjutant and Intelligence Officer and Captain H. T. Vicars and Lt. R. S. Clark were Quartermaster and Transport Officer. Before the battalion got into action there were to be more changes, but the greater part of the officers and men in the unit in 1942 would serve with it in action. Of those who would leave the unit, however, possibly the happiest were the three officers and 21 men who left for six months' instructional duties in Canada in March. A number of these returned later, but it is true nevertheless to say that the Seaforths were tapped time and again to supply trained, experienced officers and N.C.Os. for a variety of positions throughout the Corps and the Army.

The Spring of 1942 brought with it the usual number of exercises, but "Tiger" in May topped anything the Seaforths had experienced. In this exercise six divisions plus additional troops were involved, and the area of the manoeuvres took in several hundred square miles of Southern England. Lieutenant-General B. L. Montgomery[26] was the Director of the exercise. Aside from the benefit such a scheme would yield to senior officers manoeuvring large bodies of men, it was also designed to test the capabilities

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[25] Letter, Captain B. G. Parker to his wife, 15 and 18 January 1942. Copy in Seaforth Archives.

[26] At this time he was G.O.C.-in-C., South Eastern Command.

of the men to the limit.[27] The eleven-day exercise, which ended on 30 May, took the Seaforths a distance of 130 miles, all of it on foot, and frequently with only iron rations to eat. Infantry and armoured units, field and anti-aircraft artillery regiments, service corps and engineers—every type of unit was on the road. It seemed as if someone had poked a stick into a mound of army ants and sent them scurrying all across Southern England. On the exercise, rain or shine, it was a case of eating and sleeping where and when one could, for orders to advance and withdraw had no thought of the soldiers' normal training day. Time, in a sense, became meaningless, and passing hours were measured rather in terms of sore feet or empty stomachs.

The exercise will be remembered by most men who took part in it by disjointed, kaleidoscopic impressions—of Lt-Gen. Montgomery marching a mile or so with "D" Company, of Lt-Col. Tait chasing a pig in the dead of night when it started to root under his bed in a farm yard, or perhaps of a cock-pheasant, strutting proudly in front of the squire of Brightling Park, drilled through the head by a rifle shot fired by a hungry soldier. Others may remember the sight of the 1st Canadian Army Tank Brigade's Churchill tanks roaring through Uckfield for several hours, or the welcome return to bread and fresh meat after several days on canned "M and V" (meat and vegetables). Throughout it all there were exceptionally few who fell out, and despite the grumbling over short rations, blistered feet, orders and counter-orders, lack of sleep and being constantly on the move rain or shine, the battalion was in fine physical shape. Furthermore, even if few might admit it at the time, most of the men would far rather be engaged in an exercise or in some challenging training than be sitting around guarding the coast, and this was realized by higher authority who were very careful to mix training, rest and more prosaic duties in good proportion. The Seaforths had been in Britain for two and a half years, and as with other units in the division, there was a danger of their becoming stale. They had come overseas expecting to fight and, although they were not a bloodthirsty lot, after training for months on end for combat they were more than willing to try their hand on one of the

[27] Col. C. P. Stacey, *Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War: Vol. I, Six Years of War.* Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1955, p. 244.

battlefronts. How soon that opportunity might come was the source of endless speculation. Just before "Tiger" Major Forin noted in his diary that he thought the Brigadier felt that "the division might be in for a show before the summer is out."[28]

One of the most realistic phases of training for the Seaforths came in June. It was part of the changes in training which started with the introduction of battle drill, and might be termed the culmination of it. Early in the month a large field-firing range was constructed in the open fields near Thunder Barrow Hill which could accommodate an entire brigade at a time. The range encompassed over a square mile, and it was so designed that the men advancing over it would meet obstacles similar to those in battle. Barbed wire and slit-trenches were everywhere, straw dummies were scattered about to be shot at and sandbags to be bayonneted.[29] The idea of creating this range was to accustom all ranks to firing their weapons while on the move and to exercise the officers and N.C.Os. in controlling their platoons and companies while working under these conditions. To simulate further the realism of the battlefield, the division's mortars and medium machine-guns, all carefully controlled, would fire live rounds over the heads of the advancing infantrymen, while the artillery fired blank rounds to add to the realism of the training.

On 25 June the Seaforths assembled at a Forming Up Place near Beeding Hill for a "dry run" of their exercise. This was necessary since any mistake by the participants could be fatal. Then, as the War Diarist noted,

> At 1630 hrs. the troops prepared to move forward, "C" and "B" Companies in advance, "A" and "D" in the rear. The Saskatoon Light Infantry with their M.M.Gs. opened up, then the artillery with their 25 pounders. Mortar bombs dropped with unerring accuracy while the troops, armed with Bren guns, Tommies and rifles, stormed the slopes of Observatory Hill, then Thunderbarrow Hill, attacking enemy positions, through barbed wire entanglements. Sandbags and petrol tins marked with a white "X" were conveniently positioned and riddled with bullets as the Coys. pushed on.[30]

It was, to put it mildly, an interesting experience, and Lt-Gen.

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[28] Forin diary, 14 May 1942. Actually plans were being laid for the Dieppe raid at this time, but the division, as events turned out, was not to take part.

[29] W.D., Seaforth Highlanders of Canada, 20-30 June 1942.

[30] *Ibid.*, 25 June 1942.

Crerar, Maj-Gen. Pearkes and various other senior officers who were observing the exercise appeared suitably impressed. In July additional exercises were held, culminating with a brigade attack with a battalion of tanks in a combined assault up and down the hills of the range, live ammunition of a variety of calibres whistled about, but fortunately there were no casualties in the battalion.

Considering the realism of the exercise and the liberal amount of ammunition used, it is remarkable that there were not more casualties, but the wider acceptance of what was termed "wastage" was part of the increasingly tough training which was being practised. Not all casualties came from broken bones or injuries on the range. This was brought home to the Seaforths when Lt-Col. Tait left the battalion on the last day of July. Tait had not been strong physically and frequently over-taxed himself to keep up with the men on long route marches. On 21 July he had confided to his second-in-command that he had been re-boarded medically as "B" Category, and about a week later heart trouble had forced him to leave for the Shoreham Hospital. Major Forin became acting Commanding Officer and Major M. J. Griffin took over the duties as second in command.

A few days after Lt-Col. Tait left, the Seaforths were advised that the 1st Canadian Infantry Division would be moving shortly to take over the positions formerly held by the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division in the Eastbourne sector. The move would be completed by 9 August, and for the battalion it meant occupying positions on the northern outskirts of Eastbourne, with "C" Company occupying Pevensey Castle. This castle was a famous historic landmark. The outer walls were built by the Romans and one of the fiercest battles fought there was when Aella and the South Saxons swarmed over its battlements in 491 A.D. and slaughtered all its inhabitants.[31] About 500 years later William the Conqueror landed about a mile away. Ultimately he granted the fort to his half-brother who built a Norman castle inside the walls, subsequently reconstructed by King Edward I. Pevensey was only one of several historic sites in the Eastbourne area, but sprinkled among the castles and towers were several naval, military and air force installations which

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[31] The Seaforths, using grappling irons, used to climb up the high inner walls as part of their battle drill training.

were performing the same but modern task of the old castle walls —that is, defending the South Coast.

The Seaforths' duties in the new area were legion. They had to look after beachlights, spigot mortars, gasoline and oil dumps for creating in the sea a wall of flame in case of invasion, "roller-skating" anti-tank charges, Forgasse barrels hidden in road cuts, as well as to man observation posts and mount anti-aircraft machine-gun posts. In addition, the Pevensey Radar Station came within their charge, and should the enemy attempt any "commando" raids or airborne landings along the Eastbourne sector of the coast, the Seaforths would be involved immediately. Standing patrols of company strength were on the alert constantly, and elaborate precautions were taken within the Brigade Group to alert the Home Guard, coastal batteries and a variety of other units who shared the constant watch along the coast.

The South Coast of England at this time was being hit fairly constantly by German "tip and run" raids. One or more aircraft would come whipping over the Channel at almost wavetop level to escape the British radar detection. Swooping in over the coast, they would strike at oil tanks, railway stations, barracks, troops or anything else which caught their eye after they had shot up or bombed their major target. On 4 August, when the Seaforths were still in the Brighton area, a Focke-Wolfe 190 had come over and machine-gunned the streets of the city. Some thirty machine-guns in the brigade had shot his tail off as he headed back for France. When the unit marched along the Downs on 8-9 August to Eastbourne,[32] special precautions were taken by all the unit's Bren gunners to have half of their weapons at the alert along the line of march. The Seaforths had hardly settled in when more German planes flew in and bombed the area. The raid on Eastbourne on the night of 10-11 August was a particularly colourful affair which did considerable damage to the vehicles of the Edmonton Regiment and killed nine men from No. 9 Field Ambulance. This raid almost hit the unit's Pipe Band. It had returned from an engagement and had only just left the Eastbourne railway station when the station was demolished by incendiary bombs.

These raids resulted in more stringent orders being issued

[32] Incidentally camping overnight on the same site occupied for a while by the 72nd Bn., C.E.F. before it went to France.

regarding the digging of slit trenches, gathering more sand and water pails for use in the various billets, and especially manning additional anti-aircraft posts. The air force installations seemed especially attractive targets, but the city's gas and electric works drew enemy fire almost as frequently.[33]

The Seaforths' opportunity came early on 26 August, early in the morning. At Battalion Headquarters Major Forin was dealing with a couple of defaulters. Over at Crumbles Range Lt. D. H. Strain was with "D" Company getting things lined up for rifle practice. Cpl. R. E. Bosley was near the transport shed close to St. Anthony's Hall, while in their billets Cpl. R. H. Brammer and Pte. F. Moore were painting Bren gun magazines. In brief, training was going on "as per syllabus" on the 26th when two German Focke-Wolfe 190's came skimming across the Channel at about 0900 hours. They were spotted by Pte. E. G. Johnstone who manned an anti-aircraft post on top of a factory. As they flew low over Eastbourne and close to his position, he emptied several magazines into the planes and could see them hitting home. At about the same moment Pte. F. L. Wood in another post fired at them as they came abreast the gas and electrical works, and he too, at a range of about 300 to 400 yards, could see his shots strike home. The planes both dropped bombs, but one, at this point, zoomed directly up in the air, flipped over and crashed just east of the gas plant. Meanwhile Sgt. N. C. Forsbeck and Cpl. Brammer, also members of the anti-aircraft platoon, had raced outside their billets with Bren guns ready and loaded and were in time to blast away at the remaining aircraft. Cpl. Bosley, P. S. M. Metcalfe, Sgt, Buchanan, Cpl. Campbell, Lt. Strain and others who were in a position to see the rounds striking the plane all over its fuselage found themselves cheering madly at the Bren gunners' performance, and even though the second machine managed to circle back and head eastward over the Channel, the general opinion, spiced with hope, was that the pilot

[33] A humourous incident occurred on 14 August when two enemy planes came over at noon to bomb the radar station. Having dropped their bombs they circled low over "C" Company when the troops were queued up for lunch. "The troops," wrote the war diarist, "could think of nothing more offensive to do than to wave their mess-tins at them. One of the pilots waved back. . . ." (W.D., Seaforths Highlanders of Canada, 14 August 1942.) During their stay at Eastbourne the battalion was billetted in houses for the most part.

couldn't make it. Even if he did his plane, from all eye-witness accounts, must have been well and truly shot up. Meanwhile the downed plane was the object of souvenir hunters, and the swastikas on each wing soon became the prized possessions of the Seaforths.

There was particular pleasure in shooting down one German plane and having grounds for considering another one a "probable", for exactly a week previously the Canadian forces had raided Dieppe. The Seaforths had seen the hundreds of planes shuttling back and forth overhead and, all during 19th August, those not on duty had listened for news over the B.B.C. and had bought up every newspaper they could lay their hands on. Many had hurriedly been sent on special anti-aircraft duties to guard against any German aircraft attempting to strike at the ships bringing back the 2nd Division's troops returning to the coast. The Medical Officer and his section had stood by in case any of the landing craft carrying wounded men put in near Eastbourne. It was an exciting day, one which sent spirits soaring. Later, however, when word of the losses suffered by the Canadians was released the mood changed, especially when it was known that Lt-Col. C. C. I. Merritt, formerly a Seaforth company commander, was reported lost while leading his battalion, the South Saskatchewan Regiment, in battle. It was not until several weeks later that Merritt was reported a prisoner of war, and everyone in the Seaforth Highlanders of Canada was doubly pleased when it was announced he had been awarded the Victoria Cross.

In a sense, therefore, the two planes shot up by the Seaforths a week after the event did release some of the frustration which many felt as the warm summer of 1942 came to a close. Nevertheless, the battalion would not have to wait much longer. Dieppe did teach some lessons—or, more properly, it brought home some old ones. These were to be taken to heart when the next major assault would be made on Hitler's "Festung Europa", and the Seaforths were to be in the fore of that assault.

CHAPTER V

Combined Operations Training

Someday an historian of the Second World War may undertake a study of the relationship between the number of men absent without leave from a battalion and the type of training they had been doing. The chart which emerges should be interesting. Other factors which would have to be taken into consideration would be the length of time the battalion was overseas, the barracks it used, the food served, and a variety of similar things which affected the soldiers' morale. The Seaforth Highlanders of Canada might serve as a good example, and one might predict that the A.W.L. curve would go up in relationship to poor weather, boredom with inaction, and monotony of training.

It was not that the Seaforths lacked internal change. Indeed, during the latter part of 1942 and early in 1943 there were changes without end—or so it seemed. On 11 October, for example, the battalion welcomed back an old Seaforth who was to be its new commanding officer, Lt-Col. B. M. Hoffmeister. "Hoffy", as he was nicknamed, had served with the regiment since he was a boy, and he was one of a number of cadets who went through the ranks in the regiment until he commanded it. A hard-working, business-like, no-nonsense commanding officer, he was to lead the battalion into action. He had returned to Great Britain after spending several months in Canada at the Canadian Junior War Staff College, and when he took over the reins of command from Major J. D. Forin on the following day, he must have been struck by the tremendous turnover in the ranks of the officers and N.C.Os. The Adjutant (Capt.

J. H. Gowan) and Assistant Adjutant (Lt. D. H. Strain) would be among the first to "put him in the picture", and the winds of change would whistle first through this office. The Quartermaster (Lt. F. Bonnell), Paymaster (Captain G. F. Williamson), Intelligence Officer (Lt. J. J. Conway) and Transport Officer (Lt. F. W. I. Merritt) would be among the officers who could expect to receive an early visit, as could R.S.M. J. J. Nicholson and Pipe Major Esson. The padre, H/Captain R. C. H. Durnford, had come to the battalion after Hoffmeister had left for Canada, and possibly even before they met the new Commanding Officer had heard from a variety of sources a great deal of praise for this Anglican priest.

Aside from noting the new faces, Hoffmeister would have missed many of the old familiar N.C.Os. and men. A week prior to his arrival eight Seaforths had left as successful O.C.T.U. candidates to try for their commissions in Canada. The usual drain of officers to brigade, division and corps headquarters as well as to various schools and staff appointments in Canada had created additional vacancies which were being filled by young subalterns from No. 1 C.I.D.R.U.[1] It is rather interesting to note that the new Commanding Officer, when going through his officers' files,[2] would have found a surprising number of lawyers whose talents could be called upon to defend or prosecute any luckless Seaforths who decided to stay away from the fold for a period well beyond the time permitted. A few months earlier two men had been charged, as an orderly officer put it, "with depleting the slender assets of the Bn." Being in a reflective mood he added:

> Which provokes the observation that the accused persons had half the Junior Bar of Vancouver from which to choose in selecting a defending officer. With the Bn. in the field we have the following ex-legal luminaries of the B.C. Law Society: Major J. D. Forin, Major M. Griffin, Capt. D. Pugh, Capt. T. Vance, Lieuts. F. Bonnel, J. McMullen, D. Fulton, A. Mercer and . . . [Lt. F. C. Hall]. Battling barrister H. Conway is with Bde., and in London we have Lt-Col. G. S. Clark and Major T. G. Norris. It is also reported that Lieut. A. Carrol is at the holding unit at Witley.[3]

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[1] No. 1 Canadian Infantry Division Reinforcement Unit—sometimes referred to as fairyland. This holding unit held about a company of Seaforths.

[2] He was to write General Clark a few months later saying that the average age of the officers was between 27 and 28 years. (Seaforth Archives File: "General J. A. Clark—Extracts From Letters".)

[3] W.D., Seaforth Highlanders of Canada. November, 1942, Appendix "A": "Orderly Officers' War Diary".

Aside from the turnover in officers, N.C.Os. and men, Lt-Col. Hoffmeister found that both the brigade and divisional commander had changed. Brigadier C. Vokes took over command of the 2nd Brigade from Brigadier A. E. Potts on 24 June when the latter was appointed to command a division in Canada. Major-General G. R. Pearkes left the division on 1 September when he returned to take up the appointment of G.O.C.-in-C. Pacific Command, which, incidentally, brought the Seaforth's reserve battalion under his eye. He was succeeded by Major-General H. L. N. Salmon, MC, one week later.[4]

During the latter part of 1942 and early 1943 other changes were taking place which might be discussed at this point. Probably the most noticeable was a revised war establishment which came into effect less than two weeks after Hoffmeister arrived. Headquarters Company was the most affected. As one officer wrote:

> This is now split into two parts, one to be called Battalion Headquarters Company and the other Support Company. Our new Bn. H.Q. Company consists of the Signals Platoon, Anti-Aircraft Platoon and Administrative Platoon and is to be commanded by Captain Tarbuck. Support Company consists of the Carrier Platoon, Mortar Platoon, Anti-Tank Platoon and Pioneer Platoon, to be commanded by Major H. P. Bell-Irving. This is rather like splitting the former rather unwieldy H.Q. Coy. into two teams, offensive and defensive, and was greeted by all with enthusiasm as much more effort can now be spent in building up the offensive use of the new Support Coy. The Pioneer Platoon has also taken on a new look. Instead of being a sort of labour platoon, they are now to be equipped and trained as assault engineers, so ably used by the German army in their advance through France.[5]

In January, 1943 the war establishment was further changed when, for a three month experimental period, the Seaforths went on a three rather than a four rifle company basis. Platoon strengths were increased to about 45 men each. On 26 April the four rifle company establishment was reinstituted.

Changes in equipment were taking place in this period also.

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[4] Major-General Salmon was killed in an air crash late in April, 1943 and was succeeded by Major-General G. G. Simonds who was to lead the division into action.

[5] Seaforth Archives, Pierce Narrative, Chapter V, p. 41. The pioneer platoon was one of the smallest in the battalion. About one quarter of the men were tradesmen; all were skilled in anti-gas precautions, decontamination, and after this period in explosives, booby-traps and both lifting and laying mines.

Early in November, 1942 the No. 38 replaced the No. 18 wireless set. The former was lighter in weight and had a throat microphone,[6] and although a better piece of equipment many who had to use it still felt there was room for improvement. Two months later all the battalion's rifles were turned in and the men were re-issued with the new Mark IV with its spike-like eight inch bayonet. Basically the rifle was much the same with its bolt action and ten-round magazine. The bayonet, however, was a small thing which seemed to be good for toasting bread or opening a tin of milk and little else. Actually it was a deadly weapon if properly used—but then, so was a pocket knife. Generally speaking the new rifle did not receive a warm welcome.

In March 1943, the lighter English Norton motorcycles were withdrawn and the heavier Harley-Davidson motorcycles issued in their place. The Nortons were better at cross country work, but the comfort and power of the heavier bikes were welcomed by the hard working dispatch riders who often spent hours on the road without let-up guiding convoys of vehicles along the narrow British roads. In the next two months the unit was issued with two new weapons which were to be used in battle. The first was the 6-pr. anti-tank gun which had a far greater penetrating power against the newest tanks the enemy had been developing since the war began. This was to be the weapon of the anti-tank platoon. In May, 1943 the Seaforths were issued with the "Projector, Infantry, Anti-tank", or "Piat" as it was generally called. This was to be the infantry platoon's weapon against tanks. Although its range was quite short and it looked like a piece of plumbing, the bomb it fired had very good penetrating power and could disable the strongest tanks. At about the same time the Seaforths were issued with new, lightweight respirators and some received a new style steel helmet which was designed to give greater protection to the neck. Thompson sub-machine carbines, excellent for street and house fighting, were made available in May also, which further increased the fire power of the platoon to an extent which more than equalled that of a company of the unit's C.E.F. battalion when it went into action over 25 years earlier.

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[6] "Strangest sight of the day," wrote the war diarist when the new sets arrived, "was Sgt. S. H. Milne of the Signal Platoon with the throat microphone on apparently talking to himself." (W.D., Seaforth Highlanders of Canada, 10 November 1942.)

The great majority of these changes, which took place over an eight-month period, occurred after Hoffmeister took command, but at the time he arrived the Seaforths were still in the Pevensey-Eastbourne area and were getting somewhat fed up with routine training. Battle-drill kept the men in trim, and learning street or house-to-house fighting among the blitzed houses of Eastbourne was something of a fillip. The laying and lifting of mine fields, scaling cliffs or the walls of Pevensey Castle, platoon and company night exercises, and the usual mixture of schemes with and without tanks kept Seaforths of all ranks occupied and alert, but what might be termed the post-Dieppe restlessness was hard to shake off. Three years was a long time to wait, and although the Seaforths were by no means a blood-thirsty lot, the feeling of being out of it was wide-spread. During the Summer and Fall German forces had been pushing east from the Donetz River until it seemed that Stalingrad must fall. The British Eighth Army had been holding at El Alamein. Late in October General B. L. Montgomery had thrust west after the El Alamein battle and on 8 November an Anglo-American force under General D. D. Eisenhower landed in French Morocco and Algiers. So intense was the interest[7] of the Seaforths when this latter news was announced that the newspaperman was forced to ration his sale of papers to one for each house or Nissen shelter in which the men were billeted. There was some bitterness[8] that American troops were in action in North Africa despite the fact that they had come into the war two years later and that the Canadians were better trained. It is little wonder, therefore, that the Seaforths, like other 1st Division battalions, were somewhat "browned-off". Brigadier Vokes had noticed this growing restlessness in the Seaforths and had noted, too, that the battalion's efficiency had slipped. He had told Hoffmeister that his first job was to bring the unit up to its former level. This the new C.O. set out to do. A considerable reshuffling of officers ensued, and as a result of the new, firm hands which now controlled the Seaforths, a steady improvement in the morale of the unit was noticeable. Hoffmeister demanded a lot from all ranks, and they responded not only to the challenge but their confidence in Hoffmeister grew weekly.

On 5 November Major Forin heard a rumour that the Seaforths

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[7] Among other reasons for this interest was that Lt. Baldwin and several other Seaforths were on loan to the British Army in North Africa at this time.

[8] W.D., Seaforth Highlanders of Canada, 9 November 1942.

were going to move to Scotland to do combined operations training.[9] Within a week or so the unit was told that it would be doing specialist training, but neither the date nor the place was indicated. By the 21st, somehow or other, Scotland seemed to be on everyone's lips, a deduction which might have come when Forin was ordered to Scotland on 16 November to take a Beachmaster's course at a combined operations establishment.

The cry for a second front, of making a landing to breach Hitler's "Festung Europa", had been gaining strength all during 1942. The need for it, the strength of the forces required, the area where the assault should be made, and the constant calls by the Russians that it must be given relief, were discussed privately and publicly. The Dieppe Raid had shown the dangers involved, but the Canadian soldier was rare who did not feel that the next time it would be successful, and that once again Canadians would be involved.

Up until the latter part of 1942 the Seaforth Highlanders had been concerned with the defeat of any possible seaborne or airborne invasion of the Southern Coast of England. The pendulum of training began to swing in September, 1942, just at about the time all ranks heard a lecture from Lord Lovat, who had led the commandos taking part in the Dieppe raid. A few weeks earlier a Divisional Training Instruction laid down that training in September would be based on the problems faced by a "battalion group" and "brigade group" landing on enemy occupied coasts.[10] The Brigade Training Instruction issued two days later,[11] while outlining the major exercises, ordered all units "to practise all troops in disembarkation (descending by rope ladders or nets). . . ." For the Seaforths, therefore, using Jacob's ladders to descend from towers as part of their normal assault course training in mid-September was the first step taken in the elements of Combined Operations.

Training of this nature, until the unit arrived in Scotland, depended on stretching the imagination, practising "dry runs" and receiving a number of lectures and films on the subject. The film "Next of Kin", which brought home the need for security, was one

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[9] Forin diary, 5 November 1942. "Is it a 'sop' or a 'prep.' for the real thing," he wrote.

[10] W.D., Seaforth Highlanders of Canada, September, 1942, Appendix: "1 Cdn. Div. Training Instruction No. 20," 22 August 1942.

[11] *Ibid.*, Appendix: "2 Cdn. Inf. Bde. Training Instruction No. 2".

with which the Seaforths were to become quite familiar. Another, called "Combined Operations" was far more interesting and was followed with keen attention.

In September, too, the Seaforths took part in a brigade exercise which simulated a landing on an enemy coast. Exercise "Viking", as it was called, was first outlined on a huge model at an officers' T.E.W.T. at brigade headquarters. Here for the first time something of the manner and problems involved in having assault groups of men land on an enemy shore were discussed in theory. The next stage was a "dry run", that is, forming up the brigade as if it has just landed from the sea and, in a two-day exercise, practising the group in an attack simulating the problems of penetrating inland and securing a bridgehead for follow-up troops.

Another form of "dry-shod" training was carried out by the drivers of carriers and other vehicles. This consisted of practising backing up steep ramps of earth (representing the ramp of an L.C.M.[12]), and then parking the vehicles tightly into a confined space staked out on the ground representing the deck of the L.C.M. The increased emphasis given to training with tanks, of receiving instruction from N.C.Os. of the Royal Canadian Engineers on booby-traps and mines, and in general the change in emphasis from the defence to the attack, slowly picked up pace as the year came to an end.[13]

Meanwhile, rumours of going to Scotland had permeated the entire battalion, growing and fading as the men attempted to "read the signs" of a move and tried to estimate the future operations of the division as the German forces in North Africa were slowly being crushed like a nut in a nutcracker. On 7 January there was a wild rumour that Canadians were fighting in Tunisia, but this died a natural death. Not until 21 January, 1943, when two officers and a number of senior N.C.Os. left for Inveraray, Scotland for a week's tour did expectations leap once more. This time the rumour was true, for word that the battalion was off for an intensive course in combined operations was posted a few days later.

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[12] L.C.M.—Landing Craft, Mechanized.

[13] The 1st Canadian Division was given priority in the use of combined operations training facilities at this time as it was thought that it might be used in an assault against Sardinia. Col. G. W. L. Nicholson, *Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War*, Volume II, *The Canadians in Italy, 1943-1945*. Ottawa, the Queen's Printer, 1956, p. 24.

As usual there was much to be done. Surplus stores were packed and stored at Westham, billets cleaned out for the 48th Highlanders who would take over the area, the inevitable nominal rolls made out, and the usual administrative details attendant upon moving 750 men by train looked after. A fair number of officers and men had English wives and children and they had to make their own domestic arrangements. Finally on 14 February everything was in order, and during Monday three trainloads of Seaforth Highlanders, complete with vehicles and weapons, sped north to Scotland.

When the troop-train came to a halt at Gourock, the Seaforths stepped off on the same platform from which they had entrained for England three years previously. Oddly enough too, as the ferries carried them across the Clyde on the way to Inveraray they saw in mid stream H.M.T. *Andes,* now painted grey but still doing duty as a troopship. Snow and hail, driven by a fresh wind, blocked out much of the view of the area, and at first the muddy condition of the camp, which lay close by the Duke of Argyll's castle, caused spirits to sag. However the following day was clear, bright and warm, and the beauty of the country with its snow-capped mountains reflected in the lochs reminded many of home.

Training in Combined Operations started immediately. Net climbing and explanations of the landing craft started it off, and in the afternoon the battalion was divided into "serials" or groups and boarded the L.C.As. for their first practise landings. Nearly everything went well—but not quite. As the war diarist wrote:

> In No. 2 Coy. the tail board of one of the craft was somehow let down resulting in a half hearted imitation of a submarine. This was at Auchnatra about two miles up Loch Fyne from camp. The next bit of excitement was when a rope got entangled with the propellor of another craft. The naval officer went overboard and for some twenty minutes unwound the rope from around the shaft. Cold water finally conquered him before he had completed the job, and he was taken away to hospital. Major H. P. Bell-Irving finished the task and training went on as before.[14]

Work of this nature continued for the next several days, and when not practising with the L.C.As. and L.C.Ms. the companies would be taken hill climbing through the soggy gorse in the surrounding hills, scaling cliffs, climbing nets, field firing with the new rifles on various ranges in the area, or perhaps they might be exercised in a night landing on a beach. If the loch were choppy the

[14] W.D., Seaforth Highlanders of Canada, 16 February 1943.

troops on board could be expected to be properly drenched with spray; if it was or had been raining they could expect to be soaked as they stormed ashore to capture some craggy, soggy hill; and when they came back to camp they could expect to slosh through mud. As one Seaforth wrote at the time:

> . . . the camp presents a long vista of drab Nissen Huts interspersed by a sea of mud and we soon saw why we had been treasuring so long and so carefully—the rubber boots issued some months ago. The camp facilities are somewhat primitive and shaving soon became a problem. Attempts to shave in a night black ablution hut and ice-cold water was productive of some highly diverting remarks from the shavers and soon went back to the methods of using our mess tins as we've done so often on previous schemes.
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> We queue in long extended lines for meals and again for washing our mess tins—we queue for supper and teas at the N.A.A.F.I., and if any of us are lucky enough to be out during the weird hours when the Scots open their pubs we queue for the beer.[15]

The frequently miserable, cold damp weather was not conducive to a charitable opinion of Scotland even by a Canadian Scottish regiment, but the new training was interesting and realistic, and every effort was made to make the place more hospitable. The N.A.A.F.I. canteen did sell better than average food and there were two shows each evening in the Garrison Theatre. The padre Captain Durnford, and the Salvation Army Officer, Captain Newing, managed to arrange reading and writing rooms for the unit, as well as to provide such amenities as they could. Periodically the Pipes and Drums beat Retreat in the Inveraray Square, an attraction to Seaforths and civilians alike.[16]

After a week of training with L.C.As. the Seaforths were brought to the next stage when they went aboard *H.M.S. St. Hilaire* which was a large ship equipped to carry both troops and landing craft. On the 28th, for example, the battalion was divided into two

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[15] *Ibid.*, 19 February 1943. He might have added that this hard work led to some deer poaching on the duke's estate, and several deer are known to have gone into the Seaforth pot! One Seaforth veteran relates that on one occasion a prime joint of venison exchanged hands in a pub with "a dour looking old chap" who, some time later, was pointed out as being the duke's gamekeeper!

[16] Since the Seaforths were in the heart of Campbell country, the Pipe Major consulted with "local authorities" regarding certain tunes which it might be undiplomatic to play.

parts, each taken from the pier in drifters to the *St. Hilaire* which they boarded by scrambling up the nets over her side. Then they were led down below in boatloads and after an hour or so, when it was dark, they emerged to go down over the scrambling nets into L.C.As. and L.C.Ms. waiting below. Once sorted out, the smaller craft left the *St. Hilaire* and made their way towards the shore. Each company had its assigned beach sector, and each its objective which formed part of a larger area the battalion was assigned to capture.

All in all it was a good exercise, despite the cold, damp wait prior to landing and four or five hours of hard work during the dark night it took to consolidate the ground gained against the "enemy", which was represented by the advance guard of the 3rd Canadian Infantry Brigade. It was also the last major exercise of the unit's combined operations training at this time. In the next few days the companies enjoyed themselves on the field firing ranges getting rid of the remaining live ammunition which had been in such generous supply. By 3 March all the vehicles in the brigade started south in convoy, and on the 4th, the Seaforths once again crossed the Clyde to board trains which would take them over the border.

It was good to be back at Pevensey. There was a tinge of frost on the Downs, but clear, sharp days began to give way to warm, sunny weather as March slipped by. There was, as usual, plenty to do. Seven day furloughs started again, but before going on leave there was a terrific rush on the Quartermaster stores to replace boots, which had given out during the rough treatment they had had in the salt water and hills around Inveraray. Eastbourne, as usual, was bearing up patiently under almost daily air raids, and on more than one occasion Seaforths were able to lend a hand clearing the rubble from bombed homes even before the All Clear had gone. Rumours of a move were in the air too, for with the 3rd Canadian Brigade taking Combined Operations training at Inveraray, a shift in coastal defence responsibilities could be expected. In mid-March the Seaforths were shifted a few miles to the south and west to the Willingdon - Hampden Park area where they found the billets far more compact and comfortable. In fact for the first time since they left the East Delville Barracks, all companies were within a mile of each other. The new coastal area which the unit patrolled stretched between Beachy Head and Birling Gap, a lovely high part of the

South Coast which, combined with the warm, sunny days made duty along the coast and cliffs almost a pleasure.

A month after settling into the Willingdon area the Seaforths moved again, this time further west to the Seaford - East Blatchington area south of Lewes. Since it was only ten miles from their previous location, the move was made on foot. As far as that goes, if it had been two and three times as distant, the men would still have been marched, for there is nothing the army relished more than to see men march—preferably in battle order. Be that as it may, the Seaforths were hardened to it, and a ten mile walk along the coast roads was a pleasant outing, and with two pipers and drummers[17] marching with each company, the dozen miles went by quickly and pleasantly.

On 14 April, two days after the unit had settled into some large boys' schools in the Seaford area, the Seaforths won the Canadian Army Soccer Championship. Ever since the battalion had come overseas it had had a good but not outstanding sports record. In 1940 and 1941 it had participated in brigade, divisional and corps meets, but it was not until 1942 and early 1943 that the Seaforths began to gain some hard won senior prizes. Aside from a top-flight rugger and soccer team, the Seaforths could also field a good cricket XI and played numerous games with British teams, both civilian and military. Baseball, track and field sports, boxing and other sports all had their adherents, but the chance to see a good soccer game, especially if played against a rival battalion such as the Canadian Scottish Regiment, would bring out a large crowd with plenty of cheering and heckling from both British Columbia units.

Seaford in April was as pleasant a place as one could wish to be billetted, but as so frequently happens in the army, the combination of good billets and pleasant surroundings could only mean one thing—it could not last for long. Such was the case with the Seaforths. Ever since the unit had returned from Scotland rumourmongers had had a field day, and various events occurred towards the end of April to lend fresh fuel to the soldier's second favourite form of entertainment. On 24 April Major Forin noted in his diary that the Paymaster mentioned to him that the 1st Division was going overseas for a combined operation with other British formations.

[17] The Pipes and Drums were completely re-equipped with new instruments by this time.

Actually this, as rumours go, was a fairly good one, for only a day previously Lieutenant General A. G. L. McNaughton had been discussing the same possibility with General Sir Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff.[18] This meeting took place on Good Friday, and that afternoon a formal request was sent to Ottawa asking for the inclusion of Canadian forces in a proposed landing in Sicily which had been in the planning stage even while the Germans were still battling in Tunisia. On Easter Sunday Ottawa gave its approval, and on Monday, 26 April, the Seaforths were told that all leaves were cancelled. Moreover, preemptory if sketchy orders to be ready to clear out in not over a fortnight's time were received, and at the same time Lt-Col. Hoffmeister and the Adjutant, Captain D. H. Strain, left the unit for an unknown destination.

In the next day or so there was more than the usual bustle of activity which precedes a move. Personal kit was stripped to essentials, a good pile of unessential documents was burnt, a new group of reinforcements came from the Holding Unit to make up the reinstituted four rifle companies, the Quartermaster Stores were packing up, the new "Tommy guns" were cleaned and when, on the 29th, the second-in-command gave a no-nonsense talk on security, it "sent the rumour-mongers off into new ecstacies of embellishment."[19] When Lt-Col. Hoffmeister returned from London—for such was the destination of his mysterious trip—he said nothing, not even to Major Forin.[20] Hoffmeister had been told the battalion would be going into action soon, but he did not know the location of the assault himself.

During the first days of May, while the men painted and tagged kit bags before sending them to the Kit Storage Depot, the final touches were put to the administrative orders which would send the Seaforths north to Scotland. On 5 May the Road Party pulled out

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[18] Lt-Col. G. W. L. Nicholson, *Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War.* Volume II, *The Canadians in Italy, 1943-1945.* Ottawa, The Queen's Printer, 1956, p. 3.

[19] W.D., Seaforth Highlanders of Canada, 29 April 1943.

[20] Forin speculated that the division might be used to invade Norway, the Low Countries, Italy or the Balkans, but personally favoured the latter. Forin left the following day for a short tour of duty at Canadian Military Headquarters. Major H. P. Bell-Irving became the second in command. At about the same time R.S.M. Nicholson, who had left the previous month, was replaced by A/R.S.M. Ireland.

to join the large brigade vehicle convoy which took all but the tracked vehicles. Three days later the main body of the Seaforths entrained, and by the 9th[21] the entire battalion was back with the brigade at Castle Camp with the familiar sight of the Inveraray Castle looming nearby.

During the first week at Inveraray the battalion carried out training which reviewed that which it had had two months earlier. A major change, however, was the conditions, for the weather made life far more bearable and brought reason to some of the old Scots songs in which the balladeer longs to return. Scotland in late Spring was indeed a delight. Nowhere did the pipes sound sweeter, and to see the battalion march along the road past hills of heather with the Pipes and Drums skirling away at the head of the column made the blood tingle. In this setting to hear "Scotland the Brave" or "Highland Laddie" coming over the fields and hills, or to watch the Pipe Band beat Retreat in the town square, brought home to every Seaforth more than ever a pride of his regiment and its alliance with the Scots.

While the battalion, and especially the reinforcements, were practising company landings by L.C.A. and L.C.M., engaging in field firing or getting hardening up training, the B.B.C. announced the collapse of German resistance in North Africa. This was cheerful news and, naturally food for speculation. So, too, was the information that all the unit's old vehicles were to be turned in for new ones, plus the fact that the drivers were being instructed in the art of waterproofing them. On the 18th, a new twist to combined operations training came when the Seaforths were ordered, "bag and baggage" to board *LSI(L) Circassia.* This modern motorvessel, converted in the Spring to a Landing Ship, Infantry (Large), was to be "home" for the next several days.

The *Circassia* was the largest ship the unit had boarded since it left the *Andes,* but it was no luxury liner. At first the combined mess-deck and sleeping quarters seemed severe, and the task of slinging and sleeping in hammocks which the jokers in the battalion would upset or loosen caused a fair amount of uproar the first night. The Seaforths were to become quite at home in this ship. The fol-

[21] On this same day the divisional commander, Major-General Simonds, was en route back to Great Britain from Cairo where he had consulted with senior British officers regarding the operational role of the division in the Mediterranean.

lowing extract from the War Diary gives some idea of life on board:

> The messing system in the *Circassia* is exceptionally efficient. The various mess decks are divided into tables, or "messes", as the Navy calls them. At each of these plain bench-and-table combinations (over which hammocks are slung at night) sit 6 to 16 men. With each mess go certain utensils: a large dixie, two flat pans, tea pail, butter dish, etc.—even a washing tub with dish towels and cloth is provided.
>
> At meal times, the N.C.O. in charge of the table designates two men who take the containers to the galley and draw rations for the entire table. A record of messes is kept . . . , and as each soldier passes he states the number of his mess, and receives the appropriate amount of rations.
>
> After the meal the same two men wash up; and since the messes are comparatively small, the fatigue is not too arduous.
>
> This is undoubtedly the best system the Bn. has come under since coming overseas. Its smoothness, coupled with good food, and the lightness of the fatigues involved, contributes much to the well-being of troops living in unfamiliar and restricted circumstances.[22]

On the 20th, accompanied by her two sister ships, the *Circassia* slipped out to sea until the lonely watch tower on Dun-cor-Bhile faded from sight, and when the men awoke next day they found themselves in Broderick Bay off the Isle of Arran. The next stage of training was to begin.

The *Circassia* carried on board a number of L.C.A., and during the day the battalion was broken into serials, or landing parties, of approximate platoon strength. Shorn of everything but weapons, ammunition and absolute necessities, the serials were to assemble below and, on call over the ship's public address system, they would come on deck, clamber into their respective L.C.As. and these in turn would be winched down the side of the ship and headed for shore. If they were fortunate, the assault craft would land them at the right beach in a minimum of water. If they were unfortunate, as they were on the first run-in, they might be landed a mile or more from the assigned beach in several feet of water, which meant a drenching in bitterly cold water before they even set out to their correct rendezvous. Quite a few men were to remark on the similarity between these exercises and the actual assault later, even to the errors made.

After this exercise, which someone aptly named "Wetshod", the Seaforths marched to a railway station where they were taken to Hamilton, a few miles southeast of Glasgow, and for the next

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[22] W.D., Seaforth Highlanders of Canada, 19 May 1943.

three weeks the Hamilton Race Course buildings were to be the last billets the unit would have in Great Britain until the end of the war. There was much to be done, and every passing day one event or another pointed to impending action. All surplus stores had to be disposed of. Six-day furloughs were permitted to fifteen per cent of the battalion, and most realized that this was probably embarkation leave. It was here that the new respirators and helmets were issued, and the number of Thomson sub-machine guns from the unit was tripled to 165.[23] The Quartermaster stores opened up with a display of generosity which made the men blink, for generally the gentlemen in charge of stores were cautious in issuing anything. Now anyone with worn uniform or boots or webbing was given new equipment if they wished, and when the Q.M. also issued tropical clothing, those who were betting on action in the Mediterranean nodded wisely. Actually it was quite amusing to have some Seaforth with a cropped haircut stick his head out of one of the racecourse's parimutual windows and offer odds on the unit's destination. Mepacrine pills were also given out by the medical officer, and despite the acrid taste,[24] down they went every second day. The transport drivers were busy too. Lorries, "Jeeps", carriers, every vehicle, wheeled or tracked, was overhauled, waterproofed and painted. On top of the cabs the blue, white and red rondel were painted for identification from the air, while others checked to see that the Jerrycans were topped with petrol, the tools were at hand, spare tyres inflated, camouflage net stowed, and so forth. The "soft skinned" vehicles and their drivers left the unit early, for they were to go in a slow convoy and would not arrive until a week after the assault. Senior officers came and went on mysterious missions to unknown destinations, and on 6 June a group of men from the Royal Canadian Artillery and Royal Marine Commandos was attached to the battalion.

During these weeks, too, the battalion continued to train, and the padre, Captain Durnford, was not one to be left behind. As he wrote:

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[23] The Canadian division was to be maintained from bases in the Middle East, and thus its weapons were to correspond to those in British divisions.

[24] "Soon after we were issued with mepacrine pills, it became a popular sport to convince new arrivals that these pills had to be chewed carefully in order to be effective. The result, of course, was temporary paralysis of one's jaw because of the extreme bitterness of the pill." (Letter, Major General B. M. Hoffmeister to author, 16 March 1967.)

> . . . We trained, marched and manoeuvred. And I trained, marched and manoeuvred! "Schemes" were the order of the day. They were such [later] as those which saw me plunging from landing-craft up to my waist or armpits into the sea and scrambling on to some forsaken stretch of Scottish shore-line. We would invariably choose darkness for these shows and for hours we would crawl about in a country resembling something between a jungle, a swamp and an arid desert.[25]

On 14 June the battalion, trimmed to assault scale, left Hamilton to board the *Circassia* once again. This time the ship was somewhat more crowded. Aside from the Seaforths there were various detachments and groups of specialists. Men from the Royal Air Force Regiment, the Royal Naval Beach Parties and others all shared the same quarters. As for the artillerymen, the war diarist noted that there were "enough F.O.O.[26] parties to direct, one would think, the fire of the entire Home Fleet."[27] Three days later the *Circassia* left to take part in more combined operations training, only this time the Seaforths were told that they should think of it as a rehearsal rather than an exercise. The rehearsals went smoothly, as the padre put it: "At the end of a 48-hour 'assault' we would find our way back to the ship, tired out, hungry and dirty, and 'like as a hen doth gather her chicks under her wing', so the *Circassia* would receive us under her ample sides".[28]

When not engaged in practice landings the Seaforths, if weather permitted, were taken ashore for marches[29] or hill climbs in order to keep everyone in shape, for life on board ship was far too easy. On the 27th many men noticed Brigadier Vokes coming on board accompanied by a high ranking naval officer, and on the 28th the sailors began to make ready for sea. Booms were fastened down, hatch covers battened, cable stowed, and the thirteen L.C.A. carried by the *Circassia* were firmly lashed to the ship's side. Somehow, this time there seemed to be an air of finality about this move rather

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[25] Seaforth Archives, "Journal of H/Captain Durnford."

[26] F.O.O.—Forward Observation Officer. These had the task of directing the fire of the artillery or ships' guns on to the target.

[27] W.D., Seaforth Highlanders of Canada, 16 June 1943.

[28] "Journal of H/Captain Durnford", *op. cit.*

[29] By this time all identification patches had been taken down. Even the drums were wrapped in brown paper to hide the unit's name and insignia, and the kilts were not worn. The civilians quickly recognized the Seaforths, however—someone had forgotten about the MacKenzie tartan cloth cover on the bag of the pipes! (Information from Pipe Major E. Esson.)

than preparation for another exercise, and such indeed proved to be the case.

At 2100 hours on 28 June the *Circassia,* with signal flags flying and morse lamps clacking, began to ease its way down the Clyde. It had been a beautifully warm, sunny day, and every Seaforth on board crowded onto the deck to have a last look at the shores of Scotland. The tiny fields, the hedges, the stone houses, small green trains—everything which had been so foreign to them three and a half years ago had become so familiar that it was almost like leaving home. Many Seaforths had married English and Scottish girls, and a great many had small youngsters. For these men it was hardest as the long, grey file of transports[30] moved slowly towards and through the submarine nets guarding this great Scottish port. A blazing sunset set fire to the craggy hills to the west. On deck each man seemed wrapped in his own thoughts, not the least of which was a fervent hope to see these same hills again. As the hills gave up their rosy hues and settled into a grey blue and finally into darkness, the decks slowly began to clear as men went below into the blacked-out ship which began to rise and fall gently as it nosed into the open sea.

It was a time for reflection, and there was much to think about. It was not the same battalion which had entered these waters three and a half years ago. The changeover in officers and men had been constant, and the years of training had hardened those who remained into a battle-ready unit. The Seaforths had every advantage which could possibly be given them—time to train, the most modern weapons, a long, intensive period of learning every facet of military knowledge, and repeated, bone-tiring trials to build up their stamina and shake loose from the battalion officers or men who, for any reason, might not be able to "take it" in action. The officers and N.C.Os. were good, and the commanding officer had the respect and confidence of everyone in the unit. No one on board as yet knew where the battalion was heading, but come what may there was a quiet determination that the battalion would complete any task it was called upon to undertake.

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[30] These ships were part of the "Fast Assault Convoy". A "Slow Assault Convoy", carrying vehicles and heavy cargo, had left over a week earlier. (Nicholson, *op. cit.,* p. 40.) The Seaforths' vehicles would not come ashore until after the bridgehead had been captured.

On 29 June, as the convoy steamed north between Ireland and Scotland, a brief announcement was made over the ship's loudspeaker. It stated: "A signal has been received from the Admiralty. It reads: You are going to the Mediterranean to take part in the biggest Combined Operations the world has ever seen!"[31] Later in the day Brigadier Vokes spoke briefly to the officers and N.C.Os. crowded into the ship's lounge. He added some further information by saying that the division was to be part of General Montgomery's famous Eighth Army, and added that the first job would be to make an assault landing which would be "the first blow in the invasion of the Continent." Vokes let it be known in no uncertain terms that he expected the best from the brigade and that the Germans were to be dealt with harshly.[32] This bit of information still left plenty of room for speculation, and among the men on the *Circassia* one could find proponents of favoured landing spots ranging from Southern France east to Greece. Not until 1 July, at a time when the convoy was some 500 miles off the coast sailing south into an ever warmer climate, was the news finally broken when Lt-Col. Hoffmeister received his sealed orders from the ship's safe. Wrapped orders, maps, aerial photographs, etc. were unsealed for the first time, and the word was given out. Sicily!

It might be well at this time to give a brief survey of the events which lead to the Seaforths' attack on Sicily and show how it related to the strategy of the entire operation. The idea for continued operations in the Mediterranean area following the defeat of the Axis forces in North Africa had been discussed at the Casablanca Conference. Sicily was chosen since it would give the Allies a base for operations against Southern Europe and would further open the vital Mediterranean sea lanes. Planning for Operation "Husky" began in February, 1943, and after various revisions it was decided to attack the southern portion of the island. The location of good beaches, the proximity of the assault area to the air bases in North Africa, the need to secure airfields and a port to supply the assault-

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[31] W.D., Seaforth Highlanders of Canada, 29 June 1943.

[32] Wrote H/Capt. Durnford: "Brigadier Vokes . . . [gave] a fiery speech of his own, designed to instill a certain fearsomeness into the character of his men. It was intensely blood-thirsty in its sentiment, and doubtless, from a military point of view, a much needed injection. For such men as myself the speech was welcomed only for its brevity." (Durnford Journal, *op. cit.*, p. 4.)

ing armies and, of course, the defences of the island itself were major factors determining where the allied forces would land and what their objectives would be. Defending the island were two German and four Italian mobile divisions plus six Italian coastal divisions. To capture the island a simultaneous landing was planned with the U.S. Seventh Army on the left and the British Eighth Army on the right. The official history of the Canadian Army sums up the plan as follows:

> The Eighth Army would assault with two corps, comprising a total of six infantry divisions, an infantry brigade and one airborne division, in the area between Syracuse and Pozzallo. It would be responsible for the immediate seizure of Syracuse and the Pachino airfield, and the subsequent rapid capture of Agusta and Catania and the Gerbini group of airfields. On the left the Seventh Army, with one corps headquarters, four infantry divisions, one armoured division and one airborne division, was to assault between Cape Scaramia and Licata, capture the port and the airfields at Ponte Olivo, Biscari and Comiso, and on gaining contact with the Eighth Army protect the British left flank from enemy reserves moving eastward. When the two armies were firmly established across the south-eastern corner of Sicily in a line from Catania to Licata, operations would be developed to complete the conquest of the island.[33]

Bringing the Allied formations to accomplish this task were 2,600 ships of all sizes whose arrival off the Sicilian coast called for a tremendous amount of pre-assault planning. These ships, sailing from the east, west and south were en route as the allied bombers were smashing targets in Sicily, Italy and elsewhere preparatory to the assault which was timed for 10 July—D Day.

Of more particular interest to the Seaforths was the Canadian task. The 1st Canadian Division was assigned the westernmost flank of the Eighth Army. It would assault between Pozzallo and Pachino. On its right would be the 51st (Highland) Division whose target was Pachino. The Canadians, with Nos. 40 and 41 Royal Marine Commandos temporarily under command, had as their object the capture of the Pachino airfield some seven miles inland. The division was to land with the 1st Brigade on the right aimed at the airfield and the 2nd Brigade on the left (on"Sugar" beach) whose task was "to advance west and destroy beach defences, meet and assist the Special Service Brigade in its operation, and subsequently take up positions north of the Pantano Longarini marsh and patrol to the north-

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[33] Nicholson, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

west."[34] H-Hour of D Day was set at 0245 hours, ten minutes after the commandos had landed on the division's left flank.

Brigadier Vokes had laid down how the 2nd Brigade would attack. The Princess Patricias were to land on the brigade right and move north-west to cut the main Pachino - Ispica road, after which it would push on to Ispica. The Seaforths, landing on the left, were to swing to the left and push westward paralleling the Patricia's advance. The Loyal Edmonton Regiment was to follow up the initial assault to complete the brigade's thrust on Ispica. Within the Seaforths, "C" and "A" Companies would go in first, with "B" and "D" Companies following behind on the left and right respectively. On the initial assault the companies would carry with them their platoon weapons only. No covering pre-bombardment programme was laid on, for it was felt that the element of surprise, coupled with the darkness, would carry the unit through the beach defences and permit it to establish a beachhead allowing the heavier weapons to be landed before any serious counter-attack could be mounted. The immediate task, however, was to overcome the beach defences which dotted the shoreline right where the unit was to land.

For the next few days there was a strong undertone of excitement as the officers and N.C.Os. were briefed about their particular part in the coming operation. Aboard the *Circassia* a briefing room had been set up containing a sand model, aerial photographs, relief maps which showed in detail the area to be attacked and the enemy ports to be captured. Outside the door a sentry stood on guard "like the angel with the flaming sword",[35] and inside the small, ill-ventilated room one group after another was taken and the whole plan was gone over in detail by the C.O. until everyone was thoroughly familiar with the beaches, the landmarks to be recognized, and the precise role which each company, platoon and even section would play.

While the entire battalion was absorbed with the prospect of the coming action, the convoy was sailing into ever warmer waters. Had it been a pleasure cruise a tourist could not have wished much more. The food was very good with rations almost a memory. Every day the sun shone brightly, slowly tanning those who were careful and roasting those who were not. "Morale," as one officer put it,

[34] Nicholson, *op. cit.*, p. 67.
[35] Durnford, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

"was staggeringly high, every man raring to go."[36] At the same time, when divine service was held on 4 July, "throughout it ran an undertone of spiritual intensity"[37] which the padre would never forget. On 5 July, as the *Circassia* turned east towards the Strait of Gibraltar, the black flag was hoisted several times and on each occasion the convoy's ships would scatter about as the naval vessels raced towards the spot where a submarine was suspected. Sometimes, lining the decks and straining their eyes, the Seaforths would see the black, keg-like depth charges shot from a destroyer's deck go arching gracefully into the sea, followed after a pause by a boiling tower of water as each charge exploded. These explosions would hit the sides of the ship like a huge hammer. Fortunately no ships in the convoy which included the *Circassia* were attacked, but several were torpedoed and lost in a slow convoy which carried some of the Seaforth's vehicles.

The high mountains along the North African shore were in sight and the weather was decidedly hot when other convoys began to loom into view as the *Circassia* churned steadily through the Mediterranean Sea. These represented only a small percentage of the 2,600 ships, large and small, which were converging on Italy. By this time every private had been briefed as to the assault landing, and excitement was mounting. Despite all their previous training, dry-run rehearsals were held of the procedure to be followed on D Day. Something of the atmosphere on board ship during these drills is given by Major Durnford:

> We would all be assembled below deck in the section of the ship appointed to us. We would be fully dressed wtih small pack, digger, ammunition, rifle, tin hat, gas cape and in many cases mortars and machine gun parts etc. The officers carried a revolver, map case, binoculars and compass among other things.
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> All the air of impending battle was ours when, under cover of darkness . . . we would wait for orders to move. The "blower" would give orders first to this section then to that . . . "Attention please, attention please" sounded in the stilly darkness, "number blank section will proceed from their places to number blank station on the starboard side of the ship at —NOW!" The pause before the "NOW" was deliberate. . . . It sounded like the pause of the auctioneer as, having pronounced the words "Going, Going, . . ." he pauses with his hammer poised for a blow before he finally brings it down. . . . These instructions were repeated slowly with great ex-

[36] Letter, Major H. P. Bell-Irving.

[37] W.D., Seaforth Highlanders of Canada, 4 July 1943.

> actness. Then the section so addressed would proceed very slowly in all but total darkness in one single line, each man holding on to the webbing or equipment of the man in front of him so as to avoid losing his way, and up the gangways they would go, along the dim corridors, up again to the decks still higher till finally they reached the promenade or boat deck. Stumbling over the high sills of the ship's door-ways they would issue out into the open air and the moonlight. Silently . . . they would creep forward till the leader had found his boat station and then, one by one, each man would file past him into the landing craft as it swung from its davits at the side of the ship. Here they would kneel on one knee with their rifles vertical in their hands until the craft had its full complement aboard in three rows—the officer being the last to enter as he was to be the first out on landing. There was always a slight hesitancy about taking the step from the ship into the swinging hanging craft for the gap between revealed a long, long drop into the watery depths below.
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> Thus they would kneel or half squat in tightly packed lines until the rehearsal was complete and every section had found similar positions. In this way these boys would soon be lowered with other landing craft swinging below them from the promenade deck into the sea and away to an hostile shore.[38]

It should be noted that others would be involved in the initial run-in aside from the Seaforths. A short distance from the waterline was a narrow belt of barbed wire. This was to be blown with Bangalore torpedos by sappers of the Royal Canadian Engineers. These men would be among the first on shore. Certain naval personnel who formed part of the beach parties would also accompany the early assault waves. These officers and men had the job of organizing and directing the tremendous amount of traffic which would pour onto the beaches on D Day and the days which followed.

By 8 July, as the convoy came within sight of Cape Bon in Tunisia, the final touches were being made for the landing during the early hours of the 10th. Ammunition was issued, maps checked, last letters written, and both during the 8th and 9th there was a heavy run on the ship's canteen as men bought cigarettes, matches, toothpaste and a variety of other things which would be hard to come by in the days ahead. During this time too the convoy carrying the Canadians and Commandos had caught up with and very slowly passed another huge convoy as large as itself. One officer counted fifty ships without the aid of binoculars, and to everyone the tremendous sight of this large fleet of ships, varying from ocean liners to smaller motor torpedo boats, came as a heartening indica-

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[38] Durnford Journal, *op. cit.*, pp. 11-12.

tion of the strength and weight of the forces to be launched against Sicily.

On the morning of the 9th, shortly after Malta was sighted lying low and brown to starboard, the perfect weather which had prevailed for the entire trip began to change, and as the convoy headed for Sicily a terrific gale sprang up. The waves became mountainous and crashed against the sides of the *Cirassia* which sent men staggering about the ship. From the ship's rails one could see the smaller craft plunge into the troughs of water and then rear up on the spray-coated crests of huge waves until it seemed they could not take the strain. For some hours it seemed that the whole operation would have to be cancelled, but in the afternoon the fury of the storm subsided leaving only a land swell of considerable proportions. Despite the heaving, rolling waves, L.C.As. could be lowered and L.C.Ms. could take on the second wave of men which would scramble down the nets over the ship's sides once the L.C.As. had moved off.

That evening, as darkness descended, the *Circassia* slowly approached her pre-planned release point eight miles off the beaches, while on all sides other ships—monitors, battleships, destroyers and a myriad of other craft—could be dimly seen in the moonlight as they manoeuvred into position. It was hot down in the bowels of the ship as the men waited for midnight when the two leading companies would start boarding the L.C.A. There was some talk, but not too much. A few spoke to the padre giving him the address of their next of kin thinking, somehow, that the padre would be out of danger. They were to find that he was usually in the thick of it. Every reaction of which man is capable could have been found among the ranks of the Seaforths as they waited—excitement over the prospect of attack; fear as to how he would measure up to the demands of battle; tension as one wondered whether the enemy was ready and waiting; and so forth. In a way it all seemed unreal, a feeling intensified by the now silent ship, the dimmed lights and the unusually subdued voices of the mass of steel-helmeted figures loaded with ammunition, grenades and weapons. A few minutes before midnight the atmosphere changed. Orders were coming over the loud-speaker system and "A" and "C" Companies began to file up the ship's companionways. The Seaforths were going into action.

CHAPTER VI

The Campaign In Sicily

No man who was with the Seaforths on board the *Circassia* as she turned her bow towards the Pachino Beaches on the night of 9-10 July will ever forget the tension and the drama of the moment. The Mediterranean Sea seemed to be covered with ships—cruisers, frigates, monitors, transports—almost everything that floated. During the gale that sprang up in the afternoon of the 9th, whitecapped waves of major proportions caused the smaller ships to bob about like corks, and there were rumours that the *Circassia's* captain was going to beach the transport if the winds did not lessen. Everywhere ships and craft were heaving and rolling, and it seemed incredible that this tremendous armada of over 2600 ships could approach so close to the enemy's shore without being met by stiff opposition both from the air and on the water.

Still, it did not come, and as the evening fell and the waves began to moderate the ships started to form up in columns heading for the release positions eight miles off the coast. It looked as if it would be a silent landing after all, which meant the men would be in their LCA and closing in to the beach before the ships added their weight of fire to the bombers which began to fly overhead an hour before midnight. There were three major obstacles to be overcome before a firm beachhead could be secured, however. Some eight to twelve coastal guns covered the beaches and their approaches, and these weapons handled with determination and efficiency, might cause hundreds of casualties. On the beaches which were to be assaulted the Italian garrison had constructed and were manning a variety of

defences—weapon pits, bunkers, field defences, machine-gun posts and covered trenches—all designed to cover the beach with their fire. With each assaulting company would be a few sappers of the Royal Canadian Engineers[1] to blow the barbed wire strung along the beach, and men from Lt. J. H. Budd's Pioneer Platoon were also at hand to deal with mines, booby-traps and minor demolitions as required. The third difficulty to be overcome was the false beaches or sandbars. In front of the Seaforths these were about 50 to 80 yards from the beach and about two and a half feet underwater. Between the bars and the beach the water dipped to five or six feet. An assault craft caught on the bar and forced to unload its human cargo at that point might itself be destroyed and the men drowned or cut to pieces in the water.

Even before the *Circassia* reached its release position the Seaforths began to clamber into their L.C.As. swinging at deck level from the ship's davits. It was a tricky business, for a misstep would send a man down between the ship's side and the L.C.A. with no hope of rescue. H Hour—the time when the first assaulting wave would hit the beaches—was set at 0245 hours. By about 0145 hours the assault craft had been all lowered away and were in the water. Packed tightly into these craft, and heaving up and down in the heavy swell which was running, many were sick well before they reached the shore, and the steel deck reeked with vomit as the flat-bottomed L.C.A. slipped and slid over the running sea with a sickening motion made worse by cramped quarters and a pounding engine. Others, however, not affected by sea sickness, were in high spirits, and in one of the leading assault craft someone was singing away at the top of his voice "Heading For the Last Round-Up". The spirit of the regiment was terrific. Soon the craft shook themselves out in box formation with "A" Company's craft on the right and "C" Company's on the left. As the assault companies sped towards the beach through the dark, windy night L.C.A. carrying Lt-Col. Hoffmeister[2] and his Tactical Headquarters group were preparing to follow them. Behind this small group the other two companies were disembarking into the larger L.C.M., each of which would take almost 100

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[1] These were with the first wave of assault craft only.

[2] Hoffmeister, Forin, Blair and Bell-Irving were the only "original" officers of the unit to land in Sicily on D Day. Others joined the battalion later.

men. They would land as soon as the leading companies had sent up their success flares.

Several miles ahead "C" and "A" Companies, commanded by Major J. W. Blair and Captain S. W. Thomson respectively, were nearing the beach. The waves had moderated, and so far no beach-lights had picked them out. Overhead, bombers were still going in to bomb Pachino, and it was hoped the fires created in this town would help act as a beacon to enable the assault craft chart their course towards the correct beach sector.[3] It was extremely difficult to pick out any landmarks in the dark, and the remarkable thing is that the leading companies landed only a hundred yards or so from their appointed spot.

Before the L.C.As. touched down some were fired on, especially those on the right. One or two were temporarily stuck on the sand bar, in which case naval ratings leapt out and helped to shove them over. Some of the assault platoons landed almost dryshod, others had to wade on to the beach in deep water. Whatever the circumstances the Seaforths lost no time in getting ashore and through the belt of barbed wire located some 50 feet from the water's edge. The Seaforth pioneers with their white cloth tapes followed by the sappers with their Bangalore Torpedoes were first off the craft to blow the wire, and once this was accomplished—a matter of minutes —all platoons struck straight ahead to clear out the beach defences.[4]

Machine-gun fire had already caused some casualties. As the ramp was lowered in the craft carrying Lt. E. J. M. Church and his platoon a machine-gun opened up killing a naval rating and wounding several others. Bullets hammered on another craft but it had slewed around between the sandbar and the beach and had hit the beach backward. This saved more lives, for had the ramp been lowered directly on the beach more casualties would have been inevitable. Lt. J. J. Conway's platoon on the far right landed waist deep in

[3] Like so many Italian towns, most of the buildings were constructed of stone and the fires created by the bombing were small.

[4] In some instances the barbed wire was found to be of such a hard temper and so tightly strung that the men climbed over it standing upright. The fine sand on the beach, blown upwards and scattered by the explosions, settled on many weapons and caused them to jam. Many Seaforths complained of this later, and stated that if strong resistance had been offered by the Italians those with "Tommy" guns and Bren guns would have found themselves in a rather embarrassing situation.

water and were fired on and returned the fire as they waded in to the beach.

The remarkable thing about the landing really was not the casualties but rather the lack of them. As the men began to get organized and tackled the beach defences, a confusing job in the dark, the Italian garrison began to surrender in embarrassing numbers. Their defences were field works for the most part—machine-gun posts, "pill boxes", trenches and similar works, most of them covered with logs and sandbags and so sited to cover the beach. By about 0330 hours these defences had been dealt with. Swinging in behind them as dawn was just starting to break, the assault companies dug out several hundred prisoners whose appetite for battle faded very rapidly with a little encouragement from the Seaforths. The area between the beach and the southern edge of the seawater lakes (Pantano Longarini) was soon cleared and a success signal fired.

A mile or so out to sea the signal flare was difficult to distinguish, and so, too, was the coast. Battalion Headquarters' craft, carrying Lt-Col. Hoffmeister and others, had made contact with a naval officer in a small craft who had a radio and was to direct the second assault wave to the beach. It would appear, however, that although he had a correct bearing on each beach for the two leading battalions he gave the Seaforths the course he should have given to the Princess Patricias. As a result Battalion Headquarters, "B" and "D" Companies landed too far to the right and, as the Commanding Officer later related, "There was a scene of great confusion."[5]

This initial confusion caused considerable concern to Lt-Col. Hoffmeister. There was no sign of the two leading assault companies, it was still dark, there were no familiar landmarks which coincided with the aerial photographs he had studied so hard on board the *Circassia,* and dawn was not far off. It would have been senseless

[5] Interview with Major-General B. M. Hoffmeister, February 1967. There are conflicting reports regarding the time it took to get the assault companies organized. By first light it would appear everything was fairly well under control. One Seaforth recollects: "I remember the fellow who took us ashore; he was a midshipman or something. . . . He went up and down the beach there so many times I thought he was looking for Jerry, but we finally told him to land the boat and we'd find Amber beach ourselves, so we landed in a watermelon patch and I thought God, what a wonderful way to fight a war." (Seaforth Archives, Operation Accounts, Interview of Pte. G. A. Reid by Dr. R. L. McDougall.)

to start moving off without knowing where he was going with half the battalion behind him. Fortunately, although Hoffmeister could not recognize the area in the dark, the Italian defenders could not spot the Seaforths, but once it began to get light enemy fire began to come into the area. So intent was the colonel on finding his location that, as he stood on the beach staring inland through his binoculars he did not realize he was under fire until Major Bell-Irving pulled him down and told him he was being shot at. Once it was light, however, Tactical Headquarters and the two companies with it could appreciate their error and began to move westward to rejoin the rest of the battalion.

To the west, "A" and "C" Companies, having consolidated their beach position, began to swing westward to secure the high ground west of the causeway which crossed the southernmost part of the lake. This high ground, code named "Cougar", was occupied against little resistance. The low wire supporting grape vines was a nuisance, and later in the morning a mortar fired into the area caused some trouble but one or two self-propelled guns came up at this point and put it out of action.

While it was still dark, and after the second assault wave had gone in, more Seaforths were preparing to land. Major J. D. Forin, the battalion's second in command, and Captain Alan Mercer, the transport officer had sailed on board the *Alcinous* with a few of the unit's vehicles, especially the carriers. These were loaded with ammunition and vital stores and as such were among the first vehicles landed. The remainder of the unit's trucks were not available for a week or more. The *Alcinous* was busy unloading the carriers which had been lashed on deck to the L.C.M. (Landing Craft, Mechanized) while the drivers and others accompanying the vehicles swarmed down the scramble net to jump into the weaving, rising craft by the ship's side. Something of the difficulties encountered is described by one of the carrier drivers as follows:

> The crew cast off the lashings that held my carrier on deck and it rose into the air suspended by slings, and descended into the flat-bottomed steel Landing Craft. . . . I scrambled over the rail and started climbing down the net when someone screamed a warning. My carrier dangled, one end down, from its sling. One crewman had been slow in casting off the sling and the roll of the ship had jerked it into the air like a fish on the line. The landing craft, rising and falling like giant swoops on the waves, was twenty feet away. The carrier, four tons of armour plate, and loaded with high explosive, swung out and then in with a crash against the ship's

side. I shot up the scrambling net like a cork out of a bottle and watched the proceedings from the safety of a higher deck. The crewmen winched up the carrier until it cleared the deck again, where it swung like a huge pendulum, brushing everything from its path in wild crashing sweeps.

For some moments that carrier dominated our part of the invasion. But finally the crew of the landing craft brought it around to the other side of the ship where there seemed to be more protection, and finally coerced the maverick down and subdued it. The other carrier and the crews, myself included, followed, and we put off for Sicily.[6]

As this group began its one and one-half hour run into the beach the whoosh of the huge shells from H.M. Monitor *Roberts* could be heard going overhead, and in the dark occasional explosions and tracer bullets could be discerned along the vague line of the shore. Lt. Pennyfeather, the R.C.N.V.R. officer in charge of the craft, was unable to spot the correct beach at first but finally was directed by a pilot boat lying off shore to the "proper" beach. As it turned out, when the carriers sped over the craft's ramp through several feet of water to the shore, the group found itself one or two miles off to the right. The carriers, led by Major Forin, turned westward following the water-line to avoid mines. En route he ran into some of the Seaforth Platoons from "B" Company which were perplexed as to their location but he directed them to the right area.[7] By about noon the carriers had met up with the remainder of the unit which was busy consolidating on the intermediate objective overlooking the beaches northwest of the inland lake.

The addition of the carriers, together with "B" Company's arrival, brought the Seaforths up to strength except for the administrative echelons which were due to arrive later. At some points on the high ground the men could see Ispica, a town nestled on a rocky ridge about seven miles to the northwest where the first real resistance was expected after landing. So far the enemy had been flushed out without too much trouble, and the Italian prisoners were a sorry looking lot as they were despatched to compounds set up on the beach area now teeming with men, vehicles and supplies. Lt. J. W.

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[6] Letter, Mr. Angus Harris to author, 18 February 1967.

[7] Seaforth Archives: "Sicily—Battle Accounts", Letter, Major J. D. Forin to his father, 3 August 1943. Captain Middleton was about to set off for the Pachino airfield but Forin directed him to the proper area. Middleton's craft had gone back and forth several times along the coast until, in exasperation, Middleton told the naval officer in charge to land anywhere as long as it was Sicily!

Baldwin, the Intelligence Officer, had taken a patrol out in the morning towards Ispica and early in the afternoon had spotted a group of mounted Italians moving through an orchard. These were dealt with by the Special Service Brigade with whom contact had been made earlier. This, incidentally, was not the only time the Seaforths met with mounted Italians. On another occasion during the day a group of Italians came galloping along drawing mortars behind them in true horse artillery style. Although some distance away they were spotted going into the grounds of a cemetery behind whose thick walls they set up their weapons and lobbed some bombs towards the Seaforths. The naval Forward Observation Officer, who had dogged Hoffmeister's movements for hours asking for a target for his guns, was delighted to be instructed to take on the target. Within a matter of minutes the huge 16-inch shells of the monitor *Roberts* struck the enemy position with amazing accuracy and completely annihilated it.[8] Later in the day Ispica itself was shelled by naval gunfire, and indeed this form of naval fire support was available to the Canadians until their advance inland brought them beyond the range of the navy's heavy guns.

The assault so far had been a most successful one on all fronts, and on the evening of D Day the 2nd Brigade was ordered to push on to deepen the beachhead by seizing the area roughly midway between the beaches and Ispica. Shortly after dusk, with "B" Company leading, the Seaforths began their march. Behind them, from both the ships and shore, there was a fascinating display of anti-aircraft fire against enemy bombers. To the front, however, it was pitch dark, and moving through vineyards, orchards and similar obstacles the heavily laden Seaforths gained their first experience at stumbling through an unfamiliar countryside in enemy territory. By daylight the unit was consolidating on the ridges some four miles from Ispica and there was time for a few hours of very welcome sleep.

During the morning, while the Edmonton Regiment was preparing to attack Ispica, patrols from the unit continued to garner in more Italians, and a wretched looking group they were. Some had neither shoes nor socks, most had not eaten for twenty-four hours or more, and any military qualities they may have had were fast dis-

[8] Interview with Major-General Hoffmeister, *op. cit.;* Seaforth Archives, "Sicily —Battle Accounts", notes by Lt-Col. J. D. Forin; the McDougall Narrative.

appearing. They were, for the most part, happy to give up and, as the Seaforths noted, on many occasions they had left their defences without firing a shot or throwing a grenade. One incident, related later by Cpl. John Cromb, was by no means untypical. Cromb had been ordered by Captain Middleton to go with an Italian. "The fellow," said Cromb,

> with his poor English and my poor Italian made me to understand that a captain and some of his companions were in a cave just off the road up on a hillside. It was felt, therefore, that my section and myself could take care of them. We left the company, climbed this steep hillside and took up positions outside. The Italian went inside to bring out the captain and his companions. The first individual to appear was a batman. He had a large valise under each arm and one in his hand and came out bowing very politely. Then followed two lieutenants, then the captain, then his companions—123 of them! When I took this group down the hill Capt. Middleton nearly had a baby. We finally solved the problem by writing out a slip saying 'These men have surrendered', handed it to the captain and told him to take his men to the rear.

The Edmontons took Ispica with little trouble, so about 1700 hours the 11th the Seaforths resumed their advance up to and through the town. The civilians seemed delighted to see the Canadians. Some cheered and waved and clapped their hands, and others pressed wine and fruit upon the troops. The Seaforths, on their part, had their first close look at the Sicilians and they were by no means impressed. The people were poor, whether in the sunbaked, drab countryside or in the towns. Life had been hard for them from the time of their birth, and their peasant mentality with its mixture of submissiveness and shrewdness made them easy to deal with always providing that one took into account their basic opportunism.

The Seaforths pushed on through Ispica towards Modica without letup. It was oppressively hot, water was scarce, but fortunately resistance was light. A few mines on the road northwest of Ispica were so poorly sown that they could be spotted and removed by moonlight. Seven miles west of Ispica, where there was a junction with the road coming north from Pozzallo, the Italians had erected a fairly elaborate roadblock. Despite the fact that it was midnight, that the enemy was familiar with the terrain, and further had the advantage of surprise, there was no resistance. Not a shot was fired as the Italians came in to surrender. On the Seaforths went, hot, tired, sweating, yet alert. There was no doubt that the coastal garrison was made up of the weakest—perhaps most expendable—ele-

ments, but when the hard core of the defenders would be encountered was not known. In any event orders were to thrust inland and stake out as deep an area as possible. With only carriers available as transport at this point, the traditional versatility of the infantrymen was called on. In brief, he marched, marched and marched until he had to be almost kicked awake after each ten minute halt every hour when he would fall into a rock-like sleep.

Modica itself presented few problems as is illustrated by a story told about its capture—actually one of several such stories. A short distance beyond the roadblock mentioned above on Highway 115 the Seaforths struck off to the right to take up a position northeast of the town while the Patricias attacked it from the west. Cpl. M. Davidson of the Signal Platoon, coming up in the rear, did not realize the unit had moved off the highway. He was trying to catch up with it and sped along the road to Modica. He pulled up outside the town for directly in front of him was a delegation of civilian and military officials including the town mayor. These gentlemen, seeking to avoid further destruction and deaths in the town, wanted the corporal to accept the town's surrender. After some discussion one of the officials agreed to ride with Davidson on the pillion of his motorcycle and both set off to find Lt-Col. Hoffmeister.[9] The Commanding Officer passed the word on to brigade headquarters but the action which was taken ultimately had nothing to do with the Seaforths.

A Seaforth officer met a different reception which can only be appreciated when one remembers the fluidity of the battlefront. Captain Mercer had been picking up Compo rations for the unit and was returning in a 15-cwt. vehicle with a driver and a sergeant-major from the Patricias. He had been told Modica had been cleared and that the Seaforths were beyond it. Coming into the town the vehicle had just turned a corner about to descend a road leading to the centre of the place when an Italian anti-tank gun opened at almost point blank range. The first shot came between the driver and Mercer and cleared two ration boxes from the top of the truck. The second shot stopped the truck and hit the sergeant major, almost taking his leg off. Everyone scrambled from the vehicle and, after Mercer had had a look at the enemy position, he made his way back and contacted the mortar platoon sergeant of the Patricias. A half

[9] W. D., Seaforth Highlanders of Canada, 12 July 1943.

dozen bombs were lobbed at the Italian position and later, when Brigadier Vokes was informed, he ordered additional shelling of the town to soften any further opposition.[10]

While the major portion of the Seaforths were climbing to the heights above Modica part of "C" Company, under the command of Major J. W. Blair, was winding up its occupation of Pozzallo. Blair had been ordered south to take over Pozzallo which had been neutralized by naval fire. This small seaport contained an Italian garrison and, up until about midday, a German anti-aircraft troop. The latter, together with various fascist officials, had fled the town before it was surrounded, and it appeared that the town was willing to surrender. On the afternoon of the 11th Blair and his men piled into trucks and sped south to occupy it. As he came to the outskirts he saw directly in front of him a large field gun pointing directly at his vehicle, but before he could act the Italian gunners leapt out from their gun position waving white sheets. Once inside the town "C" Company encountered several thousand civilians milling in the streets. They were on the verge of starvation. The garrison, consisting of about ten officers and 250 other ranks, were for the most part willing to surrender, but there was some sniping going on and until these were flushed out and order restored little could be done.

By the following day Major Blair had things organized. The Italian officers, with their uniforms beautifully pressed, were placed in one of the law courts in the town hall. Above the judges' bench was a picture of Benito Mussolini. One of them took it down and jumped up and down on it while the others applauded his actions, which expressed in no uncertain terms their attitude to *Il Duce.* Meanwhile the Seaforths had opened up the warehouses in Pozzallo and had got the bakeries into production during the night. The next task was to form up half of the population into six huge queues and distribute bread and other foodstuffs. The Postmaster was appointed the *pro tem* mayor, the navy was signalled to bring in L.C.A. to take off the prisoners, and in general, using an Italian priest as interpreter, the seaport was brought into something resembling normalcy.

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[10] Several units claim to have been the first in Modica. See Colonel G. W. L. Nicholson, *Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War,* Volume II, *The Canadians in Italy, 1943-1945.* Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1956, pp. 81-82. Modica contained the Headquarters of the 206th Italian Coastal Division.

Later on 13 July, with the town quiet, Blair and his men left to rejoin the battalion. When Captain B. G. Parker returned to the unit and was reciting some of his adventures a number of his brother officers questioned his role while in charge of Pozzallo for, just before leaving the port, an Italian soldier had sprinkled him and the Italian officer he was talking to quite heavily with some cheap but pungent perfume. He smelt like a summer rose for some time, but stoutly denied all suggestions and allegations that were made.[11]

When "C" Company rejoined the battalion the Seaforths were located in a valley which had a small river running through it. After the brief brush at Modica on the 12th, the battalion had been ordered to push on to take up a position near Ragusa. The only opposition met was from a handful of Italian soldiers covering an improvised road block who opened up on "A" Company and wounded Captain S. W. Thomson in the leg.[12] This opposition was quickly dealt with. The move to the Ragusa[13] area was a hard, grinding march. Moving along the road in a continuous file the battalion walked in "a cloud of fine white dust which, when mixed with the perspiration of the body, made a white layer of dust over each man."[14] "It seemed," wrote the War Diarist, "to work into every nook and cranny, into your boots and up to the hair on our heads."[15] It was an exhausting thirty-mile route that the Seaforths covered in the twenty-four hours which had elapsed since they had left their positions east of Ispica until they consolidated in their area two miles northwest of Ragusa on the evening of the 12th. Here they were to rest for a few days, catch up on sleep, clean up and prepare for a further advance inland.

So far the invasion of Sicily had met with unexpected success

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[11] Personal diary of Captain B. G. Parker, 11-14 July 1943. "C" Company brought back some of the newly-baked bread which made a welcome addition to the unit's hard rations.

[12] Thomson was patched up by the M.O. and placed in a manger in a barn. A shot in the arm helped to ease the pain and put him to sleep. He awoke in the morning when two Sicilian farmers entered with pitchforks. He was never so frightened before or after, especially as he had no revolver. Fortunately the farmers were after hay for their oxen.

[13] Ragusa was entered on the morning of the 12th by the Royal Canadian Regiment.

[14] W. D., Seaforth Highlanders of Canada, 12 July 1943.

[15] *Ibid.*

on all fronts. Partly owing to the gale on the 9th, the Allied landings had come as a complete surprise to the enemy and by the evening of D plus 2 the British-Canadian forces had seized the area roughly enclosed by the line Syracuse - Palazzolo - Ragusa - Scicli. Casualties had been very light, the defence put up had for the most part been very weak, and prisoners had come streaming in from all directions. No unit in the Canadian division had met up with enemy tanks, no serious counter-attack had been launched, and no strong body of German troops had been encountered, although these were being prepared to enter the conflict even as the 2nd Brigade was resting near Ragusa.

At this point it is interesting to note what was going on back at the beaches, and two eye-witness accounts—one by a private and one by an officer—give a sometimes vivid picture of those early days. Pte. A. J. McKay had left Great Britain on the *Arundel Castle* on 1 July as part of the first line reinforcements. He came ashore on the 13th just in time to encounter an enemy air raid. Once this greeting to Sicily was over the first thing that impressed him on the beaches was "not just a buzz of activity—but a roar of commotion."[16] After helping to unload supplies for a while he and some friends gathered some Italian rifles and amused themselves taking potshots at Italian helmets, also discarded on the beach. It became obvious very quickly that the protection afforded by a steel helmet was limited. After a certain amount of scrounging, investigating, making a start on the Italian language and getting sorted out, he and other reinforcements were moved up to Rosolini, and McKay eventually reached the unit at Nissoria.

Major Durnford, the padre, who had been persuaded not to land until after the first assault companies had gone in, remained on the beaches for a day or so anxiously waiting to rejoin the battalion. In his journal he describes something of the sights and smells of Sicily which soon became familiar to every Seaforth. He wrote in part:

> I noticed that the dwellers in the low-lying stretch of land . . . lived altogether off the land and in a most primitive fashion. Their homes were crudely built of stone, and mud plaster held wattled walls together in many instances where stone was not near at hand. . . . These buildings were extremely small and I ventured inside of one to ask for a drink and

[16] Seaforth Archives, "BattleAccounts—Sicily and Italy," Journal of H70551, Pte. McKay, A. J.

> try out my smattering of conversational Italian. The house inside was little better than a hovel. It was dirty, smelly and cluttered with chickens. The floor, of stone, was littered with bean sacks, straw, earthenware, water-pots of the Old Testament period, and the sketchiest collection of rickety furniture saved the place from being mistaken for a barn. A lean-to construction at the back of the house admitted the chickens to the living quarters of the peasant. The pungent smell of pigs found its way into the kitchen-cum-bedroom-cum everything else. Oxen stared at me from their stalls and a mule and a donkey found me equally an object of curiosity. The bed was made up on a stone-built elevation upon which straw was piled, and an ancient mattress crowned the whole.
>
> Pictures of the crucifixion, of the Bleeding Heart and, above all, of the Virgin Mary abounded from the walls where they hung in dusty profusion and somewhat askew. The fireplace was set into the wall and the smoke was guided upward by a stone-built contraption leading to the roof. . . . Add to this the all-pervading smell of garlic and the cow barn and you have a rough idea of a typical Sicilian peasant home.[17]

After being sent back from Brigade Headquarters to the beach the padre commented on the scene as follows:

> The shore lines by this time (3 p.m.) were littered . . . with stacks of every sort of military equipment and supplies. Trucks were being hauled ashore in every manner that ingenuity and herculean effort could devise. Some of these vehicles were abandoned and the tops of them were awash about fifty yards from the shore.
>
> A temporary hospital had been set up by . . . the 5th Field Ambulance . . . Men were lying about on stretchers in the open. Mosquito netting wherever possible kept the swarms of flies away from blood-soaked bodies. Steadily they came, some limping in but most of them in ambulances, jeeps and trucks. They were caked in dirt and blood and those who were not unconscious looked unutterably tired and weary. My own two boys who had fallen in the first landing had been buried, and only a few cases of minor injuries to Seaforth men were to be found in this hospital.[18]

Major Durnford was fortunate to meet with Lt-Col. Hoffmeister on the 11th and was taken by carrier to the unit just in time to take part in the gruelling march to their first rest area. It left an indelible impression on his mind, but he kept up with the unit even though his feet were a mass of blisters and blood.

The short rest was soon over. To the north the 51st (Highland) Division took Vizzini and the 1st Canadian Infantry Division was to pass through and secure Grammichele and Caltagirone.

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[17] Seaforth Archives, "Diary of Major R. C. H. Durnford," p. 20.

[18] *Ibid.*, p.21. The two Seaforths who were killed on D Day were Ptes. R. E. Fieldhouse and R. H. Hunter.

The 2nd Canadian Brigade was ordered to move via Ragusa - Charamonte Gulfi - Licodia to threaten Grammichele from the south, which meant another long, hard march of 50 miles.

At about dusk on the 15th the Seaforths set out down a mule track leading toward the Ragusa - Comiso highway, and thence by the twisting road which led steadily upwards to the silent, deserted streets of Ragusa itself. The moonlight cast sinister shadows across the streets, and it was an almost ghostly procession as the battalion made its way through and beyond these ancient streets into the rolling countryside. Word had come that a mixed German-Italian force had been pushed out of Grammichele by the 1st Brigade that morning, so that with each passing mile one could expect to meet stiffer resistance the deeper the thrust towards the centre of the island. On the afternoon of the 15th, the leading elements of the Canadian division had entered Caltagirone, the previous headquarters of the Hermann Göring Panzer Division. This division, however, was withdrawing eastward to Catania and on the right the British 13th Corps was meeting increasingly strong resistance. As a result Montgomery had told Lt-Gen. Leese to push on quickly with his 30th Corps and to "drive the Canadians on hard."[19]

For the next several days the Seaforths, like the other units in the division, were pushed on through Grammichele, Caltagirone, Piazza Armerina and on north to Valguarnera. It was an uphill-downhill route of some 60 miles along dusty roads and in intense heat which reminded many of the Okanagan Valley in midsummer. Only light scale vehicles were available, although some captured Italian trucks were pressed into service as well as some mules to help carry the unit's equipment. Some relief was given periodically when a shuttle service could be organized with the unit's vehicles to take a few platoons at a time and carry them part way along the dusty, narrow roads, but for the most part it meant steady marching in sub-tropical heat which seemed to dry out one's bones. On the 16th, when seven miles south of Piazza Armerina, some enemy mortar fire came into the brigade area but this fire landed to the west of the Seaforths among the Edmontons who were having their own problems overcoming the opposition put up by elements of the 15th

[19] Nicholson, *op. cit.*, p. 92. It should be noted that the Canadian division was striking towards hilltop towns which dominated the lateral roads leading eastward into the Catania plain.

Panzer Grenadier Division holding Piazza Armerina. By evening two hills dominating the 2,000-foot high town had been seized but the enemy continued to harass the attackers. During the night Major H. P. Bell-Irving gathered together a small patrol, half of whom consisted of Lt. Budd's Pioneer Platoon which had come up to the battalion that evening in an old Italian truck they had liberated.[20] This patrol found the town to be vacated, and as a result the Seaforths, instead of having to attack the town, were able to pass through it to the high ground beyond. About a mile to the north they stopped near a cool mountain stream, "the first clear, cold running water we had seen in the Island."[21] Here, while the Seaforths washed, bathed and shaved, the artillery moved in to support the 1st and 3rd Brigades which had been ordered to push ahead towards Valguarnera. The latter town was not taken without a stiff fight. The Seaforths were to encounter their first serious engagement two days later.

During the evening of 18 - 19 July the Seaforths moved north over the twisting roads to Valguarnera which the 1st Brigade was still clearing when they set out. Major General Simonds had ordered the 2nd Brigade to lead the division's thrust to Leonforte, and leading the 2nd Brigade would be the Seaforth Highlanders. The march to Valguarnera during the night meant that the men could escape the 100-degree heat which sapped their vitality during the day, and the unit had been on the go so constantly that this was a factor to be considered. At that the Seaforths were weary, and many fell sound asleep during the ten minute halt. The battalion marched in single file with one rifle company forward followed by Battalion Headquarters. Immediately behind came the other three companies, all well spaced so that enemy fire would not catch them bunched up and so cause heavy casualties. Behind the marching men came the unit's "fighting" echelon vehicles, such as the Universal Carriers, prepared to support the infantry companies whenever required. During the small hours of the morning the Seaforths entered Valguarnera, passing deserted German vehicles and guns on the roadside and some dead, both German and Canadian, in the ditches. "A" Company, commanded by Captain Merritt, was in the lead and once through

[20] W. D., Seaforth Highlanders of Canada, July, 1943, Appendix 27: "Company Diaries—Pioneer Platoon"; Seaforth Archives, "Battle Accounts—Sicily": Letter, Major J. D. Forin to his father, 3 August 1944.

[21] Forin, *op. cit.*

the town the unit stopped until dawn. Behind them, where the enemy had blown a bridge, an R.C.E. bulldozer was pushing in fill to enable the unit's vehicles to follow up but the road was not repaired until late in the morning. About 0600 hours orders were received to continue north despite the fact that the 3-in. mortars in the carriers could not be brought up should their support be needed.[22]

A few miles further on, as "A" Company came around a spur of a hill, a wide saucer-like valley opened up and No. 7 Platoon, commanded by Lt. E. G. Begg, of "A" Company was ordered up to the high ground paralleling the line of march to the right. The lay of the land, peaceful as it appeared, made Lt-Col. Hoffmeister suspicious, and he ordered all of the leading company off the road to the higher ground.[23] While this message was being carried forward[24] the bulk of the battalion was told to move off to the right also. This movement was only partially completed by "A" Company when it and most of the battalion was subjected to fire from German heavy machine-guns, mortars and artillery. While Hoffmeister organized "B", "C" and "D" Companies behind the reverse slope of a nearby ridge and prepared to press on with the advance once his supporting arms came up, most of "A" Company was pinned down on the forward slope. What had happened was that German forces had positioned themselves along a ridge on the far side of the valley and commanded the road approach. Probably they were waiting to get the entire battalion out on the small plain which would have made an excellent killing ground. Once they saw "A" Company move off to the right, one can assume they opened up immediately with their fire.

For some hours the Seaforths were in a most uncomfortable position. With their heavier weapons the enemy could and did rake

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[22] About this time the mortar platoon abandoned its carriers and commandeered mules to transport its weapons and ammunition. As Lt. D. S. Harley wrote later: ". . . however as nobody spoke a language the mules understood and further, as no one understood the mules, we as a support platoon were inefficient and somewhat disorganized." (Letter, Mr. D. S. Harley to author, 28 March 1967.)

[23] Seaforth Archives, "Battle Accounts-Sicily": Letter, Captain J. H. Gowan to Ian Tait, 1 August 1943.

[24] The war diarist states that the wireless sets had difficulty transmitting the message. Evidently the second in command and his batman managed to attract the attention of the tail end of the lead company.

the ridge. Lt. D. S. Harley was unable to bring up his 3-inch mortars,[25] the only major supporting weapon Hoffmeister had. The artillery, when asked to help, were in column of route and it was some time before the 25-pr. shells began to pay the enemy in his own kind. To add to the general discomfort enemy shells had set fire to the grain on the reverse slope, and this combined with the enemy's mortar fire made things quite lively for a while.

"A" Company, however, suffered the most and on the forward slope casualties were mounting. Pte. J. G. McBride and L/Cpl. R. R. Story, both of "A" Company, did outstanding work that morning. McBride, a medical orderly, was three times wounded early in the action and Story was painfully wounded by an incendiary bomb. Both men disregarded the enemy fire and their own wounds to render first aid to their comrades and helped to evacuate them.[26] The Medical Officer, Captain W. K. McDonald,[27] was equally busy both on the front and reverse slopes of the ridge, moving from one platoon to another despite the shell and mortar fire. "A" Company had 18 casualties as a result of this action, among them Lt. Eric Begg.

Some idea of the action during the day is described by Padre Durnford. The doctor had been called forward to tend the wounded and the padre came with him. As their Red Cross truck approached it was mortared. He wrote later:

> Sitting where I was on top of it [the truck] I had a good view of the accuracy or otherwise of the enemy's aim. Vicious bursts of flame and clouds of dust, dirt and rock flew into the air to the left and right of us but it did not come close enough to wreck the truck. . . . It seemed ages before we got to the scene of the battle proper, though actually only five minutes by the watch. Into this valley or gully we went on foot. . . . Wounded were being brought out and I attended the dying. Boys I had known well were among the victims, torn and bleeding beyond all hope of recovery. Mortars continued to drop steadily and with nerve wracking nearness. The worst experience under these conditions is that of listening

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[25] German mortar bombs fell among the Seaforths mortar platoon and scared the mules who kicked up their heels and fled in all directions. One kicked Lt. Harley in the head and caused a severe concussion, keeping him out of action for several weeks.

[26] Both McBride and Story were awarded the Military Medal "for valour in the field".

[27] McDonald was awarded the Miltary Cross for this action and for his work at Leonforte. He was continually out where the fire was hottest to offer immediate aid to the wounded.

> to the 'fluff-fluff' of an on-coming mortar shell and wondering if it will drop near or far.
>
> In the not-too-distant hills we could hear the enemy's guns fire and we could count the seconds . . . before the shell landed in our gully. It was an anxious time for us all. But to the dying it meant nothing. They were calm and bravely faced the end. It was a tragic afternoon for me. We got all the wounded out and finally got out ourselves. It was a great joy to me to be on hand when wounded men looked up and smiled at their Padre with a cheerful greeting.[28]

By noon the worst was over. The unit's 3-inch mortar fire was joined by the 4.2-inch mortars shortly after midday, and the Seaforth's anti-tank guns came up at about the same time. Two enemy tanks in hull down positions had fired some rounds into the Seaforth area and later lumbered around the flank of the ridge but did not penetrate the battalion area. The closest brush with these came when Lt-Col. Hoffmeister, scouting about for better company positions when the grain fields were on fire, spotted one coming out of the dust and smoke. The enemy crew commander spotted him and sent a shell in his direction as he dove through a cactus hedge, head first. Both tank and Hoffmeister then retreated!

That evening the Princess Patricias passed through the Seaforths to carry on the advance towards Leonforte. On the 20th the Patricias had established themselves on their high ground dominating the road to Leonforte and the Edmonton Regiment crossed the Dittaino River and gained the high ground about two miles southeast of Leonforte. During that evening the Seaforths moved forward too so that by dawn they were well dug in just north of the river. Until the Patricias took their objectives, enemy artillery and mortar fire on the Seaforth position was fairly heavy, but once the Patricias, in an infantry-cum-tank attack, had seized Mount Desira Rossi the firing died down.

It was now time for the battalion to attack Leonforte, and after dark on the evening of the 20th the Seaforths moved off to its first major encounter. Two scouts from the Intelligence Section led the way well in advance, while close to the battalion was a bulldozer kept busy by the craters in the road caused by enemy demolitions.

It was seven miles by the winding, twisting roads from the Seaforths' assembly area to the outskirts of Leonforte, and the moonlight shining down on the rugged Sicilian hills as the men marched

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[28] Personal Diary, Major R. C. H. Durnford, p. 35.

along in single file might have given a romantic look to the high hills and square, peasant cottages at almost any time except this. The right flank was secure, but the left flank was wide open. In two places the road was cratered, which meant the vehicles and their support weapons were delayed, for to attempt to drive tracked or wheeled vehicles over the rocky ground would have soon immobilized them. "C" Company, commanded by Major J. W. Blair, was in the lead. The town, it was rumoured, was only lightly held, but situated as it was like most Sicilian towns on the top of a hill like a layered wedding cake, it could be a formidable obstacle if it was not. As the Seaforths approached their objective they saw for the first time abandoned German troop carriers off the side of the road, an indication to some that perhaps the enemy had withdrawn.[29]

What might have been wishful thinking was quickly dispelled. "C" Company, reaching the bridge over the dry riverbed a half mile south of the town about 0430 hours, was fired on as its leading sections came around a bend in the road. The company immediately deployed to high ground on the right of the road which seemed, at first, to offer cover on its reverse slope. It was soon found out that this "safe" area was under observation and fire from the higher ground across the gully. Major Forin happened to be close by, and he and Major Blair and the company's officers held a brief "O" Group behind a small rock shelter. "Perhaps," wrote one of the officers later, "under the smart of the delay imposed on the battalion in the preceding days by small German forces, it was decided that two platoons should be pushed immediately into the town."[30] Lts. R. A. Wilson and R. L. McDougall were assigned the task. Their platoons, covered by the fire of No. 14 Platoon and part of "B" Company, were to scramble down into the gully and up the other side and take out the enemy's defensive posts which would allow the main attack to go in.

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[29] The Commanding Officer sent Major Bell-Irving with a volunteer strong patrol to see if the rumour that the town was empty was correct. The patrol advanced over open ground to draw fire if the enemy was in the town. The Germans obliged with considerable vigour.

[30] Seaforth Archives, "The Lads of Cabar Feidh—The Sicilian Campaign." by R. L. McDougall. "Jim Blair's mission was to work up into the town and learn in what strength it was held and what were the dispositions of the German forces." (Forin's Letter, 3 August 1943, *op. cit.*)

Dawn seemed to come quickly that morning, and once the signal was given by Major Blair the two platoons ran forward at the double. However,

> . . . they were not fast enough. As they crossed the stream bed and began to climb the far slope they were hit by defensive fire. Within moments, despite fire support . . ., the force was scattered and lost to use. Part of No. 13 Platoon, under Lt. R. L. McDougall, climbed to the left shoulder of the Leonforte escarpment under the walls of the town; but here, later in the day, they were shot up by allied artillery, which by this time had begun preparation for another phase of this attack.[31]

The beginning of the action described above started while it was still dark and the enemy's machine-gun fire was searching the ground rather than being aimed. During the early morning, however, as Major Blair led his platoons towards Leonforte, enemy fire became directed, and as they had the advantage of height and observation, movement became very difficult and casualties began to mount. At times the fire was so intense that it was suicidal to move, and as a result it took hours to move the mile or so westward from the blown bridge to a hill overlooking the town. Here they were out of communication with the unit and under sporadic shellfire, and ultimately rejoined the main body the following day.

While the unit's 3-inch mortars and the supporting artillery began to conduct observed shoots against the enemy's posts, "D" Company, commanded by Captain E. W. Thomas, had attempted to cross the gully by what appeared to be a covered route to secure high ground north of the town. "A" and "B" Companies were ordered up along the southern ridge to provide fire. The leading platoon of "D" Company, led by Lt. R. V. French, had not got much beyond the gully when it too came under intense fire from enemy posts on the high ground which was the company's objective. With part of the company in the gully and one platoon and company headquarters on the forward slope, it suffered a considerable number of casualties. Some of the wounded were so exposed that it was impossible to reach them until nightfall. During the remainder of the morning, however, most of the forward elements of "D" Company managed to withdraw partly under the fire of the Seaforth's mortars and machine guns as well as from the fire directed by the artillery's

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[31] *Ibid.*, ultimately this group was to make its way back to the battalion bringing out its wounded on improvised stretcher bearers.

F.O.O.[32] The latter was with Captain Thomas who remained with one of his company's platoons on the forward slope all day.

About a quarter of a mile to the left of the bridge and the general area of the main battalion attack, a small savage fight had been going on. Wishing to ascertain the strength of the enemy's forces in Leonforte, Major Bell-Irving had received permission earlier to gather a composite patrol of about platoon strength and prod the town's defences to the west. As this platoon advanced down the hill towards the gully over which the town loomed it came under machine-gun fire. A corporal who was wounded there describes his view of the ensuing action in these words:

> Mine was the advance section and therefore seeing a ditch immediately in front of us we got into it to give covering fire to the remaining men who would be behind us to the right and left. Immediately the Germans commenced mortar fire which fell behind us, giving some indication of how close we were to the enemy. To my knowledge one section returned back over the hill, a second came down on our left and took up positions in the ditch; but some other men followed Major Bell-Irving straight down the slope to the dead ground immediately below what appeared to be a wall supporting a roadway along the town. Throughout the rest of the day until late that evening my section kept up a sporadic fire fight with the Germans. . . . They were shooting from windows, from doors, from streets, and there was on our right an armoured car. . . . [It] would make its appearance, fire a few shots and then back away. Because of our more or less exposed position all the men in my particular group were either killed or wounded. I kept thinking of those lines from Scott: "One by one they fell around him as the archers laid them low." However about nine o'clock that evening a terrific barrage of our guns came down on Leonforte. I made a crutch out of a rifle, took my tommy-gun and I told my men I would try and get help. . . .
>
> Just as I was preparing to leave Leon Campbell . . . came along the ditch from my left and said they were going to get away under the cover of the barrage. I said "not without my wounded." So we made stretchers out of the two Bren guns, sat the wounded on the Brens and started up the hill. . . .[33]

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[32] Communications were poor both between Lt-Col. Hoffmeister and his advanced companies, and between the F.O.O. and the gun batteries. Some of the Seaforths' anti-tank guns were at hand, but only one—covering the gully and outskirts of Leonforte—managed to get off a few shots mostly at buildings on the outskirts of town.

[33] Personal interview with Cpl. J. Cromb, June, 1967. Not only was Cpl. Cromb wounded in this action, but his brother was killed. His section was so close to the enemy that Cromb's Tommy-gun was within hitting range.

During the afternoon the brigadier decided to launch the Seaforths against Leonforte under the cover of a strong artillery bombardment and additional covering fire from the Edmontons. Lt-Col. Hoffmeister called an "O" Group of his company commanders which met in a farmyard about 1530 hours. Some of the officers stood ". . . on a pad of concrete-like surface which every Sicilian farm seemed to have and which was built and used for the purpose of thrashing grain thereon by driving mules in a circle over it."[34] The group was just breaking up when tragedy struck. Two shells landed at the edge of the concrete pad, quickly followed by two more. A British and a Canadian artillery officer who were nearby ran to their wireless sets to order a "cease fire" as it was felt that an earlier fire correction order was misinterpreted at the gun site. However the damage had been done, and the scene at the time is described as follows by the unit's second-in-command:

> The concussion sat us (Lt-Col. Hoffmeister and Major Forin) both down on our "pratts" and our immediate reaction then was for me to roll down the bank and high-tail it into the sunken roadway. . . . I told the Company which was coming down into the sunken roadway from its position up the hill preparatory to forming up for the assault on Leonforte to go back to its position, and then, having been assured by the Arty. Major that the artillery fire had been suspended for the time being I went back to the pad.[35]

The shells bursting in the farmyard had struck the battalion hard. Captain D. H. Strain,[36] the Adjutant, was killed instantly. Lt. Budd, the Pioneer Officer, was mortally wounded and died within minutes of the Medical Officer reaching him. Captain F. W. I. Merritt was badly wounded as was Cpl. M. Davidson. Cpl. G. J. Carmichael and Pte. T. F. Simpson, both signallers, were killed and others nearby, including Lt. J. C. M. Scott, were wounded. Hoffmeister ordered Forin to contact the Brigade Major, and as a consequence when Brigadier Vokes came up he ordered the Edmonton Regiment to take over the main assault with the Seaforths in a secondary role. The Seaforths were ready to resume the attack, but with one company commander wounded, another (Captain E. W.

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[34] Seaforth Archives, "Battle Accounts—Sicily": Notes on the R. L. McDougall Narrative by Col. J. D. Forin, p. 7.

[35] *Ibid.* "D" Company's commander, Capt. Thomas, was on the hill facing Leonforte and under fire, consequently he was not at this "O" Group.

[36] His place as Adjutant was taken by Captain J. H. Gowan.

Thomas) pinned down near Leonforte, and considering too the heavy casualties already suffered by the regiment, Vokes decided against it. Perhaps it was as well. "The men are feeling very blue this morning," wrote the war diarist, and indeed all ranks felt pretty grim about the whole business.

Despite these setbacks and misfortunes, there was still plenty of fight in the Seaforths, and during the rest of the 21st and part of the 22nd they kept their position on "Bloody Hill", as the ridge was called, and struck back at the enemy as hard as they were hit.

On the evening of the 21st a composite company of Seaforths led by Major H. P. Bell-Irving took part in the Edmonton's attack on Leonforte. Its task was to circle around to the north and cut off any enemy retreating from the "back door" when the main attack went in. Although the intention was sound, the combination of darkness, rugged terrain and distance to be covered resulted only in very limited success.

While the Edmonton Regiment was fighting in the town and the Seaforth company hammering at the back door of it, the Royal Canadian Engineers were working strenuously to repair the bridge across the gully where the Seaforths first came up against the enemy. This task was completed late at night. In Leonforte a confused and hard fought battle had been going on all night against an enemy supported by tanks and fighting grimly in house-to-house battles to retain his positions. At nine a troop of Sherman tanks carrying a company of Princess Patricias dashed over the bridge and up the twisting road to the town to add their weight to the fight and make contact with a group of about 100 Edmontons who had seized and were still holding some buildings in the centre of the town. Scattered among them were some Seaforths, for during the night of the 21st-22nd and the morning of the 22nd the fighting was most confused. By the afternoon the last of the enemy was being forced from the town. Enemy prisoners-of-war, both German and Italian, had been trickling in all during the day, and by nightfall the 2nd Brigade was in firm possession of the town.

It has been a costly battle. The 2nd Brigade[37] had suffered 56 killed and 105 wounded, and of the units the Seaforth Highlanders had been hit hardest with 28 killed and 48 wounded. This brought

[37] The 1st Canadian Infantry Brigade had taken Assoro on 22 July.

the battalion's total casualty rate since D Day to 121 all ranks. In the twelve days of marching and fighting Leonforte was the hardest nut the Seaforths were called upon to crack, and although at the beginning there were some doubts as to the strength of the garrison holding the heights around the town, it was later found that two battalions of the German 104th Panzer Grenadier Regiment supported by tanks had been ordered to defend it.

For the next few days the Seaforths were able to rest and lick their wounds near Assoro. Leonforte was behind them, but it would not be forgotten for a long time. The new reinforcements who came up to fill the gaps in the unit's ranks somehow seemed awfully green, and it was not easy to give answers to their eager questions about what it felt like to be under fire, or what happened to various friends they had known in the battalion. Many of the "old originals" were now resting in the rocky soil of Sicily, and all too many letters had to be written home telling how this one or that one had lost his life on "Bloody Hill". In time the Seaforths would get hardened to war and its toll but it was not an easy process.

Along with the reinforcements the men received their large packs, which meant clean clothes, a chance to dig out cigarettes which had been stashed away, and in general an opportunity to get cleaned up before being called on again. The entire division was swinging eastward towards Mount Etna, and on the 26th the 2nd Brigade was ordered back into the battle. Nissoria had been taken, but beyond it stood Agira.

The advance to Agira had started on 22 July when the 1st Canadian Infantry Brigade was ordered to push eastward from Leonforte. For four days the 1st Brigade had fought its way forward through Nissoria to within a mile or two of Agira, but the succession of hills on either side of the road leading to the town, as well as those near the town itself, were excellent points of vantage which the enemy used to the fullest extent to retain his hold on Agira and to deny the approaches to the town. On the morning of 26 July the 2nd Brigade was ordered to pass through the 1st Brigade and capture Agira. The Princess Patricias' task was to seize two ridges[38] east of Nissoria, after which the Seaforths would carry the attack further by seizing a high hill immediately west of Agira. This

[38] The first ridge was codenamed "Lion," the second was "Tiger."

third hill feature, codenamed "Grizzly", was the key to Agira and the approaches to it. The attack was to be supported by strong artillery fire, and in anticipation of success, the Seaforths were brought up to an assembly area close to Nissoria.

At 2000 hours the artillery barrage opened up and shortly afterwards the Patricias seized their first objective. It was far more difficult, however, to secure the second ridge. About midnight the Brigadier, still uncertain about the exact location of the Patricias' front, decided to commit the Seaforths. Lt-Col. Hoffmeister had brought up his battalion close to the Patricias during the night, and gave his orders keeping in mind the tremendous advantage held by the enemy in the hills along either side of the route to Agira. He decided to send "A" Company on the left and "C" Company on the right of the road; they were to push on to Agira under the cover of darkness, and their success was to be followed by the remaining companies.

What developed was a very confusing battle which can be understood if one remembers the hilly terrain (with one hill looking much like another), poor communications, the ability of the Germans in their well sited machine-gun and mortar positions to sweep the approaches to Agira, and the single road through the hills which rather limited the ability of the wheeled and tracked vehicles to manoeuvre.

"A" Company, now commanded by Major H. P. Bell-Irving, moved off in a single file past the forward posts of the Patricias about 0330 hours. Several hundred yards beyond the F.D.Ls.[39] the company came across a tank and, after trying unsuccessfully to destroy it with grenades, left it to the 90th Anti-Tank Battery R.C.A. to deal with while it broke off further to the left to a donkey trail. "C" Company, at this time, was still advancing but as dawn broke it became pinned down by enemy machine-gun and mortar fire. Far on the other side of the road Major Bell-Irving was beginning to be concerned. As he described the situation later:

> [We] . . . went forward through a donkey trail for a long time and I got more and more worried, because I didn't know where I was. . . . It began to look as if it might be first light pretty soon. I knew I had Germans well behind me, and I was trying to figure out what to do when all of a sudden a Nebelwerfer[40] went off right in my face,—within a very

[39] Forward Defence Localities.

[40] This was a six-barrelled mortar which was frequently termed a "Moaning

> few yards—right over our heads—scared the living daylights out of me. I did a right wheel and started up a hill which was on our right, and figured on getting onto high ground and staying there until daylight. On the way up we . . . had a little bit of a fire fight, but we got on top of the hill . . . and there was a road running through it.
>
> On the other side [of the saucer-like plateau atop the hill], about 75 yards away from us, was a [tank]. It was light now . . . and there was no sign of enemy except this tank. Purely by good luck . . . 'A' Coy had arrived on the very centre of the 'Tiger' objective.[41]

The action which followed is indicative both of "A" Company's spirit as well as "the fog of battle". Bell-Irving's first thought was to have Lt. Harling and a few men work around beside the tank and clobber it with a Piat. Unfortunately, when most wanted, the Piat bombs were not immediately available. They were being carried on the back of a donkey, and ". . . the donkey had gone home". In any event when the German tank crew commander was so unwise as to expose himself, the company commander shot him. "A" Company had not only an Italian donkey, but a German medium machine-gun it had "liberated", and when this was fired the noise of it attracted Canadian troops some distance below and to the rear of "A" Company. Assuming it to be an enemy post, and seeing the German tank, Canadian tanks supporting the Seaforths opened fire. This fire knocked a track off the German tank but it still managed to ease itself out of sight where yet another enemy tank had been spotted by Lt. Harling when he had been stalking the first tank with a Piat. Other shells did some damage to "A" Company, so that by midmorning one officer was killed (Lt. Marriott Wilson), one was wounded (Capt. F. H. Bonnell), and there were additional casualties in the platoons.

On the other side of the main road to Agira, and some distance to the rear, "C" Company commanded by Major Blair had been having a rough time. Even under the cover of darkness it had bumped into the enemy and when dawn came the company found itself in a position exposed to machine-gun and tank fire. All around were the evidences of the terrific battle which had been fought in the past three days. German anti-tank guns and tanks dotted the area together with Sherman tanks. Some had their tur-

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Minnie" from the sound it made. To come upon this weapon would place "A" Company well within the enemy's lines. It was , in fact, on "Tiger."

[41] Seaforth Archives, "Battle Accounts—Sicily": Interview of Brigadier H. P. Bell-Irving by Dr. R. L. McDougall.

rets blown right off, a few had careened into ditches and one or two had been "flamers". German equipment—rifles, unopened rations, ammunition, etc.—was scattered about, and so too were the dead. These may have caught the eye, but dominating the senses was the enemy's fire. Cleverly concealed and well protected enemy positions in the hills made it extremely difficult to move. Only when the Sherman tanks came up to help could the company ease its way forward at all, but by 0730 hours, with the help of the tanks, artillery fire, and Captain Money's anti-tank platoon, the company had pushed beyond the second ridge (the Patricias original final objective—"Tiger") allowing Lt-Col. Hoffmeister's Tactical Headquarters to gain a vantage point of the route to Agira.[42].

One man's recollections of the action at this point is typical of many. Pte. A. J. McKay had come up as a reinforcement a few days prior to the attack and had been told he would be a battalion runner. When the battle began he was in Nissoria close to the signal platoon's H.U.P.[43] when Lt. Anderson ordered him to go forward —presumably to Tactical Headquarters. McKay states:

> I went along a roadway charred and torn among burned and smashed up tanks. Moaning Minnies . . . [whose sound was like " . . . a ripping screech of noise coming from the sky directly at the hearer" started to fall and McKay] . . . in one horrified moment jumped into a ditch full of blackberry bushes. My legs were scratched through the skin from hose top to thigh. We were in shorts. Not sure of what to do I went down hill and moved cautiously toward the front. I came to a cave where the M.O. was patching up wounded. Had a cup of tea and went on again. Finally came to a rifle company dug in. Got up, shelled down. Got up, shelled down again. I saw a rabbit run for its life from a pile of rocks. The land was useless for anything except a war so far as I could see. I talked to the signaller during a lull. He said this is no place for a Bn H.Q. runner. Go back. . . .[44]

"C" Company, although beyond the second ridge and pushing slowly forward, was having a difficult time, and it welcomed the order to dig in until the airforce bombed Agira around noon. Also welcome was the fact that Lt-Col. Hoffmeister, his accompanying artillery F.O.Os. and mortar officer were now able to take advantage of the height of the land gained by "A" Company which gave

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[42] W.D., Seaforth Highlanders of Canada, 27 July 1943.

[43] H.U.P.—McKay's term for it was "Housing Upper Personnel."

[44] Seaforth Archives: "Battle Accounts—Sicily"—Journal of Pte. A. J. McKay.

them a view of the road ahead. The war diarist expresses something of the delight felt at the time:

> A fine panorama is before us of enemy territory. No mortar fire is coming our way at the present time. The artillery are bombing an area [map reference] 4398. Two German Mark IV tanks took it on the run below us in the valley heading north. The first one was far up the road heading into dead ground. The second was not so fortunate. A Sherman [tank] on the high ground close to Bn. H.Q. opended up at 1,000 yards. The first three shots landed on either side of the run-a-way tank, the fourth caught him fair and square—it almost skidded into the ditch and 4 men scrambled out, running for dear life to get into the dead ground 100 yards ahead. 2 of our Bren guns opened up but from observations, none of them were hit. Small scattered detachments are seen in the groves below us moving this way. Our Arty. F.O.O. reported positions and soon the area was being covered in a systematic pattern, scattering Germans like ninepins. Our 3-inch mortars added to their difficulties also.[45]

The bombing of Agira and straffing of "Grizzly" at midday together with the improved artillery observation gave the Seaforths a welcome if brief break. At one o'clock Lt-Col. Hoffmeister held an "O" Group and gave his orders for the next phase. "B" Company, which had come up to "A" Company's position on the left, was ordered to clean out the enemy from the next hill. "A" Company was to swing over the main road and capture a hill about a quarter of a mile west of Agira. This feature was "Grizzly", and although Agira itself, perched on a cone-shaped hill, loomed higher, the capture of "Grizzly" would make this ancient town almost untenable. On the right of the highway, "C" Company was ordered to make a wide right flanking movement on "Grizzly", while "D" Company was to fight its way to a cemetery north of "Grizzly" which the enemy was using as a strong point. The attack was to go in at 1400 hours behind an artillery barrage and with the support of tanks.

At two o'clock the barrage roared over the heads of the Seaforths, and shortly afterwards the leading companies began to advance. Almost immediately the Germans began to reply, and for

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[45] W.D., Seaforth Highlanders of Canada, 27 July 1943. The area which gave the tanks and artillery this exceptional vantage point was the one captured by "A" Company. A brigade report stated: "On arrival on TIGER objective the . . . ground gave excellent command towards Agira and the country to the north. The tanks, Infantry and Vickers guns from the Bde. Sp. Gp. had excellent shoots and destroyed four Tks, considerable number of vehicles and enemy infantry caught in the open. (W.D., H.Q., 2nd Cdn. Inf. Bde., July, 1943, Appendix XVII: " The Battle for Agira").

the rest of the afternoon, as the Seaforths pushed ahead over the ground which the 1st Brigade had attempted to seize earlier, periodic enemy machine gun, mortar and artillery fire contested the way.

Enemy opposition became especially heavy as "A" Company, having advanced under the cover of orchards and through the remnants of an enemy vehicle park, came over a crest which gave it the first good view of "Grizzly". It gave the defenders on "Grizzly" a good look at "A" Company as well, and the Germans holding the heights immediately brought their fire to bear on No. 8 platoon which was leading. What followed was an almost classic battle-drill attack which worked to perfection, and is best told in the company commander's words:

> The platoon was promptly abandoned by the Coy. Cmd. who moved to the right and led No. 9 platoon on a wide flanking movement to the south. Company Headquarters and No. 7 platoon followed automatically. No. 8 platoon, which received no orders, worked themselves forward in the cover of fire and movement to the base of the hill. One composite section actually scaled the face, took over an MG42 [a German machine gun] and turned it on the Hun. When driven off they took the gun with them. All this served to distract attention from the rest of the Company which had disappeared.
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> The south end of Grizzly Hill was narrow, almost perpendicular—not thought to be worth defending. Most of the rest of the company . . . scrambled up to the ledge before the Boche realized what was going on. He was badly outflanked, and had to move his M.Gs. quickly to face the south. This released No. 8 platoon who worked around to the south and eventually joined the company.[46]

One of the section leaders of "A" Company deserves special mention. This was Cpl. F. W. Terry who got his section up the hill without a casualty and then led a charge which silenced a machine-gun post. After capturing the post Terry and his men turned the gun on the enemy which further helped to loosen the enemy's hold on the southern portion and won for the corporal the Military Medal.

Sgt. Dave Penman's platoon had a rather unique experience on the way around "Grizzly". Penman, at one point, ordered Cpl. McGowan to check a cave and clean it out while others covered him. "He approached the cave cautiously," wrote Penman later, "and fired a couple of rounds and ordered everyone out. Much to his embarrassment out came an old man and lady and about twenty

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[46] Seaforth Archives, "Battle Accounts—Sicily"—Account of "A" Company's . . . Attack on Agira, by Major H. P. Bell-Irving.

women and children."[47] The task of getting up the steep slope of the hill was not easy. It was hot, the men were exhausted, ammunition was already running short, water was scarce and the company much reduced in strength. Once "A" Company had a toe-hold on the top of the hill the enemy turned his full attention on the interlopers. For some time a terrific fire fight went on, with the Germans using rifle and machine-gun fire as well as rifle grenades, but the various platoons, well tucked into the rocky crevices and using the protection afforded by terraces, suffered few casualties and not only held to their positions but slowly improved them.

On the left "D" Company, commanded by Captain E. W. Thomas, was having a very difficult time. From the firm base held by "B" Company on the left of "Tiger" Captain Thomas had led his men towards what was termed Cemetery Hill and immediately came under heavy enemy fire. One mortar bomb killed the company signaller and smashed the wireless set, which meant communications were by runner, and made it very difficult to call for supporting fire. So strongly was the enemy entrenched on the hill that, rather than push the company on at heavy cost, Lt-Col. Hoffmeister ordered Capt. Thomas to withdraw. The Edmonton Regiment was ultimately given the task of taking Cemetery Hill, and some of "D" Company's men had the pleasure of helping them secure this position which had cost the Company many casualties.

"C" Company, meanwhile, was having its own difficulties. It, too, had been directed to outflank "Grizzly", but the route there was an up and down affair over vine-terraced hills and valleys, and communications became progressively worse. Major Blair decided to use one platoon to cover the advance of the remainder of his company which was directed to make a wide encircling movement on "Grizzly" from the south. On the far right flank of the company, and thus of the battalion, was Lt. J. F. McLean's platoon which, in the difficult, broken country found itself storming up the wrong hill at about five in the afternoon. This feature was from one half to three quarters of a mile south of "Grizzly". There was nothing for it but to come down the same difficult way they had come up, with the result that time was lost and darkness had settled. At this point, about two o'clock in the morning, Lt. McLean decided to rest his

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[47] Letter, Mr. Dave Penman to author, 7 June 1967.

platoon. His men had been on the go under fire since dawn, and he knew that if he kept on going without a break his platoon would be so dead beat they would not be in condition to carry on once they reached "Grizzly".[48] The remainder of "C" Company, meanwhile, apparently using a shorter route, worked its way to another hill close to "Grizzly" but slightly to the south west.

Lt-Col. Hoffmeister, meanwhile, had been most active throughout the afternoon, moving about the battlefield and ignoring the shells and mortar bombs which continued to seek out Canadian positions. Around six in the afternoon, hearing of "A" Company's partial success and unable to collect[49] "C" Company for rapid reinforcement of "Grizzly", Hoffmeister decided to send in "B" Company. This company had met little resistance north of the road, so they were told to marry up with the carrier platoon which would rush them up to "Grizzly". The idea was good and by 1830 hours "B" Company was enroute, but nearing Agira it came under very strong mortar fire which kept it pinned down, and caused numerous casualties.

By nightfall, when the battlefield began to quieten down somewhat, the situation was still fluid, but the Seaforths' determination to hang on to what they had gained was beginning to swing the battle in the brigade's favour. By this time all of the battalion except "D" Company was south of the main road, while to the north the Edmontons began an advance which would bring them by dawn to within a half mile of Agira. Stuck out like a thumb was Bell-Irving's "A" Company holding on to "Grizzly" and defying the Germans to rout them. The whole episode on the hill, which each veteran will remember, was all the more remarkable in that the company lost only two killed and five wounded in this assault for a loss to the enemy of 75 killed, 15 captured, and an unknown number wounded.[50] As

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[48] Sgt. Penman, with "A" Company, wrote later: "By the morning we were so exhausted it was hard to line up our [weapon] sights on the enemy."

[49] By this time "C" Company was out of contact with both Battalion Headquarters and "A" Company.

[50] Major Bell-Irving was awarded the Distinguished Service Order for his action in capturing "Grizzly". It should be remembered, too, that "A" Company, like the others, was considerably under strength. On "Grizzly" it had about 50 all ranks, with two of its platoons combined into one under Lt. Harling. Of the latter officer his sergeant wrote later: "[He] was marvellous. His

the Company Commander wrote later:

> The lack of casualties in "A" Coy. was particularly remarkable in that there was a concerted attack against them just after midnight in the form of one of the only—if not the only—bayonet charges ever made against the Seaforths in this war. This attack was concentrated and heavily supported by point blank small arms fire by plastic rifle grenades. . . . The protection of the forward line of the company was a stone wall about two feet high. It was on this occasion . . . that Lt. Harling stood up his full height and threw grenades at the oncoming enemy—one after the other— . . . singing [a Hawaiian song] at the top of his lungs. He, more than any other, was responsible for the successful holding of Grizzly Hill.[51]

When Lt. McLean's platoon from "C" Company arrived on top of "Grizzly" just before first light on 28 July it was as delighted to see "A" Company as Bell-Irving was to see the first reinforcements he had had. "A" Company had control of about one quarter of the feature, and it was desperately short of ammunition[52] and water. McLean's platoon was also short of water, but was fairly well supplied with ammunition. The only nearby well was covered by enemy fire. A plan was worked out whereby Lt. McLean and three volunteers would crawl towards the enemy occupied house under the cover of smoke grenades and the fire from the remainder of his platoon and Lt. Harling's platoon of "A" Company. When close they would rush the building with the two platoons close on their heels.

The plan worked beautifully. The volunteers used their field craft in the best battle drill style so that they got within charging range. Close behind them Harling, a big man, threw grenades over their heads as if the grenades were softballs, inspiring his men as he had for the past two days. Then McLean and his men, followed by the two platoons, got up and raced towards the enemy strongpoint and such was the force of their charge that they kept going beyond it to the far end of the feature clearing it of the enemy.

Shortly before nine in the morning, by which time the Intelligence Officer, Captain W. G. Harris, had made contact with "A" Company, Major Bell-Irving was able to report that "Grizzly" was

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being there was like 'handing out guts on a platter to the men'." (Penham, *op. cit.*)

[51] Letter, Brigadier H. P. Bell-Irving to author, 3 May 1967.

[52] "A" Company had German machine-guns, rifles and ammunition but everyone hoped they would not have to use them as it might bring down Canadian mortar and artillery fire on them.

finally and completely in Seaforth hands after a last German counter-attack had been beaten back with grenades. Further to the north "D" Company, under Captain Thomas, had become disentangled from an enemy force located in the cemetery on the northern end of the line which became the prize for the Edmontons' attack during the 27th. "B" Company and the two platoons from "C" Company were converging on "Grizzly", but communications were poor and it was not until Cpl. Denis Meade made his way forward with his wireless set that these companies could be contacted.[53]

There were many others during this action whose bravery could be mentioned, but two privates, both of whom were awarded the Military Medal, deserve special notice. One is Pte. Malcolm Rae, a regimental despatch rider, who was at one point ordered to bring up the anti-tank guns to a position where it was necessary to ride along a half-mile stretch of road under enemy observation and heavy mortar fire which had already cost the Seaforths a number of casualties. On his first trip he was wounded in the chest by a mortar bomb bursting close by. Despite his wound and continual enemy fire, Rae made four more trips to bring up additional guns, only ceasing at nightfall when he was ordered to go to the R.A.P. Private Frederick Webster, a native Indian of British Columbia, gave equally valuable service up on "Grizzly". He was with No. 8 Platoon, and when it was held up by an enemy machine-gun post, Webster, in face of heavy fire, brought his Bren gun to bear so effectively that his section was able to wipe out the opposition and permit the platoon to advance.

During the late afternoon and evening of the 28th the Seaforths were able to relax somewhat as the Princess Patricias and Edmontons finished the task of flushing out last ditch enemy elements in Agira. Until nightfall, however, despite the fact that he was withdrawing, the area occupied by the Seaforths continued to be subjected to his fire. The heat and the dust for the past few days made the water-truck the happiest sight anyone saw on that battlefield even though any vehicle raising dust which could be seen by the enemy would bring a flurry of mortar shells.

The battle for Agira was over, and the Seaforths—indeed the entire brigade—could be well and truly proud of themselves. They

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[53] Cpl. Meade did this "with complete disregard for his own safety and in the face of heavy enemy mortar and small arms fire". He was awarded the Military Medal.

had made an advance of five miles in two days of almost constant fighting. The aggressiveness and skill displayed during the attack, especially by "A" Company, played a major part in the success of the brigade's attack. The 1st Battalion, 15th Panzer Grenadier Regiment,[54] had held the advantage of height and observation, and although the Seaforths were well supported by tanks and artillery, the ultimate push was primarily an infantry affair. Lt-Col. Hoffmeister was awarded the Distinguished Service Order for his extremely capable handling of his battalion, but he would probably be the first to admit that his award represented a recognition of battalion achievement in the field.

The Pipes and Drums had always been the pride of the Seaforths and there were times when only the pipes could express the feelings of the battalion. Such was the case at Agira. Since they had landed, the pipers and drummers had been used for a variety of tasks from "mule skinners" to helping with the numerous jobs behind the lines which were vital to keep the men at the front supplied. The dry heat of Sicily played havoc with the settings and tensions of both pipes and drums, but when Pipe Major Esson was asked to beat "Retreat" in the Town Square of Agira, he managed to round up the band and have his instruments decently in tune. It was the first time in weeks they had played, but the shrill cry of those Scots tunes never sounded sweeter than in that ancient town. There was pride in every piece, and defiance in every note. There would be times, later, when the pipes would again sound their tunes of glory, but there was something about that "Retreat" played in Agira which would be remembered with particular poignancy by all who were there to hear it.[55]

The Seaforths rested for a few days outside Agira and in this period a fair amount of administrative work had to be done. Reinforcements came up to replace those who had been killed or wounded, and there were a few who had to be sent "down the line" owing to complete battle fatigue. These few would probably always carry with them a sense of frustration for their inability to "take it", for most of these men wanted to carry on but they were simply unable to do so much as their heart may have wished to.[56] There would be

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[54] Belonging to the enemy's 29th Panzer Grenadier Division.

[55] The "Retreat" was rebroadcast to the world by the B.B.C.

[56] As one officer noted later: "The long, hot marches, the lack of water and

others in this category as the war went on, but it was felt—and rightly so—that their service behind the line was better than trying to keep them at the front where their actions under fire might endanger not only themselves but their comrades.

There was one temporary change made in the battalion at this time which bears notice. The Intelligence Section was enlarged by some thirty men drawn from the rifle companies. These men, moreover, rode horses—"liberated" from the Sicilians. As has been indicated, owing partly to the shortage of vehicles in the first two weeks of the campaign and owing, too, to the rugged terrain of the country, Sicilian mules and donkeys had been pressed into service to help carry the unit's heavy weapons and ammunition. These animals, properly handled and loaded, saved a great deal of back-breaking labour and could be most useful. They could also be stubborn, ornery, stupid, single-minded and destructive. The language sometimes directed towards them was colourful and heated, but usually it was difficult to inspire in them a sense of urgency, much less patriotism to the Canadian cause. The horses, however were far more tractable, and the idea of having mounted scouts out beyond the infantry had at least a measure of justification on a temporary basis.

While the Seaforths rested at Agira, there was no let up in the drive eastward towards Adrano at the foot of Mount Etna. To the north the Americans had taken Nicosia while to the south the British were pushing steadily on towards Catania. Several days before Agira had been captured, Benito Mussolini had been forced to resign and there was considerable expectation for some time that Italy might withdraw from the war before additional German legions came over the mountains to reinforce the tottering Fascist regime. If Italian resistance was crumbling, German resistance was not, and certainly by this time the Canadians were well aware of how stubborn and skilful the enemy could be to dislodge from the seemingly endless hills which stretched eastward from Agira to Regalbuto and on to Adrano.

The initial attack east of Agira was started on 29 July by the Malta Brigade, temporarily under the command of the 1st Canadian Infantry Division. About a mile from Regalbuto they bumped into

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food were of the greatest significance. Those who went 'down the line' really were completely exhausted from physical effort as much as anything else." (Letter, Col. J. F. McLean to author, 2 June 1967.)

enemy units from the Hermann Göring Division as well as the 3rd Parachute Regiment. While the Malta Brigade and the 1st Canadian Brigade were engaged in the battle for Regalbuto and its surrounding hills, the divisional commander decided to use the 2nd Brigade to probe into the hilly country north of the town between the Salso and Troina Rivers. "The terrain over which the 2nd Brigade was now to operate," wrote the official war historian, "was unsurpassed in difficulty by any that had gone before."[57] It was in this general area that the Seaforth Highlanders would fight its last action in Sicily.

In the battalion certain signs could be noticed of coming action which, in time, the veterans could read like a sailor watching the sky could foretell a storm. The Commanding Offier and his adjutant or intelligence officer hustling off in a jeep for an "O" Group at Brigade Headquarters was a warning to everyone that action was close. On 2 and 3 August Lt-Col. Hoffmeister attended several of these conferences, and late in the afternoon of the 3rd the battalion officers were given their orders while preparations were made to move under cover of darkness on the night of the 3rd and 4th. The task given the battalion was both simple and difficult. In the craggy hills which filled the pie-shaped wedge where the Salso River met the Troina the enemy had formed a block protecting the flank of Adrano. The brigade plan called for the Edmontons and Seaforths to flush them out, and so open the route overland to Adrano which was an important point on his "Etna Line".

For the first several miles the Seaforths were carried by T.C.Vs., a unique and welcome experience for everyone since up to this point, with few exceptions, the men had always marched. A dirt road, which came to an end about a mile and a half north of Regalbuto, brought the unit within a mile of the Salso. At this point the companies debussed and began to march to the dried-up Salso and along the river valley for a mile or so and then swung north into the range of craggy hills. To the left the Seaforths had the Edmontons facing a task similar to their own. Of more direct concern, however, was how far they themselves could get to their own objective under cover of darkness, for it would probably be some time before the unit's heavier weapons would be able to get forward. At Brigade Headquarters Brigadier Vokes was equally anxious, and as the messages came in

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[57] Nicholson, *op. cit.*, p. 153.

showing the progress of both units towards their objective, he must have felt relieved when, at daybreak, both the Edmontons and Seaforths had travelled three quarters of the way from their assembly points to their objectives meeting only occasional sniper fire en-route.[58]

The Seaforths' first objective was a high hill four miles north-east of Regalbuto, and by 0630 hours the leading company, "A", had secured a good foothold half way up the hill. By this time, however, the sun was well up heralding the beginning of another blazing hot day. Once again the leading elements found themselves under enemy observation without the help of the unit's mortars, and having to fight their way forward by sections infiltrating into the enemy's positions. "C" Squadron of the 12th Army Tank Regiment soon came up, however, and with its help most of "C" and "A" Company managed to get on top of their objective before nine in the morning.

For the rest of the morning and during the early afternoon the Seaforths were busy consolidating their positions, trying to get their mortars forward, and probably wondering why those bare, desert-like, sun-baked hills were so important. The periodic sounds of war on the flanks gave some indication of the progress of the Edmontons, but it was extremely difficult to figure out who was on which craggy summit, and poor maps made it very hard to determine where one's own troops were. Indeed, on one occasion the Seaforths had taken some pot shots at "the Eddies" thinking they were Germans, and this error was the more easily acceptable since there were Germans on top of that hill as well as Canadians. No food or water was available to the forward companies until late afternoon, but this could have been much easier to accept had not the platoons had to stay out in the sun crouched among the rocks for protection from periodic enemy mortar fire.[59]

Once the first objective was thoroughly secure, Lt-Col. Hoffmeister, who was forward with the companies during the entire day, ordered "B" company[60] to capture the second objective, another high

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[58] W.D., H.Q., 2 Cdn. Inf. Bde., August, 1943, Appendix I: Intelligence Log, 4 Aug 1943.

[59] *Ibid.*, 4 August 1943, Serials 20, 23, 29, 45; and W.D., Seaforth Highlanders of Canada, 4 August 1943. To the south the men could hear the R.C.E. bulldozers making a road where none existed before.

[60] "B" Company was now commanded by Captain W. G. Harris.

hill about a mile and a half to the east. It lay immediately on the other side of the Troina, and its seizure, conforming with the swing of the brigade's thrust to the east, would result in the brigade dominating one of the two main roads leading north from Adrano. "B" Company sent out a strong patrol at 1800 hours and captured its objective two hours later with a loss of only one killed and one wounded.

The capture of this position, originally designated for the Princess Patricias,[61] put the brigade in a good position for exploitation eastward through the Salso valley towards Adrano. The Royal Canadian Engineers had done an exceptionally fine job in creating roads where roads had not existed before. This had allowed tanks from the Three Rivers Regiment to come up and support the Seaforths and Edmontons during the day. The Salso Valley offered the possibility of a bold armoured rush towards Adrano, the Corps objective, which both the divisional and brigade commander appreciated.[62] Plans were immediately made to take the bold course, and the Seaforths were to be involved in it.

At the time "B" Company was completing its task the Intelligence Officer, Lt. J. J. Conway, had gone to brigade headquarters to get the latest information on the progress of the brigade front. Two hours later he returned to inform the Commanding Officer that the Seaforths were to be prepared to move off at six the following morning. Hoffmeister at that time was up with "A" Company which was being shelled and expecting a counter-attack. Communications had been poor all day, so a battalion runner was sent. He records the incident as follows:

> That evening the signal sergeant gave me a message. He said "see that rock". It was an outcropping. " 'A' Coy. is up there, so is the colonel. Take this message to him. If you can't make it or you get caught, eat it." On the way I met a wild-eyed Canadian. He put his gun on me. He had a pistol. I talked him out of shooting me. He seemed disappointed that I wasn't a German. We went together. When darkness covered the crazy up-and-down countryside we could see shells bursting. They looked like flowers blooming and fading all in a second. The red hot metal cooled

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[61] When the Princess Patricias came up about an hour later the Seaforths were able to hand them their objective on a plate, so to speak.

[62] Nicholson, *op. cit.*, pp. 158-9. The brigade's original line of attack lay through the mountainous country.

before it came back to earth. "Hoffy" came back with us about midnight. He was tired.[63]

Tired as he was, the Commanding Officer had to go to an "O" Group held at a farmhouse where he was told that at six the same morning (5 August) the Seaforths and the tanks of the Three Rivers Regiment commanded by Lt-Col. Booth would "marry up" at the junction of the Troina and Salso Rivers, and strike towards Adrano. When the plan was explained Hoffmeister returned to the unit where his company commanders had been called together to receive their instructions. The plan was simple, but preparations for it were difficult. The companies had to be withdrawn from their perches in the rocky hills and "A" Company was still in close contact with the enemy. Major Bell-Irving had to leave No. 7 Platoon in position under the command of Cpl. Chris McCardle, and for the next two days this small isolated group did a particularly fine job of work under exceptionally trying conditions.[64]

Under the cover of dark the Seaforth companies assembled down by the dry river bed of the Salso where they were almost eaten alive by mosquitoes as they waited for the tanks to come up. The delay, caused by the difficulty the tanks encountered crossing over a railway bridge, did permit some last minute briefing, however. The objective of "Booth Force", as the combined infantry-cum-tank group was called, was a high hill two and a half miles to the east overlooking Adrano. Riding on Sherman tanks "C" and "A" Companies, together with the unit's anti-tank guns and mortars, would be rushed down the valley followed by the Commanding Officer himself riding with Lt-Col. Booth's Tactical Headquarters. "B" and "D" Companies were to come behind ready to be used at Lt-Col. Hoffmeister's command. His Tactical Headquarters was nearby, so that if the battle became stationary, he could easily assume control of the battalion from either headquarters. Moreover, the company and squadron commanders were in close communication, so that the battle which ensued watched, incidentally, by the British Prime Minister from

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[63] McKay Journal, *op. cit.*, p. 4. Hoffmeister was also sick as well as tired.

[64] "During the action in this area, No. 7 Platoon of the Seaforths showed extreme devotion to duty by remaining in a position they were ordered to for 48 hrs without food or water and in continuous action, with the aid of our tanks, against German infantry." W.D., The Three Rivers Regiment, 4 August 1943.

Centuripe, turned out to be a classic example of exploitation, speed and co-operation.

The attack was about two hours late getting started,[65] but when the Shermans moved out of the orange grove where they had picked up the Seaforths, things went surprisingly well. Vineyards and orchards in the valley gave some cover to the advance, and as the Seaforths clung grimly to the tanks their eyes scanned the hills which loomed up on their left. Ahead of them, and out of sight, were the carriers of a squadron of Princess Louise's Dragoon Guards headed for the tiny village of Carcaci. At the village they were to meet the leading elements of the 78th (British) Infantry Division coming up from the south, but as far as the Seaforth Highlanders were concerned the "Plugs" were too far to the right to have any effect on the battle on their own front.[66]

"C" Company, commanded by Major Blair, lead the Highlanders into the valley closely followed by part of Bell-Irving's "A" Company. Mounted on the 32-ton Shermans, the combined attack crashed its way forward for a little over a mile before it came under enemy fire when it left the protection of the orange and lemon groves which initially gave it some protection from direct enemy fire. At this point,—and it was around 1100 hours—the squadron carrying "C" Company was stopped by a cement-lined flume filled with water which the infantry could and did wade through. Blair's platoons dismounted and made for the prominent hill which was their objective, supported by the fire from the tanks. With two platoons forward and one behind with Company Headquarters in the centre, "C" Company began to assault up the hill which, it was found out later, was part of the defensive positions of the German 3rd Parachute Regiment with a few elements of the Hermann Göring Division.

The enemy evidently was not expecting tanks, but he was especially good at holding his fire until he could create the maximum amount of damage. Thus from the time the company started up the hill they were subjected to an ever increasing amount of mortar and machine-gun fire. Some of the latter included tracer bullets, and

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[65] The difficulty encountered by the reconnaissance squadron's carriers (which were to act as a forward screen) and the Sherman tanks crossing the single available bridge took more time than was estimated.

[66] The reconnaisance squadron did send word back indicating, but not asserting, that the battalion objective was "probably" unoccupied.

soon grass and brush fires were started which added to the "fog of battle" as well as the discomfort of the Seaforths.

About half way up the hill the leading platoon came upon a group of farm buildings. The platoon reached the buildings but once there exceptionally heavy fire from the enemy located behind a stone wall about 150 yards further up the hill momentarily pinned them down. Major Blair then ordered that the leading platoon—at this time commanded by a corporal—circle around the enemy position using a gully on the left which promised both protection from enemy view and fire. Meanwhile the following platoon, commanded by Lt. J. F. McLean, was to swing to the right. No sooner had this action started when, after a stream of machine-gun fire and grenades hit the farm buildings, a few of the enemy dashed down into the farm buildings and seized the company commander who was temporarily alone as his leading platoons were occupied with the pincer movement.[67]

One of these platoons was led by Lt. J. F. McLean. It had had a hard time and had suffered a number of casualties, including Sgt. J. C. Poole who was killed. Shortly afterwards Lt. McLean was shot in the shoulder, and as he lay in a rocky crevice he was hit again by tracer bullets which burned off part of his clothes. Later he was evacuated by a Jeep ambulance, and at the R.A.P. the Medical Officer, Captain Ken MacDonald, enquired about the casualties. When told that there were still many out on the side of the hill, Captain MacDonald set out himself to tend to them. He was killed by a sniper while tending Pte. W. T. Broad of "C" Company.[68] His was a sad loss to the battalion who knew and respected him as a man who hated war and time and again went beyond the call of duty to tend and care for the wounded. His Medical Staff insisted on carrying him to his grave which they dug in an orange grove, where the padre gave a sad farewell to his close friend.

When the leading platoon of "C" Company had started up the slope to the objective, company headquarters was some little distance behind. It had been pinned down by very heavy machine-gun fire

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[67] Interview with Major J. W. Blair, April, 1967. For a while it was thought Blair had been killed. Later a German corporal was captured with some of his effects, and later information confirmed he was captured.

[68] This sniper claimed at least six men in the unit in the area near the irrigation flume where "C" Company first debussed from the tanks.

and the company wireless set put out of action. Major Blair, concerned about his leading platoons, decided to make his way forward to be in closer contact with them. When he did not return the Company Sergeant-Major, R. M. Black,

> sent out men to try and contact our forward platoons. They were unable to do so . . . and as I was unable to make contact with anyone, I decided to advance.
>
> As I remember, we [company headquarters] were about 2,000 yards from our objective and away ahead was a wide valley without any cover. I picked out a spot about 300 yards ahead which looked as though it might offer some cover, and I led off with the rest of company headquarters strung out behind me. There was no heavy armament being used against us, other than rifle and machine-gun fire which was coming from both sides. However we made our initial objective with only one casualty, a young runner who had only joined the company some two weeks prior to this engagement. Our objective was a depression about three feet deep by about twelve feet in diameter filled with cactus apples or pears. I have always been fast on my feet, but I was told by Corporal Elaschuk, of "A" Company, who was on a slight rise to our left, that he never saw a man travel so fast in his life as I did with bullets striking behind my heels all the way to our shelter.
>
> Enemy fire was still pretty heavy all this time and we stayed in our shelter for an hour. . . . Our wireless set was still dead although the signaller, Robinson, worked like a Trojan to get it operative without results. The heat was terrible and we had no water and we ate the cactus apple-pears which supplied both food and drink. (I had spines in my tongue and lip for days afterwards.) I decided that we couldn't stay there forever, and as the enemy seemed to be pretty well engaged on our left, we proceeded by leaps and bounds towards our original objective, hoping to meet up with the rest of the company. We came across an irrigation ditch where we took shelter for awhile and where we met up with L/Sgt. Pete De Ruiter and his section from our company. He told me that Lt. J. McLean had been wounded but he didn't know where the rest of the company was. There were some men from "A" Company in the ditch at this time and as they moved off, we proceeded by devious means to the base of this hill and made our way to the summit forcing the enemy down the other side.
>
> We then consolidated our position and when I counted noses there were 17 all ranks present. I can remember very vividly looking down the slope we had just come up and seeing Padre Durnford making his way up the hill using a shepherd's crook to propel himself.[69]

When "C" Company had started up the slope of its objective, some of the men, by looking to the right, could see "A" Company swing left over the Adrano-Troina road as they started up the slopes

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[69] Letter Mr. R. M. Black to author, 3 June 1967.

of the hill on the extreme right. Lt-Col. Hoffmeister had ordered his second company in to reinforce "C" Company's initial success on the southern slope. After getting through a cactus hedge this company began their advance with the help of the Sherman tanks who were able to give them remarkably good fire support over open sights. Wireless communication in this battle worked better than in any other action in which the Seaforths had fought, and this, together with the close and accurate tank support, accounts in large measure for the Seaforths' success in assaulting up a hill where a well trained enemy was ready and waiting. It was a classic example of the tanks "shooting" the Seaforths onto their objective.

When "A" Company swung into the attack it was very weak in numbers. One platoon had been left behind guarding the previous day's objective. A second platoon had not received the word to storm up the hill, and Major Bell-Irving was not the man to wait about to count his chickens. In essence his company attack was composed of one platoon and company headquarters. Moreover, although the tanks gave very good support, it was an infantry battle on those burning slopes, with rifle, grenades and machine guns the principal weapons. One of the privates in "A" Company's No. 8 platoon recalls something of the scene towards the end of the day.

> After fighting all day we finally got to the top, and just over a crest facing Adrano was a ledge down about 50 feet. This was a German Paratroop Headquarters. In the roof of this little building and in the corner facing the crest there were holes cut so they could fire at us as we came over the crest and down to them. These holes proved just as valuable to us as our Bren gunner, Hans Anderson, emptied a magazine into each of the three holes. You can imagine what it would be like in a stone house with all those .303's bouncing off the walls. There were three badly wounded paratroopers in there as a result of this. The rest of the paratroopers surrendered around the house and if I remember correctly there were about 20 of them. Major Bell-Irving . . . put a note on one of the wounded prisoners asking for the best medical attention for him as he considered him a very brave man. These wounded Germans were carried out of there the next morning in large circular grain sifters.[70]

Before the day was over, "A" Company captured four enemy machine guns on the ridge.

Something of the type of close quarter fighting may be discerned from the citations of A/Cpls. G. L. McParlon and R. J. P. Dono-

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[70] Letter C. A. Rivers to author, 6 July 1967.

hue. About 1130 hours McParlon was ordered to lead his section around the right flank of the enemy to act as a cut-off. He and his section had gone only 300 yards when an enemy mahine-gun post opened fire on them wounding McParlon in the leg and back. He ordered his section to give him covering fire and carried on with his advance. He was seen by A/Cpl. Donohue whose own section was pinned down. Donohue turned his section over to a senior soldier, took a Bren gun and pouches and went over to help McParlon in his lonely advance. Together they crawled 500 yards under fire towards the post, and then, one firing his Bren and the other a Tommy gun, blazed away at murderous range at the enemy's position clearing it out and permitting the company to advance.[71] In this way both companies fought their way up the hill which was contested every foot.

By this time "D" Company had been committed on "A" Company's left. Captain E. W. Thomas and his men were the third company to come up on the Shermans. By that time the battle was well joined, and "D" company was given such a warm reception even before it was sent in to reinforce the two leading companies it was pinned down by heavy fire. Once again tank fire from the supporting troops of the Three Rivers Regiment allowed it to get forward,[72] and the three platoons began their advance up the objective under fairly constant fire from an enemy who always had the advantage of height and observation.

The fight to gain the ridge was particularly difficult. Once pushed from the crest the enemy knew only too well that the tables would be reversed, for then the Seaforths would have the advantage. They might be exposed to German fire from positions further to the north, but that was better than being hammered from enemy posts only a few hundred yards away. One of "D" Company's N.C.Os., Cpl. D. Hadden, was instrumental in pushing the German defenders over the crest. Advancing up the rocky, bare slope two of Hadden's men were hit. He dispersed his section to give him covering fire and, taking the Bren gun, he worked his way up some 700 yards, keeping the enemy under fire any time they showed their heads, and so bringing his section forward. Continuing on alone he

[71] Both men were awarded a well deserved Military Medal.

[72] Directorate of History, File: "Account by Lt-Col. B. M. Hoffmeister . . . given on 19 August 43. . . ."

reached grenade range and lobbed five grenades into the enemy post which his section then assaulted at the point of a bayonet.[73] This charge routed the enemy, and added to the Seaforths' bag of prisoners which included, incidentally, a German Medical Officer.

There are numerous other events which occurred during this battle, in fact too many to record. Major Bell-Irving, on reaching the crest, remembers his batman apologizing to him for being so "stupid" as to have his arm almost shot off which prevented him from using his weapon. Then there was the tragic incident when Captain Money, commanding the anti-tank platoon, made a wrong turn on the road on his motorcycle and drove into the enemy's front line where he was taken prisoner. Few will forget Captain F. C. Hall who was wounded but ordered his men on, saying he was all right even though his wounds were fatal. Others will remember some of the captured German paratroopers who found it impossible to mask their fear that they would be shot. However, the Seaforths and paratroopers were soon mingling and sat around smoking each others cigarettes, looking at each others' family pictures and sharing what little water was available.

By mid-afternoon the forward companies were consolidating their areas and digging in. Early in the evening contact was made with the Princess Patricias who had come along the valley and were to swing directly north to capture Mount Seggio. Further to the west, the Edmonton Regiment had swung north into the hills also and were having a hard job to unseat the enemy on Mount Revisotto. To the south, the 78th Division had crossed the deep gully through which ran the Salso River. To the east, across the Simento River Valley, Adrano, on the slope of Mount Etna, remained in enemy hands, which meant that the Seaforths and the tanks of the Three Rivers Regiment continued to receive unwelcome attention from the enemy's mortars and artillery.

A private in the Seaforths remembers the scene vividly.

> On the evening of the day of our last battle, "Hoffy" came up and stood amongst us right at the top of the mountain. Here we watched another unit go across the valley towards Etna . . . . The unit got well out into the open and then "Jerry" threw his ".88's" and mortars at them. You could see them dropping and hear them yelling, and old "Hoffy's"

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[73] Hadden was awarded the Distinguished Conduct Medal for his leadership and personal bravery.

> eyes filled up and he said "Who the hell ever sent those men across there?" . . . It was quite a sight to see these men going in, and to see the artillery hitting Etna from three sides, the odd plane buzzing Etna, and the smoke coming from the volcano. . . .[74]

Throughout the day, it should be added, those who were sometimes thought of as being "behind the lines" were hit by enemy fire as his mortars lobbed bombs into the orange groves and along the roads, hoping to strike some target of opportunity. Located well forward as they were of the body of the brigade, those in the "rear" later recalled close misses. The difficulty encountered getting the vehicles forward during the day may account in some measure for the comparatively few casualties among the Support Company's platoons. As it was, it was ten at night before the rations could get forward and no sub-unit was happier to receive food than "B" Company. It had had no food for 48 hours.[75]

That evening the Seaforths sent out patrols, but during the 6th the battalion was instructed to hold tightly to its position where it acted as a firm base for the Patricia's attack to the north and as a guard to the left flank of the 78th Division's attack on Adrano. By the evening of the 6th the 2nd Brigade's objectives had been seized, and on the following day Adrano, which in its thousand year existence had been besieged by Romans, Normans and Saracens, fell to the British.

This was the last battle the Seaforths had in Sicily. On the 6th, as the companies clambered wearily down the slopes up which they had fought a day earlier, the welcome news reached them that the brigade was going into rest. Nothing, absolutely nothing, was more welcome than this.

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[74] Rivers, *op. cit.*

[75] W.D., Seaforth Highlanders of Canada, 5 August 1943.

CHAPTER VII

Southern Italy

When the Seaforth Highlanders were told to withdraw from the Adrano front they had been in action almost continuously for a month. In many ways it was a far different battalion from the one which had landed on D-Day on 10 July. The difference was not so much in changes of personnel, although the some 150 casualties it had suffered had brought many new faces to the unit. Rather it was a change in attitude, in ability and in the *savoir faire* of warfare which distinguishes a veteran battalion even from a well-trained battalion. Training, no matter how hard or how thorough, tends to be "by the book." Battle drill, with all its noise and fury, taught many sound lessons and basic tactics which were found to be good. But nothing can make a soldier dig a slit-trench like shell or mortar fire, especially when each shell or bomb whooshing through the air seems about to land in one's back pocket. Similarly a soldier in action soon develops a sixth sense about the ground—what will provide cover, what will expose him, and where the enemy is likely to be holed up waiting for him. The Seaforths had much more to learn before they were through. In a way, this was only the opening chapter of a book. But a month's experience was to serve them well in the battles yet to come, for they emerged a wiser, harder and more assured group from the Sicilian campaign than many would have thought possible when they were still in Great Britain.

As the Seaforths, and indeed the entire Canadian division, were in the process of turning over their front to the British 78th Division, the Germans were planning to evacuate their forty or fifty thousand

troops from Sicily.[1] As usual, topography favoured their withdrawal to Messina, for as they retreated through the mountains their front contracted, allowing them to hold an ever shortening line which permitted them to send their troops to the mainland while holding off the British-American forces attempting to destroy them. On 17 August Messina itself fell, and by the 18th Sicily was completely in Allied hands.

By this time the Seaforth Highlanders of Canada were in an area which was generally known as "Happy Valley." The battalion had moved there on the 10th by T.C.Vs. (Troop Carrying Vehicles), passing through Regalbuto and Agira and then south near Militello. This rest area was "a regular Garden of Eden."[2] It was situated in an irrigated valley, green with orange, lemon, almond and other orchards, and running through it was a delightful, clear, ice-cold stream which fed three irrigation reservoirs large enough to form swimming pools. There were plenty of apples, oranges, figs, lemons, tomatoes, and grapes in the area, and the local peasants seemed to have ample wine to sell. They were not as interested in the freshly minted A.M.G.[3] lire as they were in bartering their wares. Cigarettes, salt, shoes, soap, socks, chocolate—indeed almost any article the soldier might have to eat or wear—found a ready market with the Sicilians. To observe a Seaforth and a Sicilian haggling over six eggs, for example, was a never-to-be-forgotten and often hilarious sight, and the haggling that went on would have received approving nods in any Turkish market place.

August, with its intense heat and high incidence of malaria and dysentery, made the shady fields of the valley all the more pleasant. With a little ingenuity showers were constructed using bamboo plumbing. The local "swimming pools" were widely used, but more pleasant was a swimming parade to one of the Sicilian beaches for the few who managed to go. There, as one platoon commander wrote at the time, "the water is warm . . ., decidedly blue and crystal clear. We go in à la Adam and sunbathe afterwards."[4]

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[1] Lt-Col. G. W. L. Nicholson, *Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War, Vol II, The Canadians in Italy*. Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1956, pp. 168-69 *et seq.*

[2] Personal diary, Captain B. G. Parker, 12 August 1943.

[3] A.M.G.—Allied Military Government.

[4] Seaforth Archives, Melhuish letters, Lt. Melhuish to his family, 8 August 1943.

The hot, blazing sun which seemed to come up over the horizon with amazing swiftness also had an effect on the training schedule. Usually the pipers would play "Johnnie Cope" up and down the lines about 0530 hours, and as if to accompany them the Sicilian donkeys in the fields would bray long and loud. After breakfast there would be a morning parade from seven to ten and an evening parade from 1930 to 2230 hours. Training was not intense. There was some field firing on make-shift ranges, a considerable emphasis on the training of snipers and other specialists, and strong pressure was brought to bear on the soldiers' drill and military courtesy. A/R.S.M. Black, who took over from R.S.M. R. H. W. Ireland[5] in this period, came into his own and, since the unit had several distinguished visitors to prepare for, he had his work cut out for him.

For the most part "Happy Valley" was a place for rest and recuperation. There was a welcome change to three meals a day after weeks of living on "compo" rations; there was the cheerful sight of "Postie" Sinclair with his top hat sorting out mail which was long overdue; and in the evening the "Sally Ann" supervisor, H. E. Newing, usually had a film to show out-of-doors once the sun dipped over the hills. There was also considerable emphasis placed on sports on a company, battalion and brigade level. At such meets the "Sally Ann" was on hand again with tea, lemonade, grapes, chocolate bars and frequently cigarettes to supplement the generous amount which the regiment's Women's Auxiliary sent from Canada for general distribution.

The nearest town was Militello, and here, every day, a 36-man guard would parade with the Pipes and Drums to perform a changing of the guard ceremony. These ceremonies usually attracted considerable attention and the piping and drumming drew favourable comments. Now and then, however, the local townspeople could put on quite a fair show themselves, especially on the day of their patron saint which brought out the entire town with priests, bands, bells, donkeys, litters and gaudy "floats."

During the three-week stay in the area, there are certain days which will stand out especially in the memory of the Seaforths for one reason or another. The first, perhaps, was the visit of the Eighth

[5] Ireland was one of the youngest R.S.Ms. in the army. He left at this time to try for his commission, which he gained some months later. Black had been an N.C.O. in the pre-war years.

Army Commander, General B. L. Montgomery. Some of the Seaforths remembered him from England, but since that time his leadership of the Eighth Army across North Africa had made him the most widely known general in the British Army. "Monty," as he was usually termed, arrived on 20 August to inspect the brigade. After a hot climb up the 1,000-foot hill to the Edmontons' area where the brigade was assembled, "Monty," carrying a horsetail fly switch instead of a swagger stick, had all ranks gather round his car. He exuded confidence, paid many compliments to the Canadians and welcomed them warmly to his command. As one Seaforth private wrote later:

> He said Canadians did well, but if we wanted to get back to Canada, win the V.C. Also he said in part, 'I never fight when I am anxious!' Thereafter for a while one would hear one soldier to another 'I am not anxious.' It didn't last like the word 'Gowdeck' for the term "Cuidich'n Righ" that began back in England.[6]

"Monty's" visit, followed by a visit from Lt-Gen. A. G. L. McNaughton two days later, caused a considerable stir, but one of the most interesting events which everyone who was there will remember took place on 25 August when the 2nd, 5th and 6th Battalions of the Seaforth Highlanders and the Seaforth Highlanders of Canada gathered together in a lively and remarkable meeting of the clan in the Italian Theatre. Ever since it was known that four battalions of Seaforths were in Sicily there was a general desire to get together but the problems were too numerous until the fighting was over. Once Sicily was liberated plans were laid. Fortunately the 6th Battalion's officer's were located in a large house on the estate of an Italian baron which had plenty of garden and open space around it. The Sergeants' Mess was a long rectangular terrace with a wall around it. For the Retreat by the massed Pipes and Drums, the local Catania Stadium was appropriated. At 1630 hours everything was ready. Forty-one pipers and twenty-two drummers marched in a kilted phalanx down through the streets of Catania lined with Seaforths from all the battalions and with civilians who gaped at a spectacle they had never seen before. Although the combined bands

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[6] Seaforth Archives, Journal of Pte. McKay, A. J., p. 5. The term 'Gowdeck' (or sometimes Cuidich'n) apparently caught on when a Seaforth, when asked what his motto was, could not remember or perhaps pronounce the Gaelic and he replied 'Gowdeck'. The word caught on, and even today one Seaforth will refer to another as a 'Gowdeck' or 'Gowdiek'.

had had time for only one rehearsal, the Retreat itself was excellent. It started with "I Hae a Wife O' My Ain" and "The Highland Brigade at Magersfontein," proceeded to such marches as the "Atholl and Breadalbane Gathering" and ended with the Seaforth March Past "Caber Feidh."

After the Retreat the officers and sergeants were entertained at the home of the 6th Battalion where a magnificent table had been spread and a quantity of drink, more than sufficient even for such a gathering![7] There was intermittent piping, community singing, visits between officers' and sergeants' messes, and a great deal of fun which left a pleasant glow for a long time thereafter.[8] As one Seaforth wrote later:

> Imagine us in desert shirt and kilt, all brown as berries, partaking of food and drink which had been gathered in by our Scottish friends at great expense and trouble, at two casas perched on the slopes of Mt. Aetna under the light of Japanese lanterns (of all things)! From the time of our arrival until about 4:30 the next morning the air was filled with pipe-music, talk (ribald and other) and attendant noises both on-stage and off-stage. We had taken along our safari beds and bed-rolls and managed to steal a spell of sleep before we piled into vehicles suffering agonizing pains of hangovers, and made our way back to the cool confines of Happy Valley.[9]

There were other days to remember in Happy Valley. On 28 August, for example, the battalion won the brigade sports meet, and another memorable day was Sunday, the 29th, when Padre Durnford gave such a fiery sermon on taking the Lord's name in vain and the use of profanity that he shocked his Seaforth congregation to such an extent that there was a decided curbing of four-letter words for quite some time. There was no man in the battalion who was so well liked and respected as Captain Durnford, and every man was well aware that, no matter how hot the action or how exposed the position, he would somehow make an appearance bringing with him

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[7] The last time a similar gathering had taken place was in the Summer of 1918 when the 72nd Battalion, C.E.F. had joined with the 2nd Battalion, the Seaforth Highlanders.

[8] W.D., Seaforth Highlanders of Canada, August, 1943, Appendix No. 7: "Seaforth Reunion."

[9] Lt-Col. J. D. Forin. The Seaforths had earlier made contact with "The City of Windsor" Squadron located at an airfield some miles away. This squadron of the Desert Air Force was composed of Canadians, and numerous pleasant visits were exchanged between the two.

cigarettes for the living, comfort for the dying and a cheerful word for the wounded. Of the more than 150 casualties the unit had suffered during the Sicilian campaign, some sixty had been killed and there were few times when a soldier was buried that Durnford was not there seeing that he received a Christian burial.

These casualties had resulted in a large number of reinforcements joining the battalion during August. Among them were Lts. K. G. McBride, J. O. Moxon, R. W. Bonner, W. D. Reid, K. W. Reed, D. L. Barrett-Lennard, D. C. Rhodes, L. W. Leckie and D. M. Owen, together with a small group of men who had been left in Scotland in June. Captain W. H. Sutherland, the new medical officer,[10] replaced Captain MacDonald who was killed in the Salso Valley. There was a considerable reshuffling of appointments. Major H. P. Bell-Irving continued in command of "A" Company, with Captain D. Harris, A/Major S. W. Thomson and Captain J. McMullen in charge of "B", "C" and "D" Companies respectively. Captain Don Newsom commanded Support Company, while Captains E. F. Anderson and K. S. Murdoch replaced Captain J. H. Gowan and Lt. J. J. Conway as Adjutant and Intelligence Officer when the latter two went to Brigade Headquarters as Staff Officer and Liaison Officer. By the end of the month most of the reshuffling had been completed, and by the end of August too the battalion was ready to move once again.

Well over two months previously at the "Trident" conference in Washington, the Allied leaders had met to discuss the future use of the British and American forces after Sicily had been conquered. It was realized that the creation of a Second Front—that is, a landing on the coast of France—was not possible in 1943. The British thought it would be advisable to knock out Italy, and to threaten a landing in Southern France or Yugoslavia until arrangements were prepared for the major blow. The Americans, on the other hand, were fearful of any dissipation of forces or energy which might delay or weaken the cross channel assault. After considerable discussion an agreement was reached to continue the attack against Italy, but it was also understood that the size of the force used, together with the reinforcements and support given, would be limited and secondary to the main attack planned on Normandy for 1944.

During July, as the Sicilian campaign made rapid progress, and

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[10] For a short interim period Captain Cohen was the unit MO.

as Mussolini lost the control he had had for two decades over the Italian people, final plans were made which envisaged the Eighth Army landing in Calabria and, shortly thereafter, the Fifth Army making a landing in the Gulf of Salerno with the object of capturing Naples and expanding the front to meet the Eighth Army advancing up the centre and eastern side of the Italian boot. The 13th Corps of the Eighth Army was to cross the Strait of Messina from Sicily on 3 September with the 5th (British) Infantry Division on the left and the 1st Canadian Infantry Division on the right. Leading the Canadians would be the 3rd Brigade, with the remaining brigades prepared to follow them up rapidly as quickly as landing craft were available.

On 1 September the Seaforths began the now familiar task of dividing, amoeba-like, into two major sections—the larger fighting group and the smaller "B" echelon which would carry the cooks, clerks, quartermaster stores, etc., over to the mainland once the area was cleared. After kitbags were turned in and the companies stripped to assault scales, the battalion was transported to Riposta on the eastern side of Sicily, and on the following day, 3 September, Lt-Col. Hoffmeister held an "O" Group during which he informed his officers that the unit would be sailing from a small port near Messina shortly after midnight. The drive up the coast road that afternoon was a pleasant one. As one officer wrote:

> It was a wonderful tour as the best part of the Island is on this easterly coastline. It reminded me of the Chuckanut Drive and of West Vancouver's Marine Drive, the road winding and twisting along the shore, with great heights behind, villas perched on the sides, and the most wonderful stretches of white sand; old castles and look-outs here and there, orange and lemon groves and vineyards, jagged coasts in places, the odd sailing boat and much of interest.[11]

The move across the Strait went smoothly and comfortably. Early in the morning, as the sun's rays were lighting up the mountains of Sicily, the white city of Messina was left behind and, after a short trip in the broad daylight, the Seaforths landed in Italy. As the unit marched through Reggio Calabria, badly bombed and mauled by Allied air power, the Seaforths noted that here, as on the Island, the people seemed terribly poor, with many going barefoot or with rags around their feet. The begging cries of "cigaretto," "biscato" or

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[11] Melhuish letters, *op. cit.*, 5 September 1943.

"chocolato" from children and adults alike was both familiar and tiresome, but more important than these sights and sounds was the fact that opposition was negligible and the word was to march on.

At four o'clock on the afternoon of the fourth, the Seaforth Highlanders began their advance up the Italian boot which would last for weeks before they came to their first strong line of resistance. After a march of 10 miles by road and eight miles across country—a march which took them steadily up into the mountains along hot, dusty paths—the unit arrived on the evening of the 5th at a former Fascist Youth Camp below Mt. Basilico. No enemy were sighted, but there was a great deal of equipment around the camp which had been converted into a military hospital during the war. Further up the road there were many anti-tank guns and trucks which looked as though they had been strafed by aircraft. During the next several days the battalion continued its approach-to-contact march northward through country reminiscent of the Scottish highlands. Most noticeable was the cooler and damper climate which made the men's tropical uniforms seem especially light. The roads which twisted and turned through the mountains and into forests of oak, beech and walnut trees, were very suited to demolitions, and well placed craters and broken bridge spans not only kept the engineers busy but made it very hard even for jeeps to supply the companies with compo rations. En route the men passed hundreds of Italian soldiers, some in uniform, some partly in civilian clothes, and all looking tired, depressed and, in spite of everything, pleased to be out of the war and anxious to return to their villages. Most noticeable were the straight-backed Italian women carrying heavy loads balanced on their heads while the menfolk came behind sitting on donkeys holding an umbrella to protect them from the sun.

After three days of hard marching, with one battalion in the brigade leapfrogging the other, the pace was beginning to tell and a number of Seaforths had to be picked up by the unit's vehicles. Now and then small groups of Italian soldiers would come in but so far there was no fighting, and the entire division was being pushed hard to upset any plans the enemy might have to form a strong line of defence. Usually the Seaforths would move off on march route in the morning and push up hill, over plateaus and down into valleys until well past midnight, then sleep wherever they stopped. Shortly after they woke up, they would see the Commanding Officer set off for

another "O" Group and know, when he returned, that he brought with him orders for another 15 to 20 mile advance, rain or shine, meals or no meals, along hot, dusty, switchback roads which covered one in a chalk-like substance after 30 minutes on the march. Marching in the dark in a strange territory could be confusing, but there was always some humorist to relieve the weariness, as the following war diary extract for 7 September shows:

> In the dark the leading elements took the wrong trail, which was not surprising as the trails shown on the map in reality turned out to be a confusion of trails spreading in all directions. The C.O., Lt-Col. Hoffmeister, realized we were heading in the wrong direction, halted the Bn. and with Capt. W. S. Thomson went back on a recce. He decided it was too dark and dangerous to proceed any further on the mountain trails. In the meantime the leading Coy. had found the Edmonton Regiment's I.O. [Intelligence Officer] lying in a ravine with a broken leg, the result of a fall from a M.C. [motor cycle]. The Bn. M.O., Capt. W. H. Sutherland, and the R.A.P. staff rendered first aid . . . During the process of placing the Coys. in the dark a complete circle of a field was made, and to the amusement of all a loud voice drifted through the dark exclaiming: 'Put another nickel in the slot, and we will have another go round.'[12]

By the 9th some of the unit's vehicles had caught up to the battalion and there was a welcome issue of blankets as well as a greater assurance of regular meals. Even without issue rations, the Seaforths were good by this time at fending for themselves. One officer described this ability in a letter he wrote home to his parents while on this march:

> . . . The boys are the most amazing scroungers and, while there is no fighting to be done, all their excess energy is directed to 'scoff' for food. They really have things well organized, and it is a pleasure to see 'em at it. Immediately we arrive in an area to 'kip down' for the night, a few dash and get firewood, two others start the fire, a couple more get busy in lining up the eats, someone goes for water, always several beetle around for potatoes or tomatoes, onions or fruit, etc., and that most-sought-after delicacy—eggs. They work like a team and it's a joy to be among and with them.[13]

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[12] Lt. R. W. Bonner wrote later: "the author of that . . . was an unnamed hero in my platoon. . . . I forget precisely what the Colonel or one of his accompanying officers said by way of reply, but it indicated a deep desire to know who the smart-alec was." (Letter, Mr. R. W. Bonner to author, 1 September 1967).

[13] Melhuish letters, *op. cit.*, 22 September 1943. It was not uncommon for a Seaforth to shoot a beef animal with the approval of the owner, leaving a receipt for it signed in the name of Churchill, Montgomery or some other well-known figure.

With over six hundred Seaforths on the march, living off the country, the variety of meals "liberated" must have been remarkable. The brigade Intelligence Officer mentions running into the Seaforth scout and sniper platoon and found them eating fresh beef. Others enjoyed a rabbit stew, or perhaps roast chicken if they were fortunate. By this time news of Italy's surrender was passing around the division, so perhaps the Highlanders felt, as they quietly nabbed a chicken or a pig, that the Italian farmer would really want them to have a feast to celebrate their new alliance. Actually, as the battalion's second in command remembers,

> . . . in the villages and towns along the Calabrian Peninsula the populace exhibited a half-mad feeling of relief at being freed from the yoke of the Fascist regime and that of the German Armed Forces. At night the explosion of hundreds of Italian-type hand grenades which . . . had been left behind in thousands by the Italian army could be heard reverberating through the hills accompanied by the reflection of flashes from these explosions and from Very Lights, or their equivalent, which went up into the sky in hundreds. It was truly a Mardi Gras throughout the whole of the south of Italy. . . .[14]

For three days, from 9-11 September, the Seaforths were permitted to rest in the mountains while arrangements were made to move them north, only this time the unit was to travel in vehicles, some of them Italian with rather carefree Italian drivers, by the coast road. On the 12th, after a short drive down the twisting road to the coast, the blue waters of the Gulf of Taranto come in sight,[15] and it was a relief to all a day or so later to be able to swim in the salt water once again.

The pressure of traffic on the road, coupled with the need to push to the north, gave half the battalion an opportunity to take a brief sea-journey by L.S.I. On the 18th 500 officers and men were packed into two such craft at Trebisacce and had a marvellous dust-free, pleasant journey along the coast while the remainder of the unit bucked traffic, diversions, noise and natives up the coast road to Rotondella. From this point the division was swinging to the northwest up the centre of the Italian boot. Potenza, sixty miles due north,

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[14] Account by Lt-Col. J. D. Forin.

[15] It was at this time too that a small group of Seaforths went a few miles inland from Catanzaro to a village where they accepted the surrender of an entire Italian battalion. It was at Catanzaro that the first decorations were formally awarded to those who had won them in the Sicilian fighting.

was the division's objective, for it was thought it would be a key to the Germans' withdrawal plan from the Salerno front. The 1st and 3rd Brigades were to make every effort to seize the city before the enemy could occupy it in strength. The 2nd Brigade was to be in a reserve role, but was to push on as quickly as it could. What resistance might be met enroute was not known, but there was a general realization that the further one went the greater the likelihood.

By 21 September, after a two-day journey by T.C.Vs. along roads where enemy demolitions were much in evidence, the Seaforths reached Potenza. After passing beyond it several miles the battalion settled in an area where they could hear the rumble of guns in the distance. As if to emphasize the closeness of the enemy, two Messerschmitt fighters made an attack on the brigade area, one of which was shot down.[16]

From Potenza roads radiated out like spokes in a wheel, and patrols were sent out by all the battalions in the brigade, to probe for the enemy and reconnoitre the roads. The Seaforths had not been called upon to perform a great deal of patrol work, but one patrol from "C" Company under Lt. A. L. Robinson deserves special mention. Robinson and some 20 men were ordered to patrol to Baragiano, a small town several miles northwest of Potenza. Having reached Baragiano and found no enemy, Robinson sent his patrol back but kept his runner. From the citizens of Baragiano he had heard various reports of enemy guns and emplacements on the way to Muro and Bella, two towns as far again northwest of Baragiano as the latter was from Potenza. Robinson felt that Lt-Col. Hoffmeister would be interested in these reports, so he decided to push ahead on his own. Something of the spirit of the Seaforths is captured in the report he made when he returned, part of which is as follows:

> After patrol left I contacted Carabinieri H.Q. and arranged for accommodation for night and concealment if enemy patrol should return to investigate. Obtained services of interpreter and arranged to have civilians and farmers in vicinity brought in for questioning.
>
> Gave all information to runner with orders to return to Bn. H.Q. immediately if I did not return by 1900 hrs. It now being 1800 hrs. I proceeded to high ground overlooking Stazione di Baragione and, not being able to see any enemy movement I borrowed an Italian shirt and proceeded down the cliff toward the station. On reaching the vinyard

[16] It was here too that a huge barrel of vino, purchased at one lire a litre, was opened up and the Seaforths had their first "vino parade."

400 yds. from the station I observed enemy soldier approaching from station. Returned to town and found several civilians waiting to be questioned.

Realizing that information re enemy at Stazione di Baragione was not reliable . . . it was decided to dress in civilian clothes, take guide and go to station on morning of 23 Sep. . . . Obtained complete set of civilian clothes, discarded all marks of identification . . . retaining only binoculars and left with guide at 0630 hrs. Proceeded down cliff, crossed river and road and approached Stazione di Baragione from NE. Wandered along talking to civilians and finally reached station. No sign of enemy except tank track. Civilian reported machine gun at white house directly across from station. Walked around house but could not see gun. Believe it was in woodshed. . . . Decided closer investigation would be indiscreet and proceeded to find tank. Guide took covered route thru' orchard to edge of road about 150 yds. behind the station. He pointed out location of tank but was unable to see same. Went to edge of road when burst of machine gun fire disclosed tank immediately. . . . Heard two enemy talking. Tank was against grey stone building under large, lone tree and was heavily covered with freshly cut branches. Guide suggested it would be unwise to return so proceeded towards Bella road to confirm . . . reports re machine guns and anti-tank guns on high ground overlooking road. Got within 400 yds. of road and met two Italian soldiers who advised Germans were shooting at anyone approaching.[17]

This is not the end of Lt. Robinson's report, for not until he was shot at three more times was he finally discouraged from skirting the enemy's defences in civilian dress. Had he been captured, there is no doubt whatever that he would have been shot at once as a spy, and the C.O., although content with the result, told him he "bloody well wouldn't" repeat what he had done.

This is only one incident, but indicative of the resourcefulness of all ranks on many similar isolated patrols and reconnaissances made during this period of fluid operations.[18]

The Seaforths, and indeed the entire 2nd Brigade, remained at Potenza for another week, and while there played a respectable part in the division's sports meet at the huge, modern stadium on the outskirts of Potenza. It was while he was there attending the game on the 29th that Lt-Col. Hoffmeister was informed that he was to take over acting command of the Brigade while Brigadier Vokes took over the command of the division in a similar capacity during

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[17] W.D., Seaforth Highlanders of Canada, September 1944, Appendix I: "Patrol Reports."

[18] At this time there were many reports of German soldiers slipping through Canadian lines dressed as Italian soldiers.

the illness of Major General Simonds. Major J. D. Forin became acting Commanding Officer of the battalion while Major H. P. Bell-Irving took over temporarily as Second-in-Command.[19]

By the time the 2nd Brigade reached Potenza, the American Fifth Army on the left had linked up with the British Eighth Army on its right to form a line across the Italian peninsula from Salerno to Bari. At this time communications and the maintenance of supplies were stretched to the utmost in the Eighth Army, for the rapid drive of over 250 miles across mountains and plains had strained the Army's capabilities to a point where a temporary halt was needed. During the last week of September, German forces, in a fighting retreat, were pushed back on the east to a line running approximately from San Severo to Lucera, and during this time, while he regrouped his forces, Montgomery made plans which would have the 1st Canadian Infantry Division move to the northeast where it would launch an attack from Troia and Lucera towards Vinchiaturo and Campobasso and the line of the Biferno River. Once again the Canadians were to find themselves in the mountains where the defence favoured the enemy. The main thrust along Highway No. 17 was to be made by the 1st and 3rd Brigades while to the south the 2nd Brigade was to strike through the bleak country and protect the division's left flank.

On 1 October the Seaforth Highlanders were en route once again by T.C.V. and by the 2nd it was on the immense Foggia plain which reminded some of the Canadian prairies. On the following day the battalion, together with the other units in the brigade, began to probe its way westward, and on the 4th, as it approached the crossroads about two miles from Foiano di Val Fortore, the leading company reported it was under shell and mortar fire. For the first time in over a month, the Seaforths were about to go into battle once more.

The Seaforths, during the evening of 3-4 October, had been stopped at Castelfranco owing in large part to the thoroughness of the enemy's demolitions along the narrow, winding road which led via Montefalcone to Foiano and thence wriggled and twisted its way northward to the crossroads at Decorata. At first light on the 4th,

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[19] Captain T. C. B. Vance assumed command of "A" Company, vice Major Bell-Irving. The change in command was thought to be temporary at first, but it was confirmed as permanent about two weeks later.

screened by Lt. Gray's Scout Platoon well in advance, "C" Company under Major Thomson had been ordered forward as a patrol in strength to make its way to Foiano and beyond. Behind them came the remainder of the battalion. Only two of the ubiquitous jeeps were able to follow the battalion, for craters, blown bridges, fallen trees, mines and similar obstacles made it impossible to get wheeled vehicles forward. A few miles to the north the Edmonton Regiment was to seize S. Bartolommeo while the Princess Patricias were directed on the crossroad midway between S. Bartolommeo and Montefalcone.[20]

"C" Company, on foot and not confined to roads, had come under some shellfire as mentioned above about a mile from Foiano in mid-afternoon, but it managed to get in and beyond the town which the Scout Platoon had passed through earlier. Contact had been made with elements of "Popski's Private Army," but information gained from this source was vague. The remainder of the unit moved up to within a few hundred yards of them by early evening. About three miles west of Foiano, beyond the road leading north to Decorata, was a feature called Hill 1007 or Mt. S. Marco. Major Forin, who went forward to establish a command post close to "C" Company, could appreciate at first hand the difficulties Major Thomson was having attempting to establish precisely which was the hill feature where the battalion was to consolidate, for in this hilly territory, and with the poor Italian maps available, it was a frustrating business. Rain during the afternoon made progress slow for the infantrymen and, in the rear, caused a considerable amount of worry to the Royal Canadian Engineers and unit pioneers who were responsible for constructing innumerable diversions circumventing enemy demolitions. The Seaforths' transport was still unable to get up, and thus the battalion, stuck out at the tip of the triangle which formed the brigade's locality, had as weapons only those which they could carry. Moreover, as Major Forin could observe when he went up to a viewpoint with the Scout officer, several bridges were blown on the route beyond Foiano. As usual the sites were under periodic shellfire from the enemy to make the necessary repairs or diversions as awkward a job as possible.

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[20] W.D., H.Q., 2nd Cdn. Inf. Bde., October 1943, Appendix: "Intelligence Log," 4 October 1943, Serial 17.

The sudden downpour also caused some concern to Lt. Gray and his scouts. During the afternoon, after contacting the leading elements of the Princess Louise Dragoon Guards, Gray had been told that this reconnaissance battalion's scout cars had been fired on from Hill 910, a feature several hundred yards west of the crossroads where one turned north towards Decorata. He had sent several patrols down two dry streams in the area, and so quick was the run-off from the rain that these streams were soon rushing torrents. In any event, when they returned the scouts reported that Hill 910 was clear of the enemy but that some German infantry and armour were close-by to the north of the feature. Informed by Gray of the situation, Forin ordered the feature occupied, and the Scouts led three companies on foot up to the hill without the enemy being aware of it. By last light on the 4th the Seaforths were busy consolidating. "C" Company was nearest Hill 1007, while "A" and "D" Companies were digging in near Hill 910, about three quarters of a mile closer to Foiano. After a hasty meal, a program of active patrolling to the north, west and south was carried out to try and confirm at least some of the numerous civilian reports which had come in about the near presence of enemy self-propelled guns and tanks.[21] Harassing fire was continued on the route leading from S. Bartolommeo to the north, but some German vehicles ran the gauntlet of this fire and pushed on to the north.

By the morning of the 5th, as the patrol reports came in and were examined, it appeared that the area within the triangle formed by Foiano, S. Bartolommeo and Hill 1007 was clear of the enemy Only one German prisoner was captured.[22] The enemy, however, was only a very short distance away and his fire was falling in the brigade area.[23] Moreover, aircraft had sent back reports about enemy tanks and other armoured vehicles in the area which were causing some concern because the brigade's supporting tanks were still unable to come up owing to the condition of the roads.

Patrolling on the 5th, and the advance of the Princess Patricias to the high ground between Baselice and Foiano, helped to improve

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[21] *Ibid.*, various serials for 4 October and W.D., Seaforth Highlanders of Canada, 4 October 1943.

[22] "He was a deserter from his regiment and a survivor of Stalingrad and was thoroughly fed up with everything in general," reported the war diarist.

[23] Lt. R. W. Bonner of "A" Company was wounded by a shell.

the knowledge of the enemy's locations and gave the hard working engineers more time to repair roads which allowed the Seaforths' vehicles to get up as close as Tactical Headquarters. During the day there were one or two brief brushes with small groups of Germans, pushed towards the Seaforths by the Princess Patricias, but these were easily dealt with with the aid of two 3-inch mortars packed up to the forward companies by mules during the day. During this period Major Forin moved "D", "B" and "C" Companies into better positions west of the Benevento-Decorata road.

Under the cover of darkness during the night of 5-6 October the Royal Canadian Engineers were able to make a diversion around a major road block which permitted the Seaforths' anti-tank guns to get forward and into position before dawn. By 0700 hours "B" Squadron of the 4th Princess Louise Dragoon Guards, using the same diversion (about a mile west of Foiana) managed to get forward. As soon as their armoured cars had reached the road leading to the north, the order came from division ordering that the Decorata Cross-roads should be seized and held. The acting brigade commander, Lt-Col. Hoffmeister, was up with the Seaforths whose area formed the firm base from which the reconnaissance squadron began its sweep to the north, but the leading vehicles had gone no more than about a mile when, in rapid succession, four of them were knocked out by enemy gunfire. Although the "Plugs" hammered the enemy, they more than welcomed the artillery fire which Hoffmeister ordered to assist them. At the same time the Seaforths, now aware that the hill they occupied was not 1007, prepared to advance on it with the aid of 4.2-in. mortars, medium machine-gun and artillery fire. From Hill 1007[24] the battalion would then swing north, with one company leap-frogging the other from one prominent hill to the other.

Shortly after one in the afternoon "D" Company, commanded by Captain McMullen, began to move forward towards Hill 1007 to take up a fire position on a knoll about 500 yards from the feature where it would cover the advance of "C" Company under A/Major Thomson. "D" Company was successful in the first move, suffering

[24] At the time it was thought that the hill was lightly defended. This was true, for the great volume of defensive fire was to come from the flank. Forin was aware of at least several tanks or self-propelled guns in the area, but he realized that the hill must be taken before he could carry out the brigadier's order to swing north against Decorata.

only one man killed by a sniper. When "D" Company was firm on its position, "C" Company, with the Scout Platoon tagging along, began to advance to a bare rocky knoll closer to Hill 1007. By this time the enemy was very much on the alert, and began to bring down heavy artillery and mortar fire and then medium machine-gun fire. This latter, especially, pinned down the company momentarily, but Major Thomson called for all the supporting fire available to concentrate on Hill 1007. When the swoosh and whistle of the artillery and mortar fire had started, Thomson, who had also arranged for a smokescreen from the 4.2-in. mortars, rallied his company and got the platoons going once more to cover the remaining 600 open yards to the slope of the objective. Enemy resistance continued to be strong, and midway across the plain four enemy tanks or self-propelled guns appeared on the company's right flank and struck at the Seaforths with every available weapon.[25] The fire was intense, so much so that the war diarist noted that it ". . . was such as had never before been experienced by this battalion." Nevertheless, under Thomson's leadership[26] "C" Company, with the sun in their eyes, stormed up Hill 1007 and by late afternoon seized what the enemy had obviously considered to be a highly prized objective. The company suffered a number of casualties in the 1,000-yard advance over open, muddy ground, but there seems to be little doubt that these casualties would have been much higher had a less capable officer led the assault. Shortly after 1800 hours "C" Company was joined by "D" and "B" Companies near Hill 1007 to help consolidate the hard-won objective, but not until after darkness had settled were the unit's anti-tank guns able to get forward to give close support against any further attacks by enemy tanks or self-propelled guns.[27] By eight o'clock that evening Hill 1007 or Mt. S. Marco was firmly in Seaforth hands and Major Forin

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[25] Only a few smoke bombs fell so the "screen" was very thin indeed. Also, the closer "C" Company got to their objective, the more difficult it was for "D" Company to fire at the enemy without hitting their own comrades.

[26] Captain, Acting Major, S. W. Thomson was awarded the Military Cross for his "cool and skillful leadership" which " was an inspiration to his men throughout and a model of direction." (Citation for award of The Military Cross, A/Maj. S. W. Thomson).

[27] At the summit of Hill 1007 was a cluster of huge rugged rocks covering about two acres and affording the best possible protection against armour. From the top of the hill one could see in the distance Decorata Crossroads.

was having a conference with the Brigadier about the attack to the north.

The advance which took place on the night of 6-7 October was not a successful one—owing partly to erratic weather and partly to poor intelligence. At 2200 hours on the evening of the 6th, Major Forin went to Brigade Headquarters to discuss the next stage of the assault with Lt-Col. B. M. Hoffmeister. Three Seaforth companies were on or near Hill 1007 and one, "A", was about half a mile to the east with Tactical Headquarters. The night was clear with an almost white moon shining through a few clouds. The Decorata crossroads lay four miles directly to the north over rolling ground which was rather rocky and offered little cover. It was known that the enemy was located in positions both to the north and west, while to the north-east conflicting patrol reports from the Princess Patricias made that area uncertain. It was also known that a major enemy demolition on the road leading north to Decorata as well as mines on the road would prevent the unit's anti-tank guns from coming up to support the battalion once it had seized its objective which, once again, would thrust it well out into enemy territory. Evidently there was no word of enemy armour between Hill 1007 and Decorata, and indeed, of the messages coming into Brigade Headquarters during the evening of the 6th, only the Seaforths reported encountering armoured vehicles when on the way to Hill 1007. Given these considerations Forin wanted the advance to take the form of a strong patrol, leaving the three companies near Hill 1007 until he knew more about the enemy's strength. The brigadier, however, was more optimistic and, having pushed the enemy back from Foiana wanted to keep him rolling back and disrupt his opportunity to form a stronger defence line.

As a result, it was decided to attack during the night[28] for the cross roads were important to the enemy. The Scout Platoon was to lead the way across country along a route running several hundred yards east of the road to Decorata. Behind would come "D" Company, followed by "C" and "B". An arrangement was made with the artillery to fire on Decorata to help give the companies a sense of direction, and this was effectively carried out. Communications were fair to poor, the method used being from the advancing companies

[28] Further talks between Forin and the brigadier resulted in Forin receiving permission to modify the strength of the attack, but by that time the companies had started and were temporarily out of communication.

by wireless to Major Forin's Tactical Headquarters, and thence by field telephone to the artillery and brigade headquarters.

At first the advance went well, but in a remarkably short time, when the leading companies were less than half way to their objective, clouds began to blot out the moon. This, combined with a fog or thick ground mist, soon made the night as black as pitch, with the result that the companies had to march in file or control of the force would be lost. Some enemy machine-gun posts were encountered and dealt with, but as the darkness thickened the Seaforths began to hear motors running, the noise disappearing and then coming back.[29] "At length," one of "D" Company's officers related later,

> . . . after a lull, with Jim McMullen, Sgt. Fairweather and others of the company again in the lead, . . . when I was talking to Jim, there was a blinding flash of light from three tanks, as we thought they were, from three large calibre guns. . . . The company immediately hit the ground. We then heard these tanks start up their engines and pull out. . . . We rallied the company and we couldn't find McMullen or Sgt. Fairweather and I think one or two others. We organized a search—we were following a track, I remember . . ., and one platoon took the right hand side in an extended formation, holding hands. They went back and forth up the side of this path searching . . ., and similarly on the left hand side of the road. This continued for 15 or 20 minutes and we found no one.[30]

This action began a rather nightmarish, confused affair. Enemy tanks, or self-propelled guns, were obviously protecting the crossroads. The Seaforths could hear them, they could hear the commands being given and the clang of metal turrets but it was impossible to see them so that even if the Piats were available—and they were not—it is questionable if they could have been used even though the men were at times only a few yards from the enemy's vehicles. The enemy, on his part, was in a far more favourable position. He could not see the Seaforths, but he could hear them, and when he did he brought his machine-guns to bear on the direction of the voices and swept the area with fire. As might be imagined, the majority of the casualties were caused by the latter, but the darkness also prevented many more casualties.

When Major Thomson, who had charge of the leading attacking company, came forward to get a first hand report on the situation,

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[29] The leading Seaforths at this point were about to cross the road and continue their attack along a route west of it.

[30] Seaforth Archives, Interview with Captain A. W. Mercer by Dr. R. L. McDougall, p. 3.

he felt that the attack should be called off and asked Major Forin for permission to withdraw. Neither Thomson nor Forin wanted the force to be caught in the open in daylight, especially without the aid of armour or anti-tank guns. Behind the road was blown, in front the enemy was in strength, and to continue to probe forward in the pitch blackness was inviting trouble. The problem of casualties was another consideration, and mention must be made here of the extraordinary work done by the medical section under the most adverse conditions. Corporal R. M. Thomas, specially, worked valiantly and during this entire action he led his section through enemy fire to gather up six wounded Seaforths and bring them the long distance back.[31]

The Scout Platoon, especially Sgt. G. K. McKee, performed a small marvel of navigating to get the bulk of the companies back to Hill 1007. Here "B" Company was ordered to remain among the large boulders scattered about the area, while at first light "C" and "D" companies went back to their original positions held before the attack on Hill 1007. It was a tired and weary group of men who settled back into their former areas. They had been on the go, frequently under fire, for the past 18 hours and had covered about 20 miles of rough country. Nor were things quiet on their return, for the enemy laid down some rather accurate fire both on Hill 1007 and to the east near Battalion Headquarters. When Capt. McMullen's body was found later in the day, his mapboard was gone and it was assumed, probably quite rightly, that the enemy gunners used it to bring their fire on the markings of the company positions on his mapboard.

The attack, which from its beginning had cost the Seaforths 11 killed, 26 wounded and two prisoners, may have had the effect of warning the enemy that the set-back they had inflicted on the Seaforths would not necessarily mean the end of the contest for the crossroads. Indeed, on the 7th, some armoured support was available to the unit and tank-hunting patrols from the brigade on the following evening found no German armoured vehicles south of Decorata. During the 8th a careful plan was made for an attack on the crossroads by the Princess Patricias and a squadron of tanks, but before their attack went in, a patrol from the Seaforths was able to report the

[31] He received a hard won Military Medal for his action both at Hill 1007 and Decorata.

objective clear. The Patricias' attack, therefore, met with very little resistance.

Demolition, mines, blown bridges, cratered roads and enemy rearguards had slowed down the advance to cut off the enemy's 29th Panzer Grenadier and 26th Panzer Divisions which were withdrawing northward along the network of roads east of the Matese Mountains. The Canadians' objectives remained the same, and the 2nd Brigade's drive towards Vinchiaturo and beyond was not relaxed for a moment.

For the Seaforths, the slight pause given them on the 8th and 9th was most welcome. It was becoming wet and cool, and when the kit bags came up on the 9th the summer khaki drill uniforms, now almost white from numerous washings, were exchanged for the warmer and now more comfortable battledress.[32] Meanwhile preparations were made to continue the push to the west. On the 9th the Edmonton Regiment, striking west from Decorata, had occupied Castelpagano, and on the following day the Seaforths sent out numerous patrols to the west and southwest prior to moving on an enemy force reported at S. Croce, a small village on the road leading north to Cercemaggiore. The attack on S. Croce on the 12th met with no opposition, and two days later the Seaforths were in Cercemaggiore itself which had been cleared by the Edmontons.

Cercemaggiore lies about nine miles, as the crow flies, northwest of Decorata, and if the crow kept flying in the same direction for an equal distance it would come to the town of Baranello. Between the latter two towns, narrow twisting roads clung to the sides of steep hills and mountains, for the 2nd Brigade was in rugged country which was overlooked by German-held towns perched on the sides of the Matese Mountains only a few miles further west. By the 14th, Highway No. 87 had been cut when Campobasso had been taken by the Canadians, but near Vinchiaturo a few miles southeast of Baranello, the enemy could still pass his troops on to Highway No. 17 which ran through the Biferno Valley. To hamper his withdrawal, as well as to maintain pressure on the enemy, the 2nd Brigade was instructed to continue its drive to the west and seize Vinchiaturo and Baranello.

Vinchiaturo was to be an exercise in battle drill tactics on a brigade level. The Princess Patricias were to make an attack on the

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[32] For the companies out on Hill 1007, the kit bags had to be transported by mules, so soggy was the ground.

right, the Edmontons on the left, and the Seaforths were to pass through and seize the town itself. By the 15th, when the Seaforth phase of the attack was to start, scouts well in advance of the battalion returned with the news that the town was unoccupied. Lt. K. G. McBride's platoon was sent in to occupy the town, and Brigadier Hoffmeister, whose command post was nearby, immediately ordered Major Forin to move north and west to the Baranello area. Since the unit was ready to move, and only a change in direction was involved, the Seaforths were able to set set out immediately. No enemy was encountered although everyone was very much on the alert, for the country offered itself as a good defensive area and the Seaforths found that the enemy was leaving the town just as they entered it. By late afternoon, the leading companies of the battalion, "A" and "B", were within a mile and a half of the outskirts of Baranello, while the remainder of the companies were at the crossroads on Highway No. 87 where the secondary road branched off to wind its way to Baranello itself. During the night, Lt. Harling took a patrol towards the town but he was stopped by machine-gun fire 300 yards from his goal.

Baranello itself was typical of many other towns in Southern Italy. It clung to a hilltop. Situated on a high spur, it overlooked the Biferno River Valley as well as two lesser valleys to the north and south. At the same time the town itself and its approaches were under enemy observation from the various high features in the area, especially from the higher range of mountains to the west. Control of these dominating features in the immediate area, therefore, was of prime importance, and in the action which followed the denial of the features to the enemy as observation posts was as important as seizing the town itself. Even before the attack went in, instructions were issued that vehicles using the road leading to Baranello from the highway must travel only at night as enemy shell and mortar fire was being directed from enemy posts to the north and south.

Once established in its new area, Major Forin ordered "A" and "B" Companies to send fighting patrols out to reconnoitre the area. "B" Company's patrol was to go to Point 763, a high feature one and a quarter miles due south of the town, while "A" Company was to send a patrol to the northern outskirts of Baranello. By the afternoon of the 16th, something of the general picture of the enemy's positions and defences was beginning to emerge not only from the patrol reports but from information supplied by Italian sources as

well. The enemy was definitely holding Baranello with (as was learned later) a company of the 67th Panzer Grenadier Regiment, with a high percentage of machine-guns and automatic weapons available.[33] Aside from enemy positions in the town, various other enemy weapon emplacements were sighted immediately south of the town. Moreover, by placing their mortars beyond the crests of the various hills and using the hilltops as observation posts, the Germans were able to bring their fire on the Seaforths from locations which were very difficult to spot.

With a fair picture of the enemy's defences available to him, Lt-Col. Forin planned his attack. At first light on the 17th "D" Company,[34] commanded by Captain Newsom, was to seize Baranello. Supporting the company would be one platoon of medium machine-guns, one platoon of 4.2-inch mortars and a battery of guns from the field artillery. At 0500 hours the 25-pounders would lay down a ten minute barrage on the town, after which the guns would switch and pound for a further ten minutes the high ground to the south of the town. Newsom was to have the 4.2-inch mortars on call, and as further precaution, two of the unit's anti-tank guns were brought up to "A" Company's area where they could fire at targets which might offer themselves to the north and south.

The plan worked like clockwork. An hour after "D" Company advanced, its platoons were near a high-walled cemetery 600 yards from the outskirts of Baranello and by 0730 hours the company was in the town having met only light resistance. It was fairly evident that the enemy had withdrawn under the weight of the artillery supporting the infantry attack, and later in the morning, when enemy shellfire began to fall on the town, it was also evident that the enemy was in good communication with his own guns.

As "D" Company began to consolidate its position and engage in periodic fire fights with enemy positions on features south of the town, Lt-Col. Forin brought his Tactical Headquarters up to a brickyard closer to the town and at the same time ordered his Scout Officer to send some men out to get "all possible information on the situation in and around Baranello." "D" Company, at this time, was suc-

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[33] 2nd Cdn. Inf. Bde., Intelligence Report and Sitrep, 19 October 1943.

[34] One Platoon of "A" Company was to come under "D" Company since one of "D" Company's platoons was occupied at Vinchiaturo.

cessful, but it was stuck out in front of the battalion which was itself the westernmost unit in the brigade's advance. Moreover, the enemy had been contacted and engaged on Points 735 and 763, two high hills, about a half mile and a mile respectively south of the town, and whether they might try to swing up and pinch off "D" Company was a consideration not to be overlooked.

By midday three scouts had entered and passed through Baranello—Sgt. McKee, Pte. G. A. Reid and one other. These men went through "D" Company and down the precipitous bank at its western end to the valley bottom beyond. They forded the waist-deep Biferno River, reconnoitered a bit of the far shore area and then swung back approaching the town from the north. No enemy was sighted, but as they were in an Italian farm house an Italian farmer ran towards them yelling that the Germans were coming. After extracting such information from him as they could, the scouts decided to make straight up a mule track into town to warn "D" Company. It was now late afternoon.

While the scouts had been roaming out beyond the town, Baranello itself was being subjected to some shelling, and Lt-Col. Forin sent out a platoon to Point 763 to ensure it was not occupied. Meanwhile "D" Company was beginning to suffer casualties from the shelling, and when Captain Newsom was told about enemy troops approaching the town from the southwest and northwest, he decided to withdraw from Baranello. His signaller had been killed in the shelling so, unable to confirm the report, "D" Company first moved back to the cemetery, and then later to its original position.

The withdrawal of the Canadians came as a surprise to the enemy but they took immediate advantage of it to reinforce the company defending the town. The 7th Company, 2nd Battalion of the 9th Panzer Grenadier Regiment was rushed to Colle d'Anchise and then by foot across the river and up the steep slopes of the western part of the town. This company was about 65 strong, which by the evening of the 17th meant that Baranello was now held by a German force twice as strong as it had encountered in the morning.

It was the advance of the German reinforcements which the Italian peasant reported to the scouts, but unfortunately, unknown to McKee and the others, the Germans had reoccupied the town by the time they returned. Moreover, they were clever enough to remain out of sight as McKee and Reid went into the local police station.

They were there only a minute when there was a knock on the door and someone called out, in English, to tell them "They are withdrawing." The scouts, thinking a "D" Company man was speaking, opened the door. Reid was first, and a German grabbed him by the binoculars hanging around his neck and pulled him into the street. McKee had a chance to empty his pistol through the door and he then ran upstairs and, while a German officer was beginning to question Reid, McKee threw out a box of Italian hand grenades into the street. In the resulting furore, Reid yelled to McKee the number on the epaulet of the enemy's uniform, hoping that the sergeant might get away to the unit with the identification of the enemy. At the same time he sprinted down the street hoping to escape himself with enemy machine-gun bullets at his heels. As he stated later:

> . . . They were shooting at my feet . . . But I made it round the corner, and I laid behind a plant . . . growing in a bucket. I lay behind this because it was a dead end. There was no way out from this alley . . . so I thought I'll just play possum and they might think they've got me and buzz off. But they started marching and I counted 19 of them walking by the end of the lane. Then one came up and he looked at me and said "Kaput?" I just laid there. . . . He kicked me in the side and, well, he knew I wasn't dead then so he said "Ah, nicht Kaput. Kommen sie 'raus." So I got up and he made me take my shoes off, tie them around my neck and loaded me down with their ammunition. Then they took me to a building right on the outskirts of town, practically overlooking the brickyards. They started shooting questions at me. . . . Then they said why were you in Baranello and I said I wanted some wine. They said oh don't give me that. I said well I was after a girl if I could get one—you know, I tried to make it sound as good as could. I don't know if he believed me or not, but anyway they quit slapping me around. . . .[35]

Pte. Reid hoped to escape later that night when he was taken behind the enemy's lines beyond the Biferno, but a full moon and a clear night made that impossible. Sgt. McKee, it was learned later, was caught and tried to escape three times. On the third try he was shot and killed.

The withdrawal of "D" Company from Baranello was an action which did not sit well with the Commanding Officer. During the night of 17-18 October, Lt-Col. Forin ordered strong patrols out as part of the brigadier's order to all battalions to maintain contact and probe boldly into the enemy's lines. "B" Company sent patrols

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[35] Seaforth Archives, Typescript interview of Pte. G. A. Reid by Dr. R. L. McDougall. Information regarding the enemy's dispositions is contained in the 2nd Cdn. Inf. Bde., Intelligence Report and Sitrep, *op. cit.*

both to the outskirts of the town as well as to Point 763, but although no enemy was encountered on the latter, five men were wounded several hundred yards from Baranello.

On the evening of the 17th, Forin and Hoffmeister conferred about the capture of the town, and as a result the Seaforths were ordered to try again. This time "A" Company, commanded by Captain Vance, was given tank support for his company's task to occupy and hold Point 763. This would protect the left flank of the battalion and more especially "B" Company's simultaneous attack on Baranello launched from "D" Company's area. Two companies of the Princess Patricias were to be ready for a counterattack role should the situation warrant it, but as events turned out they were not needed. Artillery and mortar fire would precede the attack on the town timed for about 0800 hours, and to further occupy the enemy, the Edmonton Regiment was pushing patrols deep into the contested area south of Baranello.

"A" Company was the first to move off, and en route to Point 763 it met only light opposition in the form of a machine-gun nest which was quickly despatched by a tank's main armament blasting the building the enemy was using. Captain Vance reached and occupied the high hill with only two casualties, but no sooner had the infantry and tanks consolidated than the hill was subjected to enemy fire.

"B" Company, commanded by Captain W. G. Harris, began its attack at 0900 hours, and as the platoons reached the outskirts of town the strength of the enemy made itself apparent in the hail of rifle and machine-gun fire met by the leading platoons several hundred yards from the town. Overhead Kittyhawk aircraft sped towards targets west of the Biferno, but offsetting this support to some extent was the accurate enemy fire the German artillery was able to direct on the Seaforths from an observation post in Busso, a hilltop town two miles to the north. As the company made its way slowly towards the town, enemy troops were observed moving up the left flank, as if to cut the company off, but evidently this group was directed on Point 763 and was dealt with quite satisfactorily by "A" Company.

By noon, with the cheerful aid of the Saskatoon Light Infantry's 4.2-inch mortars, the unit's anti-tank guns and the supporting artillery fire, "B" Company had beaten down the enemy's well-sited machine-gun posts on the outskirts of town. Early in the

afternoon the Seaforths were in the town itself engaged in fierce house-to-house and street-to-street fighting. A pall of dust and smoke over the town made it difficult for observers to see what was going on as the afternoon wore on, but the rattle of machine-guns, the thump of 3-inch mortars and the periodic cracks of rifle fire made it very evident that the enemy had to be pried from his post. Along the road leading to the town the unit's pioneers were sweeping for mines which would allow the tanks and carriers to get past the old brickyards and cemetery which had marked the Seaforths' outposts in the past few days.

By 1630 hours Baranello was cleared of the enemy except those who were prisoners of war. About 20 of the enemy were killed, and almost an equal number captured. The latter were a mixed batch—14 belonged to the 9th Panzer Grenadier Regiment, one was an artilleryman attached to the 26th Panzer Division and the rest belonged to the 67th Panzer Grenadier Regiment.[36] Among them was a wounded officer. Indeed this was the largest single group yet rounded up in one action by the Seaforths. Three more were nabbed by "A" Company later that night when they came to Point 763 thinking, possibly, to re-establish an observation post.

All in all it was a most successful attack, with more of the enemy killed on one day than the Seaforths had lost in total casualties during the 17th and 18th combined. Moreover, Lt-Col. Forin was not leaving anything to chance. Both "A" and "B" Companies were ordered to dig in and hold, while to the south, west and north strong patrols searched out the enemy. Busso, that troublesome town to the north, was occupied by the Royal Canadian Regiment on the 19th, while to the south the Edmontons brought the brigade's forward posts close to the river line.

The capture of Baranello brought with it a period of rest for the Seaforths. Blue, cloudless skies during the next few days permitted Allied aircraft to strafe the enemy positions to the west and north which were so difficult to locate from the ground, while at the same time, the other battalions in the division closed up to and crossed the Biferno and cut Highway 17. To the north the enemy continued to carry out his fighting withdrawal to his winter line. During this time enemy shells continued to land periodically in Baranello and the

[36] Later in the day a platoon of Germans, unaware the Canadians held the town, entered Baranello and the whole lot, including their officer, was captured.

single road leading into it. For the first few days of their period of relaxation while in reserve, therefore, the Seaforths were still very much on the alert. A few batteries of medium artillery which moved into the area did little to soothe one's nerves. By the end of the month, however, things had quietened down. All the companies were located in billets, the mobile baths had paid a welcome visit to the unit, and when mail, pay, the canteen and other amenities were made available, the battalion could really begin to relax. An Italian professor began to teach Italian to the Seaforth officers and one can only assume that this, in turn, helped to cement relations with the local inhabitants.

The end of the month brought with it certain changes in command. At this time it was announced that Major General C. Vokes was the new divisional commander, while Brigadier Hoffmeister's acting appointment as commander of the 2nd Brigade was confirmed. Lt-Col. J. D. Forin had announced earlier that Major Bell-Irving, promoted to Lt-Col., was leaving to take over a command in Great Britain, and his place as second in command would be filled by Major S. W. Thomson. During November, as some of the officers who had been wounded in Sicily came back to the battalion, there was a certain amount of reshuffling of officers. By the end of November, the rifle company commanders were Major T. C. B. Vance, Captain W. H. Buchanan, Major W. D. Blackburn and Captain A. W. Mercer of "A", "B", "C" and "D" Companies respectively.

The battalion's period of rest at Baranello lasted almost to the end of November, but even during most of this period the rumble of guns could still be heard far in the distance to the north. Nevertheless everything was done to make this period in reserve as comfortable as possible. Several miles to the north Campobasso, much larger in size, had been made into a "Maple Leaf City" for Canadians who could go there and enjoy a variety of entertainments arranged for them by the various Auxiliary Services. Clubs and cafes, theatres and movies were established so that truckloads of Seaforths or Edmontons or any other unit could go there for a day or so and enjoy themselves to the full. In Baranello itself everyone was in billets, and if these were sometimes crowded, it was far better than being out in tents. The approaching signs of winter were everywhere. Peasants in the fields were cutting back and tying up vines, donkeys clattered along the roads carrying bundles of wood for the winter's supply, the leaves were beginning to turn, and from mid-November onward it seemed to rain every day. Looking to the north, one could see the mountain peaks get their

first covering of snow, and gradually this white dusting crept slowly down from the peaks as the weather got colder. Memories of the heat of Sicily began to fade, and when the kit-bags came up, men reached far down to bring up scarves, woollen shirts and long underwear which they had packed away when they were in Scotland.

As usual the rear echelons, which had been brought up to Baranello, were especially busy. There were a great many men deficient in kit of one sort or another. Boots needed resoling, battledress had to be mended and socks to be darned. All the weapons in the battalion were examined by the armourer, and new ones had to be zeroed. Pioneers had their mine-sweepers adjusted, and the signal platoon checked the various wireless sets in the unit, collected a small store of spare parts for future use, and carried out a fair amount of technical training. Possibly one of the hardest working groups was the Transport Platoon whose drivers and driver-mechanics had done exceptionallly good work since landing in Italy. It was up to them to keep the men at the front supplied with food and ammunition, and they realized that should either not be forthcoming owing to mechanical breakdowns, road accidents or any other reason, it would have a direct and adverse effect on the fighting. These drivers took their vehicles over roads, along diversions and up mountain paths which put a tremendous strain on both men and trucks. The rest period at Baranello, therefore, gave Captain Martin, the Transport Officer, time to give some of the care and maintenance to his vehicles which in most cases was long overdue, and at the same time prepare them for the rigours of winter driving which would come all too soon.

The rest period at Baranello was also a time when the whole battalion could get together, and several groups took advantage of the occasion to arrange a special entertainment. On 4 November, for example, all the senior N.C.Os. got together for a bang-up party reminiscent, in some ways, of the affairs the Sergeants' Mess were known for in their own armoury in Vancouver.[37] It was noted, however, that only five of the "old originals" were left—an indication of both the wastage of war as well as the normal turnover during the years. Not to be outdone the Signal Platoon, commanded by Lt. W. F. J. Gildersleeve, also had a dinner party. Men in this platoon were usually scattered throughout the battalion in action, and as with most

[37] It was at Baranello that the officers had their traditional annual dinner, the first within sound of enemy guns—but not enemy bombs—since the war.

of the other platoons in Support Company the only time they saw each other as a group was when in rest. By a judicious exchange of tobacco, chocolate and other items for farm produce from the Italian farmers, this platoon sat down to a chicken dinner with a bottle of vino for every drumstick with enough left over to go with the apple pie for dessert.[38]

If there is one thing the Seaforth veteran had learned by this time it was to enjoy himself while he could, for he knew that as he was taking advantage of some peace and quiet, someone else was busily plotting and planning to hurl him into action once again. Such was the case at Baranello, and at this point it would be well to look further afield and note some of the events which were to shape the next move of the battalion.

During September, as the Allies were pushing their way up the southern part of the Italian "boot," there was considerable speculation by the German High Command regarding the possible intentions of the Anglo-American forces. Would they continue to push up the peninsula? Should the German forces expect more major seaborne landings in their rear such as that made at Salerno? Did the Allies intend to use Southern Italy as a base for an attack across the Adriatic Sea to the Dalmatian Coast? Whatever the intentions of the Allies, what dispositions should the Germans take? At a meeting on 30 September Hitler conferred with Field Marshals Rommel and Kesselring and a few days later he directed Kesselring ". . . to fight a delaying action only as far as the line Gaeta-Ortona."[39] "This line," der Fuhrer continued, "will be held. The time necessary for organizing the defences and for bringing up the infantry divisions will be won by operations forward of the line to be held." The Gaeta-Ortona line which was chosen was called the Bernhard Line. It crossed the narrowest part of Italy and took full advantage of Italy's rugged terrain and river valleys. To improve the defensive potentialities offered by rivers and mountains, the enemy did everything he could to prepare for the coming onslaught. Mine fields, road demolitions, barbed wire, field emplacements and camouflaged, well-sited strongpoints were prepared during the weeks the Allied Armies pushed their way northward in the late Fall.

[38] Far away in London a mess dinner was held at Claridge's on 30 October at which 29 former Seaforth officers and their guests sat down to carry on a traditional gathering which had persisted, and still continues, since 1919.

[39] Quoted in Nicholson, *op. cit.*, p. 266.

To the extent that the decision of the Germans to defend Rome lengthened the enemy's line of communications and made him commit forces which otherwise could be used on the Russian front or to strengthen their hold on France, the enemy's decision was welcomed by the Allies. At the same time, the difficulties which had to be met and overcome if the enemy were to be pushed off the various lines of defence offered to him in Italy were not underestimated. Furthermore, it was understood that the Second Front was to have priority on the resources available to General Alexander. This meant that not only would the build-up and supply of the Allied Armies in Italy[40] be difficult, but also the opportunity to turn the enemy's line by assaulting from the sea could be exercised only with the hard-won permission of the "Overlord" planners who were themselves pressed by the lack of landing craft. As to whether or not the Allies should themselves stop south of Rome or continue to carry the fight to the enemy, the latter was approved at a meeting late in October. For political reasons Rome must be captured, and for strategic reasons the Foggia airfields and the port of Naples had to have greater defence in depth. On 8 November, Alexander issued his orders. On the right Montgomery's Eighth Army would attack to gain the Rome-Pescara highway and an area from which he could threaten the enemy's left flank. The next phase would see the U.S. Fifth Army drive up the Liri and Sacco valleys as far as Frosinone. The third phases would include a seaborne landing south of Rome at Anzio and the ultimate capture of Rome itself.

The 1st Canadian Infantry Division, as part of the Eighth Army, was thus more immediately concerned with the first phase of the attack. On the right General Montgomery selected the narrow area of foothills between the Apennines and the Adriatic Sea for his main thrust to turn the Bernhard Line, and planned to cross the Sangro and Moro Rivers to capture first Ortona and then Pescara. By mid-November the 3rd Canadian Infantry Brigade was engaged in the opening moves of the major assault, and by the end of the month, as we have seen, the rest of the Canadian division was en route to a battlefield which was to witness some of the toughest fighting in the entire campaign.

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[40] By the end of October there were eleven allied ground formations in Italy. The Germans had 21 divisions, of which five were in transit. (Nicholson, *op. cit.*, p. 272).

CHAPTER VIII

From The Moro River To Ortona

The journey from Baranello eastward to the coast was miserable. On the afternoon of 1 December a cold rain driven from the northeast soaked the men and made the narrow, twisting roads slithery with mud. This made the uncomfortable journey even longer, so that it was after midnight before the Seaforths debussed, loaded their great-coats on the Quartermaster's three-ton vehicles, and then set off on foot across the Sangro River. At the head of the file Lt. Melhuish, the Brigade Liaison Officer, led the battalion over the recently erected footbridge, and as they crossed the Seaforths passed in the dark men from the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders of the British 78th Division who were happy to be going out. "She's all yours, Seaforths and you're welcome to it." "Give 'em old Hell, Seaforths."[1] These and similar, though unprintable, remarks were exchanged as the two Highland units passed each other and the Seaforths wound their way across the Sangro near the high, arched bridge which the Germans had blown several days earlier. Up on the far bank the Seaforths passed the reclining forms of some Princess Patricias whose guides had not come up. By three in the morning, the unit was in its assembly area where Major Thomson and the company seconds-in-command[2] met up with the companies and showed them their localities. This

[1] Directorate of History, "Baranello to San Leonardo—Account by Lt-Col. Forin, December, 1943." The Pipes and Drums of this regiment had welcomed the Seaforths in 1939.

[2] Captains E. W. Thomas, F. D. Colquhoun, B. G. Parker and D. S. Harley of "A," "B," "C" and "D" Companies respectively.

was completed before dawn, which was heralded by the arrival of "F" Echelon's vehicles with the rations and, overhead, a flight of six enemy aircraft which dropped their bombs close to the battalion area. In a way this welcome to the front more or less set the tone for the events which were to follow, as did the return of the commanding officer from a Brigade "O" Group a few hours later ordering everyone to be prepared to move in ten minutes.

In the next two days, as the 2nd Canadian Infantry Brigade eased its way forward behind the troops of the 78th Infantry Division, the Seaforth Highlanders had the opportunity to get a close look at the terrain which was typical of the area between the Sangro and Ortona. To the right was the sea, and not far inland were the Apennines. Between the two there were a succession of rivers running across the axis of advance. Between the river valleys were long ridges of land, some of which had plateaus, which stretched like outspread fingers from the mountainous area to the west. The river valleys, running from the southwest to northeast, were themselves fed by smaller streams coming into them from the smaller ridges of land, and thus to an observer on one ridge the other side of the "river" held great defensive potentialities. Winter rains had made the ground soft and the rivers higher. The enemy had demolished all the bridges and, as the Seaforths knew from experience, his guns, mortars and machine guns would have the roads and potential crossing sites covered for defensive fire. In the battle shaping up, Bailey bridges and mud were to be of prime importance, for the combination of ground and weather were to govern the rate of advance of the Canadians to a far greater extent than ever before.[3]

During the 3rd and 4th the battalion moved up Highway No. 16 towards San Vito as the British completed their task of getting up to the banks of the Moro before the Canadians took over their front. By the evening of the 4th the Seaforths were located on the narrow plateau on the ridge which separated the Feltrino and Moro Rivers. Running through the unit's position was the road which wriggled down over the escarpment and led across the Moro to San Leonardo. This small town, for which the battalion was to battle so fiercely, was roughly on the boundary between two German divisions, the 90th Panzer Grenadier Division on the east and the 26th Panzer Division

[3] Directorate of History, "Crossing of the Moro River and Subsequent Operations . . ., by Major General Vokes," p. 1.

on the west.[4] That night, after digging in under intermittent shell-fire which wounded two of "B" Company's officers,[5] the unit settled down with the Princess Patricias on the right and the Edmontons on the left. To the front R.C.E. patrols were creeping down the banks of the Moro to find the best crossing places for the infantry-cum-armour attack to be launched the next day. To the rear, staff officers at brigade and divisional headquarters made their final plans and worried about the heavy rain which washed out bridges over the Sangro and threatened to disrupt the supplies which would be vital to the attack over the Moro.

Along the Canadian front there were three places which patrol reconnaissance reported suitable for crossing the Moro. One was on the extreme right following the coastal road, another was on the axis of the road leading into San Leonardo and, finally, about a mile south of the latter, the river was fordable close to Villa Rogatti. Major General Vokes decided to make his main thrust at San Leonardo and then to strike out to cut the main Ortona-Orsogna highway beyond. This task was given to the 2nd Brigade, and to lead the attack Brigadier Hoffmeister selected the Seaforths. To the left a diversionary attack on Villa Rogatti would be made by the Patricias, while on the right the 1st Brigade would create another diversion.

Lt-Col. Forin[6] and several of his company commanders had time only on the morning of the 5th to observe the ridge beyond the Moro from Sant' Apollinare, but just as they could observe the German-occupied ridge, so could the enemy observe that held by the Canadians. Any movement brought enemy shell-fire, and attempts in daylight to scout the river bank brought a quick reply from the enemy with sniper or machine-gun fire. They could see the blown bridge crossing the river to San Leonardo, and the re-entrants leading into the enemy-held ridge. If their defences beyond the Moro were as well sited and protected as those noticed by the Seaforths when they crossed the Sangro, storming the far ridge was going to be no easy matter.

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[4] Both formed part of the enemy's 76 Corps. The 90th P.G. Div. was a fresh division, arriving on the front at about the same time as the Canadians.

[5] Lts. F. R. Perrett and L. W. Leckie.

[6] Forin at this time was still having a personal battle with jaundice which had struck him at Baranello. He was almost over the sickness by this time, however.

At 1000 hours on the 5th Lt-Col. Forin called an "O" Group at which he outlined the main course of the attack and issued his orders for the battalion. The Seaforths were to attack in two phases to secure a bridgehead over the river which would permit the engineers to construct a bridge to enable the armour to cross. In the first phase "B" Company, crossing the river near Sant' Apollinare, was to attack up the gully on the left of San Leonardo, seize the high ground to the south to protect the left flank of the main attack from German interference from La Torre, and be prepared to move into San Leonardo on the success of the main attack. At the same time as "B" Company advanced, "C" Company would cross the river at the blown bridge and go straight for the town on the left of the road while "A" Company would advance on the right of the road moving up what appeared to be a fairly covered approach into San Leonardo. "D" Company, with Battalion Headquarters, would follow up the success of either "A", "B" or "C" and exploit it. Zero hour was midnight. To gain surprise there was to be no preliminary barrage, but on call there would be the divisional artillery as well as the guns from "1 AGRA" and the tanks of the 4th (British) Armoured Brigade. Mules would be used to pack ammunition and supplies forward under company arrangements, and by daylight it was hoped that the tanks themselves would be able to cross the river through the efforts of the Royal Canadian Engineers working initially under the cover of darkness. The part played by the engineers was both dangerous and crucial, and they had to have the protection of the Seaforths' bridgehead if their work was to go forward with any speed. It was also appreciated that without support from the tanks the infantry would not be able to carry out the brigade task.

An hour before midnight Captain W. H. Buchanan led his company towards the sloping river bank, and shortly afterwards, the entire battalion was en route.

The crossing itself went well, and "B" Company was able to gain its objective and dig in without too much trouble. It was a different story with the others, however. "C" Company had gone only a few hundred yards beyond the river when

> . . . they were laced by an intense MMG fire from high ground to the west on fixed lines covering their approach. They were unable to go further until some neutralization could be brought from arms other than their own.[7]

[7] "Baranello to San Leonardo . . .," *op. cit.*

"A" Company was hardest hit, and some idea of the action as it developed on the right is given by the following account written by one of the scouts.

> I'm assigned to take "A" across tonight. Once over the river I'm told my job will be done. It is dark, with clouds overhead and no moon. We leave "A" Coy. area and wind our way along the bank. To the left, across the valley, bright flashes show where a battle is in progress.[8] Shells burst ahead of us on the ridge and we detour into dead ground. A message is passed up from Major Vance, "A" Coy. O.C., for more speed. I locate the path leading down into the valley and am joined by Major Vance, Lt. J. W. Baldwin of the leading platoon, and C.S.M. Angus Blaker. I accept, under protest, a bodyguard of one section and start downward. The noise of the men with me seems more dangerous than their protection is worth. I drop them off as guides at each turn in the trail.
>
> The brush is head high. Every few minutes a flare blossoms in the sky to sparkle brilliantly for a moment or so. I freeze and look at the bleached landscape. The trail is good and no German patrols seem to be using it. I reach the river, hardly more than a stream, and cross. There is a steep bank. Lt. Baldwin and his platoon join me on the higher ground a hundred yards ahead. I tell him that my job is officially over. However since Bn H.Q. is to cross later tonight, there seems no sense in going back and then over again. Besides Gerry knows something is up. He is shelling our back trail. The flashes decide me and I stay. . . . The plan calls for us to go up a draw to our right which will by-pass San Leonardo. Baldwin's platoon will continue on and cut the road behind the town. The other two platoons will fight their way in with, we hope, that help of "C" Coy. . . .
>
> We move off in the dark. Words comes that the rear platoon is missing. Clinking equipment, boots squelching in the mud, and the odd muttered curse, sound more clearly to me than the distant noise of battle. My rope-soled shoes and lack of all metallic gear except helmet and pistol, allow me to move silently.
>
> I cross a gully, ten feet in front of the lead platoon when a stream of fire flies tracer bullets arches lazily through the blackness. They grope for the muffled sounds of "A" Coy. The quiet is shattered by the ripping sound of Spandaus. There are shouted commands behind me and then the pop-pop-pop of the Brens. Other Spandaus join in laying down a cross fire. "A" Coy: is pinned.[9]

The volume of machine-gun fire which struck at "A" Company came from an estimated dozen weapons. Major Vance, blinded by a bullet, did what he could to keep control and work small parties forward. Blaker, his Company Sergeant Major, was killed, and Lt. Baldwin was wounded. Despite his efforts Vance was unable to get

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[8] Probably in the area where the engineers were working on the bridge.

[9] Seaforth Archives, Operation Accounts. "Account by Mr. A. K. Harris."

forward and the company's casualties were mounting. One platoon eventually worked its way far enough to the left to contact "C" Company, but the other two returned over the Moro using "C" Company's original route. Communications with Tactical Headquarters was out, and not until after 0200 hours did Lt-Col. Forin receive any word of their situation. Until the situation was clearer, therefore, he held "D" Company on the east side of the river. Meanwhile he went forward with his Intelligence and Scout Officers to the ground overlooking the bridge crossing. "The Germans," he wrote later, "were shelling the mule track approach used by 'A' and 'C' Coys, and the diversion and road, with heavy shells so that the R.C.E. could not carry out their work. . . . We could see the outline of German M.M.G. fire directed at 'A' and 'C' companies from the tracers. . . ."[10]

Not until first light was Lt-Col Forin able to get a firm idea of the location of his forward companies, and only then could he call down artillery and mortar fire to assist them. On the left "B" Company was firm on the hill south and across the gully from San Leonardo.[11] It was still under machine-gun fire, but it had nabbed a number of prisoners and these were on their way back, ducking and dodging enemy artillery fire as were their escorts. "C" Company was fairly close by and on lower ground closer to the village. Both were dug in. Further up the river, the Princess Patricias had managed to capture Villa Rogatti, and their somewhat deeper bridgehead was receiving prime attention from the enemy. Eight tanks managed to reach the Patricias about the time of the first enemy counter-attack was launched, but no tanks had yet reached the Seaforths. During the morning, however, a furious tank battle started, with British and German machines hammering away at each other both at long range from across the river as well as at close quarters from the Patricias' beachhead. Despite every effort to reach the Seaforths' forward companies time and again during the day by the supporting tanks, the effort was called off after a number had bogged down in the soft river bed.

In mid-afternoon Lt-Col. Forin was becoming increasingly uneasy. His battalion was divided by the river, the Patricias were being counter-attacked again, and although only three tanks were seen making their way down hill from San Leonardo to the Seaforths' positions, the C.O. knew that there were no friendly anti-tank guns

[10] "Baranello to San Leonardo. . . .," *op. cit.*

[11] Forin did not know even of this success owing to poor communications.

aross the river. The three tanks were engaged at long range by artillery on the near side of the Moro and driven off, but this might be a preliminary to a stronger attack. Across the stream "B" and "C" Companies were hanging on to their positions, but their location was vulnerable. At 1400 hours Forin decided to send "D" and the remainder of "A" Company over the Moro assisted by strong artillery, mortar and tank fire, but permission to do so was refused by Brigadier Hoffmeister. Messages coming in to brigade headquarters reported tanks in and around San Leonardo, and until the Seaforths could be assured of getting tank support to put muscle in their own attack, the result might be disastrous. As Lt-Col. Forin noted himself:

> The weakness of the plan, of course, was that no prospects existed of getting the tanks across the stream that day or night nor, as a matter of fact, the next day if the Germans controlled the bridge crossing with their arty fire in the same volume as the previous night. An excellent tank run existed into . . . [San Leonardo] for the Germans and . . . their anti-tank guns could . . . blow down the buildings in which we should . . . have to put some of our troops.[12]

With the surprise attack on San Leonardo only partially successful, Major General Vokes, as he wrote later

> . . . was now faced with a big decision—how to exploit the success of the P.P.C.L.I. As you are aware, a cardinal rule of tactics is to exploit success and ignore failure. By switching my main thrust to the left flank, and once the top of the escarpment had been gained, there would be a clear run without any intervening natural obstacles to the Ortona-Orsogna lateral road. Having cut this road the direction of attack could then be swung towards Villa Grande or Ortona. The route which the P.P.C.L.I. and their tanks had followed would not do to build and sustain an attack in strength. Feasibility would hinge on whether the demolished road bridge could be restored with a Bailey Bridge as the road exit up the far escarpment was necessary for movement.[13]

This decision resulted in several changes for the Seaforths since the Edmontons were to reinforce the Patricias. "D" Company, which had not yet been committed, was detailed to provide protection for the engineers who would have another try at placing a bridge over the Moro below San Leonardo. "A" Company was to provide protection for the mule train taking up rations to "B" and "C" Compan-

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[12] "Baranello to San Leonardo . . .," *op. cit.* However, had he known of "B" Company's success earlier and despatched his reserve company to help at first light, the battalion might have gained the day.

[13] Letter, Major General C. Vokes to author, 4 July 1967.

ies, both of which, but especially "B", had been heavily engaged all during the day.

Around 2200 hours on the 6th, the C.O. was told to withdraw his remaining companies on the far side of the Moro and to shift his entire battalion about a mile to the south on the escarpment overlooking the Patricias' bridgehead. The engineers had reported that "it was impossible to construct a Bailey bridge on the old bridge abutments because the road turned sharply at right angles on reaching the river leaving no room for the construction of a Bailey bridge prior to launch."[14] Thus for the present, the small but hard won and heartily defended bridgehead made by the Seaforths had to be abandoned.

It was only when "B" Company returned across the river that Lt-Col. Forin got a first hand account of the battle it had had. Both companies across the river had taken a total of 40 prisoners and had captured two guns, not to mention numerous machine-gun emplacements. But "B" Company, towards the end of the day, had lost wireless communication with Tactical Headquarters when its No. 18 wireless set went out of commission. Finally, a runner got through asking permission to withdraw hours after the order had gone out. When Captain Buchanan and Lt. McBride reported to the colonel late that night, both were utterly exhausted. The exploit of this company, wrote Lt-Col. Forin later, was outstanding.

> Located by the Germans at first light that morning they had been mortared steadily and heavily machine-gunned. They worked their way forward during the day and overran the German posts one after another. Sixteen in all fell to the company by nightfall. . . . They made a busman's holiday of it. The example of Capt. Buchanan lent inspiration to all ranks. In short, "B" Company out-thought, out-schemed and then outfought the Germans. With nightfall a large party of Germans . . . came in and made to envelop the company. Buchanan gave way, keeping his platoons intact, playing now this, now that off against the Hun and the whole, with exception of half a dozen, coming through the gap.[15]

A typical example of the work done by the company was that by L/Cpl. J. H. Teece. He and a handful of men were surrounded and cut off by the enemy. With this small party of Seaforths was Captain Carter, an artillery Forward Observation Officer who had been

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[14] *Ibid.* The bridge, pre-fabricated at the site, was usually pushed straight ahead over the gap to be crossed.

[15] "Baranello to San Leonardo . . .," *op. cit.*

directing the artillery fire of the 2nd Field Regiment, R.C.A., supporting the battalion. Carter was wounded, and could not walk. L/Cpl. Teece saw his predicament and was determined to rescue him. "With great courage and most skillful use of cover," reads Teece's citation for the Military Medal, "Lance Corporal Teece worked his way through some 200 yards of ground controlled by the enemy to where Captain Carter lay wounded. There under heavy fire, he helped to organize the men and then prepared to evacuate Captain Carter to company headquarters." Teece brought back both the F.O.O. and his section safely after a hard and perilous journey from the bridgehead across the Moro. His group, incidentally, was the last to withdraw.

It was not until the mid-morning of 7 December that "B" and "C" Companies rejoined the main body of the battalion, and even then they continued to be subjected to the enemy's artillery[16] and mortar fire. About a dozen men were killed, wounded or missing from the action across the river, and having fought so hard to retain the small bridgehead they had won, both companies were tired yet annoyed that they had to yield ground. It was obvious, however, that San Leonardo and La Torre were strongly held by a very determined and well entrenched enemy. To persist in the attack would have been fruitless and wasteful, and without close support from tanks the chances of success were extremely slim. Even the Princess Patricias, who had tanks with them in their bridgehead, were unable to make much headway beyond Villa Rogatti, and had their hands full retaining the ground they held.

Owing to the difficulties encountered on the 2nd Brigade's front, and especially the reported inability to get a Bailey bridge over the Moro, Major General Vokes decided to attack San Leonardo from the right rather than the left. On the division's right flank the Hastings and Prince Edward Regiment had managed to gain a foothold over the Moro in a well-executed if unexpected manner, so Vokes decided to prepare a hearty whack at San Leonardo by launching a two-battalion attack on it by units from the 1st Brigade. The division's

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[16] One piece of equipment the enemy had turned against them was a captured German 88-mm. gun. Sgt. H. Lay of the Anti-Tank Platoon and a few enthusiasts fired it against the German positions across the Moro during this period.

front would be reduced by the 8th Indian Division[17] taking over the Rogatti area which meant the 2nd Brigade would be shifted to the right. The Edmonton Regiment would not reinforce the Patricias' bridgehead across the Moro, but rather the brigade, after a short rest, was to be prepared to land the second blow on the enemy at San Leonardo once he had been struck by the 1st Brigade. During the evening of the 7th, when the 21st Indian Infantry Brigade relieved the 2nd Canadian Infantry Brigade, the Seaforths moved about a mile and a half to the northeast close to the area they had previously occupied opposite San Leonardo. The shelling and mortaring continued, and some of the vehicles which burst into flame seemed to give the enemy an added incentive which made it a rather uncomfortable night for the Seaforths as well as the Princess Patricias who moved in on their left that night.

Early on the morning of the 8th Lt-Col. Forin went to Brigade Headquarters where the new divisional plan and the part to be played by the 2nd Brigade was outlined to him. During the first phase the 48th Highlanders were to seize the high spur of ground between La Torre and San Leonardo from which the Seaforths had withdrawn on the night of the 6th. On the right, another 1st Brigade unit, the Royal Canadian Regiment, was to break out of the Hastings and Prince Edward Regiment's bridgehead and push south to take San Leonardo. This would give the division control of the Moro escarpment. The 2nd Brigade would be committed at once on the success of the 1st Brigade. Phase II would have the Seaforths move directly over the river through the town to a road junction a mile beyond it. The Edmontons would then be passed through to cut the highway, and the Patricias were to exploit to Ortona.[18]

The plan for the Seaforths was based on the success of the 1st Brigade, for with the far side of the Moro in Canadian hands the engineers could put in a crossing over the river near San Leonardo permitting the tanks to get forward. It was planned that "D" Com-

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[17] "The sappers of this division found no difficulty in constructing a Bailey bridge at the "impossible" place. Their men carried the equipment across the river and assembled it on the far side and launched it backwards. I can tell you I was in an evil temper when I learned about this, but by then it was too late." (Vokes to author, *op. cit.*)

[18] Directorate of History, "Account by Capt. W. S. Dewar, I.O., 2 C.I.B. given to Capt. Hughes . . . on 12 Jan 44."

pany of the Seaforths, mounted on several troops of tanks of the 14th Armoured Regiment (The Calgary Regiment), would be early across the Moro and this force was to get into a position beyond and west of the town ready to provide a left hook to the main attack nearer the highway. Tanks would also accompany the latter since it was known that German armour was in the area. Some two dozen mules with Indian drivers were also allotted to the Seaforths to carry mortars, ammunition and other heavy loads through the muddy valley and up the escarpment. This age-old and primitive means of transportation contrasted vividly with the fighter and bomber planes[19] of the Desert Air Force which crossed back and forth over the front all during the 8th, but in the circumstances the mules were to prove quite useful.

Late in the afternoon of the 8th the 1st Brigade began their attack. On the left the 48th Highlanders made good progress and had seized their objective by first light. On the right, it was a different story. The Royal Canadian Regiment was attacking across rather than through the front of the 90th Panzer Grenadier Division, and on the moonlit tableland it quickly ran into a repetition of the stubborn resistance which the Seaforths had experienced earlier. Despite their efforts the R.C.R. companies were unable to reach San Leonardo by daybreak, but the engineers, under the cover of darkness and taking advantage of the diversion of the enemy caused by the 1st Brigade, were able to create a crossing for the 2nd Brigade.

By dawn of 9 December the situation was not particularly bright, but the enemy might be pried from his position in San Leonardo if advantage was taken of the tank crossing across the Moro River. Hoffmeister was ready to try it. Captain A. W. Mercer's company was placed under the command of Major E. A. C. Amy, "A" Squadron of the Calgaries. At 0730 hours this combined group, told only minutes before they would have to fight for a bridgehead, set off down the hill into the valley and soon ran into difficulties as the tanks, their engines roaring, crawled forward. Two of them failed to make a sharp turn and toppled down a 30-foot embankment. "D" Company's runner, Pte. McConnell, was on one of them

[19] Some Seaforths saw an unusual incident occur when a small, slow, unarmed artillery observation aircraft was attacked by a German fighter but outmanoeuvred the diving Messerschmitt at tree-top level causing the attacker to slam into a hill.

and wound up underneath it but survived. Other Seaforths had leapt off and followed on foot. Down in the valley mortar and machine-gun fire forced the Seaforths off the tanks, but both tanks and infantry kept going. A short distance up the road into the town a tank ran over a mine blocking the road, but Amy was able eventually to get one troop through the mud and mines to the right through olive groves.

It was abundantly obvious that the column could not pass San Leonardo, as originally had been intended, but rather that the Calgaries and Seaforths would have to attack it. Lt-Col. Forin, listening into the wireless reports of the battle that was shaping up, concurred with the change in direction. Lt. J. F. McLean, who had taken over No. 18 Platoon only a few days previously, but who had already gained a reputation for himself at Agira, was directed to make a frontal attack on the town with his platoon and the troop of tanks while the rest of the company supported him on the right. Thus started a fierce and bitter engagement where both infantry and tankmen fought like lions. Under very heavy fire, and using superb leadership and tactics, McLean and his group battled their way up the hill, silencing an anti-tank gun, ten enemy machine-gun posts, killing at least eight of the enemy and capturing eighteen.[20] By this time it was almost 1000 hours, and No. 18 Platoon had been reduced to eleven all ranks. The tanks had performed valiantly but were held up temporarily by mines on the road about 100 yards from San Leonardo and the engineers had not yet arrived to deal with them. Several Seaforth pioneers with mine-detectors were despatched immediately by Lt-Col. Forin to help, and these were rushed forward on a tank. They arrived in time to help the R.C.E. party.

Some idea of the role played by the tanks is given by the squadron commander. "We established a foothold in the village", he wrote later:

> . . . and I deployed one troop to cover both the main road leading north towards Ortona and the dirt track leading east to the Adriatic. I positioned my own tank along with the F.O.O.'s tank to cover the main approach from the north. . . . the remainder of my tanks were scattered over the valley. . . .
>
> The infantry were working their way through the buildings and one

[20] McLean won the Distinguished Service Order. Major General Vokes wrote below his citation: "Much consideration has been given to recommending him for a higher decoration than the D.S.O. which latter decoration I consider to be well merited although he is not of field rank."

saw them only occasionally as they ducked from door to door or scurried from cover to cover. My main preoccupation was the enemy armour which had been reported the day before near San Leonardo. . . .

The enemy set fire to a haystack in front of my own tank and as I changed position I saw a German tank moving towards us from the north. It was a Mark III and we knocked it out at about 150 yards.

This all took place less than 100 yards in front of Lt. Charbonneau, who asked if he could move the position of his tank. I refused him and within minutes he himself knocked out a German Mark IV tank at about 40 yards. . . . This incident caused a Seaforth soldier who had been lying in the path of the oncoming German tank, to run up to Charbonneau's tank, pat it on the side and say: "You big cast-iron son-of-a-bitch I could kiss you."[21]

Meanwhile McLean decided to continue the attack. Helped by the fire from the tanks, he and his platoon stormed into the town and cleared it from end to end thus allowing the engineers to complete their task[22] and the rest of Amy's tanks to come through. Only five tanks were left to take up a position covering the northwest end of San Leonardo, but each one of the 32-ton monsters was a wonderful sight to the Seaforths who prepared immediately for the inevitable counterattack. Among those at the far edge of the village was Corporal G. F. Horan. He and his section had fought with exceptional skill from the time they had crossed the Moro. Horan himself personally accounted for two of the ten enemy posts encountered on the way to San Leonardo, and he and his section played a striking part in beating off the counterattack which developed later.[23]

The co-operation between the Seaforths and Calgaries was very good, despite the broken ground, mines and buildings which sometimes split the infantry from the tanks. Writing later about the time when his men had reached the eastern end of San Leonardo, McLean stated:

. . . our tanks came up the hill to the town entrance just below the flat part. Under very heavy covering fire from them we proceeded northward up to the far end of the town. There was great difficulty here but the job went quickly.

At this point we moved the tanks forward. Unfortunately either we had not cleared the town sufficiently or there were guns sited outside it. In any case they lost one or two tanks coming up the road.

Just about this time from the far end of the town we observed Ger-

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[21] Letter, Brigadier E. A. C. Amy to author, 1 November 1967.

[22] The Seaforths managed to capture a plan of the enemy's minefield at the river's edge. This was sent back by a despatch rider.

[23] Corporal (Acting Sergeant) Horan was awarded the Military Medal.

man tanks coming in from the north end. I brought the platoon together near the northern extremity of the town. Mercer joined us here and ordered us to pull back from our forward position and regroup. The tanks also pulled back and firing over our heads met the German counter attack. The attack was violent but did not last long.[24]

By about 1030 hours most of "D" Company was in San Leonardo and the enemy was withdrawing north-eastwards. To the right the Royal Canadian Regiment was closing up to the town and was advancing against lessening opposition. By this time too Lt-Col. Forin had ordered the remainder of the battalion over the river to reinforce and strengthen the hold gained by "D" Company and Major Amy's tanks. Some idea of the battlefield might be gained by the descriptions given by two men who were there—one a scout, the other a battalion runner. The former wrote later:

> We follow a draw to the left of "D" Coy.'s route. The sounds of shell, mortar and machine-gun fire come from all points of the compass . . . The body of an R.A.P. man lies beside the trail. I think I recognize him but can't be sure. A few yards further along four Seaforths form the spokes of a wheel. The hub is a shellhole with the smoke of H.E. still drifting from it. We go in single file, scouts leading.
>
> An Indian mule driver and mule, carrying ammo, are with us. We start up a gentle slope and are mortared, inaccurately. . . .
>
> There is Spandau fire on our right and the battle in the town doesn't slacken. German planes swoop out of the clouds dumping bombs and firing on our transport and reserve tanks across the river.[25]

Crossing the river a little later, came the runner. Reminiscing from a diary he kept at the time, he described the advance in part as follows:

> No artist, no writer could ever give a clear picture of the horror which must have struck the first troops in their attack. A few mules used for pack animals had bolted and in their frenzy left bits of hairy flesh scraped off by jagged tree trunks, and a stream spread from its natural course, oozed downhill, pink and muddy. Our dead still bleeding. The others were pale. I felt sick.
>
> No one spoke. 'Jerry' spotted us. . . . A burst of machine-gun fire dispersed us as we had been taught to do. I didn't look for cover. I could sense there wasn't any.[26]

By about 1330 hours most of the Seaforths were over the river. With them now was "B" Squadron of the Calgaries. Shell-fire was

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[24] Letter, Col. J. F. McLean to author, 1 August 1967. McLean added "We would have been massacred without the tanks."

[25] Seaforth Archives, Operation Accounts, "Accounts by A. K. Harris."

[26] Seaforth Archives, Journal of Pte. McKay.

still falling as they approached the town, and among the bursts the Seaforths could feel the special blasts of the enemy's six-barrelled mortar, the "Moaning Minnie" or Nebelwerfer. But even before the main body of the Seaforths arrived, "D" Company had been counter-attacked from the northeast with twelve tanks and infantry. This attack started shortly after noon, and while Major Amy's tanks fought it out with German tanks and self-propelled guns, "D" Company, joined later by the rest of the battalion and a company of the Royal Canadian Regiment, held their own against the infantry. Lt-Col. Forin, who had entered the town some hours previously to keep Hoffmeister well informed, was by this time the senior combatant officer in the town, so Brigadier Hoffmeister placed both armour and infantry under his command.

During the afternoon of the 9th, while the tank battle was going on north and east of San Leonardo, "A", "B" and "C" Companies entered the main part of the village and its environs to consolidate their position. Until the supporting tanks were free to rejoin them, there would be no opportunity to continue on to their original objective close to the highway, and with the enemy counterattacking themselves, the Hastings and Prince Edward Regiment as well as the Royal Canadian Regiment, it seemed unlikely that much more could be done that day. By seven in the evening, all Seaforth companies were digging in around the village preparing for further counterattacks. Most of the Calgaries' tanks were still operational, but a number had been knocked out either by enemy fire or accident —an indication of the fierceness of the battle since daylight. The Edmontons were en route to give local protection to the tanks in harbour and the Brigadier had suggested that Forin push on. Although at first agreeable, after consulting with the Commanding Officer of the Calgary Regiment he decided against it. More armour was also coming into the bridgehead, and in anticipation of carrying on the attack, "A" Company, now commanded by Captain Thomas, was "married up" with a squadron of tanks ready to carry on the task originally allotted to "D" Company.

That night San Leonardo was fairly quiet except for periodic shelling. Mules carrying medium machine-guns and 4.2-in. mortars were making their way up the escarpment from the river to reinforce the double ring of infantry and tanks disposed around San Leonardo. The Edmontons, together with tanks from the Ontario Regiment,

gave the brigade a stronger base for the battle expected on the 10th, while on the right of the village the Royal Canadian Regiment was in firm contact and thankful for darkness and a brief rest.[27] The Moro escarpment was now firmly in Canadian hands.

Early on the morning of 10 December, Lt-Col. Forin attended an "O" Group at Brigade Headquarters where the day's attack was outlined. A company of Edmontons and a squadron of tanks were to seize the objective just short of the Ortona—Orsogna highway,[28] then exploit to the highway itself. The Edmontons were to be supported by a similar group of the 48th Highlanders on their right and of Seaforths on their left. Intelligence reports had suggested that "the next defensive stand by the enemy would be made on the Arielli or the Foro Rivers several miles beyond."[29]

Shortly after 0900 hours the Edmonton Regiment started its attack and within an hour its leading column had reached its first objective a mile beyond San Leonardo. Comparatively little resistance was met, and the same was true for "A" Company of the Seaforths when, with "A" Squadron of the Calgaries, it moved forward on the left to take up a position on the high ground northeast of San Leonardo. As the Edmontons carried their attack forward to the highway, however, they were stopped by a hail of fire from a deep, narrow gully which ran parallel to the highway and acted as a huge natural trench for the enemy. "The Gully", as it was termed, ran from the coast inland for over a mile. It was a trench, an anti-tank ditch and a natural obstacle all rolled into one, and the enemy, dug into the near side, could not be touched by our artillery and was extremely difficult to get at with the mortars.

Some of the fire which stopped the Edmontons, and later the Patricias, fell on the Seaforths. One round in particular hit a tree at chest height very close to Lt-Col. Forin who was leading his Tactical Headquarters forward towards "The Gully". It burst and the shrapnel wounded him and Lt. D. S. McLaughlin, the acting Intelligence Officer as well as one of the scouts and a signaller. For a few hours Captain D. B. Blackburn took over command until Major S. W.

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[27] Of all the division's units in battle on the 9th, the Royal Canadian Regiment had suffered most casualties—a total of 21 killed and 53 wounded or missing.

[28] This was the original objective of the Seaforths.

[29] Vokes, *op. cit.*

Thomson arrived. A short time earlier as the companies dug in under enemy shell-fire, a mortar bomb burst inside the building housing Tactical Headquarters riddling the room with shrapnel and wounding Captain B. G. Parker, second-in-command of "C" Company, the Adjutant, Captain F. H. Bonnell, and some signallers. These and other casualties had been incurred as the Seaforths closed up behind the Edmontons on the evening of the 10th. Behind them, the 48th Highlanders were in La Torre and the Princess Patricias in San Leonardo. In San Leonardo, too, was the Seaforths' Medical Officer working desperately. One of those wounded at the same time as Lt-Col. Forin gave this eye-witness description of his journey back from the advanced to the main Regimental Aid Post:

> Advance R.A.P. is in a house fifty yards behind the gully. It is full of wounded and shell shocked men. King [30] is beside me, still breathing. There is talk of a German counter attack. A tank takes shelter behind the R.A.P. Mr. Gray[31] goes out to protest. We expect to be fired on at any moment but Gerry either doesn't spot the tank or refrains because he knows it's an R.A.P. He is still shelling the area heavily. An R.A.P. Jeep arrives. Lt. McLaughlin, King and I are loaded on it. King is unconscious but breathing.
>
> The Jeep creeps cautiously down the shell-pocked road to San Leonardo. I think that if I were driving I'd go all out. Shells blossom on the road on both sides, but the driver has critically wounded aboard and to hit a shell hole at high speed might kill them. He risks his life and takes his time....
>
> The R.A.P. is a dark room in a battered house. Lights from car batteries hang over blood-stained stretchers. Shells are still falling outside. Their crump is varied occasionally by the peculiar whirr of slate shingles blown from nearby roofs. There are many wounded.
>
> The M.O. [Captain Anderson] takes a quick look at King and he is carried through to the back room. He glances briefly at the field dressing on my leg. . . . My friend, Harry Coen . . . comes over and chats. Later I overhear him saying to Moose Molson that casualties in the battalion are very heavy....
>
> The door opens to a weird noise. Two men come in. One is over six feet and heavy. He is only a boy. His eyes are glazed and from his open mouth comes a scream that rises and falls with the noise of shelling outside. Behind him is an R.A.P. man. He has his hands over the youngster's ears and is talking to him in a soothing voice. The boy is an advanced case of "shell shock"....
>
> Fresh casualties keep arriving. The M.O. is desperately tired but he never stops working or loses patience with the shock cases.[32]

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[30] Lt-Col. Forin's runner.

[31] The Scout Officer.

The Medical Officer treated men from almost every part of the battalion on the 10th, for not only were casualties incurred as the battalion came up on the Edmonton's left, but the Germans were firing at any target from "The Gully" back to the Moro River. Truck drivers, cooks, medical orderlies, and so forth all came in for their share, and throughout the day the enemy's strength and determination made itself manifest along the entire front.

On the following day there was little let-up in the action. Shortly before 1100 hours "A" Company, by this time greatly reduced in strength, was ordered to try and seize a ridge several hundred yards ahead of the battalion's position which would allow it to dominate the westernmost part of "The Gully". Before 1300 hours "A" Company was on its objective, but Captain Thomas reported a large number of the enemy concentrating for a counterattack on their immediate front and called for artillery support. This was a good, opportune target but very close to "A" Company[33] which, being on high ground and on trajectory line, made it quite unsafe to engage the enemy in "The Gully". Consequently the Commanding Officer withdrew the company from the ridge and brought all the available artillery to bear on the target. Later observation confirmed an exceptional kill. Since it was too exposed and isolated from the rest of the battalion the position vacated was not reoccupied but was dominated by patrols. Supporting artillery fire kept the enemy from poking his nose out of "The Gully", and tank fire, directed on known or suspected German defence positions, hopefully made life as uncomfortable for the enemy as it was for the Seaforths. Certainly the Germans' shell and mortar fire during the day kept the Seaforths in their wet slit trenches, though to some extent the soggy ground absorbed a fair amount of shrapnel which, in the dry, rocky fields of Sicily would have caused more casualties; but to counter this the Germans used a liberal amount of air-burst shells. The same damp ground was having an adverse effect on the tanks whose treads churned up great gobs of earth and resulted in some of them bogging down and the rest being confined to existing roads or tracks.

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[32] "Account by A. K. Harris," *op. cit.* Among the fatal casualties was Lt. R. A. Wilson, a well liked and respected son of a former Commanding Officer.

[33] In this move Captain Thomas, commanding the company, was given as support an anti-tank troop. To his surprise it was commanded by his younger brother.

For the next two days the battle for "The Gully" went on all along the divisional front with little let-up. Canadian attacks were met with counterattacks, and although some gains were made and the defending forces ground down, the enemy's defensive position was extremely hard to crack. On the 13th, part of the Seaforths was engaged in an action which achieved a surprising success. The plan for the 13th was for a frontal attack on the crossroads beyond "The Gully" on the Ortona - Orsogna highway. Advancing behind an artillery barrage the Carleton and York Regiment was to attack beyond the Seaforths while on the right and left respectively the P.P.C.L.I. and the West Nova Scotia Regiment would make every effort to support them. The Carleton and Yorks managed to get as far as the crest on the lip of "The Gully" but there they were stopped. The two flanking units, both of which had seen constant action in the last several days, met the same fate.

At ten on the morning of the 13th, Major Thomson attended a brigade "O" Group. There he was instructed to send a company of infantry with the four remaining tanks of "C" Squadron of the Ontario Regiment to help the Carleton and York Regiment regain their momentum. The infantry-cum-tank team would follow a secondary road which ran westward from San Leonardo around the end of "The Gully" to meet the main highway a mile and a half from the cross roads. The route had been tried with some success earlier in the morning by the Ontarios and a company of the West Nova Scotia Regiment, and at the time the orders were given the possibilities for the Seaforth company seemed fair.

"A" Company, commanded by Captain E. W. Thomas, was chosen for the task. It met with Acting Major H. A. Smith's[34] few tanks about noon, and together the weak company (about 40-45 men) and troop-sized squadron (four tanks) set out towards "The Gully". Shortly afterwards "A" Company lost wireless communication with Major Thomson, and it was not until some time later that the full story of the attack came out.

After "marrying up" with the tanks, "A" Company made a sweeping approach to "The Gully" from the left with little or no opposition. As they came near the rise of ground before "The Gully", the company was ordered to fix bayonets and spread out in line.

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[34] The group was under Smith's command.

Interspersed along the line were the tanks. Captain Thomas was on the left flank and Captain D. S. Harley was on the right. It had been arranged that, once on the crest of the rise, the combined force would sweep forward, firing their weapons, going down "The Gully" Hell for leather and yelling like Indians at a massacre. As Captain Harley related later:

> As we came over the rise, it seems that they [the Germans] thought that instead of one company coming over, the whole brigade was coming over. That was the impression I got, because there was so much clatter. . . . There was no depth to our attack at all, and it therefore seemed that we were just the advanced company to a big attack that was coming. . . .[35]

The speed and surprise of this daylight attack simply astounded and overwhelmed the enemy whose slit-trenches were found to be only lightly manned. Behind the Seaforths the tanks were spitting fire all over "The Gully", setting on fire a tank near a culvert at the bottom of "The Gully" and, with the force of their fire, preventing the enemy from organizing. Within minutes, as the infantry and tanks poured down the hill, a most unusual and somewhat embarrassing situation arose. German soldiers began to surrender by the dozen, and soon the number of prisoners outnumbered the attacking force as they streamed out with hands held high. In a group of buildings, obviously a headquarters, a German commanding officer and his adjutant came out and surrendered to Captain Harley.

For a short time the attack was held up, owing to the need to round up the prisoners and send them back under a very small guard. By this time one of the Ontario's tanks was lost also, so that the dust and smoke of battle was thickened a bit more by at least two burning machines in "The Gully". The attackers soon resumed their formation,[36] however, and continued up the other side of "The Gully" which brought them to within a few hundred yards of the Ortona-Orsogna highway. The Seaforths and Ontario tanks then turned north and struck forward[37] along the axis of the road to Ortona. Captain Harley relates:

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[35] Seaforth Archives, Interview with Captain D. S. Harley by Dr. R. L. McDougall.

[36] "At this time my company strength was 32 all ranks. I formed two platoons of two sections, each with six men, and a third platoon consisting of myself, the C.S.M. and one or two others." (Note to author from Major E. W. Thomas, 22 October 1967).

[37] At about this point another tank was hit.

> . . . Our left hand man was at the edge of the road. . . . We went along through fairly open, undulating country; and soon after we swung we lost the second tank. And then we had one tank in the middle with roughly 20 men on either side, but well spread out, with a good 5 to 10 yards between each. Very shortly . . . we ran into a roadblock type of position with slit trenches, but pointing towards the gully. . . . they were surprised because we were coming in laterally to them, perhaps a little behind them. . . .[38]

The combined force carried on parallel to the road for well over half a mile, with the Seaforths in front and the armour close behind. "The armour", by this time however, consisted of only one tank, and when this bogged down the squadron commander raced ahead to halt the infantry attack from continuing. His orders were to destroy his tank should he get stuck, and as it was twilight and "A" Company was away out on a limb and out of communication with Battalion Headquarters, it was decided to return.

This decision was most disappointing to the men. In their advance they had taken from 75 to 100 prisoners,[39] including six officers. The accompanying tanks had destroyed two of the enemy's Mark IV tanks, two anti-tank guns, and three self-propelled guns to say nothing of the tremendous fire support they had given the company of Seaforths.[40] Casualties in the company had been very light, and in view of the remarkable success achieved by such a comparatively light force, morale was sky high and everyone wanted to carry on right to Berlin. To stay, however, was to court disaster. The nearest troops was a column similar to their own composed of a squadron of tanks from the 11th Armoured Regiment (The Ontario Regiment) and a company of the West Novies which had attacked Casa Berardi and were withdrawing to take up positions close to the Seaforths.[41] "A" Company withdrew back to the high ground at the head of "The Gully" which commanded the entrance to the highway. There the men dug in for the night.

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[38] Harley, *op. cit.*

[39] The Seaforths were able to scoop up part of this large number of prisoners owing to the simultaneous attack put in by the West Nova Scotia Regiment with supporting tanks further to their right.

[40] W.D., Seaforth Highlanders of Canada, 13 December 1943.

[41] W.D., H.Q., 2nd Cdn. Inf. Bde., Appendix, Intelligence Log, 13 December 1943, Serial 69; W.D., Seaforth Highlanders of Canada, 13 December 1943. The Seaforths could hear the sound of battle in the town and would have gone on but Brigade Headquarters wanted the force to return.

The attack, termed a "brilliant achievement" by the official war historian, had carried the column almost to Casa Berardi. Although forced to retire for tactical reasons, the vulnerability of the enemy's flank was exposed by the column and, as a result, the Canadian plan of battle was to change to take advantage of it. In terms of achievement, despite the withdrawal at the end of the day, no attack made by the Seaforths, with or without tanks, had up to that time ever resulted in such high dividends of enemy losses in killed or captured. When one considers the weakness of both the Seaforths' company and the Ontario's squadron at the outset, this small action combined the elements of dash, surprise, and ultimate success which would long be remembered in both regiments.

For the next six days the Seaforths were not thrown into further attacks against the Germans, but were moved slightly to the south close to La Torre where they protected the left flank of the division and conformed with the right hand units of the 8th Indian Division. All during this time, however, the Seaforths were subjected to enemy artillery and mortar fire, and there was a continuous trickle of casualties. Some of the shell-fire was from German heavy guns, and after being battered by them a story went around that the recoil from firing the gun sent its breech so far back that it was used as transportation of reinforcements to the front! Enemy aircraft slipped in periodically to bomb and strafe the area of San Leonardo where Tactical Headquarters was located, and so concentrated was the division that if the bombing or shelling hit any house there was bound to be someone killed or injured. The chilling rain and mud-churned landscape made any farmhouse, even if partially demolished, a prize to be occupied by any group fortunate enough to possess it, for their thick walls and heavy timbers provided fair protection except against a direct hit.

If the enemy made the Canadians suffer,[42] the Canadians' attack was chewing up the German divisions opposing them. On the 14th, for example, the 90th Panzer Grenadier Division had been so worn down by casualties and exhaustion that the German commander of the 76th Corps brought in the 3rd Parachute Regiment to bolster the defences along "The Gully", and it was against battalions of this

[42] From 5-13 December inclusive, the Seaforths suffered a total of 107 casualties. Of this number 33 were killed, 72 wounded and two were taken prisoner.

regiment, and later of the 1st Parachute Division, that the 1st and 3rd Brigades launched their major attacks in the days which followed. On 14 December Casa Berardi was seized after a terrific fight by the Royal 22nd Regiment and the Ontario's tanks, and the crossroad beyond on the 18th with the support of a tremendous artillery barrage[43] which shook the ground a mile away where the Seaforths were located.

With "The Gully" and the crossroads firmly in Canadian hands by the 19th, the time was at hand to commit the 2nd Brigade to the attack. On the same day the 1st and 3rd Brigades were tidying up their front and getting their units reorganized, the Seaforths—as part of the brigade move—were ordered eastward to the right flank of the division. Ahead was Ortona, a town of some 10,000 people in peacetime, and at this time an objective which was to call for the greatest tenacity and determination by the Canadians before it was captured.

On the morning of 20 December Major S. W. Thomson, together with the other unit commanders in the brigade, attended an "O" Group called by Brigadier Hoffmeister at the Seaforths' Tactical Headquarters to get the final details of the brigade attack on Ortona. Upstairs in the house where the battalion's headquarters was located one could get a sweeping view of the approaches to Ortona, and there an artillery F.O.O. had already established himself with his wireless set, map, binoculars, and other impedimenta in preparation for the attack. Initially it was thought that the enemy's next major line of defence would be along the Arielli River, but at the same time, knowing the 1st Parachute Division faced them, the Canadian divisional commander realized that to get Ortona he would have to give the enemy a major push even if the Germans were conducting a fighting withdrawal. Hoffmeister's plan of attack was simple. Initially the Princess Patricias were to seize an area of high ground on the brigade front which would gain for the brigade a platform from which one could assist the major attack. On the left the Edmontons were given the main task of advancing up Highway No. 10 to seize the outskirts of the town. To protect their right flank, the Seaforths were to clear the enemy from the gullies between the highway and the sea. Both the Edmontons and the Seaforths would be converging on the town on routes resembling two sides of an arrow-

[43] Three medium regiments, nine fields regiments and a heavy anti-aircraft battery of artillery were involved.

head, with the Patricias holding the narrow base. A heavy barrage was to precede the attack. It was known from patrol reports that the enemy had sown the approaches to Ortona with anti-tank as well as anti-personnel mines. Among the latter were "S" mines. When stepped on, they were designed to leap several feet from the ground and explode, scattering lead pellets waist high with deadly effect.

At about noon on the 20th "D" and "C" Companies of the Seaforths set out on their diversionary attack. On the extreme right of the line, their route took them over the crest of high ground down a steep slope to a brick factory, then across one of the main minefields between the factory and the highway. Beyond the minefield the ground rose very steeply to the outskirts of Ortona. Among the buildings was a typical, solidly constructed masonry church (Santa Maria de Constantinopoli) which was "C" Company's objective. "D" Company commanded by Captain Mercer, was to advance to a spur of ground jutting towards the sea which would place it in a position to give fire support to "C" Company coming from the right rear. Captain Harley's "C" Company, therefore, would have the longest distance to travel.

On the left of the brigade the Edmontons made faster progress than expected[44] and as a consequence "C" Company's zero hour was advanced 45 minutes which gave the company officers only the briefest time for reconnaissance. Furthermore the barrage that was to see them across the minefield was cancelled. The company started down the slope into the valley in fairly close arrowhead formation, with Sgt. Elaschuk leading. There was no enemy fire on the way down the slope, but in the valley the leading platoon soon advanced into the minefield. There was nothing to do but go forward. The humps of ground under which the mines were hidden were not difficult to spot, and the Seaforths made rapid time through this area dotted with the mutilated bodies of dead Germans caught, presumably, by Canadian artillery fire. It was like running across an egg-strewn

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[44] "The Seaforth H.Q. being almost at right angles to the Edmonton line of approach provided a grandstand view of the barrage behind which they were advancing. We were concerned about two splendid white oxen grazing in the path of the heaviest barrage we had been able to concentrate to date. It was a bit disconcerting to see all this firepower approach, pass over and have the oxen untouched and serene."
(Letter, Brigadier S. W. Thomson to author, 20 September 1967).

floor without cracking an egg, and the surprising thing is that this was accomplished without any casualties. Part of the reason for this is that "D" Company's fire was drawing the attention of the enemy. It was also partly owing to "D" Company as well as the surprise of "C" Company's line of approach that Captain Harley and his men were able to cross the valley without being fired on. As they approached the town, the lay of the land forced "C" Company towards the coast and, consequently, towards the steeper part of the cliff-like ridge which had to be gained to reach Ortona. By this time, and it was early afternoon, the company began to receive some of the fire which hitherto had been directed on "D" Company. The latter's commander had been wounded by this time, and its fire began to slacken just as Harley and his platoons began to scramble up the cliff on all fours. Apparently at this point, too, the German parachutists realized that "C" Company was making the main attack and, moreover, were right on their doorstep. While the Seaforths were still struggling up the cliff, the enemy began to lob grenades at them causing some casualties. Despite this the Seaforths went over the top of the precipice with bayonets fixed, clearing out the enemy from his slit trenches at the edge and neutralizing four machine-gun posts in the process. The comparatively sudden appearance of the Seaforths from so unexpected a quarter prevented the enemy from reinforcing this sector as quickly as he may have wished. A number managed to escape through the vineyards, and these and others now brought an ever increasing volume of fire into "C" Company.[45]

Some 400 yards ahead was the church whose main structure and belfry loomed over the vineyards, hedges, and scattered trees in the area. No. 15 platoon, under Sgt. Elaschuk, was ordered to make a left-flanking movement to secure a group of cottages occupied by enemy troops who were firing at the company. After a brisk fight the parachutists were routed. No. 14 platoon, commanded by Lt. D. C. Hanbury, was then ordered to make a right flanking movement on the church. By this time the enemy was beginning to increase his

[45] W.D., Seaforth Highlanders of Canada, December, 1943, Appendix "A": "Report of the Action Fought by 'C' Company on 20 Dec. 43 Before Ortona." This action could be seen clearly by "D" Company which, together with four anti-tank guns, were located on the spur overlooking the valley. The Germans and "C" Company were so closely engaged that "D" Company could not give close support with fire. (Information from Mr. W. R. Hyndman).

fire and was subjecting the company area to light mortar and small arms fire as well as sniping from the church. No. 14 platoon ran into heavy opposition with the result that Hanbury and five others were wounded while Sgt. J. Mottl and two privates were killed. The Germans were quick to press their initial success and, as the company commander wrote later:

> The enemy, immediately seizing the advantage, counter-attacked simultaneously on both flanks. 13 platoon successfully repelled the attack on their sector, but the remainder of 14 platoon lacking leadership began falling back in disorder. The Company Commander immediately ordered Lieut. Robinson, with 15 platoon, to the right flank with instructions to act boldly and repair the situation. Whereupon he led two sections of his platoon in a bayonet charge, knocked out two machine-gun posts and caused the enemy to fall back. During this operation Lieut. Robinson, Cpl. Doherty and one Private lost their lives, and two Privates were wounded.[46]

By mid-afternoon "C", although close to its objective, was in a rather difficult position. Captain Harley was in good wireless communication with Lt-Col. Thomson and looking back and down he could see the tremendous open space between his own position and the rest of the unit. He also realized that if the Germans wished they could go from Ortona along the beach and swing in behind him. "Looking down," he said later:

> I could see this tremendous opening, and I remember saying to Sid [Thomson] that on my seaward side there was a tremendous opening where a counter-attack could come in and by-pass us. He said: "All right, I'll keep that watched, don't you worry about that." Then I asked him for support and he said: "Well, I'll give you the 25-pounders."[47]

In the meantime Sgt. Elaschuk, out on the left, beat off another counterattack, and enemy fire from the church tower especially was making things rather difficult. One awkward situation which had to be dealt with was the removal of a small group of prisoners of war. With Captain Harley at this time, and indeed with him ever since the initial attack, was a war correspondent from the Manchester "Guardian". With his peaked cap, trench coat and brown shoes he looked like an officer on leave in London. Naturally he was unarmed.

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46. *Ibid.*

47 Seaforth Archives, Interview with Don Harley by Dr. R. L. McDougall, 7 June 1961, p. 7. A platoon from "A" Company was despatched to guard the seaward flank of "C" Company. Most of the low ground between the forward and reserve companies was overlooked by the latter.

However, the company commander had lost a number of men and he did not wish to weaken his company further, so he asked the newsman if he would take the prisoners back. The correspondent said he hadn't a weapon. Harley offered him a "Tommy gun", but the newsman protested saying he had never fired one in his life. "Just wave it around," urged Harley, but the war correspondent, wisely, stressed his non-combatant status. Ultimately a few of the walking wounded took the dozen or so prisoners back, but in doing so several men—both German parachutists and Seaforths—were blown up as they made their way through the minefield.

The wounded were another major concern to the company commander. Initially only one R.A.P. man had been allotted to the company with the promise that more would be following closely in the rear. Owing to blowouts in the road and the density of mines, the additional R.A.P. men were unable to get up to the company. The wounded had been collected behind company headquarters, but towards last light, when Harley called for artillery support, one of the shells landed within 50 feet of this area and inflicted further wounds on the casualties and put out of action temporarily the sole first aid man. Harley then ordered the wounded to be taken further down the cliff-like slope to a place which gave them better cover. This was better, but further shells landing after dark resulted in some of the walking wounded attempting to make it back to the Regimental Aid Post on their own. It is believed that several of these men were killed by mines on the way.

Before darkness fell further enemy counterattacks were made but the Seaforths held grimly to what they had won. Captain Harley cheered his men on, visited the platoon positions and, in the words of his citation for the Military Cross, "inspired his men to fight with a spirit that could not be beaten." That night "C" Company came under the temporary command of the Edmontons whose troops had reached the outskirts of the town and with whom the Seaforths were now in contact by patrol. The way the battle was shaping up it appeared that the 1st Parachute Division was not going to yield Ortona without a bitter struggle. In the week which followed the Edmontons and Seaforths were to find that they would have to blast their way block by block through the town.

Ortona was a comparatively small seaport with the Adriatic on the east, a gully on the west and a narrow approach from the south.

In the main part of the town the buildings were packed one against the other, with some of the larger ones rising to four or five stories. Except for the main thoroughfare—Corso Vittorio Emanuele—which was large enough to take tanks, most of the side streets were narrow, twisting lanes which lent themselves to defence. The Corso, which carried the highway through the town, spilled out to the north towards Pescara. It also carried German supplies and reinforcements into the town, and thus while the 2nd Brigade attempted to force a passage through the town, the remainder of the division was energetically engaged in trying to cut the enemy's route to the north.

On 21 December, as the Edmontons began to force their way into the town and the company of Seaforths consolidated its position around the church, Brigadier Hoffmeister decided to commit the entire battalion to the battle. The Edmontons were finding the going difficult, so Ortona was divided into two parts, with the Edmontons taking the right half and the Seaforths the left. Neither battalion was at full strength, and indeed platoons with only half their complements available were asked to take on tasks which would be difficult if sections were at full strength. To make matters worse, the reinforcements stream seemed to be drying up to a trickle, and with the constant daily casualties suffered by the rifle companies especially, the man at the front was frequently doing double duty. This, in turn, placed a great strain on everyone—privates and officers alike—and hastened the exhaustion which was so noticeable everywhere after a week of constant house-to-house fighting.

Fighting in such close quarters was new to the Seaforths, as were daily advances measured in feet or yards. It is almost impossible to attempt to describe the action that was fought by the battalion in the same terms as if it were engaged in attacking an objective which permitted room for the companies to manoeuvre. Thus what follows will be a descriptive montage—actions taken out of sequence and seemingly unrelated to one another, but which form part of that kaleidoscopic battle from the point of view of one or another engaged in it.

To understand the battle for Ortona and to grasp its flavour one must appreciate first the fanatical defence put up by the German parachutists, the cream of the German forces in Italy. These well-trained, highly skilled men were as determined to deny the town to the attackers as the brigade was to take it. Armed liberally with

automatic weapons and grenades, and backed by tanks, engineers and all the necessary military paraphernalia, they were able to select their defensive posts and fields of fire well in advance in an area with which they were thoroughly familiar. The enemy's siting of his weapons was exceptionally good, with each supporting another. His anti-tank gun sites were protected by snipers and machine-gunners, and as he knew the town well and was slowly being backed up, he could site these guns to over the few approaches tanks could take. He was also very good at preparing "killing grounds", that is open areas covered by his weapons which were death traps should the Canadians enter them. He also employed a limited number of flame throwers which were more terrifying than lethal owing to their limited range and bulk. An enemy soldier spotted with one of these weapons received immediate attention.

The German engineers, working closely with the parachutists, made excellent use of demolitions to create 12 to 15-foot high piles of rubble from the debris of buildings blown so as to collapse at street intersections. These barricades, and the approaches to them, were manned by machine-gunners. One way to deal with such obstacles was with the co-operation of tanks firing armour piercing rounds whose impact, slamming into the concrete blocks and stone, would slowly reduce the barricades to a height which the tanks could attempt to cross. The streets were frequently mined and there were anti-personnel mines in these barricades so that each one claimed its share of casualties before it was seized. One or two blocks away, as the Seaforths soon discovered, there would be another one.

Since streets provided such a "killing ground",[48] the Seaforths soon learned new principles of clearing a town, and during the week there evolved a pattern of advance which was measured in rooms taken and buildings seized. An excellent description of street-clearing at Ortona is described as follows by a "B" Company subaltern:

> With the help of excellent air photographs the town was split up into various definite areas with a rifle company responsible for each area. As our company, "B" Company, was short-handed, we divided the company into two large platoons. [This], I think, was very sound as I doubt if

[48] Since the streets were often mined, blocked or under fire, the Seaforths' anti-tank guns played a minor role. Two of them did get into the town and, located near the church, were used to shoot up the old castle fort when the enemy showed his nose from any part of it.

adequate control could have been maintained over three platoons for two reasons: first, the difficulty of communication . . . [made it] almost impossible to tell exactly where each sub-unit was operating; secondly, the danger of firing upon our own men.

The plan adopted by "B" Company was to send the two platoons down adjacent, parallel streets ensuring that each platoon maintained approximately the same rate of advance. After a platoon had successfully cleared one block a runner was sent back to Coy. H.Q. with the information. I would like to emphasize that in Ortona a platoon could not function as it does normally, viz., in three sections. The most satisfactory and safe method of operating was in small groups of three or four men. A large section of men couldn't possibly get from one position of cover to the next without incurring unnecessary casualties.

The enemy were very skillfully concealed. . . . He . . . employed any substantial building that offered a good field of fire. Every time we located an enemy position we usually lost a man and, in most cases, our casualty received an entire burst of machine-gun fire. It was "dirty" fighting because every man was well aware that before we found the next nest we would have another serious casualty. . . .

The most useful weapons were the Tommy gun, Bren, grenade and rifle in that order. On several occasions the Piat proved very handy chasing the enemy out of houses and from behind barricades whereupon the Brens and Tommy could be employed. The No. 36 grenade was an excellent weapon and everyone carried as many as possible.

In the larger buildings the enemy had large numbers of men but in the normal position there would be a [machine-gun] supported by two or three rifle snipers. The enemy fought magnificently even when their position was hopeless. . . . The outstanding feature of the week's fighting was the tremendous amount of efficient demolition work on the part of the enemy. As he retreated across town he systematically destroyed all large buildings.[49]

In large measure, in the Seaforths' as well as in the Edmontons' sector, Ortona was captured building by building. Once a building was cleared of the enemy, the "drill" was to get to the top storey and using a "beehive", Piat bomb or perhaps a German "Teller" mine, a hole would be blasted through the walls into the top storey of the adjacent house. Crawling through this hole, four or five men would start to clear it. One or more hand grenades tossed into an adjoining room usually ended opposition there, and just to make sure a Seaforth would spray the room with machine-gun fire before entering it. Then on the group would go until one floor was empty of the enemy. Then the group would start on the next floor down, after

[49] Seaforth Archives, File: December, 1943 Operations Accounts, "Comments on Ortona by Lt. K. M. McBride, 4 January 1944."

dropping several grenades down the stairs as a "calling card". Such work called for close co-operation and rigid control if one was to avoid hitting one's own men. Also, a Seaforth engaged in such work had to be exceptionally alert. A grenade might kill the enemy in a room, but as the Seaforth entered and surveyed the damage he might be shot at from a window in a neighboring house across the street. Some Seaforths went into rooms apparently free of Germans but nevertheless were wounded or killed by booby-traps ingeniously contrived to explode by the slightest pressure or by moving some object the enemy felt any soldier might pick up as a souvenir. There was also the possibility, too, that an entire building might be prepared for demolition several hours after the enemy were cleared from it. At the same time, the parachutists would infiltrate back into buildings which were cleared but left unguarded close to their own line.[50]

This type of fighting brought about some rather odd situations as the Seaforths, working closely with the Edmonton Regiment on their right, fought their way block by block through the town. Let us take "D" Company for example. On 20 December this company, down to a fighting strength of 42 all ranks, took over from the Edmontons' "D" Company in Ortona. It was extremely dark, and the enemy was in and around the ruined and shattered buildings they occupied. It was a bit hair-raising, during the lull of shelling, to hear Germans speaking only a few yards away. On the following day two patrols left to make a reconnaissance and went only 75 feet before they returned to report enemy positions—possibly the shortest "recce" the men had ever made. On the 22nd, when the company began to adjust to its new environment, No. 18 platoon was surprised to find a detachment of German troops underneath them. Adjustment was rapid, however, for "D" Company, like the others, soon became alert to the fluidity of street fighting. The day following Major Vance arrived to take over command of the company from Lt. J. F. McLean, but he was killed by a sniper the following day while trying to communicate with a tank.[51] The area was thought to be clear, but in Ortona death lurked in every corner. Lt. McLean again resumed command of the company which had at this time only one other officer. As one N.C.O. commented later: "I know when I went in I was Acting Corporal.

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[50] *Ibid.*, "Attack on Ortona." (An unsigned typescript).
[51] *Ibid.*, "D" Company, Seaforth of C., Dec. 20-29.

Before it was over I was Acting Corporal, Acting Sergeant, Acting Platoon Commander."[52]

Ortona was, primarily, a private and N.C.O's. battle, for when a building was being cleared either from the top down or the bottom up, it was done by small groups of men in such a way that an officer could not keep close control. Each group had its own story, and the innovations used to advance were frequently thought up on the spot. In one instance, when a large building was cleared, some Seaforths bowled grenades like cricket balls down a long hall while the parachutists attempted to retaliate in kind.[53]

Weapons were used in a way which was never mentioned in the training pamphlets. It took a good eye and judgment to fire a 2-inch mortar bomb through a window, but the effect was usually worth the attempt. Someone realized that the old Boys anti-tank rifle would be excellent for blasting locks off the sturdy front doors, and oddly enough at least one of these weapons was found and did just that. The Seaforths Anti-Tank and 3-inch Mortar Platoons were in the thick of it. The former, commanded by Lt. W. R. Hyndman, worked in an "anti-tank house" or "anti-barricade" capacity, sending round after round into enemy strongholds frequently over open sights owing to their flat trajectory. The mortar platoon[54] was equally busy lobbing their bombs farther afield. The "rear areas" of Ortona, where the company and Tactical Headquarters were located, were periodically shelled and mortared throughout the entire week, and the Seaforths' mortars retaliated warmly at every target—real or suspected—which offered itself.

One of the busiest platoons in the battalion was the signals. During the first few days Lt-Col. Thomson had established his headquarters in the Church of Santa Maria. Its brick walls and heavy, lead-tiled roof provided good protection against mortars and shrapnel, and on the upper storey the signallers could get a good reception with a No. 18 set. One of the men who helped to maintain contact with the companies wrote of this period:

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[52] Letter, G. F. Horan to author, 26 August 1967.

[53] The German "stick" grenade was good for throwing, not bowling.

[54] Commanded by Lt. W. D, Reid until 22 December when he took over as Adjutant, replacing Captain W, S. Murdoch. On the same day Major Thomson was informed by Brigadier Hoffmeister that he was to be acting Lieutenant Colonel.

> I ran messages to Support Company which was on a lateral road inland a quarter mile or so. Approaching from the south along the Adriatic a stream of equipment, supplies and men moved in continuous profusion. There were no quiet days nor still nights. The churchyard became a graveyard and the rectory became a little War Office. . . . Near the church mortars had blasted loose the covering of a crypt and rattled the brown bones of several generations. Someone put down a ladder. It was a substantial air-raid shelter.
>
> Inside the hollow church proper among the pews every sound above a hand clap ricocheted from wall to wall. A small shed on the lee side was used by signal personnel not on actual duty. They looked out across a choppy Adriatic and dreamed of the salty old Atlantic. And this was as it was—the gun smoke mixed with fog; wet soldiers; sad faced men going forward, wounded, patched up or dying.[55]

Communication in Ortona until the end of December was mostly by wireless or runner, though some field telephones were used when a company was in a stable position for a day or so. Although two signallers per company was the usual complement, the day and night activity soon took its toll. Lt. Gildersleeve, the Signals Officer, recalls that on the day before Christmas he could not get one of the company headquarters on the set. He went out with a spare battery and found "both operators so exhausted that they were asleep. They had been going for about three days without sleep or much more than the rum issue. One of them was "Pop" Warner and the other was "Kid" Wiley. Gildersleeve wrote later:

> I will never forget the sort of men we had in the Sigs. Platoon, from Sgt. Meade, M.M., to Sgt. Hicks, both experts at handling men and communication equipment down to the newest arrivals. With an ever compelling urge to 'get through' no matter what the cost, these men kept the command and information channels of the unit open, and usually with complete disregard of their own safety. Walking close to their Company Commanders with an overhead antenna waving from their backs they were obvious targets to enemy snipers; and wearing earphones in the midst of battle they were deprived of the usual warning of whistling preceding enemy bombardment.[56]

One of the highlights of the Seaforths battle in Ortona was the Christmas dinner provided through the hard and often dangerous work by the Quartermaster, Captain D. B. Cameron and his men. At this time three of the four rifle companies were fully committed with

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[55] Seaforth Archives, "Journal of Pte. McKay," p. 15.

[56] Seaforth Archives, Interview with Lt. Gildersleeve by Dr. R. L. McDougall, and Letter, Gildersleeve to author, October, 1967. Later a signaller tracing a cable found a basement full of choice liqueurs.

one company in reserve. The approaches of the town were under enemy fire, but Cameron, aware of the exhaustion of the men and the need to bring some cheer to platoons who had been fighting a hard and difficult battle, made arrangements to provide a first class dinner in the battered ruins of the church housing Tactical Headquarters. During the 24th, when Cameron began to bring up his special supplies, the companies had had an especially hard time wresting a church and a school from the enemy around "Dead Horse Square", so called because of the dead horse lying in it. A section from "A" Company, having gained the school, perished in it when the enemy demolished the entire structure with a previously set charge. Thus while the few men who could be spared scrounged chinaware from the ruined houses, Cameron and his staff set to work arranging long rows of tables with white table cloths, a bottle of beer per man, candies, cigarettes, nuts, oranges, apples and chocolate bars. Arrangements were made to feed each company in relays, and as one finished it would go forward and relieve the next. Soup, pork, vegetables and Christmas pudding provided the main fare, but as much as the meal meant, the spirit of the occasion meant much more. Two accounts give some idea of the event. The war diarist wrote:

> "C" Company was the first Coy. to eat Dinner in the church, a dinner none had felt possible under such conditions, but no one had truly tested the ingenuity and resourcefulness before of the Q.M. . . . and staff. From 1100 to 1900 hours, when the last man of the Battalion reluctantly left the table to return to the grim realities of the day, there was an atmosphere of cheer and good fellowship in the church, a true Christmas spirit. The impossible had happened. No one had looked for a celebration this day. December 25th was to be another day of hardship, discomfort, fear and danger—another day of war. The expression on the faces of the dirty bearded men as they entered the building was a reward that those responsible are never likely to forget.
>
> When C Company had finished their dinner they relieved A Company so that they might come back the 300 or 400 yards for the same.
>
> Christmas Day was no less quiet than the preceding ones, but it is one this Regiment will never forget. Pipe Major Esson played his pipes several times throughout the meals. During the dinner the Signals Officer, Lieut. W. Gildersleeve, played the church organ and, with the aid of an improvised choir organized by the padre, carols rang throughout the church.[57]

The padre kept a diary during the war in which he made notes

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[57] W.D., Seaforth Highlanders of Canada, 25 December 1943. Captain Cameron was awarded the M.B.E.

frequently in the form of brief phrases sufficient to recollect the day's events later. The following extract with its cryptic style describes the Seaforths' Christmas as he saw it:

> 25th—Sat. Xmas Day. Red Cross Jeep to Ortona with Tom Mercer and Paddy (Leo) Hawkins. Jerry sending shells over. Deathly chatter of machine guns. Rumbling of falling buildings, roar of guns (ours). Church. The tables set for Coys. Cards and talk and prayers in Cloisters. Roses, violets. Tom Vance. Col. Locket and the R.A.P. Shells whine and explode. "Holy Night." The meal for "C" Coy. Brigadier and Colonel cheered. The faces of new recruits.[58] Fine speech by Don Harley. Orders to leave for front—a few hundred yards forward. "A" Coy. returns from front. Weary, strained, dirty. . . . I collect them for carols in Cloister (careful to make all voluntary). They cheer and come and join me. Gildersleeve (Wilfred) on harmonium and I singing. Soon have about 35-40.
>
> Dinner. Medals for Indian (Webster, M. M.) and his Tommy gun. Sitting with patience waiting for Parachuter sniper to move first. . . . The order to return to front. Faces of boys new to warfare! The reluctance, the faraway look, the nervous strain, the slight inebriation in few cases. The excited talk. The news representatives. Sinclair & the "Highland Gentleman" from Siberia & Hongkong. Daily Express & Guardian Reporters. I dine with them & Syd.
>
> "B" Coy. comes in from front. News of Seller's death. Germans mining houses & blowing them after our boys get in. Mjr. Buchanan greets me enthusiastically. Carols from Pipe Organ loft. Postie, Gowan, & other officers & men are pumpers. Cooking goes on behind high Altar, men eat in main body of church. Piled up plates cover the altar; fruit & tins of provisions cover side altars. Carols, guns, vibration of near explosions, laughter, news of deaths. Wine, vaults, mail from home; signals bell with urgent ringing, yelling conversations over sets. Reunion of cronies. Farewell to return, as darkness begins to fall.
>
> Don Coy comes in at 5 PM (about). We organize singing in candle light by harmonium near high altar. I sang solo for a while with Gildersleeve at organ. Anxious time with lights. In flickering light & shadows I meet the men at the tables. (John) McLean Capt.
>
> The type of fighting in Ortona "We share same house, exchange grenades & shoot at his head if out of window & he at ours. Thowing grenades at each end of a long hall in dark behind sacks & boxes. Paddy & Jerry caught in same "storm" share room. Paddy's conversation takes highly critical course. I return with Pay to 'F' Esch. in pitch dark.

Although the Christmas Dinner stands out in the memory of all Seaforths, the 24th to the 26th of December were all days of stiff, heavy fighting for the unit. On the morning of the 24th paratroopers launched a heavy attack on the Seaforths front which, if successful,

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[58] About 100 badly needed reinforcements arrived the day previously.

would have had disastrous effects on the Brigade's position. As usual the front was so narrow (about 300 yards) and the enemy in such close contact that supporting artillery could not be called on, and even the battalion's mortars were ineffective in such close quarters. The threat was such that A/Lt-Col. Thomson made his way to the company positions and, although constantly exposed to sniper, machine gun and mortar fire, remained with the forward troops, directing and co-ordinating the defence, and showing a cheerfulness and coolness under fire which did much for the men beating off the attack. To see the commanding officer of the battalion at such a time somehow gave confidence to the private soldier, and Thomson's unruffled calm and big smile acted like a tonic. His tactical skill, gained under fire as a platoon and company commander, was evident as he went from post to post making sure that his men, more accustomed to the attack than the defence, had their weapons and fields of fire placed to the best advantage. The counterattack was beaten back,[59] and the slow, dangerous process of "mouseholing" from building to building continued without let-up.

"Mouseholing" could work both ways, and it was quickly found out early in the game that it was necessary not only to clear out a house but that the building had to be garrisoned against enemy infiltration. "C" Company's experience on the 26th was not untypical of some of the fighting at the time. It was on the left flank of the battalion front when two setions got cut off from the rest of the company. Early on Boxing Day the enemy managed to surprise this small group of Seaforths and capture them. For about seven hours the Germans held them until the rest of the company recaptured the house and the Seaforths were released.

By 28th December it was becoming evident that the paratroopers had been pushed out of Ortona. The street by street and block by block advance had carried the brigade to the northern end of the town, and the advances made on the left by the 1st and 3rd Brigades helped to loosen the enemy's grip on a town which the press was beginning to refer to as a minor Stalingrad. The vicious grenade battles and night fighting, the hammering machine-gun fire and blasts from exploding mortars were beginning to lessen to the extent that

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[59] A/Lt-Col. Thomson was awarded the Distinguished Service Order for the part he played in the Ortona battle.

on the evening of the 28th the war diarist wrote that "the night was very quiet, bringing to a close one of the toughest and bloodiest battles the battalion has fought." On the following day officials from "AMGOT"[60] arrived to take over control of the town and help the few civilians who remained[61] to start the long task of reconstruction. Mines and booby-traps, which were sprinkled liberally throughout Ortona, continued to take their toll, and the roar of buildings being blown up as the paratroopers withdrew across the valley to the north was a fitting climax to a week of fighting and destruction such as the Seaforths had never before encountered.

On the same day, even though enemy shells continued to land in the streets and the Luftwaffe hurled in all of six aircraft to bomb the town, burial parties were organized. After a month-long stint of fighting from the Moro River to the heights of Ortona, Seaforth casualties had been heavy. Rifle company strengths were extremely low. At times a company commander would think himself lucky if he had half of his war establishment strength at the front. Many who had served with the unit for years were now dead or wounded, and reinforcements coming up were no longer from Vancouver or British Columbia but represented every province in the Dominion. The bitterness of the loss of friends and comrades was reflected by one of the burial parties under an N.C.O. who wrote later:

> When it was all over I was detailed to clean up the mess in our area. We collected all own own dead all right but when it came to the Jerries we made a half hearted attempt to dig graves. But the weather was cold and the ground was frozen, so to Hell with it. We gathered them all up and heaved them down a well and heaved a hand grenade down with them. A real Vikings' funeral.

An officer who came up as a reinforcement to the unit from the Canadian Scottish Regiment attended the burial service a few days later when the Seaforths were laid to rest. "I can still remember the overwhelming sense of sadness at the burial service . . . ," he wrote. "[It] was held on a small level patch of high ground above the Adriatic

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[60] Allied Military Government. A/Lt-Col. Thomson was more than a little miffed to discover that AMGOT officers had aerial photos of Ortona far superior to those given to the fighting companies!

[61] Many had sheltered throughout the battle in a railway tunnel that ran north and south under Ortona.

and the lament fading slowly over the water emphasized the finality of it all."[62]

This, perhaps, capped the end of the battle but memories of it continue to live on in the minds of those who were there. Some will remember coming upon a Christmas tree left by the Germans with a note saying: "Sorry we can't stay to put mistletoe on you but we'll make it hot for you in the hills."[63] One Seaforth will never forget trying to loosen a brick to see into the next room only to have a paratrooper kick it into his face. A Seaforth patrol out on Christmas day recollects its surprise when it came upon a group of enemy soldiers singing Christmas carols in a basement, while others will never forget an Italian mother whose arm was shot off while she was carrying her baby. Shelling sometimes drove friend and enemy together. On one occasion a paratrooper and a medical orderly, both seeking shelter in the same room from the shrapnel ricocheting in the street, had a strong argument about the war in general. The paratrooper spoke English and the Seaforth, whose non-combatant status the paratrooper respected, was determined to give him a piece of his mind. They were not all like that. Most of the enemy fought until the last brick fell and one, taken prisoner when he was blinded but still had his weapon, said: "I wish I could see you—I'd kill every one of you."[64] He was not given the opportunity.

This was Ortona.

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[62] Letter, Mr. A. Staples to author, 10 August 1967.

[63] Durnford's Diary, *op. cit.*, p. 28.

[64] *Ibid.*

CHAPTER IX

The Spring Campaign of 1944:- The Hitler Line

The battle of Ortona climaxed the year 1943 for the Seaforth Highlanders of Canada. No battle they had fought since landing on the beaches of Sicily had been so intense or so vicious. At no other point had the Canadians met with and overcome such stubborn opponents as the German paratroopers. In no other action had the Seaforths paid such a high price in such a comparatively short time to win a victory. Between 20 and 28 December inclusive, the battalion lost 42 officers and men killed in action and another 78 had been wounded. The fighting during the earlier part of the month around the Moro River and San Leonardo had been almost as costly, but it had stretched over a longer period of time. December casualties caused a great strain on the battalion, and looking back to the total losses since the Seaforths landed in Sicily, the changeover in personnel accounted for approximately fifty per cent of the total strength of the Seaforths.

The impact of this change on the battalion was most noticeable to anyone returning to it who had been away for several months. Most of this change took place in December, 1943, and early January, 1944. The attrition among subalterns and platoon sergeants was most noticeable, even though the L.O.B. (Left Out of Battle) system had been employed for some time. Several months earlier all units had been instructed to keep a small nucleus from each platoon out

of battle so that, in the event of numerous casualties, there would always be a hard core of experienced soldiers around which the platoon could be rebuilt. Thus, supposing a platoon to have a strength of about 33 all ranks, some six or seven men would be kept in the rear when the battle commenced. If the platoon officer took in the group, then his sergeant remained behind and vice versa. The same thing was true on the company level. If, therefore, the company commander was killed or wounded, his second in command could be called forward to take his place. The L.O.B. "system" had the effect of husbanding officers, N.C.Os. and men at critical stages of the battle and made the task of rebuilding the platoon or company after a fight that much easier. But nothing could replace experience, that hard-won talent of survival and military know-how which was gained at such a high price.

Something of the casualties inflicted on the senior N.C.Os. can be seen in the promotion to acting ranks during December among the corporals. Those who gained their third stripe included A. Francis, A. V. Bowerman, L. L. Cross, D. McGowan and S. Maracle. Some of these replaced sergeants who, in turn, became acting Company Sergeant Majors such as J. M. Duddle, J. Gibson, C. McCafferty, J. Elaschuk and W. G. McNaughton. One of the former C.S.Ms., Matthew Black, was promoted to acting Regimental Sergeant Major to replace R. H. W. Ireland. A rather unusual promotion took place early in the new year when, by special authority, Sgt. J. A. LeClaire was commissioned in the field to the rank of Lieutenant to become the Seaforths' Transport Officer. LeClaire had been a brigadier at the outbreak of war, had voluntarily resigned his commission and ultimately served with the Seaforths for some time before being commissioned again. He was one of a number of Seaforths whose backgrounds ranged from service in the International Brigade during the Spanish Civil War to participation in a variety of other revolutions and uprisings during the "troubled thirties."

Promotions up the ranks of the N.C.Os. and warrant officers was matched by those in the commissioned ranks but at a slower rate. One of the difficulties in breaking through the "acting appointment" barrier was the inflow of reinforcements holding confirmed ranks. Thus a lieutenant during the course of a battle might become acting second in command and then company commander, but a week after the battle was over a new reinforcement captain and major might de-

throne him from the dizzy heights of acting field appointment back to the more prosaic position of platoon commander. After the Ortona battle a number of reinforcement officers joined the battalion. Among them were acting Captains E. D. Fulton, L. J. Courtin, D. G. Duncan, Captains H. L. Glendinning and R. E. M. Cross, and Lts. L. W. Leckie, O. H. Mace, V. C. Moore, A. Staples, T. E. Woolley and F. T. DeBanke. Some of these officers had served with the Seaforths before, and were returning for service after hospitalization or from postings. Most of them, however, were newcomers to the battalion in the field, and they were fortunate in that they were able to become accustomed to front-line conditions when the unit was holding a quiet sector. This held true also for a large number of reinforcements who came to the unit in January from the Perth Regiment, the Irish Regiment of Canada, the Westminster Regiment and the Cape Breton Highlanders. These were not direct transfers, but rather diversions from the reinforcement stream into a battalion whose severe losses necessitated immediate replenishment. As a result, the Seaforth Highlanders of Canada began to lose its once local or parochial colour. No longer was the great majority of the officers and men in the unit going to claim greater Vancouver as their place of residence, and the "K"[1] in front of a man's regimental number would not be so common on the regimental orders and nominal rolls.

Despite these changes, there was one thing which remained the same, and that was the spirit of the regiment itself. The reputation of the unit stood very high by the end of the Ortona battle, and those who came to it absorbed the Seaforth traditions and pride which had been built up year by year for over three decades. This sense of belonging and of being welcomed was fostered in a variety of ways. It was passed on by those who had been with the unit for years, indeed ever since militia days. The Pipes and Drums playing their traditional tunes was another means of accustoming newcomers to the regiment's environment. The unit's hat badge clipped into his balmoral and the Seaforths' buff on blue shoulder title set above the red divisional patch brought them closer into the regimental family, as did various other features, large and small, which made the newcomer identify himself daily more closely with the Seaforths.

A conscious effort to provide a continuity of command was

[1] "K", the eleventh letter in the alphabet, was one of the identifying marks of a private who enlisted in Military District XI.

made at the higher echelon. Up to the time when Lt-Col. Forin was wounded, the commanding officers of the battalion had been Seaforth officers who had served with the unit since the pre-war years. Major Thomson, who was acting Lieutenant Colonel during his month-long tenure of command, had been with the unit since 1940, but he had not had the requisite senior officers' training which would qualify him for more than acting rank. His ability in the field was unquestioned as his D.S.O. and M.C. attested. It was generally hoped that he could receive his staff training and return to the battalion, and by a fortunate set of circumstances this was arranged. On 30 December, Lt-Col. A. J. Creighton, who had served with the Seaforths in peacetime,[2] arrived from Canada via the United Kingdom to assume command of the battalion and shortly thereafter Major S. W. Thomson returned to take the Senior Officers' Course in England. At the same time, Major D. M. Clark arrived to assume the duties of second-in-command. Serving in "A" Company at the same time was his brother, Lt. J. A. Clark. Both were sons of the former commanding officer of the 72nd Battalion, C.E.F., Brigadier General J. A. Clark, who was still very active as Honorary Lieutenant-Colonel of the regiment. Regimental tradition and family tradition often marched in step.

When Lt-Col. Creighton took over command on 30 December he assumed charge of a battalion which was tired to the point of exhaustion. For almost ten days weak companies had been fighting under conditions which would have taxed strong companies, and the strain on all ranks could be seen on their faces. Brigadier Hoffmeister had told the Seaforths that they would remain in Ortona for a month to reorganize and re-equip. Although it was not possible to gain the full month promised, for the next three weeks the unit had at least a partial rest in the town even though all during this time Ortona received intermittent shelling from enemy guns and accepted philosophically the periodic air raids which the *Luftwaffe* brought. At that

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[2] Lt-Col. Creighton was a graduate of the Staff College (Camberley). He had served on the directing staff of the Company Commanders' School, South Eastern Command, and of the Senior Officers' School. Prior to his return to the Seaforths he was at the Staff College, Kingston. It might be noted here that earlier, when Lt-Col. Forin was ill with jaundice, he remained in command so as to give Thomson more experience as a second-in-command and thus be more capable of replacing him rather than "import" a commanding officer outside the regimental family.

it took a while for the Seaforths to get accustomed to walk openly in the streets of Ortona rather than dash across them.

During this time the Seaforths were billeted in homes and buildings in Ortona which still boasted a roof and some degree of protection from the elements. A certain amount of scrounging from bombed houses yielded up a variety of furniture which, with a little inventiveness and a wide measure of imagination, could make the new quarters modestly comfortable. Civilians were beginning to return to the seaport, but the Allied Military Government officials took care of them. The main thing the Seaforths were interested in was food, sleep and a bath, and those in "A" and "B" Echelons worked hard to ensure that they got it. For some it was the first opportunity they had had in days to wash and shave, and every passing day saw morale go up steadily. Parades were numerous: bath parades, meal parades, pay parades and muster parades, and interspersed with these were periodic visits to the Q.M. stores for clean clothes, new equipment and new weapons.

The reorganization of the battalion was concerned primarily with the absorption of the large number of reinforcements and their allotment to the various platoons. Combined with this was the reshuffling of officers and N.C.Os., and among the former especially the turnover in appointments early in 1944 was considerable. For example, "A" Company was commanded successively[3] in the next few months by Captain McLean, Captain Glendinning and Captain Allen until, by May, McLean had been promoted to Major and took it into battle once again. Lt. W. Roberts was assigned the Mortar Platoon but he was replaced when he was wounded a few weeks later. Captain W. G. McGuire had command of "C" Company until he was wounded late in March, after which it was led by Captain F. N. Pope, then Captain F. H. Bonnell. Lt. F. Whiting had the Scout Platoon until mid-March when he was replaced by the Intelligence Officer, Lt. Sir A. G. A. A. Mackenzie, who subsequently turned his job over to Lt. R. K. Swinton. And so it went until the battalion was withdrawn completely from the front in preparation for its next major engagement.

There was probably no town in Italy which became so familiar

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[3] In "A" Company, as with the others, command was sometimes temporary while the company commander was sick, on leave or on course.

to the Seaforths as Ortona. Having helped to capture it, one of the first tasks which had to be done was to clean it up. Bulldozers driven by the Royal Canadian Engineers were used to clear much of the rubble, but civilian parties working under the direction of the unit pioneers helped a great deal as well. In several cases it took a few days before bodies of Seaforths could be recovered from the buildings where they had been covered with debris from enemy demolitions. There was also the danger of encountering unexploded booby-traps as well. One tragic incident occurred in mid-January when a dozen Italians were killed when one of them struck a teller mine when digging into the ruins.

It was while they were in Ortona that the Seaforths first encountered elements from the 5th Canadian Armoured Division. This formation, which had arrived in Great Britain in 1941, had come to Italy in November to form part of the 1st Canadian Corps.[4] Owing to the difficulty in obtaining vehicles, the armoured brigades of the division were not committed for some time, but the division's 11th Infantry Brigade was sent north in mid-January to relieve the 3rd Brigade. Units from this brigade passed through Ortona on the 11th en route to their first engagement. Their new equipment, cocky cheerfulness and eagerness for battle caused considerable banter as they passed by the Seaforths who felt that the infantrymen from the 'mighty maroon machine" would learn their lesson soon enough without advice from them. The 11th Brigade's attack towards the Arielli on the 17th brought with it a more modest demeanour when next the two brigades met. This meeting came soon enough, for on 17 January the Seaforths were informed they were to relieve the Irish Regiment of Canada on the following day.

When the battalion moved to the front line about three miles northwest of Ortona it began a three month tour of duty which saw it engaged in almost continual patrol activity. Although during this period it switched about from one area of the front to another, its duties were similar in motive and the entire period might be considered as a whole. Generally speaking "no man's land" was quite wide, with some of the enemy's forward defended areas almost half a mile away across the flat-bottomed valley of the Riccio River, while others were much closer. The area was usually quiet by day, but at

[4] The 1st Canadian Corps, commanded by Lt-Gen. H. D. G. Crerar, became operational at midnight on 31 January 1944.

night it became very active with patrols from both sides probing and prodding the others lines, each trying to dominate the valley and the outposts overlooking it. As one company commander relates:

> They [patrols] were all difficult and hard on the nerves. One of the best actions I have ever seen in the war was carried out by Lt. J. Charters on the Lanciano front. He took a reconnaissance patrol of six men across the valley in broad daylight. Fortunately he was able to leave the Seaforth side under cover because of a brief snowstorm which came down suddenly. He got down into the valley without being seen and the sun broke out. We watched his progress from our side through binoculars. After about half an hour we saw the patrol approach the ridge on the other side, about half a mile away. Suddenly Charters jumped up from his crawling position and started firing his pistol into the ground in front of him and throwing grenades. Up into view came several 'Tedéschi' from their trench. He cleared out the group and then brought his patrol back home....
>
> Another amusing episode . . . occurred when one of the patrols set forth at night with the greatest care and stealth to cross the enemy's lines. All proceeded well until about half way across. Then there was a tremendous 'Whoopee' from one of the men. He had apparently secreted a bottle of vino under his jacket and was imbibing at every halt, of which there were many. The patrol, as I remember, returned in good order but not so quietly![5]

Patrols varied to suit the occasion. They were carried out day and night, but mostly during the latter. There were fighting, reconnaissance, listening and ambush patrols, and since most Seaforths had their turn on one of them sooner or later, it might be well to describe them briefly here. Generally a patrol leader would be a sergeant or lieutenant, and the number in the patrol varied from five to ten men depending on the task set for it. A fighting patrol would usually consist of a dozen men armed with grenades, carbine machine-guns and sometimes explosives for demolitions. Their job was to seek out and kill the enemy, take prisoners if the opportunity offered, destroy enemy outposts and in general to deny control of "no man's land" to the enemy. A reconnaissance patrol ranged in strength from two to five men. Frequently it was given a roving commission to check on enemy developments, report new enemy defences, probe his F.D.Ls., seek out his heavier weapon emplacements, and scout for information which might be valuable not only to the unit but to the artillery and supporting aircraft. Sometimes the "recce" patrols penetrated behind the enemy's lines. A listening patrol was also usually small, and

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[5] Letter, Lt-Col. J. F. McLean to author, 22 November 1967.

although it crept, crawled and slithered through the muddy ground close to the enemy's lines, its task was somewhat similar to the same job being done by the men manning company outposts. The difference was that the patrols were mobile and close to the enemy's lines. A listening patrol tried to gain intelligene of the enemy's locations and intentions by sight and sound. Voices, the sound of digging, the unmistakeable noise made by vehicles, the flash or sound made by the enemy's mortars, guns or machine-guns, the muffled noise of a German patrol or sentry—all of these when located, noted and recorded by the Intelligence Officer helped to establish the pattern of defences facing the Seaforths. Such a patrol would avoid contacting the enemy if possible. Frequently, too, it would attempt to establish itself in one spot so that it could take compass or sight bearings which, when compared with other patrols, could pinpoint the enemy and his activity. An ambush patrol was somewhat like a static fighting patrol, and frequently was the same size. If a pattern of enemy movement could be observed, whether it be a path usually taken by an enemy patrol or a house, empty during the daytime but occupied after dark with some regularity, a patrol of Seaforths might be sent out to deal with the situation. With hands and faces blackened, wearing rope-soled shoes and so equipped as to move quietly with considerable fire-power, the Seaforths would set out and patiently wait for the enemy to make an appearance. If things went well, the enemy patrol or position would be wiped out.

This kind of activity, like a double-edged sword, could cut both ways, and creeping about in darkness, never knowing when one was going to bump into an enemy patrol whose intentions were equally murderous, called for strong nerves and good discipline. Like the Seaforths, the enemy had his own methods of discouraging these ventures near his lines. His anti-personnel mines, cleverly hidden and impossible to spot in the darkness were frequently deadly means of surprising the rash and incautious.[6] Rocks in cans suspended on barbed wire could give away the position of a group and result in withering machine-gun fire directed on fixed lines, or perhaps a

[6] A favourite device of the Seaforths was to pull the pin of a No. 36 grenade (keeping the handle depressed) and insert the grenade into a smoke-blackened can. A wire tied to a stake at one end and the grenade at the other, would pull the grenade from the tin can, the handle would fly up and the grenade would explode in four seconds.

shower of grenades from an otherwise silent enemy outpost. A patrol caught in this position usually was lucky to return with one or two killed or wounded, and to return to one's own front lines bringing the casualties was very dangerous as well as difficult.

Nor were the enemy willing to surrender the control of the area beyond their lines easily. A week after they had moved into the line, for example, a forward section from "A" Company heard a shot ahead and below them near their observation post. It was only shortly after dark and enemy mortar bombs had been falling in the area. Upon investigation it was found that the two men were missing —captured by a German patrol.[7] Some time later another enemy patrol managed to come close enough to a Seaforth post that it hung a white cloth on a nearby tree which enemy artillerymen used as an aiming post to shell the position.

Patrols, especially those operating at night, had the advantage of surprise but frequently found themselves in ticklish positions. An excellent example of that is a patrol out on the evening of 27-28 January by Lt. Dave Fairweather of "D" Company. Fairweather, as a former sergeant and now junior subaltern, had attended the annual Burns Night supper put on by the sergeants in Ortona. This dinner, which the Seaforth sergeants had held every year no matter what the circumstances, was a tremendous affair and the bard of Scotland received his due in excellent style. Fairweather, whose platoon was in the line, got back to his trench at four in the morning and after stand-to he was told to report directly to the commanding officer at Battalion Headquarters. Here he was told that he would have the dubious honour of taking out the first fighting patrol and it was to be that night. As he wrote later:

> It took me most of the day to make the reconnaissance and get things organized. We had drills laid on which made things easier so that I was well prepared when it was time to go. There was one thing I found out about a fighting patrol, and that is, if you wanted to you could always find trouble. My patrol certainly found it that night. We ended up in what I estimated as an enemy platoon position, watching a sentry about 100 feet away. I was out in front of the patrol and had Lance Corporal Pete Barker with me. The sentry had a rifle slung over his shoulder, and I had just made up my mind to rush him, when he got out of his trench and walked around the corner of a house, about another 100 feet from his trench. We hear him challenged by another sentry. I told Pete to cover me and

[7] W.D., Seaforth Highlanders of Canada, 25 January 1944.

went forward into the sentry's slit trench. As soon as I was in the hole, I found out that there was a connecting tunnel to another slitty ten feet away. I did not know if he had a buddy in the trench or not so I crawled through. There was no one in there. When I came up in the second hole the sentry was on his way back around the corner. He did not understand my 'handen-holt' until he got a burst from my Tommy. This really opened things up. The second sentry came running around the corner and got the next burst. Four of them came out of the house and Pete Barker opened up on them. The rest of the patrol joined in and a real fire-fight developed. A heavy machine gun started thumping at us from about 300 yards away so I decided it was time to go. One of the patrol was missing. However, he showed up at the rendezvous which I had arranged. This was approximately half way back to our lines. By this time the whole front was in action. The Jerries were stonking all their D.F. (defensive fire) targets and our side were doing the same. We stayed where we were for an hour until everything quietened down and then got back into our own lines at 0330 hours. Once I got the men down I reported to battalion headquarters and made out a patrol report. It was almost daylight when I finally got back to my platoon—in time to "stand to". We must have got Jerry mad at us because he put on almost half an hour hate program, using mortars mostly. In any case, one of my platoon was hit, and when I went over to help him another salvo landed and both myself and a First Aid man were also hit. I was out for six weeks then came back in time for a few more patrols in the static line. . . .[8]

About a week later an "A" Company patrol under Lieutenant Stewart Lynch was sent out to nab a prisoner if at all possible. Lynch had heard of an enemy machine-gun post on the other side of the shallow valley separating the Seaforths from the enemy and this seemed as good a position as any to start operations. When near his objective Lynch ordered all but one man to remain quiet while he went forward to scout the post. As he made his way forward, he came upon a German listening post and was challenged. Lt. Lynch killed one of the sentries in the post with his "Tommy" gun and wounded the other. Then he withdrew to the rest of the patrol and disposed it near the listening post to ambush any rescue party that might be sent by the enemy to its assistance. After waiting for ten or fifteen minutes without result, Lynch and one Seaforth went to the post again, took the wounded German prisoner and started back towards "A" Company lines. The patrol had not gone far when enemy machine-guns opened up on the far side of the valley. Lynch ordered his men to take cover, while he stayed with the prisoner and finally helped to carry him up the slope to the company outposts. One Seaforth was

[8] Letter, Lt-Col. Fairweather to Author, 10 September 1967.

wounded and another killed as a result of the enemy fire, and the Germans emphasized their feeling by mortaring "A" Company's area. Meanwhile, Lynch asked for artillery fire to discourage the enemy machine-gunners and the assistance from the guns allowed the rest of the patrol to make it back safely bringing their two comrades with them.[9]

When Lynch finally brought in the wounded German paratrooper, the enemy soldier was treated with great care. Both the brigadier and the divisional commander had wanted identification of the enemy opposite the 2nd Brigade, and Hoffmeister was so pleased to get one after a week of unsuccessful trials, that he ordered a rum ration for the entire battalion. The prisoner, when questioned in the R.A.P., gave valuable information, not only about his own front but about flanking units as well.[10]

The steady series of patrols, and the occasional platoon or company attack on a limited objective, took its toll during the late Winter of 1943-44. There was a steady trickle of killed and wounded, and some of the officers and men who came to the unit after Ortona were evacuated as casualties having served with the unit only a short time.[11] About once a fortnight the Seaforths would switch their front to relieve one of the other battalions in the brigade and permit it to go into reserve and late in February the Seaforths came out of the line for a two weeks' rest at San Vito when the 2nd Brigade went into reserve. "Rest", however, is a rather loose word, for if anything it meant a change in activity rather than a cessation of it. While here an N.C.Os.' course was started which continued to process corporals and sergeants until the division left the Adriatic Coast. A Scout and Sniper School began also, and training ranging from lectures and tactics to range practice kept the men busy. Lt-Col. Creighton, who always paid careful attention to training and who realized the need to bring the large number of reinforcements up to a high standard as quickly as possible, saw to it that every man was given the opportun-

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[9] Seaforth Archives, File: "Honours and Awards," citation for the Military Cross, Lt. S. Lynch.

[10] The prisoner was 18 years old and kept a diary which was taken. Entries in it showed that the pressure of Canadian patrols, artillery fire, air bombardment, etc. was having the required effect on enemy morale.

[11] Jaundice was prevalent among all ranks and resulted in many having to be hospitalized.

ity to learn the realities of warfare from the best instructors available.

Early in April, when the Seaforths were on that part of the front close to and facing Crecchio, patrolling went on with undiminished energy on both sides. The enemy on this front was quite aggressive, and as a result the forward outposts of the Seaforths were wired and often approaches to them were booby-trapped. Nevertheless on 10 April one group of Germans came into "no man's land" and blew up a house, usually occupied at night by a platoon from "B" Company. A few days later another enemy group tried to storm another Seaforth outpost but was driven back, leaving dead, identified them as belonging to the 755th Regiment of the 334th Division. On 17 April, in another bold raid, German soldiers, closely following a well-laid pattern of shell-fire managed to overcome a Seaforth section of six men and took them away as prisoners of war.

On their part the Seaforths were equally active. Patrols towards Crecchio were carried on night and day, and on various occasions the mortar and anti-tank platoons were able to bring up their weapons close to the front and get in some excellent shoots which, by direct observation, caused numerous casualties among the enemy. The Intelligence Section was especially good at gaining and piecing together the steady variety of reports coming in from patrols, observation posts, scouts and snipers and their own examination. So good were they that on 6 April the Divisional Intelligence Officer came to the unit to study their methods, and paid them the compliment of saying that theirs was "the most efficient in the division!"[12]

It was during this time, too, that the cold, blustery, rainy, frigid weather, began to ease up. As Lt-Col. Creighton wrote later, "unless you have lived in the open in the cold rain and wet snow of a bad Adriatic winter it is hard to describe. It has all the hardships of a war with none of the glory."[13] For almost three months the Seaforths had examined, studied and crawled over the terrain north of Ortona, and the pleasantest sight they saw was the tinge of green begin to spread over the fields and bushes which grew in depth as the sun's rays began to dry up the mud which stuck to everything. One Seaforth who must have been especially pleased with the change was Lt. "Wilf" Gildersleeve, one of the tallest men in the unit, whose large feet complemented his tall frame. The Commanding Officer remembers him

[12] W.D., Seaforth Highlanders of Canada, 6 April 1944.
[13] Letter, Brigadier A. J. Creighton to Author, 5 October 1967.

coming back to battalion headquarters after a tour around his signals posts with so much mud clinging to his boots that they looked like snowshoes. "He would fish carefully through the mud, untie his laces and gingerly remove his feet from what looked like two big lumps of mud."[14] Warmer weather and drier ground also meant the likelihood of renewed action and an end to a static front. Such, indeed, was to be the case, and by mid-April a second movement order to Brigade Headquarters was to set in motion the transfer of the battalion away from the Adriatic.

When the Seaforths began to receive, for the first time, copies of "The Maple Leaf", the Canadian soldiers' newspaper which started in mid-January, they had available to them a paper which was flown from the presses to the front and thus contained up-to-date news. The Anzio landings on 22 January and the fighting from Cassino westward along the Garigliano River was followed with intense interest in "The Maple Leaf's" columns. The occasional map which appeared showing the distance which separated those in the Anzio bridgehead from the main body of the Allied troops made it fairly obvious that a major battle to join the two forces could be expected in the Spring. Rome was the prize and closely connected with it was the blow which could be dealt the German armed forces prior to the cross-channel attack on France. If the Allied armies in Italy could wear down the enemy, force him to bring more formations into the peninsula, and at the same time seize Rome, it would greatly assist the major seaborne attack against Normandy. To accomplish this, however, would require the breaching of the Gustav and Hitler lines and this, in turn, necessitated first a vast reorganization and transfer of troops from the Adriatic over the mountains to the Liri Valley.

Although there were various signs behind the lines that a move was imminent, it was not until 21 April that Lt-Col. Creighton held an "O" Group and told his officers that the 3rd/1st Punjabs of the 10th Indian Division would be relieving the Seaforths two days later. They were also told that they were leaving the front to do some special training in which the entire division would be involved. Speculation ran the whole range from a transfer back to Britain to take part in the Second Front to the G.O.C.'s humorous reply to a soldier that the

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[14] *Loc. cit.*

brigade "was going to Hollywood to make a movie!"[15] All divisional and unit identification badges were ordered removed for the trip as part of a much wider scheme to deceive the enemy as to the whereabouts of the division. On a higher level, "dummy" headquarters with wireless personnel was established to continue the normal stream of wireless communication which the enemy was known to monitor. It was hoped Field Marshal Kesselring might be led to expect a seaborne landing north of Rome.[16]

On 23 April the Seaforths left the Ortona area and in a long convoy of vehicles headed south on a three-day journey towards an area they had fought through in October, 1943, driving in easy stages by way of Vasto and Larino, the unit then swung farther inland to Campobasso, south past the road leading to Baranello and then to its new area a little over two miles east of Vinchiaturo.

The new area in which the battalion was located had a sort of rugged, well-worn beauty about it. The terrain was hilly and rocky, but the weather was cold and windy. For the first five days it rained in a steady downpour, and since most of the Seaforths were in "pup" tents life was most disagreeable despite the arrival of a heavy mail and an occasional issue of hot rum. The "Sally Ann" tent burnt down and the Auxiliary Services Supervisor moved in temporarily with the padre. He, in turn, soon had his own troubles when his vehicle was "borrowed" by a wine-happy Seaforth who in a brief, enthusiastic journey managed to turn it upside down.[17] The miserable weather, which played havoc with the training syllabus, began to change at the end of the month. Route marches, at times with the Pipes and Drums, relieved some of the montony. Generally it was a happy battalion which received word that it was to move, this time almost due east to the outskirts of Lucera near the Foggia airfield. Here, on 9 May, the Seaforth Highlanders of Canada met with the North Irish Horse.[18]

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[15] Directorate of History, File: H.Q. 1 Canadian Division, "Summary of Operations of 1 Cdn. Div., 1 to 15 Apr. '44."

[16] Col. G. W. L. Nicholson, *The Canadians in Italy, 1943-1945*. Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1956, pp. 391 ff.

[17] Those who saw the accident blanched at the thought of the mess inside for, as one man put it, ". . . the padre's vehicle was living quarters, marriage bureau, Bible school, church and (also contained) other sundry-articles. . . ." ("Journal of Pte. McKay," Book 3).

[18] This armoured regiment, commanded by Lt-Col. E. V. Strickland, M.M, had arrived in Italy from North Africa only a few weeks previously.

For the next few days the Seaforths and Irish were busily engaged in infantry-cum-tank exercises, thus beginning a brief but very close association with a unit with which it would share one of its hardest won battle honours. The North Irish Horse was equipped primarily with Churchill tanks,[19] and although the Seaforths on more than one occasion had gone into action with the armour both on a regimental and squadron level, there were numerous reinforcements of all ranks who had no experience of this nature. The training took the form of lectures by the North Irish Horse officers to the Seaforths, demonstrations of the capabilities and limitations of a tank, rides on the tanks by platoons of the Seaforths, practising communications between the infantry and tanks while on the move and so forth. By and large the Seaforths had great respect for the huge monsters and their fire power, but at the same time many could not help but think that the noise they made together with their bulk offered good targets to the enemy. The infantryman, accustomed to mobility and trusting to his ability to get cover from fire either in a ditch or a slit trench, felt sorry for the troopers in their 40-ton tanks. The troopers, on their part, tended to sympathize with the infantrymen on the battlefield exposed to shrapnel, bullets and various other pieces of steel which ricocheted off his tank. The infantry-cum-tank training went well, and one of the features of it was that the officers and men of both units could get together after the various exercises and got to know each other personally.

On the last day of training orders were received to move across the mountains. Preparations for an attack through the Gustav to the Hitler Line and beyond were far advanced, and although in the opening phase of the spring campaign the Canadian Corps was to be in reserve, concentration of thousands of troops preparatory to battle was well under way. On 12 May the Seaforth column made its way south through Troia, then west through Oriano, Benevento and finally to the small town of S. Agata about 22 miles northeast of Naples. Far to the northwest the opening phase of the battle had started and that evening Lt-Col. Creighton gathered the battalion together to "put them in the picture." Aside from outlining the task of the Eighth Army and the possible course of events as far as the Canadian Corps was concerned, he also informed the men that he, himself, would be leaving very shortly to become the Director of

[19] These were the first Churchill tanks used in Italy.

Training in Ottawa. His place would be taken by Lt-Col. S. W. Thomson who had completed his Senior Officers' Course and was en route from Great Britain. Two days later Thomson arrived to assume command and Lt-Col. Creighton left the following morning.

In the four months he had command of the unit Lt-Col. Creighton had accomplished a great deal. Fortunately for the Seaforths they had in him an expert in training and administration at a time when these talents were especially needed. When Lt-Col. Thomson took command the Seaforths were once more at full strength, and the several hundred reinforcements which had joined the unit since he commanded it at Ortona were as well trained as he could wish. He found a number of changes, as was to be expected, in the battalion but there had been changes at the higher levels as well. He had been back only one day when Hoffmeister dropped in to see him. Hofmeister had been promoted to Major-General and now was General Officer Commanding 5th Canadian Armoured Division. Brigadier T. G. Gibson now commanded the 2nd Canadian Infantry Brigade while Lt-Gen. E. L. M. Burns commanded the Corps on Crerar's return to Great Britain on 19 March.

A day following Hoffmeister's visit, during which he probably gave Thomson a more up-to-date account of the breaching of the Gustav Line than could be received over the wireless, the Seaforths were ordered to move closer to the front. The route took them northward along the Valturno River Valley to Dragoni, then westward to Highway No. 6 and north again to Mignano. Shortly after the Seaforths arrived, Lt-Col. Thomson was informed that the division was to relieve the 8th Indian Division in the Liri Valley and thus on 17 May the Seaforths moved north again near Pignataro.

At about this point the Seaforths were passing through what had been the Gustav Line. As they marched towards their new area and as the sounds of the guns banging away a few miles ahead of them became louder, the sights of the great offensive were everywhere. The traffic on the roads was extremely heavy. Huge trucks, tanks, ammunition carriers, ambulances, jeeps, artillery vehicles and a variety of other four-, eight- and ten-wheeled trucks trundled supplies, weapons and equipment forward to ensure that the front-line troops had everything they needed. So recent was the battle that unburied German dead were still exposed to the sun and heat and the smell was nauseating. German prisoners of war straggled to the rear,

some young, some old and most of them tired, haggard and despondent. Wrecked buildings, knocked out tanks, scattered equipment, rifles stuck in shallow graves with a British or German helmet on top of them, occasional dead animals, charred houses—these and other sights, wrapped in a never-to-be-forgotten odour which the warm mid-May weather made all the more pungent, greeted the Seaforths as they settled down for the night to sleep made restless by occasional German air raids.

During the next two days the battalion eased forward, each time in bounds of about two miles. Off to the right they could see the dark, massive bulk of Monte Cassino about five miles to the north. Closer at hand, to the south, was the long range of mountains which shed numerous streams into the Liri River. The river itself, which wriggled and twisted its way to the sea could be seen at times to the south as the Seaforths advanced slowly up the valley. Ahead, to the west, the valley opened and widened, forming a broad corridor to Rome which the Allies were as anxious to use as the Germans were to deny. By 19 May, the Seaforths were three miles east of Pontecorvo, very close to the Hitler Line, and at this point it might be well to examine the defences established by the Germans and tasks which the Seaforths were given to help breach them.

The Hitler Line had been under construction for many months. Running across the Liri Valley, it formed a belt of defensive installations immediately in front of the area through which the Canadian Corps was to attack. The defences were well placed, cleverly camouflaged, and so sited as to funnel attacking troops into positions which were to be killing areas for German artillery and machine-gunners. Every 150 to 200 yards along the line were concrete-covered steel shelters almost impervious to anything but direct hits. These held almost a platoon of men. Scattered about were specially constructed pillboxes in which were mounted machine-guns or anti-tank guns. Encased in steel, and sticking only a few feet out of the ground, these were very difficult to spot and almost as hard to hit. Aside from these sunken, steel and concreted strongpoints there were numerous field defences, belts of barbed wire, mine-fields, anti-tank ditches, anti-personnel mines, machine-gun and weapon pits, and so forth. For five months the enemy had prepared his weapons, studied the terrain, improved his fields of fire, concealed his strongpoints, and prepared himself to make this line across the valley as difficult and as

dangerous an obstacle as the Eighth Army had met since it landed in Sicily.

The Gustav Line, which was the forward defended line, had been attacked and breached by the British 13th Corps on 11-12 May. Ten days later the Canadian Corps, which had joined the advance up the valley on 16 May, stood at the outer fringes of the Hitler Line. By the 17th both the 1st and 3rd Canadian Brigades had been committed, and the short bounds made by the Seaforths during this week represented the general movement of the 2nd Brigade in reserve following closely on the heels of the 1st Division's advance. By the 20th the 1st and 3rd Brigades, on the left and right respectively, had advanced to the outskirts of the Hitler Line and the 2nd Brigade, moving in tactical formation, was close behind them.

The task facing the divisional commander was to commit the 2nd Brigade where it would be most likely to maintain the division's momentum.[20]

On the 20th the G.O.C. decided that the main thrust would be on the division's right, just south of Aquino and held an "O" Group at 1200 hours to outline his plans which, two hours later, were given out at the brigade level. The movement of the battalions of the 2nd Brigade to relieve those of the 3rd Brigade was cancelled before it was due to take place that evening. The divisional commander, examining the progress made by the 1st Brigade, felt an attack on the left would be more fruitful. During the night 20-21 May, however, he was ordered by the corps commander to widen the front of his attack. It was then decided that the 2nd Brigade would, indeed, attack on the right and the 3rd Brigade, sidestepping left, would attack simultaneously on a one-battalion front. On the 21st this new plan was issued shortly after noon, and arrangements were made to send on scouts to study the new area while reconnaissance parties went forward to gain the information necessary to guide the battalions into their forward position. By this time the Seaforths, as well as the other units, were on one hour's notice to move, but an order cancelling the expected

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[20] In a message to the division the Army Commander said in part: "The enemy is far from beaten but he is shaken. Take risks. Find his weak spots. Push on boldly. Keep him moving." (W.D., H.Q., 2nd Cdn. Inf. Bde., Appendix I: Intelligence Log, 21 May 1944, Serial No. 8.)

move came on the evening of the 21st postponing it for 24 hours. This gave time for additional but limited patrolling.[21]

By the 22nd everything was in readiness for the "set-piece attack". The 2nd Brigade was to advance on a two battalion front with the Seaforths on the left and the Princess Patricias on the right. Supporting the Seaforths would be two squadrons of the North Irish Horse which, by this time, were close by them. In addition, the battalion was given a troop (four guns) from the 90th Anti-tank Battery and support from a troop of self-propelled anti-tank guns. The attack was to be in two phases. In the first preceded by a barrage from the guns of the 3rd Field Regiment, R.C.A., the two battalions were to secure the line of the Aquino-Pontecorvo road, a distance of about 1500 yards from the start line. In the second phase, after a sixty minute pause in the barrage, the Seaforths on the left and the Loyal Edmonton Regiment[22] on the right were to advance beyond the main highway to a series of low hills which lay due north of Pontecorvo. H Hour[23] was to be at 0600 hours on 23 May.

The ground between the Seaforths' taped start line and the final objective was undulating, dotted with farmhouses and treed areas. Along the left boundary of the unit's line of attack ran a small stream, running at right angles to the start line. There were few roads, and generally speaking it was only fair tank country. Anti-tank mine fields were known to exist and only those immediately in front of the start line had been gapped. Information about the enemy varied as might be expected since the front had been shifting since the Gustav Line had been breached. One could take an optimistic or pessimistic view of possible resistance depending on the source one favoured. Those who had been in battle before were wise enough to expect the worst and be happy later if their fears were groundless. However, the Seaforths were to find that the enemy and his defences were far stronger than was known or suspected, for in numerous instances neither aerial photographs nor intelligence reports spotted well cam-

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[21] Directorate of History, "2nd Canadian Infantry Brigade in the Liri Valley Battle," Section II, The Battle of the Adolph Hitler Line.

[22] The Edmontons were to go through the Princess Patricias, who would protect the right flank. On the left of the Seaforths the Carleton and York Regiment would gain the intermediate objective and the West Nova Scotia Regiment would leapfrog them to the final objective.

[23] The term "H Hour" replaced the earlier "Zero Hour" on 3 May 1944.

ouflaged gun emplacements which could sweep the lines of advance with murderous efficiency.

The plan of attack within the battalion was laid down by higher authority. All four rifle companies were to be committed. Leading would be "A" and "D" Companies on the left and right respectively with "B" and "C" coming behind. Each company would have two platoons forward followed by Company Headquarters with the third platoon coming up behind it. Advancing with the infantry would be the tanks of the North Irish Horse. The Seaforths knew that before they got to their intermediate objective there would be a belt of barbed wire about twenty feet wide and about one to two feet high. Bangalore torpedoes were taken by the pioneers attached to the companies to blast a route through this obstacle if the artillery barrage did not cut the wire sufficiently, and presumably the tanks could grind it down if both failed. This belt of wire, however, was also sewn with anti-tank mines and some anti-personnel mines.

For the Seaforths the days before the battle, and especially the changes in plans and timings, were days of mounting tension. The expectation of a major battle and the preparations for it always create some degree of strain, and German air-burst shells dropping periodically in the battalion area causing casualties did nothing to relax the men. The padre noted in his diary:

> My boys move in tonight. I see them off. How can one ever forget the scene. New boys with fear and nerves and anxiety hidden under quick smiles and quick seriousness. Old campaigners with a far-away look. It is the hardest thing to watch without breaking out into tears.[24]

The move up to the West Nova Scotia Regiment's area which was to provide the firm base for the Seaforth's attack took only a short time, and by dusk the companies were dug in. Those who could, got some sleep. An enemy air raid shortly after midnight disturbed some, but when reveille came at four in the morning an interrupted sleep was the last thing anyone thought of. Breakfast was a slice of bread and a slice of Spam. There was no time for tea, but hard rations were issued to each man should he get a chance to eat later in the day. Somewhat surprisingly mail was handed around too.

Between 0430 and 0530 hours last minute preparations were made. The Churchill and Sherman tanks of the North Irish Horse came forward to "marry up" with their respective companies, one

[24] Seaforth Archives, Diary of H/Maj. Durnford, p.54.

squadron with the two forward companies, the other with the next wave. The companies themselves moved back about 200 yards from the start line to be well clear of the opening barrage. It had been hot and sultry the day before, and as H Hour approached a clear sky above gave promise of burning off the ground mist which lay over the tree-dotted field ahead. Behind the companies Lt-Col. Thomson had established his Tactical Headquarters in a house on top of a hill but screened from the enemy's view by trees. The Regimental Aid Post of both the battalion and the supporting armour was established in the same building.

Everything was ready when, promptly at six, the guns roared out and within seconds the peaceful, park-like countryside errupted as shells threw up earth and dust. As soon as the opening three minutes fire had lifted to fall 100 yards ahead, the Seaforths moved forward crossing the start line at 0607 hours. For a short time the attack went well. Every five minutes the artillery barrage would lift another hundred yards, and between 0600 and 0700 hours the battalion was more than half way to the intermediate objective. But well before this time the enemy retaliatory gun and mortar fire had grown in intensity, and the leading companies were only a few hundred yards beyond the start line before casualties began to start coming back to the Regimental Aid Post. Captain C. G. Preece, the Medical Officer, was to have one of the most exhausting and difficult days he had ever encountered.

Between 0630 and 0700 hours also the tanks of the North Irish Horse were encountering mounting resistance. To an extent the tankmen had some protection from the mortar and artillery fire which was taking its toll of the Seaforths, but some of the tanks began to strike mines. The dust thrown up by the shelling, the smoke from the guns and the ground mist cut down visibility to only a few yards. By 0730 hours the tanks reached the barbed wire, but between this point and the objective there were 400 yards of open field. There was no communication with the infantry owing to casualties among infantry personnel carrying wireless sets. This open ground was to be a graveyard for the tanks. As the North Irish Horse historian wrote later:

> At 0800 hours Major G. P. Russell M.C., led the move of B Squadron out of the wood and across the ground towards the objective. One hundred yards from the objective very heavy anti-tank gunfire was opened on this squadron as a result of which five tanks, including those of Major

Russell and Capt. M. B. Pope, M.C., were knocked out. Major Russell was seriously wounded, Capt. Pope slightly. Major Russell's tank was found later to be no more than thirty yards from a Panther turret emplacement but tank commanders could not see more than ten yards at this time owing to the dust. Lieut. J. H. Pyl, however, on the left of B squadron, reached the objective with his troop and there found some of the Seaforths who pointed out a house to him which was two-hundred yards beyond the objective and from which they said they were being heavily engaged. Lieut. Pyl's troop immediately destroyed this house and silenced all opposition from it, after which operation he withdrew his troop to join the remaining tanks of B squadron. Capt. W. M. Mackean, M.C., now commanding B squadron, advanced into the clearing, but was immediately engaged by enemy anti-tank guns. Under cover of smoke he succeeded in extricating his tank from this position but the tank was then knocked out by another enemy anti-tank gun. Captain Mackean and his crew evacuated the tank but were pinned to the ground by enemy machine-gun fire.[25]

The events described above took place during the first hours of the attack, and some of the problems faced by the tank crews were being shared by the Seaforths as they groped their way forward behind the roar of the barrage, their numbers thinned each passing minute by enemy fire.

The forward company on the left, "A", was commanded by Major J. F. McLean. This company was less than a third of the way to the objective when the smoke and dust became so thick that at one point McLean had to check his compass to make sure the company was going in the right direction. As the leading platoons closed to the belt of barbed wire, rifles and machine-guns opened up, apparently from a ridge about fifty yards beyond. The left forward platoon was commanded by Lt. W. D. C. Tuck. He relates what happened in these words:

Each platoon moved with 2 sections up and 1 back. Attached to the company and under my wing was a bangalore torpedo party led by Corporal Bob Peebles. The barrage, of course, was pounding away and within minutes it became impossible to hear or pass orders. My last one was to Cpl. W. B. Sked . . . to the effect that in order to keep direction he must try to stay up out of the gulley until we reached the first objective. Shelling then became very intense.

It must have been at about 0620 that I saw Peebles go down and hand

[25] *The North Irish Horse, Battle Report: North Africa and Italy*. Belfast, W. and G. Baird Ltd., 1946, p.33. Some of the men whose tanks had been knocked out fought with the Seaforths as infantry during the remainder of the day.

> his bangalore torpedo to someone else. I quickly lost sight of Cpl. Weston . . . and it became apparent that . . . the only effective formation would be groups who hopefully would stick together. . . . I think it must have been about 0645 when I saw Sked ahead about 25 yards and slightly to the left. I thought that he was moving too far left and I started to jog towards him . . . that was the end for me because I caught a sizeable chunk of shrapnel through the open collar.[26]

The Company Commander, meanwhile, went forward where he met Cpl. E. S. Weston from one of the leading platoons who informed him that Lt. Tuck had been wounded, Lt. McLaughlin had been killed, and the forward sub-units both were depleted and shaken. McLean then returned through the wire and brought up his third platoon commanded by Sgt. McGowan. At about this time, and it was still early in the morning, Lt. T. E. Woolley and his platoon from "D" Company on the right came up. With both platoons McLean attacked what looked like a redoubt but which turned out to be a German bunker. The enemy inside were persuaded to come out and were sent back through the wire as prisoners of war. Lt. Woolley meanwhile returned to his own company.

"A" Company then pressed on towards their objective. Cpl. Weston, at about this point, reported to McLean that he had lost one of his sections which he thought must be ahead, and both the corporal and the major scrambled forward to try and spot it. In doing so they crossed the main road, so McLean immediately returned and got on his wireless set and informed Lt-Col. Thomson where he was and pleaded for reserves. Thomson had no reserves to send, but promised to urge the tanks forward if at all possible. McLean again went over the road to find the lost section of men. To the left Pontecorvo could be seen, and more encouraging was the sight of a platoon from the Carleton and York Regiment pushing over the road towards the second and final objective. Behind him Company Sergeant Major McMullen was getting what remained of the company dug in. Before Weston and McLean could return back to the main company position three German tanks appeared, possibly drawn by the sight of the North Irish Horse attempting to close up to the Seaforths. In any event, the enemy tanks, after manoeuvering about, fired into "A" Company's position. The company commander was wounded and knocked out. Cpl. Weston was killed. Communications had now

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[26] Letter, Mr. W. D. C. Tuck to author, 22 November 1967.

broken down. C.S.M. McMullen was told to take charge of the company, now dug in along the line of the road, while McLean was helped by two privates back beyond the wire. As he wrote later:

> I was half dragged, half walked back to the small shelter in the trees on the other side of the wire. My recollection is very vivid of this trip, probably because it was done pretty slowly. The firing continued on my right flank and the North Irish tanks were in a very, very desperate position. Nearly all of them were broken up on the hill, apparently in an attempt to reach our . . . position. Most of them were burning and only one had gained any distance up the hill. Although the tanks had tried very hard to get forward, at no time did they get within 75 yards of our position. The scene was one mass of devastation, burning tanks, wounded men, shell holes, continual firing, etc. . . .[27]

Among the men in "A" Company who did an excellent job was Pte. Walter Kadeniuk. When his section commander was wounded he took over command. Shortly thereafter, when he and his men were held up by one of the numerous machine-gun posts encountered on the advance, he charged the position single-handed, firing his Bren gun from the hip, killing three of the enemy and capturing the post. He was wounded in the leg in this action, but it was courage and resourcefulness[28] such as this which allowed the company to get forward.

Those in "A" Company along the road were in an unenviable position. C.S.M. McMullen did a marvellous job, but to see the withering fire of the enemy cut up the advancing tanks of the Irish was as depressing as the arrival of the tanks immediately to his front which had struck down McLean and others. The enemy tanks had spotted the Seaforths and rolled up pouring machine-gun fire into slit trenches.

"B" Company, commanded by A/Major J. C. Allan, had followed "A" Company into the attack with No. 12 Platoon on the left, No. 11 Platoon on the right and No. 10 Platoon in reserve. This company quickly ran into the hail of fire and smoke which "A" Company had encountered. In charge of No.12 Platoon on the left was Lt. Artindale. By the time this group reached the first belt of barbed wire casualties were mounting and it was difficult to keep a sense of direction. Corporals Beard and Cromb made their way forward and on top of a ridge spotted some Seaforths in a slight gully on their

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[27] Letter, Lt-Col. J. F. McLean to author, 7 October, 1967.

[28] Pte. Kadeniuk was awarded the Military Medal.



Brigadier General J. A. Clark, C.M.G., D.S.O., V.D., C.D.

Honorary Colonel
The Seaforth Highlanders of Canada

1957 –

HONORARY COLONELS




Colonel J. A. Macdonell, D.S.O.



Maj. Gen. J. W. Stewart, C.B., C.M.G.

HONORARY COLONELS



Colonel The Honourable E. W. Hamber, C.M.G., K.St.J.



Colonel H. R. MacMillan, C.B.E.

COMMANDING OFFICERS



Lt. Col. R. G. Edwards Leckie, CMG 1910-1914 (Major General)




Lt. Col. J. S. Tait, OBE 1914



Lt. Col. G. H. Kirkpatrick, DSO 1914: 1918-1924 & 2nd Bn. 1941



Lt. Col. J. A. Clark, CMG, DSO, VD, CD 72nd Bn. C.E.F. 1915-1918 (Brig.-General)



Major F. E. Leach, 1915-1916 (Lt. Col., 321 Bn., C.E.F.)



Major R. H. Tupper, 1916-1919



Lt. Col. A. D. Wilson, DSO, VD, 1924-1928, 2nd Bn., 1940 (Brigadier)



Lt. Col. R. M. Blair, VD, 1928-1933



Lt. Col. R. W. Brock, 1933-1935




Lt. Col. J. R. S. Lough, CBE, DSO, MC, VD, 1935-1937 (Brigadier)

COMMANDING OFFICERS



Lt. Col. T. S. Leslie, ED, 1937-1939



Lt. Col. J. B. Stevenson, ED, 1939-1941 (Brigadier)



Lt. Col. C. C. Ferrie, ED, 1941-1942 (Colonel)



L. Col. J. M. S. Tait, ED, 1942



Lt. Col. B. M. Hoffmeister, CB, CBE, DSO, ED, 1942-1943 (Major General)



Lt. Col. J. D. Forin, OBE, ED, 1942-1943; 1946-1947 (Colonel)



Lt. Col. A. J. Creighton, CBE, ED, 1943-1944 (Brigadier)



Lt. Col. S. W. Thompson, DSO, MC, 1943-1944 (Colonel)



Lt. Col. H. P. Bell-Irving, DSO, OBE, 1944-1945 (Brigadier)



Lt. Col. D. M. Clark, ED, 1945; 1947-1950 (Brigadier)

COMMANDING OFFICERS



Lt. Col. H. G. Wright, MC,
2nd Bn., 1941-1943



Lt. Col. D. R. Blair,
2nd Bn., 1942-1946



Lt. Col. A. W. Mercer,
1950-1951



Lt. Col. C. C. I. Merritt,
VC, ED, 1951-1954



Lt. Col. A. W. Gray,
1954-1957



Lt. Col. I. M. Bell-Irving,
CD, 1957-1961



Lt. Col. D. I. Fairweather,
CD, 1961-1963



Lt. Col. C. B. Campbell,
CD, 1963-1966



Lt. Col. D. J. Anderson,
CD, 1966-1969

REGIMENTAL SERGEANT-MAJORS



WOI D. Nelson, 1910-1915



WOI H. T. Skelley, 1915-1916



WOI H. E. Baker, 1916



WOI A. Ewart, 1916-1925



WOI S. Long, 1917



WOI R. Stirrat, 1917



WOI G. H. Barker, 1918



WOI T. N. Anderson, 1926-1939



WOI J. Maitland, 1939-1940



WOI E. G. Begg, 1940-1942



WOI J. Nicholson, 1942-1943



WOI R. H. W. Ireland, 1943

REGIMENTAL SERGEANT-MAJORS



WOI R. M. Black, 1944



WOI G. McMahon,
1944-45, 1950-57



WOI B. Sweeney, 1945



WOI W. Douglas, M.B.E.,
1940-47, 2nd Bn.



WOI T. Taylor, 1947



WOI W. G. Ward,
CD, 1947-50



WOI R. TANKARD,
CD, 1957-1961




WOI H. BULLOCK,
CD, 1961-1964




WOI E. J. Ashby,
CD, 1964-1969



The Officers – May 17th, 1925



Signal Platoon
Dominion Champions 1927




Fireplace – The Officer's Mess
Seaforth Armoury,
Vancouver, B.C.




Some Members of the Sergeant's Mess Circa 1930

Front Row – E. J. Colton – Geo. Lewis – Hugh Caldwell – John David – Harry Duncan – Tom Anderson – John Gillies


2nd Row – John Newbury – Dal Gross – Marcus Smith – Bruce Rutherford – W. C. Ward – Tom Hughes – Geo. Clapshew – Harry Howe – Pete Duncan – Jack Nicholson – Jim Maitland – Bill Laurillard – Ord Tucker – Bob Hardie




H. R. H. Edward, Prince of Wales
Colonel In Chief, The Seaforth Highlanders of Canada
Accompanied by Capt. Duns, M.C. – 1927
C.P.R. Station, Vancouver, B.C.



Funeral of the Commanding Officer, Lt. Col. R. W. Brock – 1935




Seaforth Armoury 1936



Formal Opening by His Excellency The Governor-General, Lord Tweedsmuir
August 29th, 1936




Pipe Major J. Gillies, M.S.M.



His Majesty King George VI
Accompanied by Lt. Col. T. S. Leslie, E.D.
C.P.R. Pier B – Vancouver 1939



Major General A. G. L. McNaughton, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.
Accompanied by Lt. Col. J. B. Stevenson, E.D.
Inspecting Officers of the Regiment before departure overseas Vancouver 1939



H.M. King George VI accompanied by Lt. Col. J. B. Stevenson



Guard at HQ I Cdn. Inf. Div. – 1941
Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth, accompanied by Major A. J. Creighton




Major B. M. Hoffmeister leading "B" Company




Sandwich lunch in the field – in England


SOMEWHERE IN ENGLAND




"A" Company – 1940

"C" Company – 1941





"D" Company, Melville Barracks, Aldershot, 1940



The Signallers – 1940





German Spandau and crew with
their captors of "A" Company, Salso Valley, Sicily

SICILY




A street in Italy – infantry section moving to attack.



Results: 1st Canadian Division track and field day after conclusion of campaign in Sicily.




Cleaning up – Sicily, 1943.



Allied ship exploding off coast of Sicily during landing operations.



Retreat – Evening Agira Captured



Seaforth 6 Pdr. Anti-Tank Gun Crew




En Route to Brigade Inspection by
General Sir Bernard Montgomery, Militello, Sicily 1943



Monty's Parade


THE OFFICERS "HAPPY VALLEY" – SICILY 1943



Front Row: Capts. K. S. Murdoch, W. D. Blackburn, S. W. Thomson and J. L. Malkin, Major J. D. Forin, Lt. Col. B. M. Hoffmeister (the Commanding Officers), Capt. J. H. Gowan, Major H. P. Bell-Irving, Capts. D. F. Newson and J. E. T. McMullen
Centre Row: Lieuts F. W. Healy, J. W. F. Taafe, A. W. Gray, J. W. Baldwin and W. R. Hyndman, Capts. T. C. B. Vance, F. H. Bonnell and B. G. Parker, Lieuts. M. A. Martin, D. B. Cameron and D. M. Owen
Back Row: Capt. R. C. H. Durnford, Lieut. D. Barrett-Lennard, Capt. G. F. Williamson, Supervisor H. E. Newing, Lieuts. W. Anderson, K. W. Reed, W. D. Reid, K. A. W. McKenzie, F. R. Perrett, R. W. Bonner, H. L. Robinson, L. Leckie, J. A. Charters and W. H. Melhuish




General Sir Bernard Montgomery GOC in C 8th Army investing Major H. P. Bell-Irving with Ribbon of D.S.O. won by "A" Company at "Grizzly Hill", Agira




Lt. Col. S. W. Thompson, D.S.O., M.C. Lt. Gen. E. L. M. Burns

ITALY



Seaforth Highlanders treat Sicilian girl suffering from infected legs and arms.



Cpl. Pete Labrie with friends.




No. 11 Pl ("B" Company)
Marching out of Gothic Line, 1945



Bearded Pipe Major Esson playing Lament at graveside, Ortona

ITALY



Our Padre in Action
Ortona



Christmas Dinner
at Russi – 1944


Cpl. Greig
The Padre

Capt. J. D. Pierce
Capt. D. I.
Fairweather



F.D. Ls. The Senio Dyke, Winter 1944-45

Savio Bridge



"C" Company objective in Savio River Crossing. Tank knocked out by our Tank Hunting Platoon in the immediate vicinity where Private Smith of the Tank Hunting Platoon won his Victoria Cross.



Pte. E. A. (Smokey) Smith, V.C., Pipe Major J. McHardy, Cadet Pipe Major Hugh Aird, Vancouver



7 May 1945

Group of "D" Company officers and men on final position after orders for cessation of hostilities in Europe.




Left to Right: Maj. E. Barr, Sgt. Bond, Lt. D. Harper, Pte. Keays, Lt. Len Bennett, M.C. (on wireless), Maj. J. D. Pierce, Lt. John Campbell, CQMS Stiles.




Left to Right: Major. E. D. Fulton, Lt. Col. D. M. Clark, Commanding Officer of the Regiment; Maj. John Bassett, Maj. Roy Durnford, D.S.O. Chaplain, and Capt. Borden Cameron, M.B.E.

RETURN HOME



C Detloff picture of troops passing in front of Armoury



Troops drawn up at rear of Armoury showing huts




British Empire Games, Empire Stadium, August 7th, 1954. His Royal Highness The Duke of Edinburgh accompanied by Major I. M. Bell-Irving




Vancouver International Airport
July 1958

Her Royal Highness, The Princess Margaret accompanied by Major

OFFICERS – SEAFORTH HIGHLANDERS OF CANADA SEPT. 29th 1957




Left to Right Seated: Major H. S. Robertson, T. V. O'Neil, Capt. R. W. Salter, The Honorary Colonel, General Clark, The Commanding Officer Lt. Col. I. M. Bell-Irving, Majors D. I. Fairweather, J. D. Pierce, W. L. Roberts
Standing Centre Row: Maj. L. C. Willoughby, Capts. G. R. Batten, Peter Coleman, J. W. Lawrence, P. T. A. Ready, J. N. White, H. Crosby, D. H. MacKay, H/Maj. E. W. Horton, Majors C. B. Campbell, D. G. May
Rear Row: Lts. K. J. Course, R. Chowne, D. W. Whittall, N. E. Cowan, A. Percival, C. R. Pokorny, A. B. Dubois-Phillips, D. Fraser, D. G. Cook, D. J. Anderson



Burns Dinner –
Sergeants' Mess




First duty of H. R. MacMillan, installed as Honorary Colonel of the Seaforths, was to present a Coronation Medal to Pipe Major Ed Esson



Lt. Col. R. M. Blair, V.D. 1929, winner of King's Prize and Grand Aggregate, Bisley congratulating Sgt. G. Westling, The Queen's Prize winner, Bisley, 1960



His Honour Frank M. Ross, C.M.G., M.C., accompanied by Lt. Col. I. M. Bell-Irving, CD and former Honorary Colonels H. R. MacMillan, C.B.E. and E. W. Hamber, C.M.G., on the occasion of presentation of new drums to the Regiment – May 1959 by the Lieutenant Governor



Visit of the U.S.S. "Coral Sea" – 1960



Cadet Band 1960



Receiving colours – 3 June 1962
(Next page) New colours being marched off ▶



right. This turned out to be Major McLean and Lt. Woolley who at this time were preparing to attack the concealed enemy post to the front. Cpl. Cromb and his section were ordered back until this was accomplished. Cromb and his section went back under cover to contact No. 10 Platoon.

This all took time, and the area was shaken by the blast of mortars and the harsh explosions of shell-fire. Lt. Artindale decided to push on without waiting for his corporals. He swung to the right at the barbed wire, then forward, eventually coming to the gully, where, presumably, Cromb had earlier spotted McLean.[29] Here he contacted three men from "A" Company and pressed forward to the road, capturing five Germans en route. One of the corporals on this advance gives the following vivid description of the platoon's action on the intermediate objective:

> There was a terrific amount of enemy fire coming down upon the road, and Mr. Artindale decided to head for a small house about 200 yards ahead. About half of us made the house, the remainder stayed on the road.
>
> Around this house was a series of German-made trenches and we inhabited these. Around the trenches were a few "A" Company men. Firing was still very heavy, but Cpl. MacDonald left the position and contacted an approaching tank who in turn informed BHQ [Battalion Headquarters] by wireless of our position and asked for instructions. It developed that we were positioned upon the start line of our barrage (for the second phase of the attack) which was about to commence. Fifteen men returned to the first objective, whilst Ptes. Barkase, Dupuis and myself remained in the slit trenches.
>
> Within a few minutes three German tanks approached from the right and commenced to shoot up the position and take the remaining men away on tanks.
>
> Meanwhile, a few feet from my own position were two dug-in 8.1-cm.-mortar pits which Dupuis and myself destroyed by dropping grenades into the barrels. The explosions of the grenades drew attention of the tanks towards us, and they fired five A.P. [armour piercing] rounds at the house, smashing the remaining wall.[30]

Meanwhile Cpls. Cromb and Beard, who had contacted No. 10 Platoon, found themselves temporarily in an area which the tanks were using for regrouping, and presumably, as veteran infantrymen, were happy to leave that position which would attract enemy fire.

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[29] W.D., Seaforth Highlanders of Canada, May, 1944, Appendix II, Statements by Cpl. B. C. Garrioch and Cpl. J. Cromb.

[30] *Ibid.*, Statement by Cpl. Garrioch.

Moreover it was beginning to rain which for the moment helped visibility. Cromb and Beard went forward again to catch up with their own platoon, passing dead and wounded Seaforths en route. "During this advance," Cromb reported, "we were completely smothered by mortar fire and my remaining four men became casualties. Cpl. Beard and myself succeeded in getting them into a sunken road where we found two lost, Carleton and York Other Ranks who we sent back to our BHQ for stretcher parties. We met Sgt. Drienel and a party coming up the road, so Cpl. Beard and myself went forward with them. Mortar fire was still heavy and Sgt. Drienel and Pte. Durack became casualties and were sent back."[31]

Further to the right of the company's advance an action took place which illustrates something of the hard fighting even the second wave was encountering. Corporal C. M. Anderson's section found itself the object of attention of an 88-mm. gun whose fire was being directed by a sniper. Anderson tried unsuccessfully several times to locate the sniper and then tried to draw his fire. The ruse worked, Anderson was wounded but he in turn shot and killed the sniper. The corporal continued to lead his section forward for another 300 yards when it was pinned to the ground by a machine-gun. Anderson then crawled across open ground for fifty yards swept by machine-gun fire, and then charged the post, killing its occupants with grenades and his "Tommy gun". He then gathered his section together and pushed on to the objective.[32]

Control in such a battle was extremely difficult, even on a company and platoon basis, so that shortly after 0700 hours Lt-Col. Thomson had only intermittent wireless contact with his sub-units and by eight o'clock the "fog of war" had well and truly descended on the battlefield. Reports filtering back from the walking wounded, from some of the tanks and one or two similar but irregular sources gave the Commanding Officer some idea of the progress of the battle, but as with the flanking battalions communications were very, very difficult owing to the large number of casualties.

"B" Company's commander, Major J. C. Allan, was one of the few who was able to maintain periodic contact. By the time the major part of the company reached the barbed wire, twenty per

[31] *Ibid.*, Statement of Cpl. J. Cromb.

[32] Anderson was awarded the Military Medal.

cent of his men had been killed or wounded. This was between 0700 and 0730 hours. The wire itself was swept by enemy fire, and as we have seen, the left-hand platoon had had great difficulty getting through it. Most of the supporting tanks had been knocked out, and when Allan asked Capt. Mackean of the North Irish Horse to help reduce the fire from enemy posts on the right flank, this tank attempted to do so but was disabled by a mine in the attempt. There was nothing for it but to push forward and shortly thereafter what remained of "B" Company was on the intermediate objective with Lt. Artindale's platoon west of the road.

The right forward attacking company, "D", was commanded by Major L. M. McBride, and as it advanced parallel to "A" Company it too ran into the same heavy opposition. Visibility was poor, and as the Seaforths went forward the supporting tanks were struck, and casualties among the infantrymen soared as rifles, machine-guns, mortars and shell-fire laced the area with steel. One of the men following "D" Company was Pte. H. F. Dore. He was with a special assault section comprised of Sgt. Storch, Cpl. Moore, two sappers from the R.C.E. and three riflemen. They carried the bangalore torpedoes to blast through the wire[33] if necessary, together with special explosives to deal with strongpoints. Shell-fire and poor visibility separated the group, so Pte. Dore and a few others pressed on. Coming to a ditch which gave them some cover yet was parallel to the line of advance, they went ahead, passing two burning tanks and returning wounded. After crossing the wire Pte. F. Wilkin, a "D" Company man, was seen herding four enemy prisoners back at the point of a Bren gun. Near the wire was a badly wounded German close to a machine-gun post. Moving past the wire and angling to the right they saw a "75" gun mounted in a gun turret set in concrete, while to the left was a similar weapon, mounted on wheels. By this time the group was close to the road when heavy shell-fire forced them back near the concreted anti-tank gun near which a dug-out offered some protection. As Dore wrote later:

> The entrance to the dug-out was booby-trapped . . ., so we entered by the other end. . . . We here saw a Seaforth . . . walking in from the right flank without weapons. He was suffering from severe shock . . . then Pte. Stewart passed with three P.W. [prisoners of war].

[33] The wire was low and most of it sufficiently gapped by shell-fire so as not to require the torpedoes.

> I went to assist Stewart and we went to the gun, looked into the entrance of a dug-out beneath the emplacement and saw enemy therein. When ordered they began to file out, then dashed in again. I fired a shot into the entrance and three of the Jerries came out. Then I threatened to throw a No. 36 grenade into the dug-out and three more came out.[34]

Dore accompanied the prisoners back where they were collected by a provost major and his men. Even as they were turned over shell-fire killed two of the provost. The Seaforths then turned back towards the battalion objective.

Beyond the wire "D" had been badly cut up. Typical of the action were the events described by Major McBride who, like the other company commanders, was experiencing poor wireless communication and great difficulty in controlling the company owing to the combination of poor visibility, the tremendous fire from hidden enemy gun positions and the partially wooded, undulating terrain. He wrote later:

> Taking the small group of company headquarters that was still intact I started to pick my way very carefully through enemy wire. . . . Suddenly there was a tremendous explosion and I woke up on the ground back in front of the wire but Pte. H. J. Johnson had been killed instantly as had L/Cpl. J. V. Warner. . . . The young radio operator had a bad gash in his cheek and I . . . patched him up temporarily with a field dressing. That eliminated all of company headquarters except myself and trying to locate the three platoons I came across a private from the Pats and we went on together. . . . Suddenly we came under machine-gun fire and hit the dirt. Every time we moved in the deep hay it showed up and we got another blast for our trouble. I am not sure what happened next . . . but whatever it was hit me in the left eye and when I more or less came to it was to find several Germans looking down on me. They put a bandage on my eye and when it started to get dark they put me in an ambulance and we no sooner got underway when a large shell went off beneath the vehicle and some unfortunate Jerry who had a bunk below me in the ambulance got almost the full brunt of the explosion.[34a]

By mid-morning, the only surviving officer in "D" Company was Lt. T. E. Woolley. He had been wounded in the arm near the start line but he led his platoon forward until most of the officers and a large number of the N.C.Os. were killed or wounded. He rallied and reorganized the remainder and pressed on to the objective to join the remnants of the unit. He then led a few Seaforths against an

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[34] W.D., Seaforth Highlanders of Canada, May, 1944, Appendix II: "Statement by Pte. H. F. Dore."

[34a] Letter, Mr. L. M. McBride to author, March, 1968.

enemy self-propelled gun. He was wounded again in the leg around noon, but stuck it out until he was ordered back late in the afternoon by the senior surviving officer.[35]

Behind "D" Company came "C" Company commanded by Captain J. J. Conway. It advanced with No. 14 and 13 Platoons left and right respectively with No. 15 Platoon in reserve. As the enemy's fire increased in intensity Conway noticed that one of his leading platoons was pinned to the ground from a machine-gun post. The danger of the momentum of the attack becoming slowed down prompted Conway to organize a detachment of four men from his company headquarters which he led against the machine-gun post. One of his men was wounded in the act of throwing a grenade and it fell to the ground beside the group. Captain Conway swooped down, grabbed and threw it but in the act of doing so it exploded, blew off his right hand and sent shrapnel into the back of his legs and thigh so that he could not move.[36] As he wrote later:

> Someone must have organized the soldiers and taken them ahead. Very soon all was silence. I put a field dressing on my stump, ate some chocolate and smoked a couple of cigarettes. After a while I raised myself up on my elbow and promptly got shot at. So I shot back with my revolver. . . . The Jerries must have been as browned off as I was for three of them came forward with their hands up. They gave me a drink of water from a flask . . . I directed them to help me up and they supported me—or rather dragged me—to the rear. . . .[37]

The flying shards of iron and steel which whistled out of the dust and smoke thrown up by enemy shells and mortars struck indiscriminately at all the platoons. No. 14 Platoon, commanded by Lt. Harry Robertson, had not gone very far when, as Robertson relates:

> Word came forward that one of my L/Cpls. had been hit. I went back to see how he was and found him sitting on the ground with a big grin on his face and a 3 - 4 inch gash along the bottom of his right jaw. We continued on for about another 15 or 20 minutes and had lost all contact with the platoons on the right and left . . . as far as we could tell this was now a platoon attack. I, myself, was the next casualty, taking 88-mm. shrapnel in my right shoulder and mortar shrapnel in both legs. On getting to my feet again . . . I turned back to find my next in command, Cpl. Montgomery. Monty moved forward to take command and I promptly collapsed from loss of blood. A young private who looked like a school-

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[35] Lt. Woolley was awarded the Military Cross.

[36] Captain Conway was awarded the Military Cross.

[37] Letter, Dr. J. J. Conway to author, 24 October 1967.

> boy popped out of a shell-hole and dragged me in and started to dress my wounds.[38]

Within a short period this platoon alone suffered ten casualties.

In No. 13 Platoon, which in the smoke and dust had strayed off in the wrong direction, Lt. Whiting and all the N.C.Os. were struck down before it had emerged from the treed area to the open fields leading to the intermediate objective. It was at this moment that the leadership qualities latent in many Seaforths came to the fore. Pte. William Henderson, who was one of the "old originals" of the battalion, ordered the platoon to ground, reorganized those who remained, and then took command and led it forward through the heavy artillery and mortar fire. When he came to the wire, hidden in the fields by the high grain, he reconnoitered a route through it and ultimately brought his platoon to the road thus helping the remnants of the battalion to hold the objective.[39]

When Captain Conway was wounded, and the platoon officers struck down, control of the company went to Company Sergeant Major J. M. Duddle. He gathered together those he could with a few strays from "A" and "D" Companies and led them forward. Three tanks from the North Irish Horse were still smouldering as he closed up to the wire, all believed to be the victims of a concealed anti-tank gun. He continued forward with the remainder of the company, capturing several prisoners en route and ultimately reached the Pontecorvo-Aquino road. He advanced 200 yards beyond it and consolidated briefly at a farmhouse but later withdrew to the road where other Seaforths from the various companies were attempting to dig in.

By about mid-morning of the 23rd the only company commander in the intermediate objective who was not a casualty was Major J. C. Allan. There were two junior officers, Lts. T. E. Woolley and W. R. Artindale, and at that Woolley was wounded but carried on until ordered back. There were also about 100 N.C.Os. and men—all that was left of the four companies which went into the attack several hours previously. Along the three-quarter-mile route of advance were Seaforths—many dead, some dying, and more who were wounded, waiting to be picked up or making their way back painfully on their own amidst fire which the enemy still sent crashing into

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[38] Letter, Mr. H. S. Robertson to author, 9 November 1967.

[39] Pte. Henderson was awarded the Military Medal.

the fields and orchards. Scattered beyond the boundaries of the battalion's advance too were small groups of Seaforths who fought with flanking battalions just as some of their men fought with the Seaforths. The combination of terrain, smoke, shell-fire, enemy pill-boxes, and manoeuvring to outflank enemy defences had resulted in the platoons frequently being forced off to the right or left, or some groups being pinned down and others being able to advance. Burnt and shot-up tanks were everywhere. In one field alone on the right flank fifteen of the North Irish Horse tanks had been disabled—an indication not only of the ferocity of the battle but the overwhelming advantage held by concealed anti-tank guns against squadrons whose experience was in open, desert warfare.

The small group of Seaforths along the Pontecorvo-Aquino road was only periodically in touch with Lt-Col. Thomson during the morning and early in the afternoon communications broke down completely for several hours. A certain amount could be seen and observed, however. On the left the Carleton and Yorks had reached the road, but on the right the Princess Patricias were having a most difficult time reaching the objective as were the Edmontons, who, by this time, were somewhat intermingled with them. Minefields, enemy anti-tank guns, very stubborn German resistance and counter-attacks from the direction of Aquino made the going as tough on the right as it was on the centre. At one point in the early afternoon the Edmontons, who at the time had neither tanks nor anti-tank guns, were offered a self-propelled anti-tank gun by Lt-Col. Thomson. This gun the Seaforths could have used themselves but it was unable to reach the Seaforth front and evidently the colonel felt, with good reason, that if the brigade's right flank—then being counter-attacked—could employ it usefully it might ease the pressure on the left.[40]

The German attack on the right flank of the brigade rolled along the front to the Seaforths. By this time, as we have noted, there was no longer company and platoon organization owing to the heavy casualties. Major Allan, the senior officer, had organized the remnants of the attacking force as best he could along the road, with company sergeant majors in charge of "companies" and surviving N.C.Os. leading scattered groups of Seaforths no matter what company they belonged to. In many ways the battle that was fought in

[40] W.D., H.Q., 2nd Cdn. Inf. Bde., May, 1944, Appendix I: Intelligence Log, 23 May 44, Serials 97-103.

the afternoon, especially after Major Allan was wounded, was an N.C.Os. battle and great tribute must be paid to the courage and leadership which they displayed.

At one point during the first counter-attack C.S.M. Duddle saw a tank approach about 200 yards to his right. With Ptes. Gustafson and Richardson he went forward to see if he could knock it out with a Piat. Despite enemy fire they managed to get within 30 yards of it. While manoeuvering towards it, they found the one they were aiming at was a second tank they had not noticed. But one tank was as good as another. Pte. Gustafson had the Piat—Duddle gave him the range. Gustafson removed his glasses, polished them, and rested the anti-tank weapon on Richardson's back. This way he could get clearance over the tall grass. He fired two bombs, both of which hit the tank. This aroused the attention of the other tank which immediately began to lace their position with machine-gun fire and Duddle and his men withdrew.

Shortly afterwards Cpl. Jenkins contacted Duddle to say that some of "C" Company was across the road. Duddle, Jenkins and Sgt. Game worked their way forward from the road to the spot Jenkins had pointed out. "Here," Duddle reported later:

> . . . we found three badly wounded men, in addition to six others. I decided we would have to improvise stretchers to remove them, and on Pte. Henderson's suggestion we moved to a house a little way ahead. We returned with a few pieces of railing which, with the aid of our tunics, webbing and shirts, were fashioned into two rude stretchers. Returning to the wounded we were forced to go to ground by the re-appearance of three German tanks who cut forward to Major Allan's position and opened fire. By now it had started to rain. . . . Cpl. Jenkins worked his way back to the road and on returning said that some prisoners had been taken away on tanks and quite a number were killed.[41]

The situation faced by Major Allan that afternoon was anything but encouraging. His men were fairly well dug in along the road, some in slit trenches, others taking cover in a ditch running alongside it. A number of anti-tank guns in the area had been silenced by Seaforths who killed or captured their crews, but the damage they had done could be seen in the fields behind the road which was littered with tanks. Across the road enemy tanks and an occasional enemy self-propelled gun could be seen. The last of the Piat bombs

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[41] W.D., Seaforth Highlanders of Canada, May, 1944, Appendix 2: "Statement of C.S.M. Duddle, J.M."

had been used and his position was under both observation and fire. Allan attempted to work to the north to contact the Princess Patricias but the Seaforths were compelled to withdraw by heavy machine-gun fire from both enemy tanks and infantry. For a short time the signallers established wireless contact with Lt-Col. Thomson and requested Piat bombs and anti-tank guns. As we have seen, Thomson did his best but the S.P. guns were driven back. Thomson then tried to get tanks to come up the Pontecorvo road from the south, but the divisional commander decided to attack with the 3rd Brigade on the left taking advantage of the success gained so far by the Seaforths and Carleton and Yorks. Orders were given at 1330 hours, yet despite the fact that the attack was launched in a minimum of time, the results were too late for the Seaforths.

About the only thing left for Major Allan to do was to hang on and, unable to contact the battalion on the right he decided to ease to the south and occupy a high feature beyond the road in front of which was a deep gully. At this point a man from "C" Company who had been watching the enemy tanks on the right and rear told Allan they were counter-attacking.

Three tanks came in from the front and two from the rear, and in the next half hour they created havoc. With nothing to oppose them the tanks roamed over the Seaforths' positions, firing their cannon and machine-guns along the ditch and directly into the slit trenches, killing, wounding or capturing dozens of the defenders. Major Allan himself was badly wounded, but he played dead and the Germans left him as such. Others were scooped up, however, so that in one fell swoop almost half the defenders were forced on board the tanks and carted off to captivity.[42] Many were wounded, but for most it was a simple case of surrender or of being cut down by the tanks.

When the German tanks moved off the situation on the Seaforth front was desperate. It was now late afternoon. In Allan's immediate area there were only 12 men alive. C.S.M. Duddle was on the far side of the road with about the same number, of whom three were wounded. Across the road, too, were Cpl. Garrioch with Ptes. Barkase and Dupius. After the second counter-attack Dupuis had returned to the road but found only Pte. Russell of "A" Company who

[42] During the day two officers and 50 N.C.Os. and men were taken prisoner of war. Most of these were captured late in the afternoon.

died of wounds later that night. This small group remained in position all night. So, too, did Pte. L. B. Poppell of "A" Company who had helped carry Major McLean back, then returned to the front but managed to evade capture. Major Allan probably had the largest group and continued to exercise command up to the last moment.[43] He continued to hold his position but when his leg began to stiffen up he ordered the survivors to bring in the wounded and move back to a forward Regimental Aid Post which had been established some 500-600 yards back from the road. The senior unwounded Seaforth left at the front was C.S.M. Duddle,[44] and he and his group helped to organize the evacuation of the wounded while with the remaining eight men, he prepared to hold on to the front. At about seven in the evening he was ordered to return. On his way back, to quote his own story given at the time:

> . . . we discovered a very badly wounded Lieutenant of the North Irish Horse laying along side a tank who told us there was a stretcher in the 3rd tank away. There was no stretcher there, but beneath it two badly burned troopers with one man in attendance. They said they would try and walk back but one, who was practically blind, had to be half carried out. We arrived at BHQ at 1930 hours.
>
> . . . I remained there until 2100 hours when . . . I guided a stretcher party . . . in the attempt to find some of our wounded. It was very dark by now and difficult to locate any particular spot.
>
> However, we found a Seaforth lying in a slit trench and he was removed by stretcher. The Churchill tank with the wounded officer was found, and an additional man burnt around the body.[45]

During the day the tension at Tactical Headquarters mounted by the hour. Intermittent communication by wireless was sufficient only to get a rough location of the whereabouts of the companies, and the reports brought back by the wounded tended to exaggerate the losses which were sufficiently high as it was. Nearby the Medical Officer, Captain C. G. Preece, worked hard. Close by was the padre Major Durnford, who wrote in his diary at the time:

> The hospital, an old barn with its manger, begins to fill with wounded. Incredible suffering and unbelievable bravery. Dr. Cliff and the M.O. of the North Irish Horse work ceaselessly thro' the day with a marvellous staff of uncomplaining workers. The battlefield is very, very near. The

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[43] Major J. C. Allan was awarded the Distinguished Service Order for his "cheerful resoluteness and organizing abilty under fire. . . ."

[44] C.S.M. Duddle was awarded the Distinguished Conduct Medal for his leadership, energy and the "inspiring example" he set.

[45] "Statement by C.S.M. Duddle," *op. cit.*

> house is a B.H.Q. as well as a hospital. It is a hive of activity. Maps, signals, anxious officers, battered and war-weary men weave about everywhere. Shells drop all around the area and fragments wound German prisoners who stand near the R.A.P. These Germans are dull and dopey or nervous and excitable. Pale, dirty and utterly exhausted they stagger down the line. I make tea endlessly and soup. The boys keep coming on —some bomb happy, some terribly broken and shell-shocked, some with limbs torn off and some almost gleeful with light wounds. . . .
>
> Syd Thomson is feeling the strain but has been marvellous all day. (Who has not?)[46]

The Commanding Officer spent many anxious hours during that day. In a set-piece attack such as this, especially considering the narrow front of the brigade assault, there was little room for manoeuvre. The brigade plan laid down that all four companies should go in, so that Thomson was extremely limited even insofar as providing reinforcements. At the outset he was in communication by wireless with both his companies and the tank squadrons, but as we have seen the casualties suffered in men and tanks resulted in communications breaking down—sometimes intermittently, but as the day wore on the wireless network simply went quiet as one signaller after another was wounded or killed. His best wireless link during the day was with Major Allan, but in this case, for one reason or another this contact was lost periodically.

When Major Allan was trying to consolidate the remnants of the battalion on the intermediate objective, Lt-Col. Thomson, as he wrote later:

> decided to take my I.O., Lt. Swinton, forward and establish a tactical H.Q. in Major Allan's position in preparation for the second phase of the attack.[47] We first started up in a Honey tank but soon lost a track to a mine. We then went by Jeep but were stopped by a ditch. We went on by foot and lost our signaller by shell-fire and consequently contact with Major Allan. We came across a large number of enemy in a large dug-out and told them to stay put. We reached Major Allan's position to find shallow trenches and a number of small arms weapons. It was all too clear what had happened, when a German tank opened on us with small arms fire from some 200 yards. We hit the ditch and made our way back picking up the German prisoners from the dug-out on the way. Shortly after arriving at Bn.H.Q. a group of some 20 men came in led by that splendid sergeant, "Jumbo" McLean.[48]

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[46] Seaforth Archives, Major Durnford's Diary, *op. cit.* p.55.

[47] The second phase never did go in for obvious reasons.

[48] Letter, Colonel S. W. Thomson to author, 19 October 1967. With this group was the Signals Officer, Lt. Gildersleeve, who remembers coming upon a

By the time Lt-Col. Thomson arrived at the road the battle had been won, and the Seaforths could be justly proud of the part they had played in the action. To anyone there at the time it may have appeared quite otherwise. A few Seaforths were dotted here and there along the road, a few in front of it, cut off, isolated, low in ammunition and out of contact. There were still some wounded, waiting patiently to be picked up, chilled to the bone in the rain but thankful for the quiet on the battlefield after the ear-splitting roar of artillery and mortar fire died down late in the afternoon. If a counter-attack came, Lt-Col. Thomson could muster at the most only one composite company of the four which went into the attack, and even that number includes those who straggled in after sundown in twos and threes.

Although the Seaforth front seemed at the moment as thin as paper, the fact was that the Seaforth Highlanders had been the only battalion to reach the intermediate objective and hang on to it all day. The success gained by the unit and the Carleton and Yorks on its left led, in turn, to the further success of the Royal 22nd Regiment and the West Nova Scotia Regiment when they, as part of the 3rd Brigade, further widened the initial opening and permitted the 5th Canadian Armoured Division to hammer its way forward beyond the Hitler line.

It was known even as Thomson went forward late in the afternoon that the enemy was beginning to abandon his positions, and from five in the afternoon until last light reports came crackling in over the brigade wireless that the enemy was blowing bridges and that his thin-skinned transport was beginning to fill the roads leading westward. Thus although those few Seaforths still at the front were shelled and periodically machine-gunned until about midnight by German rearguards, when morning came the grinding roar of the tanks they heard were those of the 5th Canadian Armoured Division streaming through the gap which they had struggled so valiantly to create.

Writing later about this battle the Commanding Officer stated:

> As it developed, in this battle, there was only one possibility of succeeding and that was for each individual to fight forward until he dropped

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functioning wireless set near the barbed wire but with no trace of the signaller. One odd sight was the number of cackling hens wandering about the main defences. Evidently they had been kept for their eggs by the German defenders.

> or obtained the objective. Each man did just this and the line was broken. Certainly it was a battalion success, not [one gained] by overwhelming artillery support silencing enemy for this did not happen, . . . [nor] by brilliant infantry-cum-tank tactics for the infantry had to go on and break the line without the tanks. But [success was gained] by the bravery and sheer guts of men in pride of regiment. I must repeat this was an other ranks battle, 'their finest hour'.[49]

The Seaforths would be the first to express their gratitude to the North Irish Horse squadrons which gave them such tremendous support in the opening phase of the battle and which tried valiantly to help them in the afternoon. Mine fields combined with deadly, concealed enemy anti-tank guns made the area between the belt of barbed wire and the intermediate objective a killing ground which the enemy had cleverly established when preparing his defences. The location of many of these guns was unknown prior to the attack and their location discovered only in battle. The broken ground and limited visibility added to the great difficulty of the tanks, and as their losses mounted squadrons were reduced to troops, and these shifted from one side of the brigade front to the other to help fill the demands on either flank as the infantry asked for armoured support. During the day the North Irish Horse, which now wears a maple leaf in memory of this battle with the 1st Canadian Division, lost 41 of its tanks, of which 25 were completely destroyed, which represented approximately half of its strength.[50]

On the day after the battle one Seaforth Highlander, who with others were retracing their steps up to the front searching for dead, wounded, weapons, etc., recollects an incident which is worth mentioning:

> I found myself on the road immediately to the right of the knoll that I had occupied the day before. Immediately in front of me, believe it or not, was a French 75 [gun]. . . . About a hundred yards further up the road was an undamaged German tank with its right track in the ditch and its gun pointing to the sky. It was being examined by a British major, and as I moved closer, picking up a Bren gun and a couple of rifles on the way, he spoke to me asking if I had been in the battle the day before. I said 'Yes, I lost some of the best friends a man ever had yesterday; I hope the results are worth it.' He simply patted the tank with his hand

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[49] Thomson to author, *op. cit.*

[50] *North Irish Horse Battle Report, op. cit.*, p.35. Losses in men were smaller than an infantryman might expect, since each tank had a crew of five, and usually all in a tank were not casualties even though the tank was disabled. At that, 74 officers and men were killed or wounded.

> and said 'This alone makes it worth it.' When I mentioned this incident to the acting intelligence officer later in the day, he said he had reason to believe that the tank in question was a new type of which so far there had only been rumours—a Mark 5 Panther. By getting one undamaged they would be able to assess its capabilities in performance and so have some idea of what we might be up against in future.[51]

For the Seaforths the breaking of the Hitler Line was a never to be forgotten experience. Their losses were heavy. Forty-nine other ranks and three officers were killed, seven officers and 99 other ranks were wounded and two officers and 50 other ranks were taken prisoners of war.[52] These 210 casualties were the heaviest in one day that the battalion ever suffered throughout the entire war. There were numerous bitter battles yet to be fought, but the Hitler Line victory was to be the hardest won battle honour awarded the unit during the Second World War.

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[51] Letter, Mr. J. Cromb to author, 29 January 1968.

[52] Total casualties for the brigade was 543. The official historian wrote that its casualties "were unequalled in a single day's fighting by any Canadian brigade during the entire Italian campaign." Nicholson, *op. cit.*, p.423.

CHAPTER X

Through The Gothic Line To San Fortunato Ridge

It was not until the day after the Hitler Line battle that the Seaforths could really begin to assess the casualties incurred on 23 May. During the morning and all during the 24th of May stragglers came in from various parts of the front to group around Battalion Headquarters, grab what they could to eat, and either sink into an exhausted sleep or seek news of their friends. Many were still jittery, and occasional enemy shells whistled over as if to remind them of the tremendous pounding of the previous day. Everyone had his own story to tell, and some who came with parts of their uniform or equipment ripped or torn by bullets or shrapnel could back their accounts with solid evidence. The battlefield itself was a scene of utter carnage, and although the 5th Canadian Armoured Division was pushing the Germans back, a few small pockets of Germans had to be winkled out before stretcher parties could bring back the dead and search out the last of the wounded.

On the following day the search for the dead continued. One of those involved was the padre who, as with others, saw for the first time the defences that the companies had encountered. He wrote in his diary later that evening.

> Visit Hitler line. Deep entrenchments. Tunnels of cement and steel, and steel and concrete pillboxes. Wire very deep. Vastly fortified. We go back to cemetery and bury 42 in the dark. Bodies keep coming in, mute testimony to awful victory. The cemetery is filling up fast. Work goes on

> at a fast and furious pace. . . . I go to bed but not to sleep. Air raid by Jerry on big scale. The house shakes, the plaster falls. Bombs are huge it seems, falling all in and around our area.[1]
> Parachute flares increase bombing accuracy. Engines shut off, they swoop swiftly and silently behind gun positions and machine-gun them.

On the 26th—a bright, warm, cloudless day—a most impressive service was held at the cemetery[2] with over 500 in attendance. Major-General Vokes, Brigadier Gibson and other senior officers were in attendance as the pipers played the lament which drifted over the rows of white crosses into the fields and orchards beyond. Even after the service was over, and when the last of the Seaforths had gone, more graves were being prepared for bodies that were being found a day or so after the unit left the area.

The Seaforths had been warned to move earlier in the day, and within hours after the ceremonies at the graveside of their comrades the battalion marched through the Hitler Line to the Pontecorvo road. Burnt-out tanks, shell-holes, wrecked buildings and splintered trees were everywhere. Some men spotted snipers' nests in the trees, beautifully camouflaged with concealed ladders. On their four-mile cross-country march to their new area, some of the veterans pointed out locations to the new reinforcements where their platoon, or the remnants of it, had had a particularly sticky time. There were many questions from the newcomers, but fewer from the Left Out of Battle (LOB) personnel who had come up to rejoin the unit after the battle. These experienced officers and men could see at a glance what the action must have been like, and there were few indeed who did not inwardly thank their lucky stars that they had been fortunate enough to be left out of battle for that particular show.

The new camp, a little over a mile northwest of Pontecorvo, was close to the Liri River and here for a few days the unit had time to reorganize and recuperate. There was a tremendous amount of reorganization to be done. Several hundred reinforcements of all ranks had to be taken on strength and assigned to companies and platoons. There was a decided lack of experienced N.C.Os., and somehow some balance had to be worked out between those who

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[1] Three Seaforths from "B" Company were killed as a result of this night attack.

[2] Seaforth Archives, "Diary of H/Major R. C. H. Durnford", 25 May 1944. The cemetery referred to was a short distance behind the Seaforths' original start line. Here were interred the dead from the 2nd Brigade as well as those from the North Irish Horse

were veterans and reinforcements N.C.Os. who were potentially good but had not been in action. The company quartermaster sergeants had their work cut out for them trying to provide for the deficiencies in kit and clothing which came in the wake of any battle. Company and battalion clerks wrestled with nominal rolls, sergeant majors with duty rosters, and officers with letters of condolence and citations for bravery.

For the Seaforth private there was little to do except to make himself as comfortable as he could as quickly as he could for he knew that a call to action might come at any time. In the heat of late May, many went for a swim in the muddy, fast flowing river only a few hundred yards from the battalion's lines. Occasionally a bloated body of a dead German floated by as if to remind them of the battle being fought nine or ten miles upstream.[3] These unwelcome reminders of war were not needed, for everyone knew that the battalion was under orders to be prepared to move into action on 12 hours' notice. On the 29th there was increased activity at Battalion Headquarters and veterans who could read the signs began quietly to prepare for the inevitable. They were correct. Late in the morning the long line of troop carrying vehicles rolled into the Seaforths' lines, and that afternoon the unit was en route.

During the five days the 2nd Brigade had been out of action, the 5th Canadian Armoured Division had shouldered its way through the gap in the Hitler Line between Aquino and Pontecorvo and thrust its way further up the Liri Valley. By the evening of the 25th the armoured division had gained a bridgehead over the Melfa River. Some 40 miles to the northwest the American 6th Corps had broken out of the Anzio bridgehead and had cut Highway No. 7. The German Fourteenth and Tenth Armies were stretched to the limit, and there was a good chance that the enemy's forces in the Liri Valley might be cut off. As a result the German High Command approved a fighting withdrawal, and a series of stop-gap lines of defence[4] were drawn so that the retreating forces could retire from one position to another and so impose maximum delay on the Allies.

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[3] W.D., Seaforth Highlanders of Canada, 26 - 29 May 1944.

[4] The second line of defence "cut the highway a few miles southeast of Frosinone, along the line Ceccano - Arnara - Rippi. . . ." Lt-Col. G. W. L. Nicholson, *The Canadians in Italy, 1943-1945*. Ottawa, The Queen's Printer, 1956, p. 438.

With the British 13th Corps on its right and the French Expeditionary Corps on its left, the 1st Canadian Corps continued its thrust on the 26th along the general line Ceprano-Pofi-Frosinone. By the 27th the first of the enemy's delaying lines at Ceprano had been breached, and two days later Pofi was seized, thus placing the armoured division 15 miles beyond the Hitler Line. The tanks, however, had encountered considerable difficulties in overcoming the geographic obstacles to their advance, and as a result the 1st Canadian Infantry Division was ordered forward to take the lead.

For the Seaforths the move up to the front was a rather leisurely and somewhat interesting affair. To sit in a vehicle and watch the scenery go by is always a pleasant sensation for the soldier. Moreover the troop carrying vehicles were not crowded and the weather was fairly decent even at night. When the 2nd Brigade came under the command of the 5th Canadian Armoured Division on the 30th, orders stated that one unit in the brigade was to remain mobile, and the Seaforths were selected. Thus the vehicles remained, and not until the battalion went into action were they withdrawn. The area through which the unit travelled had recently been cleared by the armoured division, and evidence of the battle was to be seen on every side. Here and there knocked-out tanks—both Canadian and German—stood cold and stark, bleak reminders of a critical moment in the lives of those who manned them. Sometimes a German or Canadian helmet placed on an up-ended rifle or stick told their own story, and the smell in some areas was such that the veterans knew that not all the bodies had been collected. Near Pofi, the Seaforths camped on the same spot where the enemy had been a few days previously, and so sudden was his departure that he left various things behind including a number of German blank "feldposte" letters which some Seaforths used to write to their relatives at home. There was also vino available in some of the farmhouses, but this supply was quickly "liberated" and happily consumed.

By the morning of 31 May, the 2nd Brigade was situated in front of Frosinone, a town perched on a hill commanding an important road junction. Frosinone, which was the objective of the Loyal Edmonton Regiment, was defended by a battalion of the 134th Grenadier Regiment with some Panther tanks. While the "Eddies" were taking the town, the Seaforths were directed to circle to the left of Frosinone and take the road junction behind it. The Edmon-

tons were already within a mile of the town and by first light were probing towards it. The Princess Patricias were about three miles south of Frosinone but by mid-morning they had advanced directly north and were within a mile and a half of it when the leading elements of the Seaforths passed through them to form the left side of the pincer attack.

The area which concerned the Seaforths lay west of a stream, the Fiume Casa, the upper branches of which reached Frosinone. Running parallel to the stream was a road and a disused railroad bed which the enemy was using as a tank run. Coming in to meet the main highway from the west were several roads which the Germans were still using. When enemy vehicles reached the highway they turned left, or north, and used the highway as an escape route.

The Seaforths left their camp at 0400 hours on 30 May and drove by T.C.V. along the congested roads as far as Armora, and from that point on the companies marched on foot, reaching the outskirts of the town by mid-morning. The progress made by the Edmontons was sufficient to permit Lt-Col. Thomson to start his phase of the action by noon, at which time "D" Company set out to occupy a high feature commanding a bridge over the Casa about half a mile south of Frosinone. This was accomplished without incident, and two platoons were sent forward to occupy the area on either side of the bridge.

As soon as this was accomplished, "B" Company was sent forward to cross the bridge and cut Highway No. 6. This company was en route by 1430 hours and after crossing the bridge and reaching the railroad, Captain O. H. Mace led his men north until they reached Highway No. 6. At this point, where they were now northwest of Frosinone, enemy tanks and machine-guns opened fire and killed three men and wounded an equal number. Mortar fire was also beginning to fall on "B" Company as Mace distributed his platoons to dominate the highway, and enemy mortar bombs continued to strike into the company area for some time.

"C" Company left to cross the bridge fifteen minutes after "B" Company and advanced along the road paralleling the railway. It met no enemy in the first instance, but after advancing about three quarters of a mile and while skirting Frosinone the company began to consolidate just when enemy mortar bombs began to fall. Seven men in No. 15 platoon were injured including Sgt. J. F. Murray, the

platoon commander. The other platoons were more fortunate, and although sporadic mortaring continued until nightfall, no further casualties were incurred.

"A" Company had moved off behind "B" Company and ultimately passed through them until its leading platoon was fired on by snipers near Highway No. 6. This fire was traced to a group of buildings at the main intersection of the cluster of roads reaching the highway immediately north of the town. These buildings were cleared by No. 7 platoon under the direction of Lt. A. Staples, but when "B" Company reached and consolidated on the highway immediately on the left, the battalion was able to report that the objective was seized.

Late in the afternoon the Seaforths began to reap some of the benefits of their domination of the crossroads. Down the highway from the northwest a convoy of four small German vehicles and a ration truck approached evidently with the idea of swinging left and carrying on north to Ferentino. All were captured by the Seaforths, much to the surprise of their occupants. Later two motor-cyclists came speeding towards the intersection. The first was killed; the second slowed down and was taken prisoner. About fifteen minutes afterwards a small armoured car approached. The anti-tank guns had been unable to come up with the forward troops owing in part to the numerous mines which were liberally sprinkled everywhere. However, "A" Company peppered the car with rifle and machine-gun fire which caused it to retreat in the direction from whence it came. One or two more enemy vehicles were accounted for in the morning, including a fully loaded German paymaster's truck, but by that time it was evident that the Germans were retiring to their next line of defence.

The action at Frosinone, which cost the Seaforths 20 casualties, was the last they were to fight for over a month. From the vantage points in the town one could get a sweeping look over the plain to the north and the highway which ran on to Ferentino and thence to Rome. Both behind and to the front the roads were jammed with vehicles of every description as more formations pressing ahead were restricted to fewer avenues of approach in the Sacco Valley. Despite some monumental traffic jams, however, the Canadian, British and South African units surged ahead, and within a day or so the Seaforths found themselves in the backwash of the advance.

By 2 June the American forces from the Anzio beachhead had

struck so far inland that they had cut Highway No. 6 at Valmontone, some 25 miles northwest of Frosinone. By that time also Ferentino had fallen to the 2nd Brigade and the Seaforths were ordered to a new position on the northern outskirts of the town. There they occupied a huge school in which the sole piece of furniture was a grand piano. The pace of the advance on Rome was such that the Quartermaster was able to bring up the men's large packs and kitbags, so that in a remarkably short time the battalion was enjoying at least a small measure of peace and comfort while the rumble of gunfire receded in the distance. Close by was the North Irish Horse, and for a day or so there was a fair amount of visiting between the regiments whose memory of the Hitler Line battle was very fresh. Pipe Major Esson took the Pipes and Drums to play in their lines, and the Seaforth officers had the officers of the North Irish Horse to dinner to cement further the friendship which had grown between the two units.

It was while the Seaforths were at Ferentino, too, that the first word came of the Allied invasion of France. A wave of elation ran throughout the battalion, and small knots of Seaforths could be seen gathered around the signallers' wireless sets as they listened to the B.B.C. news announcers describe an event which had been expected for months. There was no thought that, with the opening of the "Second Front", the Italian theatre of operations would sink to second place in the attention of the Canadian press and public. Rather there was a combination of excitement and expectation that now, once the commitment had been made, the enemy must soon crack under the tremendous pressure being exerted on him from the East, South and West. There were many Seaforths, too, who hoped that the time would not be too far distant when the Canadians in Italy might unite with the Canadians fighting in France. There were to be numerous battles before that wish became a reality, however, for although the enemy was now under increasing strain, his discipline and energy were by no means beginning to slacken.

About 36 miles due north of Naples lies the tiny village of Piedmonte d'Alife. It had escaped much of the damage that the war had visited on so many Italian towns, but early in June it was "invaded" by Canadians when the 2nd Canadian Infantry Brigade was pulled out of the line and placed in army reserve along with the rest of the Canadian Corps. Word of a three- or four-week period of rest and refit had begun to circulate on the same day as the D Day news

broke. For once the rumour was correct, and on the afternoon of the 7th the Seaforths were on their way south down Highway No. 6. This route took them close to Cassino, and as the T.C.Vs. drew near the town the men could get a good look at the tremendous destruction in the area. Houses and buildings were flattened, the trees scarred and at times shredded by shell-fire, and everywhere a scene of such desolation that most Seaforths soon fell silent since words and comments were unequal to the view. High up on the hill the old monastery appeared to be a crumbled ruin, and as one gazed upward it seemed almost incredible that the position could have been taken at all. Despite the wreckage in the area, the main road arteries hummed with activity as military traffic roared northwards to support the front line troops. It was not until the Seaforths swung into the Salturno River Valley and onto the secondary roads leading to Piedmonte that they began to feel they were really and truly out of the line and definitely in for a decent period of rest.

The Seaforths' stay in this new area lasted for over a month. During this time most of the battalion lived under canvas, the men in "pup-tents" with larger tents housing everything from company quartermaster stores to the Battalion Orderly Room. It was a time for relaxation, and as many men as possible were given several days off to visit Naples or Rome where leave centres had been established for that purpose. Large hotels had been taken over in both major cities, some for officers and some for men, and for the equivalent of about fifty cents a day a Seaforth could luxuriate in living in a hotel which not only had a roof on it, but one which boasted electric lights, running water, as well as a cafe where he could eat off a plate instead of from a mess-tin. There were other touches, too, which made even a brief furlough something to remember. Neither centre had been greatly damaged, and the disruption to the normal life of the city was comparatively minor compared to Ortona or Baranello. The leave centres were well organised and there was plenty to see and do in these historic cities. Rome, especially, attracted many, and the opportunities for entertainment of every variety far outstripped the financial capabilities of most Seaforths to enjoy them. It must be admitted too, that the attractions were tempting and as a consequence the number of Seaforths posted as A.W.L. (Absent Without Leave) began to soar. So, too, did venereal disease cases—the latter to an extent that Naples was placed out of bounds owing to the high

incidence of disease in that city. There were also a number of instances where those who overstayed their leave decided to have a real fling and stayed away so long they were posted as deserters. A few "went underground", living in the big cities by their wits and making enough on the black market until they were either nabbed by the military police or until they decided to take the consequences of their action by turning themselves in.

Those unable to be away, found a fair amount of entertainment in the battalion and brigade areas. Trucks made regular trips carrying swimmers to the Salturna River about six miles away. In June and July the weather was hot, and whether the swim was part of regular sports parade or an evening's relaxation it was more than welcome. Another feature of the planned relaxation was the touring shows which played to the brigade. When the C.W.A.Cs. appeared in a theatre performance a few days after the unit arrived, it was the first time many Seaforths had seen a member of the Canadian Women's Army Corps. A week or so later the 2nd Canadian Army Show played to the brigade, and it too played to an appreciative audience.

Aside from the organized, professional shows there were other forms of entertainment. The band of the Royal Canadian Army Service Corps displayed its versatility occasionally, and of course the Pipes and Drums of the Seaforths played not only in their own lines but were invited to play by other units as well. In the evening, after dusk, there was usually a cinema show of some sort put on by the Auxiliary Services, and for those disinterested in organized entertainment there was usually something to do ranging from playing horseshoes to taking part in a crap game.

In any rest period of this nature there was usually plenty to do, and work was balanced with relaxation. The Regimental Sergeant Major, G. M. McMahon, had to smarten up company and battalion drill in preparation for a visit by the Corps Commander on 1 July. Equally involved in his own sphere was the Regimental Quartermaster Sergeant, S. Wellburn, who saw to it that every Seaforth appeared on parade with every item of uniform and equipment in the best possible condition. The Paymaster, Dental Officer, Medical Officer and Adjutant all had their claims to make on the men while they were all together rather than broken up into their various echelons, and in the Orderly Room the clerks brought up to date the various changes in appointments, promotions and postings which

continued whether the battalion was in the line or out of it.

Within the battalion itself those who had come to the Seaforths as reinforcements were finding themselves very much a part of the regimental family, so much so that they looked upon the reinforcements which arrived in June in a rather paternalistic way. Both "new" and "old" Seaforths approved the decision to form a Seaforth reinforcement company at No. 1 Canadian Base Reinforcement Group. This company, composed of men new to the theatre as well as veterans returning from hospital through the reinforcement stream, came up to the unit to train while it was in reserve. In this way not only would the officers and men in the reinforcement company gain the benefit of training with the unit, but it would also help to strengthen regimental family ties with those destined to serve in the battalion.

Just as there was a movement into the Seaforths there was a steady trickle away from it as well. The process of selecting potential officer material from among the other ranks was constant, and while at Piedmonte A/C.S.M. W. H. Jans, A/Sgt. J. H. Teece, Sgt. R. Game and Pte. J. B. Allen were sent to try for their commissions at an O.C.T.U. About two weeks earlier Major F. N. Pope and Captain F. H. Bonnell left to take a staff course, one in Canada and the other in Great Britain. Late in July five Seaforths were selected to escort prisoners of war back to Canada.[5] One interesting result of this constant flow to and from the battalion was the polarization into Support Company of many of the "old" Seaforths. Part of the reason was that, since the specialist platoons in this company did not have proportionately as high a rate of casualties as the rifle company platoon, there was already a larger number of long-service Seaforths serving there. This in turn tended to attract many into Support Company as positions became vacant. Presumably, too, Support Company with its greater proportion of vehicles was an attraction to men who had marched hundreds of miles up and down the twisting, mountainous roads of Italy.

The weeks at Piedmonte were not all filled with one long round of sports, recreation and furlough. There was a modest syllabus of training, and about once a week there would be company or battalion exercises lasting one or two days. Sometimes platoons would be taken for a leg-stretching hike over the nearby mountains, or perhaps a com-

[5] The selection of the five was a very difficult task and great consideration had to be given to claims of long service balanced with compassionate grounds.

pany might set out in the evening to watch a demonstration by the pioneer platoon clearing a minefield by night. Such hardening training as mountain climbing and cliff scaling[6] interspersed with an occasional scheme on a brigade level, kept the Seaforths in shape for the tasks ahead. On 25 July, when everyone was ordered to remove all marks of identity which might indicate to enemy agents that a Canadian unit was on the move, it appeared that once again the division was going into action.

During the weeks when the 1st Canadian Infantry Division had been in reserve, the German forces had been pushed back relentlessly by the Allied Armies. The nineteen German divisions which had barred the road to Rome had been hit so hard that in many instances their strength was equal to or less than the fighting strength of a Canadian brigade. Far to the north the enemy could take some small comfort in the preparations which had been made to strengthen the Gothic Line which ran across Italy from Rimini to Pisa. However there was to be no headlong flight. The Gothic Line itself required more work on it, and to gain the time to strengthen it with mines, anti-tank ditches, pillboxes, and the usual array of defences, several "delaying lines" were established south of Florence. These were not designed to be defended to the "last man, last shot", but rather as positions of natural strength which could hold and delay the attacking force.

By mid-June General Alexander's forces were midway between Rome and the Florence-Leghorn line, but the possibility of continuing this rate of advance up the leg of Italy was beginning to fade. In France the Normandy bridgehead was secure, and it had long been the consideration of General Eisenhower and others that an invasion of Southern France should not be deterred by any plans of General Alexander in Italy. Operation "Anvil", as the invasion of Southern France was named, was given priority over the battle in Italy by a directive on 2 July, and this in turn meant that divisions in the Italian theatre which might have been used to keep up the pressure on Kesselring's retreating forces had to be withdrawn in preparation for "Anvil". This subordination of the Italian theatre and the withdrawal of the divisions from it was to make itself felt all along the front, and

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[6] Highland dancing for the officers gave an additional filip to their physical well-being.

dashed to the ground any hope that the Eighth Army might find itself close to the Alps by winter.

If the strategy of General Alexander had to be curbed as French, American and British formations prepared for Operation "Anvil", the immediate task of engaging and destroying the enemy continued with unabated energy, and by the time the Seaforths received information of their impending move, the British 13th Corps was within a dozen miles of Florence. The plan for the Canadians was to move secretly to a concentration area near Perugia, and from that point the Corps would take over the positions of the 10th British Corps so as to permit the 10th and 13th British Corps to concentrate on the breakthrough of the Gothic Line. Initially the 1st Canadian Division would go into the line at Florence to reinforce the 13th Corps whose front was extended to take over the area previously held by the French Expeditionary Corps.

The movement of the Canadians was to be made under strict security. This resulted in the removal of all identification on uniforms as well as a series of lectures by Lt. F. R. Perrett, the Intelligence Officer, who drummed into everyone's head the need to be especially careful. Cigarette boxes of Canadian manufacture were not to be tossed out of moving vehicles, and indeed the route north taken by the Seaforths was lined not by the usual conglomeration of unit direction signs but by markers carrying only a single letter. The towns enroute were to be out of bounds and, at a higher level, a deception scheme was put into operation to convey the impression that the Canadians were moving northeast to concentrate behind the Polish Corps on the Adriatic.[7]

The Seaforths were roused early on the morning of 28 July by the call of bugles. It was still pitch black, but camp fires began to light up all over the valley as preparations were made to have a breakfast in the starlight. By 0500 hours the camp was struck and the companies left by T.C.V. to head north up Highway No. 6 towards Rome. For the next five days the battalion made its way towards Florence by way of Valmontone, Castigliore de Lago and Siena. A typical day's move was described by "C" Company's diarist on the 29th as follows:

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[7] Nicholson, *op. cit.*, pp. 481-482; W.D., Seaforth Highlanders of Canada, 22-28 July 1944.

> Reveille at 0400 hr. Breakfast 0430 hrs. Left staging area about 0550 hrs. Passed thru Rome and left Highway 6 to Highway 3. Mr. Lynch left with advance party. Country much hillier than the country we left or travelled thru yesterday. Towns and villages passed thru were in some cases heavily bombed or demolished by artillery. Some places passed, however, had little or no evidence of fighting. Went over one range of mountains and the grade was fairly steep. Convoy moved at very slow pace. Weather very warm and clear. Arrived at approx. 1430 hrs. . . . This is one of the nicest areas we have been in. There is shade about, flat ground and a small river nearby for bathing and washing. The villages both near and far are out of bounds for us for security reasons. No vino about. The people are a much finer type than the people of the south. They are cleaner and all seem much better dressed. Hot supper at 5 p.m. Pup tents erected.[8]

By the time the unit reached the area of Lake Trasimene, close to one of the enemy's delaying lines, the evidence of destruction was far more evident. Huge craters, smashed buildings, shattered houses, wrecked tanks and vehicles and other signs of a heavy battle were passed, yet at times some villages had hardly been scratched. One could almost determine the areas of rapid withdrawal and those where the enemy had made a stand. After a few more days of travel the Seaforths arrived at a position about twenty miles south of Florence and on 4 August Lt-Col. Thomson was called forward to make a reconnaissance of the positions along the front of the 2nd New Zealand Division which his unit would be occupying. After being briefed at Brigade Headquarters, Thomson returned to inform his officers that the Seaforths would be relieving the New Zealanders on the 5th.

The Seaforths' tour of duty along the line of the Arno River on the outskirts of Florence was remarkably short. During the three days they were there numerous patrols were sent out to discover the layout of the enemy's defences on the north bank of the river. A few minor clashes took place when they bumped into enemy patrols attempting to do the same thing. Enemy shell-fire and occasional bursts of machine-gun fire was the first introduction that many of the new reinforcements taken on strength after the Hitler Line had of conditions at the front, but to the veterans it was almost peaceful. During the second day at the front a band of Italian partisans came into the line and for most Seaforths it was the first time they had come into contact with these rugged, bearded men who had been fighting the Ger-

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[8] Seaforth Archives, Diary of "C" Company, Book 1, 29 July 1944.

mans behind the lines for months. Armed with a variety of small arms, and benefiting from their knowledge of both the terrain and the people, the partisans were of considerable help to the Canadians. On this and on later occasions they were able to describe the locations of enemy weapons, point out enemy defences and minefields, and also give the Canadians a fair idea of German forces located on their immediate front. Periodically one or more partisans would accompany a reconnaissance patrol. Their demands were few. Food and supplies of arms and ammunition sufficient to enable them to carry on their underground war against the Germans were their prime requisites, and given these they would infiltrate back through the enemy's lines to harass "Tedeschi" in their own unique way.

The Seaforths had scarcely put up their shoulder titles and divisional patches than they were told to remove them again on the 8th. Moreover, somewhat to their surprise, the unit was informed that the long front[9] they occupied was to be turned over to the 6th Lancers of the 8th Indian Division. The turnover did not take very long, and as soon as the battalion was free of its responsibilities the companies were driven south on T.C.Vs. From the outskirts of Florence the Seaforths were driven south through Siena and thence to Perugia where camp was set up on the west bank of the Tiber River. Here, again, strict security measures were enforced to conceal the identity of the Canadian forces concentrated in the area. Nearby towns were out-of-bounds, but somehow or other the scroungers in the unit managed to forage a fair amount of fruit, corn, eggs, chianti and other farm produce so that the usual army rations received a welcome supplement and variety. If there was one thing the veteran Seaforth learned, it was to scrounge while the scrounging was good.

The reason for the withdrawal of the 1st Canadian Division from the central part of Italy was the decision of General Alexander to change the location of his main thrust from the central part of Italy to the Adriatic front. The enemy had been pushed north some 260 miles following the Spring offensive but he was by no means defeated. Seven divisions[10] had been taken from the Italian theatre. These were currently preparing for the invasion of Southern France

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[9] During its brief stay along the Arno River, the 1st Canadian Division was spread out along a ten mile front.

[10] Included among these were the only formations available to Alexander which had experience in mountain warfare.

on 15 August. To the north, the range of mountains running up the "spine" of Italy swung to the northwest a short distance beyond Florence. As a result of these various factors, therefore, it was decided to launch the main blow against the Gothic Line on the extreme right, even though rivers and mountainous ridges running at right angles to the proposed line of attack offered good defensive positions to the enemy. The new plan envisaged the Eighth Army attacking with three corps. On the right, nearest the sea, was the 2nd Polish Corps which was at this time fighting its way from Ancona to Pesaro. Next to it the 1st Canadian Corps would continue the attack to seize Cattolica and Rimini. Further inland the 5th British Corps would have Bologna and Ferrara as its objective.

Although nothing of this was known to the Seaforths at the time there were signs that something was in the wind. During the 15th and 16th of August the companies were exercised on an assault river crossing of the Tiber, and during the same period the Corps Commander, Lt-Gen. E. L. M. Burns and the Army Commander, Lt-Gen. Sir Oliver Leese, both paid a visit to the Seaforths. The Commanding Officer, Lt-Col. Thomson, it was noted, was making numerous visits to and from Brigade Headquarters, and when on 16 August word got round that the unit was to move back to the Adriatic area, there were not too many Seaforths who were surprised.

It was a mark of the experience of the battalion that a move over the mountains to the east coast of Italy could be made with so little fuss. During their training in England, masses of paper work seemed to be required to get from one point to another. Now the entire unit with its vehicles, weapons and supplies needed only a route and a few map references and away it went, sure of its ability to get there on time and fully expectant that the advance party would have everything in hand when they arrived. The entire division was a very smoothly operating machine, with its morale as high as its self-confidence.

The move from Perugia via Foligno and Fabriano to the small town of Barbara was completed by the 19th. Situated on the side of a hill overlooking a small valley, the Seaforths could hear periodically the sound of guns as the Polish Corps closed up to the Metauro River about twelve miles to the north. That night one could hear the rumble of tanks moving forward on the roads, and indeed on the roads both night and day were veritable streams of traffic as the Canadian

Corps concentrated in preparation for its role. When an order came to investigate all the Italian civilians living in the area occupied by the unit so as to ensure there were no enemy agents in their midst, the task was carried out but many wondered how on earth so many thousands of men, tanks, guns and vehicles could concentrate without the enemy knowing about it.

The task for which the Canadian Corps was concentrated might be divided into two phases. In the first the 1st Canadian Division was to advance from the Metauro River to the Foglia River, a distance of about ten miles. Immediately beyond the Foglia were the main defences of the Gothic Line, and breaking through this line and swinging towards and seizing Cattolica would form the second phase. In the first phase the 1st Canadian Division with the British and Polish forces, west and east respectively, attacking on either flank, would advance with the 2nd Brigade on the left, the 1st Brigade on the right and the 3rd Brigade in reserve. In the initial silent assault over the Metauro the 2nd Brigade was to have the Princess Patricias on the right and the Loyal Edmontons on the left. These units, supported by tanks from the 145th Regiment, Royal Armoured Corps, were to cross the river about three miles southwest of Montemaggiore and advance to the high area near Serrungarina, one and a half to two miles beyond the start line. Following their success the Seaforths, assisted by the same British armoured regiment, were to advance about three miles beyond the initial brigade objective along the line of the road leading to Mombaroccio. H hour was set at 2300 hours on 25 August, and up until the last moment everything was done to conceal from the enemy the weight of power which was about to fall on him.[11] Not until the leading battalions reached the highway north of the Metauro would the artillery open up, and only at first light would the tanks dash forward to take up their positions in support of the infantry.

For the Seaforths the day before the attack was filled with quiet activity. Vehicles remained stationary whenever possible to reduce the amount of road traffic. Arms and ammunition were checked, petrol tins topped, Bren gun magazines filled, iron rations distributed, aerial photographs studied, and a dozen last minute details attended to. A short distance ahead of their concentration area was a building

[11] The presence of the Canadians did surprise the enemy, as did the withdrawal of the German Tenth Army surprise the Canadians. (Nicholson, *op. cit.*, p. 502.)

on a hill which served as an excellent observation post looking over the river valley and the route the unit would take. Here Lt-Col. Thomson could study the ground to be taken, and right up until the last warm rays of the sun sank over the horizon, officers strained their eyes to fasten in their memory the view of the future battleground. That evening the armour moved up to within a mile of the Seaforths. Before the guns opened up at midnight the assaulting battalions were over the river and reporting initial success.

The attack went remarkably well. Before first light the Loyal Edmontons and Princess Patricias were on their objectives, and consequently the Seaforths, who had been on 30 minutes' notice to move, started off for the river about 0400 hours. An hour later the battalion was over the Metauro River, and shortly after eight "A" and "C" Companies, accompanied by tanks struck out for their first objectives. These were seized without any opposition and by mid-morning "C" Company, after a brief skirmish, rounded up about a dozen prisoners at the third objective, Point 394, a hill two miles south of Mombaroccio. Most of the prisoners captured here, as with others captured later, were from the 211th Panzer Grenadier Regiment of the 71st Infantry Division. Around noon, as the Seaforths neared their final objective (Point 479), the leading company ran into medium machine-gun fire and some shelling from self-propelled guns. Nevertheless by 1230 hours the final objective was taken and about 15 more prisoners captured for a loss of three wounded.

At this point the battalion had advanced, in straight line distance, about two and a half miles beyond the Edmontons and Patricias. During the afternoon Lt-Col. Thomson ordered "B" Company, commanded by Major F. D. Colquhoun, to patrol about half a mile further northeast to the convent Beato Sante located on a steep knoll dominating the road leading into Mombaroccio. "B" Company, mounted on tanks, closed up to the hill to make an attack on the small village near the convent. En route demolitions on the road held up the tanks. Advancing on foot the Seaforths, while manoeuvering for the attack, were suddenly subjected to heavy shelling and mortaring. Major Colquhoun and four others were killed while twelve others were wounded, among them Lt. J. L. Thirlwell. Thirlwell, in spite of his wounds, took command of the company and, contacting the tanks, directed their fire with such good effect that a number of enemy machine-gun posts were silenced as well as at least one enemy SP

gun.[12] This permitted Lt. Fairweather's platoon to get into the group of houses near the monastery which the Seaforths captured along with six prisoners. From these it was learned that on the hill above the village another 60 Germans were dug in. On advice from Lt-Col. Thomson "B" Company withdrew. It was stuck out far ahead of the brigade "fortress", both flanks were exposed, the tanks were experiencing difficulty getting forward, and the Commanding Officer felt that the enemy on the ridge would provide an excellent target for the artillery. Under the cover of darkness, therefore, the company drew back and the field guns were able to engage the target. On the following day 25 enemy dead were counted on the hill.

The success of the first day's action made it apparent that the enemy was fighting only a rearguard action and appeared to be concerned primarily with getting his forces back over the Foglia and into the main defences of the Gothic Line. If he was able to do this, it would mean probably that the momentum of the attack would be halted. On the 27th, therefore, the divisional commander ordered the brigades to press hard on the enemy's heels and deny him the opportunity and time he needed to regroup. The brunt of the fighting on the 27th in the 2nd Brigade was borne by the Princess Patricias and the Loyal Edmontons. During the morning the "Eddies" pushed on to Montecciccardo while the Princess Patricias advanced to Monte Santa Maria. While these two units were thus engaged, the Seaforths set out shortly after noon to occupy the high ground just north of Mombaroccio to be in a position to continue the advance when called on. As the Highlanders and the fighting vehicles moved forward over the dusty roads a good interval was kept between the marching men and the cloud of dust thrown up by the carriers, anti-tank vehicles and other wheeled transport. The enemy's artillery observers remained in position until the last moment, and dust rising on the roads could bring a flurry of shells which could wreak havoc among men bunched together.

Early on 28 August Lt-Col. Thomson held an "O" Group at which he outlined the plans for an assault on Ginestreto, a village about four miles to the northwest. The plan was dependent on the capture by the Loyal Edmontons of Montecciccardo. Although the Edmontons had entered the town at 0130 hours on the morning of the 28th its occupancy was quickly challenged by enemy infantry

[12] Thirwell was awarded the Military Cross.

and tanks, and there developed a see-saw battle during which the town passed from hand to hand as the Edmontons and Germans gained and then lost possession. During this fighting the tanks accompanying the Seaforths were sent ahead to aid the Edmontons who ultimately captured it late that afternoon. Early in the evening three companies of Seaforths moved across country to Ginestreto. Only slight opposition was met and the objective was secure by daylight of the 29th. "A" Company then was sent to take Sant' Angelo. No enemy was encountered. It was now apparent that the enemy was no longer in strength this side of the Foglia, and the second phase of the corps' attack could be mounted.

The rapid advance of the Canadian Corps from the Metauro to the Foglia Rivers was due in part to the decision of the German commanders to withdraw into the Gothic Line. Not until the evening of the 28th were the Germans convinced that the attack on the Line from the Adriatic end was the main Eighth Army assault, and consequently he worked hard to bring over reinforcements into his defences north of the Foglia to bear the brunt of the attack. It took time to shift brigades and divisions, however, and by the 29th, when the three-corps' assault had gained the heights overlooking the Foglia valley, there developed a race. To the north the enemy was frantically trying to man his defences with fresh troops, while to the south, in the Canadian sector, plans were being rushed to gain a breakthrough into the Gothic Line through which Lt-Gen. Burns could pour his armoured regiments to send the enemy reeling back towards the Po.

The attack on the Gothic Line was to be made on a two divisional front—the infantry on the right and the armour on the left. Thus on the 29th the Seaforths were relieved by the Perth Regiment[13] and moved back several miles to regroup. The 3rd Brigade, meanwhile, had moved up and its units were actively patrolling the outskirts of the Gothic Line, hoping to find a hole in it which, if lightly held, could be pried wider by following platoon-sized patrols with companies, and if successful, companies with battalions.

During the evening of 30-31 August the Canadian attack went in, and in the initial 36 hours of combat both divisions fought tooth and nail to crack through the belts of minefields, barbed wire, pill-

[13] It formed part of the 11th Canadian Infantry Brigade of the 5th Canadian Armoured Division. This brigade was to make the initial assault on the Gothic Line directly in front of the Seaforth's position.

boxes, field defences and weapon pits which the enemy had prepared. Leading the attack on the 2nd Brigade front, the Princess Patricias penetrated the line at Osteria Nuova, and by the evening of the 31st this unit, after an exhausting battle, had captured two hills just south of Pozzo Alto. By noon on the 31st, the Seaforths had moved up close to Montelabbate to be in position to go through the Princess Patricias, and a few hours later Lt-Col. Thomson returned from Brigade Headquarters[14] to give his final orders for the attack.

The plan envisaged by the Commanding Officer was simple, but the execution of it, as we shall see, became rather complicated as a result of the fire and smoke encountered in the Gothic Line itself. By mid-afternoon the Patricias had seized Osteria Nuova and were reaching further north. "B" and "D" Companies of the Seaforths, supporting the 145th Regiment, Royal Armoured Corps, were to go through Osteria Nuova and strike almost due north to the village of Pozzo Alto and, if possible, push on to Point 119, a high feature about half a mile to the northwest.

By 1726 hours both companies had gone over the slope down into the valley and had reached the river. On the far side of the river, which was easily fordable, "D" Company mounted the tanks and were taken through the littered, shell-pocked battlefield to Osteria Nuova. Here the platoons dismounted and, together with the tanks, pushed on over the hilly, secondary roads until they were stopped by heavy shell-fire. What happened to "B" Company is not too clear. Apparently, when crossing over the valley beyond the river it swung too far to the right and entered Borgo Santa Maria.[15] This town was still held by the enemy, and consequently even while on the outskirts the Seaforths began to receive a pounding from our own mortars and artillery as well as opposition from the enemy.

Meanwhile, to the north, "D" Company was advancing slowly while the accompanying tanks went ahead and did an excellent job of softening up the enemy. One troop swung to the right to occupy a feature roughly midway between Pozzo Alto and Borgo Santa Maria. Here they put an anti-tank gun out of action and caused some fifty

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[14] The 2nd Cdn. Inf. Bde. for the next few days was in support of the 21st Tank Brigade, Royal Armoured Corps. Thus in the action which followed, the Seaforths were in support of the 145th Armoured Regt.

[15] W.D., H.Q., 2nd Cdn. Inf. Bde., August, 1944, Appendix: Operations Log, 31 August 1944, Serial 39.

enemy casualties among troops from the 1st Parachute Division. "B" Company, meanwhile, with its tanks, engaged in some close fighting, and managed to round up 21 prisoners by the end of the day.

"B" Company found itself in rather difficult circumstances when it reached Borgo Santa Maria. Expecting to find the Princess Patricias there, and unaware that they were some distance off to the right, this company fought an awkward, uncomfortable battle in the area during which it inflicted a number of casualties but did not capture the town. As time went on, "B" Company's commander realized that he was too far to the right, that the objective was further north, and at nightfall both companies "married up" north of Borgo Santa Maria. With nightfall the tanks had taken up defensive positions, and the Seaforths formed the outer rim of this laager. At the same time plans were laid to continue the attack on Pozzo Alto, only this time the two companies were to attack the village at dawn, with part of the attacking force swinging around so as to come in from the north.

There was little sleep for those in "B" and "D" Companies that night. Although their left flank was fairly well protected by the deep penetration made by the tanks of the British Columbia Dragoons, their front and right flank was still very much up in the air. The enemy had been hit hard and was obviously shaken and disorganized, but the two companies were behind his main defences and in spite of a degree of disorganization in the initial attack, it seemed possible that an advance on Pozzo Alto and Point 119 under the cover of darkness looked promising. Such, indeed, was the case. The village was taken with little opposition and shortly after 0900 hours on 1 September the companies were consolidated on their objective. "D" Company almost immediately set off for Point 119 which it occupied with the aid of the tanks later that day. By noon "A" and "C" Companies had come up to Pozzo Alto where Lt-Col. Thomson established his Tactical Headquarters. That evening the Seaforths and the tanks were firmly established in the Pozzo Alto-Point 119 area from which the other units in the brigade, working closely with the British tanks, struck north towards Monte Luro and northeast towards the coastal road leading into Cattolica. The Gothic Line had been penetrated, but well aware of the tenacity of the enemy in defence the Canadians knew that, given the slightest chance, he would quickly recover and provide a stiff resistance.

On the following day the Seaforths took part in the dash towards Cattolica on the coast of the Adriatic Sea. Only slight resistance was met, mostly in the form of snipers with an occasional isolated enemy group or self-propelled gun inflicting such damage as it could before being rounded up as prisoner or destroyed. After moving up to Monte Luro, the 145th Regiment, Royal Armoured Corps and the Seaforths struck northwestward to establish themselves on the outskirts of Cattolica. On the 3rd, when fighting patrols entered the coastal town, they found it to be almost deserted except for a few civilians and an occasional German paratrooper. By noon on the 3rd, about 22 paratroopers had been gathered into the battalion's prisoner-of-war cage, which brought the total of prisoners captured by the Seaforths in the last four days to 73. Almost as many had been killed. During the ten days of battle since the battalion had formed up to cross the Metauro its losses had been comparatively light. From 25 August to 3 September inclusive, one officer and nineteen other ranks had been killed and two officers and 49 other ranks had been wounded. During the period the Seaforths, in direct line distances, had advanced approximately 20 miles. The entire battalion was ready for a rest, even a brief one, for between Cattolica and the Po Valley there was a rugged stretch of country which had to be penetrated before the Canadians could break out into the Lombardy Plains of Northern Italy.

For the next week and a half, while others took up the task of hustling the enemy northward towards Rimini, the Seaforths as part of the 2nd Brigade, relaxed in Cattolica. The padre wrote in his diary his impressions which were those of most Seaforths: "Adriatic is beautiful. Sands lovely. Whole district evacuated by German orders. Every man gets his own villa to live in. Luxury for a day. Yesterday kill and being killed, dodging from hole to hole, crawling in darkness and danger—today lolling on sands, swimming and lounging."[16] Actually the entire period was not spent in such bliss, but for men who had fought through the August heat, covered with dust and dodging shells, the short time spent in this coastal town was very pleasant. Many of the Seaforths were billeted in a naval training station right on the beach, separated from the older part of the town by a canal. The naval station was very modern, and so designed in

[16] Seaforth Archives, "Diary of Major R. C. H. Durnford," 3 September 1944.

the interior as to resemble the hull of a ship. The ends of the buildings were curved, and the walls, too, sloped down and inward with some of the windows designed to resemble portholes. More important than the billets, however, was the sea. The engineers swept the beaches for mines almost immediately, and the Adriatic was perfect. The warm sand and salt water was a tonic, and the combination of recreation and light training quickly made a noticeable difference in the battalion.

Although the Seaforths were several miles behind the front they were by no means out of the battle zone. For the first week several enemy planes bombed Cattolica every night, and when the high explosive and incendiary bombs whooshed down quite a few men decided to sleep in the basements of their billets and even a few tried slit-trenches. Periodically, some distance out to sea, rumblings of naval fire could be heard as Royal Navy ships lobbed shells into enemy positions further up the coast. Every day fighters and bombers from the squadrons supporting the Eighth Army passed overhead, and the Seaforths were sufficiently close to see the sky fill with black smoke from the enemy's anti-aircraft shells. "It was quite a thrill", wrote "C" Company's War diarist, "to see the raiding planes in formation, then break off and fly thru his ack-ack and drop their bombs and return homewards from different directions, then pick up their formation again."[17]

There were the usual tasks to perform when at rest, one of which was assigning reinforcements to the various platoons. The padre tried to catch up on the letters he wrote back to Canada to relatives of those killed or wounded, the paymaster doled out lire on pay parade, men gathered about the company clerks at mail call to await the hoped-for parcel or letter; and then there was the usual small line-up of somewhat dejected Seaforths who were "up on orders" for "conduct to the prejudice of good order and military discipline. . . ." It was a time for visiting too, for in action friends in different companies might not see each other for days. The same held true for a Seaforth who served in one of the rear echelons who, for example, had a chum in Support Company. Cattolica was too pleasant a place and the weather was too good for some of the old-timers to believe the unit could be there for very long. They were quite correct. On the 12th

[17] Seaforth Archives, " 'C' Company Journal", Book I, 9 September 1944.

Lt-Col. Thomson warned of an impending move, on the 13th aerial photographs of the new battle area were circulated and on the 14th the unit was told to be ready to move on the following day.

By mid-September the Eighth Army had pushed its front on the Adriatic Sector up to the line of the Marano River. Five miles beyond lay Rimini. Between Rimini and the front were a series of hills and rivers which the enemy, now fully aware of the danger to his flank, was determined to make it very costly for the Allies to take.

The Seaforths' twelve day rest period was brought to an end when the 2nd Brigade was ordered to concentrate about two miles south of the Conca River prior to taking over from the 3rd Brigade. It was the intention of the brigadier that the Seaforths would relieve the Royal 22nd Regiment on the 16th and take over the San Martino feature prior to launching an attack on the San Fortunato ridge. The line of the railway was to be the startline for the brigade attack with the Seaforths on the right and the Princess Patricias on the left. Once the San Fortunato feature was secured, the Edmontons would pass through, cross the Marecchia River and capture the important highway junction north of Rimini.[18] The plan was sound, but as events turned out, decidedly ambitious, for the Seaforths soon found themselves in a fight which almost rivalled Ortona for bitterness.

By mid-afternoon on 15 September, Lt-Col. Thomson had established his headquarters in a farmhouse about two miles inland from Riccione, and the companies had scarcely settled down when they were ordered to send representatives to accompany Major D. M. Clark who was to reconnoiter a new area three miles further to the west. In the small hours of the morning of the 16th the companies marched through the shattered remnants of the village of Santa Maria di Scacciano and on through an area over which the 48th Highlanders had fought ten days earlier. There was to be little sleep for anyone that night, for even when the men were "kipping down" in their new area, Lt-Col. Thomson was attending an "O" Group at Brigadier Gibson's headquarters. The Seaforths were to cross the Marano River at 0600 hours the same morning, for though the San Martino feature was still not captured evidently it was expected that it would be cleared by the time the Seaforths arrived. Brigadier Gibson expected

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[18] W.D., Seaforth Highlanders of Canada, September 1944, Appendix III: "Action Which Led to the Fall of Rimini, 16 - 20 Sept. 44."

the leading 2nd Brigade units to occupy the San Martino-San Lorenzo features and spend the day in preparation for the attack over the River Ausa.

Shortly after first light on the 16th, "B" and "D" Companies moved off to take over from the forward companies of the Royal 22nd Regiment. Accompanying them were two troops of tanks from the 145th Regiment, Royal Armoured Corps, whose tanks were also supporting "A" and "C" Companies following behind. Each company had been carefully briefed by Lt-Col. Thomson, and on the face of it things looked fairly simple. However, it soon became evident that the Royal 22nd Regiment was not in complete control of the village, and shortly before their arrival at the forward lines the Seaforths were subjected to a severe shelling. "D" Company, fortunately, had been led by a Royal 22nd guide to a large house[19] with very thick walls which then and later withstood numerous direct hits by enemy shells. "A" and "C" Companies were not so fortunate, and during the day the battalion suffered almost two dozen casualties from shell-fire alone. Tactical Headquarters also felt the weight of enemy shells, and in mid-morning Thomson moved closer to the front and took up quarters in a damaged power-house which seemed to offer some protection. It was later discovered that this location was under enemy observation, and when it became apparent that any movement brought a flurry of shells, and especially when one struck the C.O.'s jeep, Thomson wisely moved further back.

During the morning, while the Seaforths and Patricias were manoeuvering into position, further attacks by the Royal 22nds and the 48th Highlanders of Canada against the ridge were beaten back. At one stage the Seaforths' mortar platoon had the unique experience of having a company of the 48th Highlanders withdraw through them leaving the platoon in the front line. Very shortly thereafter, however, the Toronto unit, which had only withdrawn to reorganize, came charging forward again to the great relief of the Seaforth mortarmen. The mortar crews, as the rifle platoons, were in an exposed position. They had taken shelter in a farmhouse and had dug trenches in the wine cellar. Any movement outside the house brought down immediate enemy fire and even to man the mortar located behind the farmhouse was a dangerous undertaking. At times the crews drew lots to see who would go out to the well for water.

[19] It was about 1,000 yards south of the village.

Shortly after noon a liaison officer from Brigade Headquarters arrived at Tactical Headquarters. He brought the plans for an attack on and beyond the ridge which the brigadier wished to make at 1530 hours. There are times, however, when the battalion commander on the spot may question such orders and this was one of them. The ridge, which had been attacked in the morning and early afternoon, was still in enemy hands, and from the amount of shells and mortars he was tossing into the Canadian lines one would almost think the opposing enemy forces, if thin on the ground, had some sort of special priority on the output of German munitions. As a result of Lt-Col. Thomson's discussions with the brigadier,[20] the planned attack was postponed until the next day. Later that evening the attack was put off for yet another day on the orders of the G.O.C.

Despite the postponement, or perhaps because of it, the Seaforths sent out several strong fighting patrols on the night of 16-17 September. "D" Company was to try and get as far as the railway line west of San Martino, "A" Company's patrol would swing into the area between the railway and the village while "B" Company patrol would attempt to infiltrate into the village itself. It was an ambitious plan, but under the cover of darkness and out of view of the enemy's artillery spotters, there was a chance of success. As events turned out, the enemy was too much on the alert. "D" Company's patrol made two attempts to circle around San Martino but it was turned back. "A" Company's men reached their area but found two enemy machine-gun posts guarding the crossroads. Lt. D. I. Fairweather took the "B" Company patrol to within 50 yards of the village but owing to machine-gun fire as well as fire from enemy tanks, the group was forced back. During the early hours of the 17th a further attack on the village was planned, this time by "B" Company, commanded by Major "Ollie" Mace. It was not an easy task to organize the attack in the middle of the night, but since the enemy was already alerted, the attack could be delivered under the cover of

[20] The Princess Patricias' Commanding Officer also suggested that an attack on the ridge might be successful, but the companies would be unable to push far beyond it as Gibson hoped. It should be noted also that the approaches to San Martino were over open ground under enemy observation. There were times when the Pioneer Platoon, for example, were unable to clear minefields because as soon as they exposed themselves in the open, they were subjected to enemy fire. The enemy were in excellent positions to dominate the approaches by fire.

darkness and was considered a fair risk. Moreover it was now known that the enemy was reinforcing San Martino, and as its position dominated the area to the north and south its retention by the enemy made things very difficult for the flanking battalions.[21] This two-company attack went in about 0300 hours. Some of the Seaforths managed to get into the outskirts of the village but that was all. Seven prisoners were taken and an unknown number of the enemy killed and wounded. Despite everything they could do, however, the Seaforths were unable to advance any further owing to the hail of fire which struck at them. Both companies were withdrawn across the valley to the ridge of land where their original positions were located, while in the last hours of darkness stretcher bearers combed the area for the dead and wounded. By the time the companies arrived back another hot day was breaking and once more enemy shelling scattered throughout the entire battalion brought with it a steady trickle of casualties into the Seaforths' Regimental Aid Post.

As a result of the information from the patrols sent out by the Seaforths and the units on its flanks, the Brigade Commander was able to obtain a much better idea of the enemy's defences. Moreover, the report of tanks in the area seemed to confirm the opinion that the Germans were reinforcing the ridge. If the enemy was successful he might be able to impose a delay on the division's front which he had been unable to do at the Gothic Line. It became important, therefore, that the San Martino ridge should be cleared as soon as possible, and as a consequence a two-battalion attack on the ridge was planned for the afternoon of the 17th. On the left the Seaforth Highlanders, and on the right the 48th Highlanders, were to assault up the hill with heavy artillery support which would start with a 25-minute barrage. Further support from the tanks would be available, but at the outset it would be strictly an infantry show. On the Seaforths' front "A" and "C" Companies[22] were assigned the assaulting role, while

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[21] W.D., H.Q., 2nd Cdn. Inf. Bde., September 1944, Appendix: "Intelligence Log", 17 September 1944, Serials 1, 7 and 9.

[22] Commanded by Majors H. W. J. Paterson and H. L. Glendinning respectively. "Our best plan," wrote Lt-Col. Thomson later, "was to try and force the enemy to keep his head down with our heavy weapon fire and try and get the companies into the village. Certainly four companies attacking might have succeeded by virtue of one-half of the number surviving, but the art of war is to win and live." (Letter, S. W. Thomson to author, 24 January 1968.)

two troops of Churchill and two troops of Sherman tanks were to back them up.

At 1330 hours the Seaforths heard the whistle of the shells of the barrage pass over them and then fall on the San Martino feature. For almost half an hour the rain of shells kept up, and with each passing minute tension grew as H hour approached. The open country leading to the objective offered little cover, but from the smoke and dust rising from San Martino it seemed that any opposition must be flattened. Right from the beginning of the infantry-cum-tank attack, however, the Seaforths encountered heavy opposition, especially from machine-gun fire, and when the platoons topped the crest just before the village, enemy shell-fire was severe. It was apparent that much of the fire was coming from the flanks, and the supporting tanks were finding it extremely difficult to locate the enemy posts. In some cases the artillery fire had blown down houses whose masonry gave additional protection to enemy strongpoints constructed on the lower floors, and the dust and rubble and confusion of battle in this case favoured the enemy. Moreover it was later found that the enemy had several strong anti-tank gun emplacements in a commanding position on top of the ridge. As for the tanks, valiant as was their action, they began to suffer increasing losses from well-sited enemy anti-tank guns located even beyond the village.

"A" and "C" Companies were suffering severe casualties also, among them Major H. W. J. Paterson who was killed during this attack. Yet in spite of the blasts of exploding mortars, the whistle and banging of shells and the stream of small arms fire directed at them, some of the Seaforths managed to make it to the village. One was Acting Sergeant R. E. Jenkins of No. 15 Platoon, "C" Company. Doubling across the open field which the enemy had sited as a "killing ground", Jenkins and his men dashed into two houses barricaded and occupied by the enemy. He forced his way in, killing four of the enemy and taking the remainder prisoner. In the back garden were two slit trenches manned by the enemy. As the sergeant stepped out to deal with them he was shot through the neck and cheek. Bleeding and furious, Jenkins ran forward and killed those who were in the slit trenches. After ensuring his platoon was firm on its objective he contacted Major Glendinning and was ordered back. He refused an

escort as his platoon was already weak and the fighting was by no means over.[23]

If capturing the miserable group of houses which constituted San Martino was only a matter of courage the Seaforths would have had the village "in their pocket", but in this instance courage alone was not sufficient. The enemy had a magnificent sweep of observation over the entire front, as the Seaforths found later when they had pushed further north and could look back. As a result he was able to direct his artillery, "Moaning Minnies" and anti-tank guns on the attacking force, bringing down concentration of fire right on top of his own dug-in troops, knowing that although they might suffer some casualties, the Canadians would suffer far more. As a result, it became evident that the Seaforths could not hold on. The same thing, approximately, was occurring with the attack by the 48th Highlanders. Late that afternoon, with many of their supporting tanks knocked out, the Seaforth companies were ordered back since without armour[24] they could not hold out on the objective. Once more the platoons came back across the shell-ripped area, some with walking wounded. Other Seaforths, struck down and unable to move, waited patiently to be found by stretcher-bearers who combed the battlefield that night aided by the light of burning haystacks and buildings. Two sections of No. 15 platoon were still missing, and Lt. R. K. Swinton had taken over command of "A" Company. As one Seaforth wrote later:

> As a result of this action our forward fighting strength had deteriorated considerably and our supporting armour had suffered such heavy losses that it was no longer a fighting force. A counter-attack seemed imminent and the situation would have been grim indeed, had it not been for the fact that a squadron supporting the P.P.C.L.I.'s tanks were in the vicinity of [Tactical Headquarters] and were available for the defence of the feature. That evening "B", "C" and "D" Coys. were firmed up on the

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[23] Jenkins was awarded the Military Medal for his exceptional leadership and courage.

[24] Lt-Col. Thomson was unable to get Lt-Col. Strictland, commanding the tanks, to commit those still in hull-down position in the rear. Thomson, from his headquarters, had an excellent view of the battle in progress. He felt he could get Brigadier Gibson to order the tanks forward if only Gibson could view the situation as it was developing. Unfortunately the location of Gibson's headquarters did not permit him to view the brigade attack, and when Thomson went back to see both Gibson and Strictland (see below) it was too late.

crest overlooking S. Martino while "A" Coy. retired to its old location on the low ground behind [Tactical Headquarters].[25]

While the much depleted companies were returning, Lt-Col. Thomson had met with Brigadier Gibson and Lt-Col. Strictland, commanding the British tank regiment to discuss the battle. When Thomson arrived back at the unit, he informed his officers that the brigadier ordered the Seaforths were to attack once again that night. This time "B" and "D" Companies would go in heavily armed with Piats to see if they could knock out the German tanks which had created so much havoc among the infantry and tanks that afternoon. If successful, the Seaforths would be placed in a reserve role for the attack on the San Fortunato ridge[26] planned for the following day.

Shortly before midnight the two Seaforth companies set out to deal with San Martino, and for the next four hours, owing to poor communications, there was no word heard from them. The full story of the movement of these two companies will probably never be known, but it would appear that the enemy exercised somewhat the same tactics at night as he did during the day. The leading platoons managed to get within 40 or 50 yards of the village before they were met by crossfire from machine-gun posts. These weapons were so sited that one had to be fairly close to spot them, and a ground feature put them out of line of direct fire from any distance. Furthermore the enemy had dug very deep dugouts and called down his own artillery and mortar fire so close to his own positions as to make it extremely difficult to reach him without suffering heavier casualties than were acceptable. During the night attack attempts were made by the company commanders to swing their platoons further to the right and left and to try different approaches, but they met with the same fate. By about 0430 hours, when the main attack was due to go in,

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[25] "Action which lead to the Fall of Rimini . . .," *op. cit.* At the time Lt-Col. Thomson ordered the companies withdrawn he was under the impression all of the tanks had been put out of action. Half an hour later he was told that only half were knocked out and was asked to hold on while these eight reorganized and others came to assist. By this time, however, he had given orders to the companies to withdraw, and casualties among the signallers made communications poor. (2nd Cdn. Inf. Bde., Intelligence Log, *op. cit.*, 17 September 1944, Serials 61, 62 and 69.) There are indications that the Brigadier did not think Thomson was pushing his unit hard enough, but the casualties suffered by the unit in this attack appears to answer this contention.

[26] *Ibid.*, Serial 73; W.D., Seaforth Highlanders of Canada, 17 September 1944.

communications were re-established and the companies were recalled.

The dual attack by the Seaforths on the 17th had been costly. On this day alone almost 100 officers and men became casualties. Not all of these were felt in the rifle companies, although they bore the brunt of it. The enemy's fire fell over the entire battalion area, directed from excellent enemy observation posts further back towards the San Fortunato ridge, and during the 18th the shelling took its toll in every sub-unit of the battalion. Two men in slit trenches were killed by a direct hit in "D" Company's area and five others were wounded. One of the latter had the shell burst so close that it caved in the walls of the trench and buried him for a short time until he was rescued.

Canadian batteries were making life equally miserable for the Germans, and assisting them were medium bombers from the Tactical and Desert Air Forces. On the 18th, when the main attack across the River Ausa went in, it was a cheering sight to see the hundreds of light, medium and fighter bombers roaring overhead to attack the enemy's positions on San Fortunato Ridge and beyond, and it is a tribute to the stubborn fighting qualities of the German Tenth Army that the divisions it had brought over to face the mass of the Eighth Army attack that they fought as well as they did.[27]

During the 18th, while the Seaforths licked their wounds, other units in the division carried on the fight to the north but the hill on which San Martino stood, despite a desperate attempt by the Loyal Edmonton Regiment[28] to take it early in the morning, remained in the possession of the German paratroopers who held it. Not until the night of 18-19 September, after the ridge had been outflanked by the division's push over the Ausa River, did the paratroopers withdraw. Then a patrol from the 48th Highlanders entered the battered, burning village and reported it empty. Surprisingly, several "C" Company men returned to the unit's lines that afternoon. Pte. May, L/Cpl. Harris and Pte. Paterson came back with a German prisoner having spent the night on the objective. Unable to get out, they had rather dangerous box-office seats to the attacks and counterattacks put in during the day. Pte. Nickerson was with them, but he was fatally in-

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[27] Nicholson, *op. cit.*, pp. 547 - 48.

[28] Commanded by Lt-Col. H. P. Bell-Irving, formerly of the Seaforths. After an initial repulse, the "Eddies" made a successful left flank attack.

jured on his return. A few men from No. 15 platoon managed to return also, some of whom had escaped from their German captors.

That evening all the Seaforth companies moved back slightly to rest and reorganize. The almost constant day and night attacks and the steady shelling had made sleep a luxury, and even one full night's respite would do wonders. Furthermore, the strength of the rifle companies had been greatly depleted and one or two had to be regrouped on a two-platoon basis.[29] This had to be done fairly quickly, for the battle was still going strong and in all likelihood the Seaforths would be re-committed on the 19th. Thus those who had been left-out-of battle were rushed back to their companies, and any reinforcement within arm's reach was taken immediately into the thinned ranks of the platoons.

There was to be little rest for the weary. At 0830 hours on the 19th, Lt-Col. Thomson received word that, as of mid-morning, the Seaforths were to be on one hour's notice to move. It was not until late in the afternoon, however, that the unit moved back north across the Marano River to the southern part of the San Martino ridge. Lt-Col. Thomson, meanwhile, attended an "O" Group called by Brigadier Gibson, and there he was given the latest situation report as well as plan of attack for the next phase in the battle.

During the 19th the 3rd Brigade had been hammering away at the San Fortunato ridge with only partial success. Early in the morning the left wing of the brigade had reached the main highway at the base of the feature, but the attempt to gain the heights met with very strong resistance. The attack is described quite vividly in the official history as follows:

> The shelling increased in intensity. Barrage brought down counter barrage. The daylight air billowed with the dust and the fumes of the artillery battle and the blasting from the skies. Yet when the bombing ceased and the barrage lifted, leading sections could see the German infantry pouring out of their dug-outs, and jumping into their forward weapon pits. Within a minute they were sweeping the hillsides with their machine-guns, sending the Canadians to ground. From well-con-

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[29] "A" Company had been very badly hit. "C" Company had about 50 per cent of its normal strength. "B" and "D" Companies were reported as being in "fair shape". (2nd Cdn. Inf. Bde. Intelligence Log, *op. cit.*, 18 September 1944, Serial 57). At midday, when a more accurate count was made, Lt-Col. Thomson informed the Brigadier that he could muster only 190 men in the field. (*Ibid.*, Serial 117).

> cealed positions near the crest enemy tanks and self-propelled guns checked the advance of the armour. The whole attack faltered.[30]

On the right the picture was somewhat the same. Seven battalions of Germans, one of which was a paratroop battalion, held the ridge all during the 19th. Further daylight assaults would be costly. Major-General Vokes, therefore, decided to bring up the 2nd Brigade and attack it by night, hoping to push over and beyond the ridge under the cover of darkness. To help "firm up" the 3rd Brigade's area, the Royal 22nd Regiment made an attack on the southern part of the spur after last light and by midnight it was secure on top of the ridge.

The plan was simple, but much depended on the drive and initiative of the unit's company commanders as, indeed, was the case of most night attacks. Using the ground gained by the 3rd Brigade as a firm base, the Loyal Edmonton Regiment, commanded by Lt-Col. H. P. Bell-Irving, was to make a silent infiltration by night over the ridge to secure the area from approximately San Fortunato to San Lorenzo in Monte. When this was secure the Seaforths, by this time assembled at the base of the feature, would follow in the gap made by the Loyal Edmontons but once up on the ridge "B" and "D" Companies were to swing to the right and seize the two spurs on the Rimini side of the ridge. "C" Company was to come up in the rear, take San Fortunato and mop up. "A" Company, which had been hardest hit two days earlier, would be held back in reserve. The Seaforths, in the course of their action, would take the tiny but well defended villages of Covignano and Le Grazie. Like the Edmontons they would be stuck out on a ridge, but in the case of counterattacks, they would have the advantage of height, solid artillery support and armour as soon as the latter could make its way forward. In the assault, too, excellent artillery support had been arranged, and in the battle it was so flexible that the artillery's shell-fire could be laid down or stopped "like turning a tap on and off."[31] To help give some direction to the attacking companies the 7th British Division, on the left flank, were using searchlights whose beams, pointing towards the enemy and reflecting their light from the clouds overhead, worked to the benefit of the attackers.

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[30] Nicholson, *op. cit.*, p. 553.

[31] W.D., Seaforth Highlanders of Canada, 19 September 1944. San Fortunato, a small group of buildings, was later given to a 3rd Brigade battalion to deal with.

Two hours before the Edmontons' attack went in "D" and "B" Companies, with "C" Company following, started their march through the battered countryside towards the base of the ridge which loomed darkly ahead of them. At their assembly area the companies were given their final instructions. To the left the noise of battle of the Royal 22nd's fight could be heard and the flashes of exploding shells could be seen along the ridge. It was not until 0220 hours that Lt-Col. Thomson was informed that the unit could cross the start-line in one hour's time, and at the same time word came that the companies should expect opposition from "Cootehall", as San Fortunato was codenamed.

Almost immediately "D" Company, now commanded by Major E. D. Fulton, led off to be in position. As the leading platoon came to the crest of the ridge and made its way towards the start-line, it came close to some enemy positions near San Fortunato. A German soldier fired a round from a "bazooka"[32] into the platoon which caused eight casualties when it exploded. At the same time the platoon's "Piat" was lost. On deploying to attack, the company also came under fire from a machine-gun post, also on its right. This meant that the company would have to move further left or north of San Fortunato, and while a route was being reconnoitred by Sergeant Roberts, the artillery, which was firing along the ridge over which the company would advance, was halted. By 0420 hours, however, "D" Company was again en route. When the leading platoon reached the road which formed the start-line, an enemy tank was heard approaching. It came from Covignano and seemed intent on business, which the Seaforths thought was them. Everyone went to ground, for without a Piat handy no action could be taken. However, the tank roared right by the platoons without seeing them and rattled on towards San Lorenzo where it was dealt with by the Edmontons. With this danger past the artillery were called to recommence their programme for ten minutes, after which "D" and "B" Companies started forward further up the slope to seize their respective objectives. This was accomplished with few casualties within the hour, and about a dozen prisoners of war were netted. "B" Company, meanwhile, was having a somewhat rougher time of it on the right, but by a judicious

[32] The name Canadians used improperly to describe a German anti-tank weapon properly called a *faustpatronen*. It was an infantry weapon similar to the Piat. Other sources claim the section was hit by grenades.

use of artillery fire as well as its platoon weapons, the company fought its way towards Le Grazie which, as dawn began to break, gave it a magnificent view of the surrounding countryside.

"C" Company, as things turned out, had one of the most difficult yet successful battles. It had received during the 19th, 22 new reinforcements and two new reinforcement officers, Lts. S. Dickinson and J. H. F. Mara. These men had to be armed, equipped, fed and shuffled into platoons very rapidly and within hours of their arrival they were committed to battle. Originally "C" Company was to follow "D" and "B" Companies, but when the former were held up temporarily near San Fortunato, Lt-Col. Thomson told Major Glendinning to take his men around to the right uphill from the main highway where it was to seize a road junction south of Le Grazie. No. 13 Platoon, commanded by Lt. Mara, was in the lead, and the forward sections had gone about 600 yards when Pte. J. H. Bohan was killed by mortar fire. The forward sections continued on through the terraced side of the ridge, clearing houses and dug-outs, when Lance Corporal D. G. Skinner's section came under heavy machine-gun fire from a dug-in position on the face of a 70-foot cliff on the edge of a draw to the left. Skinner placed his Bren gun crew to give the section covering fire and continued to advance for the company objective was some 300-400 yards away. Within 150 yards of the objective Skinner signalled his Bren gun crew forward but they were unable to come owing to a very heavy machine-gun and mortar fire which had been brought to bear from enemy positions on the right. Skinner then ordered the rest of his section to follow him and the group dashed to the far side of the draw to a house occupied by the enemy. Without the aid of his light machine-gun, but using rifles and grenades, all eight of the enemy occupants were killed. The position was an important one, and it enabled Skinner and his men to give right flank protection to the company.

Major Glendinning came forward and, appreciating the enemy's strong hold on the high ground to the right, he placed Lt. Dickinson's platoon in position beside Lt. Mara's to engage the enemy with fire. On the spot he planned a classical battle-drill manoeuvre. He personally took No. 14 Platoon back along a semi-sunken road towards San Fortunato and in a wide, sweeping movement during which mortar and machine-gun fire swept the area, he placed them in position behind the main enemy stronghold. Then Glendinning returned to

the other two platoons alone, en route finding a wounded signaller and carrying him 400 yards to safety.

Meanwhile, No. 13 Platoon had been having a rough time of it. The platoon had been ordered to hold its position at all costs, and Skinner's section was counterattacked behind a concentration of machine-gun and mortar fire. One German soldier came to within a few yards of the house with a bazooka and opened fire. Skinner crept out of the back of the house alone, crawled into a favourable position and with a burst from his "Tommy" gun put an end to that danger. From about 0830 to 1130 hours L/Cpl. Skinner and his men held this half ruined house against three counterattacks, and by doing so made it possible for "C" Company to carry out its attack. Skinner, for "his outstanding bravery and leadership under the most difficult conditions", was awarded the Distinguished Conduct Medal.

When Major Glendinning returned to his two platoons he intended to use them as far as possible as an assault group to drive the enemy back on No. 14 Platoon which would cut them down. Most of No. 13 Platoon was steadily engaged, but gathering all the men he could, Major Glendinning personally led the group uphill towards the German positions. The plan worked beautifully, and when the enemy realized that there were Seaforths all around they became increasingly eager to come up from their trenches and out of the road cuttings where they had felt so secure. A company account of the action describes the latter stages of the battle in these words:

> The advance was continued and opposition was met in a deep cutting. The flank protection section went around and returned the fire. . . . The enemy were caught in the cutting and surrendered. The first count was about 40, but as the leading section proceeded further, more enemy were taken out of dug-outs and positions so that the final count was 52. Also taken in the cutting was a hospital containing 24 wounded in the care of a doctor and three orderlies.
>
> The Company then proceeded to Covignano with little opposition, taking some 20 prisoners. A platoon was sent down the cliff road to relieve the sections in the houses. Some resistance was encountered and one Company Commander and 9 prisoners were taken. A message was sent to the sections in the houses, and they rejoined the Company and 6 wounded were picked up.[33]

Possibly the most remarkable thing about "C" Company's attack during this day is that only one man was killed and another

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[33] W.D., Seaforth Highlanders of Canada, September 1944, Appendix 13: "Report on "C" Company's action on the 20th of September."

wounded. For his success in planning and carrying through the company attack, Major H. L. Glendinning was awarded the Distinguished Service Order.

As the darkness gave way to a fine September day, the three companies of the Seaforths were situated in the form of a triangle atop the ridge. On the right "B" Company was fighting its way towards Le Grazie. Several hundred yards to its west "D" Company was near its goal on the second spur while behind, or to the south, "C" Company was at this time (approximately 0830 hours) pushing ahead under fire towards Covignano. All companies, having infiltrated into the heart of the enemy's defences, found on several occasions that they were being fired at from all sides. Lt-Col. Thomson was most anxious to get tanks up to the ridge to help them consolidate their positions and beat off enemy counterattacks. These arrived by mid-morning after a difficult climb up the hill. Ammunition was running low, and enemy shell-fire, aside from causing additional casualties, had knocked out another "Piat," at least two light machine-guns and a radio set.

The arrival of the tanks in mid-morning made a decided change for the better. Reports began to come into brigade headquarters from both the Seaforths and the Edmontons of groups of enemy beginning to retreat down the ridge to the north, and these provided artillery targets which were eagerly reported by the infantry who were, for a change, in the happy position of being able to look down their throats. By midday the ridge was secure in Canadian hands, and shortly thereafter the Princess Patricias were ordered to advance through and seize a bridgehead over the Marecchia River. Beyond lay the flatlands of the Po Valley, and many of the Seaforths who gazed from the ridge northeastward towards Rimini and northwestward towards the level, cultivated fields of the Romagna wondered what it would be like to go into action on level ground. Those in "C" Company's area especially looked back over the area to the south with some awe, for from San Fortunato ridge one had excellent observation of the San Martino feature and the hills to the south. It was painfully obvious that the enemy's "O-Pips" had been able to direct his gun, mortar and anti-tank fire on the Canadian attack during the past week with ease. The capture of San Fortunato in many ways took some of the sting out of the lack of success encountered during the 16th, 17th and 18th of September, and the delight with which reports were sent back to

the hard working artillerymen of enemy tanks, mortar and infantry positions can almost be read in the entries in the brigade intelligence log.

In mid-afternoon the Seaforths were informed that the 3rd would relieve the 2nd Brigade, and that evening, as ambulances and carriers worked hard to come up to the forward companies, the Hastings and Prince Edward Regiment began to take over the Seaforth positions. For a while, at least, there would be a period of rest and much needed reorganization and reinforcements. All companies were low in strength, for during the past five days of almost constant attack, the battalion had lost many men. Four officers and 41 men had been killed, 5 officers and 78 men had been wounded and 17 men had been captured.[34] These 145 casualties bespeak something of the ferocity of the fighting, especially for the San Martino ridge. The task which the battalion had accomplished was recognized by the Eighth Army Commander, Lt-Gen. Sir Oliver W. H. Leese, who sent the following personal message to Lt-Col. Thomson:

> My congratulations to you and all ranks of your battalion on your hard fighting at Pozzo Alto and S. Fortunato. The regiment may be proud of its part in a hard and well fought victory. With my thanks and best wishes to you all. Well done Canada[35]

It was welcome praise—and well merited.

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[34] The prisoners were lost on 17 September when No. 15 Platoon had been overrun. On September 20 alone, however, the Seaforths were credited with capturing 214 prisoners of war.

[35] W.D., Seaforth Highlanders of Canada, September 1944, Appendix 6; "Message, TAC Eighth Army".

CHAPTER XI

Fighting in the Po Valley

On 23 September, 1944 the Seaforth Highlanders arrived at Cattolica for a period of rest. As was usual after every major battle, there was a considerable amount of reorganizing to be done. Reinforcement officers and men were welcomed and posted to the various platoons and companies which had been hit hardest. Care was taken that no one platoon received a majority of reinforcements, however, and consequently there was some shuffling with the battalion to strike a nice balance of veterans and recruits. There were two reasons for this. Obviously it was wise for the recruit to learn, and learn rapidly, from the "old hands" in the unit. A veteran frequently knew by instinct what to do and what not to do, and if the recruit was to survive he had to be prepared to follow the veteran's actions in the field. A platoon of recruits could be an embarrassment even if the N.C.Os. were veterans. Another reason for scattering the recruits about was to enable them to absorb quickly something of deeply engrained "esprit de corps" of the Seaforths. If they remained together it took longer for them to lose their former attachments and identities. Almost without exception this process worked well. The daily playing of Retreat by the Pipes and Drums, wearing their kilt and sounding the old yet blood-tingling tunes, made the absorption work that much sooner. Regimental Sergeant Major G. M. McMahon helped this melding process during his "smartening-up" parades when he roared at veterans and recruits alike, so that with one thing and another the new reinforcement soon found himself accepted by his comrades and,

as soon as he proved himself in battle, thoroughly relied upon as one of a team.

A rest period is only a relative term, for training always went on. Although there were the usual shows and movies to see, the chance to get thoroughly clean and the opportunity to scrounge about and have some sort of a party, there was also a fair amount of time spent preparing for the next action. Thus although the few days of the last of the Indian summer permitted many to go in swimming after the beaches had been checked for mines, it was not long before the same beaches would be used as ranges as men fired away at floating targets with the various weapons in the battalion.

Two weeks after the unit had been in Cattolica Lt-Col. S. W. Thomson left the battalion. For some time relations between Thomson and Brigadier Gibson, who was transferred at the same time, had not been happy. In such situations it was not uncommon for one or the other or both to be changed around and given positions where the clash of personalities would not affect the fighting potential of the battalion or brigade in action. Lt-Col. (later Brigadier) M. P. Bogert became the acting brigade commander and Lt-Col. H. P. Bell-Irving[1] returned to take command of the Seaforths. Bell-Irving, since leaving the unit in southern Italy when he was second-in-command, had had a spell of duty in the United Kingdom and returned in June, 1944 to take command of the Loyal Edmonton Regiment. His transfer back to the Seaforths at this time may be summed up in the oft-quoted phrase, "Once a Seaforth, always a Seaforth". Certainly the chance to command the regiment he had served with since militia days was a rare one, and he was quick to seize it while at the same time regretting the circumstances which created the opportunity. Thomson was sorely missed by all ranks, but in Bell-Irving the unit knew that it had an experienced officer whose restless energy belied his nickname "Budge".

The change in command took place a day prior to the Seaforths moving a few miles north to Riccione on 9 October where they were

[1] Thomson's second-in-command, Major D. M. Clark, was in hospital with jaundice. As the unit was known to be going into action soon, the selection of a new C.O. could not wait, much to Clark's disappointment. However, Bell-Irving was happy to be back, and the Edmontons' second-in-command was very competent to take his place. Lt-Col. Thomson, after a short spell of duty in the U.K., was given command of the Black Watch (Royal Highland Regiment) of Canada.

to remain for another five days prior to going back into action. It was at this point that the tank-hunting platoon was formed under the command of Lt. F. H. Harfield, and as the role this platoon was to play in subsequent events was most important, an outline of its origin might be given here.

One of the difficulties encountered by all the infantry battalions' anti-tank platoons in Italy was getting the six-pounder guns into position in the rugged terrain through which the Canadians had fought since landing in Sicily. The enemy was extremely skilful in defence, and frequently he established himself on hills or crests which had to be assaulted by infantry who, on reaching the objective, were sometimes thrown back by the fire from tanks. Mined roads and fields made bringing up anti-tank guns difficult at the best of times, and trying to get them up steep hills and mountain sides which even tanks found difficult to climb was almost impossible. The "Piat", the anti-tank weapon of the infantry platoon, had been used successfully as had the "75" Hawkins anti-tank grenade. The Piat, however, was heavy and awkward. It was never a favourite weapon. More important, perhaps, was the fact that it was thought of defensively rather than offensively.

When Lt-Col. Bell-Irving came to the Seaforths he had in his mind the excellent work done on San Fortunato ridge by men from the Loyal Edmonton Regiment who, by clever and aggressive use of anti-tank mines and the "Piat", had knocked out several heavy German tanks which, under other circumstances, might have meant the difference between success and defeat. He decided, therefore, to form in the Seaforths a tank-hunting platoon similar to the one which the "Eddies" found so valuable. The men were taken from the anti-tank platoon—a total of one officer, one sergeant, one corporal and fourteen other ranks. Eight men would provide four two-men crews for the Piats, while six, including the corporal, would carry No. 75 grenades and "Tommy" guns. Basic tactics called for a road to be blocked by mines to break the tank's tracks. When the tank was immobilized the Piat crew would knock it out at short range and the crews would be dealt with by the Tommy gunners.[2] Various modifications were

[2] Directorate of History, "Canadian Military Headquarters, 16 Jan. 1945, Canadian Operations—Mediterranean area: Extracts from War Diaries and Memoranda: Notes on Tank Hunting . . . by Lt-Col. H. P. Bell-Irving."

suggested in time after experience, but the concept was to work so well and raised the morale of the infantrymen to such a degree that the idea was taken up and soon spread to other battalions facing the same problems.

If the idea of this platoon was engendered in the hills and ridges to the south, the value of the new tactics was to be demonstrated in the Romagna—the name given to the southern part of the Po Valley. This area was flat, well populated and thoroughly cultivated by innumerable small farms with typical thick walls, red tiles and attached winery. The entire area is crossed by a succession of canalized rivers which have high banks on either side to take care of the flood waters which, in wet weather, can change the placid streams to rushing torrents. Running from the foothills to the sea, these rivers crossed the line of advance of the eastern wing of the Eighth Army. The flat countryside was criss-crossed by drainage ditches and a chequerboard pattern of country roads. In summer time the area would present fewer difficulties than in winter, but winter rains not only caused the rivers to act as barriers, but the fields themselves became so sodden that when a vehicle moved off the roads it would sink down to its axles in mud. In the Romagna roads, crossings, rivers, dykes and farmhouses became unusually important tactical goals, and during the latter part of September and early October British, New Zealand, Greek and Canadian formations were learning new lessons as they fought their way towards the Savio River.

The Seaforth Highlanders had some idea of what to expect when next they went into action while still in Cattolica, when the companies began to be practised in river crossings. The weather had turned cold and wet, so everyone welcomed the issue of battle-dress when their khaki drill uniforms were turned in at the end of September. But woollen battle-dress does not keep out rain, and even those using the oiled gas capes or leather jerkins could not keep dry in the grey, streaming rain which began to fall almost daily at this time.

The sodden weather had slowed down the rate of the Eighth Army's advance and, equally important, had given the enemy time to reorganize and rest behind the numerous watercourses which acted as moats to his defences. During the first week in October, the new army commander, Lt-Gen. Sir Richard L. McCreery, decided to rearrange his own front. As a result on 9 October the 1st Canadian In-

fantry Division came out of army reserve and moved on the Savignano area to relieve the British 56th Infantry Division. The divisional commander's plan was to assault with the 1st Brigade over the Fiumicino River towards Cesena, and use the 2nd and 3rd Brigades to attack over the Savio and beyond. Thus, for the first week of fighting the Seaforth Highlanders were not directly involved, and had a short time to accustom themselves to the flat countryside, the limited vision from one end of a field to the other, as well as the innumerable short Bailey bridges spanning the water courses which marked the route of the forward troops.

On 15 September Major-General Vokes and Lieut.-General Freyberg (commanding the 2nd New Zealand Division) attended a meeting at which it was decided to widen the front of the 1st Canadian Division. In the hilly country to the west the British 46th Infantry Division would strike towards Cesena. The Canadians were to advance now on a two-brigade front by taking over some of the New Zealanders' area. The 1st Brigade would continue on towards Cesena while, on the right of the railway, the 2nd Brigade would come into action to thrust north and northeast of the town. The object of the division was to gain crossings over the Savio and link up with the British on the left in a pincer movement engulfing Cesena.[3] Within the 2nd Brigade, the Seaforth Highlanders would lead the initial assault which, in the first two phases, would have the battalion advance to the banks of the Pisciatello River[4] about three miles east of Cesena. The third phase would put the brigade over the river and the fourth would have it two miles north of the city in position to carry the attack over the Savio.

Lt-Col. Bell-Irving, informed of the new plan on the 16th, had his companies in motion by 1620 hours the same day. From the battalion's concentration area just east of Savignano, "C" and "D" Companies moved westward along Highway No. 9 and, passing through the firm base of the Hastings and Prince Edward Regiment, swung north towards the river in the area of Ponte della Pietra. Accompanying them was a squadron of tanks from the 12th Bn. Royal Tank Regiment. During the advance there was little opposition, but progress was slow because of the numerous craters in the roads and the order

[3] W.D., H.Q., 2nd Cdn. Inf. Bde., October 1944, Appendix No. 1: "Operations Log", 16 October 1944, Serial 10.

[4] In Caesar's time, more commonly known as the Rubicon.

given to the infantry not to advance beyond the armour. Darkness came quickly, and confined as they were to the roads, the tanks would have been very vulnerable to infantry anti-tank weapons without the protection of the Seaforths. "A" and "B" Companies passed through "D" Company towards the river and completed the second phase of the attack well before midnight. By this time, however, the enemy[5] was well aware of the Seaforth advance, and began to lace the roads with medium machine-gun fire as well as heavy artillery. Among the casualties caused by the enemy defensive fire was Captain T. E. Woolley, who was bringing the unit's anti-tank guns and medium machine guns up to "C" Company's area close to where the railway crossed the river. These periodic concentrations of mortar and artillery fire during the 17th made road travel very hazardous.

The brigade plan called for the Seaforths to gain a bridgehead over the river if circumstances permitted. "C" and "A" Companies sent out patrols to attempt to cross the river both before dawn and later that morning, but in every case withering fire from the enemy forced them back. Unable to get the armour over the river, it was not possible to take the Germans' positions without incurring heavy casualties. From their positions along the dyked river the forward companies could see a large palace close to Cesena which was being used as an observation post by the enemy. The Commanding Officer called down "cab rank" fighter-bombers as well as artillery on the huge, thick-walled building and the lessening of fire falling into the Seaforth's area was noticeable even though, from a distance, the old palace seemed hardly touched. The battalion's mortars, commanded by Captain Roberts, were able to get into position about 500 yards from the river and sent their bombs thumping over to observed or suspected enemy positions. Thus as the rain began to fall in mid-afternoon, a steady fire-fight on either side of the river kept friend and foe alike well dug in.

Since it was obvious that the third phase of the brigade attack —the gaining of a bridgehead over the river—could not be accomplished with ease, the brigade commander planned to push the Edmontons through the Seaforths. The latter had advanced over two miles to reach the river, and their position was to be used as a firm base by the Edmontons. The "Eddies" had been put on a three-

[5] Identified as the 3rd Battalion, 361st Panzer Grenadier Regiment by prisoners taken.

hour notice to move on the morning of the 17th, even as the Seaforths were busy discouraging enemy attempts to infiltrate on their left flank. Rain in the afternoon caused some misgivings but on the night of 17-18 October the Edmontons made a silent attack over the river at Ponte della Pietra. By aggressive action they had established a bridgehead by mid-morning sufficient for the engineers to start constructing a bridge allowing the supporting tanks to come to their aid. The Edmontons' attack over the river, meanwhile, did not lessen the constant shell-fire falling in the Seaforths' area, and by nightfall of the 18th the battalion had suffered almost two dozen casualties from shelling alone.

The Loyal Edmonton Regiment lost contact with the enemy during the night of 18-19 October when the Germans pulled back. The Princess Patricias, who were to leapfrog through the bridgehead and push on to the Savio, managed to reach the main road running northeast of Cesena by midnight of the 19th. With the advance made by the British to the high ground south of the city, the enemy was deprived of his observation posts and the Seaforths, for the first time in two days, enjoyed a lull in the shelling which had been both costly and troublesome.

During the 19th and 20th, as the Princess Patricias closed up to the Savio River about a mile north of Cesena, the brigade commander was pondering the problem of how best to establish a bridgehead over the Savio to continue the right hook around the city. The division's photo interpreter had arrived at brigade headquarters on the morning of the 19th and with the latest aerial photographs. "Likely crossings were not apparent," wrote a brigade observer at the time, "as even the Italians in peacetime had never put a bridge across the river on the front on which we were advancing."[6] The aerial photographs showed that the enemy held many positions covering the river, and further that he seemed fairly confident of his ability to prevent a crossing as he had placed most of his defences along the river without emphasizing depth. The approaches to the river were over muddy fields. The banks of the river were high and dyked, and although the water gap at the time was not high, the engineers realized that sudden or continuous rains could turn the modest stream into a formidable water barrier.

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[6] Directorate of History, "2 Cdn. Inf. Bde., Report on Ops., Savignano - F. Ronco . . ., 14 Oct. - 28 Oct., 44", p.4.

While the engineers brought their bridging stores forward the brigade commander selected the area where two companies of the Princess Patricias were to establish a bridgehead over the Savio which the Seaforths would enlarge so as to permit the bridging work to be carried out. The attack went in at dusk on the 20th, and both companies immediately ran into such strong resistance that one was forced back over the river while the other was clinging only to the far bank after losing a third of its strength in the crossing. Moreover, the enemy was bringing such heavy fire on the roads east of the river that engineer reconnaissance parties were unable to do their work either that night or in the early morning. As a result, the division commander held an "O" Group early on the 21st and prepared a more elaborate plan. On the left, the 3rd Brigade would put in a feint attack while the actual crossing would be made on the right with the Loyal Edmontons on the left and the Seaforths on the right. Two field companies from the R.C.E. would prepare a crossing behind each battalion with the main one in the Seaforth area. A strong artillery plan was laid on, and the full support of the 4.2-inch mortars and medium machine guns of the Saskatoon Light Infantry would harass the enemy. The 145th Regiment, Royal Armoured Corps, would be in support, but the weight of the armour could only be brought to bear when the crossings were complete.

When Lt-Col. Bell-Irving returned to the unit with the information about the attack, he met his officers in a church at S. Martorano, located some 500 yards east of the Savio. From its tower one had a good view of the area to be attacked, but it also drew enemy fire as it was a logical place for an observation post. So close was it that the Germans periodically laced it with machine-gun fire. However, the advantage it offered was to some extent offset by the risks involved. The Seaforths were to attack with "B" Company on the right and "D" Company on the left on either side of the Princess Patricias' toehold over the river. Both companies had local objectives about 500 yards west of the river. "C" and "A" Companies would exploit through on orders from the Commanding Officer to cut the main north-south road running parallel to the Savio which provided the enemy with an excellent lateral route which he could use to move his armour and infantry along the front where he was hardest pressed. The unit's tank-hunting platoon was to cross with "B" Company to assist it, then it was to go with "C" Company and be on call for the push to the highway. Concentrations of mortar

and shell-fire could be brought down on call on known or suspected enemy positions, each of which had a codename. To add to the enemy's discomfort, the machine guns of the Saskatoon Light Infantry would harass probable enemy approaches to the river so as to interfere with his reinforcements.

It was raining when the companies approached the river to cross the startline at 2000 hours, but although it made crawling up the slippery, muddy banks and wading across the waist-high river a difficult job, it helped to cover the assault. On the left "D" Company, under the command of Captain D. G. Duncan, had found that the company's forming up place prior to crossing the river was also a spot which the enemy had under direct fire. As a result, the company, led by Lt. D. H. McKay's No. 16 Platoon, advanced in single file to the river bank between bursts of enemy machine-gun fire. Once across a mud flat and over the river, which was chest high at this point, contact was quickly made with the remnants of the Princess Patricia's company on the far bank. While the Seaforths wiped some of the mud from themselves and cleaned their weapons, Duncan was told that on a slight ridge about 100 yards ahead there were several known machine-gun positions. Duncan was unable to get artillery fire on the enemy owing to the fact that "B" Company, making fairly good progress, might be too close to the target, but some mortar fire was brought down a short time later.

While arranging for the mortar fire, the men in "D" Company were able to note for themselves the enemy's positions which were exposed by the flashes from their weapons. Lt. McKay arranged that Cpl. H. R. Smith would take a section forward under the cover of fire from the company's small arms, and when he had reached a position favourable for a flank attack, he was to fire his Bren gun which would bring up the rest of No. 16 Platoon to him. The plan worked well. Lt. McKay wrote later:

> The road running straight up [from our position] had good cover on the left. We proceeded up about 100 feet to an open field on our left, walked right in behind the machine-gunners, and took them without a shot.[7]

After the platoon had cleared out the machine-gunners and

[7] Letter from D. H. McKay to author, 23 June 1968. McKay noted that, so muddy were the Seaforths' weapons by the time they reached the far bank, many of the Princess Patricias exchanged weapons with them since the Seaforths were attacking.

rooted out more Germans from a nearby farmhouse, the remainder of the company came up. Lt. McKay continues:

> Capt. Don Duncan, the O.C., after checking a map, pointed out that we were still too far over to the left and our objective was still to be taken. My instructions were . . . to clear the river bank and take my objective. The remainder of the Coy. were to proceed in the opposite direction and take out another objective as originally planned. I left Pte. Pringle and one man in the farmhouse to guard two or three wounded prisoners. Just as we started out, I heard the noise of a tracked vehicle coming from what appeared to be the area which we were to clean out. I halted the platoon on the side of the road and sent a man back into the house to pick up the Piat from Coy. Headquarters. During the minute we waited the lead section noticed some movement ahead. Cpl. Smith's section picked up two more prisoners from a weapon pit (they were Roumanian conscripts). We placed the two prisoners in front of us and moved off. Cpl. Smith took the right side of the road and I took the left. . . . We proceeded down the road and turned left to our objective. We checked the buildings; they were clear. We could hear Coy. Headquarters and No. 17 Platoon arriving from the other direction and they arrived with the collected prisoners. . . . As I still had to go back and pick up Pte. Pringle and some wounded Germans we proceeded back to his position. On arriving at the house I found a Patricia officer laying on a couch. He had been laying in water for a number of hours and was trying to recover. He gave me the following account: A German officer accompanied by one man had opened the door of the house and walked in. While speaking to Pte. Pringle in English, he drew a revolver from under his overcoat and fired point blank at Pringle and missed. Pringle killed him with his tommy-gun and wounded the Pte. slightly in the arm. On questioning the Pte., and learning that the house had been used as a German headquarters and that the dead officer was an Intelligence Officer, we bundled all his maps, papers, etc. into a sand bag and sent the bag back to Bn. Headquarters.[8]

Typical of the advance along the road was the following account written by Lt. Gildersleeve, formerly the Signals officer, but now commanding No. 17 Platoon.

> We spied the house and the platoon prepared to attack it. I had the Piat man fire one round at the house and we advanced a section at a time until we were almost up against the walls. Then a potato masher grenade landed close to us, hurting no one. and we rushed the front door which was slightly ajar. I saw a flash and felt a slight pinch in my right leg. . . . We fired a few rounds in the front door and charged in shouting, 'Kommen sie 'raus!' An answer came back in English: 'Don't shoot! Vee are coming!' Out filed about eight Germans led by an officer who held out his pistol. Rockfort and I both reached for it, but I got there first. . . .

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[8] *Ibid.*

Amongst the Germans was a medical man, and all of them had obtained protection in a dugout dug in the floor of the living-room and covered with planking.

In a short time a runner reported the crossroads secure. A section from No. 16 Platoon was sent back to the river both to escort the prisoners and then return with ammunition which was badly needed. The section was successful getting back, but when attempting to re-cross the river with the ammunition they found the river too high to cross.

Six hundred yards to the north, or twice that distance if one followed the twisting river, "B" Company commanded by Captain A. Staples, had been subjected to a spate of enemy mortaring before crossing the river which caused five casualties. Staples moved his men 300 yards further north and the first platoon reached the river bank and gave covering fire to Nos. 11 and 12 Platoons. All platoons got over the river without too much trouble,[9] and then moved south to pick up their original axis of advance. From this point on, the company was involved with the enemy as the platoons fought towards the farmhouses and crossroads which were their objectives. At times farm buildings would be defended by as many as three machine-gun posts, and in the rainy darkness these would often open up only when the Seaforths were at close range. Once spotted, however, darkness gave the platoons the advantage of surprise and manoeuvre, but it was a grim and deadly game of hide-and-seek which took a heavy toll of section leaders. All during the night the Seaforths systematically cleared the enemy from the bend in the river, taking 15 prisoners and five machine-gun posts. Here again, the darkness and pouring rain covered the approach of the Seaforths' attack. In one or two instances, where the enemy's defences were hard to crack, Captain Staples held off from an all-out attack on them until daylight when, with the aid of directed artillery and mortar support, they were overcome. By the time the company area was completely clear, "B" Company had netted in 51 very wet and surprised prisoners with an unknown count of killed and wounded.

Among those who were doing an outstanding job west of the

[9] The main reason for this was that it began to rain very heavily at this time, so that the enemy retired under the covered portions of their dug-in positions which permitted the Seaforths to by-pass them without being seen or heard.

Savio was a company signaller, Pte. G. V. Carrington. When the company was caught in the mortar fire near the start line, two of the three signallers at company headquarters were wounded. Carrington, already loaded with spare parts satchels, took over the No. 18 set. It went out of order when water got into it on the river crossing. Carrington went to work to get it functioning again, lying in the field where he could get the best reception, but exposed at the same time to shelling, mortaring and intermittent machine-gun fire. His persistence was rewarded, communications were restored with Lt-Col. Bell-Irving, and information vital to the battalion plan could be sent. Carrington was awarded the Military Medal.

By about 2330 hours the assaulting companies had made sufficient progress to permit "A" and "C" Companies to start moving across the river, and about half an hour later the reconnaissance party from the engineers left Tactical Headquarters to check the proposed crossing site. It was still raining heavily at the time, and as we have seen, the river was beginning to rise. Enemy shells fell periodically in the area. As the party neared the river, three engineers were wounded by anti-personnel mines, among them the officer in charge who was killed by a shell shortly afterward. The two survivors made their way back to Tactical Headquarters for help, but warning that the mines were so thickly sown and so well concealed in the mud as to make them almost impossible to find. The Seaforths' medical officer, Captain J. C. Portnuff, volunteered to go to the area to render what aid he could. He entered the minefield and completed first aid on one engineer when a mine exploded nearby. Mud and fragments struck Dr. Portnuff causing temporary blindness. He groped his way out of the minefield and got back to the R.A.P. where his sergeant treated him so as to enable him to regain part of his sight. He refused to be evacuated until a relief medical officer arrived. "Working with impaired vision and with the guidance of the staff," states the citation for his Military Cross, "he administered one blood transfusion and retained control of the regimental aid post until all casualties had been dressed and evacuated."

While these events were going on, "A" Company commanded by Major R. S. Clark, was making its way over the Savio, and reported itself in "D" Company's area a few minutes before one. The forward elements of "D" were not far from a road junction almost half way between the river and the highway, and the leading platoon had only pushed on a short distance beyond when four of its men

were wounded by medium machine-gun fire. Although Clark had been told to get to the main highway and by-pass resistance where necessary, the enemy posts along the country road had to be taken out. The wounded men were put in a house at the road junction and No. 9 Platoon pushed to the next buildings while No. 7 Platoon cleared out the houses and barns in the area of the road junction, gathering six prisoners in the process. No. 8 Platoon was busily engaged in the same type of action forward and to the right. As the company fought its way forward, the wounded, the prisoners, a first aid man and two guards remained at the road junction. About half an hour later, as the main body of the company closed up to the highway, a patrol of ten Germans appeared at the junction and overwhelmed the Seaforth party while liberating their own men. Shortly after a single Seaforth appeared on the scene escorting a prisoner to be added to the "cage". Their positions were quickly reversed. At about this point, Major Clark noticed some Germans crossing a field and thought he recognized them. He sent a group back to the junction and these men captured the Germans guarding the Seaforths. One of the men, Pte. Frockledge, although he was covered by the German guards on his approach, was quick at getting off a round wounding the guard who offered resistance.

By dawn "A" Company had reached a second road junction only 300 yards from the highway. A patrol sent out to investigate some houses at the highway itself found them unoccupied, but when No. 7 Platoon was sent forward to hold them it withdrew when a tank opened fire on the position from the west.[10]

To the north "C" Company, commanded by Major Stewart Lynch, had crossed the river into "B" Company's area by 0100 hours on the 22nd. Its objective was a group of buildings at Pieva Sestina. "C" Company's line of approach was along a road paralleling "A" Company but some 400 yards to the right. With "C" Company was the bulk of the tank-hunting platoon. In its initial thrust beyond "B", "C" Company made a comparatively rapid advance along the dark, muddy road so that about 0400 hours it was close to Pieve Sestina, a small cluster of buildings at a road junction some 500 yards from the highway. No. 14 Platoon was sent out to clear a house on the left of the junction, No. 15 Platoon moved

[10] W.D., Seaforth Highlanders of Canada, October 1944, Appendix No. 11: "Report on "A" Company's Action at the Savio River."

north along the road to seize another junction several hundred yards away and No. 13 Platoon remained with Company Headquarters to occupy a church in the village close to No. 15 Platoon. Major Lynch wrote later:

> Although each position was occupied in some strength, we achieved almost complete surprise. This, plus the filthy weather and the artillery fire kept the enemy's heads down long enough for us to take our objectives without undue difficulty. No. 14 Platoon took out a machine-gun position and knocked out an enemy truck, taking 9 or 10 prisoners. No. 15 Platoon, after a short, sharp exchange of fire, took another dozen prisoners, and No. 13 Platoon, with no real opposition, took the church and its occupants, perhaps 10 or 12. Unfortunately Lt. Sid Dickinson was wounded in this action. . . . Including the tank-hunters the total company strength was only about 50 all ranks, so 13 and 14 Platoons were merged, and a hurried defensive position was established in the vicinity of the road junction, based on the church.[11]

It was about half an hour later that "C" Company was subjected to an enemy attack by a German force consisting of four Panther tanks, two self-propelled guns and thirty infantrymen. The Seaforths had no supporting tanks west of the Savio for the constant downpour had caused the river to rise six feet in the preceding five hours. Anti-tank guns were also east of the water barrier. The only defence against the tanks, whose power and weight seemed terrifying at first, was the newly-formed tank-hunting platoon.

Sgt. K. P. Thompson had charge of the tank-hunting platoon with "C" Company and his action in the next hour was superb. Under the general direction of Major Lynch, he immediately deployed his men so as to trap and destroy the armoured force. First, he set across the road junction near the church a string of Hawkins anti-tank grenades and ordered his Piat groups to cover the most likely approaches. After camouflaging his mines, he personally took charge of the Piat group covering it. The first vehicle to come into "C" Company's position was a German staff car with a driver and officer. The Volkswagen's wheels, by a stroke of luck, passed between the mines, but within yards of the trap it was hit by small arms fire. The driver was killed but the officer leaped out and began yelling to the next vehicle. He was cut down. Roaring up the road next came a self-propelled gun. Its wide tracks hit the mines and it came to a halt. It was dealt with both by Piat bombs and grenades tossed into the open hatch. Sergeants Leon and Greenglass of

[11] Letter, Major Lynch to author, 7 July 1968.

"C" Company with the company's Piats were assisting in this action but in the next few minutes, while Sgt. Thompson was moving about over ground swept by enemy fire, encouraging his men, and re-siting the weapons to counter the enemy's moves, an outstanding example of valour was displayed by one of Thompson's men, Pte. E. A. Smith.

Coming up behind the self-propelled gun was a Mark V Panther tank. Smith had led two men with a Piat across a field to a position where the weapon could best be employed. Leaving one man there, he recrossed the road with a friend and obtained a second Piat. He had just got into position when the tank approached firing its machine guns along the line of ditches, wounding Smith's comrade.

> At a range of 30 feet and having to expose himself to the full view of the enemy, Private Smith fired the Piat and hit the tank putting it out of action. Ten German infantry immediately jumped off the back of the tank and charged him with schmeissers and grenades. Without hesitation Private Smith moved out onto the road and at point blank range with his tommy gun killed four Germans and drove the remainder back. Almost immediately another tank opened fire and more enemy infantry closed in on Smith's position. Obtaining some abandoned tommy gun magazines from a ditch, he steadfastly held his position protecting his comrade and fighting the enemy with his tommy gun until they finally gave up and withdrew in disorder.[12]

Another tank, beyond the range of the Piats, began to sweep the ground with fire. Disregarding this, "Smoky", as he was nicknamed by his friends, helped his wounded friend, Pte. James Tennant, to cover and obtained medical aid for him behind a nearby building. Then he returned to his position beside the road to await the possibility of more enemy attacks. For his "dogged determination, outstanding devotion to duty and superb gallantry," "Smoky" Smith was later awarded the Victoria Cross, the only Seaforth to be so honoured in the war.[13]

Blocked on one road, the enemy force sought out other aven-

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[12] The Canada Gazette, Extra, Volume LXXVIII, No. 53, 19 December 1944.

[13] As had been mentioned earlier, a former Seaforth officer, Lt-Col. C. C. I. Merritt, was awarded the Victoria Cross while commanding the South Saskatchewan Regiment at Dieppe. Pte. Smith's V.C. was the third and last won by a Canadian in the Italian campaign. Smith's friend, Pte. J. A. Tennant, had fired the Piat at the self-propelled gun "at such close range that either a piece of shrapnel from the bomb or the ring from the bomb's tail-piece flew back into his eye." (Letter, Major Stewart Lynch to author, 7 July 1968).

ues of approach. Another self-propelled gun swerved around the church under a hail of fire from "C" Company which merely bounced off it, but it was hit with a Piat bomb and knocked out. Roaring up out of the darkness, which even the searchlights did little to lessen, the third Panther tank came up, tried to get around the self-propelled gun and got into a water-filled ditch. As the 45-ton monster began to churn the mud in its frantic efforts to reverse, it was hit by a Piat bomb and began to brew up, illuminating the area for a good hour. Still another tank got so bogged down that the Germans abandoned it after some encouragement from "C" Company during which a few of the five-man crew were killed and the others chased away.

This swirling action which lasted less than an hour in the darkness ended in complete success, and great tribute is due to the cool thinking and courage of the corporals and sergeants of both "C" Company and the tank-hunting platoon.[14] Sergeant Thompson's coolness, tenacity and inspiring leadership won him the Distinguished Conduct Medal on the direct recommendation of the Eighth Army Commander. The enemy's attack had not only been stopped —it had been almost demolished, and those Germans not captured, wounded or killed as they floundered around "C" Company's area, made their way back to the main highway and took up positions in some buildings several hundred yards away. The Seaforths, meanwhile, were subjected to some vicious shell-fire as Major Lynch strengthened the company's defences, made arrangements to take back the wounded and prepared for further attacks.

By this time a grey, watery dawn was beginning to outline the smoking, tank-littered crossroads. A short distance to the south "A" Company's men could now see more clearly the highway which was about the same distance away as it was from "C". Behind "A" Company a rather humorous incident occurred at "D" Company headquarters which had been used by the enemy for the same purpose only a few hours earlier. Some of the German machine-gunners on

[14] "Once the action began," Major Lynch wrote later, "it was a section commander's battle and it does great credit to their individual courage, their discipline and training, that each did his job more than admirably. Some were luckier than others, some results were more spectacular, but I can assure you, that when it came to the question of awards, it was a very difficult decision to favour one above the other." (Lynch to author, *op. cit.*)

the river bank, who had no idea of the success of the action on their flank, became hungry. Back they came with their mess-tins to their former kitchens. As Lt-Col. Bell-Irving wrote later:

> This surprised and surprising breakfast line-up netted us 56 prisoners of war. Another innocent group was taken in by a simple ruse. Our chaps cut a telephone line leading down to the river. A line party came up to repair it and were taken prisoner. The remaining enemy on the river bank were cleaned out without any fighting. The result of the night and morning efforts was some 150 prisoners of war. Our only record of the German dead was 27 graves which we prepared before leaving the area.[15]

East of the river there was grave concern. By early morning of the 22nd the river was reaching flood proportions. In places it was 16 feet deep where at midnight it had been only chest high. Casualties could not be taken back, nor ammunition nor reinforcements brought over. The unit's second-in-command, Major Mace, worked hard to bring to the forward companies the supplies they needed, but at first he was as frustrated as the engineers who sought vainly to find a site along the crumbling, water-softened banks sufficient to carry the weight of a bridge. At 0705 hours the brigade commander, aware of the danger to the two infantry battalions[16] across the river without tank support or anti-tank guns, sent them a terse message:

> Cannot get vehicles across river either flank for some time. Situation referred to divisional and corps commander. Hold position. Firm up positions. Check DF [defensive fire] tasks. Repair ammunition immediately. All being done to make crossing.[17]

The difficulties presented by the turbulent, rushing river were overcome in part later in the day when slings and rafts were used to drag over food, ammunition and even rum, but not until midnight of 22-23 October was a class two raft in operation which permitted one jeep and two anti-tank guns to be ferried over. Telephone lines across the swollen waters were carried away by floating haystacks and other debris, and attempts to shoot lines across the river attached to Piat bombs were unsuccessful.

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[15] W.D., Seaforth Highlanders of Canada, October 1944, Appendix No. 11: "Account by Lt-Col. H. P. Bell-Irving . . . of the Seaforths of Canada Assault Across the Savio. . . ."

[16] On the left was the Loyal Edmonton Regiment.

[17] W.D., H.Q., 2nd Cdn. Inf. Bde., October 1944, Appendix: Intelligence Log, 22 October 1944, Serial 49.

To the left or south of the Seaforths, the Edmontons had encountered many of the troubles the Seaforths had been meeting. Their bridgehead was shallow, but their right hand company was in contact with "D" Company. Moreover, on the morning of the 22nd, the Edmontons were able gradually to deepen their holding across the river and withstand some light but troublesome counterattacks by the enemy.

For the Seaforths, the morning of the 22nd was a tense one. Behind them was the turbulent Savio which the engineers were trying frantically to bridge. Enemy shell-fire in the area was constant, for he knew the area of the bridgehead as well as the likely approaches used by the unit to bring up supplies. Ahead was the enemy who had received a bloody-nose but at the expense of most of the available Piat bombs. Until more could be carried over the river, a similar attack might roll the Seaforths back to the river banks. On "A" Company's front, about the middle of the afternoon, a body of about 30 Germans was spotted going north on the main highway and plans were made to ambush them. The ambush failed, however, when a Bren gunner opened up on them when they were 200 yards instead of 20 yards away. Shortly afterwards, an enemy tank opened up on "A" Company's positions and this was followed by an infantry attack. Major Clark was forced to withdraw from the highway after a bitter, close-quarter fight. The company remained in its buildings overlooking the highway, subjected to long-range machine-gun and tank fire. Without Piat bombs, little could be done, but fortunately the tanks were extremely wary of coming too close, and it seems that the hard knocks the enemy had had the previous night in effect, saved the company from a much more determined attack. "C" Company on the right was experiencing approximately the same thing.

Both forward companies were extremely relieved when, about eight in the evening, a ferry system started in "B" Company's area and the pile of ammunition and supplies, built up by Major O. H. Mace under very difficult conditions, could be moved across the Savio. Major Mace, the second-in-command, came over the river and supervised the carrying parties bringing up food and ammunition. On the return trip casualties were ferried back, with prisoners of war being used as stretcher bearers. The unit's pioneers worked with the engineers to construct a raft sufficiently large to take over two two-pounder anti-tank guns and a jeep, while Captain C. C. Tarbuck

marshalled the Seaforths carriers and 6-pr. anti-tank guns near the sodden dykes ready to rush them across as soon as a bridge was completed.

That night, working in the rainy darkness which was periodically lightened by explosions from bursting shells, two anti-tank guns were ferried over the Savio and immediately sent up to "C" and "A" Companies. A jeep managed to get over as well, but there was still no bridge across. To the north of "C" Company the rattle of gunfire could be heard as the West Nova Scotia Regiment and Princess Patricias attacked over the Savio to widen the bridgehead in order to obtain a suitable site for a bridge to be constructed further north. They encountered heavy going, and by first light only "D" Company of the West Novies was west of the river and it was under heavy infantry and armour attack. Only the defensive fire of the artillery brought down by the company commander, aided by some excellent shooting from the east bank of supporting self-propelled guns, saved the company and even at that, it was considered advisable to withdraw the company at midday. This left the Seaforths and the Edmontons, who had deepened their bridgehead to conform with that of the Seaforths, holding the brigade's front across the Savio.

That afternoon Major Clark took a reconnaissance patrol up to the highway to see if a group of buildings in the vicinity were occupied. Enemy fire left no doubt that they were, and during the withdrawal a number became casualties including Major Clark who was killed. To the right "C" Company had widened its area slightly when it occupied an old palace. During the evening the Scout Platoon, which was holding it, was reinforced by a platoon from "D" Company which gave Lt. Sir A. G. A. A. Mackenzie a "half company" to hold the right flank. The remaining two platoons of "D" Company, relieved by a company from the Princess Patricias, went forward under Captain Duncan to strengthen "A" Company, which had become somewhat disorganized. Of all the men at the front, however, probably none was more welcome than the artillery observation officer, for it was his ability to bring crashing down on the enemy the weight of steel from the guns east of the river that provided the Seaforths with the strongest available means of defence.[18]

[18] It was not until the early morning hours of the 24th that a pontoon bridge was established permitting the unit's vehicles and supporting arms to cross the Savio.

Although during the morning of the 23rd the attempt to widen the bridgehead was beaten back, the brigade commander prepared to accomplish the same thing by passing the West Novies, then under command of the 2nd Brigade, through the Seaforths' bridgehead and have them attack northward. This was cancelled, however, owing to the advance being made on the left by the British who had crossed the Savio and were making such good progress that the enemy decided to retire behind the Ronco River. By 0840 hours on the 24th patrols from "D" Company reported no contact with the enemy, and when the Princess Patricias went through a short time later, they forged ahead against little or no opposition.

The part played by the Seaforths in forcing and maintaining a bridgehead over the Savio speaks for itself, and it did not go unrecognized by the Eighth Army Commander. Early on the 23rd Lt-Col. Bell-Irving received the following message from him:

> My best congratulations on your gallant and successful action in the night crossing of the River Savio under most difficult conditions. The maintenance and enlargement of your bridgehead in face of armoured counterattacks shows determination and skill of the highest degree. Your part in this attack has made a decisive contribution to the army plan.[19]

The battle, of course, took its toll. Close to 100 Seaforths were killed or wounded. The enemy's losses, however, were twice that number, and the fact that some 150 prisoners were taken from one of the best German divisions in the Italian theatre exemplified the ability of the battalion after over a year's fighting. Indeed, the entire Canadian division was, by this time, one of the best in the Eighth Army, and it was the fighting spirit and enterprise of units such as the Seaforths and Edmontons which made the division one of the most formidable formations in the theatre of operations.

Of all the exploits which took place in the Savio River fight, and they were numerous, none shone as brightly as that by Pte. Smith. The announcement of his award, the Victoria Cross, made headline news across Canada. Two months later he was given a tremendous reception by the people of New Westminster and by all those in the

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[19] W. D., Seaforth Highlanders of Canada, October 1944, Appendix No. 5: "Message, Main 8 Army H.Q. to Seaforth of Canada". It was the phrase "a decisive contribution to the army plan" which suggested to the C.O. the possibility of a Victoria Cross within the battalion. An immediate consideration of the numerous acts of bravery which had been performed during the night resulted in the citation of Pte. Smith, which was awarded.

"regimental family" in greater Vancouver. He carried with him the pride of the regiment, and the tribute paid to him was accepted modestly and invariably with reference to the Seaforths still fighting in Italy.

The rain and swollen river, which had so dominated the course of the 2nd Brigade's attack over the Savio, continued to determine the course of the pursuit on the 24th after the enemy decided to withdraw to the Ronco River. Generally the leading troops were hard on the heels of the enemy, for the more closely he was engaged, the less time he had to organize his forces and prepare his defences. On the 25th and 26th, however, the winter skies deluged the Romagna once more, and again the Savio swelled to its height sweeping away most of the bridges in the Canadian sector. Thus the pursuit could be carried on only at an infantry pace—and at that, one unsupported by armour. The Seaforths made themselves as comfortable as possible as the tide of war swept beyond them and enemy shell-fire slackened to mere attrition. It was a time to pack platoons into barns and farmhouses where, if uncomfortable, they were at least dry and comparatively warm. The usual scrounging, carried out with maximum efficiency, normally turned up something—be it an Italian chicken, pig or bottle of vino. These were "liberated" forthwith, and with a little effort and imagination, the Seaforths could make a meal which would have made their Great War forbears green with envy.

Meals at the front, it should be noted, were remarkably good under normal circumstances. Cooked a mile or so to the rear, they were brought up piping hot in universal carriers by the company quartermaster sergeants and served out on a platoon basis. The battalion cooks were good, and although there were many times when conditions limited meals to cheese or bully-beef sandwiches with the inevitable tea, generally the cooks could bring up a roast beef or mutton dinner with all the trimmings including a dessert. With the carrier the mail and the daily issue of "The Maple Leaf" were brought up as well as the rum ration. It was a time to get battalion news too, from the carrier driver, the C.Q.M.S., or one of the cooks. The arrival of a batch of mail, word of a sackfull of cigarettes from the Women's Auxiliary, news of former wounded Seaforths returning to the unit, the latest rumour about a move—the gossip was endless.

It was from "The Maple Leaf" that the troops kept abreast of

news from the other battlefronts, and as they read about the great strides being made towards the German frontier by the allied forces in France, there inevitably arose the question as to when the 1st Corps might join the Canadian Army in Northwest Europe. The Seaforths had been told, as had the other units in Italy, that their work in the Italian theatre was contributing to the grand strategy of the Allies by wearing down German divisions which otherwise would be used in France or Russia. True as this was, there was still the feeling of being out on the limb and away from the main areas of action which were making the headlines in home newspapers. Something of this came out in the song "We Are the D-Day Dodgers", sung to the tune of "Lili Marlene". It did not reflect any lowering of morale in any sense, but rather, as they looked ahead to the soggy, canal-crossed plain, there was the realization that the likelihood of any major breakthrough in the winter months ahead was very doubtful indeed. Coupled with that was the desire to rejoin the bulk of the Canadian forces in Europe and fight in an area about which they had heard so much from veterans of the Great War.

As the Seaforths talked and chatted about the First Canadian Army's fight in Belgium and Holland and pondered their own role in Italy, the pattern of the winter campaign was being decided by General Eisenhower. In order to bring about a German collapse in the Spring, he felt that a winter campaign should be waged on the western front, and to supplement his campaign, he requested General Alexander and his army commanders to continue without abatement the fighting in Italy. On 10 October Alexander directed his armies to continue "active offensive operations with all available forces . . . as long as the weather and the state of the troops should permit. . . ."[20] For the Eighth Army and in particular, for the 1st Canadian Corps, this meant that the slow and weary advance over the waterlogged Po Valley must continue, but before the Canadians were to be called upon again, the Corps[21] was to have a thorough rest to recoup its strength after the long, wearing autumn campaign.

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[20] Nicholson, *op. cit.*, p. 595.

[21] On 5 November Lt-Gen. Burns left the 1st Canadian Corps which was taken over by Lt-Gen. Charles Foulkes, formerly commanding the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division. On 30 November the G.O.C., 1st Canadian Infantry Division—Major-General C. Vokes—left to take command of the 4th Canadian Armoured Division. His place was taken by Major-General H. W. Foster.

On 2 November, the Seaforths heard that they would be going to Riccione and when Major W. S. Murdoch took a reconnaissance party to that seaside resort town, the rumour was confirmed. Two days later, the unit moved back out of the range—but not beyond the sound—of the guns.

For the remainder of the month the battalion was able to relax to an extent which it had not enjoyed for over a year. The last time the men had been out of the line for any length of time was in June after the Liri Valley battles. At that time the men were in pup tents and rather isolated even from the nearest town. Riccione, on the other hand, had some billets, the Adriatic shore offered some opportunities for relaxation, and there were buildings which were taken over on a unit or brigade basis and used as canteens, cinemas and theatres. One welcome event was the beginning of seven-day furloughs to Rome or Florence. During the four weeks the unit was in rest, over a hundred Seaforths took advantage of the opportunity to visit these leave centres despite the long, twisting road journey it entailed. How much "rest" they got is questionable, but if nothing else, the relaxation of soft beds, good meals and the lack of military atmosphere in their surroundings were worth the inconvenience of bouncing several hundred miles in the back of a truck.

Even more exciting for a few was the announcement made by Major-General Vokes on the 14th when he visited the battalion. He said that all men, who had served overseas for five years, would be given the opportunity to have a thirty-day leave in Canada as soon as transport was available. It is rare when a divisional commander makes a speech that he is interrupted by a burst of applause, but such was the case. Since many men in the corps qualified, only three were to be selected in the first instance, and these would be selected by lot. The selection was made on the 16th, and of the three fortunate men whose names were drawn one elected to let another take his place. This was Corporal L. L. Greig. He had enlisted in the Seaforths on 28 September, 1939. A veteran of the Great War, he never took advantage of his age when it came to sharing the hard work and hazards of younger men either at the front or in rest. For some time he had been sanitation corporal, and in action he would frequently be found helping in the Regimental Aid Post or scouring the battlefield under fire with the stretcher bearers. Often, he helped Padre Durnford who time and again, missed death by inches when

giving comfort to the wounded or who had the sad, unenviable task of collecting the dead. Greig, a bachelor, asked if the leave to Canada might be given to a married veteran and this was granted. "This shining example of unselfish devotion," states Greig's citation for the British Empire Medal, "had a great morale effect on all his regiment." It went hand in hand with his cheerfulness, his courage and his contribution to the Seaforth spirit which made him so well known and well liked by all ranks.

This period in Riccione was also a time when platoons, companies and officers made arrangements to have some sort of a dinner or get-together. Ever since 1919, the regimental officers, both in the overseas and the reserve battalions during the war and in the N.P.A.M. battalion after the Great War, had held what was termed the Passenchendaele dinner in November in order to celebrate the capture of Crest Farm by the 72nd Battalion, C.E.F. Preparations for this annual dinner had been in progress even before the unit came out of the line, and the "scrounging" activity had been intense prior to the celebrations on 4 November. Guests at the Seaforths' Officers Mess included many senior officers such as Major-General Hoffmeister, Lt-Col. Bogert, Major-General Vokes, Lt-Col. the Lord Tweedsmuir, Lt-Col. Danby, Lt-Col. Ross, R.C.A., Lt-Col. J. R. Stone of the Edmontons, Lt-Col. R. B. Clark of the P.P.C.L.I., as well as many former Seaforth officers now attached to brigade, divisional and corps headquarters. Regimental officers wore the kilt as did the pipers and drummers. It was a rare evening with plenty to eat and drink, much to talk over, old acquaintances to renew, and a chance to have fun afterwards under the direction of the "Mayor of Hogan's Alley".

The officers may have thought that their dinner and entertainment would be hard to match, but when the N.C.Os. and men decided to put on a dinner, their united talents were almost overwhelming. By trading, bartering, buying and a variety of other methods, some of which are best left undescribed, they would comb the Italian countryside and come up with a menu which was hard to beat. Support Company, commanded by Captain C. C. Tarbuck, invited the commanding officer and padre to one such dinner. The latter wrote in his diary:

> It was remarkable for its thoroughness and variety. Everything from cocktails to hors d' oeuvres, soup to nuts. The wine list was excellent. The turkey, goose and beef lovely, and the cauliflower and peas delicious.

> I go in my kilt but fail to put up my bar or crown. Buck Private Durnford! The O.C. was the only guest besides myself . . . Italian waiters—orchestras and 8th Army boys entertain.[22]

Get-togethers such as these helped the new reinforcement officers and men to know each other and the veterans of the Seaforths with whom they would be going into action, and indeed, during the time the unit was in Riccione, it had received a considerable number of officers, N.C.Os. and men to replace those lost in action or posted elsewhere. Among the changes was the transfer of Major O. H. Mace to "A" Company when Major W. S. Murdoch arrived to become second-in-command of the unit. Another "old" Seaforth to return to the unit was A/Capt. J. D. Pierce who had left the battalion when it was still in Great Britain. He took over as intelligence officer from Lt. Perrett, who assumed command of the Scout and Sniper Platoon. Lt. N. R. DePoe was posted to the unit as signals officer to replace Lt. Gildersleeve. The latter had become so attached to the battalion that he had wrangled a transfer from the Signals Corps to the Seaforths as a platoon officer.

These are but a few examples of changes and transfers which were going on at all levels. One of the major readjustments in the organization of the battalion was the creation of a "tank-hunting" company under the command of A/Capt. Sir A. G. A. A. Mackenzie. This developed from the original idea of Lt-Col. Bell-Irving's tank-hunting platoon which had met with such striking success at San Fortunato and Savio bridgehead. On 19 November, a secret memo from divisional headquarters instructed each battalion to form a tank-hunting company forthwith. It mentioned that operations in the Po Valley would be over terrain which would make tank support for the attacking units decidedly slow, and as it was expected that the Germans would commit their tanks in "penny packets", there must be a readily available defence against them.[23] The tank-hunting company was to be divided into a company headquarters with three platoons. Two platoons would be "tank-hunting" and would be armed with mines and Piats. The third platoon was to have available to it 2-pr. "Littlejohn" anti-tank guns. Although these guns did not have the weight or power of the 6-pr. or 17-pr. anti-tank guns, their pene-

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[22] Seaforth Archives, Private Diary of H/Major R. C. H. Durnford, 25 November 1944.

[23] W. D., H.Q., 2 Cdn. Inf. Bde., November, 1944, Appendix 22: "Inf. Bn. A. Tk. Coy.", 19 December 1944.

trating power at close range was sufficient to discourage any boldness on the part of enemy tanks. Personnel for the new company was to come from Support Company in general and the anti-tank platoon in particular. The latter would lose its 6-pr. guns for the present to the division's anti-tank regiment, but the heavier guns would be available on the request of the brigade as needed.

The Seaforths had the opportunity to see two new pieces of equipment which were to be used in the division. One was the "Lifebuoy" flame-thrower—a wicked, fearsome weapon designed to be man-handled and used at short range as the opportunity offered. The carrier-mounted "Wasp" flame-thrower was also demonstrated. The battalion was also issued with several "Weasels". Designed somewhat like a universal carrier, it was lighter, and its wide tacks made it particularly useful for operations in the soggy flats of the Po Valley.

By the end of November, with the weather changing for the worse, there appeared the usual signs of an impending move. Leave and furloughs were cancelled, company sergeant-majors began to prepare "left out of battle" lists, the regimental quartermaster sergeant conferred with Captain Cameron about the final details of equipment to be issued, and platoon commanders brought up-to-date their platoon rolls. Transport drivers topped up their jerry-cans with petrol, a full scale of ammunition, grenades, etc. was parcelled out to the men, and when the battalion was put on 24 hours notice to move, kit-bags were packed, laced up, and piled high to be stored in "B" Echelon until called for again. It was a smooth operation, well organized, and so routine by this time that a few words took the place of sheets of orders previously issued when in Britain. The "Red Patch" division was once more moving up to the front, and for the Seaforths, there was to be more than one more river to cross.

CHAPTER XII

The Battle of the Rivers

On 26 November, at a meeting of the Army Commanders, plans were laid which were to commit the Canadian Corps to what the official historian so aptly termed "the Batttle of the Rivers".[1] The immediate goal of the U.S. Fifth and British Eighth Armies was the capture of Bologna which would be accomplished by a huge pincer movement meeting north of the city. The start line for the combined army offensive was to be the Santerno River, but before this was reached the Eighth Army had to advance over two "major" rivers, the Lamone and the Senio. As its part in the battle, the Canadian Corps was "directed to capture Russi, cut Highway No. 16 northwest of Ravenna in order to ensure the fall of that city, and then advance through Lugo to establish a bridgehead over the Santerno. . . ."[2]

During the third week in November the new Corps Commander, given the Canadian tasks in the army plan, prepared his orders which would have the 1st Canadian Division take over from the 10th Indian Division and then thrust northward to seize Russi. On the right the

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[1] Lt-Col. G. W. L. Nicholson, *The Canadians in Italy, 1943-1945*. Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1956.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 611. Early in November staff officers at Canadian Corps Headquarters had worked on a plan to capture Ravenna which involved an amphibious landing north of that city by a battalion group formed around the Seaforth Highlanders of Canada. Lt-Col. Bell-Irving was informed of the scheme but the secret was so well kept initially that few others in the unit knew about it. When the revised plan was worked out later, this landing was set aside and the river-hopping plan substituted.

5th Canadian Armoured Division would swing towards Godo and Ravenna and come up to the north of the 1st Division's front along the Lamone. Between the Lamone and the Senio Rivers on the Canadian front the largest city was Bagnacavallo, and three miles to the west, but across the Senio, was Lugo.

Within the 1st Division the 3rd Brigade was given the initial task of breaking out from the Montone bridgehead, seizing Russi and then moving eastward to come up to the line of the Lamone. This was accomplished by the early hours of 4 December, by which time the 1st Brigade was being readied to assault over the river to gain a bridgehead for an attack on Bagnacavallo. The 2nd Canadian Infantry Brigade, meanwhile, was in the process of getting into position for its phase in the divisional attack which would see it seize Cotignola and exploit to Lugo.[3]

For the Seaforths, the rest period at Riccione came to an end on 1 December when the various echelons of the unit parted company. It was dark by the time the vehicles carrying the troops began their journey through the table-flat country beyond Rimini. A clear sky and later a full moon gave the men an opportunity to see the countryside. The fields on either side of the road were flooded, and those that were not were crossed with drainage ditches brimming with water. It was soggy country indeed—and that meant primarily infantry country unless winter frosts hardened the ground sufficiently to carry the weight of supporting tanks. After a journey of several hours the Seaforths debussed at the small village of Massa, and here they would remain for a day or so until the other brigades, even then on the move, had consolidated their positions.

The good progress made by the 3rd Brigade permitted the Seaforths to move several miles closer to the front, and on the 4th the Seaforths marched to an area two miles southwest of Russi which placed them very close to the Lamone River. Holding the line of the river itself was the Royal Canadian Dragoons, who of necessity rather than choice were in an infantry role which, periodically, armoured regiments were compelled to fill. Meanwhile the Intelligence Officer, Captain Pierce, had paid the front an earlier visit to examine the road and rail crossings over the Lamone which the Seaforths hoped the engineers would be able to gap. Pierce had reported both

[3] Directorate of History, "2 Canadian Infantry Brigade, Reports on Ops, 1 Dec. 44 - 8 Jan. 45, Battle for Bagnacavallo".

bridges blown and the sites covered from the opposite bank by German machine-gunners. Until the 1st Brigade was able to establish a firm bridgehead over the river further to the north, the Seaforths, and indeed the entire brigade, were ordered to bide their time, and this in turn gave the unit the opportunity to examine the river to get a better idea of how it might be assaulted.

One of the first things which had to be done was to tidy up the immediate front. The Seaforths were in and amongst the F.D.Ls. of the Dragoons, and between these buildings and the high, dyked banks of the Lamone—a distance of seven or eight hundred yards—there were other buildings which, it was thought, the enemy were using as outposts. During the early hours of the 6th the Dragoons attacked the houses by the river bank along a 700-yard stretch of the Lamone but enemy fire forced them back. "A" Company then went forward to an area slightly to the south and occupied some buildings hard by the river bank. At the same time it sent back a message asking the Pioneer Officer, Lt. D. H. McKay, to bring some of his men up to rid the area of the numerous Teller and Schu mines which were found to be scattered about. The pioneers, with their mine-sweepers and probes, worked away until a little after midnight on this necessary and sometimes hair-raising job. While they were still doing their work under cover of darkness, three patrols were sent out to report on the width and depth of the Lamone and to gain what knowledge they could about a possible crossing place. They reported in early on the morning of the 7th. Two of them had been unable to get the information wanted owing to enemy activity and the third found that the "artificial moonlight" silhouetted their presence when they reached the top of the dyke. Partly as a consequence of this, Lt-Col. Bell-Irving was determined that the Seaforths should dominate the area right up to and including the dykes, and as a result, on the 7th, elements from the Seaforths and the Dragoons moved forward to occupy positions which would ensure a warm reception to enemy patrols attempting to cross the river.

With their positions thus improved the companies were ordered to patrol the river bank itself. The searchlights covering the Seaforths' front were extinguished, and this in turn permitted a closer examination of the Lamone. What was involved, in a sense, was a quiet, careful patrol across sodden fields to the high, steep, dyked bank of the river which was now safe with the area dominated by the Canadians. One had to be careful and quiet crawling up the banks

and over the other side, for it was almost like crawling down the butt side of a rifle range. Despite the cover from darkness, the enemy were on the other bank of the river which, in normal times, one could almost leap across. Patrols found that, with recent rains, the river was now a good six feet deep with a fairly strong current. The enemy had been using a boat or footbridge to cross the 20-foot wide water gap, and there were some who thought there might be a ford of some sort which was known by the enemy but not by the Seaforths. One Seaforth officer, Lt. W. M. C. Stone, had walked and half floated for 200 yards along the neck-high river seeking the ford but without success.

By the time the battalion had become thoroughly acquainted with its section of the river front, even to the extent of slipping some patrols over to the far side of the river, word came of a change in plans. The assault to be made by the Seaforths had been dependent upon the success of the 1st Brigade's attack over the river further to the north. The 1st Brigade's attack on 5 December met with initial success but a swift German counterattack under the cover of fog pushed its two battalions back over the river with heavy casualties. Preparations for a further assault on the following day were delayed owing to weather forecasts predicting rain which might bring on conditions similar to those encountered on the Savio. This delay, as we have seen, gave the Seaforths time to examine their own front more carefully, and on 10 December,[4] each company was given the opportunity to practise assault handling of the new Olafson bridge which the 1st Brigade had used to such good effect further downstream.

As soon as the weather permitted, the new Corps plan called for a two-division assault over the Lamone, each on a one-brigade front. In the 1st Division's sector, the 3rd Brigade would cross the river and the 2nd Brigade, rather than cross upstream as had been planned originally, would pass through the established bridgehead and swing south to protect the left flank. On the evening of the 10th the 3rd Brigade's attack went in and, strongly supported by mortar fire, the three battalions of Canadians were soon firmly established

[4] On this day also the Seaforths' second-in-command, Major W. S. Murdoch, left the unit to become G.S.O. at divisional headquarters. He was replaced by Major H. L. Glendenning, formerly commanding "C" Company.

on the eastern side of the river. Once this was done, the 1st Brigade was committed to deepen the thrust towards Bagnacavallo.

Meanwhile the Seaforths were told that there was yet another change in plans. The 1st Brigade was to pass through the 3rd and cross the Fosso Vecchio northeast of Bagnacavallo and the 2nd Brigade was now to be ready to pass through the 1st and outflank the city from the north. During the next two days, 11-13 December, the Seaforths turned over their front on the Lamone to the Princess Patricias and moved over the river into the bridgehead to await further orders. News coming in over the unit's wireless told of heavy fighting as the brigades of both divisions pressed on towards the Naviglio Canal, a water obstacle about 700 yards beyond the Fosso Vecchio. It was evident that the enemy had been reinforced, and apparently the 98th Infantry Division was strengthening the line between the enemy's 356th Infantry and 114th Jaegar Divisions which originally had borne the brunt of the Corps' attack. The 1st Brigade had established a small bridgehead over the Naviglio, but from first light of the 13th their positions were subjected to repeated, fierce infantry-cum-tank counterattacks. By midday the bridgehead had been reduced to a toehold, and only the arrival of tanks from the B.C. Dragoons saved a situation which might have been disastrous. To regain the ground lost, the Loyal Edmonton Regiment crossed into the shell-racked Naviglio bridgehead and at 1900 hours Lt-Col. Bell-Irving instructed his company commanders that the battalion was crossing the river to help the Edmontons.

The advance over the Naviglio was to start an action which, for the Seaforths, lasted initially only for a few days but which was to be fairly typical of the house-to-house and crossroad-to-crossroad attacks between the succession of canals and deep ditches before reaching the Senio. Accompanied by the tank-hunting company, the four companies crossed the Naviglio Canal only to find that the Edmontons, pressing ahead during the late evening, had succeeded in taking two of the Seaforths' objectives before they arrived. However, "D" Company, commanded by Major D. G. Duncan and "A" Company commanded by Major O. H. Mace, had to fight for their objectives.[5] Both lay along a road about 700 yards west of the river, and both represented the initial deepest penetrations. Moreover enemy tanks were in the area and their fire covered the companies objectives.

[5] The battalion's area was about a mile north of Bagnacavallo.

At this time, about 0230 hours on the 14th, the unit's anti-tank guns were being manhandled over the Naviglio and the pioneers were working valiantly under sporadic shell-fire trying to get the guns up the steep bank of the river which was accomplished eventually with great difficulty.

Without waiting for the guns, "D" and "A" Companies made their way forward, keeping a sharp eye out for the tanks which, as daylight approached, could be glimpsed periodically amongst the vineyards about 500 yards away. These enemy vehicles, however, did not stay in one spot long enough for the tank-hunting groups to close up to them without exposing themselves, nor did they come charging down the road where their tracks might be blown off and the tank immobilized. Rather they kept their distance, perhaps because they had felt the sting of the guns from the two squadrons of British Columbia Dragoons. The arrival of the B.C.Ds. in the bridgehead late on the 13th had been almost melodramatic in the way it changed the course of battle.[6] By 0645 hours all companies were able to report that they were in position. Most of the opposition came from very heavy enemy shell and mortar fire, and to counter the threat of enemy tanks the B.C.Ds. were moving up in support as were some of the Seaforths' anti-tank guns.

With the coming of daylight the Seaforths, as well as the Edmontons on their right, began to receive increasing attention from the enemy's guns as well as their *nebelwerfers.* These latter six-barreled mortars made a hair-raising noise as they fired, and the blast effect of their bombs was considerable. Moreover enemy tanks were still on the perimeter of the bridgehead. Shortly after daybreak, the tank-hunting group with "D" Company saw the tanks which had been heard during the night. Lt. Fairweather, commanding the group, related later:

> . . . Peebles and I spotted the Jerry tanks. There were three of them off the dirt track and approximately 600 yards to our front. It looked as if they were either bogged down or else having very heavy going in getting back to the road. I suggested we bring down our 25-pr. guns on them. This was relayed back and an artillery F.O.O. arrived about 8 a.m. Within 15 minutes he had a shoot going and destroyed two of them. The third one pulled out and left the scene.[7]

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[6] R. H. Roy, *Sinews of Steel.* Brampton, Charters, 1965, p. 340.

[7] Letter, Lt-Col. D. I. Fairweather to author, 6 March 1968. The artillery Forward Observation Officer contacted an artillery "spotter" aircraft over-

As the day wore on reports came in of enemy troops concentrating for apparent counterattacks in conjunction with the tanks, but these received the attention of the supporting artillery as well as the aircraft swooping overhead, and the combination of air and artillery fire broke up these threats while allowing elements from the 11th Brigade to break out of the bridgehead towards the north.

Within the Seaforth area itself the 14th was a day marked by considerable tension. Several times during the morning, it appeared that the enemy would attack, but with the anti-tank guns up, the tank-hunting platoons alert and the field artillery active the companies felt reasonably confident but remained constantly ready. In "C" Company, commanded by Captain J. L. Thirlwell, five casualties were caused in a house which was booby-trapped and the pioneers checked other buildings but found them "clean" of these deadly devices. Shortly after noon fresh reports came in of enemy troops and tanks gathering to attack, and at 1315 hours a heavy concentration of enemy artillery fire lasting from fifteen minutes struck the front of both battalions. It was followed immediately by an enemy attack with the heaviest weight coming against the Edmontons. On the Seaforth front "D" Company's area was the target for the enemy. Artillery "DF" tasks had been carefully planned and within half an hour the German attack had been thrown back with heavy casualties.

The first counterattack had rolled along the Edmontons' front to "D" Company's position adjoining them. A little over two hours later the Seaforths were struck again, this time from the south on "C" Company's front which was closest to Bagnacavallo. The Seaforths managed to dispose of the German infantry but a tank which accompanied it left the road and came towards them across country. This tank, which was a "Tiger", upset the carefully planned anti-tank defence arranged on that flank by Lt-Col. Bell-Irving, who had arranged to cover all possible approaches except the flat, open farm fields which were considered too soggy and soft to support a tank's weight. The "Tiger", although weighing 56 tons, was 12 feet wide and had very wide tracks which permitted it to cross ground known to be impassable to Shermans. Thus it trundled forward, took up a position only sixty yards from the Seaforths and began to lace their

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head which in turn directed a battery of heavy artillery on the tanks. (Letter, Major J. D. Pierce to author, 10 July 1968.)

positions with cannon and machine-gun fire. The Seaforths' Intelligence Officer wrote later:

> The A/tk defence in C Coy area consisted of the following: one Arty 6-pr. fired one round, missed, jammed and could not fire again. One Arty 6-pr., sited to cover the Bagnacavallo road, could not traverse sufficiently enough to cover the cross country tank approach, so both gun crews took shelter in the house. The two 75-mm. Sherman tanks, parked behind the house, were unable to move owing to observation by the 'Tiger' tank and shots were ineffective. One regimental tank hunting platoon got one Piat bomb away and hit the tank without noticeable effect. One rifleman shot the tank commander and the tank hastily withdrew.[8]

This second counterattack petered out about dusk with no ground lost. Not too long afterward, as if in a final burst of hate for the day, the joint Tactical Headquarters shared by the Seaforths and Edmontons was subjected to a vicious "stonk" from the enemy's *nebelwerfers* but fortunately casualties were light. After that the shelling decreased in activity but no platoon relaxed its vigil.

On the following day it was apparent that the enemy had no intention of retiring to the Senio. Indeed enemy armoured vehicles were still on the perimeter of the bridgehead, and one was on "D" Company's front. It was pinpointed by the artillery and knocked out. Other German tanks received similar attention, so that by noon, as a result of the two-day battle, two "Tiger" and four "Panther" tanks plus one self-propelled gun had been knocked out either by artillery, tanks or aircraft. The battlefield was becoming quite untidy.

During the night of 14-15 December the Princess Patricias had come into the bridgehead and, using the Seaforths' area as a firm base, they had pushed the brigade front 700 yards closer to Bagnacavallo. Their arrival permitted the Seaforths to shorten their front and to prepare for an attack due west from the bridgehead which would deepen the Canadian penetration. "D" and "A" Companies, attacking after dark, were to advance along parallel routes with tank support to seize Casa Pozzi and Casa Zaboni, both groups of farm buildings situated on one of the roads radiating north of Bagnacavallo.

Surprisingly, the Seaforth war diary has little to say about this attack, but apparently "A" Squadron of the B.C. Dragoons remem-

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[8] Directorate of History, "Seaforth Highlanders of Canada, Report on Ops, 1-31 Dec. 44, Battle for Bagnacavallo." This also points up the importance of the aggressive infantryman even in a situation where armour seems to dominate the scene.

bers at least part of it more vividly. "D" Company, prodding towards their objective in mid-afternoon, nabbed 12 prisoners. The company was ordered to move forward before dark, and with them went the tanks. An N.C.O. in charge of one of the supporting tanks wrote later:

> We took up positions with an infanty company on one of the roads leading out of Bagnacavallo. Then we received orders to go further up where another of our troops was, so off we went . . . We arrived at this forward point just as the troop was blasting a couple of houses 400 yards ahead. Jerries scooted in all directions . . . .
>
> Shortly after we arrived the other troop and the infantry put in a push to gain the next crossroads while we and a newly arrived company of infantry took over the position vacated. The infantry found some Jerries still holding out in the first houses up the road although it had been blasted by tank cannon. The tanks following up the road used liberal amounts of MG at every possible place. The house fell . . . then they proceeded to advance the remaining 400 yards to the crossroads where they hit upon a Panther tank which was duly dispatched.[9] By this time it was dusk.
>
> Neither the troop up ahead nor the position of ours were any spots to fall asleep at. The two position stuck out like a thumb from the remaining battle line so that we had Jerries on both sides. Furthermore, he mortared hell out of us, and looking through periscopes at certain times one could see sparks and flashes as he poured the stuff in. We spent a miserable six hours in the buggy that night.[10]

By six that evening "D" Company was on its objective but it was being subjected to heavy shelling. One armour piercing shot from an enemy tank passed right through the building Major Duncan was using as his company headquarters. This caused seven casualties, including the signallers who were manning the wireless set which was demolished. Half an hour later the company was consolidated, anti-tank guns were en route to the position and mines were laid to keep enemy tanks from approaching too near.

With "D" secure, Major Mace was ordered to bring up "A" Company to its objective about 400 yards to the north. Mace had to lead his platoon across country. Moreover, he was unable to have tank support since, owing to the narrow tank tracks of the Shermans and the wet, soft ground, the Dragoons could not follow the infantry. The

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[9] W.D., H.Q., 2nd Cdn. Inf. Bde., December 1944, Operations Log, 15 December 1944, Serial 79. This message reports: "D Coy getting on well . . . Tanks have KO'd another tank". The time was 1655 hours.

[10] Roy, *op. Cit.*, p. 341.

road beyond "D" Company's position was blown at the crossroads, and it was not until the following day that this exposed spot could be filled sufficiently for the tanks to cross. Fortunately "A" Company reached its objective with comparatively little trouble.

The attack by the Seaforths and Dragoons, as well as the activity on the rest of the brigade front, had stirred up the enemy who, from mid-afternoon onward, began to shell and mortar the area with increasing intensity. Casualties from this fire began to mount. The padre, H/Maj. Durnford, had been visiting the Regimental Aid Post and when word arrived of the men who had been wounded with "D" Company, nothing could stop him from going with the ambulances to give them such comfort and aid as he could. As the vehicle he was with started up along the road which led from "B" to "D" Company, a German tank appeared and began to shell the route. Durnford led the stretcher-bearers ahead[11] on foot over territory he had never travelled before and which was continually under fire. He arrived at the battered company headquarters about 1900 hours and organized the removal of the wounded using two prisoners of war as additional stretcher-bearers. Word was then received that there were men at "A" Company. The padre was for setting out at once for "A" Company some 500 yards to the north, but the company commander would not let him go as the area was being swept by machine-gun fire. The padre then took "D" Company's casualties back to the R.A.P., and then set out across country for "A" Company although he had been warned that the area between "A" and "D" Companies was not confirmed as being clear of enemy troops. As he came closer to "A" Company there was every sign that a battle was still in progress, and when he arrived he found the company so busy clearing and consolidating its newly won position that men could not be spared to assist in the evacuation of the wounded. There were a number of casualties, however, so, in words of his citation for the Distinguished Service Order:

> . . . once again Major Durnford pressed prisoners of war into service as stretcher-bearers. Having organized them himself, he led the whole party back alone, again under mortar fire and across country which he had not formerly seen . . . On arriving at the crossroads he found one of

[11] Major S. Lynch, "B" Company's commander, advised him not to go and the Commanding Officer ordered him not to. "My orders come vertically, not horizontally" was the padre's reply. (Letter, Major S. Lynch to author, 7 July 1968).

the ambulance vehicles broken down. He personally organized a shuttle service with the remaining vehicle and remained in the open at the cross-roads, completely disregarding occasional mortar fire until all were taken care of. He himself arrived back at the Regimental Aid Post at 0230 hours on the morning of the 16th December with the last of the wounded.[12]

At the Regimental Aid Post, Captain J. C. Portnuff, the medical officer, was hard at work in an atmosphere similar to that described by the padre in his diary a week earlier:

> Tonight we stay up till 3 a.m. with wounded cases. Feet hanging by skin, buttocks torn, legs ripped, hands mangled, eyes battered, arms broken and bloody. I help with bandages, etc. . . . The M.O. moves swiftly and quietly and efficiently. The jeeps roar up to the door, stretchers with their moaning load brought in and put on up-turned boxes. Bloody bandages cut away, tunics, pants cut up, chloroform, tea, . . . Plasma. Doctor works smoothly and staff, coordinated does grand job. Quiet confidence and humour now and then, with a certain amount of tension pervades the hot room and the faces of all under the one pressure lamp are slightly sweaty and alert. Towards 2 a.m. tiredness creeps in and the work slacks off. At 3 a.m. all is over and the room with its piles of blood-soaked shell dressings and boots and battle-dress is tidied up and we retire to bed and to philosophize and thence to sleep.[13]

The R.A.P. staff deserves great praise working as they did, under grim conditions. It is true that at times, but only rarely, nervous tension would build up to such a state that they had to be changed. The stretcher-bearers, especially, had an unenviable task. They did not have the chance to fight back, nor did they have the opportunity to dive into a ditch or slit trench when mortar and shell-fire whistled around their ears. The desire for self-preservation is strong in any man, and to go out to the front, time after time, to bring back the shattered bodies on stretchers which soon ran red with blood was a trying duty. The red cross bands on their arms would give them some protection from direct fire, but certainly they had none from the flying steel of bursting bombs or the indiscriminate machine-gun fire which laced the roads and field in battle. Yet it was during these days when their services were most needed. The remarkable thing,

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[12] Seaforth Archives, File: "Honours and Awards". Since he was "escorting" prisoners carrying the wounded (among whom was a wounded German) the Padre carried a rifle—but it was unloaded. On a previous occasion under somewhat similar circumstances he took the bolt out of the rifle as double insurance of his status as a non-combatant.

[13] Seaforth Archives, "Diary of Major Roy C. H. Durnford, Chaplain (P) . . .", 8 December 1944. Among the wounded were Seaforths, Edmontons and Germans.

perhaps, is that there were not more battle fatigue cases among this devoted group of men who served their comrades so well and so frequently when the going was toughest.

By the morning of the 16th both forward companies had tanks up with them in close support, and for "D" Company especially it was well they were there. At 0800 hours an enemy self-propelled gun accompanied by infantry attacked the left forward section of the battalion's front but the Dragoons' tanks were waiting and ready. The SP-gun was driven off, and the infantry was hit so hard both by the Seaforths and supporting artillery that periodically during the rest of the morning German soldiers filtered into Seaforth lines to give themselves up.

Except for this attack, the battalion front remained static. However, the "nebelwerfer" fire which pounded the area indiscriminately from time to time, and the shell-fire which made the road leading back to the canal from "D" Company extremely hazardous, were very trying. Casualties were numerous along this short stretch of road. Apparently it was under enemy observation from Bagnacavallo, still in enemy hands although the Princess Patricias were within 700 yards of that ancient town, one of whose old towers the Germans were using to such good effect.

It might be mentioned here, incidentally, that by this time the Seaforths were particularly good at directing artillery fire themselves. When artillery Forward Observation Officers were not available, Seaforth officers and N.C.Os. used to call for and direct artillery fire by wireless. The 3rd Field Regiment, R.C.A., and the Seaforths had worked so long and so well together that the artillery permitted the Seaforths to call down fire very close to their own positions, and in a pinch right within the company area if the situation warranted. By this time, of course, the former creeping barrage had given way to the new method of striking at numerous known, suspected or anticipated enemy locations, each of which was codenamed. Thus one could ask for a few minutes of artillery fire on ALASKA, which might be the codename of a crossroads. The results were usually most satisfactory and prompt.

At noon on the 16th the weary Seaforths were informed that the 2nd Brigade was to be relieved by the 3rd, and when the West Nova Scotia Regiment came up in the afternoon,[14] the unit was happy in-

[14] When reconnaissance parties moved to examine the new billets, enemy shell

deed to turn over their front to the Maritimers. Before midnight the Seaforths, along with most of the brigade, were east of the Naviglio but close to Bagnacavallo, thankful for a quiet night and a long sleep.

By the time the 2nd Brigade were taken east of the canal the 1st Division's front across the Naviglio ran from a point about 700 yards north of Bagnacavallo, swung north to a depth of about 2,000 yards and then narrowed again as it met with the 5th Armoured Division's front. The Senio River was still about two miles to the west of the Seaforths' former advanced positions, but getting there was proving to be a much harder task than was expected. "The time spent in the Naviglio bridgehead", wrote an officer on the brigade staff later, "included some if not the toughest fighting ever experienced by this brigade—never before has the shelling been heavier or his counter-attacks stronger."[15] The left or southern wing of the division's front, however, had only recently been pushed up to a line running approximately from Boncellino to the eastern outskirts of Bagnacavallo. This had been accomplished by the 3rd Brigade whose area the 2nd Brigade now occupied while it regrouped in preparation for a further attack. It appeared to the Corps Commander that Bagnacavallo itself might best be taken by a pincer attack on either side of the old, walled town, and to accomplish this he planned to have the 1st Brigade storm over the Fosso Vecchio and the Naviglio south of the town and pass the 2nd Brigade through to swing north and encompass the town. Unfortunately the 1st Brigade's attack was unable to penetrate over the Fosso Vecchio so that the plan was changed once more. This time the 2nd Brigade was to attack on the night of 20-21 December through the Westminster Regiment who were on the right of the 2nd Brigade's original bridgehead over the Naviglio. Attacking on the right would be the 11th Canadian Infantry Brigade. Both had the task of clearing up to the Senio, with the 2nd Brigade swinging left to encircle Bagnacavallo from the north. The brigade plan called for the initial assault to be made by the Edmontons and the Princess Patricias while the Seaforths would come in on the second phase.

For a few days, therefore, the Seaforths were in semi-reserve as first they waited for the results of the 1st Brigade attack and then prepared for their phase of the new plan. Although within mortar range

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fire caused more casualties. Among them was a reinforcement officer, Lt. L. C. Day-Smith.

[15] "2 Canadian Infantry Brigade . . ., Battle for Bagnacavallo", *op. cit.*, p. 7.

of the enemy their front was quiet, and for some there was even an opportunity to take advantage of a unit shower bath which was set up in a farmhouse. It was while the battalion was in this area that the news arrived of the award of the V.C. to Private "Smoky" Smith, and with it came letters and telegrams of congratulations not only from British Columbia but from other regiments and those battalions which had fought side by side with the unit on the Savio. It was a morale-raising piece of information which lifted the spirts of everyone after a hard and sometimes gruelling fight over the sodden fields and mud-churned roads between the Lamone and the Senio.

As things turned out, the Seaforths' recommitment to the attack was far less costly than anticipated. Both the 2nd Brigade and the 11th Brigade assaulted on the evening of the 19th and immediately ran into strong resistance from infantry and armour which continued all during the next day. By the evening of the 20th however, the German commander decided to order a general retirement to the Senio so that when the Seaforths came back over the Naviglio and began to push towards the Senio and swing south so as to cut off Bagnacavallo, they found the going relatively easy. Half an hour after the leading companies, supported by "A" Squadron of the B.C. Dragoons, had started for their objectives they were able to report themselves firmly in possession of them. Two German prisoners had yielded the information that an order for withdrawal to the Senio had been given, and as the morning wore on with little resistance being met except in the form of mined roads and occasional shells, Major H. L. Glendinning, the acting Commanding officer,[16] ordered patrols to be pushed ahead to the Senio and southwards as far as the Bagnacavallo-Lugo road. By the end of the day the Seaforths had moved up to the Senio and were occupying a 3,000-yard stretch of ground from the Lugo road to the Via Bigarano.

That night all companies sent patrols towards the 20-foot dyked banks of the Senio which loomed up like a wall running through the flat farmland. The night was quiet, and here and there one could hear the sounds of the enemy digging into the dyke. An "A" Company patrol picked up a German officer and one other rank who had been ordered across to reconnoiter the Canadian positions. This officer provided more information than he could have hoped to have gained.

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[16] The Commanding Officer was evacuated on 15 December owing to a bout with malaria.

For the next day or so the Seaforths were kept fairly busy tidying up the area they occupied. All houses had to be searched and although no orders were given to patrol over the Senio, the ground right up to the river banks was to be cleared. The river was narrow and some Germans appeared to be infiltrating back periodically, occupying their old dugouts for a short time and causing some inconvenience with their rifle and machine-gun fire before nipping back to the west side of the river. Whether these same men were acting as observers or not cannot be ascertained, but possibly they were. In any event at noon on the 23rd an enemy shell landed on "C" Company Headquarters wounding two artillery officers, the company commander Captain J. L. Thirlwell,[17] Lt. T. A. S. King, a platoon commander and Cpl. V. A. Murphy. A short time later a Seaforth patrol, checking houses near the canal, found one to be reoccupied by the enemy and there was a sharp little fight before this situation was reversed but not before the section leader was wounded.

During the afternoon arrangements were made to turn the battalion area over to the Royal Canadian Dragoons while the Seaforths, in turn, were to move south to occupy positions held by the Royal Canadian Regiment and the Hastings and Prince Edward Regiment, both of which were going out of the line for Christmas.[18] This was completed by midnight, but in the process a tragic accident occurred adding to the trickle of killed and wounded which was a feature of every day life even in so-called quiet areas. Coming into the new area the Mortar Officer, Captain F. H. Harfield, led his convoy too far south along the road bordering the Naviglio Canal and drove into the enemy's lines. The leading vehicle was engaged by machine-guns and burst into flames. Of the six occupants in the vehicle, including Harfield, only Private Wittick escaped. There was no road-block or sentry on the road to mark the end of the former regiment's occupancy, and owing to this stupidity the Seaforths lost a well-liked officer and a fine group of specialists.[19]

[17] His place was taken by Major Lynch.

[18] Since the Seaforths had spent a rugged Christmas in Ortona the battalion expected it would be relieved from the line. Brigadier Bogert came around to each company to explain the situation and his apologies were well taken by most of the men except one unnamed platoon of "old sweats" in Support Company who exhibited their feelings in blunt terms, much to the embarrassment of Bogert and Captain Pierce who was conducting him on his rounds.

[19] Pte. R. E. Lewendon was killed, while Ptes. T. Marsland, R. J. Donohue, N.

The new area held by the Seaforths covered a front 3,300 yards long stretching from the Bagnacavallo-Lugo railroad to within a few hundred yards of the Cotignola road, and it was here, with the platoons widely scattered among farmhouses and slit trenches, that the battalion spent its second Christmas in Italy. Several weeks earlier preparations had been started by Captain Borden Cameron, the Quartermaster, to celebrate the season with a bang-up Christmas dinner. The farm area through which the unit had been fighting turned out to be fairly fruitful in this respect, and typical of all companies was "C" Company whose diarist wrote in part:

> 19 Dec. 44: Today we sent four geese down to be added to the pool for our Battalion Christmas Dinner. They were good healthy birds. Our contribution to the pool to date is 8 turkeys, 5 geese and 5 chickens—which isn't too bad.
>
> 20 Dec. 44: We loaded a pig at Coy H.Q. into the trailer—all tied up nicely—but probably very uncomfortable. The pig 'followed' a couple of lads from 13 Platoon down to this area. At 15 Platoon we bought another about the same size for ½ case of Bully Beef . . Johnny Shaw and self wrapped a tarp carefully around both of them (to keep them warm no doubt) . . . There was only one place on the way back that they did any squealing and that was over a canal where a Provost was on guard at a Bailey Bridge. Both our passengers registered complaint at the same time and the Provost changed a frown to a smile and we returned safely. They were immediately butchered with expert help from "Guts" Allan of "D" Coy and no chances were taken with the corpses. They were hung in the back of a 60-cwt. truck and Bob Rice backed the truck up against the house so no one could get into it without moving the truck.[20]

By one means or another the Quartermaster and the Quartermaster Sergeants gathered in the "offerings" which happened to come into Seaforth hands by a variety of accidents, unusual liberations, or, in a pinch, straightforward purchases. Back of the lines the cooks were working hard, while others—pipers, company clerks, and so forth—made such preparations as they could to make the atmosphere as happy a one as circumstances would permit. Christmas Day itself was cold and clear with very little shelling, and on the following day the Seaforths were relieved and went back over the Lamone to billets in Russi. Here, on the 27th, the Seaforths celebrated Christmas.

Murphy and C. P. Ritchie were taken prisoner. Evidently Harfield's driver did not see the other vehicles of Support Company led by Captain Pierce turn off the road, and this, plus the absence of a sentry on the road, resulted in the accident.

[20] Seaforth Archives, "Diary of 'C' Company, Book II".

It was clear, sunny and cold when the first company filed noisily into the large windowless building facing the town square of Russi. The banquet hall with its high ceiling was large enough to hold one company at a time, so six sittings had been arranged and the officers and sergeants were kept busy until nightfall serving turkey and pork with all the trimmings to the men. The hall had been decorated, the Pipes and Drums were in attendance, Padre Durnford led the carol singing, and perhaps best of all, unlike the last Christmas when one company left to go back into the line to kill or be killed, the men could return in peace to their billets. "An atmosphere of festivity prevailed over the assembly," wrote the war diarist, "which spoke volumes for the organization which had so largely contributed to its success." From mid-morning until eight in the evening the cooks worked valiantly. After turkey and vegetables came the Christmas pudding with rum sauce and the minces pie washed down with beer. Then tea or coffee, apples and oranges, nuts and candy—indeed it was a feast which would have matched anything the cooks might have put on under the most favourable peacetime conditions.

It was a time, too, to meet old friends since those left out of battle together with the men who served in "B" Echelon were united after being apart for several weeks. The Christmas carols intermixed with the music of the pipes was the best entertainment that could be provided, and of course the traditional custom of being served by the officers[21] and sergeants was an added enjoyment. Now and then one of the cooks would pop in to survey the scene and then dash back to a busy, hot kitchen where the petrol-fed burners kept large cauldrons steaming hot for the next group. The Seaforths were fortunate to have such cooks for these men, working behind the scenes and not infrequently under shell-fire, served the battalion well. Considering the wartime rations and the difficulties under which they worked at all hours of the day and every day of the year, the cooks deserved and received the thanks of everyone in the unit.

Even while the Christmas dinner was in progress something of a Christmas present arrived for all ranks when a liaison officer from Brigade Headquarters told the Commanding Officer that the unit would be out of the line at least until the end of the month. Since the corps offensive began on 2 December, 2,556 officers and men had

[21] Included among them was Lt-Col. Bell-Irving who returned from hospital two days earlier.

become casualties. The enemy had probably suffered even heavier losses,[22] but serious consideration had to be given the desirability of continuing the winter campaign. There was not only the exhaustion of the troops to be considered, but stocks of ammunition had to be built up as they had been constantly depleted all during the December campaign. On 30 December, therefore, Field Marshal Alexander decided " 'to go on the defensive for the present and to concentrate on making a real success of our Spring offensive.' "[23]

For the Seaforths the new year was to be decidedly different from the old, but when Lt-Col. Bell-Irving was called to an "O" Group at Brigade Headquarters early on New Year's Day, it seemed that the future was to be much like the past—more fighting. There had been one or two internal changes in the unit which, to the discerning, might have been indicative of a changing role. The Scout Platoon, formed in Sicily, was disbanded and the tank-hunting company was disbanded while the Anti-Tank Platoon under Lt. W. H. Pollard was brought up to full war establishment. Of far greater concern, however, was the news carried by the commanding officer when he hopped out of his jeep at battalion headquarters. It soon leaked out that the Seaforths were going into the attack in a few days' time.

Between the left flank of the 1st Canadian Infantry Division and the right flank of the 56th British Infantry Division there remained a salient on the east side of the Senio. This salient was to be eliminated, the towns of Cotignola and Granarolo seized, and the front brought up to the line of the Senio. On the far left the 2nd Brigade was given the task of capturing Granarolo and clearing the enemy from the area between the Naviglio and the Fosso Vecchio. To accomplish this the acting brigade commander, Lt-Col. Bogert, decided to have the Princess Patricias assault over the Naviglio under an artillery barrage to gain a bridgehead about half a mile south of Granarolo. In the second phase the Seaforths were to cross the canal on the right of the bridgehead and in four successive phases it was to swing in behind the town and westward to the Fosso Vecchio. In this position it would slam the back door of the town while the Loyal Edmontons attacked the town itself from the east.

The pocket held by the Germans consisted entirely of flat fields

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[22] In the same period 1,670 Germans had been taken prisoner. Their number of killed and wounded is unknown. (Nicholson, *op. cit.*, p. 640).

[23] *Ibid.*, p. 643.

and vineyards dominated on the far western side by the Senio dykes and under observation from the buildings at Cotignola. Recent frosts had hardened the ground but not sufficiently to ensure safe passage for the 32-ton Shermans. The armour, therefore, was to play a secondary role in the attack but would follow closely and be ready for any counterattack. Clearing the roads of mines for the armour, the anti-tank guns and the unit's carriers was the responsibility of the engineers and the Seaforths' Pioneer Platoon. In addition, the battalion was to have four 6-pr. anti-tank guns from the R.C.A. as well as a troop of M-10 self-propelled guns. This wealth of anti-tank protection, coupled with the unit's anti-tank platoon, was felt to be sufficient to counter the ever-present advantage held by the Germans when the Canadian infantry was over a river or canal and into an area where the enemy's defensive positions, together with the flexibility of his own armour, could play a decisive role before consolidation had taken place. H hour was to be shortly after dusk on 3 January.

At 1900 hours the artillery fire heralding the attack of the Princess Patricias opened up and shortly afterwards their companies reported they were making good progress against a surprised enemy. Even before the opening barrage started the Seaforths were en route to their assembly area a mile behind the Naviglio and by 2130 hours "D" Company was at the forming up place 400 yards east of the railway leading to Granarolo. Across the railway line the road which was to be the unit's axis of advance was reported by the Patricias to be mined. Moreover, the mines were frozen solid in the dirt road and could not be moved either by the engineers nor pulled away by carriers. Eventually these had be detonated where they were buried which held up the armour. These and similar reports were flowing into Brigade Headquarters where Lt-Col. Bell-Irving was keeping a close watch on events and awaiting the moment to order his first company over the start line. By midnight the Princess Patricias were obviously doing well, so Bell-Irving ordered "D" Company to move forward while he, in turn, went to his own Tactical Headquarters and ordered Major Mace to bring up "A" Company to follow in the wake of "D".

Less than quarter of an hour after he had advanced over the railway line "D" Company was out of communication with the C.O. as well as the artillery observation officer following in bounds behind it. The Signal Officer, Lt. N. R. DePoe, with some Seaforths as protection, was ordered to go ahead and contact the company but

just as he was about to leave it came back on the wireless to report. The company had had a sharp clash with enemy machine-gunners at the Naviglio crossing but these had been taken care of and the platoons were attacking the first large houses in the area. It was now slightly after one in the morning, and with this information available "A" Company, commanded by Major Mace, was ordered to cross the canal. "D" Company, meanwhile, was pushing on towards its final objectives, taking three prisoners and capturing intact a German self-propelled gun in the bargain—a most unusual prize.[24] At about 0300 hours, while A Company was going through "D" and the pioneers were busy sweeping the road leading to the canal, "C" Company was ordered up to the start line. Major Mace's task was to push up the western side of the canal behind Granarolo, and his platoons had to fight for every yard they gained, but between 0400 and 0500 hours his progress reports indicated that the back door of the town was slowly being slammed shut. During this time Major Lynch had taken "C" Company into the bridgehead and was preparing to push through "A" and occupy the northern pocket of land formed by the Naviglio and the curving dykes of the Fosso Vecchio. So far all was going well, with the greatest frustration coming from an unexpected source. Communication over the No. 18 sets had become increasingly erratic with strange voices, at first thought to be German, ordering the sub-units to do strange things. It turned out that the Loyal Edmontons were late in switching their code signs which, by coincidence, became the new ones for the Seaforths. To further confuse things, both units were slightly "off net" and were achieving an overlap in frequency and signals.

It was still dark when Major Staples took "B" Company forward. As he advanced along towards the canal he could see that the road was clear of mines and he passed some of the engineers' vehicles bringing up fascines. Clattering behind came a bulldozer prepared to fill in the holes left by exploding mines. Engineers and pioneers had by this time started to sweep roads west of the canal, and Lt-Col. Bell-Irving had warned his group at Tactical Headquarters to be prepared to move forward into the bridgehead.

"B" Company, meanwhile, had entered the fray. After crossing

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[24] It was later tested by R.C.A. On 5 February the testing crew brought it to the Seaforths so they could examine it at their leisure. On its hull the R.C.A. had painted "Seaforths of Canada—'D' Coy."

the Naviglio the company commander headed straight for the Fosso Vecchio, the smaller of the two canals. He described the situation later in these words:

> The right hand platoon had advanced to within about 200 yards of the canal when they were pinned down by heavy fire from the bank. They suffered several casualties . . . As we moved forward towards the farm buildings that were our objective, one of the out-buildings was hit by a shell and burst into flames. In the semi-light with the smoke and mist illuminated by the flames, ghostly figures appeared and the only way you could tell friend from foe was whether they fired at you or not.
>
> We took the building without too much trouble . . . Once the house was cleared I went upstairs to see if I could find an OP (observation post) and I entered a room that had had its whole window wall blown out. There, signalling to somebody on the other side of the canal was the biggest . . . Jerry I had ever seen. In the best wild west style, I yanked out my pistol and let fly—and missed him by a yard. Fortunately for me the German was so surprised he fell out the window and broke his leg.
>
> About this time we heard obvious sounds of a counterattack being formed up out of sight beyond the canal. I called for an artillery stonk and in a few moments a big column of heavy black smoke rose into the sky and noises stopped for the time being.
>
> For a while things were pretty tense until the anti-tank guns came up but, unfortunately, as I was putting it into place I was hit. The Germans . . . immediately started mortaring the area but a gallant Corporal crawled out and dragged me into the house.[25]

These events were taking place around 0700 hours on the morning of 4 January, and Major Staples was wounded about an hour and a half later. So brisk had been "B" Company's fighting that when Staples was hit by a bullet he was the last of the company's officers, and as a consequence the N.C.Os. took over and did an excellent job beating back the enemy on the dykes of the Fosso Vecchio. When Staples was receiving medical treatment at the R.A.P. he was visited by the Assistant Adjutant, Captain J. W. H. Bassett, who in turn relayed to the Commanding Officer the situation reported by Staples. Lt-Col. Bell-Irving then ordered the Acting Adjutant to go directly to "B" Company and take charge. Bassett reached the company after crawling along a ditch in the road. He wrote later:

> Company Headquarters was in a half burnt out farmhouse beside the road and I popped in to be greeted with delight by C.S.M. McKim who gave me a very warm welcome and a slug of rum. Things were messy and Mr. Finnerty's platoon, although well dug in, was in a completely exposed position . . . and Finnerty himself was lying in a slit trench

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[25] Major A. Staples to author, 12 March 1968.

> wounded. Lt. Salter was missing but Sgt. Topping had taken over efficiently . . . Sgt. Garrioch had brought the other platoon into battle and was his usual tough, efficient and confident self.[26]

Bassett managed to get the wounded evacuated and Bell-Irving sent some tanks up so that later, when the company was counter-attacked, the company "simply beat the hell out of them" and wanted to chase the retreating Germans. Bell-Irving, naturally, put a damper on this suggestion. Later, however, he came up to company headquarters and cut off his own crowns handing them to Bassett saying: "Congratulations, *Major* Bassett, you can now retain command of 'B' Company."

By daylight the road and bridge leading over the Naviglio were able to carry vehicles into the bridgehead and SP guns were rushed forward as soon as they were available to help the Seaforths hold what they had gained. While all companies cleared out the few German stragglers, word was received that the Loyal Edmontons had entered the town with minor opposition.

Early in the afternoon "B" Company especially was subjected to an enemy counterattack but, with the aid of the tanks and some good shooting by the mortar platoon, this was beaten back within an hour. Enemy shell and mortar fire during the morning and afternoon took its toll of casualties in the newly won area, as did stray small arms fire. Among the victims of the latter was Major S. Lynch. He had been helping a new platoon commander organize his defences when an enemy machine-gunner fired at him. He was wounded when a bullet glanced off his revolver and into his body. He and Staples went back in the same ambulance, doubtless thinking of the "O" Group the previous evening when both thought it was Major Mace's turn to be wounded.[27]

By the evening of the 4th the Seaforths had completed what the war diarist termed "a successful and satisfactory little battle which worked out almost entirely according to plan." Both the plan and the execution of it was almost a model, and indeed the brigade had accomplished its task with some three dozen killed or wounded as against 75 Germans taken prisoner, over sixty known killed or

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[26] Letter, Mr. J. W. H. Bassett to author, 21 March 1968.

[27] These three officers had been with the Seaforths for a year without being wounded, and had joked with one another that their run of luck could not possibly continue. "C" Company was taken over by Captain Thirlwell even though the latter's wounds were not completely healed.

wounded, and the capture of five guns, two of them self-propelled.[28] A short distance beyond the Seaforths' outposts was the Senio River, and although this was to be the responsibility of the British brigade on the left, Lt. S. T. Campbell of "D" Company took out a patrol to the Senio's dykes, probably as part of Lt-Col. Bell-Irving's constant urging to all and sundry to patrol aggressively. For the remainder of the period spent on this section of the front, however, the enemy was satisfied to use mortar and artillery fire against the battalion. On 8 January the Seaforths were relieved by the 6th Battalion, the Cheshire Regiment, and that evening it moved north to take up positions along the Senio in front of Fusignano.

The Granarolo action brought to a close the offensive winter operations of the 1st Canadian Infantry Division. The winter line was to be along the Senio with two brigades in the line and one in reserve. For those battalions at the front, however, the end of the offensive certainly did not mean an end to the fighting. Rather it took a somewhat different form. It became at times more personal, and most of all the men were frequently brought into closer contact with the enemy than had ever occurred before on a static front.

On the morning of 9 January, as the Seaforths were becoming acquainted with their new positions, the brigade commander was holding an "O" Group with his battalion commanders during which he explained the new role of the brigade. The general policy was to inflict as many casualties as possible on the enemy although this did not imply the units would be employed in any extensive raiding or patrolling actions. At the same time each battalion was to make their areas as secure as possible.

While making their area secure, the Seaforths believed in making themselves comfortable. "The boys at Company Headquarters are living like kings," reported the "C" Company war diarist. He continued:

> Geese, chickens, bacon and eggs comprise their daily menu. Their chickens lay eggs for them and as a hobby the boys are poultry-farm conscious. They feed their flock with clock-like regularity and herd their fowl in each night, taking no chances whatsoever. The accommodations

[28] The SP gun captured by "D" Company was so well concealed behind a hedge that the Seaforths came right up to it without knowing it was there. On the other hand, the German crew did not see the Seaforths approach, and were captured when they were "brewing up" a few yards from their vehicles.

> are well worth recording too—mattresses seem to be plentiful, with some to spare, and the quilts—they are in every colour.[29]

This front-line comfort, however, went hand in hand with a sufficient amount of danger which kept everyone alert. It was here, for example, that the unit was first subjected to a form of rocket fire. Towards evening on the 10th the Seaforths heard what sounded like a half-track drive up on the enemy side of the river. It stopped, and then there was a groaning sound like a "moaning minnie". This was followed by a projectile with a trail of smoke behind it coming into the Seaforths' lines on a high trajectory. It exploded with a crashing noise in a ball of fire, and got the nickname "casa cruncher". Then the vehicle moved on another 50 yards and let off another round. These fell periodically into the Seaforths' lines and now and then caused considerable damage.

On this front the enemy were about 30 feet from the Seaforths' forward posts, and this in turn led to the wide use of the Piat, the 2-inch mortar, No. 36 grenades, and the EY (grenade launching) rifle. On the afternoon of the 10th, for example, a Piat group from "D" Company moved to a place of vantage on the dyke and attempted to shoot up a small enemy footbridge. After firing a few shots the group moved further along the dyke to get a better angle of fire, and were surprised to see two Germans poke their heads out of a slit trench in the area the team had just vacated. When the Germans spotted the Seaforths the two heads disappeared smartly and failed to appear when ordered out. Cpl. Duncan lobbed in a grenade and after the explosion, two wounded men crawled out. They were identified as belonging to the 16th SS Division. This incident intensified the search for any Germans located in positions on the west slope of the eastern dyke, but none was found.

The mortar men during this period were having a most interesting time. Sounds of enemy movement or a suspicion that certain buildings were being used by the Germans would bring an enthusiastic response from the 3-inch mortar crews anxious to try their skill and marksmanship. This was fine for targets some distance from the dykes, but enemy positions across the tiny river received attention from special weapons devised by some ingenious members of the battalion. Two worthy of special note were called the "V-2" and the "Dagwood". The "V-2" was made from a crotch of a tree and a piece

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[29] "Diary of 'C' Company", *op. cit.*, p. 163.

of an inner tube. The stem of the crotch was planted firmly in the ground where, incidentally, it had a full traverse. Then a grenade with a seven-second fuse was placed in the pouch. The rubber band was stretched, the weapon aimed, the grenade's pin pulled, and the grenade was catapulted into the enemy's line with great satisfaction. It had a range of about 100 yards with a No. 36 grenade, or about half that distance with the heavier No. 75 "Hawkins" anti-tank grenade. The "Dagwood" was a lethal sandwich made up by putting a No. 36 grenade between two No. 75 grenades. These were tied together and placed in a sandbag which, whirled around once or twice, was thrown over to the enemy-held dyke where it exploded with a tremendous blast among the SS troops.

The devices used to annoy the enemy were varied. "One night," wrote the Commanding Officer,

> our men filled a metal garbage can with a centre core of mines surrounded by winter deposits from a latrine. Fused and lidded this was rolled up and over the dyke. The enormous explosion, then silence, then a rather splashy rain, was followed by hoots of mirth and loud laughter. I suspect that there was considerable damage to enemy morale, though possibly no casualties. On another occasion a makeshift vehicle constructed by the pioneers was bedecked with mines and pushed up and over. All these incidents led to a serious deterioration of enemy morale. We had evidence that their officers had to use force to restrain their troops from desertion.[30]

The sniping, mortaring, and general harassing fire throughout the day went on while considerable work was being accomplished in adding to the defence of the area. Rolls of concertina wire were laid out, a task familiar enough in the Great War, but the first time the Seaforths had used it since they had left Great Britain. Coupled with this was the laying of minefields in designated areas under the direction of the pioneers. With the frozen ground, sometimes covered with snow, this was not an easy task, but it did give a measure of comfort to the defenders. The pioneers and various other specialist groups were concerned with the enemy footbridge which still existed across the Senio on "D" Company's front. A Piat team had tried in daylight to knock it out with only partial success. Then at night, after

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[30] Letter, Brigadier H. P. Bell-Irving to author, April, 1968. Still another "invention" was a charge of dynamite surrounded by broken metal in a chamber pot, the whole covered with a tin pie plate wired firmly in place. The fuse stuck up beyond the plate. The contraption was grasped by one of the pot's handles and slung over the dyke at suspected enemy positions.

grenading a German dugout on the opposite bank the pioneers laid a bangalore torpedo on the bridge but the fuse refused to burn. Then on the 13th 60 pounds of ammonal dynamite were put in a barrel with the idea of floating it under the bridge. Attaching a rope to the barrel the fuse was lit and the barrel was pushed over the dyke but it stuck in a German slit trench. It was pulled back and rolled over again. It stuck again, but realizing by this time that the fuse was too short, they scrambled back and the explosion blew a considerable hole in the dyke. The next time the pioneers tried again and the barrel floated under the bridge since the device designed to hook it failed to work. This time the explosion showered the Seaforths with gallons of the river water. Finally, on the 15th, using a barrage of grenades to keep the enemy's heads down, and using the rope to hold the barrel under the bridge, the pioneers' "naval action" was a complete success.

After ten days on this front the Seaforths were relieved by the Carleton and York Regiment and for a few days the unit was in the Godo-Russi area out of range of the enemy's guns. Here it was on four hours' notice in its role as part of the corps counterattack force. The Seaforths had hardly time to reconnoiter the routes they would use should the enemy launch a counterattack when the battalion was told it was going back into the line once again, this time to relieve a unit from the Cremona Battle Group on the night of 22-23 January.

The Seaforths' new area was about a mile and a half north of Mezzano with the companies occupying positions between the Lamone and the Fosso Vetro. The takeover from the Italians was quite an experience. A "C" Company Seaforth who accompanied "A" Company at the time described the initial meeting as follows:

> On arrival at 'A' Coy's casas all the doors were locked and bolted. No slit trenches nor guards manned outside of the casas. We pounded on the doors and at last got a response from within. 'Canadishe Amigos?' they asked, and when assured of this fact they opened the doors to us. Here was a real sight. On entering their 'stronghold' we found a platoon of men all in one room. There was an unfamiliar smell about the room too—unpleasant—as though they were not even leaving the room to urinate, doing the job in the fireplace. Wine and glasses were on a table in the centre of the room . . . With the additional soldiers of 'A' Coy moving into the room it was overcrowded. There was a makeshift gasoline lamp on the table which let off a black smoke. The Italians did not know their own pass-word.[31]

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[31] "Diary of "C" Company," *op. cit.*, p. 173.

What "A" Company had encountered was quite typical.

The new area was somewhat similar in appearance to the former front—flat farmland with dyked rivers running northeast to the Bay of Comacchio. The 5th Canadian Armoured Division had captured the territory, and in the Seaforths' sector the enemy had launched a counterattack which the armoured division had repulsed with severe losses to the Germans. Their dead were still scattered about,[32] frozen stiff and probably easily observed by the enemy who manned the banks of the Fosso Vetro. There was a fair amount to be done in this part of the front and the Seaforths set about doing it. Barbed wire was laid out along the dyke and around company positions and trip flares as well as anti-personnel trip mines were carefully set up in likely approach areas. Some houses and slit trenches were also booby-trapped by the pioneers, each set with tender care and great hopes that the enemy would attack and occupy these "prepared" positions.

Generally speaking the two weeks spent by the battalion in this area were quiet with only one or two casualties and these were the result of minor wounds. At dawn and dusk there would be the usual one-hour stand-to during which everyone in the forward area would be very much on the alert. On either flank the enemy sent fighting patrols to test the defences, but no major patrols attempted to penetrate the Seaforths' lines. Almost every night the Seaforths themselves had listening, reconnaissance and fighting patrols both on the east and western dykes of the river, depending on the purpose laid down each day by Tactical Headquarters. Sometimes a prisoner was captured and occasionally one would give himself up.[33]

Typical of the fighting patrols was one taken out by Lt. W. M. C. Stone commanding No. 16 Platoon. With about half a dozen men, armed with automatic weapons and a Piat, the party went through the forward platoon positions around 2030 hours. Soon after this they came to the enemy-occupied house they were to attack. The first Piat bomb knocked out a machine gun which fired on the patrol from the upstairs window of the house and also blew the roof and the rear wall of the room to pieces. While the Piat group was getting ready to

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[32] A number of the enemy dead were booby-trapped, so the Seaforths left them there once this was discovered.

[33] On 2 February, 1945 two Germans surrendered. They were from the 40th Regiment of the 42nd Jaeger Division.

fire the next bomb, the small arms shot up all the windows and doors keeping the enemy from returning the fire. The second Piat, an incendiary, went through the upstairs window setting fire to the upper part of the house. By the time the patrol withdrew the house was blazing merrily and no enemy fire hampered the patrol's return to its own lines.

Between the 4th and 10th of February the Seaforths were out of the line in the Russi area, again in a counterattack role, but in fact thoroughly enjoying a rest. All during this period leaves to Rome or Riccione were granted in every company for a few days or a week, and this combined with a fair amount of sickness in the battalion kept company strengths low. In Godo and Russi arrangements had been made to enable men to take baths, see cinema shows and even the periodic army show put on in a local theatre. Now and then, too, six or seven of the "old timers" would be selected among those eligible to return to Canada on a month's leave. These left amidst a mixture of envy and delight among those who remained—envy of their good fortune to be leaving the muddy Italian battlefield, and delight that those who did leave deserved the opportunity to visit their families after being away from them for over five long years.

On 10 February the battalion went back to the front and this time found itself along the banks of the Senio almost opposite Fusignano. In this area it was apparent from the first that the enemy was aggressive and somewhat bold. From the first day, therefore, the companies were busy sending back reports of enemy activities ranging from mortar and gun flashes to sounds of digging or vehicle movements. The stream of reports, each pinpointing the activities by sight and/or compass bearings, were coordinated at Tactical Headquarters. From these there emerged a pattern of German locations and these were engaged by the 2 or 3-inch mortars when possible or, if distant, the artillery was called upon.

Locally the forward platoons were soon using grenades at an unheard of rate so that it was not uncommon for one company to use one hundred grenades daily. The "Dagwoods" and "V-2's" were manufactured and used with considerable success. The enemy tried to man forward posts on the east bank of the Senio, and on the west bank he had dug through the dyke so that from narrow slits his weapons could dominate the top of the east bank. Each major post was covered on either side by snipers' holes. These provided the Seaforths

with a challenge, and a variety of methods were used to neutralize them. Something of the day to day routine may be gathered from the following excerpts of a diary kept by a Seaforth officer in "D" Company.

> 12 Feb. 45 The night was noisy and effective—another fine day. Pte. Freeman of 18 Pl. did a one-man patrol of our bank between the left fwd. posn. and our left neighbors. After passing a suspicious looking slot in the grass about 4 ft. from the bank top, he turned around to see a periscope being pushed out. The Hun saw him and hurriedly turned round in the hole to scramble out. Freeman emptied a pistol into his backside. He (the German) screamed for help and whilst two companions helped him out of the hole (on) the other side, Sgt. Bond, 18 Pl., emptied a tommy gun through the hole while Freeman lobbed over grenades . . . .
>
> 13 Feb 45 This was our unlucky day, Pte. Josephy and Lytton wounded by small pieces of a 5-cm. mortar and later Pte. Robinson, D.V.F., became venturesome, and put his head over the top (of the dyke) for a look. He was shot instantly . . . In the afternoon the other bank received an awful lacing . . . with Piats on the sniper post which was responsible for Robinson's death. A German was heard to scream for help on the opp. bank . . . the hate went on late into the evening.
>
> 14 Feb 45 Valentine's Day—the hate still goes on. Cpl. Logan and Pte. Wheeler, L.H. evacuated to hosp, with small mortar wounds. The C.O. paid a visit to fwd. sub units.
>
> 15 Feb. 45 During the morning a sniper on the other side put a bullet through the tiny top of our battalion periscope. As a reward No. 16 Pl. threw over a tin of M & V (meat and vegetables) with a letter or valentine attached.[34]

As the days wore on the enemy's aggressiveness did not diminish but rather tended slowly to increase. Harassing mortar and gun fire fell in the Seaforths' area steadily, and not infrequently the Germans[35] would attempt to cross the Senio and establish themselves in some dugout where they could inflict maximum damage before being kicked back over the river by the Highlanders. Patrols along the banks of the dykes were sent out constantly to make sure the enemy had not crept back in, and the usual methods were used against

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[34] Seaforth Archives, "Operation Accounts—February, 1945," unsigned MS, written by Captain J. D. Pierce.

[35] On 15 February those opposite the Seaforths were identified as being from the 956th Regiment, 362nd Infantry Division. On the same day a hammer with a note tied to it came sailing into "D" Company's lines. The note read: "I tried to give your can of M and V to my dog but he wouldn't eat it." The note ended with a query asking the Canadians why they were fighting against the Germans "and letting the Russians come into our old Europe?"

the two foot bridges which spanned the Senio on the Seaforths' front. If an enemy sniper or a machine-gun post was spotted—and most were very well camouflaged—the Seaforths would try to blow it up if it was approachable, or direct mortar or artillery fire on it if it was behind the enemy's dykes. Each day and night there was always something to be done in this respect, and usually at some part of the front a group of Seaforths would be having a brief, bitter clash to ensure that activity in their company areas was not observed by the enemy.

The persistence of the enemy coupled with what appeared to be his periodic observation of the Seaforths' lines over the preceding two weeks culminated on 24 February when he made an attack over the Senio. That morning activity along the canal had been fairly normal, even to the daily visit to the companies by the C.O. and the padre. Grenades were tossed back and forth, a 2-inch mortar crew was trying its luck against a suspected enemy sniper nest on the west bank, and one of the supporting tanks from the 12th Royal Tank Regiment was blasting another enemy post between "B" and "C" companies. In the unit's area, too, were some Indian officers looking over the positions their battalion was to take over. Late in the morning the enemy began to shell some of the houses occupied by the men, and unlike previous days, he kept it up so that the houses began to be knocked down by being repeatedly hit by his "casa crunchers". Moreover, not one but all companies were reporting this process to battalion headquarters. Some indication that an enemy attack would be launched before the end of the month had been gleaned several days earlier from a prisoner, and by mid-afternoon the entire battalion was especially on the alert. Counter artillery and mortar fire was paying back the enemy in kind, and from the racket going on in the flanking Edmonton's front, it was obvious they were receiving the same attention from the enemy as the Seaforths.

Early on the same evening the Edmontons warned that some enemy had come over and were behind their right forward position. An hour later more were reported to have come over, by which time "C" Company was saying the same thing. It soon became apparent as the night wore on that somewhere between 125 and 150 enemy troops, operating in small groups, were attempting to establish themselves east of the Senio. The Commanding Officer described the attack later as follows:

> They came over in waves. The first lot rolled fused mines down our side of the dyke. Then came some back-packed flame-throwers, then the main assault. Because there was no space at all between our F.D.Ls. and the enemy, we had our artillery D.F. Tasks predicted right into our battalion area, between our forward companies on the dyke and the reserve companies and battalion headquarters behind. The divisional artillery was now fired on these DF tasks . . . Our 3-inch mortar platoon fired more or less straight up in the air.
>
> Because we were in slit trenches and the enemy was running around in the open, we got away with it.[36]

In the Seaforths' area the attackers were either pushed back or hunted down, but not without loss to the companies. However, the battalion's defences had been well planned, and by daylight of the 25th the only Germans east of the Senio were dead, wounded or prisoners. The area itself, however, was rather a mess. Smoke curled up from demolished casas and some burnt out vehicles which had been hit by enemy shell-fire. Houses which hitherto had served as comfortable billets within a few hundred yards of the dyke had walls blown down and roofs blown off much to the disgust of the relieving battalion.[37] Here and there the human cost of the raid to the enemy was evident. The Seaforths, however, suffered only about a dozen casualties and fortunately only a few of these were fatal.

The relief of the Seaforths by the Mahratta battalion of the 21st Indian Infantry Brigade was part of the general relief of the Canadian division by the 8th Indian Infantry Division, and although they did not know it at the time, this was to be the last fight by the Seaforths in Italy. Various rumours had been circulating for weeks about the future role of the unit in particular and the Canadians in general, but the only thing known about the move was that the division was to concentrate in the Fermo area for a long rest where it would be part of the Army Group reserve.

The long move down the Adriatic Coast to the town of Offida was accomplished with little trouble. It was months since the unit had moved so far from the front, and the stream of traffic on the main highways, the huge dumps of military vehicles and equipment,

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[36] Bell-Irving, *op. cit.* The attack came in an open area between "B" and "C" Companies. "The shells were so close," Captain Thirlwell related later, "you felt they were going to part your hair."

[37] To soften the blow in the "D" Company area at least, the Seaforths had a big brew of tea waiting for the Mahrattas. (Letter, Mr. L. J. Bennett to author, 3 May 1968).

and the unfamiliar rear-echelon tactical signs provided interesting sidelights to an otherwise routine trip. Near San Benedetto, roughly midway between Ortona and Ancona, the convoy of trucks headed inland a few miles to Offida. This "really clean Italian town", to quote the war diarist, provided some of the best billets the Seaforths ever had, with the result that after examining their quarters and casting a practised eye at the town, "everybody . . . (was) quite contented with their lot, and morale . . . (was) excellent".[38] By the following day the Seaforths were making friends with the natives and bartering with the local laundresses to wash shirts and socks for cigarettes and soap or swapping used clothing for vino.

The day after the battalion arrived in Offida Lt-Col. Bell-Irving ordered the battalion to parade on the football field on the edge of the town. No one knew why the parade was called, though when the men were formed into a horseshoe shape most thought it was a prelude to the usual speech during which the commanding officer would "put them in the picture" regarding the length of time they would be in rest and similar matters. Actually, the parade was planned with considerable care and secrecy for the padre, H/Maj. Durnford, who was to be presented with the Distinguished Service Order. The padre described his own reaction in his diary on the same day.

> 28 Feb. Wednesday. Rise early as usual. Interviews and writing till noon. A big parade called. Whole battalion called out. Something secret they say. Burmah? Curses, & I hate parades & have a lot do anyhow. All arrive on football ground. Big hollow square. What a Church Parade this would be. The O.C. takes over after much ceremony. He begins to tell of Smokey Smith & his V.C. "I have called you together to help me in presenting what constitutes a Padre's V.C." My God! *Me?* Surely a mistake. He goes on talking. I hear none of it. I am dazed. My heart flutters like a bird pounding against the bars. "I now call upon Major Durnford to come forward." I heard it. I drop my gloves. (Thank heavens I left my stick on the wall just before & under protest). I march forward. God knows I felt every step was going to be the last. I salute. Budge grins & I advance still closer & he pins it on. "Good work, Roy, this is a great honour for me & I am proud of you." "Budge I am dreaming this? I can't believe this is real." I step back: He shakes my hand. I salute & step back further & salute (unnecessarily) again, & return to my place which seemed an age away. "Three cheers for the Padre," says the O.C. The roar was instantaneous. So was the "Tiger." The parade falls out. This was all it was called for. *The whole battalion for me!* What an honour. How undeserved too! Budge & officers and men shake & congratulate. I

[38] W.D., Seaforth Highlanders of Canada, 27 February 1945.

> am overwhelmed. Go back with the O.C. in Jeep. The boys meet me at Sally Ann & congrats are hearty & very sincere & universal. I reach my cabin & weep there. Tonight I put on my kilt & after dinner the M.O. the C.O. & myself visit all Companies at their parties. What a welcome I got!! And what parties they were!! This has been the greatest day of my life in or out of the army. The salute of brave men. I shall by God's help endeavour to be worthy of so great an honour. I wear it on behalf of all fallen heroes.[39]

February 28th was a special day in another way as well. That morning the Commanding Officer attended a conference called by Brigadier Bogert, and there he was informed that in a week's time the battalion was to be prepared to leave Italy as part of the movement of the 1st Canadian Corps to North West Europe. Rumours and speculation regarding the future had been going around the battalion for so long that the actual word of the move which Lt-Col. Bell-Irving brought back to the unit that afternoon came as a delightful surprise. The 5th Canadian Armoured Division was already en route, and the 1st Canadian Infantry Division was to follow them as soon as possible. The Seaforths were told that they were to be ready to move across Italy via Foligno and Pontassieve to Leghorn on March 6th. All identifying marks on uniforms and vehicles which would mark the battalion as being Canadian were to be removed, and strict security precautions were to be taken to prevent the enemy from gaining knowledge of the 1st Corps moving from one theatre of operations to another.

During the next few days the unit lines displayed an activity unusual for a rest area. For the first time since England the men were to carry their large and small packs, and what couldn't be stuffed in these or their kitbags had to be disposed of unless the Seaforths could find some cranny in the unit's vehicles already groaning with equipment and stores. Since everyone had the same idea, excess baggage was reduced to a minimum. Also the excess vehicles "liberated" and used by the unit had to be disposed of in various mysterious ways. The inevitable nominal rolls were ground out at company orderly rooms, vehicles were checked, stores packed, and last minute administrative orders issued for the long trip to the west coast. While this was going on the evenings were left free for the men to enjoy themselves. Usually the Pipes and Drums under Pipe Major Esson beat Retreat in the Offida town square, and parties on a platoon or com-

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[39] "Diary of Major R. C. H. Durnford . . .", *op. cit.*, p. 122.

pany basis were to be found later in the evening as the men took full advantage of the liberal amount of vino and farm produce which could be purchased locally.

At 0320 hours on 6 March the Seaforths began their long journey over the mountainous waist of Italy. The weather was good, the route well marked and the tented camps and billets arranged for the overnight stops were well planned. Each day the convoy would pull into the prepared camp site, the cooks would prepare dinner, and usually arrangements had been made to show a film out of doors after nightfall. By 0900 on the following day the T.C.Vs. would be en route once more, sometimes going through beautiful countryside and at other times through areas where the scars of battle were still fresh. Even in the latter areas work was starting or well under way on new bridges and roads demolished by the Germans during their fighting withdrawal in the fall of 1944. Near Florence they passed their own former positions and saw the farmers ploughing the fields and pruning their vines.[40] On the 9th, after passing through part of the "Italian Riviera", the convoy was escorted to Harrod's Camp, a few miles north of Leghorn, the last staging area in their Italian voyage.

For the next three days the Seaforths took full advantage of the almost picnic-like atmopshere in the huge tented city which the U.S. Army had prepared for the Canadians. Short visits to the nearby leaning tower of Pisa, plenty of sports and similar entertainment were mixed in with talks about the move to Belgium, parades to change lire for francs, and last-minute work on vehicles and stores preparatory to loading. Then on 13 March, about one year and eight months after the battalion had stormed ashore on the beaches of Sicily, the Seaforths once again were taken on board a variety of ships at Leghorn, some of which were L.C.I. (L)[41] which had been present at the Sicily landings. Early on the morning of the 14th the small flotilla of

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[40] Security was good but not perfect. One Seaforth remembers a "comfort stop" which his vehicle made close to an Italian who was working near the road making mud for his brickyard. The Seaforths ignored him. However he stepped up to our vehicle and said: "I know you speaka da Engleesh. I know. I know. I was in America twenty years. I comea home to see my friends. I like-a go back but son-of-a-bitch Mussolini, he not let-a me. O.K. boys, so long!" (Seaforth Archives, Personal Diary of Private A. J. McKay, Vol. III, P.2).

[41] L.C.I.(L)—Landing Craft, Infantry (Large).

five L.C.I. (L) carrying most of the battalion eased out of the harbour of Leghorn and in beautiful weather began the short voyage to southern France.

There were not many Seaforths[42] who gazed at the retreating shores of Italy who had stormed ashore in Sicily in July, 1943. And certainly there were mixed feelings among all ranks as the craft reached out into the Mediterranean. Behind them they left many of their comrades who would rest forever beneath the soil of Italy.[43] Gone, too, were the months of hardship and danger they shared with other men from all parts of the Empire and Commonwealth who made up part of the Eighth Army. There were Italian place names, too, which they would always remember, many of which would appear ultimately on the regiment's colours as battle honours. Memories flooded back with each mile the ships drew away from the harbour —the vino, the spaghetti dinners, the fighting at Agira, the warmth of Sicily, the charge through the shell-fire at the Hitler Line, the unexpected beauty of the countryside after turning a bend in the road, the wretched poverty of the villages, the mud of the Senio dykes and the almost unreal Christmas dinner at the front line in Ortona. There was much to remember, but mixed with the nostalgia, and gaining in excitement as the coast of France came into sight on the following day, was the thought that at long last the battalion would be together with the bulk of the Canadian Army in the primary theatre of operations.

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[42] Of the 42 officers in the unit, including attached officers, who are listed on the battalion nominal roll at this time, only seven landed with it in Sicily.

[43] During the campaign the Seaforths had a total of 1576 casualties. Of these 344 were fatal, 1,121 were wounded, 105 were prisoners of war and six were deaths not suffered on the battlefield.

CHAPTER XIII

The Campaign in The Netherlands

The voyage on board the "L.C.I. 48" lasted little more than 24 hours, but it was probably the easiest, most pleasant trip the Seaforths had had for a year and a half. The blue sea was calm, the weather warm and there was little to do except eat, sleep, play cards or "craps" and watch the waves go by. By 0800 hours on 15 March the outline of the southern coast of France came into view and an hour later the craft was easing its way into the cluttered harbour at Marseilles. By mid-morning the battalion disembarked and embussed on waiting T.C.Vs. which took the men to a huge staging or transit camp some twelve miles north of the seaport. Later that evening the drivers of the jeeps and unit vehicles which had come to Marseilles on a L.S.T. rolled into camp and the unit was complete.

For the next week the Seaforths were shuttled from one staging camp to another on their way to Belgium. The camps themselves, generally speaking, were well sited and contained the basic necessities for the various battalions which were shuttled through them as part of Operation "Goldflake". Tents, water and petrol points, latrines, etc., were established at each camp, and when the advance party arrived at the camp one or two hours prior to the main body, they quickly allotted space to the companies, set up kitchens to have a hot meal ready for the men, and met the incoming vehicles to guide them to their areas at the end of the day's journey.

Fortunately the weather remained fairly warm, and for the men riding in the trucks the trip was rarely boring. Southern France especially had been little affected physically by the war, and compared

with the shattered towns and villages of Italy, the country had hardly been touched. The scenery, too, was frequently beautiful, with gentle sloping farmlands dotted with neat cottages, ancient chateaux perched like a picture postcard atop high hills, and gentle, winding rivers whose banks were lined with willows. There was a neatness and cleanliness about the people and country too which contrasted so favourably with Italy. Through the ancient papal seat at Avignon and on up through Lyons and Dijon the convoy wound its way through towns and villages with their side-walk cafés, arched mediaeval bridges and prosperous shops.

Periodically there would be signs of war, however. On the second day's journey the Seaforths passed by miles of German vehicles of all descriptions which, evidently, had been caught in convoy by Allied aircraft and hammered unmercifully during the period when the Allies were pushing up from Southern France. These bullet and bomb-pierced vehicles lay strewn on either side of the road for miles. Then on the Seaforths went, and a bend in the road might bring the sight of acres of apricot trees in blossom. Something of the pleasure of this drive through France can be gained from the following entry from "C" Company's private war diarist in which he describes the area just past Dijon:

> We stopped for lunch at 1200 hrs. in a field off the road. We had travelled 87 miles since our start this morning. Along the road where we had lunch the road followed a canal. It was very pretty and the water was nice and calm. Freight barges were tied up along the shore. We passed through Vitteaux and Les Laumes. Through the valleys with green pastureland on either side of the highway it was a perfect picture of peace. Looking over the fields it gave one the urge to wander about and gaze at the feeding cattle and sheep. Passing through a small hamlet between Vitteaux and Les Laumes, the houses were very old. Stone roofed houses and stone fences coated with a green moss. A castle, well preserved for its years, stood untouched by any modern warfare—its moat dry, its solid wooden doors or gates white with the weather. The people seem very friendly as we passed through these little villages. The kiddies are clean and well groomed. The women's 'hair-do's' are very neat and tidy and everyone wears shoes.[1]

Paris, which everyone hoped to see, was by-passed, and the further north they went the more the Seaforths saw evidence of the war. At Cambrai, reached on the 20th, rubble from aerial bombing was very evident. As the convoy pressed on through Valenciennes to-

[1] Seaforth Archives, " 'C' Company War Diary," Book II, p. 225.

wards Brussels the battalion entered into a section of Belgium which was well known to veterans of the Great War, and here and there the convoy would pass huge military cemeteries with acres of white crosses—an indication of the sacrifice made by tens of thousands of their fathers' generation. By the 21st of March the journey of over 1700 miles ended when the Seaforths crossed over the border into Belgium and the companies were directed to their billets in the small villages of Westmeerbeek, Houvenne and Ramsel.

If the journey had been long, it had been exciting in many ways, and for the men to be billetted in the neat, clean Belgian homes was a delight which they had not expected or hoped for. Since only a few were billetted per house, most of the men found themselves sleeping in beds between clean sheets—an almost unheard of luxury after months of sleeping on floors or in dirty Italian barns. The Belgians were most hospitable, too, and went out of their way to make the battalion feel at home. Many of them spoke at least some English, and in a matter of hours Seaforths were settling down as if they were invited guests of the Belgians rather than foreign soldiers from a distant land imposed on them.

During the next few days there was a great deal to do. Captain G. F. Williamson, the Paymaster, had already changed Italian lire for French francs and now all these had to be collected and exchanged for Belgian francs, and since the latter were worth about two Canadian cents, there were hundreds of thousands of the new currency notes to issue. A large bottle of Belgian beer cost about 17 Belgian francs, and as there were numerous pubs[2] and a constant Seaforth thirst, the Paymaster's francs were soon piling up in publicans' tills in the area. Almost immediately the Seaforths were ordered to sew up their unit and divisional patches. Vehicles had their identifying signs painted on by drivers and mechanics who were also busy checking the wheeled vehicles after their long journey. All weapons had to be checked, and in some cases exchanged. For example, the Sten gun was issued to all those who, in the Italian theatre, had been equipped with the "tommy gun". The former, at first acquaintance, seemed a poor substitute and looked like a piece of plumbing. However it was lighter to carry and its smaller calibre rounds meant one

[2] Battalion Headquarters Orderly Room was located in a pub, "one with a bar that functions, too!" (W.D., Seaforth Highlanders of Canada, 24 March 1945).

could pack more magazines in less space. It was never highly regarded, however. Similarly all .38 revolvers were returned to the Quartermaster who issued new 9-mm. Browning pistols in their place. The latter were a definite improvement. There were other minor exchanges and these, together with making up various shortages which invariably turn up after a close inspection, kept those charged with administrative matters busy far into the evening.

No office was more active than the Adjutant's, and one of the most pleasant if sometimes frustrating tasks he had was preparing lists of names of those who were permitted to go to Great Britain on leave. There was a tremendous amount of excitement when this was announced. Naturally everyone wanted to go, but only one in ten was eligible for it. For many it meant seeing wives and children whom they had left almost two years previously. For most it was an opportunity to return to "civilization" or to a country with which they had become so familiar that it seemed like going home. The majority of the Seaforths who lined up to get their passes, boat and train tickets, etc., on 24 March were wearing the kilt. A sufficient number had been obtained to permit those going on leave to wear it, and when they returned they would turn it in to be worn by the next fortunate group. The R.S.M. gave the first 80 N.C.Os. and men a thorough inspection before they got on the train which would take them to the Channel boat, and without a doubt he had not seen a smarter turnout since the unit left Scotland.

For some not fortunate enough to go to Britain, short leaves were permitted to Brussels or Paris. These were few in number, but most came back broke but with a glow which left little doubt as to the attractions to be found in these cities. But even those who remained in the villages had a fairly pleasant time. There was plenty to keep them busy from physical training to route marches. Moreover Mr. A. Lawrence, of the Auxiliary Services, had two films per evening showing in a local theatre, company cooks were turning out excellent meals, and despite the best efforts of the thirstiest Seaforths, Belgian beer remained available at the local pubs. All in all it was too good a situation to last, and towards the end of the month rumours were going about that the battalion was soon to go into action.

It might be well at this point to review briefly the role played by the Canadian forces in North West Europe up to the time they were joined by the Italian veterans of the 1st Canadian Corps. About a

fortnight after the Hitler Line battle had been fought in Italy, the assault on Normandy had been made by Allied forces which included the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division, and the 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade. From June to August the Normandy campaign was fought, during which time the 2nd Canadian Infantry and 4th Canadian Armoured Divisions entered the fray to round out the 2nd Canadian Corps. The First Canadian Army, of which the Italian veterans now formed part, was commanded by General H. D. G. Crerar. As is natural in warfare on this scale, the Canadian Army had a variety of troops under its command following the breakout from the Normandy bridgehead, and indeed it was not until the arrival of the 1st Corps from Italy that the army had for the first time two Canadian corps under its command.

Following the breakout from Normandy the First Canadian Army had fought its way through France on the extreme left of the 21st Army Group commanded by Field Marshal B. L. Montgomery. During the late Fall and Winter of 1944 while the Canadians in Italy were engaged in the Gothic Line and Po Valley battles, the 2nd Corps had been attacking the German-held French ports along the English Channel and had been engaged in the miserable, bitter fighting between the Scheldt and the Maas. For most of February the Canadian and British divisions in the First Canadian Army had been engaged in clearing the enemy from the area between Nijmegen and Goch, a necessary operation preparatory to crossing the Rhine itself. In late February and March, while the Italian veterans were leaving for North-West Europe, the 2nd Canadian and 30th British Corps had cleared the west bank of the Rhine down to Wesel. The stage was now set for the great thrust over this major river barrier into the heart of Hitler's Third Reich.

The grand strategy behind the British-Canadian-American attack north from the Rhine need not concern us in detail.[3] Sufficient it is to say that basically forces from the three armies were to strike directly north and north-east. Liberating the Northern Netherlands would be the primary task of the Canadians. After the 2nd Canadian Corps had made its assault, the 1st Canadian Corps was to cross the

[3] For details of Operation "Plunder" and the role of the Second British and First Canadian Armies see Colonel C. P. Stacey, *The Victory Campaign* (Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War, Vol. III). Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1960, pp. 530 ff.

Rhine and swing to the left or west to face the enemy in the Western Netherlands. The 1st Canadian Infantry Division was to take up positions along the Ijssel River between Deventer and Zutphen, while from the south the 5th Canadian Armoured and 49th (West Riding) Divisions were to attack from the Nijmegen bridgehead over the Neder Rijn and Ijssel Rivers.

On 25 March Lt-Col. H. P. Bell-Irving together with Majors J. L. Thirlwell, J. W. H. Bassett and Captain W. L. Roberts made a trip to examine the crossing where the British-Canadian forces launched their attack on the evening of the 23rd. The weight of artillery fire, the constant roar of bombers overhead and the massive amounts of equipment and arms backing the assault had been most impressive. A few days later another group of Seaforth officers left to visit the bridgehead but the traffic on the roads leading to and over the bridges was so thick that little could be seen. Nevertheless reports coming back told of excellent progress being made all along the front. On the last day of March the Seaforths were warned that they could expect to move within 24 hours, but it was not until 2 April that Brigade Headquarters gave definite orders for the battalions to move to the Reichswald Forest a short distance over the border. At 1430 hours on 3 April the Seaforths crossed into Germany. A few hours later the entire unit was bedded down, and in spite of the lack of tents or canvas, spent a fairly good if cold night with the sounds of the guns firing to the north providing background music. Unknown to the men, the area where they slept had been fought for and won by the 2nd Battalion of their affiliated regiment several weeks earlier.

For the next three days the Seaforths remained in the Reichswald, making themselves as comfortable as they could in the raw, rainy weather which made the dark, black earth a gluey mud. Overhead there was an almost constant shuttling of fighter and fighter-bomber aircraft back and forth which were striking the enemy on the 2nd Corps' front. In the Seaforths' area many of the men wandered about examining former German slit trenches and weapon positions dug in among the shrapnel-scarred trees. Not far from the camp there were fields containing a number of gliders and wrecked Dakota aircraft, mute testimony of the airborne attack the previous September. Of greater interest, perhaps, were the "Buffaloes". These large, tracked, amphibious vehicles were examined with more than usual interest as the rumour was already going around that the first attack in the new theatre by the brigade was to be a river crossing.

By mid-morning on 7 April the Seaforths, along with the rest of the brigade, were on the move north. A depressingly cold and damp reveille gave way to somewhat warmer weather as the vehicles made their way through the Reichswald on the way to Cleve. The route took the unit through the Siegfried Line where the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division had erected two signs spaced fifty yards apart. The first read: "This *was* the Siegfried Line" and the second: "And this was the washing". Accompanying the latter was a short line of well worn army clothing. This, of course was in reference to a fairly popular song in 1940 entitled "We're going to hang out our washing on the Siegfried Line". Further along the Seaforths passed through the German city of Cleve, the first German city they had seen. The destruction here was so great that most of the men gazed in silence. Allied bombing and shelling had left the city a ruin which reminded many of Cassino. There was hardly a house with a roof on it. Mountainous piles of rubble, twisted iron and bricks gave the impression that some mighty hand had swatted it almost to the point of obliteration. Travelling north the Seaforths crossed the Rhine at Emmerich. Once across the pontoon and Bailey bridges which spanned this wide, swift moving river the convoy passed through the ruins of Emmerich which the Canadian Scottish Regiment had helped to clear a week previously. A few miles to the north the convoy reentered The Netherlands near the village of Heerenberg, and as the trucks moved almost due north through Keppel and Hummel to Baak, there was a distinct difference in the amount of damage done on the other side of the border. Most of the houses were still occupied, and almost all sported the red, white and blue flag of the The Netherlands with orange streamers hanging everywhere. These people had been liberated only a few days previously, and the cheering and waving of the Dutch people in the villages as the Canadian units passed by was so obviously friendly and authentic that it made similar instances in Italy look pale by comparison. Shortly after noon the Seaforths arrived at their area a short distance south of Baak. Two miles to the west was the Ijssel River. Less than two hours after the companies had debussed in their new assembly area a scattering of enemy shells fell in "D" Company's area causing two serious and one light casualty. "Following this", reported the war diarist, "everyone dug slit trenches with marked enthusiasm."

The new area occupied by the Seaforths, although within range of the enemy's guns, received little attention from the German gun-

ners who were far more concerned in the next two days with the attacks on Zutphen and Deventer by the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division. Both cities were in Canadian hands by the night of 10-11 April, and this in turn set the stage for the crossing over the Ijssel. While the 2nd Corps would push on to the north against obviously disintegrating enemy forces, the 1st Canadian Division was to launch its attack over the river. Coming up from the Arnhem area the remainder of the 1st Corps would act as the southern end of a huge pincer movement. On 9 April, therefore, the Seaforths moved about nine miles to the north to a position close to the village of Gorssel, roughly midway between Deventer and Zutphen. The capture of Deventer would decide the timing of the 2nd Brigade's attack, and until word came through of its seizure, the Seaforths used the remaining time examining the proposed river crossing site from a nearby observation post and getting even better acquainted with the Buffaloes which were to be used to take them over the Ijssel.

Information regarding the enemy west of the river was somewhat hazy. It was expected he knew the Canadians were preparing a crossing, but fortunately most of his prepared defences were on the east side of the river. He was, therefore, hurriedly preparing his defences on the western side. The enemy troops facing the river "were 'odds and sods' under the command of 6 Para Div".[4] Little was known of their fighting qualities, but if one were to judge from the intelligence reports coming in from the 2nd Corps divisions striking towards the north, one could expect a variety of opposition. Germany was in desperate straits as the Allied Armies pushed steadily into the Reich. As a result old and young men—some in their sixties and many in their teens—had been thrust into uniform and sent as reinforcements to battered German divisions. As a consequence of many such makeshift divisions, the enemy's efficiency in battle was not infrequently noticeably poor. On the other hand, the very desperation of their circumstances could result in an intense effort by the Germans to resist all the harder. At any rate, the Seaforths were warned not to be overly optimistic.

The battalion itself was in excellent shape. Owing to new reinforcements each company could commit almost 100 men to battle.

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[4] W.D., Seaforth Highlanders of Canada, April, 1945, Appendix No. 14: "Operational Report, the Seaforth Highlanders of Canada, 7-23 April 1945, Exercise 'Cannonshot.' "

Their spirits were high, everyone was thoroughly rested, and as one officer added:

> The thought that they would now have all the equipment and support that would be needed under any circumstances in order to successfully do an operation, tended to put even the lowliest in fine fettle.[5]

The divisional plan envisaged the 2nd Brigade making the initial crossing over the river in the bulge it made due west of the village of Gorssel. When the bridgehead was secure, the 1st and 3rd Brigades would thrust out of the bridgehead towards Apeldoorn. The 2nd Brigade was to attack with the Princess Patricias on the right and the Seaforths on the left. Both units were to assemble in the woods near Gorssel where they would 'marry up' with the Buffaloes[6] with which they had been doing loading exercises for the past two days. During the actual crossing, the flanks of the assaulting units were to be covered by a concentration of smoke laid down by the artillery. The guns were also to fire an initial barrage which would lift to the outer perimeter of the bridgehead when the Buffaloes carrying the companies reached the other shore.

In the Seaforths' area, Lt-Col. Bell-Irving planned his attack with "D" Company (Captain R. K. Swinton) on the left and "B" Company (Major J. W. H. Bassett) on the right. Once the Buffaloes, each carrying a platoon of men, waded up the opposite shore of the river, the two companies were to push due north for about 700 yards to gain depth. They were to be followed almost immediately by "C" and "A" Companies (Captain Sir A. G. A. A. Mackenzie and Captain W. D. C. Tuck). In the second phase "C" Company, on the left, would widen the bridgehead to the west, "A" Company was to remain in reserve, "B" Company was to swing northwest to "D" Company's area and patrol to the northeast to contact the Princess Patricias. In the third phase, "C", "B" and "D" Companies were to strike westward and occupy positions over the road leading to the village of Wilp.

Shortly after 1400 hours the Seaforths had completed loading both men and vehicles on the "Buffaloes" and were ready to move

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[5] "Exercise 'Cannonshot,' " *op. cit.*

[6] The "Buffalo," or L.V.T. (Landing Vehicle, Tracked) could carry 28 men or four tons of stores. It had bullet-proof armour in front, was armed with three machine-guns, and had a speed of 25 m.p.h. on land or 7 m.p.h. in water. The vehicles supporting the Canadians were from the 4th Battalion, Royal Tank Regiment.

from the woods near Gorssel to the assault area. The battalion had crossed a number of rivers in Italy, but travelling on the large, amphibious assault craft was a new experience. Tactical Headquarters was temporarily established in Gorssel itself when the leading vehicles passed through en route to the river for the crossing at 1630 hours. By the time the "Buffaloes" reached the river bank, the smoke screen on either flank of the brigade attack was slowly drifting about in a light wind.

Fortunately the crossing of the river was very uneventful. There was no opposition from the far shore and the second wave, "C" and "A" Companies were ferried across and established some forty minutes after the initial assault. Some enemy artillery fire, evidently from Wilp about one and a quarter miles northwest of the crossing, began to fall in the Seaforths' area minutes after the landing, but no hard core of enemy resistance had yet been encountered. Some idea of the initial resistance may be gained from the following account written by the signaller accompanying Major J. W. H. Bassett of "B" Company.

> The Buffalo troops were fighters. They had Heavy Machine Guns mounted along the front. . . . They strafed everything ahead of us. I landed in the mud beside John Bassett carrying with me signal equipment . . . First we stood quite amazed at what to do for machine-gun fire from houses ahead of us was whistling by our heads and I recall seeing turf being ripped with grass roots upturned only a few feet away. The Buffaloes were still giving us covering fire and I do believe the enemy was concentrating on them mostly.
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> . . . As though we were both hit by the same thought we began at a sprint directly towards the enemy positions. They must have contracted 'buck fever' . . . [After closing up to the building McKay fired several shots through the windows] Three Germans came out a side door. One kid was in a shed where I sent three rounds for him to think about . . . I took the prisoners aside to the next house, about twenty yards away . . . There I found a few company personnel, one signaller and a larger group of prisoners.[7]

"D" and "B" Companies were on their objective shortly after 1700 hours and "C" Company, commanded by Captain Mackenzie, was pressing south along the river before swinging northwest to seize its objective about midway between the river and the road to Wilp. "A" Company, in reserve on the eastern side of the river, was guarding about four dozen prisoners which the forward companies had passed

[7] Seaforth Archives, Diary of Pte. A. J. McKay, 11 April 1945.

back to it. Enemy shelling, though not heavy, was fairly accurate. One shell in particular landed among the anti-tank platoon still on the eastern side of the river preparing to load their guns on the Buffaloes. It wounded three men and knocked out one of the guns.

By eight o'clock that evening Lt-Col. Bell-Irving, who had brought his Tactical Headquarters across the river, ordered his company commanders to complete the second stage of the attack. The battalion, at this point, had established a triangular bridgehead with a 1,000-yard riverside base with "D" Company, commanded by Captain R. K. Swinton, at the top of the triangle, some 800 yards to the north. Swinton was now to move westward to cut the road to Wilp. His left flank would be protected by "C" Company's advance and the northern flank of the battalion would become "B" Company's responsibility under Major Bassett's command. So far enemy opposition had been only sporadic. Several anti-tank guns were across the river, seventy-one prisoners—including one officer—had been captured, and on the right the Princess Patricias were keeping pace with the Seaforths. At the river crossing, however, accurate shelling was delaying the construction of a Bailey bridge, but it was harassing fire rather than the drumbeat of fire which the Seaforths remembered on similar occasions in Italy.

In the second phase of the attack "D" Company was to advance about 1,000 yards. Its objective was a crossroads in a wood. Before it reached that position it had to seize a crossroads which lay on a road running on top of a dyke. The two crossroads, if seized, would cut the secondary routes running north to the village of Wilp. When Captain R. K. Swinton's leading platoon was within yards of the first intersection at dusk it came under intense fire from numerous machine-gun posts along the dyke which the enemy was using as a natural breastwork. A number of Seaforths were wounded, and until additional help was forthcoming Swinton decided to consolidate his gains and dominate at least one of the roads by fire.

The Commanding Officer, keenly aware of Captain Swinton's initial predicament, paid little heed to either shell or small arms fire in his effort to direct his companies to keep the enemy off balance while ensuring, at the same time, the security of his part of the bridgehead and its importance to the divisional plan. Bell-Irving was constantly on the move, directing, advising, supervising and visiting the company areas. As a result he had an exceptionally good grasp of the

situation and was able to commit his forces so skillfully that the enemy was buffeted, first from one direction and then the other.[8]

When Swinton and his company were engaged in the battle for the dyke, the Commanding Officer ordered his reserve company to push westward in a wide left-flanking movement. It was to come up to Swinton's area and push beyond the dyke some 400 yards to a second crossroads in a wooded area still held by the enemy. "B" Company was also ordered to cross the flat farmlands and strike westward to come up on "D" Company's left flank to cut the second north-south road leading to Wilp.

The reserve company under Captain Tuck arrived in "D" Company's area to find it so closely engaged as to make a combined attack extremely difficult. Bell-Irving, when told of the situation, ordered Tuck to ease to the south and try to cross the dyke. Tuck reported later:

> I disengaged Upton's platoon under command of a Senior Corporal and off we went in the darkness to the left. At a point on the dyke which looked peaceful, we went over in waves of platoons, each of which knew its ultimate objective and was told to go like billy-be-damned and not stop for anything. It was a complete surprise for Jerry. Pollard introduced himself to the house-cum-barn at the crossroad with a Piat bomb through the front door and swept in. All dug in furiously in this rather exposed spot, which came under constant small arms fire from the dyke and elsewhere. The Company took about 20 prisoners on the spot . . . We had some twelve casualties, including three killed.[9]

These advances, made during the night of 11-12 April, brought "D" and "B" Companies more or less in line to the dyke which "D" Company had fought to take at dusk. "A" Company's left flanking movement at dawn, however, placed the enemy's position between "D" and "A" Companies. Meanwhile the bridge over the Ijssel was being built and being prepared for traffic in the morning. The leading elements of the Edmontons were about to come into the bridgehead to prepare for their exploitation role, and equally important, tanks were being rafted across the river. A troop of these were requested immediately they were available by Lt-Col. Bell-Irving. These he placed on the southern flank of the bridgehead near "C" Company.

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[8] Lt-Col. Bell-Irving was awarded the Bar to his Distinguished Service Order for the outstanding success achieved by the battalion and his leadership of it during this action.

[9] Letter, Mr. W. D. C. Tuck to author, 30 May 1968. Lt. T. Upton had been wounded.

The latter was ordered to attack to the southwest to take a large group of buildings which turned out to be a sanatorium filled with patients, both old and young. Captain Mackenzie accomplished this task shortly after five on the morning of the 12th.

The scattered enemy gunfire in the bridgehead area and in the loading area immediately to the east of it struck indiscriminately at the Seaforths, and among those killed during the night was Major H. L. Glendinning.[10] This officer had just returned from a brief furlough in the United Kingdom. He had been married only a week. His death was a sad blow to everyone who knew him.

At the westernmost point of the Seaforths' bridgehead "D" and "B" Companies had been having a rough time of it. At least one counterattack had been thrown back, and "A" Company, having reached the second crossroads knew that the enemy along the dyke had to be overcome before the company could evacuate its wounded and replenish its supplies. The Germans had an anti-tank gun in position and behind them was at least one self-propelled gun,[11] the fire of which was uncomfortably accurate. "C" Company had requested tank support and so had "D", and to Lt-Col. Bell-Irving "D" Company's position—especially in view of "A" Company's attack which started shortly after 0500 hours—seemed to be more serious. Until "D" Company captured the dyke the position of "A" Company holding on to the second crossroads would remain awkward. The tanks went forward to help Swinton early on the 12th, but for a variety of reasons the tank troop commander felt that he could not accomplish what Swinton requested. Swinton, therefore, realizing that he must have help soon owing to the exposed positions so close to the dyke, asked for "Wasps"—the flamethrowers mounted on carriers with which the Seaforths had trained but had never used in action. Three "Wasps" came up under Corporal R. G. Woodward about noon. Swinton explained the situation to him, pointing out that an anti-tank gun covered the road leading towards the dyke, but stressing, too, the need for action. Woodward and his crews did not hesi-

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[10] Major Glendinning was second in command of the battalion, his position being filled by Major Mace when Glendinning was on leave.

[11] The artillery reported having knocked out two of three self-propelled guns in the Seaforths' front. The location of these were not given. One may have been in "C" Company's area when it advanced on the morning of the 12th.

tate. The "Wasps" lined up, with Woodward in the centre one which would dash directly along the road. Swinton, weary from eighteen hours of ceaseless activity but more concerned for his men than himself, jumped into a Wasp also. A smokescreen was arranged by the Commanding Officer and early in the afternoon the three Wasps charged. Under heavy machine-gun fire and in the face of a Bazooka firing at point-blank range, Woodward and his men raced forward and flamed the dykes. The long squirts of liquid flame arching over the dyke so shattered the morale of the defenders that they surrendered immediately to "D" Company's platoons following in their wake or to "A" Company which scooped up those running past its position. Aside from the anti-tank gun, "D" Company and the Wasp crews captured fifteen automatic weapons, a dozen Bazookas, a variety of other weapons and garnered in over three dozen prisoners.[12]

Cracking this enemy position was a major factor towards completing the battalion's task. By 1400 hours "D" Company and the "Wasps" began to thrust west towards the second crossroads where they contacted Tuck's platoons and then went north to help "A" Company clear out a large estate between the two roads. The Seaforths flushed out Germans in all directions. "A" and "D" Companies gathered up the majority, and "B" Company was alert for any trying to escape in their direction. By the end of the afternoon close to 100 of the enemy had been captured by all companies, some of them wounded, but many who felt that the war was too close to an end to fight to the finish for a lost cause.

Behind the Seaforths' front the Carleton and York Regiment was taking up positions while on the right the Princess Patricias had advanced up to and including the village of Wilp. On the left the Loyal Edmontons were widening the bridgehead to the south while the 1st Canadian Infantry Brigade was preparing to push hard towards Apeldoorn. By late afternoon the Carleton and York Regiment moved forward to take over from the Seaforths while the latter, after two days of fighting, rested on their arms and took stock.

It had been an exceptionally good battle. Casualties were light, yet six German officers and 214 other ranks had been captured since

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[12] Captain R. K. Swinton was awarded the Military Cross for his leadership in this action while Corporal Woodward was awarded the Military Medal.

the battalion crossed the Ijssel.[13] When one considers that most of the mile and a quarter advance was made in daylight, primarily without the use of tanks, it was a good record even if the enemy troops were considered second rate. In few battles they had fought had the Seaforth companies been manoeuvered about in battle to the extent they had in this case. Moreover the entire fighting echelon had been engaged—mortars, carriers and so forth. The most valiant demonstration by unit supporting arms had been the charge of the three flamethrowers against the dyke to help "D" Company, and in all probability their later use against the estate which "D" and "A" Companies attacked during the afternoon of the 12th was responsible in large measure for the size of the "bag" of prisoners taken during the day.

The night of 12-13 April was fairly quiet for the Seaforths. There was far less shelling of the area, the enemy's attention now turning to the 1st Brigade as it kept up the momentum of the attack. The 2nd Brigade's task, however, was by no means over. Before sunset Brigadier Bogert instructed his battalions to be prepared to strike out towards the south and southwest. The Seaforths were instructed to probe due south along the western bank of the river, but this was not to take place until the 13th. Meanwhile there was a chance for a hot dinner, a wash and shave, and a good night's rest.

Early on 13 April, while the Loyal Edmontons and Princess Patricias brushed aside light opposition as they advanced towards Voorst, "B" and "C" Companies prepared to probe south from the bridgehead down towards Hoven. The large area between the river and Voorst was covered by Seaforths in carriers and on foot during the afternoon with little incident. Except for a few stragglers, the enemy had retired, and it was not until "C" Company reached a large brickworks about a thousand yards north of Hoven that the first serious encounter took place. Some two dozen enemy were in this location, and Captain Mackenzie's platoons were engaged with the defenders for over an hour. Six of the defenders were captured and the remainder who were not casualties retired behind a marshy brook which curved, crescent-like, around the outskirts of Hoven. It was almost dark by this time, so both companies were recalled.

That night, since Lt-Col. Bell-Irving was evacuated owing to a bout with malaria and a high fever, and since the battalion's second

[13] W.D., H.Q., 2nd Cdn. Inf. Bde., April 1945, Appendix: "Operations Log," 12 April 1945, Serial III.

in command had been killed earlier in the action, Major O. H. Mace assumed command. Hoven had to be taken. The main highway to the north crossed from Hoven into Zutphen, and it was essential that a bridge be constructed over the Ijssel at that point as soon as possible. The engineers had been warned to start construction just as soon as Hoven was secure. When Major Mace made his plan of attack that night, he quickly accepted the self-propelled guns offered by Brigadier Bogert to support his attack—in fact the brigadier urged Mace to use them. The problem, however, was that the wide brook and marshy areas might not permit the SP guns to provide the close work for which they might be required. Shortly after midnight Mace held an "O" Group with his company commanders. The Seaforths were to move before sun-up and would go into the attack at first light.

Reveille on the 14th was at 0300 hours. It was cold, with light clouds scudding across the sky when the Seaforths lined up at the company cookers for breakfast, but there was little leisure time even for a cigarette. Platoons and companies were assembled, ammunition checked, last minute instructions given and the various Support Company vehicles which would accompany the rifle companies lined up. By 0430 hours the battalion was assembled in a small wood about 800 yards north of the brickworks "C" Company had cleared the previous evening. An hour later Captain Mackenzie, who was familiar with the area, again occupied the brickyards with little opposition and reported his platoon firmly consolidated.

With this accomplished "D" and "A" Companies were sent forward. "D" was to keep close to the river bank, cross the wide brook which surrounded the town like a moat, and make for the main intersection of roads in Hoven. "A" Company, advancing about 500 yards to the right, was to cross the canal-sized brook and push forward to seize a building surrounded by a square moat 500 yards south of the brook. Shortly after seven "A" Company passed through "C", and by 0800 hours both "A" and "D", spread out for the assault, watched with considerable satisfaction the shells from the medium artillery churn up the area they were to attack. This lasted only a few minutes, and by 0812 hours both companies were advancing over the flat ground and meeting an increasing amount of machine-gun and small arms fire.[14]

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[14] Seaforth Archives, "Intelligence Log, Seaforth Highlanders of Canada," 14 April 1945. This fire came not only from the enemy entrenched beyond the

On the right, as "A" Company crossed over the brook and entered the marshy area immediately south of it, the leading platoon became pinned down by the volume of enemy fire almost directly to its front. It was soon discovered that 300 yards from the brook and running parallel to it, the enemy had dug a line of entrenchments running eastward from "A" Company's objective to the Ijssel River. On the left, as "D" Company advanced along the road on top of the flood dyke running parallel to the river, it too was fired on and encountered barbed wire. Leading "D" Company's attack was the platoon commanded by Lt. L. J. Bennett. It had been subjected to some mortar fire since it left the start line, but despite the casualties this fire was causing Bennett kept his men advancing steadily under close control. Crossing the brook was a small bridge which, fortunately, was not blown but which was prepared for demolition. The engineers immediately set to work to remove the charges. Ahead, however, was the heavy belt of barbed wire crossing at right angles the company's line of advance. It appeared, for a while, that the momentum of the attack might be lost. To the right "A" Company was calling down artillery fire on the enemy hoping to drive him from his prepared positions and permit their men to get out of their waterlogged positions. On the right the M-10 self-propelled guns were doing their best to beat the enemy back, but the situation for the moment resembled a shooting-range with the Seaforths at the butt end. In the midst of this Lt. Bennett, in full view of the enemy, dashed forward and calling his men to follow, raced around the barbed wire. He was wounded in the head but carried on and disposed his men along the eastern side of the dyke. "D" Company now met the full force of the enemy's fire, but once over the dyke the leading platoon at least had protection. A rapid glance at the situation of the enemy made Bennett realize that Wasps might be extremely useful. He dashed back to company headquarters, described the enemy's positions, and shortly before noon the flamethrowers arrived. Bennett[15] led them down the road and, roaring over the barbed wire, they swung into position beside the line of the enemy's trenches. In naval terms it was like crossing the "T". The hissing roar and fearsome sight of

canal, but particularly from an enemy strongpoint at a railway and road crossing a few hundred yards beyond "A" Company's first objective.

[15] Bennett, who continued to lead his platoon into Hoven although blinded in one eye, was awarded the Military Cross.

the arching liquid flame had the desired effect. As the Wasps advanced up the trench the enemy started to run out the other end of his defensive system and scurried towards the house which the leading platoon of "A" Company had almost surrounded.

This action by the Wasps cleared the last major obstacle to "D" Company's advance. Captain Swinton's platoon, aided by excellent close supporting fire from the self-propelled guns, went straight out for the main road and railway crossing in Hoven and reported themselves on the objective by 1249 hours. Behind them and on the right, Captain Tuck's "A" Company apparently was taken somewhat by surprise at the speed and success of the Wasps. "Enemy evacuating slit trenches towards you. Give 'em hell", Major Mace told Tuck, and added a minute later, "Jerry is running off. Push on, push on!"[16] Tuck needed little urging. As soon as the fire slackened off "A" Company was on its feet, and within minutes it covered the open fields towards the company objective and pressed on to the railroad. Behind them came "B" Company. Major Bassett and his men were ordered to clear out any remaining enemy in the trench system, advance through "A" Company and then swing east along the road leading into Hoven. Inside the town itself "D" Company had spread to the east and west, and before two in the afternoon tanks had reached the centre of town which made it that much easier for the battalion to clear the remnants of the enemy from Hoven in mid-afternoon. This was no push-over, for here and there small bodies of the enemy fought with skill and determination from well-sited positions. The tanks and Wasps were most helpful in winkling out these pockets of resistance south of the railway as the day wore on. A similar situation existed on the Seaforths' right where the Edmontons had pushed south from Voorst towards the railway. They, too, fought all afternoon to get their companies over the railway which the enemy held with considerable tenacity backed up with self-propelled guns.

Not until after dark was the battlefield fairly quiet, but the price of war among both soldiers and civilians was constant. The padre described something of this in his diary at the time:

> Great suffering of shell-wracked civilians. Children in R.A.P. torn, bleeding, dying. Women hear their children crying but they too are stretcher cases and terribly knocked about. I watch and pray with one man as his wife slowly passes away whilst another young woman lies

[16] Intelligence Log, *op. cit.*

> behind us on the verge of death. The poor man has two children in 'no man's land' but can't get to them as Germans fire on Red Cross now. Boys of 16, Jerries, come in as Prisoners of War. They are very cruel, so our boys say, and are less likely to obey Geneva convention re Red Cross than older men. I talk to them. They speak of Russian millions as menace of Europe as a whole and Germany in particular. Dutch greet us with tears of joy. R.A.P. wounded workers brought in after trying to get Jerry wounded as well as our own. I try to cheer up our boys. . . .[17]

The stubbornness of the resistance on the 14th was accountable in large part to the fact that when they drove south from the bridgehead the Seaforths—and indeed the entire brigade—ran into a parachute division. "C" Company's own diarist commented late on the 14th and early on the 15th as follows:

> We took several Jerry prisoners who were paratroopers and very young. The boys treated them pretty well but sternly. We also got a couple of Jerry officers. . . .
>
> Just before C.Q.M.S. Padgett and Joe Swicki arrived with breakfast, we had a Jerry Paratrooper give himself up. He was an Austrian and a better type. Staub talked to him for quite some time in German and his story is as follows:— He had been a Paratrooper for six months. He told us the original Paratroopers are almost inhuman. He told us that during the past 6 months he had seen things which we would not believe. He told us that he had seen his own wounded shot and killed by his own men. . . . He would have given himself up last night but he figured we would be pretty mad and shoot him, so he thought he would wait until this morning.[18]

On the evening of the 14th Major-General H. W. Foster, the divisional commander, visited Brigadier Bogert at the latter's headquarters and outlined the new plan of attack. The 1st Division's troops were to continue to close up to Apeldoorn and would capture it in the next two days. The 2nd Brigade, however, was given the task of clearing the west bank of the Ijssel from the north while a brigade from the British 49th Division would clear the river from Arnhem up to Dieren. Since the other two battalions in the brigade were given the job of forcing the enemy from the river, the Seaforths had a fairly quiet day. The battalion moved west from Hoven to the small village of Empe on the morning of the 15th, and from here patrolled to the northwest, west and southwest in a two mile radius. By foot,

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[17] Seaforths Archives, "Personal Diary of H/Maj. R. C. H. Durnford," 14 April 1945.

[18] Seaforth Archives, "Diary of 'C' Company", entries for 14 and 15 April 1945.

carrier and jeep, sometimes accompanied by a tank, the Seaforths prodded through the flat, open countryside with its neat farmhouses, tree-lined roads and ploughed fields. There was little or no resistance. Here and there a handful of the enemy would be garnered in—men who had become separated from their units as the Canadians pushed the main forces to Apeldoorn. Periodically reports came in of enemy mortars or guns firing into the area, and very shortly a "Fearless Fosdick"[19] would come into sight, slowly circling the suspected area of the gun, and as likely as not causing the enemy gunners to move elsewhere.

Late on 15 April civilians reported that the town of Klarenbeek had been evacuated. Patrols from the Princess Patricias confirmed the report, but before the Seaforths moved to the town a "C" Company patrol entered it just to make sure. Something of the fluidity of the front as well as the reaction of the Dutch people when the Canadians came into the town in force may be gained from the "C" Company diarist:

> Arrived at Klarenbeek at about 1630 hours. We have a nice place, too, in which to stay. The people appeared very happy about us being here. Joe Wilson brought in two Jerry prisoners who gave themselves up at the outskirts of the town. They were older men, and it is believed that most of . . . [the enemy] has retreated to . . . Apeldoorn where the 1st Brigade is having a real tough time of it. The people of the underground were busy rounding up the collaborators. When they were caught, they were marched down to Brigade with people following, always singing the Dutch national anthem. We witnessed many such parades. At the Church, the people and the nuns danced in a circle on the street, like Ring-Around-A-Rosy, singing all kinds of songs. They would grab us and put us in the middle and dance around us. They were most happy.[20]

Further to the south the other battalions had been making good progress, so that by the time the Seaforths were taking up positions west of the town contact was being made in the south with the British. The two huge pincers of the 1st Canadian Corps were beginning to close, and the enemy, although fighting fiercely at selected spots, could not but feel the desperate straits he was in. Apeldoorn was worth fighting for, but in the Seaforths' position, five miles southeast of the city, the enemy just did not have the strength to prevent the

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[19] The term given the Auster aircraft used by artillery observers seeking targets for the guns.

[20] "C" Company Diary, *op. cit.*, 16 April 1945.

brigade from swinging around it which, in turn, helped loosen his hold on the city.

That evening the Seaforths and Princess Patricias were ordered to swing south and west into the forested area south of Apeldoorn. Both units crossed the Aeldoornisch Canal late that evening, and shortly after midnight, following a six mile march from Klarenbeek, the battalion settled down in the forest two miles south of Oosterhuizen.

With the 1st and 3rd Brigades beating down the enemy's resistance in Apeldoorn, and owing to the wide open gaps in his defences on the 2nd Brigade's front, Brigadier Bogert was determined to push his battalions hard towards Barneveld, some 18 miles due west. Thus scarcely had the sun crept over the horizon when a patrol from Captain Tuck's company probed about two miles to the west where they rounded up about twenty prisoners whom they found hiding in the woods. As soon as the area was reported clear the Seaforths moved to the new area which brought them astride the main highway leading north to Apeldoorn, then in the process of being completely liberated.

By the 17th the brigade was really beginning to stretch its legs in a way it had hardly experienced before. The enemy was on the run and he was to be kept running. Thus no sooner had Major Mace established his headquarters on the highway than a reconnaissance patrol from "D" Company reported that it had penetrated as far as Hoenderlo, three miles further to the west. It was free of enemy, although some were enountered when the patrol, probing northwest, was met by enemy fire near another road leading out from Apeldoorn. Major Mace sent his companies towards the new location, using trucks where possible to carry the men, so that by suppertime the battalion was over six miles from the area it held the previous day. Moreover word came from Brigade Headquarters that the Seaforths must be ready to move again soon. Such indeed, was the case. The race to Barneveld was on, and reading the message log of Brigade Headquarters for the date almost reminds one of listening to the radio report of a horse race. There were no reports of flanks, no cautionary advice regarding enemy retaliatory fire, and no report of any serious resistance. Advances were thought of in terms of miles, not yards, and the main problem was how to leapfrog the companies and even battalions with fairly limited transport. Towns and villages, farmland and forest were probed and passed. Sleep was something

to be snatched if and when possible. Ahead of the divisional front the enemy, withdrawing steadily westward, were meeting with the forward elements of the 5th Canadian Armoured Division which, by this time, was beyond Barneveld and striking hard towards the coast to seal the enemy in a huge trap.

For the Seaforths the 17th and 18th were like a training film about pursuit being played at a very fast rate. After being mobbed by the happy inhabitants of Hoenderlo shortly after noon the unit pushed through the forests to the west and that evening temporarily occupied an army camp which the Germans had used twenty-four hours previously. After a hot meal the Seaforths were ordered forward again, so the reconnaissance parties were on their way to check the route before the main body followed. It was a cold, very foggy night, and when the battalion loaded the vehicles and set off again through the blackness, the potential for ambush was such as to scare the veterans even despite the obvious disintegration of the enemy. By the early morning of the 18th the Seaforths pulled off the road about a mile from Barneveld. The Edmontons were on the other side of it, while the Patricias were east of the Seaforths. To the north Major-General Hoffmeister's 5th Canadian Armoured Division was completing the task of sealing the gap by reaching the Ijsselmeer where another British Columbian regiment, the British Columbia Dragoons, had occasion to have some of its tanks shoot out to sea to discourage enemy troops attempting to flee by boat to the north.

For the next two days the Seaforths were able to rest. The entire brigade had been on the go for a week, and in the last four days especially the constant moves and consequent lack of sleep made the brief rest that much more appreciated. Situated midway between Barneveld and Voorsthuizen there was little to do except sleep and eat, and wait for the next movement orders. For the first time in days many Seaforths had a chance to listen to the news over the wireless. Everywhere great advances were being made. At about the time when the 1st Canadian Division had crossed over the Ijssel, the 8th Army had started its attack over the Senio River in the Po Valley. It was now advancing rapidly up the Po and in two weeks' time German resistance in Italy was to collapse. On the Eastern Front the Russians were hammering at the gates of Berlin, and on the Western Front the British and American armies were overrunning huge areas of Germany. In the area for which the First Canadian Army was responsible the story was the same. To the northeast the 2nd Corps had

liberated most of northern Holland and were close to the Leda River. On the 1st Corps front the Canadians and the British 49th (West Riding) Division had not only clamped shut the huge pincer movement from the south and east at Barenveld, but by 20 April it had cleared the entire area west of the Ijssel to a line running from Renkum north to Nijkerk to the sea.

Although great advances had been made and most of The Netherlands had been liberated, the northwestern section of the country was still under German control. In this area were the great cities of Amsterdam and Rotterdam where millions of Dutch civilians, close to starvation, were still under the heel of the Germans as they had been since 1940. The desire by the Allied Commanders to liberate this area of The Netherlands had to be balanced against the destruction which could be caused by the Germans defending it. They might not only flood large sections of the territory, but if they fought to retain the cities there would be no doubt that many civilians would be killed and tens of millions of dollars of damage done by shelling and bombing. Moreover the enemy had established a defensive line—the "Grebbe Line"—running from Nijkerk and Amersfoort south to the Waal River. Under the circumstances Field-Marshal Montgomery had directed his forces to the north and northeast so that by 18 April the 1st Canadian Corps stood roughly along the Grebbe Line behind which stood the 88th and 30th Corps of the German Twenty-fifth Army. The civilian head of this part of occupied Holland was the iniquitous Reichskommissar Seyss-Inquart. It had been suggested to him that, on humanitarian grounds, relief shipments of food should be delivered into the area to feed the starving civilian population. The Reichskommissar, evidently, thought in terms of the Allied forces stopping at the Grebbe Line while these supplies were delivered, and that the forces under his command would continue to control the area until Germany was defeated. Unsatisfactory as this was, General Eisenhower recommended that negotiations to this effect be undertaken, and on 28 April the first meeting between Allied and German representatives took place.[21] Meanwhile the 1st Canadian Corps, having sealed off the Twenty-fifth Army, was ordered to patrol towards but not penetrate the Grebbe Line. As it turned out the Corps' thrust from the Ijssel to Barneveld was its last offensive operation.

[21] Stacey, *op. cit.*, pp 584-585.

The end of major operations for the 1st Corps did not mean the end of the fighting on the Corps' front, although the scale of contact with the enemy was reduced to patrol activity. For the Seaforths, acquaintance with the hide-and-seek patrol activity on this front came on 21 April when the battalion moved to take up billets in a number of farm houses about two miles south of Barneveld. In the flat farmlands to the west lay the Grebbe Line, and between this line and the forward battalions was a no-man's-land which the Canadians were determined to dominate by active patrols. Typical of these was one taken out by Captain R. George, who had taken over the carrier platoon. Shortly after arriving in the new area, Captain George took out a section from his platoon and a section of the Saskatoon Light Infantry who had their medium machine-guns mounted on Seaforth carriers. After patrolling about two miles to the southwest about a dozen enemy were sighted and fired upon. They withdrew and the patrol continued on its rounds.

Each patrol was almost a unique experience in itself. Sometimes the enemy was met, sometimes not. If met he was always engaged. Some were killed, some wounded and not infrequently a few were captured. On one occasion "C" Company captured an entire enemy patrol which rode into its area on bicycles. Sometimes a mortar crew with its weapon would be taken along in a carrier to engage any target that might appear. Not infrequently Seaforth patrols would be engaged, and during this period a number of Seaforths were killed or wounded.

On the 23rd the battalion moved two miles further west to the small village of De Glindhorst and here the usual, though strange routine was kept up. It was strange in that on the one hand the battalion's quarters and living conditions were better than those it had normally enjoyed when out of the line in Italy. At the same time those on patrol, going through country physically almost untouched by war, could expect to encounter the enemy at any twist in the road. One such confrontation on 25 April is described quite vividly by the "C" Company diarist whose company was involved. The entire brigade was leaning hard towards the Grebbe Line, first by patrols and then by occupying the area it dominated. On the 24th a strong patrol led by Captain George encountered numerous enemy in a wood two miles west of De Glindhorst, and Major Mace decided to clear them out by sending in "C" Company with tank support. The diarist wrote:

> The Coy. moved off . . . at 1000 hrs. We were trailed by our Despatch Rider, Montgomery and the Artillery Carrier, then 4 tanks from the Three Rivers Regiment. The idea . . . was to clear a large brush area, where a Carrier Patrol yesterday was shot at and "Frenchy" French, one of the old carrier drivers, killed.
>
> At the start line . . . we waited in the ditch along side of the road while they called down artillery fire into the woods just prior to our attack. Just prior to this a small contact patrol was sent in to learn where the enemy was located. They saw Jerry, but he was just watching our every move and waiting for the next. After the artillery barrage the tanks went forward with us.
>
> The first group of farm buildings, which was our first objective, was set on fire. The second objective was also set on fire, it too being a group of buildings. A small contact patrol was sent out to see what was around the 3rd objective and here the boys ran into trouble. Spotted by Jerry, they were fired on from a house on either side of the road. They retraced their steps towards the Coy and when going over an obstacle on the road, Cpl. Myles, who was the last of the patrol, was shot. . . . He fell into the ditch. . . . Blystone, who was with him couldn't do anything for him but remained with him for half an hour. The patrol returned to the wooded area. While the patrol was out, Jerry threw in a lot of mortar shells into the wooded area which did some damage to us. Pte. Votary was killed and Pte. Mackenzie, whose stay with us was only 24 hours, was wounded.[22]

Patrols of this nature, together with the more numerous smaller "contact" patrols, were greatly assisted not only by information supplied by Dutch civilians in the area but by members of the Dutch forces. A platoon of twenty-five civilian volunteers had been attached to each company of the Seaforths, three days previously. They were equipped with the same battledress, equipment and weapons as the Canadians, and quickly absorbed the basic lessons of field training to the extent that they were soon accompanying patrols probing to the west. Many had served for years in the Dutch Underground, and their eagerness to pay back the enemy, especially the Dutch collaborators, made them valuable allies.

One of the first Dutchmen to join the unit as an interpreter after the Ijssel River crossing was Rutger D. Bleeker. He was a university student who for several months had been going from one hiding place to another to escape the Gestapo. Of this particular period Mr. Bleeker wrote later:

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[22] "C" Company War Diary, *op. cit.*, 25 April 1945. This was the last serious encounter with the enemy by the Seaforths during the war.

. . . We started out early with a dozen or more Bren Carriers, under the command of Captain George, and moved on to a farm about 3 miles from the Grebbe Line called Midden Romselaar, which was on fire. We had some sniper fire, and near the farm I convinced a group of Dutch farmers who didn't want to retire, to do so for their own safety. At that point a much heavier fighting patrol, reinforced by Sherman tanks and Bren and flame thrower carriers, took over our position and moved farther forward, under the command of Captain Sir Allan MacKenzie. He saw no need for me to come, but after half an hour he sent a despatch rider, Buck Berry, to fetch me. We had to jump off and take cover twice during the trip, because we came under mortar fire, and finally he delivered me to Captain MacKenzie's Company, which was digging in in an acre about a mile from the Grebbe Line, just out of view of the enemy position, and which just had come under unpleasantly accurate mortar fire. Sir Allan asked me to join Corporal Miles on a reconnaissance patrol to a farm about halfway between our position and the Grebbe Line, named Romselaar, where according to his information several farmers were in distress.

We started at once, took a narrow road through the bushes first, and had to cross a barrier of a fallen tree. The Dutch farmers had told me it was mined, I told Corporal Miles so but he said "just walk right in my footsteps and you'll be alright". We got across safely, and crouched to the edge of the wood, where we came in full view of the farm and of the enemy bunkers of the Grebbe Line. The road ahead ran straight to the farm, there were undeep ditches on both sides, and pastures offering no cover at all.

We had only gone several yards when a murderous machine gun fire broke loose. We both fell in the ditch, my helmet fell on the road and was soon pierced, I also dropped my rifle. Corporal Miles was killed at once, shot through the head. I could not even carry him back, he was later found by a Red Cross carrier.

I managed to collect my rifle and crouched back through the ditch, into the wood, past the tree barrier, trying to remember how I had crossed it first. It didn't explode—yet, it went up a few minutes later when some cows frightened by the incessant mortar fire, ran into it and set the mines off, they were probably anti-vehicle or anti-tank mines and didn't react on my weight. I hurried back to Captain MacKenzie, whom I told the bad news.[22a]

By the 28th, the Seaforths as well as the other battalions in the brigade were patrolling to within two or three miles of Amersfoort and thus probing the outer defences of the Grebbe Line. Immediately north of the Seaforths' positions was the village of Achterveld, occupied by the Princess Patricias. During the last few days, while the

[22a] Seaforth Archives, "Battle Accounts—The Netherlands", Letter, R. D. Bleeker to Mr. Wilf Gildersleeve July 1968.

Canadians continued their vigorous patrolling, negotiations with Reichskommissar Seyss-Inquart had resulted in the Germans agreeing to meet Allied representatives in a schoolhouse at Achterveld on the 28th to discuss the problem of feeding the Dutch civilians west of the Grebbe Line. On the evening of the 27th Brigadier Bogert ordered an end to offensive fire along the brigade front which came into effect on the morning of the 28th. This "cease fire", in effect, was to last several days and in fact ended hostilities for the 1st Canadian Infantry Division. The meeting by the high German and Allied commanders on the 28th was followed by several further discussions on the terms of entry of foodstuffs, coal and medical supplies into the Western Netherlands by land, sea and air. After exerting some pressure, fairly rapid arrangements were made to start moving the thousands of tons of supplies into the area.

During this period the Seaforths' front remained quiet and those who could took the opportunity to improve their living conditions. For those in the field it was soon found that after only a short period of rain their slit trenches began to fill with water. Consequently it was found necessary to construct sandbagged defences above ground and camouflage them as best they could. The furloughs to the United Kingdom continued on a rotating basis, and for those confined to the battalion area the Auxiliary Services supervisor, Mr. A. Lawrence, did his best to provide cinema shows and other forms of relaxation for those not on duty. What the Seaforth war diarist termed "the Sitzkrieg" continued on into May, but the new month was to bring with it tremendous news. Late on the 1st the British Broadcasting Corporation announced the death of Adolph Hitler, an announcement which made the attached Dutch soldiers far more jubilant than the Seaforths who accepted the fact with rather calm pleasure. In the next few days, however, the reports came in thick and fast. The Russians now occupied Berlin, and on 3 May word was received of the German surrender in Italy. Then on 4 May, at 2037 hours, there came the tremendous news that all German forces in North Germany, Denmark, and The Netherlands had surrendered unconditionally. The ceasefire was to go into effect at 0800 hours on 8 May. "The news spread as if by magic," wrote the war diarist, "and soon civilians were out on the roads, shouting and shaking hands with all and sundry."[23] When darkness fell the skies were lit up at intervals by

[23] W.D., Seaforth Highlanders of Canada, 4 May 1945.

Very lights and flares of various kinds, and now and then some anti-aircraft battery in the rear would fire tracer rounds which arched high into the air. Within the battalion itself, however, there was no spontaneous outburst of either joy or relief that the war was just about over. A few shot off rifles or emptied a magazine from their Sten gun into the ground as if to relieve their feelings. Perhaps it was partly because the platoons were scattered around the rain-soaked countryside, perhaps it was owing to the fact that in the past month the inevitability of Germany's surrender was obvious or it might have been owing in part to the fact that the local ceasefire, which had been in force for a week, took the edge off the celebration. Whatever it was, the Seaforths accepted the news calmly and indeed many of the older veterans who had served for six years found it difficult to believe that at long last it was all over. However, despite the initial calm, the Seaforths were soon to be in the midst of the wildest rejoicing which took place anywhere in Europe.

On the 6th and 7th of May, as news of the extent of the German collapse continued to come in, plans were being laid for the role of the 1st Canadian Infantry Division after the general ceasefire. A few minutes after nine on the morning of the 7th, Brigade Headquarters informed the Seaforths that the unconditional surrender of Germany to the Allies had been signed and would come into effect a minute after midnight on the 8th. All offensive action was to cease. Later the same day[24] the Commanding Officer called an "O" Group to inform them that early on the 8th the unit was to travel directly to Amsterdam as part of the division's takeover from the German 30th Corps. The enemy was still armed but once the Canadians arrived the Germans were to move into certain designated areas preparatory to being marched back into Germany.

The whole battalion was up and ready to go shortly after daybreak, and as the long column of vehicles left De Glindhorst the entire village was on hand to wave farewell. As the convoy passed through Amersfoort, Baarn and Bussum it began to take on the aspect of a triumphant march. At 1015 hours the head of the column reached the outskirts of Amsterdam. For five long years the people there had waited patiently for this day, and their pent-up emotions burst over the Seaforths, the first regiment to enter their town. The

[24] Lt-Col. Bell-Irving arrived to take command of the battalion late on 7 May.

scene may best be described by those who were there. Lt-Col. Bell-Irving wrote:

> Tuesday—'V' Day—was clear and lovely. . . . We had one squadron of P.L.D.G. armoured cars etc. under command, so my force totalled about a thousand men and two or three hundred vehicles. No other fighting troops were near us, so it was our show entirely. . . . As the convoy entered the city there must have been half a million people throwing beautiful flowers at us. An old lady, handing me a bunch of roses, said from the very bottom of her soul 'Thank God, at last you've come.'
>
> The universal happiness amounted to an ecstasy which I have never seen even approached in any crowd before. Before this, few of our men could have given a clear reason why they came. . . . But here in Amsterdam, in one day, all that was changed. . . . Every life lost, every long day away from home, had been spent in a good and necessary endeavour.[25]

The unit's war diarist reported:

> Waiting for us were thousands of people of all ages, lining the sidewalks and encroaching on the roadway to such an extent that the convoy was forced to slow down and finally stop. Immediately every vehicle was smothered under a mountain of humanity. Every part of a vehicle offering support or a hand-hold was used. . . . However, there was no scraping them off and it was with the greatest difficulty that the convoy was able to move again under the guidance of a member of the N.B.S. . . . We were led by a very circuitous route to the Vondelspark . . . where the swarming civilians were gradually herded out. . . .[26]

In the convoy was Padre Durnford who wrote in his diary:

> Amsterdam. Thousands upon thousands upon thousands line the streets for four miles. Flowers—roses, tulips, and every sort. Crowds load every vehicle including our R.A.P. jeep. I stand on running board. *Terrific welcome.* Nothing like it in history of Holland. They tell in broken English with tears and unbridled joy how thankful they are to us. Children are lovely. Terrible shortage of food. . . .[27]

An N.C.O. in "C" Company added:

> The reception we received from the population along the entire route was something we'll always remember. On the outskirts of the city the people mobbed the vehicles. . . . It was more than your life was worth to pull out cigarettes. . . . All evening crowds were thronging around our billets. . . . When a soldier steps out of a house dozens of children mob him for his signature.[28]

And as the Adjutant wrote home a few days later, summing up the

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[25] Seaforth Archives, "Operation Accounts, May, 1945", Typescript manuscript, Letter from Lt-Col. Bell-Irving to ?, 11 May 1945.

[26] W.D., Seaforth Highlanders of Canada, 8 May 1945.

[27] Durnford Diary, *op. cit.*, 8 May 1945.

[28] "C" Company Diary, *op. cit.*, 8 - 9 May 1945.

feeling of most Seaforths: "There were flags and streamers and smiles and cheers and everywhere such obvious happiness as to stir the soul most deeply. . . ."[29]

The tremendously warm affection of the citizens of Amsterdam for the Seaforths was expressed in innumerable ways in the weeks which followed. Invitations to homes and parties were so numerous for all ranks as to be almost an embarrassment. Delegations from church, state and municipal bodies expressed their delight to the liberators, formally and informally, and very quickly a strong bond of attachment grew between the citizens and the Seaforths which went beyond the feeling of gratitude for being liberated. On the afternoon of 10 May Lt-Col. Bell-Irving addressed a huge gathering of over 35,000 people in Dam Square during which he described how pleased and honoured the Seaforths were to be the first troops to enter and liberate Amsterdam, and expressing, too, the mutual delight of the Canadians with the Dutch that Hitler's long reign of terror was ended. It was, wrote the Intelligence Officer, ". . . one of the finest addresses Col. Bell-Irving had ever given", an opinion which was supported by the thunderous cheers given by his audience. It was also a fitting climax in another sense, for two days later the Commanding Officer was promoted to Brigadier to command the 10th Canadian Infantry Brigade. His place was taken by Lt-Col. D. M. Clark, who had been second-in-command of the Seaforths in Italy and, more recently, had been on the staff of Headquarters, 11th Canadian Infantry Brigade.

During the following weeks the pace of both work and play was almost exhausting. Inside the city were thousands of armed Germans who had to be concentrated, disarmed, guarded and prepared for their march back to Germany. The Canadians were in charge of the city and, although there was no problem with respect to police action, etc., night and day patrols were established, huge dumps of materials had to be guarded, and there were innumerable administrative details to be ironed out respecting the slow but sure turnover of control to the civil authorities.[30] The requests and suggestions of

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[29] Letter, Captain R. L. McDougall to his mother, 18 May 1945. Many Seaforths commented on the semi-starvation of the people. It was a common sight to see a civilian faint from hunger. Many had died from malnutrition, especially the older citizens.

[30] The first few days were the most difficult. Dutch civilians sometimes sniped

civilians were, understandably, more than the Seaforths could possibly cope with even had they the facilities to do so. Requests for vehicles, demands for the arrest of collaborators, inquiries regarding passes, information about the location of Germans dressed as civilians, and so forth flowed into Battalion Headquarters on the one hand while on the other orders and instructions poured in from Brigade Headquarters regarding its new and very complex role as liberators, administrators and garrison troops.

While this activity was going on, and while the companies were being distributed around the city to be better able to accomplish its numerous tasks, the Seaforths' evenings were equally full. The dances and cinema shows arranged by the Auxiliary Services could now be held in proper dance halls and theatres, and it was a rare Seaforth who did not have a Dutch girl to escort to these affairs. Officers and Sergeants messes and a battalion canteen were reestablished in excellent quarters, and here, too, some of the hospitality of the Dutch people could be repaid. Every day brought some further advance towards "peacetime soldiering". Almost everyone had his own arrangement for getting his clothes cleaned and pressed — frequently for one bar of soap. A package of cigarettes could "buy" services of various types far above their legitimate cost in Dutch guilders, and items in parcels sent from Canada could be traded at a price ten times their original cost. Whatever the means used, the end result was an obvious smartening-up in the men's dress which went somewhat beyond the C.O.'s orders. Thus at the impressive memorial service on 23 May at Ooster Park Kerk, the Seaforths' appearance as they paraded through the streets of Amsterdam was as smart as if they had marched from barracks in England in 1940. Naturally Mr. B. C. Sweeney, the Regimental Sergeant Major, contributed to this renewed emphasis on military dress, drill and deportment. However, the men preferred to be smart rather than sloppy, and for most it was a matter of having the opportunity now to be able to get regular haircuts, polish their boots and press their uniforms.

With the end of May there began an internal change or turnover of personnel in the battalion which was to continue for the

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at the Germans, and great restraint had to be employed by both sides to prevent a dangerous situation becoming uncontrollable. Disarming the Dutch underground fighters was also a problem since many feared a Communist takeover.

next several months. It had been decided by higher authority that a serviceman would be returned to civil life on a priority determined by his length of service. This, in turn, was based on his time in Canada as well as overseas, and figuring out one's number of points became of absorbing interest to many Seaforths. At the end of May the first small draft of officers, non-commissioned officers and men — all of whom, naturally, were "old timers" with the battalion, left on the first stage of their journey back to Canada. These drafts continued with periodic regularity so that, although many were replaced by reinforcements, the strength of the unit dwindled noticeably.

The number of new faces among the ranks also increased as Seaforths began to volunteer for the Canadian Army Pacific Force, a formation being organized in Canada designed to fight with Allied forces against the Japanese. Commanded by a former Seaforth, Major-General B. M. Hoffmeister, the C.A.P.F. attracted a fair number of veterans from the battalion who, as it turned out, never served in the Far East as the Empire of Japan surrendered before the Canadian formation left Canada. The first of several C.A.P.F. drafts left the unit on 6 June under the command of Major S. Lynch, MC, and by the end of the month about one hundred all ranks had volunteered for this service.

The loss of these experienced men was keenly felt, but many of them were still on hand on 10 June to take part in a divisional parade at Rotterdam. This was a most impressive demonstration of the division's strength, not only of men, but of hundreds of guns, vehicles, carriers, armoured cars, self-propelled guns and other military equipment which most men in the battalion had never seen all together at one spot. It took close to two hours for this demonstration of armed power to pass, even though the infantry battalions marched eight abreast. The marching troops were led by the Pipes and Drums of the Seaforth Highlanders of Canada and the 48th Highlanders of Canada under Pipe Major Esson.[31] It was a memorable experience for those taking part in it, but at the same time everyone was happy when it was over.

The saddest event in Amsterdam was the leaving of it. The Seaforths quarters had been very good, the people exceptionally kind, and the entertainment within the city available to all ranks had been such that frequently those who could go on furlough to London

[31] Who now wore his M.B.E. ribbon but no longer his beard.

had second thoughts before accepting. However, on 19 June the Seaforths were moved to the small rural village of Maartinsdijk, located midway between Utrecht and Hilversum. It was a pleasant spot, somewhat like the south of England but flat, criss-crossed with dykes and water ditches, and with little local entertainment potential except for a nearby lake. Hilversum and Utrecht were not far away. however, and there were numerous opportunities to send men away on leave, both to the United Kingdom and to such places as Paris, Brussels and Amsterdam.

The slow decrease in the strength of the Seaforths was further aggravated by additional drafts going to the Canadian Army Occupation Force. Those going on these drafts were primarily "low point" men, and their loss was only partially made up by "high point" men from other units. This constant changeover placed a strain on the morale of the battalion but the effort made to keep the men busy and content offset any deterioration in the unit's *esprit de corps*. There were numerous inter-company and inter-battalion sports, and unit transport to the larger cities was fairly liberal quite aside from longer furloughs. Military training was at a minimum, but there were numerous, well-attended lectures on rehabilitation and on vocational training which would be available to the servicemen after demobilization. One task which kept many busy during the end of June was the greasing and packing of weapons. First all the heavy weapons were dealt with, but rifles and bayonets were among the last, so that when the unit took part in the huge Dutch-Canadian Parade in Amsterdam[32] on 28 June, all the men had was their personal arms. Early in July, however, even these were processed for packing. Rifles, Bren guns, Sten guns, and even steel helmets and ammunition were piled and stacked in the Quartermaster Stores ready for transport to Ordnance Depots in Nijmegen. In mid-month the unit began to turn in its vehicles, but fortunately this did not take place until after the Seaforth Highlanders of Canada joined with the 2nd, 5th, 6th and 7th Battalions of Seaforth Highlanders for one last, glorious get-together at Cuxhaven. A little over one hundred of the Canadian

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[32] The massed pipe bands were under the leadership of Pipe Major E. Esson. "Later that evening," wrote the war diarist, "a surprise birthday party was given for our 'Pipes' at which no fewer than fourteen Cdn. Pipe Majors were present." (W.D., Seaforth Highlanders of Canada, 28 June 1945.)

Seaforths were able to make the trip for the three days of sports and festivities. The spectacle of the 100-strong massed Seaforths Pipes and Drums alone was worth the trip.

Despite the furloughs, the weekend passes and the recreational facilities made available to the battalion, there was an increasing desire on the part of all ranks to return to Canada and resume civilian life which, for some, had been interrupted six years earlier. As long as the war lasted the overwhelming desire to destroy the enemy and the consciousness of being on a great crusade had been a unifying factor which had kept everyone's mind on the goal to be achieved. With the end of the war, however, thoughts turned towards home and marking time in The Netherlands was becoming tedious.

Equally anxious to have the Seaforths return were the relatives of the men in Canada, and in July rumours began to circulate in Vancouver that the battalion might be home by the end of August. Actually it was not until this time that the Seaforths left The Netherlands for the United Kingdom, and some weeks were to pass before the men boarded the *Ile de France* for the return trip to Canada. There was a strong desire by all those in Vancouver connected with the regiment to make the battalion's return to the city a memorable one, and with that in mind a meeting of ex-Commanding Officers of the regiment met at the home of the Honorary Lieutenant-Colonel, J. A. Clark, to prepare a reception for the unit.

Planning and organizing the welcome for the Seaforths was to take hundreds of hours of work for the next two months, but the end result of it was to be very worth while. The basic idea was that the overseas battalion, arriving at the Canadian Pacific Railway depot, would parade through downtown Vancouver to the Seaforth Armoury where they would be dismissed in a brief, formal ceremony.

It would be tedious to recount all the trials and frustrations which were overcome to meet this object, but all parts of the regimental family were so involved and put in so much labour that something of their effort should be described if even briefly. Both the 2nd (Reserve) Battalion and the Seaforth Cadets were to be on hand to greet the overseas unit, and both prepared enthusiastically for it. The cadets, under Major W. L. Waldie, had excelled at home in their own sphere as much as had the battalion in Europe on the field of battle. They had won the Earl Grey Trophy, symbolic of the cadet championship of Canada, for three years running, and their drill, discipline and appearance were every bit as smart as that of their seniors. The

Women's Auxiliary was given the responsibility for providing a lunch for an estimated three thousand people — the veterans and their relatives — who would congregate in the Armoury after the unit was dismissed on the parade square outside. Ten thousand sandwiches and hundreds of gallons of tea, coffee and ice cream were but one facet of the preparations which had to be made. For the relatives of veterans from points outside Vancouver arrangements had to be made for hotel or private accommodations, and, of course, invitations and instructions were mailed to thousands regarding such details as routes, parking, timings, and so forth.

The time when the battalion would arrive was in itself problematical. Also, would the unit come by C.P.R. or C.N.R.? Would it come in one or two trains, and if the latter, could arrangements be made to have both arrive at the same time? Suggestions were made that the battalion should be presented with the King's and Regimental Colours at Kamloops and parade them through Vancouver. Then in September General Clark heard that there were almost 250 ex-Seaforth veterans at Camp Shilo, Manitoba, who wished to be present for the homecoming. These officers and men, who were part of the Canadian Army Pacific Force, were due for discharge, and from Clark's office, by this time close to resembling a Seaforth Tactical Headquarters, letters and telegrams poured out to make the necessary arrangements.[33]

When the Seaforths left Southampton on the *Ile de France* at the end of September, the last flurry of arrangements were being tidied up for the unit's return. Mayor J. W. Cornett of Vancouver declared that 7 October would be "Seaforth Day", and flags and bunting were hung up along Granville, Georgia and Burrard streets, the route of the unit's parade. In the city's newspapers there were daily acounts from correspondents accompanying the two trains bearing the Seaforths steadily westward. There were, of course, the last arrangements to be made but finally the great day arrived. On Sunday, 7 October, the Seaforths arrived in Vancouver early in the afternoon, and for the next few hours they received a tumultuous reception which equalled that of the Royal Visit in 1939. An estimated 100,000 people thronged the route, and the city police and military

[33] Fortunately General Clark has a wide circle of friends, both political and military. Assisting him in Ottawa were Major E. D. Fulton, M.P., Lt-Col. C. C. I. Merritt, V.C., M.P., and Major-General G. R. Pearkes, V.C., M.P.

provost had a difficult time opening up a lane wide enough for the troops to pass. Marching six abreast, and led by the Pipes and Drums, they formed an impressive sight as they marched through the crowds of people who cheered themselves hoarse. Over 100 officers and N.C.Os. wore the kilt as, of course, did the entire Pipe Band. Forward through the sea of humanity the Seaforths marched, and as they neared the old Vancouver Hotel where Seaforth veterans of the Great War and many Seaforths' relatives were assembled, the cheering grew in volume. Passing the Georgia Hotel, where Lieutenant Governor W. C. Woodward was on the saluting stand, the Seaforths' band broke into the "Pibroch of Donald Dhu", and then the column swung left on Burrard towards the Armoury.

The sight of the battalion led by the Pipes and Drums coming over the Burrard Bridge would never be forgotten. In perfect step, with kilts swinging to the skirl of "Scotland the Brave", with colours flying and the cheering from the crowds growing even louder, the battalion swung into the huge parade ground behind the Armoury. Here the entire regiment lined up — both battalions, the cadets, the overseas veterans who marched with the returning unit. Surrounding the square were the men's families and relatives whom they had not seen in years, yet the discipline was such that no one broke ranks. The formalities were exceedingly brief — a few one-minute welcome speeches by several dignitaries, a brief reply by Lt-Col. D. M. Clark, and then the order "Dismiss". There was hardly an instant's pause before the Seaforths on the parade square were engulfed as veterans and civilians merged in an indescribable scene of happiness. The Seaforths were home.

CHAPTER XIV

The Post-War Era

When the overseas battalion arrived back in Vancouver, the Seaforth Highlanders entered a new phase of their history. The two decades following 1945 were to be quite different in many respects from the post-1919 era when, generally speaking, the role of the militia was considered to be similar to that which existed at the turn of the century. The striking changes which came about as the result of the Second World War were to have a great impact on Canada. As a consequence the roles of the Active and Reserve Forces were to be changed and modified periodically as Canadian politicians and statesmen strove to promote the principles in the charter of the United Nations, while realizing at the same time the defences of Canada must never be allowed to reach the abyss of unpreparedness which was typical of the pre-war period. Considerable attention has been paid already to the activities of the Seaforth Highlanders of Canada as a regiment in the Non-Permanent Active Militia in the inter-war years. Many of these routine activities continued after the war. It is intended here to describe primarily some of the new problems and situations which had to be faced in the post-war world under conditions which, from a military point of view, were as different from those of the Twenties and Thirties as a machine-gun is from a flint-lock rifle.

The new age was ushered in by the explosion of the atomic bomb over Hiroshima on 6 August 1945. The tremendous destructive potential of this new weapon of war was so great and had such far-reaching implications that, as the years went by, Canada's military

policy shifted periodically to take into account the role it should play. The scientific and technological advances made in weaponry, and especially in the ability to deliver the atom bomb, outstripped men's political progress towards peace. As a result the Canadian armed forces received more attention than ever before. The nation's pre-war isolationism and neutralism in external matters gave way to a policy of involvement in world affairs and a keen awareness that, if for no reason other than geography, Canada no longer lived in a fireproof house far from the flames of war.

During the last year of the Second World War consideration had been given to the organization of the post-war armed forces and in January, 1946, the new shape of the army was made public. Canadian land forces were to be called the Canadian Army, which in turn was to be divided into an Active Force, a Reserve Force and a Supplementary Reserve. The Active Force was not to exceed 25,000 all ranks, or about five times the pre-war permanent force. The Reserve Force was not to exceed 180,000 all ranks. It was to consist of six infantry divisions, four armoured brigades and selected corps and army troops. Within Canada there were to be five operational commands (Western, Prairie, Central, Quebec and Eastern Canada), and these in turn were divided into areas. Thus Western Command, with its headquarters in Edmonton, included a British Columbia Area with headquarters in Vancouver. Among the reserve infantry regiments in this area were the Rocky Mountain Rangers, the Seaforth Highlanders of Canada and the Canadian Scottish Regiment which were to form part of the 15th Infantry Brigade (Reserve). The Reserve Force, in general, was to provide the basis for the organization of a field force in the event of an emergency. The reserve regiments were to fill their ranks with volunteers who, as in pre-war days, were to be employed on a part-time basis and subject to annual military training. One major improvement in the new organization was that provision was made for Active Force administrative and training staffs to be made available to Reserve Force units to permit commanding officers to concentrate on the training of their men.

In many respects the Seaforths were very fortunate when, in 1946, they prepared to resume their duties and responsibilities. The regiment had established an excellent wartime reputation for itself; it had a first class armoury; it had the promise of a full-time Active Force officer and one or two N.C.Os. to help in the Orderly Room and Quartermaster Stores, and the cadets and wartime reserve bat-

talion continued to function without interruption as did the Women's Auxiliary and Seaforth Association. Thus there was no need to build from scratch, but rather to continue on a firm foundation already established.

One of the first tasks was to reorganize the post-war unit. At the end of the war Lt-Col. D. R. Blair commanded the reserve battalion which had provided hundreds of men to the overseas battalion as well as to other overseas units. Many officers and men in the reserve battalion had carried on their duties at home because their age, medical category or occupations were such as to prevent them from serving overseas. Many were now willing to step down and have younger men fill their places. It was natural, too, that the commanding officer of the reorganized unit would wish to have as many veteran officers, N.C.Os. and men in the battalion as he could. They were both trained and proven, and preference was given to them in almost every instance.[1]

In mid-February Lt-Col. Blair, whose tenure of command did not end until May, expressed the desire to retire earlier so that the new commanding officer would be able to take over the unit in time to prepare it for summer camp. He felt there were many suitable officers available from the overseas battalion who were qualified and had the necessary leadership qualities. As a result Col. J. D. Forin[2] was appointed as his successor, and the regiment took its first post-war steps under the command of an officer who had served with it for many years and who had last led it in action at San Leonardo.

One of the primary problems of a reserve regiment is to maintain as high a percentage of its established strength as possible. This was an early task of Lt-Col. Forin as well as that of his successors. In the immediate post-war years interest in the reserve forces was rather limited. Most of the veterans were concerned primarily with re-establishing themselves in civilian life, and with young families to support they found their spare time fully occupied. Many joined the Seaforth Association or would attend annual reunions, but the idea of "peacetime soldiering" had little appeal. For those who were inter-

[1] This caused a considerable amount of resentment among some of the officers and men who had served on the home front during the war. It was a situation by no means unique with the Seaforths.

[2] Colonel Forin reverted to Lt-Col. to take command and his second-in-command, Lt-Col. D. M. Clark, reverted to the rank of major.

ested in the army, and there was a considerable number, there existed the opportunity to remain in the Active Army and make it their career. Fortunately there was a small but solid core of former officers and N.C.Os. who were willing to serve with the Seaforths, and it was around this group, most of whom were from the overseas battalion, that the reorganized regiment was formed.

During the post-war years the Seaforths' strength grew slowly until the Korean War period, and after this the average strength was about 32 officers and 215 other ranks. By March, 1966, the regiment was the strongest among the reserve units in British Columbia.[3] To maintain this average strength was not easy, despite the fact that the Department of National Defence was fairly liberal with funds for advertising the Reserve Forces in the press, on the radio, by printing brochures, and so forth. In 1951, when many veterans enlisted in the army after its rapid expansion owing to the Korean conflict and the raising of the 27th Canadian Infantry Brigade for service in Europe, the strength of all reserve units was low. When recruits were questioned why they enlisted, it turned out that advertising was having little impact. Most recruits claimed that they joined because of friends already in the unit or were attracted by items in the newspapers describing unit events. In June, 1955, the Commanding Officer, Lt-Col. A. W. Gray, wrote to the Honorary Lieutenant-Colonel noting that the strength of the unit at the time was 285 all ranks, but at the same time he felt that many more could be enlisted. Some of the reasons he put forth explaining the "low" strength were, among others, the lack of effort by employers to support the reserves, the absence of strong endorsement by government leaders of the reserves and the lessening of emphasis in books and other media of public communication on the role played by reserve units. In many respects these arguments held true for the pre-war years as well. In the post-war decades there was another factor, however, and that was the almost unbroken period of high employment and good wages which meant a much greater opportunity for young men to earn money to

[3] The total strengths given were: the Canadian Scottish Regiment (Princess Mary's) - 185; the British Columbia Regiment - 125; the British Columbia Dragoons - 141; the 15th Field Regiment - 196; the Westminster Regiment - 208 and the Seaforth Highlanders of Canada - 216. (General J. A. Clark's file: "JAC-728, 1964-67, Seaforth Highlanders" - H.Q., B.C. District, Circular Letter, 28 March, 1966). These figures varied yearly, but rarely was the Seaforths far down the list.

find enjoyment. Automobiles and motorcycles gave the new generation a far greater mobility than had their fathers, and at the same time, as the city grew, it became necessary to reach out even further into the suburbs to the middle class homes which provided many of the potential recruits.

The challenge to attract and keep men in the regiment was met in a variety of ways, some with varying degrees of success. In 1949, for example, the commanding officer decided to start a "Ski Company."[4] It was planned that the company would train at the armoury on alternate Mondays and at Mount Seymour on alternate Sundays. The men in this company were to pass recruit training before being permitted to ski and take part in winter survival schemes. By September he was able to write that "the introduction of the Ski Company within the battalion is proving to be the greatest attraction we have had since the war."[5] This company made its first appearance carrying skis at the change-of-command parade when Lt-Col. D. M. Clark[6] was succeeded by Lt-Col. A. W. Mercer on 19 December. During the winters of 1949-50 and 1950-51, winter training on skis was continued, but the advent of the Korean War and a lessening of interest in skiing led to the equipment being withdrawn in 1951. It was found, in time, that the ski enthusiasts became more interested in skiing than in military training, and consequently the idea was dropped.

While the regiment was working to increase its strength in the late 1940's, a train of international events was in progress which, month by month, made the possibility of military action loom large. Ever since the end of the war the Soviet Union had made it increasingly obvious that it was intent on pursuing a policy which, if continued, would bring Europe under the control of Communism. By the summer of 1948 Berlin was under a land blockade imposed by Soviet authorities, and for a time it appeared that an open clash with Russian forces might occur. The situation was such that even the Canadian Minister of National Defence felt it necessary to speak out. He said, in part:

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[4] Early in February a number of Seaforths attended a two-week camp at Wainwright, Alberta, where they underwent winter training.

[5] General J. A. Clark's file: "Seaforth - General, 1949-50", Letter, Lt-Col. D. M. Clark to Air Vice Marshal L. F. Stevenson, M.L.A., 22 September, 1949.

[6] Lt-Col. Clark was promoted to Brigadier to command the 15th Infantry Brigade.

> Since then [VE Day] the Soviet Union has flouted these war won friendships, obstinately obstructed every move to arrive at understanding, and promoted chaos and disorder and the darkness of the iron curtain as the only conditions in which communism can exist and spread.
>
> This attitude has produced changes in policy and conduct in every part of the world. . . . It has produced an attitude in Canada towards defence which is quite different from any that we ever had before in peacetime.[7]

He added:

> . . . it is now possible to set down Canada's present defence aims and objectives. They are: (1) to provide the force estimated to be necessary to defend Canada against any sudden direct attack that could be or is likely to be directed against it in the near future; (2) to provide the operational and administrative staffs, equipment, training personnel and reserve organization which would be capable of expansion as rapidly as possible to meet any need; and (3) to work out with other free nations plans for joint defence based on self help and mutual aid as part of a combined effort to preserve peace and restrain aggression.[8]

Two things become apparent from this statement. First, the status of the reserve forces was enhanced, and in a practical way this was made apparent when Reserve Army units, such as the Seaforths, were authorized thirty days training with pay during the 1948-1949 and 1949-1950 training years. Second was the belief that, although a highly trained, mobile Active Force was to receive prime attention, the concept of building up the reserve to "flesh out" the small Active Force was still considered as the primary role of the reserves in case of emergency. The knowledge and ability to manufacture the atomic bomb at that time still remained solely with the United States. Whereas Canada had for years been shielded by the protection of the Royal Navy, it was now protected by the power of the United States' atomic arsenal. If war had come, therefore, the reserves would have fulfilled their traditional role.

In the late spring of 1948, when the newspapers began to speculate on the outcome of the Berlin "Air Lift", there occurred an event in British Columbia of more immediate importance. A warm spring and early summer had increased the run-off from the snow-covered mountain ranges to such an extent that the Fraser River began to

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[7] Hon. Brooke Claxton, *Canadian Defence Planning,* Ottawa, King's Printer, 1948, p. 2.

[8] *Ibid.,* p. 6.

rise to record levels. During the latter part of May serious flooding began in the Fraser delta, and on the evening of 28 May the Seaforths were warned that it was likely they would be called out in aid of a civil power. Later on the following day Lt-Col. Clark was warned that the unit was on two hours' notice. Immediately the call went out to all members of the unit by phone and radio, so that by late afternoon 140 officers and men were at the armoury ready to take part in Operation "Overflow".

For a week the Seaforths were joined in battle with other reserve and active service units against the flood waters. Within a matter of hours the battalion, equipped with rubber boots, dry-back clothing, essential stores and the necessary transport, laboured side by side with thousands of civilian volunteers to combat the floodwaters. The first area of operations was in the Pitt Meadows-Port Coquitlam area where serious leaks in the dykes occurred. All during the night the Seaforths worked, filling, carrying and placing sandbags. There was no halt in the work until dawn, when the sodden soldiers, having repaired the breach in the dyke, were permitted to rest.

Two days later the battalion was rushed to the Richmond-Ladner area where a dyke had caved in and the civilian workers needed help. Here and elsewhere the Seaforths proved their worth, working closely with the civilian authorities but finding that their own organization was well adapted to the task. The Signal Platoon, assisted by the B.C. Telephone Company provided, excellent communication although it was necessary to disrupt normal phone traffic. The Quartermaster, Captain Bruce Rutherford, kept the men well fed, the transportation of men and material worked smoothly, and the speed and efficiency which was displayed by the sub-units all along the miles of dykes was a credit to all ranks.

This emergency operation, which involved the entire battalion, also provided excellent experience for everyone. The commanding officer wrote later:

> This operation enabled the Bn. to concentrate and function as a Bn. under its own organization. This has not been possible since the unit returned to Canada and in view of the large number called out it is considered that the operation was of greater training value to the regiment than normal summer camp, as in the latter case it is unlikely that more than 100 all ranks would have proceeded to camp.
>
> From the regimental point of view the operation was very successful

and the resultant increase in regimental spirit should go far in increasing the efficiency of the unit . . . .[9]

The lessening of the danger of the flood did not have its counterpart in a lessening of the danger of the confrontation between the eastern and western occupation forces in Europe. Rather, that situation worsened as the months went by and was not resolved until the following year. By that time a number of European and North American countries, including Canada, had become sufficiently apprehensive over Russian intervention to unite in a defensive alliance under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. This was a unique step for Canada, and the seriousness of her purpose was exemplified by the expansion of her armed forces from about 35,000 in 1947 to over 95,000 in 1952. The impact on the reserve forces was considerable as well, and for the 1951-1952 training period, reserve units were allowed 45 days of training at local headquarters with an additional 15 days permitted for annual camp.

Shortly after agreement was reached on N.A.T.O., and while the details of the military contributions of the member nations were still being considered, the Republic of Korea was invaded from the north by the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea. This event, occurring after the series of Communist threats and political takeovers in Europe, resulted in a sharp reaction in the United States. In June the United Nations considered the attack a breach of the peace and an act of aggression and decided to take collective action to stop it. Early in August, 1950, the Prime Minister of Canada announced that a Canadian Brigade Group would be formed to meet the nation's new commitments.

The decision of the Canadian government to send military forces overseas without a formal declaration of war marked a notable change in Canada's military policy, and as such it had an effect on such reserve regiments as the Seaforth Highlanders of Canada. The most immediate effect was the formation of a "Special Force", (later termed the 25th Canadian Infantry Brigade Group) which was to fight in Korea. The opportunity to serve overseas held considerable attraction, and a number who had been serving in the Seaforths left

[9] Directorate of History, Annual Historical Report of the Seaforth Highlanders of Canada, 1949: Appendix "B", "Report on Operation 'Overflow' ". One result of this emergency was that many Seaforth veterans re-enlisted, and the unit's strength increased noticeably.

to join the Special Force, especially in Lt-Col. Stone's battalion of Princess Patricias. Among them were Captains Swinton and Foulds. It is interesting to note that a former Canadian Seaforth officer (Danby) was G.S.O. I to the Divisional Commander, Major-General A. J. H. Cassels, CBE, CB, DSO, a former Imperial Seaforth who became the Honorary Colonel of the British affiliated regiment in 1957.

Early in May, 1951, the Minister of National Defence announced the decision to form the 27th Canadian Infantry Brigade Group for service under the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe (S.H.A.P.E.). This brigade group was to have its battalions comprised of companies raised from the reserve units, and as a consequence the Seaforths were asked to provide a company for the 1st Canadian Highland Battalion. This company initially was to be called "E" Company, while a second company, "F", would provide reinforcements when "E" Company left for Valcartier.

Recruiting started on 7 May with Captain Sir A. G. A. A. Mackenzie as recruiting officer. The first "recruit" to be interviewed and taken on strength was Company Sergeant-Major C. McCafferty. Thirteen officers from the regiment volunteered their services, but only five were needed. Major R. N. George was appointed as Officer Commanding,[10] and as the company's ranks began to fill training started immediately. A considerable amount of time was spent at Blair Range, firing various weapons. On 23 July, the five officers and 122 other ranks comprising the company paraded in Vancouver for the last time before leaving for Camp Valcartier that evening.

The "Seaforth Company" of the 1st Canadian Highland Battalion carried out intensive field training in Quebec for the remainder of the year. On 2 December, the unit embarked on an Italian ship at Quebec City en route to Hanover, Germany. When it left it carried with it a special company pennant or standard. On it, on one side, was the regiment's badge and motto with a small Union Jack in dexter chief. On the other side were the unit's Great War battle honours with a cougar (the collar badge worn on the regiment's uniform) in the centre. This standard was presented by the Honorary Colonel, the Honourable E. W. Hamber, at a special ceremony in the Seaforth Armoury on 28 November. It was carried by the Seaforth Company

[10] Captain J. W. Baldwin was his second-in-command.

until the 1st Canadian Highland Battalion was reorganized to become a permanent regiment in the Active Force.

During the early 1950's the Seaforth Highlanders felt the impact of the greatly increased amount of money granted the Defence Department. The increased pay and allowances for all ranks was welcomed as was the decision to increase the number of days of training. At the summer camps, not only was there a noticeable improvement in efficiency, but fatigues and chores were now carried out by permanent staffs which allowed those attending to take greater advantage of the time allowed to train. The regiment's equipment was left over from the Second World War, but at least it was not quite out of date. Moreover, compared to the pre-war era, there was plenty of it. In 1950, for example, the Seaforths had 200 rifles, 15 Bren guns, 20 Sten guns, an anti-tank gun, two Piats, three 2-inch and three 3-inch mortars, six wireless sets and nine vehicles among which were four Universal carriers.[11] The movement of massive amounts of Second World War equipment and ammunition by Canada in the early 1950's to the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, France and other European countries under the Mutual Aid Programme by no means stripped the reserve units. In the long run it assisted them, since it necessitated the manufacture or purchase of more up-to-date weapons. By 1960, for example, the Seaforth Armoury contained such modern weapons as rocket launchers, more and much improved wireless sets, better mortars with a longer range, automatic rifles, and so forth,[12] although vehicles continued to be scarce.

The equipment available to the Seaforths and the allocation of it within the unit had a definite bearing on the unit's strength. For example, Support Company with its anti-tank weapons, its Universal carriers, *et cetera*, could and did attract men who were interested in the variety of weapons offered by the specialist platoons. If the men had at least a degree of mobility, so much the better, for this added to the spice of training. Frequently a recruit in a rifle company could absorb all he needed to know about his platoon's weapons, map reading, military law and organization, and similar military knowledge in a comparatively short time. Regimental sports and competitions,

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[11] Directorate of History, Annual Historical Reports, Seaforth Highlanders of Canada, 1 April 1949 - 31 March 1950. Compared with the pre-1939 era, the variety of weapons and equipment available was good.

[12] *Ibid.*, 1960-1961.

the annual camp, periodic social functions, range work and weekend schemes would help maintain his interest. Beyond that, however, much would depend on his senior N.C.Os. and officers to create a challenge to his imagination and at the same time build up the sense of identity with the regiment which led him to enlist in the first place. It did not take too long for the "Seaforth spirit" to well up within him, but it was and continued to be a constant task to maintain his enthusiasm, especially when the Active Force was competing for him. The Seaforth soldier in the 1950's and 1960's had far greater opportunities open to him than the Seaforth in the inter-war era. He was better paid, better equipped, better dressed and in other ways better provided for than his pre-war comrades. Comparatively, he had available to him much of which the militiaman of 1935 had dreamed. At the same time the social and economic life of the young Canadian had changed vastly. The degree to which the senior officers of the regiment (and the higher echelons of the Reserve Force) acted to cope with and utilize this change, was a measure of the vitality of the unit.

In this respect too much cannot be said about the service performed by the large proportion of officers and senior N.C.Os. who had served with the Seaforths in battle and continued to serve in the decade after the war. The influence of both commissioned and non-commissioned veterans in training, in imparting the regimental spirit, and in leaving well-trained successors on their retirement was very great. Company Sergeant-Majors, Company Quartermaster Sergeants, Medical and Orderly Room Sergeants—they all played a vital role, and not the least was maintaining an excellent Sergeants' Mess which was noted for its formal and informal gatherings. It would be invidious to cite a few names and leave others out. Sufficient it is to say that the Seaforths were fortunate in acquiring and retaining the services of these men who forged a strong link between the wartime and post-war periods.

Generally speaking, training at the sub-unit and unit level was interesting during the 1950's and early 1960's. Summer camps, lasting from one to two weeks, were held in a variety of improved camps at Wainwright, Vernon, Sarcee, Albert Head (Victoria) and up in the Chilcotin area. There were also various weekend schemes which Lt-Col. C. C. I. Merritt, VC, encouraged with vigour. Lt-Col. Merritt, who had served with the regiment before and during the war, was a man of unlimited zest and boundless energy who kept all ranks hop-

ping. At the end of March, 1952, for example, Merritt organized a combined assault landing on Paisley Island.[13] The island, held by "enemy forces", provided excellent training, part of which is described in the British Seaforth's magazine, *Cabar Feidh:*

> At first light Sunday morning "C" Company, under command of Major Bruce Campbell, made a landing from an L.C.T. on the South Beach under cover of a smoke screen from the Navy craft, and proceeded to attack the first objective which was taken . . . From there the attack moved up the island until, at 1000 hours, a squadron of mustangs strafed the North Hill, enabling the attacking force to gain the final objective.
>
> The defending force consisted of the reinforcement Company (Seaforth) of 1 Canadian Highland Battalion in Germany, under command of Major G. Sellar, and the whole exercise was carried out by both forces under very realistic conditions. This was an umpired scheme, and proved of great value . . . The defence was ably assisted by a band of armed guerillas, under command of Brigadier H. P. Bell-Irving which proved to be a thorn in the side of the attackers . . .
>
> In the afternoon a 3-inch mortar demonstration was put on by Support Company, after which we embarked for home, those travelling by L.C.T. being transferred to the Navy craft in mid-ocean due to heavy weather.

In 1953 there were similar instances of imaginative weekend exercises. In April the Seaforths were engaged in Exercise "Gazelle" in the Mount Blanchard-Jacob's Lake area. This was rough country, but the scheme was designed to train the companies in mountain and jungle warfare, and included an air drop of supplies despite poor weather. In November of the same year the Seaforths, working in co-operation with the Royal Canadian Engineers at Chilliwack, learned a considerable amount about the problems involved in a river crossing at Vedder Canal. Numerous other examples could be cited of Lt-Col. Merritt's determination to instill realism in training, and there is little doubt that it provided spice and interest to the normal routine.

As usual some of the best training was provided at the annual camps. Concentrated with other infantry regiments as well as units from other arms of the service, the Seaforths were able to work with tanks, artillery, armoured personnel carriers and similar equipment which added realism to their role. Also the concentration of the reserves, with an efficient training and umpiring staff from the Active Force, permitted manoeuvres on a skeleton brigade group scale. Here, too, the Seaforths could assess their ability against other reserve regi-

[13] Brigadier H. P. Bell-Irving and Lt-Col. C.C.I. Merritt both had summer homes on the island.

ments, and not infrequently managed to garner a good proportion of trophies. An outstanding example of this was the summer camp at Wainwright in June, 1957. The Seaforths returned with the brigade proficiency trophy, the Pipes and Drums won the "Edmonton Journal" Trophy, the camp's infantry pennant was awarded to the unit and Brigadier D. M. Clark's Infantry Sword Trophy for the best platoon in infantry tactics was won by 2/Lt. Angus Percival's men. Piper J. Low won the Grand Aggregate Cup, an individual trophy, and the Huntington Trophy was also taken home to Vancouver.

By 1957 the Reserve Army had been reorganized following the report made by a committee of officers under the chairmanship of Major-General H. K. Kennedy, CBE, MC. One of the major changes was the creation of Militia Group Headquarters[14] which replaced the former brigade headquarters. The number of infantry units was reduced while armoured units were increased. Improvements were made in training syllabuses, a bonus was paid for attendance at summer camp, and in general changes were made in the entire militia establishment. The reorganization of the militia went hand in hand with the improvements occurring in the Active Force. By June, 1955, for example, the regular army consisted of 5,600 officers and 43,000 other ranks, or more than there had been in the Reserve Army five years previously. For decades the reserves had been proportionately far greater than the regular army, but the acquisition of the atomic bomb by the Soviet Union had tipped the international balance of power. "Forces in being" became the catchword of the early 1950's following Russia's acquisition of the atomic bomb and all it implied. A steadily increasing regular force and a proportionately decreasing reserve force had been the result.

Late in 1957 the entire world was startled by the announcement that the Soviet Union had put a satellite in orbit. "Sputnik I" was quickly followed by "Sputnik II", weighing almost half a ton. The implications were tremendous. The advances made by Soviet scientists had never been revealed in so dramatic a fashion. Although the United States launched its first satellite, "Explorer I", in January 1958, there is little doubt that the Russian achievement brought home with greater force the possibility of North America becoming

[14] The Canadian Army (Reserve Force) was re-named the Canadian Army (Militia). The Seaforths come under the 24th Militia Group Headquarters.

an atomic battlefield. It was equally obvious that the geographic position of Canada made it inevitable that it would have to be prepared to cope with such a possibility, and it was this problem with which the new Conservative government had to contend late in 1957.

From the military point of view, especially as the 1950's came to a close, the capability of inter-continental ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads presented the gravest problem. Many high-ranking military planners thought that the nature of war had completely changed. If an enemy could launch a nuclear attack from bases thousands of miles away from the nation being attacked, then the result would be an unimaginable holocaust which could be countered only by the threat of retaliation from underground launching sites which might survive the initial blow. Submarines with nuclear power carrying rockets armed with atomic warheads and huge aircraft, constantly in the air, also carrying atomic bombs, were other forms of deterrents to a "first strike" possibility on the part of the enemy. Since the only two powers capable of carrying out such attacks were the United States and the Soviet Union, and since Canada's position placed it between the two, it was natural that the Canadian military role had to be reconsidered. There were, in brief, two schools of thought on this problem. One felt that an atomic war would be so devastating that there would be no victory and thus such a war was beyond the bounds of possibility. The other felt that, despite the horrors implicit in an atomic war, certain precautionary measures must be taken to anticipate it. It was one thing to say it must not happen; it was another to have the responsibility for preparing for it if it should. Consequently it was decided that much greater emphasis should be placed on the role which the Reserve could play in civil defence. In a "white paper" the new minister stated:

> All Regular and Reserve Forces in Canada, not directly engaged in activities against an aggressor, will be available for survival operations.
>
> Regular and Militia units will be trained so that they can undertake reconnaissance and radiation monitoring and move into damaged areas to rescue and evacuate the injured. Also, training will be necessary in traffic control, road clearance, demolitions, bridging, assistance in the restoration of public utilities and in the maintenance of law and order. Necessary equipment will be provided to meet these tasks, Mobile support columns will be provided with radio equipment, vehicles for evacuations, and communication equipment to control operations.[15]

[15] Honourable G. R. Pearkes, *Defence 1959*, Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1959, p. 11.

The impact of this new change of emphasis on training on the Seaforths was considerable. Generally speaking it was not welcomed, despite the merit of the idea itself, partly because the change was too sudden. It was felt that the primary task of the Reserves was a military rather than a civil one, and although aid to the civil power had been one of the responsibilities of the militia for years, the fact that it was now given priority was resented, especially when some senior officers frowned on the Seaforths practising such elementary things as section training. The new training, naturally, did bring certain innovations. There were lectures on first aid, a variety of films dramatically showed the awesome power of an atom bomb, and there were talks on such things as traffic control, radiation hazards, the problems involved in re-entering bombed cities and so forth. Older veterans, visiting the armoury during this period, might be startled by seeing Seaforths amid an array of ropes lowering a "casualty" in a stretcher from the balcony to the armoury floor. Weekend schemes also reflected the new training as the Seaforths, equipped with more vehicles, wireless sets and special equipment, practised their role as a mobile column entering Vancouver after the city had been partially demolished.

Although emphasis on national survival training continued for several years, it began to be modified in the early 1960's as the two greatest powers continued to build up their atomic arsenals and refined their delivery systems. The reams of editorials and magazine articles about "megamurder", "overkill" and "anti-missile missiles" lessened perceptibly and more attention was focused on the ways and means of preventing the possibility of atomic warfare. More consideration, too, was given to "brush-fire" wars and the means of preventing a small conflict from spreading. Korea had been one example where Canadian troops could be used, and later Canadians were to be employed as part of the United Nations forces in Egypt, the Congo and Cyprus.

Although military training again came to equate with national survival training in the militia, the latter had caused a certain falling off in the Seaforths' strength which was partly made up by the inauguration of the Young Soldiers Training Plan. The Y.S.T.P., as it was termed, began as an experiment shortly after Lt-Col. I. M. Bell-Irving took command of the unit in 1957. For six weeks during the summer of 1958 high school students between the ages of 16 and

19 years were to be given special training both at the armoury and at camp by full-time instructors. It was an experiment promoted by the regular force to assist the militia, and it gave the young men an opportunity to earn money during their holidays. It had been carried out successfully in Ontario and the Seaforths were given the task of organizing it in British Columbia. Initially Captain B. G. Parker was "called out" to train the young men with R.S.M. L. R. Tankard[16] and R.Q.M.S. Eric Ashby as his assistants. Major D. I. Fairweather and Lts. D. J. Anderson and A. B. DuBois-Phillips assisted during the summer camp. Seventy-eight youths joined initially, and of that number over 40 decided to remain with the Seaforths while others went into other corps. Many of the Young Soldiers made up the 100-man Royal Guard for Her Royal Highness Princess Margaret when she visited Vancouver in July, 1958. Under R.S.M. Tankard's direction their drill was brought up to such a high standard that many onlookers thought the Guard, smartly turned out in their new green tunics, was composed of veterans.

The apparent success of the experiment led to further refinements and the decision to recruit a special Young Soldiers company ("D" Company) into the unit. These young men were to be no different from other Seaforths with respect to such matters as pay, dress and discipline. Recruited from the high schools, they were taught the usual subjects such as drill, field craft, map reading, first aid and weapon training. After recruit training the Young Soldier took the usual mixture of national survival and military courses. In order to avoid interfering with their homework, however, the Young Soldiers trained for three hours on Saturday mornings, and as such, especially under the imaginative leadership of their company commander, Major C. B. Campbell, soon formed the strongest and keenest company in the battalion.

While the Young Soldiers gave the unit an immediate increase, the No. 72 Seaforth of Canada Cadet Corps was also showing a

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[16] Mr. Tankard, formerly with the Brigade of Guards and recently retired as the R.S.M. at Sandhurst, served 28 years with the British Army before joining the Seaforths in 1952. He replaced Mr. George MacMahon as Regimental Sergeant-Major in September, 1957. By the mid-1950's there was a large proportion of former British Army officers serving in the regiment, a reflection of the large immigration into Canada from the United Kingdom during the post-war years. They gave a unique flavour to the mess, and their service experience was of great value to the unit.

decided increase in strength under the leadership of Major J. D. Pierce. The Cadets, of course, were a unit unto themselves, but strongly affiliated with the regiment in every respect. Their Pipes and Drums won almost as many cups and trophies as the senior band in both Canada and the United States.[17] The boys in the Cadet Corps came from all parts of the city, and in one or two cases an entire platoon would be raised at one of the schools.[18] By 1960 the Seaforth Cadets had an enrollment in excess of 200, which was not much lower than its wartime numbers. Traditionally the battalion had absorbed many cadets into its ranks when they became of age. In the post-war era proportionately fewer came to the unit, but nevertheless the combination of the increasing strength of the cadets and more especially the enthusiasm of the Young Soldiers gave the regiment a welcome influx of new blood.

During the late 1950's and early 1960's there were a number of events which took place which the Seaforths remember with considerable pride. One was the demonstration put on in 1954 before some 35,000 spectators by a 100-man Guard of Honour in full dress as part of the closing-day ceremonies of the British Empire and Commonwealth Games. At first there was a demonstration lasting forty-five minutes, based on drill movements over a century old. After an immaculate performance the Seaforths moved off the field, happy for the half-hour break before they were due to form up as a Guard for His Royal Highness Prince Philip. While they were sitting and standing around, munching sandwiches and drinking coffee, there was a roar of motorcycles and a black limousine carrying Prince Philip drove right beside them and on into the Stadium. Major I. M. Bell-Irving, Captain Tom O'Neil, 2/Lt. D. J. Anderson and others on the Guard were horrified. The scheduling of the athletic events called for the Seaforths to remain outside the stadium in the parking lot. The gates were closed with the Prince inside and the Guard outside. Fortunately Lt-Col. C.C.I. Merritt met Prince Philip on the field, explained the situation, and while His Royal Highness chatted

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[17] The cadets started out the post-war period by winning in 1949 the Earl Grey Trophy awarded once every five years to the outstanding cadet battalion in Western Canada. During the summer of 1959, the cadet's Pipes and Drums, playing in various competitions up and down the west coast of Canada and the United States, won five cups, 24 medals and $475.00 in cash awards.

[18] St. George's School had approximately a platoon of Seaforth cadets also.

with some of the athletes, the Guard assembled and marched on for their formal inspection a few minutes later. It was probably the only time in the regiment's history when it kept an inspecting officer waiting. Everything went well, however, and many Seaforths were able to see the magnificent athletic performances of the Games including the "miracle mile" by Bannister and Landy.

A different but nonetheless equally interesting event which exemplifies the variety of tasks taken on by the unit occurred in January, 1960, when the Pipes and Drums represented the Canadian Army at the recommissioning of the *U.S.S. Coral Sea* at Bremerton, Washington. The ship was commissioned on Robbie Burns Day, and the ship's captain, Captain James Gray, as well as three former commanders of the ship, were all of Scottish descent. The ship's recommissioning officer, Admiral James A. Russell, was piped on board by Pipe Major E. Esson. The Admiral was delighted, and to everyone's surprise borrowed Esson's pipes and played a short tune on them himself! This huge aircraft carrier paid a three-day visit to Vancouver in March and the entire battalion paraded aboard the ship which was the largest of its type ever to visit the city. It was also during Lt-Col. I. M. Bell-Irving's command that the "Seaforth Tattoo" was reinstated (April, 1958) and played for four years to as large a crowd as could be packed into the Seaforth Armoury.

During these years when the regiment was commanded by Lt-Col. I. M. Bell-Irving, Lt-Col. D. I. Fairweather and later Lt-Col. C. B. Campbell, the regiment won an unusually large number of trophies which was indicative of the hard work and effort of all ranks of the battalion as well as some exceptional talent of small groups and individuals. The Pipes and Drums under Pipe Major Esson had won the J. W. Stewart Trophy as the outstanding pipe band of its class on the Pacific Coast for ten consecutive years up to 1957. By 1964 it was back with the regiment once more.[19] In 1964 the Seaforths won the Blair Trophy for excellent shooting for the fifth consecutive year; indeed they won most of the available trophies in the various shooting competitions for the entire year. Perhaps

[19] The trophy was first put up in 1914 when it was won by the unit as it was again on the 50th anniversary of its presentation. During this entire period the Seaforths, in competition with other regiments, won it fifty percent of the time, an excellent record matched by no other regiment competing for it.

the greatest prize for 1964-1965 was the winning of the Wallace Efficiency Trophy which every British Columbia militia unit competes for as symbolic of the best regiment in the province.[20]

Training tended to be more adventurous in mid-1960s, perhaps as a result of the decreasing emphasis on national survival training. On several occasions Lt-Col. C. B. Campbell[21] took the Seaforths out into rather rugged country. The long march down Indian River from Squamish to Wigwam Inn was one noted example as was the crossing of the Garibaldi Glacier. Another interesting weekend scheme was Exercise "Wildwest". This was an exercise designed to train the men in platoon tactics in a closed-in area against a guerilla force. An interesting aspect was that 65 men from the 56th Rifle Company, United States Marine Corps (Reserve), joined with the Seaforths in this exercise just as the Seaforths had trained with them earlier up on the snow level of Mount Hood. The friendly relations with the American troops over the border, which originated in the 1930s, was still going strong in the 1960s. Mention must be made during this period of the excellent co-operation the Seaforths received from the Regular Army. To mount an exercise such as "Wildwest", for example, called for a great deal of planning, and when it came to the question of such things as maps, special equipment, provisions, and other necessities which were not available normally to a reserve unit, an appeal had to be made to the Regular Force. Time and again the Seaforths benefited from the latter, and a close relationship between the two forces permitted the Seaforths to broaden their experience and, at the same time, make their training more realistic and challenging.

In the post-war era, and indeed going back to the years immediately prior to the Great War, the regiment was very fortunate in having Brigadier General J. A. Clark[22] as a rocklike guard over its

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[20] The Seaforths were not only pleased to win the trophy, but at this period when rumours of cuts in the reserve forces and the disbandment of various units were going around, it was essential that the regiment should demonstrate its qualities and abilities at every opportunity. The Seaforths won the trophy in the following year as well.

[21] Lt-Col. Campbell had served with the Rifle Brigade during the war. During his command he stressed realism in training and brought the unit to a high level of efficiency at a time when the Suttie Commission was asking to cut back on all reserve regiments in Canada.

[22] He was appointed Honorary Colonel in October, 1957.

traditions and its military fortunes in peace and in war. There has been no one individual in the regiment who has given so much of his time and energies to the betterment of every aspect of its life than General Clark, and at the same time asked so little in return. His sense of duty towards the regiment is matched only by the pride he has in its achievements. Probably, when he inspected the cadets, they looked on him as a kind, elderly man whose ribbons were numerous and were won in battles fought long before they were born. When the same cadets matured and took their place in the regiment, they only then realized that the dress uniforms they wore were paid for indirectly through his efforts. Similarly, the young potential officer whom he interviewed might wonder, at first, if this was the major task of an Honorary Colonel. If the young man served long enough with the regiment, he would come to realize that General Clark was involved in and kept himself informed on every possible aspect of the regiment's life.

It was only natural, therefore, that General Clark played a prominent part in what was the outstanding public display put on by the regiment in the early 1960s. Indirectly, the origin of the display was in a meeting of former commanding officers early in 1957. These officers, under the chairmanship of Major-General B. M. Hoffmeister, were to select from the numerous battle honours awarded the Seaforths during the Second World War the ten major honours which would be selected to be embroidered on the Regimental Colour. This took time, and when final approval was confirmed, the next step was to have these ten honours added to those already awarded from the Great War.[23] The near completion of the new colours came at a time when it was announced that the Second Commonwealth Study Conference would be meeting in Vancouver early in June, 1962. His Royal Highness Prince Philip was to address the conference and, although it was announced that his public appearances would be extremely limited, General Clark thought he might be persuaded to present the new colours to the Seaforths. Late in 1961 he began to make enquiries, both in Canada and the United Kingdom,[24] and

[23] In May, 1959, Lt-Gov. Frank M. Ross presented a set of eleven new drums to the regiment. Each displayed the regiment's battle honours of both wars. This was the first time these honours were "on parade" prior to the presentation of the new colours.

[24] General Sir A. James H. Cassels, KBE, CB, DSO, was most helpful in this

while he worked in the background a formal request through the proper military authorities was made by the Commanding Officer. At first the reaction from the official channels was discouraging, but in February, 1962, General Clark received word that Prince Philip would be very pleased to present the new colours.

A tremendous amount of planning and activity followed, and during the spring the pace at the Seaforth Armoury quickened week by week as all ranks buckled down to make the ceremony a memorable one. The drill had to be perfect, the dress impeccable and the entire, complicated presentation run with precision. Everyone had his task, and while the men trained at the armoury and later at the stadium of the University of British Columbia, vast administrative preparations were underway. Invitations and programmes had to be printed, seating and parking arrangements made, information provided for the radio, television and newspapermen, routes and traffic control planned with city and military police, matters of protocol decided, and a hundred and one other things attended to.

Sunday, 3 June 1962, was a beautiful day with just enough breeze to wave the standard of Prince Philip. The public had started to fill the stands by 0900 hours and within an hour they were packed. Shortly thereafter the regiment's four guards[25] marched to the playing fields accompanied by the Pipes and Drums as well as the band of the Royal Canadian Engineers from Chilliwack.

From the time of the arrival of Prince Philip, dressed in the uniform of the Queen's Own Highlanders (the recently amalgamated Seaforths and Camerons), the entire ceremony went like clockwork. After inspecting the regiment His Royal Highness went over to greet about two hundred veterans of the Seaforth Association—an un-

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respect. Cassels was Colonel of the Regiment to the Seaforths, while Clark held the same position (i.e., Honorary Colonel) with the Seaforth Highlanders of Canada.

[25] The guards of fifty men each were commanded by Majors W. L. Roberts, CD, J. D. Pierce, CD, K. J. Course and T. U. O'Neil, CD. The Adjutant was Captain W. D. Holmes and the Regimental Sergeant Major was W.O. I. H. Bullock, CD. The Old Colour Party consisted of Lt. F. Boomer, C/Sgt. D. Cross, Sgt. M. McCann, Lt. D. Wilson and C/Sgt. R. Stewart; the New Colour Party was composed of Lt. A. DuBois-Phillips, Sgt. J. D. Anderson, C.S.M. D. J. Robins, Lt. E. M. Metcalfe and Sgt. E. E. Olinek, Major C. B. Campbell, CD, and Major J. W. Lawrence handed the New Colours to Prince Philip.

planned but most welcome greeting. Then the old colours were trooped past the rigid lines of Seaforths to the tune of "Loch Duich", and finally they were taken from the grounds to the tune of "Auld Lang Syne" while the entire battalion presented arms. It was a magic moment, which was hard to watch without deep feeling. Slowly the colours went by. On them were emblazoned the Great War battle honours which many of the older veterans watching them go by had helped to win. Fifty long years parted like a veil, and though their eyes saw the colours and their ears heard the pipes, in their memories they were back in the trenches of Flanders.

Next came the consecration of the new colours in a brief drumhead service by Honorary Major Reverend R. H. Durnford, DSO, CD, and Honorary Captain Reverend R.S.M. Kennedy after which His Royal Highness presented them to the regiment. He then spoke briefly to all ranks, and returned to the reviewing stand. The next part of the ceremony was performed with all the elan which one could hope to see in any regiment. With the Pipes and Drums[26] playing "The Pibroch O' Donuil Dubh", the battalion marched past Prince Philip in flawless formation, the sun sparkling on their accoutrements, their lines as straight as a ruler. It was a magnificent spectacle and after His Royal Highness had left[27] the audience in the stands rose to their feet and applauded and cheered to the echo as Lt-Col. Fairweather marched his battalion off the parade ground.

There were many congratulatory letters sent to the Seaforths on their performance that day, but perhaps one which carried the most weight was one to General Clark from Lt-Col. F. C. Garret of the 15th Field Artillery Regiment, R.C.A. (Reserve). "The excellence of your parade", he wrote in part, "makes us all very proud to be militiamen." It was a moving tribute, all the more so, perhaps, when one considers that the Seaforths were at that time involved in national survival training and so had less time for strictly military affairs.

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[26] The band was still under the direction of Pipe Major Esson who continued to lead the Pipes and Drums until 1965 when Pipe Major A. J. Duncan, CD, succeeded him. Esson had been trained by Pipe Major Gillies, whom he had succeeded, and their combined service stretched back to the origin of the regiment—an almost unique record of service.

[27] He was to have lunch with the officers of the regiment and invited guests of the Honorary Colonel—72 in all—at the Faculty Club.

Although the next event goes beyond the limits of the chronology of this history, it merits inclusion since it stems in part from the Presentation of Colours parade. A short time before Prince Philip arrived in Vancouver, Lt-Col. Fairweather had written to the military authorities in Ottawa expressing the wish to have His Royal Highness appointed Colonel-in-Chief of the Seaforth Highlanders of Canada. This appointment had been vacant for many years, and as Prince Philip was now the Colonel-in-Chief of their affiliated regiment, the Seaforths were naturally anxious to strengthen the bonds between the two regiments in this manner. When His Royal Highness presented the colours he had been quite impressed by the parade. In talking to General Clark at the time, in the congratulatory message he had sent the regiment and in conversations he had later with Seaforth veterans overseas, he paid warm tribute to the smartness of the unit. Late in 1962 General Clark wrote a number of letters to the appropriate authorities requesting that the regiment be given the honour of having Prince Philip as its Colonel-in-Chief. His letters evoked considerable interest and sympathy. However it was suggested that such an appointment should be made only on the occasion of the unit's centenary or some very special event.

For several years no further move was made, but in the spring of 1966 the appointment was brought up once more. This time the formal request by Lt-Col. C. B. Campbell went through the various military and diplomatic channels with remarkable speed. The appointment of His Royal Highness as Colonel-in-Chief of the Seaforth Highlanders of Canada became official on 7 April, 1967. The regiment was very proud of this appointment, not only because he was a member of the Royal Household but also he was the Colonel-in-Chief of the Queen's Own Highlanders (Seaforth and Cameron) in Scotland. Furthermore, everyone was most impressed by Prince Philip during the Presentation of Colours ceremony and the brief speech he made after the presentation was an exceptionally good summary of the Seaforths' ideals. Part of it is given below, and forms a fitting epilogue to this history.

> It takes more than men, drill and equipment to make a good regiment. The spirit of a regiment has to be built up over the years. It is made up by the service and sacrifices of everyone who has served with it or ever been connected with it in peace or in war. It is part family, part fighting machine, part club and part brotherhood in which past, present and cadet members play an equal part in its being. Much is said about the spirit of

the regiment. But it has a most important practical value. In time of stress or battle, the binding force of a regiment sustains the morale of all those members and inspires acts of courage and endurance far beyond the capabilities of any ordinary group of people. This is why these colours are so important. They provide the continuing link between past and present. They are a reminder that all the regiment's courageous actions, and all the individual's services, great and small, of all its members, live on and are proudly recognized by those who are currently serving in its ranks and who are determined not to disgrace the reputation of the regiment.

It is quite natural to dwell on the war service of a regiment, but it would be quite wrong to dismiss its service in peace as of no account. It requires a sense of public duty and a willingness to submit to discipline when everybody else seems to be taking it easy, and it requires a sacrifice in time which might be used for lazier activities. There might be some practicle inducement if there existed an immediate threat to your security. Anyone can feel warlike in defence of their own homes. But the people who serve with the militia forces of Canada have no such inducement. They serve for the freedom of all mankind. In two world wars, in Korea, and in countless other trouble spots of the world, Canadians have helped to keep the peace, fighting and dying thousands of miles from their homes. Seaforth Highlanders have played an important part in establishing this tradition of service, and judging by the discipline and spirit you have shown today, you will long continue to serve your country and the peace of the world.

APPENDIX "A"

Battle Honours of the Seaforth Highlanders of Canada

The Great War, 1914-1919

YPRES, 1915, '17, FESTUBERT, 1915, SOMME, 1916, Ancre Heights, Ancre, 1916, Arras, 1917, '18, VIMY, 1917, PASSCHENDAELE, AMIENS, Scarpe, 1918, DROCOURT-QUEANT, Hindenburg Line, CANAL DU NORD, VALENCIENNES, Sambre, FRANCE AND FLANDERS, 1915-18.

The Second World War, 1939-45

Landing in Sicily, AGIRA, Adrano, Troina Valley, SICILY, 1943, MONTE SAN MARCO, Baranello, The Moro, San Leonardo, The Gully, ORTONA, Liri Valley, HITLER LINE, GOTHIC LINE, Pozzo Alto Ridge, Rimini Line, San Martino-San Lorenzo, San Fortunato, SAVIO BRIDGEHEAD, Naviglio Canal, Fosso Munio, Granarolo, ITALY, 1943-1945, APELDOORN, NORTH-WEST EUROPE, 1945.

(Battle Honours approved for emblazonment are in capital letters.)

APPENDIX "B"

Fatal Casualties of Members of the Seaforth Highlanders of Canada

	Date of Death
Lieut. Barrett-Lennard, D. L.	18 Oct. 1943
Lieut. Budd, James H.	21 July 1943
Maj. Clark, Robert S.	23 Oct. 1944
Lieut. Claxton, Peter H.	15 Dec. 1943
A/Maj. Colquhoun, Frederick D.	26 Aug. 1944
Lieut. Cooke, Hugh A.	17 Sept. 1944
Lieut. Day Smith, Lyman C.	16 Dec. 1944
Lieut. French, Arthur V.	28 July 1943
Maj. Glendinning, Haworth L., DSO	11 Apr. 1945
Lieut. Hall, Frank C.	5 Aug. 1943
A/Capt. Harfield, Frank H.	23 Dec. 1944
Lieut. Hentig, John K.	23 May 1944
Lieut. Matthews, Robert H.	16 Feb. 1945
Capt. McBride, Kenneth G.	16 Sept. 1944
Lieut. McLachlan, Donald H.	23 May 1944
A/Maj. McMullen, James E. T.	6 Oct. 1943
Lieut. McNamara, James R.	17 Sept. 1944
Lieut. Nageleisen, Douglas A.	12 Apr. 1945
Maj. Paterson, Herbert W. J.	17 Sept. 1944
Lieut. Perrett, Frank R.	25 Apr. 1945
Lieut. Prideaux, Norman L.	23 Apr. 1945
Lieut. Robinson, Arthur L.	20 Dec. 1943
A/Capt. Strain, Douglas H.	21 July 1943
Lieut. Tucker, Lewis O. R.	25 Oct. 1942
Lieut. Tucker, Montague E.	26 Mar. 1944
A/Maj. Vance, Thomas C.B.	24 Dec. 1943
Lieut. Whiting, Frank H.	23 May 1944
Lieut. Wilson, Marriott	28 July 1943
Lieut. Wilson, Richard A.	10 Dec. 1943
A/Capt. Woolley, Thomas E., MC	17 Oct. 1944

K 65304	Pte. Alexy, Dan J.	21 July 1943
M 57241	Pte. Allarie, Leo J.	13 Dec. 1943
M105142	Pte. Anderson, Kenneth A.	8 July 1944
K 52866	Pte. Anderson, Lorne S.	14 Oct. 1942
K 48829	Pte. Andronik, Steve	17 Dec. 1943
K 69003	Pte. Asselin, Maurice	21 July 1943
K 51545	Pte. Atkinson, Eugene E.	17 Sept. 1944
K 54633	Pte. Aves, Radford E.	29 Oct. 1944
L 155642	Pte. Babcook, Roy F.	12 Apr. 1945
K 40993	Pte. Bachman, Edward P.	7 Dec. 1944
K 48612	A/L/Cpl. Baerg, George	20 Dec. 1943
K 50018	A/Cpl. Bailey, John	12 Apr. 1945
H103599	Pte. Baldock, John L.	10 Dec. 1943
K 52666	Cpl. Barber, Bruce	5 Aug. 1943
K 50906	L/Cpl. Barkase, Bernard	27 Aug. 1944
K 69649	Pte. Barker, George W.	11 Apr. 1945
K 42978	Pte. Barnes, George R.	5 Aug. 1943
M 11390	Sgt. Barrett, Robert S.	16 Dec. 1943
D175571	Pte. Basque, Emile	23 May 1944
M105970	Pte. Batchelor, James G.	26 Aug. 1944
K 53789	Pte. Bates, Oliver R.	18 July 1943
M106695	Pte. Bauer, William	17 Sept. 1944
K 37071	Pte. Beads, James L.	23 Dec. 1943
K 37072	Cpl. Beads, William S.	20 July 1943
E 30649	Pte. Beaton, Alexander J.	26 Dec. 1943
K 53821	Pte. Beaton, Francis B.	10 Dec. 1943
K 16375	Pte. Bennett, William S.	28 May 1944
K 41406	Pte. Bercy, Louie	3 Feb. 1944
M 1250	Pte. Berg, Leonard A.	14 Apr. 1945
K 42128	Pte. Berry, Edwin	29 Dec. 1943
K 51759	Pte. Best, Wilfred M.	17 Sept. 1944
H102853	Pte. Bignell, Peter	9 Dec. 1944
M 33969	Pte. Bjerke, Henry	25 Dec. 1943
K 43510	A/Cpl. Blackburne, John S.	17 Sept. 1944
K 52036	A/CSM. Blaker, Mark A.	6 Dec. 1943
K 71329	Pte. Bohan, John H.	20 Sept. 1944
K 4330	Pte. Boltz, John W.	12 Apr. 1945
K 52942	Pte. Bompas, Clifford B. N.	19 July 1943
K 76475	Pte. Borsato, Leno	9 Dec. 1944
B 42628	Pte. Borton, Thomas B.	23 May 1944
B 135810	Pte. Bougie, Leonel	17 Sept. 1944
K 52540	Sgt. Brammer, Robert N.	21 July 1943
K 53251	Pte. Brant, Jerry	24 May 1944
L106925	Pte. Briggs, Thomas A. P.	14 Apr. 1945
M 16268	A/Cpl. Brink, Glen A.	11 Dec. 1943
K 53134	Pte. Broad, William T.	6 Aug. 1943
K 89715	Pte. Brown, Walter H.	11 Feb. 1945

K 53099	A/Cpl. Buchanan, Sidney L.	25 Dec. 1943
M 31152	Sgt. Bunnage, Alvin M.	13 Feb. 1944
K 53217	Pte. Cameron, William	14 Dec. 1943
M 17345	Pte. Campbell, James A.	16 Sept. 1944
K 51653	Pte. Cannon, Ian D.	26 Oct. 1944
K 317	Pte. Carlson, Henry O. A.	11 Jan. 1945
K 16347	Pte. Carmichael, Bruce	28 Aug. 1944
K 52351	Cpl. Carmichael, Garth J.	21 July 1943
K 53780	Pte. Carney, James P.	21 July 1943
K 53075	Cpl. Carsell, Dallas A. H.	26 Dec. 1943
M 31218	Pte. Cartwright, Harry	25 May 1944
A 107982	Pte. Caullay, John	8 Apr. 1945
A 117708	Pte. Challen, William	27 Jan. 1944
K 49284	Pte. Chamberland, Louis	23 May 1944
L 100232	Pte. Charbonneau, Leo J.	14 Dec. 1944
K 3250	Pte. Cheer, Dan	12 Apr. 1945
K 46194	Pte. Christianson, George J.	11 Dec. 1943
M102762	Pte. Clack, Reginald	28 July 1943
K 52950	Pte. Clark, Charles H.	20 Sept. 1944
C 52809	Pte. Clarke, Arthur A.	14 Apr. 1945
K 15867	L/Cpl. Clarke, Raymond C.	17 Sept. 1944
K 50752	Pte. Collins, George K.	23 May 1944
H 1413	Pte. Comstock, William D.	2 Sept. 1944
K 76499	Pte. Consterdine, Robert J.	2 May 1945
K 42602	A/L/Cpl. Cooper, Jack H.	22 Jan. 1944
K 52255	Sgt. Cooper, Sydney V.	10 Mar. 1942
K 37027	Pte. Cope, Ronald H.	3 Aug. 1940
K 52709	L/Cpl. Cowan, James M.	1 Sept. 1944
K 52746	Pte. Croft, Genvey	11 Feb. 1941
K 52962	Pte. Cromb, Charles A.	21 July 1943
D 108040	Pte. Crowley, John	16 Sept. 1944
L 106776	Pte. Currie, Stanley K.	18 Sept. 1944
M 49765	Pte. Cuthbert, George	17 Oct. 1943
M106109	Pte. Cwihula, Nick	4 Jan. 1945
H105045	Pte. Dahl, Haakon A.	26 Aug. 1944
L 86626	Pte. Dahl, William E.	23 Dec. 1943
K 52916	Pte. Dale, Douglas H.	7 Dec. 1943
K 66225	A/Cpl. Davy, Cecil H.	9 Dec. 1943
M 17387	Pte. De Pagie, Paul H.	22 Oct. 1944
B 74277	Pte. Deitsch, Lawrence H.	31 July 1943
M107541	A/Cpl. Demeria, Edward A.	12 Apr. 1945
K 67308	Pte. Dempster, William F.	11 Dec. 1943
C 115038	Pte. Derochie, George W.	26 Aug. 1944
K 69770	Pte. Diggens, Harry O.	7 Oct. 1943
M105924	Pte. Dikes, Jack	23 May 1944
K 52708	Pte. Doan, Charles H.	15 Dec. 1943
K 53042	A/Cpl. Doherty, James	20 Dec. 1943

K 50302	L/Cpl. Dore, Harold F.	31 Aug. 1944
M 12280	Pte. Douglas, William	11 Dec. 1943
K 53629	Pte. Doyle, Gordon F.	19 July 1943
K 52680	A/Cpl. Drake, Ivan	24 Dec. 1943
K 57840	Pte. Druskin, Ross	23 May 1944
K 51792	L/Cpl. Duffus, Stewart G.	1 Sept. 1944
K 2534	Pte. Duke, William I.	14 Dec. 1944
B 54980	Pte. Dunbrack, Roy M.	4 Feb. 1944
K 75061	Pte. Dunn, Lloyd B.	17 Dec. 1943
K 49957	Pte. Dutli, Carl A.	29 May 1944
M102891	Cpl. Earl, Thomas S.	23 May 1944
K 66791	Pte. Eastwood, George W.	4 Jan. 1945
K 68544	Pte. Edgington, Ernest E.	11 Dec. 1943
M103423	Pte. Ehrman, Gilbert	23 May 1944
K 53348	A/L/Cpl. Ens, Isaac	9 Dec. 1943
H 21142	Pte. Evans, Walton B.	23 May 1944
K 52511	Pte. Fagervik, Leif T.	17 Oct. 1943
K 29031	Sgt. Fairweather, George	6 Oct. 1943
K 52090	A/CSM. Farmer, Alexander	27 Dec. 1943
M 60452	A/L/Cpl. Feenstra, Tys	31 May 1944
K 53802	Pte. Ferguson, John T.	21 July 1943
K 53219	Pte. Fieldhouse, Reginald E.	10 July 1943
K 37054	Pte. Fisher, Stephen G.	25 May 1944
K 73854	Cpl. Fitzgerald, Brian E.	26 Dec. 1943
K 43509	Pte. Flindall, Rupert	23 May 1944
L 154086	A/Cpl. Folk, Mike	13 Feb. 1944
K 66584	Pte. Foreman, Robert L.	24 Feb. 1945
B 135894	Pte. Forgett, Roy	20 Sept. 1944
K 21029	Pte. Forrester, John G.	26 Dec. 1943
K 51785	Pte. Fraser, Thomas W.	23 May 1944
K 50446	Pte. Frederick, Albert E.	23 May 1944
K 53191	A/Cpl. French, Alfred	24 Apr. 1945
D 82925	Pte. Fried, Carl M.	23 May 1944
C 120652	Pte. Gagnon, Wilfred R.	28 Jan. 1944
K 53236	Pte. Gamba, Louis P.	23 May 1944
E 52660	Pte. Ganjolouski, Alexander	6 Oct. 1943
F 55754	Pte. Gauvin, Earl R.	7 Feb. 1944
B 135644	Pte. Gedrasik, Walter	23 Oct. 1944
M107355	Pte. Giguire, Joseph A.	1 May 1945
K 16506	Pte. Gill, George J.	22 Jan. 1944
K 52156	Pte. Gilmore, Robert G.	25 Dec. 1943
B 144028	Pte. Gipson, William I.	18 Sept. 1944
H 8212	Pte. Girardin, Edward L.	23 May 1944
K 50681	Pte. Glover, George R.	24 May 1944
K 68963	Pte. Godson, Robert E.	12 Apr. 1944
K 16315	Pte. Goertzen, Isaac W.	27 May 1944
K 69856	Pte. Goetjen, Raymond V.	17 Sept. 1944

K 45872	Pte. Good, George A.	26 Dec. 1943
M 38468	Pte. Goodfellow, Robert W. R.	8 Jan. 1944
K 53758	A/Cpl. Gordon, Clifford F.	18 July 1943
M105811	Pte. Gordon, Michael G.	25 Jan. 1944
B 143988	Pte. Gordon, Wilson M.	14 Dec. 1944
K 53880	Pte. Grad, Joseph	29 July 1943
M 28730	Pte. Graham, William E.	23 May 1944
M 56232	Pte. Gramiak, Mike J.	21 July 1943
M104919	Pte. Green, Vernon L.	14 Dec. 1944
K 43556	Pte. Greenlees, Raymond E.	10 Dec. 1943
G 1046	Pte. Gregg, Charles N.	22 Jan. 1944
K 49750	Pte. Grinder, James E.	14 Dec. 1944
K 38669	Cpl. Gunter, Ernest E.	20 Dec. 1943
K 384	Pte. Gurney, Kimberley P.	16 Sept. 1944
K 62170	L/Cpl. Halhed, Basil M.	23 May 1944
K 49304	Pte. Hall, Raymond E.	23 May 1944
K 74749	A/Cpl. Hamann, Henry R.	27 Dec. 1943
K 42990	Pte. Harasymchuk, James	18 Sept. 1944
K 65289	Pte. Harris, Arthur E.	23 May 1944
K 66885	Pte. Hartley, Owen I.	5 Aug. 1943
K 50427	Pte. Haslett, Francis G.	23 May 1944
K 52088	Pte. Havemeyer, Theodore A.	7 Apr. 1941
L 86565	L/Cpl. Head, Donald W.	25 Feb. 1945
D 82842	Pte. Henderson, Douglas	16 Sept. 1944
M103491	Pte. Henderson, Wesley H.	20 Sept. 1944
K 52436	Pte. Hennessy, Arthur M.	10 Dec. 1943
K 10173	Pte. Hodgkinson, Frank E.	9 Aug. 1944
C 121347	Pte. Hollywood, Herbert J.	17 Sept. 1944
H 8540	Pte. Holmes, John A.	17 Sept. 1944
U 2055	Pte. Hudson, Herbert A.	17 Sept. 1944
K 53687	Pte. Hughes, Frank	8 July 1941
A 37739	Pte. Hughes, Harry J.	22 Oct. 1944
K 52527	Pte. Hunter, Raymond H.	10 July 1943
K 52438	Pte. Huntley, Lorne A.	19 July 1942
K 53235	Sgt. Hutchinson, Kenneth G.	17 Sept. 1944
L 86833	Sgt. Irwin, Wesley G.	23 Oct. 1944
M 53028	Pte. Jarvie, Andrew S.	1 Sept. 1944
K 46225	Pte. Jarvis, William J.	12 Apr. 1944
K 53092	A/L/Cpl. Johnson, George H.	9 Dec. 1943
H 20425	Pte. Johnson, Herbert J.	23 May 1944
M 31586	A/L/Cpl. Johnson, Victor G.	11 Dec. 1943
K 53176	Pte. Jordon, Harold	17 Dec. 1943
K 69461	Pte. Kadeniuk, Walter, M. M.	17 Sept. 1944
L 105893	Pte. Kerr, Ernest L.	16 Dec. 1944
K 53211	Pte. King, Arthur E.	28 Dec. 1943
K 52022	A/L/Cpl. King, Lorne Wm.	10 Dec. 1943
K 53598	A/Cpl. King, Ronald D. B.	23 July 1943

K 16464	Pte. Knight, William A.	21 Jan. 1944
K 53140	Pte. La Rocque, Robert	27 Dec. 1943
C 65110	L/Cpl. La Rue, Russell B.	23 May 1944
D 86032	Pte. Laing, William	26 Dec. 1943
M103997	Pte. Lamy, Albert J.	17 Dec. 1943
K 74377	Pte. Landry, Marcel E.	26 Dec. 1943
L 106859	Pte. Larance, Charles A.	16 Sept. 1944
M103047	Pte. Larson, Howard W.	23 May 1944
M 50876	A/Cpl. Larson, Paul A.	24 Feb. 1945
K 69993	Pte. Laughren, Melvin S.	13 Feb. 1944
D125043	Pte. Lavigne, Edward J.	18 Feb. 1945
K 67654	Pte. Lawton, Lawrence	7 Aug. 1944
K 52857	Sgt. Le Clair, Frank	17 Oct. 1944
K 53193	Pte. Lebeau, Ralph G.	25 Dec. 1943
K 50420	Pte. Leblanc, Bernard	23 May 1944
A 50405	Pte. Lediet, Preston H.	27 Aug. 1944
K 42998	Pte. Leduc, Kenneth C.	24 Oct. 1942
K 53368	Pte. Lee, Daly F.	25 Dec. 1940
K 62240	Sgt. Leedam, Charles L.	26 Dec. 1943
D 86158	Pte. Leith, Stewart H. A.	6 Oct. 1943
H 18884	Pte. Lelond, Lyall T.	12 Apr. 1945
K 71003	Pte. Leon, Charles	21 July 1943
K 16438	Pte. Leslie, Cecil O.	29 Jan. 1944
M103846	Pte. Leverington, Robert	17 Dec. 1943
K 53100	Pte. Lewendon, Robert E.	26 Dec. 1944
K 53318	Pte. Livingstone, Allan A.	28 July 1943
K 53009	Pte. Lloyd, James	29 Apr. 1940
K 50076	Cpl. Logan, Robert G.	11 Apr. 1945
D 98743	A/L/Cpl. Lorimer, Robert J.	5 Aug. 1943
M 56244	Pte. Loyer, Henry K.	23 May 1944
K 52182	A/Cpl. Lucas, Donald A.	5 Aug. 1943
K 52975	Pte. MacDonald, Alexander F.	19 July 1943
K 52166	Pte. MacLeod, Alexander	5 Oct. 1943
M101975	Pte. MacLeod, John H.	26 Dec. 1943
B 133633	Pte. MacLeod, John W.	21 July 1943
K 52301	Pte. MacLeod, Ross R.	5 Aug. 1943
M102381	Pte. Madden, Melville E.	24 Dec. 1943
K 51268	Pte. Magee, Robert L.	4 Jan. 1945
K 49509	L/Sgt. Maxwell, Donald S.	31 Aug. 1944
D141250	Pte. May, Robert S.	14 Apr. 1945
K 67764	Pte. McArdle, Patrick C.	25 Dec. 1943
M107330	Pte. McCallum, William A.	23 May 1944
K 52198	L/Cpl. McConnell, Lester H.	26 Dec. 1943
K 52658	Pte. McCuish, Alexander	19 July 1943
K 2010	Pte. McDonald, George E. E.	29 Aug. 1945
K 53120	A/Cpl. McElhoes, Spencer K.	21 July 1943
C 102821	Pte. McIlvenna ,William J.	18 Sept. 1944

M 12224	Pte. McKay, Donald S.	17 Sept. 1944
K 53097	Pte. McKay, John C.	26 Oct. 1942
K 52203	Sgt. McKee, Gordon K.	18 Oct. 1943
C 79330	Pte. McKittrick, James H.	7 Dec. 1943
K 54482	Pte. McLean, Dean C.	23 May 1944
D 139961	Pte. McLoon, Ronald G.	19 Sept. 1944
K 98595	A/Cpl. McParlon, George L., MM	23 Dec. 1943
K 74808	Pte. McPhee, Frederick J.	26 Dec. 1943
K 53353	Pte. Menelaws, Thomas	15 Dec. 1944
K 52278	Cpl. Mercer, Hugh	20 July 1943
K 42559	Pte. Mercer, Wesley R.	28 Feb. 1945
C 117009	Pte. Miller, Frank C.	31 May 1944
C 121699	Pte. Miller, Gilbert L.	1 June 1944
K 51199	Pte. Miller, Lloyd L.	23 May 1944
D 125283	Pte. Miller, Stanley J.	29 July 1943
H 9258	Pte. Mitchell, Earl J.	23 May 1944
C 120192	Pte. Mitchell, Eugene O.	24 May 1944
B 43201	Pte. Mohrman, Basil F.	19 May 1944
K 53462	Pte. Monahan, Robert S.	21 July 1943
K 52223	Pte. Montgomery, William H.	8 Dec. 1943
K 42772	Pte. Moore, Frederick F.	6 Oct. 1943
D 140069	Pte. Moore, Walter	18 Oct. 1944
K 43061	Pte. Morrison, William S.	21 July 1943
C 103506	Pte. Mosley, Ivan G.	6 June 1944
K 42023	Sgt. Mottl, Joseph	20 Dec. 1943
K 70964	Pte. Murphy, Patrick R.	23 May 1944
B 137837	Pte. Myles, Earl C.	18 Oct. 1944
K 98459	Cpl. Myles, John	25 Apr. 1945
K 37075	L/Sgt. Needham, James G.	23 May 1944
K 10101	Pte. Neilson, William K.	24 Oct. 1942
K 52254	A/L/Cpl. Newell, Henry J.	17 Dec. 1943
K 65006	Pte. Nicholas, Toby	21 July 1943
F 56482	Pte. Nickerson, Edsel J.	17 Sept. 1944
K 52875	Pte. Nicol, Arthur	17 Dec. 1943
K 52591	Pte. Niven, William R.	19 July 1943
A 37298	Pte. Noble, Ernest	25 Jan. 1944
K 65213	Pte. Nordling, Gustav	20 Dec. 1943
D 95728	Pte. Norris, Clifford R.	11 Dec. 1943
M 65376	Pte. Northey, Arthur E.	11 Dec. 1943
M 65310	Pte. Northey, Lloyd H.	20 Dec. 1943
K 72606	Pte. Nowell, Norville C.	11 Dec. 1943
D 71599	Pte. O'Brien, John M.	27 July 1943
K 52241	Pte. O'Brien, Robert	21 July 1943
K 74743	Pte. Olson, Elmer O.	27 Aug. 1944
M 10653	Pte. Olynyk, Harry	6 Oct. 1943
K 74626	Pte. Overill, William J.	6 Oct. 1943
K 16466	Pte. Paine, Gordon F.H.	19 Dec. 1943

K 63062	A/Cpl. Palmer, Gordon E.	4 Jan. 1945
B 102183	Pte. Parkhill, George W.	23 May 1944
K 52830	Pte. Parry, Arthur	5 Aug. 1943
K 50209	L/Cpl. Paterson, Kenneth A.	22 Oct. 1944
K 52446	Cpl. Peace, Cecil M.	14 Dec. 1943
K 51562	Pte. Pearson, Clarence E.	23 May 1944
K 54364	Pte. Pearson, James	17 Sept. 1944
M 55560	Pte. Pearson, John	14 Dec. 1944
D 109483	Pte. Pelletier, Louis G.	9 Feb. 1944
M 56529	Pte. Pimm, Lawrence V.	6 Dec. 1943
K 53059	Pte. Plecas, Paul	22 July 1943
K 54073	A/L/Sgt. Poole, James C.	5 Aug. 1943
E 38210	Pte. Powers, Chester	22 Oct. 1944
L 66648	Pte. Prongua, Charles V.	17 Oct. 1944
C 100922	Pte. Pye, James W.	17 Sept. 1944
K 68833	Pte. Reimer, Walter A.	6 Oct. 1943
K 52312	Cpl. Rennie, David W.	17 Sept. 1944
E 49607	Pte. Retiff, Maurice	9 Dec. 1943
M 3247	Pte. Richardson, Elmer M.	17 Sept. 1944
C 117018	Pte. Richardson, Robert	18 Oct. 1944
D 91740	Pte. Riopel, Paul	29 May 1945
H 100251	Pte. Robertson, Edward	6 Oct. 1943
K 52561	Pte. Robinson, Clarence D.	12 Aug. 1943
B 144333	Pte. Robinson, Donald J. F.	13 Feb. 1945
K 69707	Pte. Rolston, Harold	23 May 1944
M105541	Pte. Ropchan, Mike G.	30 May 1944
K 52148	Pte. Ross, Edgar J.	17 Dec. 1943
A 103224	Pte. Ross, John W.	23 May 1944
M 12234	Pte. Rowan, Harold	8 Dec. 1943
M106429	Pte. Rucka, Milan	8 Jan. 1945
H 195151	Pte. Rushowic, Peter	1 Sept. 1944
K 69669	Pte. Russell, Gordon F.	23 May 1944
K 49910	Pte. Ruthig, Norman W.	26 Aug. 1944
K 52574	Pte. Sager, Norman F.	5 Dec. 1943
M 31052	Pte. Sagmoen, Marvin S.	11 Dec. 1943
K 71002	Pte. Saul, August	27 July 1943
H 7202	A/Sgt. Sawatzky, John L.	24 May 1944
K 52266	Cpl. Sellers, Eric F.	25 Dec. 1943
K 42576	Pte. Shaw, Geeorge C.	22 Oct. 1944
K 63077	Cpl. Sheppard, Richard P.	25 May 1944
K 53104	Pte. Shields, Edgar J.	11 Apr. 1945
M104846	Pte. Siebls, Alvin J.	23 May 1944
K 37289	Pte. Sillers, William J. B.	21 July 1943
K 53601	Pte. Simpson, Thomas F.	21 July 1943
K 54061	Pte. Simpson, William	26 Aug. 1944
B 133366	Pte. Smeltzer, Benjamin C. L.	21 July 1943
K 49357	Pte. Smith, Albert E. J.	20 Sept. 1944

A 42408	Pte. Smith, Robert W.	26 Aug. 1944
H102183	Pte. Smith, William C.	17 Sept. 1944
K 29058	Pte. Squire, James H. J.	23 Dec. 1943
M105316	Pte. Steadman, David M.	23 May 1944
K 66380	Pte. Steel, Maurice A.	19 Dec. 1943
L 107613	Pte. Stickley, David W.	18 Sept. 1944
K 52299	A/L/Cpl. Story, Rupert R., MM	29 July 1943
K 52963	Pte. Strangeway, Richard W.	21 July 1943
K 52319	Pte. Street, Louis J.	23 May 1944
M106492	Pte. Stromsmoe, Waldo R.	12 Apr. 1945
K 42910	Pte. Suden, James	18 Oct. 1944
K 658	Pte. Sutherland, Murray A.	18 Sept. 1944
K 37062	Pte. Sutton, William F.	17 Sept. 1944
K 53354	L/Cpl. Swanson, Benjamin A.	19 July 1943
K 57478	Pte. Sweet, Jackson H.	9 Dec. 1943
K 52969	Pte. Swordy, Robert R.	21 July 1943
D 82004	Pte. Symmers, John S.	18 Oct. 1944
K 53147	Pte. Tapley, Cyrus L.	21 July 1943
K 65492	L/Sgt. Taylor, Franklin E.	17 Sept. 1944
K 40590	Pte. Terepocki, Bela	11 Apr. 1945
K 52631	A/Cpl. Terry, Frederic W., MM	28 July 1943
K 53747	L/Sgt. Tessaro, Harold I.	23 May 1944
K 51503	Pte. Thomas, James O.	2 May 1945
L 101358	Pte. Thompson, Gordon E.	9 Dec. 1943
K 50197	Pte. Thompson, Lloyd N.	17 Sept. 1944
H 19216	L/Cpl. Thomson, Alexander	14 Dec. 1943
K 74872	Pte. Thomson, John W.	16 Dec. 1944
K 52771	A/L/Cpl. Thomson, Matthew	10 Dec. 1940
B 133834	Pte. Toomer, Vernon W.	7 Oct. 1943
K 53269	Pte. Townsley, Charles	17 Sept. 1944
D 86190	Pte. Tracey, Donovan B.	13 Feb. 1944
K 54496	Pte. Turff, Clarence A.	22 Oct. 1944
K 62814	Pte. Vanstone, David W.	22 Jan. 1944
K 62256	Pte. Vogel, John P.	28 Feb. 1945
L 107942	Pte. Von Eschen, George O.	26 Feb. 1945
C 123736	Pte. Votary, George F.	25 Apr. 1945
D 82061	Sgt. Wakeling, William E.	12 Dec. 1943
K 53364	Pte. Wallace, Alexander	26 Dec. 1941
K 50329	Pte. Wallace, Ewan M.	17 Oct. 1944
K 53419	L/Cpl. Warner, Joseph V.	23 May 1944
K 53549	Pte. Warnica, Gordon	21 July 1943
A109165	Pte. Washburn, Cameron G.	17 Dec. 1944
M 38526	Pte. Watson, John G.	17 Sept. 1944
K 68555	Pte. Watson, John M.	21 July 1943
M106707	Pte. Wells, Clarence E.	27 Dec. 1943
L 27826	Pte. Wells, Joseph J.	20 Dec. 1943
K 3446	Pte. Werniuk, Stanley	12 Apr. 1945

D166168	Cpl. Weston, Edward S.	23 May 1944
K 51927	Pte. Westwood, Wilfred	4 Jan. 1945
M 11867	Pte. White, Andrew R.	31 Aug. 1944
K 52556	A/L/Sgt. White, David	23 May 1944
M104482	Pte. Whyte, Duncan C.	17 Oct. 1944
K 69593	Pte. Williams, David J.	6 Oct. 1943
A 23052	A/Cpl. Williams, George K.	24 Dec. 1943
K 66262	Pte. Wilshire, Maurice H.	23 May 1944
K 43034	Pte. Wilson, John C.	8 Dec. 1943
K 62658	Pte. Wilson, John P.	10 Dec. 1943
K 69884	Pte. Wilson, John W.	23 May 1944
H 8696	Pte. Wolfe, John P.	18 Oct. 1944
M107343	Pte. Wood, Clifford	31 May 1944
E 52751	Cpl. Wynd, George B.	27 July 1943
K 53215	Pte. Yates, Norman	22 Dec. 1943
M102005	Pte. Yellowfly, Gordon	27 Dec. 1943

Fatal Casualties of Members of the Seaforth Highlanders of Canada after being Posted from the Regiment

Lieut. Grant, D. C., with 48th Highlanders		KIA 7 Dec.
A/Capt. Hardy, R. W.		K 20 June 1945
Lieut. Harling, J. L., with I. C. S. R.		KIA 9 July 1944
Capt. MacDonald, W. K., MC, RCAMC attached		KIA 5 Aug. 1943
Lieut. Nelles, L. D., Canloan to Seaforth Imperials		KIA 11 July 1944
Lieut. Scott, F., Canloan		KIA 11 July 1944
Lieut. Tracey, J. E.		died 10 Nov. 1942
K 52300	Pte. Butler, G. W., with S.L.I.	DoW 16 Dec. 1943
A 107908	Pte. Butler, R., Essex Scot	died 26 May 1945
K 53057	Sgt. Campbell, James, 3 Public Relations Group	KIA 20 July 1944
K 52056	Cpl. Carrie, R., 2 Survey Regt., RCA	DoW 8 Aug. 1944
K 52388	Pte. Davis, J. E.	died 22 Apr. 1941
M 67535	Pte. Decoine, John, P.O.W. ex RCR	died 1 May 1945
K 52858	Cpl. Diamond, William	died 1 Feb. 1942
D 93677	A/Sgt. Fuller, R.O.H.	died 6 Dec. 1941
C 103160	Pte. Galligan, F. A.	died 24 Aug. 1944
G 52091	A/Cpl. Gold, Arthur, P.L.D.G.	KIA 14 Jan. 1944
K 18024	Pte. Gorrie, James,	died 24 Aug. 1940
M103884	L/Cpl. Hankie, H. S., 8 Fd. Sgn. R.C.E.	DoW 13 July 1945
M 53104	Pte. Johnson, Carl, Calg. High'rs.	KIA 26 Aug. 1944
K 52876	Pte. Jones, E. G.	died 1 Aug. 1943
K 53367	A/Sgt. Keyes, J. F., 1 Cdn, Spec. Services Bn.	KIA 5 Dec. 1943
F 64792	Pte. LeBlanc, E. 31 Fd. Coy R.C.E.	DoW 26 July 1944
K 1457	L/Cpl. Levesque, G., R.C.R.	DoW 15 Apr. 1945
L 86713	Pte. Lockhart, A. C.	died 6 Apr. 1944
K 52195	A/L/Cpl. McConnell, A. C., L.S.H.	DoW 30 Jan. 1944
K 52194	Pte. McKay, George, 8 Cdn. Recce Bn.	DoW 21 Sept. 1943
F 22434	Pte. Martin, R. M.	died 16 Mar. 1945
K 52465	Cpl. Mawby, G. J., GHQ 2nd Ech 21 Army Group	KIA 16 Dec. 1944
K 42021	Pte. Moir, Richard, 1 Cdn. Scots	KIA 8 July 1944
K 62490	Pte. Northey, Robert A., 48 Highlanders	KIA 17 Dec. 1944
K 52772	Pte. Park, William James, D.C.M.,	K 2 July 1944
K 42924	Pte. Pastor, Frank, 48 Highlanders	KIA 25 Dec. 1943

K 52742	Pte. Rhino, C. W., 15 Cdn. Gen. Hosp.	died 2 Dec. 1943
K 37077	Pte. Riley, George, 48 High's	KIA 9 Dec. 1943
K 52797	Pte. Smolock, Anthony, 5 Cdn. Armed Div, Sigs.	died 28 Sept. 1944
K 37064	L/Cpl. Smuland, Albert P., 2 Prov. Coy.	died 6 Feb. 1945
G 50700	L/Cpl. Stewart, W. L.,	died 2 Sept. 1946
K 52637	Pte. Tremaine, A. V., 14 Cdn. Armd. Reg.	KIA 2 Feb. 1944
K 43514	Pte. Underdown, Gerald P., 48 High'rs.	KIA 30 Dec. 1943
K 29066	Pte. Walker, Norman A., 1 Cdn. Div. Sigs.	KIA 18 July 1943
K 52346	Cpl. Watson, James A., 1 Cdn. Corps. Sigs.	DoW 31 May 1944
K 53030	Pte. Weir, C. R., L. E. R.	DoW 11 Dec. 1943
K 52816	Pte. Lambright, Ivan Lee, C. Scot. R.	KIA 14 Feb. 1945

Prepared from Canadian Military Records

Non-fatal Casualties

A/Maj. Allan, James C.	23 May 1944
A/Capt. Anderson, Ernest F.	8 Oct. 1943
Lieut. Artindale, William R.	31 Dec. 1943
Lieut. Baldwin, James W.	21 July 1943
Lieut. Barton, Kenneth F.	12 Dec. 1943
Lieut. Begg, Eric G.	19 July 1943
Lieut. Bennett, Leonard J.	14 Apr. 1945
Capt. Bonnell, Franklin H.	10 Dec. 1943
Lieut. Bonner, Robert W.	5 Oct. 1943
Maj. Buchanan, William H.	20 Apr. 1944
Lieut. Church, Edward J. M.	22 July 1943
Lieut. Clark, John A.	23 Mar. 1944
Capt. Conway, John J.	23 May 1944
Capt. Cross, Robert E. M.	8 Feb. 1944
Lieut. Debanke, Frederick T.	6 Feb. 1944
Lieut. Dickinson, Sydney	22 Oct. 1944
Lieut. Fairweather, David I.	28 Jan. 1944
Lieut. Finnerty, Maurice P.	4 Jan. 1945
Lt-Col. Forin, John D.	10 Dec. 1943
Lieut. George, Robert	23 May 1944
Lieut. George, Robert	17 Jan. 1945
Lieut. George, Robert	21 Sept. 1944
Lieut. Gildersleeve, Wilfrid F. J.	24 Oct. 1944
Capt. Glendinning, Haworth L.	4 Apr. 1944
Lieut. Hall, Frank C.	12 July 1943
Lieut. Hanbury, Douglas C.	20 Dec. 1943
A/Capt. Harley, Donald S.	26 Dec. 1943
Lieut. Harley, Donald S.	5 Aug. 1943
Lieut. Harper, David A.	31 Aug. 1944
Lieut. Healy, Felix W.	26 Dec. 1943
Lieut. Henderson, George F.	31 Aug. 1944
A/Capt. Hyndman, William R.	25 Dec. 1943
Lieut. Hyndman, William R.	25 July 1943
Lieut. King, Terrence A. S.	23 Dec. 1944
Lieut. Larose, David H.	9 Dec. 1944

Lieut. Larose, David H.	15 Dec. 1944
Lieut. Leckie, Lorne W.	5 Dec. 1943
Lieut. Leckie, Lorne W.	16 Sept. 1944
A/Maj. Lynch, Stewart	4 Jan. 1945
Capt. Mackenzie, Sir A. G. A.	23 Nov. 1944
Lieut. Manahan, John A.	16 Sept. 1944
Lieut. Martin, Maurice A.	21 July 1943
Lieut. Marvin, Wendell E.	17 Oct. 1944
Lieut. McBride, Leigh M.	5 Aug. 1943
Lieut. McConnell, William S.	23 Feb. 1945
Lieut. McConnell, William S.	24 Feb. 1945
Lieut. McDougall, Robert L.	27 July 1943
Capt. McGuire, William G.	28 Mar. 1944
Lieut. McLauchlin, Donald S.	10 Dec. 1943
Lieut. McLean, John Fletcher	5 Aug. 1943
A/Maj. McLean, John Franklin	23 May 1944
Lieut. McMullen, Arthur H.	15 Dec. 1944
Lieut. McNamara, James R.	25 Jan. 1944
Lieut. McNamara, James R.	13 Feb. 1944
Lieut. Melhuish, William H.	25 July 1943
Capt. Mercer, Allan W.	20 Dec. 1943
Capt. Merritt, Francis W. I.	21 July 1943
Lieut. Milne, Stuart H.	25 Feb. 1945
Lieut. Nageleisen, Douglas A.	19 Dec. 1944
Lieut. Owen, David M.	15 Dec. 1943
Capt. Parker, Basil G.	10 Dec. 1943
Lieut. Perrett, Frank R.	5 Dec. 1943
Capt. Pierce, James D.	5 Nov. 1944
Lieut. Reed, Kenneth W.	13 Dec. 1943
Capt. Rhodes, Dallas C.	15 Dec. 1944
Lieut. Roberts, William L.	23 Jan. 1944
Lieut. Robertson, Henry S.	23 May 1944
Lieut. Robinson, Arthur L.	26 July 1943
Lieut. Scott, John C. M.	21 July 1943
Lieut. Speirs, Harold M.	11 Apr. 1945
A/Maj. Staples, Anthony	4 Jan. 1945
Lieut. Storrs, Andrew T.	27 Dec. 1943
Lieut. Swinton, Robert K.	8 Oct. 1944
Lieut. Swinton, Robert K.	17 Sept. 1944
Capt. Thirlwell, John L.	23 Dec. 1944
Capt. Thomson, Sydney W.	12 July 1943
Lieut. Thurgood, Mervyn F.	19 Sept. 1944
Lieut. Tuck, William D. C.	23 May 1944
Capt. Upton, Terence	12 Apr. 1945
Capt. Vance, Thomas C. B.	6 Dec. 1943
Lieut. Wilson, Richard A.	5 Aug. 1943
Lieut. Wooley, Thomas E.	23 May 1944

K 65848	Pte. Abacherli, Paul F.	5 Aug. 1943
K 52566	A/L/Cpl. Adam, Jim M.	5 Aug. 1943
K 69320	Pte. Adams, Gordon L.	27 Feb. 1944
K 2579	Pte. Adams, Robert S.	14 Apr. 1945
K 52042	Sgt. Adams, Roy A.	29 July 1943
M 16730	Pte. Ajas, Ralph R.	12 Apr. 1945
M 16730	Pte. Ajas, Ralph R.	23 May 1944
K 76329	Pte. Alec, David R.	22 Feb. 1945
K 53351	Pte. Allan, Donald J.	26 Dec. 1944
K 42797	L/Cpl. Allan, Donald S.	19 Sept. 1944
K 53810	Sgt. Allan, James W.	27 Dec. 1943
K 66512	Pte. Allard, George W.	25 Dec. 1943
M 10613	Pte. Allworth, John G.	27 Jan. 1944
M 10613	Pte. Allworth, John G.	4 Jan. 1945
K 67094	Cpl. Andersen, Carl M.	16 Sept. 1944
K 67094	Cpl. Andersen, Carl M.	23 May 1944
K 67094	Cpl. Andersen, Carl M.	6 Dec. 1943
K 52450	Pte. Andersen, Christopher H.	15 Dec. 1943
M106089	Pte. Andersen, Merle M.	24 May 1944
M 65653	Pte. Andrews, George	8 Dec. 1944
M 65653	Pte. Andrews, George	8 Mar. 1945
M 65653	Pte. Andrews, George	17 Oct. 1944
M103076	Pte. Archibald, Neil G.	17 Jan. 1945
M103076	Pte. Archibald, Neil G.	25 Feb. 1945
L 2571	Pte. Armsden, Harry G.	17 Jan. 1945
K 68585	Pte. Armstrong, Russell A.	11 Dec. 1943
K 68585	Pte. Armstrong, Russell A.	18 Oct. 1944
C102058	Pte. Arthur, Charles	20 May 1944
C102058	Pte. Arthur, Charles	21 Feb. 1945
C102058	Pte. Arthur, Charles	3 Sept. 1944
L 54709	Pte. Ask, Julian M.	17 Sept. 1944
K 71029	Pte. Atchison, Gordon S.	22 July 1943
H 18535	Pte. Austin, Norman A.	12 Dec. 1944
K 48465	Pte. Bagstad, Ernest A.	26 Dec. 1943
K 29017	Pte. Baillie, James P.	24 May 1944
K 29017	Pte. Baillie, James P.	18 Oct. 1943
K 45671	Cpl. Bain, Douglas W.	14 Dec. 1944
K 45671	L/Sgt. Bain, Douglas W.	13 Jan. 1945
M103905	Pte. Bakala, Nick	10 Dec. 1943
M103905	Pte. Bakala, Nick	16 Sept. 1944
D 83024	Pte. Baker, Duncan	5 Apr. 1944
D 83024	Pte. Baker, Duncan	23 May 1944
D 77953	L/Cpl. Baker, Duncan	2 Sept. 1944
K 52377	Pte. Baker, Henry	23 May 1944
K 52030	Pte. Ballard, Cecil D.	25 July 1943
D 83024	Pte. Ballard, Kenneth W.	14 Dec. 1944
K 52083	C.Q.M.S. Bamford, Arthur	18 Oct. 1944

L 64843	Pte. Barker, Mersille B.	16 Feb. 1945
L 64843	Pte. Barker, Mersille B.	12 Jan. 1945
L 64843	Pte. Barker, Mersille B.	29 Mar. 1945
K 52941	L/Cpl. Barker, Peter F.	13 Feb. 1944
K 52941	A/Sgt. Barker, Peter F.	17 Sept. 1944
K 53525	Pte. Barlow, James C. C.	22 July 1943
K 53273	Pte. Barnes, Robert J.	22 May 1944
K 76226	Pte. Barr, Douglas W.	11 Dec. 1943
M105906	A/Cpl. Barr. Kenneth S.	17 Sept. 1944
K 69124	Pte. Barrie, James W.	16 Feb. 1945
K 46401	Pte. Bates, Frederick	24 Feb. 1945
M106695	Pte. Bauer, William	18 Apr. 1944
K 52843	Pte. Baxter, Frederick G.	4 June 1944
K 37071	Pte. Beads, James L.	18 July 1943
K 42855	A/Sgt. Beard, William K.	18 Oct. 1944
R 135964	Pte. Beasley, Clifford G.	17 Sept. 1944
B 135964	Pte. Beasley, Clifford G.	25 May 1944
M 9000	Pte. Beaudry, Daniel J.	9 Jan. 1945
D 46107	Pte. Beaulieu, Raymond M.	19 Jan. 1945
D 46107	Pte. Beaulieu, Raymond M.	22 Oct. 1944
K 52443	Pte. Beech, Stewart E. E.	18 Oct. 1943
K 65694	Pte. Beet, Harry C.	19 July 1943
H 87991	Pte. Bell, George H.	22 Apr. 1945
K 3151	Pte. Bellamore, John W. P.	25 Feb. 1945
K 2651	Pte. Bendickson, Oscar L.	12 Jan. 1945
K 52064	Pte. Bennett, Roland J.	30 July 1943
K 67505	Pte. Benoit, David	18 Sept. 1944
L 9871	Pte. Bentz, Philip	23 May 1944
L 9871	Pte. Bentz, Philip	2 Sept. 1944
K 69868	Pte. Berkeley, Kenneth J. A.	23 May 1944
K 52382	Pte. Berkeley, Victor	19 Dec. 1943
M 31479	Pte. Berkholtz, Louis	4 Aug. 1943
A 104918	Pte. Berry, John A.	23 May 1944
K 52059	C. S. M. Biddlecombe, William E.	20 Dec. 1943
M107848	Pte. Bienvenu, Joseph	14 Dec. 1944
H102853	Pte. Bignell, Peter	26 Aug. 1944
M104154	Pte. Bilinsky, Bill W.	9 Dec. 1943
M104154	Pte. Bilinsky, Bill W.	23 May 1944
K 42002	Pte. Bishop, Ernest E.	19 July 1943
K 68639	Pte. Bittle, Frederick	27 Dec. 1943
K 4567	Pte. Bjornson, Barney A.	4 Jan. 1945
K 54065	Pte. Black, Angus W.	27 July 1943
M 15505	Pte. Blackie, William D.	31 July 1943
K 42903	Pte. Blanchard, Cecil R.	17 July 1943
K 42903	Pte. Blanchard, Cecil R.	31 Jan. 1945
K 41578	Pte. Blaney, Archibald H.	19 Jan. 1945
M100225	Pte. Bobowski, John H.	16 Feb. 1945

D143676	Pte. Bockus, Graham A.	12 Apr. 1945
K 71329	Pte. Bohan, John H.	23 May 1944
K 57063	Sgt. Bond, James A.	16 Feb. 1945
K 57532	Cpl. Bond, Victor	25 Apr. 1944
K 41568	Pte. Booth, Laverne G.	14 Apr. 1945
M106713	Pte. Boraas, Iver O.	23 May 1944
K 1841	Pte. Bousfield, John	4 Jan. 1945
K 54079	Cpl. Bowie, George	22 Oct. 1944
K 4366	Pte. Bowie, Harry	14 Apr. 1945
L 106198	Pte. Boyce, Norman W.	17 Jan. 1945
K 49131	Pte. Boyko, Michael	16 Feb. 1945
K 69304	Pte. Boyle, Denis P.	24 Dec. 1943
M100907	Pte. Braconnier, Louis A. B.	24 Aug. 1944
H 70425	A/Cpl. Bradley, Frank R.	23 July 1943
K 70457	Pte. Brickwood, George C.	26 Aug. 1944
K 52369	Pte. Briggs, Frederick	18 Oct. 1943
M 16268	L/Cpl. Brink,Arvid	5 Aug. 1943
M103773	Pte. Brown, Archie B.	11 Dec. 1943
D144504	Pte. Brown, Charles L.	12 Apr. 1945
K 67760	Pte. Brown, Douglas B.	21 July 1943
K 67760	Cpl. Brown, Douglas B.	17 Sept. 1944
K 67760	Pte. Brown, Douglas B.	28 July 1943
K 67760	Pte. Brown, Douglas B.	11 Sept. 1943
K 53689	Pte. Brown, James	12 Apr. 1944
M 39540	Pte. Brown, Joseph W.	9 Dec. 1944
K 52769	A/L/Cpl. Brown, Leonard M.	20 Dec. 1943
K 52769	Pte. Brown, Leonard M.	21 Apr. 1944
K 89715	Pte. Brown, Walter H.	14 Jan. 1945
K 53441	Pte. Brown, William D.	20 Dec. 1943
K 53237	Sgt. Buckley, Denis H.	8 Oct. 1943
K 53970	Pte. Buckley, Walter W.	15 Dec. 1943
K 1587	Pte. Buller, Harry C.	23 Feb. 1945
K 71510	Cpl. Bullock, Harry	20 Dec. 1943
M 1294	Pte. Burleigh, James R. M.	16 Dec. 1944
K 16549	Pte. Burlingham, Herbert H.	17 Feb. 1945
M104747	Pte. Burness, James N.	7 Jan. 1945
K 49292	Pte. Burnett, Emile	5 Apr. 1944
L 101579	Pte. Busby, Robert G.	8 Oct. 1943
K 49167	Pte. Cairney, John	25 Jan. 1944
L 86785	Pte. Cairns, Thomas R.	6 Dec. 1943
K 37026	Pte. Cairns, William	8 Dec. 1943
K 37026	Pte. Cairns, William	31 Aug. 1944
K 73570	Pte. Calhoun, Arthur B.	25 Aug. 1944
K 1317	Pte. Callaghan, Patrick N.	16 Dec. 1944
K 37538	Pte. Cameron, David C.	17 Oct. 1944
B 38179	Cpl. Cameron, Donald R.	23 May 1944
K 52676	Pte. Cameron, John G.	9 Dec. 1943

K 15024	Pte. Campbell, George T.	17 Dec. 1944
L 102891	Pte. Campbell, Harry J.	31 Dec. 1944
H 22219	Pte. Campion, Chester V.	14 Apr. 1945
M102145	Pte. Carlsenius, Lars A.	14 Apr. 1945
K 16347	Pte. Carmichael, Bruce	23 May 1944
L 64262	Pte. Carrier, Henry W.	20 Dec. 1943
K 11190	Pte. Carrington, Gordon V.	21 Dec. 1944
K 11190	Pte. Carrington, Gordon V.	24 May 1944
K 53036	Cpl. Carsell, Quintin L.	26 May 1944
K 48271	A/L/Cpl. Carswell, Colin E.	23 May 1944
M 31218	Pte. Cartwright, Harry	8 Dec. 1943
K 40552	Pte. Casey, Albert D.	14 Dec. 1944
K 50116	Pte. Casper, Edward A.	17 Feb. 1945
K 46193	Pte. Cave, William J.	23 May 1944
M102579	Pte. Chalifoux, Joseph	17 July 1943
L 28022	Pte. Charette, Edwin J.	12 Dec. 1943
M102904	Pte. Charley, Frederick	23 Dec. 1944
M102904	Pte. Charley, Frederick	2 Sept. 1944
K 3250	Pte. Cheer, Dan	10 Jan. 1945
K 46106	L/Cpl. Chrishop, Harry R.	17 Sept. 1944
K 42379	Pte. Christieson, Jack C.	26 Aug. 1944
K 76544	A/Cpl. Clark, Douglas W.	10 Dec. 1943
M 66684	Pte. Clark, James	4 Jan. 1945
M107055	Pte. Clark, Thomas G.	23 May 1944
M107055	Pte. Clark, Thomas G.	20 Sept. 1944
C 52809	Pte. Clarke, Arthur A.	23 Feb. 1945
K 69854	Pte. Clarke, Thomas G.	19 Jan. 1945
K 70985	Pte. Clarricoates, Charles E.	28 July 1943
K 70985	Pte. Clarricoates, Charles E.	9 Dec. 1943
K 42037	L/Cpl. Clayton, John G.	23 Dec. 1944
F 35113	Pte. Cleveland, Carl V.	28 Jan. 1944
U 1810	Pte. Clough, Edwin	19 July 1943
K100069	Pte. Code, Duncan M.	6 Dec. 1943
K100069	Pte. Code, Duncan M.	20 Apr. 1944
K 53071	Pte. Coen, Denis C.	8 Dec. 1943
M 66317	Pte.Coldwell, John A.	20 Dec. 1944
M 66317	Pte. Coldwell, John A.	22 Oct. 1944
M 8731	Pte. Cole, Dale A.	20 Sept. 1944
K 52932	Pte. Collins, Ronald J.	23 May 1944
K 4513	Pte. Conway, John R.	20 Feb. 1945
K 46145	Pte. Cook, Gordon L.	21 Dec. 1944
K 53593	Pte. Cooke, Benjamin B.	5 Aug. 1943
K 53593	Pte. Cooke, Benjamin B.	9 Dec. 1943
K 52452	C.S.M. Cooper, Cedric B.	25 Dec. 1943
M 39010	Pte. Cooper, Hippolyt M.	14 Dec. 1944
K 72655	Pte. Cope, Edward	9 Dec. 1943
K 72655	Pte. Cope, Edward	9 Dec. 1944

C 65501	Pte. Corbett, Lloyd A.	23 May 1944
C 65501	Pte. Corbett, Lloyd A.	17 Sept. 1944
M 16857	Pte. Corpan, Jack D.	23 May 1944
H 46513	Pte. Cosgrave, Peter A.	31 Aug. 1944
M103984	Pte. Cote, Evangeliste	25 Dec. 1943
K 67882	L/Cpl. Cowin, William D.	21 Feb. 1945
K 71604	Pte. Cox, John D.	26 Dec. 1943
L 9788	Pte. Craig, Howard L.	21 Feb. 1945
K 52765	Pte. Craig, Stewart M.	21 July 1943
K 52765	Pte. Craig, Stewart M.	18 Oct. 1943
M105598	Pte. Crawford, Robert M.	23 May 1944
K 66757	Pte. Critchley, Norman	18 Apr. 1944
K 52270	Cpl. Cromb, John	22 July 1943
C 40833	Pte. Crombie, Philip C.	11 Apr. 1945
K 52068	Pte. Cross, Dalziel	12 Apr. 1945
K 53031	Pte. Crowe, Swords, Edward A.	10 Aug. 1943
K 52657	Pte. Cruickshank, William	20 July 1943
L 107511	Pte. Cumberland, Joseph G.	4 Jan. 1945
K608934	Pte. Cummings, Hartley G.	23 Apr. 1945
K 57610	Pte. Cundy, Joseph A.	26 Aug. 1944
M103806	Pte. Cunningham, George	23 May 1944
M103806	Pte. Cunningham, George	24 Feb. 1945
H204549	Pte. Cupp, Lisle K.	23 May 1944
K 67186	Pte. Currie Smith, Gordon J.	28 Dec. 1943
K 45600	Pte. Dainard, Walter G.	9 Jan. 1945
K 52916	Pte. Dale, Douglas H.	17 July 1943
K 52798	Cpl.Davidson,MacPherson	21 July 1943
K 49898	A/Cpl. Davies, Alexander T.	24 May 1944
K 74313	Pte.Davies, John	14 July 1943
K 53528	Pte. Davies, Thomas G.	26 Dec. 1943
M 65339	Pte. Davis, Frank N.	6 Oct. 1943
M102892	Pte. Davis, Orville E.	9 Dec. 1943
K 53118	A/L/Sgt. Daws, George	21 July 1943
K 52787	Pte. Dawson, Roy K.	18 Sept. 1944
M107246	Pte. Dederer, John L.	23 May 1944
M107246	Pte. Dederer, John L	17 Oct. 1944
K 42546	Pte. DeGrazio, John	16 Sept. 1944
K 42546	Pte. DeGrazio, John	11 Apr. 1945
K 42547	Pte. DeGrazio, Michael	20 July 1943
C 77817	Pte. Delahunt, Charles L.	2 Sept. 1944
K 52541	A/Sgt. Delmage, Howard S.	21 July 1943
M 67495	Pte. Delorme, David	8 Oct. 1943
M 67495	Pte. Delorme, David	14 Dec. 1944
M 67495	Pte. Delorme, David	13 May 1944
M 67495	Pte. Delorme, David	17 Sept. 1944
M 17387	Pte. Depagie, Paul H.	4 Sept. 1944
K 70818	A/L/Cpl. Deroche, Ernest I.	21 July 1943

K 53428	Pte. Derry, Maurice F.	23 May 1944
K 67871	A/L/Sgt. DeRuiter, Pieter	8 Oct. 1943
K 67871	Cpl. DeRuiter, Pieter	26 Dec. 1943
K 68715	Pte. Deschene, Raymond	9 Dec. 1943
K 68715	Pte. Deschene, Raymond	13 Feb. 1944
B 17038	Pte. Devoe, James H.	5 Jan. 1945
K 54451	Pte. Dixon, David	26 Jan. 1945
K 54451	Cpl. Dixon, David	28 Aug. 1944
K 54451	Cpl. Dixon, David	24 May 1944
K 54433	Pte. Docksteader, Robert A.	4 Jan. 1945
K 2842	Pte. Dodman, Robert E.	12 Apr. 1945
M106596	Pte. Donaldson, Christopher S.	23 May 1944
M106596	Pte. Donaldson, Christopher S.	20 Sept. 1944
K 53254	Pte. Donohue, Robert J.	23 Dec. 1943
K 48385	Pte. Doran, Robert J.	10 Apr. 1944
K 49041	L/Cpl. Dougall, Ninian	26 Aug. 1944
K 49041	Pte. Dougall, Ninian	23 May 1944
K 49041	Pte. Dougall, Ninian	8 Oct. 1943
K 52571	Pte. Dow, John	18 Oct. 1943
K 52680	Pte. Drake, Ivan	26 July 1943
K 76958	Pte. Drape, Lawrence V.	14 Apr. 1945
K 16426	Pte. Drayton, Ronald J.	19 Sept. 1944
M103495	Pte. Drefko, Anthony	23 May 1944
M103495	Pte. Drefko, Anthony	23 Feb. 1945
K 42986	Sgt. Driemel, Hugo E.	23 May 1944
M102221	Pte. Dudley, John	20 Dec. 1943
M102221	Pte. Dudley, John	21 July 1943
H103396	Pte. Dumka, Alex	12 Jan. 1945
H103396	Pte. Dumka, Alex	21 Sept. 1944
H 19400	L/Cpl. Duncan, Allen C.	13 Jan. 1945
H 19400	A/Cpl. Duncan, Allen C.	11 Feb. 1945
L 154085	A/L/Cpl. Dupuis, Joseph A.	28 Dec. 1943
L 154085	A/Cpl. Dupuis, Joseph A.	28 Aug. 1944
B 131651	Pte. Durack, Willard J.	23 May 1944
K 49799	Pte. Durrant, John A.	22 Oct. 1944
K 49957	Pte. Dutli, Carl A.	26 Dec. 1943
K 53933	Cpl. Duxbury, John B.	15 Dec. 1943
K 52471	Pte. Eade, James H.	29 Mar. 1943
M 36674	Pte. Earl, Clarence E.	7 Oct. 1943
M 36674	Pte. Earl, Clarence E.	10 Dec. 1943
K 40919	Pte. Earnshaw, Herman H.	30 Jan. 1944
K 65082	Pte. Eely, Raymond W.	24 Feb. 1945
M103423	Pte. Ehrman, Gilbert	21 July 1943
L 154015	Pte. Ell, Markus	6 Aug. 1943
L 13775	Pte. Elliott, Lloyd W.	9 Dec. 1944
L 13775	Pte. Elliott, Lloyd W.	23 May 1944
K 52127	A/Sgt. Ellis, Eric G.	28 July 1943

K 72914	Pte. Elmore, Lloyd R.	20 July 1943
K 85494	Pte. English, James W.	9 Dec. 1943
K 85494	Pte. English, James W.	13 Jan. 1945
K 42689	Pte. English, Percy G. D.	15 Dec. 1944
K 50372	Pte. Erickson, George	25 Jan. 1944
K 52158	Pte. Esselmont, James J.	22 Feb. 1945
K 65250	Pte. Everson, Rodney P.	21 July 1943
K 65250	Pte. Everson, Rodney P.	25 May 1944
K 72912	Pte. Ewart, Robert A.	26 July 1943
K 52090	A/Sgt. Farmer, Alexander	19 July 1943
D 82686	Pte. Farmer, William C.	15 Dec. 1943
K 42014	C. Q. M. S. Farquharson, James G.	4 Dec. 1944
L 65678	Pte. Farrar, Kenneth N.	22 Feb. 1945
K 74361	Pte. Fast, Daniel G.	2 Sept. 1944
U 2021	Pte. Fedrick, Francis W.	10 Dec. 1943
M 60452	Pte. Feenstra, Tys	6 Dec. 1943
M105712	Pte. Fenske, James F.	15 Jan. 1945
K 65268	Pte. Fergie, Arthur L.	14 July 1943
K 65268	Pte. Fergie, Arthur L.	26 Aug. 1944
K 53763	Pte. Ferguson, Alexander W.	7 Apr. 1944
M 38876	Pte. Ferguson, Donald	18 Oct. 1944
B 119245	Pte. Ferguson, Leonard C.	12 Apr. 1945
K 53256	Pte. Fernandez, Benjamen F.	16 Jan. 1944
K 76246	Pte. Ferrier, James N.	14 Dec. 1944
K 52948	Pte. Ferrier, Walter A.	17 Feb. 1945
L 84697	Pte. Fetsch, John P.	26 Dec. 1943
L 84697	Pte. Fetsch, John P.	8 Feb. 1944
K 43528	Pte. Finer, Allen R.	8 Oct. 1943
M106677	L/Cpl. Finlan, John A.	18 Sept. 1944
K 40109	Pte. Fletcher, George F.	23 May 1944
K 52114	A/L/Cpl. Flett, Reginald L.	29 July 1943
H 7192	Pte. Florentine, Harry	12 Apr. 1944
L 154086	Pte. Folk, Mike	7 Aug. 1943
H 7224	Pte. Ford, Francis J.	26 Dec. 1943
H 7224	L/Cpl. Ford, Francis J.	17 Sept. 1944
K 66584	Pte. Foreman, Robert L.	20 May 1944
K 66584	Pte. Foreman, Robert L.	4 Jan. 1945
K 66584	Pte. Foreman, Robert L.	28 Dec. 1943
K 52115	Pte. Forrester, Ralph	17 July 1943
K 53879	A/Sgt. Forsen, Ivor	17 Sept. 1944
K 53287	Pte. Forsyth, Douglas W.	10 July 1943
K 76474	Pte. Fortier, Edward	11 Apr. 1945
C 123605	Pte. Fox, Ernest E.	14 Dec. 1944
L 66352	Pte. Francis, James A.	30 Mar. 1944
M106662	Pte. Fraser, George H.	14 Apr. 1944
L 372	Pte. Frazer, William C.	23 Jan. 1945
K 57790	A/L/Cpl. Freeland, Card A. J.	16 Apr. 1944

K 53555	A/L/Cpl. Freeman, Philip M.	5 Apr. 1944
K 53555	Pte. Freeman, Philip M.	19 Feb. 1945
K 53191	Pte. French, Alfred	16 Sept. 1944
M107273	Pte. Friesen, Arnold	4 Feb. 1944
M106488	Pte. Frieze, Harold R.	1 June 1944
K 50103	Pte. Frocklage, Albert L.	23 May 1944
K 42445	Pte. Frolek, Robert	23 May 1944
K 42445	Pte. Frolek, Robert	31 Aug. 1944
K 53586	Pte. Gallagher, Donald J.	25 Dec. 1943
K 53586	Pte. Gallagher, Donald J.	17 Sept. 1944
C 39541	Pte. Galligan, Francis	4 Feb. 1944
M 12250	Pte. Garth, Herbert W.	25 May 1944
M 8541	Pte. Gascon, Edward P.	11 Jan. 1945
M 8541	Pte. Gascon, Edward P.	20 Sept. 1944
K 42988	A/Sgt. Gaspard, Leslie P.	26 Aug. 1944
K 50773	Pte. Gaudreau, Lionel D. J.	23 May 1944
K 53489	Pte. Gauthier, Philip R.	22 Feb. 1945
K 75134	Pte. Gawne, Harry K.	5 Aug. 1943
M103955	Pte. Geliassen, Oskar B.	13 Dec. 1944
M103955	Pte. Geliassen, Oskar B.	4 Jan. 1945
M103955	Pte. Geliassen, Oskar B.	17 Sept. 1944
L 64578	Pte. Genaille, Dominic	23 May 1944
M102526	Pte. Gendreau, Russell E.	15 Dec. 1944
M104880	Pte. Gerow, Alfred B.	23 May 1944
B 9008	A/Cpl. Gertzbein, Albert	11 Apr. 1945
K 53603	Pte. Gibson, Forest	17 Jan. 1945
K 42783	Pte. Gilbert, Melvin E.	9 Dec. 1943
B 157766	Pte. Gillard, Wilfred G.	20 Sept. 1944
K 70352	Pte. Gillen, Edward W.	17 Oct. 1944
M103571	Pte. Gillespie, Gordon W.	10 July 1943
K 69749	Pte. Gillespie, William V.	23 May 1944
D 71915	Pte. Gilmore, George S.	27 Dec. 1943
K 52156	Pte. Gilmore, Robert G.	7 Oct. 1943
D135201	Pte. Gingell, Russell G.	12 Apr. 1945
K 52122	A/Cpl. Giraud, Byng T.	5 Aug. 1943
K 49298	Pte. Giroday, Moerens J.	21 Dec. 1944
M106619	Pte. Gladstone, Gerald L.	23 May 1944
K 53596	Pte. Glasgow, Ford W.	12 Dec. 1943
B 157021	Pte. Glenn, George J.	17 Sept. 1944
M107011	Pte. Glover, Edward J.	16 Jan. 1945
K 1989	Pte. Goldsmith, Leonard D.	25 Feb. 1945
K 70970	Pte. Goodell, Frank	8 Dec. 1943
M106953	Pte. Gordon, Charles W.	22 Jan. 1944
K 18027	Pte. Goriuk, Michael	21 July 1943
A 47614	A/Cpl. Goss, Eric L.	26 Dec. 1943
K 52123	Pte. Goucher, William T. C.	19 July 1943
M107135	Pte. Gouldie, James A.	27 Dec. 1943

K 52688	Cpl. Graham, Hugh T. M.	8 Dec. 1943
K 2461	Pte. Graham, Lloyd H.	21 July 1943
K 46215	Pte. Graham, Robert J.	20 July 1943
K 42811	A/L/Cpl. Grant, Charles M.	20 Dec. 1943
K 42811	Pte. Grant, Charles M.	11 Feb. 1945
K 52130	Pte. Grant, Wilford D.	23 Oct. 1944
K 53179	Sgt. Greengrass, Robert	23 Oct. 1944
K 38638	Pte. Greenhough, Henry B.	22 July 1943
K 53107	Pte. Gregory, Mark	15 Mar. 1944
H 7039	Pte. Griffin, Daniel	6 Dec. 1943
K 49750	Pte. Grinder, James E.	20 Sept. 1944
K 51130	Pte. Grinder, Joseph F.	5 Apr. 1944
K 51130	Pte. Grinder, Joseph F.	14 Apr. 1944
B 144146	Pte. Gruenig, Ernest J.	23 May 1944
K 40242	Pte. Gulbransen, Maurice	14 Dec. 1944
K 2496	Pte. Gunn, Benjamin W.	16 Dec. 1944
K 2496	Pte. Gunn, Benjamin W.	23 Feb. 1945
K 38669	A/Cpl. Gunter, Ernest E.	22 July 1943
K 50530	A/Cpl. Gustafson, Karl J.	17 Oct. 1944
K 67553	A/Cpl. Hadden, Alexander	21 July 1943
K 48806	Pte. Haddrell, Claude D.	1 Sept. 1944
K 75209	Pte. Haimes, Wilfred J.	5 Aug. 1943
K 2633	Pte. Hall, Edward R.	23 Feb. 1945
F 56754	Pte. Hall, Robert T.	17 Dec. 1944
K 2311	Pte. Halliday, Dennis C.	14 Dec. 1944
K 69944	Pte. Halliday, John	20 Sept. 1944
K 74749	A/L/Cpl. Hamann, Henry R.	5 Aug. 1943
K 53589	L/Cpl. Hamer, Jack	11 Dec. 1943
K 53589	Pte. Hamer, Jack	1 June 1944
K 49283	Pte. Hamilton, William G.	25 Jan. 1944
K 50623	L/Cpl. Hammer, Einar	15 Dec. 1944
K 52143	Cpl. Hammond, Harold R.	30 Jan. 1944
K 42939	Pte. Hampton, Howard	15 Dec. 1943
M102344	Pte. Hanson, Vernon A.	23 May 1944
K 42990	Pte. Harasymchuk, James	5 Aug. 1943
K 53209	Pte. Harding, Edward	21 July 1943
H102286	Pte. Harnett, George T.	26 Dec. 1943
K 52632	A/L/Cpl. Harris, Angus K.	10 Dec. 1943
K 67770	L/Cpl. Harris, Arthur J.	15 Dec. 1944
K 15920	Pte. Harris, Vernon	24 Feb. 1945
L 24011	A/L/Cpl. Hassall, Percy G.	27 Dec. 1943
L 24011	A/Cpl. Hassall, Percy G.	22 Oct. 1944
M 10767	L/Cpl. Hastings, John	31 Aug. 1944
F 20511	Pte. Hayes, David E.	23 Feb. 1945
F 20511	Pte. Hayes, David E.	26 Aug. 1944
L 86565	Pte. Head, Donald W.	16 Sept. 1944
B 55646	A/Cpl. Heggie, David B.	11 Feb. 1945

B 55646	Pte. Heggie, David B.	24 May 1944
K 74136	Pte. Henderson, George F. A.	18 Oct. 1944
K 53130	Pte. Henderson, William	14 Dec. 1943
F 56688	Pte. Hendsbee, James L.	27 Dec. 1943
K 52436	Pte. Hennessy, Arthur M.	19 July 1943
H100472	Pte. Henry, Donald M.	18 Oct. 1943
E 52615	Pte. Herman, Michael	26 Dec. 1943
K 52145	Pte. Hickman, Thomas E.	16 July 1943
K 52145	Cpl. Hickman, Thomas E.	19 Oct. 1944
K 52952	Pte. Hill, James S.	5 Aug. 1943
K 52092	L/Cpl. Hill, Patrick G.	24 Feb. 1945
M 7747	Pte. Hillary, Peter H.	14 Apr. 1945
B 37947	Pte. Himmen, Herbert M.	12 Apr. 1945
H 19340	Pte. Hitchens, Leonard J.	18 Sept. 1944
B134190	Pte. Hmiel, Steven	23 May 1944
H 18515	Pte. Hnatiw, August	12 Apr. 1945
H 18515	Pte. Hnatiw, August	21 Feb. 1945
K 66685	Pte. Hoag, James N.	10 Dec. 1943
K 50669	Pte. Hoff, William M.	23 May 1944
H101390	Pte. Hogg, George W.	8 Dec. 1943
K 88028	Pte. Holden, Donald C.	10 Dec. 1943
K 88028	A/Cpl. Holden, Donald C.	4 Sept. 1944
K 42323	Pte. Hollingsworth, Forman	20 July 1943
K 42326	Pte. Hollingsworth, John A.	28 July 1943
K 42326	Pte. Hollingsworth, John A.	11 Dec. 1943
K 52539	Pte. Holman, Henry S.	3 May 1944
K 50507	Pte. Holmes, Cecil C.	16 Sept. 1944
K 52519	Cpl. Holmes, George O.	26 Dec. 1943
K 52519	Cpl. Holmes, George O.	19 July 1943
M103490	Pte. Hopaluk, Paul	24 Dec. 1943
M103490	Pte. Hopaluk, Paul	4 Jan. 1945
A105010	Pte. Hortop, John W.	11 Feb. 1945
B 70325	Pte. Hough, Arthur I.	21 Jan. 1944
B 70325	Cpl. Hough, Arthur I.	17 Dec. 1944
K 54514	Pte. Houghton, Raymond F.	4 Sept. 1944
D118173	L/Cpl. House, Jerry	19 Feb. 1945
K 54056	Pte. Houston, Samuel G. T.	23 May 1944
M 12409	Pte. Hoyle, Leonard T.	6 Dec. 1943
U 2055	Pte. Hudson, Herbert A.	23 Jan. 1944
U 2055	Pte. Hudson, Herbert A.	27 Feb. 1944
A 37739	Pte. Hughes, Harry J.	25 Jan. 1944
K 69028	Pte. Hughes, Hugh R.	24 May 1944
K 42417	Pte. Huml, Jack T.	10 July 1943
M 55517	Pte. Hunt, Leonard J.	24 Feb. 1945
K 52802	Pte. Hyra, John	28 Dec. 1943
K 68816	Cpl. Ironmonger, George	23 May 1944
K 68816	Cpl. Ironmonger, George	17 Sept. 1944

K 62237	Pte. Irvine, William	27 Dec. 1943
K 65683	Pte. Irving, George	26 Dec. 1943
M 28637	Pte. Isaak, Leonard	8 Oct. 1943
M 28637	Pte. Isaak, Leonard	17 Sept. 1944
K 57036	Sgt. Jackson, Frederick E. M.	23 Dec. 1943
K 50421	A/Cpl. Jacobsen, Paul F.	23 May 1944
L 154033	Pte. Jelinski, Edmund A.	5 Aug. 1943
L 154033	Pte. Jelinski, Edmund A.	14 Dec. 1943
K 53360	A/Cpl. Jenkins, Raymond E.	7 Oct. 1943
K 53360	A/Sgt. Jenkins, Raymond E.	17 Sept. 1944
M101876	Pte. Jeske, Emil	19 July 1943
M 53104	Pte. Johnson, Carl	19 July 1943
K 53717	Pte. Johnson, Charles M.	23 May 1944
K 53717	Pte. Johnson, Charles M.	17 Oct. 1944
C 37865	Pte. Johnson, Christopher A.	11 Feb. 1945
L 91609	Pte. Johnson, Helmer J.	31 Dec. 1944
H 20425	Pte. Johnson, Herbert J.	28 Apr. 1944
A 22563	Cpl. Johnson, Jack A.	31 May 1944
A 22563	Cpl. Johnson, Jack A.	8 Feb. 1944
M102471	Pte. Johnson, Lester L.	20 Dec. 1943
L 107883	Pte. Johnson, Murl R.	14 Dec. 1944
K 50989	L/Cpl. Johnston, Harold A.	4 Sept. 1944
K 68547	Pte. Johnston, Hugh	20 Dec. 1943
L 106222	Pte. Johnston, James H.	24 May 1944
L 106222	Pte. Johnston, James H.	18 Oct. 1944
K 2573	Pte. Johnston, James R.	9 Dec. 1944
A 76168	A/Cpl. Johnston, Robert B.	23 Jan. 1945
K 98156	Pte. Johnstone, Ralph W.	22 Oct. 1944
K 98156	Pte. Johnstone, Ralph W.	22 Feb. 1945
K 1493	Pte. Joseph, Sammy	13 Feb. 1945
K 54698	Pte. Kacer, George F.	20 Sept. 1944
K 69461	Pte. Kaueniuk, Walter	24 May 1944
K 53409	Pte. Kain, John J.	13 Dec. 1943
K 52906	Cpl. Kalinauskas, John	14 Dec. 1944
K 65038	Pte. Kalusik, Lloyd F.	8 Oct. 1943
M103539	Pte. Kandt, Rayman	5 Oct. 1943
K 46738	A/Cpl. Kay, Lloyd G.	19 July 1943
L 105180	Pte. Kelly, Gordon W.	16 Sept. 1944
K 54066	Pte. Kelton, Richard P.	4 Feb. 1944
K 54066	Cpl. Kelton, Richard P.	26 Aug. 1944
K 52560	Pte. Kennedy, Gerald M.	19 July 1943
K 49082	Pte. Kiloh, Arthur J.	21 Dec. 1944
K 69832	Pte. Kindred, Elmer I.	23 Feb. 1944
K 53211	Pte. King, Arthur E.	10 July 1943
K 52576	Pte. Kinnear, John	19 July 1943
B157989	Pte. Kirk, Dwayne E.	17 Sept. 1944
K 37061	Pte. Klassen, Peter H.	20 July 1943

K 57688	Pte. Klinger, Gustav	27 July 1943
K 29095	L/Cpl. Kneuss, George E.	12 Apr. 1945
K 51396	Pte. Knotts, Walter E.	17 Sept. 1944
D 77465	Pte. Kobelt, James H.	12 Jan. 1945
B 70336	Pte. Kotovich, John	10 May 1944
B 70336	L/Cpl. Kotovich, John	20 Sept. 1944
H 11091	Pte. Kraichy, Nickolas	13 Apr. 1945
K 67830	A/L/Cpl. Kruger, John	6 Dec. 1943
K 67830	Cpl. Kruger, John	15 Feb. 1945
K 50575	Pte. Kuzma, Peter	31 Jan. 1944
K 52012	A/Cpl. Labrie, Peter C.	28 July 1943
K 47355	Pte. Lacour, Peter	21 July 1943
K 42556	Sgt. Ladislaus, John	18 Sept. 1944
M102545	Pte. Ladouceur, William O.	22 Oct. 1944
M102545	Pte. Ladouceur, William O.	6 Dec. 1943
M102545	Pte. Ladouceur, William O.	24 May 1944
M105705	Pte. Lafleur, Solomon N.	23 May 1944
K 51269	Pte. Lamb, Robert G.	31 Aug. 1944
K 18046	Pte. Langhorn, Alfred H.	9 Dec. 1943
D125154	Pte. Lapierre, Joseph C.	26 Dec. 1943
H 19610	L/Sgt. Larocque, Henry A.	17 Sept. 1944
K 52153	Pte. Larsen, Harold	21 July 1943
L103692	Pte. Larson, Harold	12 Feb. 1945
H 20554	A/Cpl. Larson, William A.	7 Aug. 1943
K 76929	Pte. Last, Walter R.	27 July 1943
K 51353	Pte. Laursen, Allyn C.	31 May 1944
K 51974	Pte. Lavineway, Bernard G.	17 Sept. 1944
K 53174	Pte. Law, William	19 July 1943
M 15924	Pte. Lawrence, James H.	28 Aug. 1944
G 4614	Pte. Lawton, George H.	26 Aug. 1944
K 52395	CSM Lay, Harry	21 Oct. 1944
L 105029	Pte. Leas, Elmer A.	17 Sept. 1944
K 37060	L/Cpl. Lebans, Ralph M.	15 Dec. 1944
K 37060	Pte. Lebans, Ralph M.	4 Aug. 1943
K 53193	Pte. Le Beau, Ralph G.	31 July 1943
K 50695	Pte. Leclair, Raymond J.	16 Dec. 1944
K 50695	Pte. Leclair, Raymond J.	31 May 1944
B 117300	Pte. Leduc, Leo	12 Apr. 1945
K 50667	Pte. Lee, Rodney B.	4 Feb. 1944
K 42803	Pte. Lenoire, Lucien G.	26 July 1943
K 52606	L/Sgt. Leon, Robert P.	22 Oct. 1944
H 7107	Pte. Leroux, Edward	12 Apr. 1945
H 7107	Pte. Leroux, Edward	11 Sept. 1944
K 53100	Pte. Lewendon, Robert E.	28 July 1943
L104189	Pte. Lick, Edward H.	17 Oct. 1944
H 9202	Pte. Lindal, Oliver F.	22 Oct. 1944
H 9202	Pte. Lindal, Oliver F.	14 Dec. 1944

H 9202	Pte. Lindal, Oliver F.	31 Aug. 1944
K 74613	Pte. Lipsey, Francis G.	8 Dec. 1944
K 74613	Pte. Lipsey, Francis G.	12 Dec. 1944
K 74613	Pte. Lipsey, Francis G.	23 May 1944
M 11382	Pte. Loewen, James J.	14 Apr. 1944
K 50076	Cpl. Logan, Robert G.	9 Jan. 1945
K 50076	Cpl. Logan, Robert G.	17 Jan. 1945
K 50076	Cpl. Logan, Robert G.	14 Feb. 1945
M 56932	Pte. Logue, Louis J.	6 Dec. 1943
B 52372	L/Cpl. Luddington, Leonard F.	14 Apr. 1945
L153542	Pte. Lupichuk, Peter	14 Dec. 1944
B 53982	Pte. Lynch, Raymond	14 Apr. 1945
K 85416	Pte. Lytton, Brian C.	13 Feb. 1945
K 52313	Pte. Macaskill, Dosald A.	29 July 1943
K 69138	Pte. Macaulay, John M.	10 Dec. 1943
K 52200	CSM MacDonald, Augus J.	8 Dec. 1944
K 42641	Pte. MacDonald, Donald R.	17 Dec. 1943
K 54572	Pte. MacDonald, Roderick D.	26 Aug. 1944
K 54572	Pte. MacDonald, Roderick D.	17 Oct. 1944
K 53355	Pte. Macintosh Angus M.	23 Jan. 1944
M106936	Pte. Mackay, Daniel F.	21 Sept. 1944
K 2344	Pte. Mackay, Norman	17 Sept. 1944
K 10227	Pte. Mackay, Robert J.	13 July 1943
D 76953	Sgt. Mackay, Ross	26 Dec. 1943
D 76953	Sgt. Mackay, Ross	26 Aug. 1944
K 3950	Pte. Mackenzie, Alexander T.	25 Apr. 1945
K 50653	Pte. Mackillop, Ian A.	26 Aug. 1944
K 52582	Pte. Maclean, Donald J.	19 July 1943
L105384	Pte. Macrae, William J. A.	31 May 1944
F 33417	Pte. Magliaro, Anthony	18 Feb. 1945
M106645	Pte. Malinsky, George	9 Dec. 1943
K 67344	Pte. Mallett, Frederick J.	24 Dec. 1943
D140533	Pte. Mallette, Raymond D.	26 Aug. 1944
D140070	Pte. Mandigo, Kenneth I.	23 Dec. 1944
R146036	Pte. Marecki, Marian	14 Dec. 1944
K 53066	Cpl. Marsland, Frederick	13 Dec. 1943
K 50030	Pte. Martin, John T.	22 Oct. 1944
K 50992	Pte. Mathers, Robert G.	16 Dec. 1944
K 48759	Pte. Mathews, Burtis	28 Aug. 1944
F 2595	Pte. Mattatall, Harold E.	23 May 1944
K 65443	Pte. Mauro, Pete	14 Dec. 1944
K 49509	Pte. Maxwell, Donald S.	26 Dec. 1943
D141250	Pte. May, Robert S.	31 May 1944
M101741	Pte. Mazar, Metro	12 Feb. 1944
M101741	Pte. Mazar, Metro	24 May 1944
K 52518	Pte. McBride, Jack G.	19 July 1943
K 52188	Sgt. McCondach, Hugh W.	21 July 1943

K 52134	Pte. McConnell, Leslie H.	22 July 1943
K 52198	A/L/Cpl. McConnell, Lester H.	18 Oct. 1943
D135864	Pte. McCormick, John D.	12 Dec. 1943
M100469	Pte. McCracken, Wilbur R.	18 Oct. 1943
D 86285	Cpl. McCrea, Francis K.	18 Mar. 1944
D 86285	Sgt. McCrea, Francis K.	4 Jan. 1945
L 105005	Pte. McCubbin, Wilfred W.	22 Oct. 1944
L 105005	Pte. McCubbin, Wilfred W.	2 Sept. 1944
K 42007	Pte. McCurdy, William N.	21 Oct. 1940
F 50698	Pte. McCutcheon, Colin G.	17 Sept. 1944
K 52212	Pte. McDonald, William J. B.	24 July 1943
K 37058	Pte. McDonnell, Robert A.	8 Oct. 1943
K 37058	Pte. McDonnell, Robert A.	9 Dec. 1943
B 93567	Pte. McGhee, Robert	23 May 1944
M103878	Pte. McGregor, James W.	14 Dec. 1944
K 69514	Pte. McHallam, Peter B.	3 Sept. 1944
M104742	Pte. McHarg, Orville A.	17 Oct. 1944
K 52504	Pte. McHenry, Donald F.	13 Dec. 1943
C102821	Pte. McIlvenna, William J.	31 May 1944
K 52193	CSM McIntosh, Donald J.	9 Dec. 1943
K 50580	Pte. McIntyre, Arnold J.	21 Dec. 1944
K 72762	Pte. McKay, Alexander A.	15 Dec. 1943
K 51157	L/Cpl. McKay, John V.	7 Apr. 1945
L 67438	Pte. McKay, Lorne E.	8 Oct. 1943
B100072	Pte. McKellar, William C.A.	12 Apr. 1945
B 100072	Pte. McKellar, William C.A.	18 Sept. 1944
K 42955	Pte. McKenna, John J.	10 July 1943
M106020	Pte. McLeod, David M. M.	9 Jan. 1945
K 65205	Pte. McLeod, John	5 Aug. 1943
K 65919	Pte. McMath, Robert A.	25 Feb. 1945
K 52589	A/Cpl. McMillan, Jack G.	28 July 1943
K 52589	L/Cpl. McMillan, Jack G.	13 Feb. 1944
K 50383	Pte. McMow, James J.	23 May 1944
K 52725	Pte. McMullen, Edward M.	6 Oct. 1943
H 20085	A/C SM McNaughton, William G.	20 Mar. 1944
H 20085	CSM McNaughton, William G.	18 Oct. 1944
K 98595	A/L/Cpl. McParlon, George L.	5 Aug. 1943
K 51046	Pte. McParlon, Harold H. M.	23 May 1944
M107020	Pte. McPhedran, Stanley	4 Jan. 1945
K 74808	Pte. McPhee, Frederick J.	20 July 1943
K 66704	Pte. McWilliams, Douglas A.	17 Sept. 1944
K 53195	A/Cpl. McWilliams, Robert	8 Oct. 1943
K 47972	Pte. Melnyk, Edward	10 Dec. 1943
M105723	Pte. Melvin, Norman W.	14 Dec. 1944
M105723	Pte. Melvin, Norman W.	19 Oct. 1944
K 41071	Pte. Mercer, Robert J.	23 May 1944
M 60520	Pte. Merkley, Oliver M.	9 Dec. 1943

G 15006	Pte. Merritt, John H. R.	7 Mar. 1944
K 53678	Pte. Metcalfe, Wilfred A.	29 July 1943
K 53678	Sgt. Metcalfe, Wilfred A.	14 Dec. 1944
K 53678	A/Cpl. Metcalfe, Wilfred A.	22 Jan. 1944
L102959	Pte. Meyers, Henry	16 Sept. 1944
K 69789	Cpl. Middleton, Thomas H.	26 Dec. 1943
K 52292	Pte. Millar, Alexander T.	23 May 1944
M 65640	Pte. Millar, Sinclair G.	18 Jan. 1945
D140619	Pte. Miller, Edgar C.	20 Sept. 1944
B 46915	Pte. Miller, Harris W.	20 Dec. 1943
L 54910	Pte. Millward, Donald G.	17 Jan. 1945
K 67851	A/Cpl. Mitchell, George T.	23 May 1944
D 71575	L/Cpl. Mitchell, Jack C.	12 Jan. 1945
K 1733	Pte. Mitchell, Raymond A.	20 Sept. 1944
B143775	Pte. Mitchell, William D.	23 May 1944
B 156270	Pte. Moase, John D.	14 Apr. 1945
A108080	Pte. Moffat, Gordon K.	19 Feb. 1945
K 67235	Pte. Moir, Kenneth	26 July 1943
K 51491	Pte. Molland, Richard H.	23 May 1944
K 51491	Pte. Molland, Richard H.	17 Sept. 1944
K 53605	Pte. Montgomery, Harold W.	11 Jan. 1945
K 52974	Pte. Montgomery, Martin A.	14 Nov. 1944
K 52809	Pte. Montgomery, William	26 July 1943
K 52809	Pte. Montgomery, William	23 May 1944
C102840	Pte. Moore, Charles M.	12 Apr. 1945
C102840	Pte. Moore, Charles M.	6 Feb. 1945
D140069	Pte. Moore, Walter	1 June 1944
K 48476	Pte. Moran, Ford A.	22 Dec. 1943
L105537	Pte. Morange, Joseph P.	17 Sept. 1944
K 52865	Pte. Morgan, Edward	19 July 1943
K 52217	Cpl. Morris, Jack	29 Apr. 1944
D 77508	Pte. Morris, Saul	14 Apr. 1945
D 77434	Pte. Mosdell, Harold B.	15 Dec. 1944
D 77434	L/Cpl. Mosdell, Harold B.	21 Feb. 1945
K 42023	Sgt. Mottl, Joe	27 July 1943
K 42085	A/Sgt. Mountford, Gordon E.	5 Aug. 1943
K 42085	Cpl.Mountford, Gordon E.	23 Dec. 1943
C120770	Pte. Muchmore, Lawrence V.	22 Oct. 1944
C120770	Pte. Muchmore, Lawrence V.	24 May 1944
M104375	Pte. Mullen, William	17 Jan. 1945
K 52996	L/Sgt. Munro, George D.	12 Feb. 1944
K 71359	Cpl. Munro, Gillespie H.	17 Sept. 1944
K 52235	Pte. Munro, Hugh M.	1 Aug. 1943
K 53963	Pte. Munro, Robert K.	26 Aug. 1944
K 49152	Pte. Murphy, Terrence P.	14 Dec. 1944
K 49152	Pte. Murphy, Terrence P.	16 Apr. 1944
K 69395	Cpl. Murphy, Verdun A.	23 Dec. 1944

K 50711	Pte. Murray, Arthur L.	18 Sept. 1944
M 53056	A/L/Cpl. Murray, Donald S.	5 Aug. 1943
M 53056	Pte. Murray, Donald S.	22 Oct. 1944
K 76939	Sgt. Murray, James F.	31 May 1944
K 67909	L/Cpl. Murray, Robert F. J.	22 Dec. 1943
M103365	Pte. Murray, William	20 July 1943
K 53426	Pte. Murray, Wiliam G.	17 Sept. 1944
F 56378	Pte. Myers, Eugene E.	24 May 1944
H204724	Pte. Myhal, Walter	15 Feb. 1945
H 14810	Pte. Myles, William L.	14 Apr. 1945
D139194	Pte. Nadler, Morris S.	14 Apr. 1945
D139194	Pte. Nadler, Morris S.	9 Dec. 1944
D 72003	Pte. Nadon, Gerard O.	21 July 1943
K 52207	Cpl. Neely, Alexander	21 Nov. 1944
K 75503	Pte. Neilson, Carl E.	5 Aug. 1943
K 50516	Pte. Neilson, John F.	25 Jan. 1944
K 49081	Pte. Nelson, Earl G.	25 Dec. 1943
B145221	Pte. Nelson, Earl T.	31 May 1944
M105529	Pte. Nelson, Melvin A.	21 Jan. 1944
K 52289	L/Cpl. Nevin, Henry A.	9 Dec. 1944
K 43512	Pte. Newell, Cecil W.	19 July 1943
F 79651	Pte. Nicholson, Alex J.	27 Dec. 1943
F 56482	Pte. Nickerson, Edsel J.	23 Jan. 1944
M106133	Cpl. Nickiforek, Nick	20 Sept. 1944
M102929	Pte. Nickle, John	6 Aug. 1943
K 52875	Pte. Nicol, Arthur	19 July 1943
K 42681	Pte. Nicol, William A.	17 Dec. 1943
B131985	Pte. Niemi, Tykko O.	21 July 1943
U 1721	Pte. Nimmo, Richard E.	13 Apr. 1945
K 53117	A/Cpl. Nixon, Allan T.	23 Dec. 1943
M 65376	Pte. Northey, Arthur E.	20 July 1943
K 62490	Pte. Northey, Robert A.	26 July 1943
K 51750	Pte. Nowlin, Howard F.	9 Jan. 1945
K 54064	Pte. Nyschuk, Mike M.	27 Dec. 1943
E 26321	Pte. OFarrell, James G. M.	11 Feb. 1945
K 52685	Cpl. Ohling, Oke E.	25 July 1943
A115763	Pte. Oliver, Hugh F.	12 Apr. 1945
B 54983	Pte. Olsen, Ole E.	8 Feb. 1944
K 43534	A/Cpl. Olson, Floyd L.	12 Dec. 1943
K 48727	Pte. Olson, Myrl C.	23 May 1944
M105216	Pte. Orlando, Gino	17 Sept. 1944
B143533	Pte. Osmun, William E.	27 Dec. 1943
B 143533	Pte. Osmun, William E.	24 Jan. 1945
D 72125	Pte. Owens, Frederick S. P.	21 July 1943
K 63064	A/L/Cpl. Palmer, Lloyd W.	17 Dec. 1943
B 82236	Pte. Palmer, Norman W.	25 Feb. 1945
K 52807	L/Cpl. Park, Thomas P.	5 Aug. 1943

K 48272	Pte. Park, William J.	20 Dec. 1943
U 1938	A/L/Cpl. Parke, Rowland T. W.	28 July 1943
K 53106	Pte. Parr, Roddy	10 July 1943
K 42924	Pte. Pastor, Frank	28 July 1943
K 50209	Pte. Paterson, Kenneth A.	23 May 1944
K 42288	Pte. Payliss, Frank H.	5 Aug. 1943
L 21027	Pte. Pedersen, Donald N.	4 Jan. 1945
K 52246	A/Cpl. Peebles, Robert	23 May 1944
K 52246	L/Sgt. Peebles, Robert	4 Jan. 1945
K 52329	CSM Penman, Dave R.	16 Sept. 1944
M103542	Pte. Perras, Joseph R. A.	10 Dec. 1943
K 99545	Pte. Perritt, Lloyd G.	21 July 1943
K 53541	Cpl. Peters, Roy L.	16 Nov. 1944
K 52524	Pte. Philion, Paul E.	28 July 1943
K 49446	A/Cpl. Phillips, Frederick J. L.	24 Feb. 1945
C120246	Pte. Pigden, Wallace J.	17 Sept. 1944
K 73746	Pte. Pike, Bruce	13 Dec. 1943
K 54070	Pte. Pike, William D.	17 Dec. 1943
K 54070	Pte. Pike, William D.	5 Aug. 1943
K 54070	Pte. Pike, William D.	4 Apr. 1944
D 71133	Pte. Pinch, Thomas	9 Oct. 1943
K 68552	Pte. Pion, John G.	28 July 1943
M 65588	Pte. Piper, Patrick	15 Dec. 1944
M 65588	Pte. Piper, Patrick	18 Sept. 1944
A 48552	Pte. Pitblado, Leslie W.	14 Jan. 1945
K 52573	Pte. Poppell, Leon	29 Jan. 1944
K 53241	Pte. Porritt, Richard H.	12 Jan. 1945
K 52718	Sgt. Portwood, Walter J.	21 July 1943
E 38210	Pte. Powers, Chester	8 May 1944
H 6984	Pte. Powney, Ernest J.	11 Dec. 1944
K 52752	Pte. Pratt, Alfred W.	21 July 1943
K 52526	Pte. Pratt, Ronald E.	21 Feb. 1944
M 7459	Pte. Price, Jack	23 May 1944
K 53600	Pte. Price, Max G.	10 Feb. 1944
K 67811	Pte. Pringle, Ernest A.	24 May 1944
K 67811	Pte. Pringle, Ernest A.	18 Jan. 1945
H 19043	Pte. Pringle, John G.	26 Aug. 1944
H 19043	A/Cpl. Pringle, John G.	15 Dec. 1944
H101162	Pte. Pringle, Norris H.	9 Jan. 1945
L 66648	Pte. Prongua, Charles V.	17 Sept. 1944
K 67177	Pte. Proudfoot, Archie	5 Aug. 1943
K 50365	A/Cpl. Prygroski, Burney	22 Oct. 1944
K 98149	Pte. Quissy, Ernest	18 Oct. 1944
K 66583	Pte. Rae, Robert	22 July 1943
M106411	Pte. Randall, Walter F.	20 Sept. 1944
K 52258	Cpl. Rankin, Harry	23 May 1944
K 65950	Pte. Reddington, Thomas J.	23 May 1944

K 65950	Pte. Reddington, Thomas J.	18 Jan. 1945
K 62730	Sgt. Reid, John S.	25 Jan. 1944
M 36975	Pte. Reid, Martin O.	27 July 1943
D 71266	Pte. Richardson, David J.	22 July 1943
D 71266	Pte. Richardson, David J.	20 Oct. 1943
K 53290	Pte. Rimmer, Oswald A.	11 Dec. 1943
B 38115	L/Cpl. Rink, Anton R.	31 Aug. 1944
K 62956	Pte. Riseley, John	22 Oct. 1944
K 62956	Pte. Riseley, John	6 Dec. 1943
K 62956	Pte. Riseley, John	25 Feb. 1945
K 43045	Pte. Ritchie, Carleton P.	23 May 1944
C121141	Pte. Roache, Garfield R.	14 Dec. 1944
K 53188	Pte. Roberts, Earl K.	22 July 1943
K 52267	CSM Roberts, Thomas	21 Dec. 1944
K 53760	Pte. Robertson, Alexander	6 Oct. 1943
K 92447	Pte. Robertson, John R.	5 Apr. 1944
K 52901	L/Cpl. Robertson, William B.	14 Dec. 1944
K 52257	L/Cpl. Robinson, Clarence E.	21 Dec. 1944
K 52260	Pte. Robinson, Richard T.	26 Aug. 1944
K 69707	Pte. Rolston, Harold	9 Dec. 1943
K 51240	Pte. Romero, George W.	16 Sept. 1944
K 76836	A/L/Cpl. Rosoman, Henry W.	23 Dec. 1943
K 67913	Pte. Ross, Donald W.	12 Apr. 1945
K 51667	Pte. Ross, James S.	26 Dec. 1944
K 42807	Pte. Ross, Murdoch C.	22 July 1943
K 53943	Pte. Rosso, Joseph	14 Aug. 1943
K 50967	A/Cpl. Rusnak, William	6 Jan. 1945
M107720	Pte. Russell, Donald	14 Dec. 1944
K 49910	Pte. Ruthig, Norman W.	23 May 1944
K 68532	Pte. Rutledge, Harry G. W.	20 Dec. 1943
K 68532	Pte. Rutledge, Harry G. W.	24 Feb. 1945
K 37047	Pte. Ryan, Lewis Bernard	22 July 1943
K 51564	Pte. Rymer, George B.	23 May 1944
K 49545	Pte. Ryter, Werner	24 Jan. 1944
K 49991	Pte. Sampson, Alan D.	22 Feb. 1945
B115097	Pte. Sampson, Charles	14 Apr. 1945
K 53291	Pte. Sanseverino, Joseph	21 July 1943
K 50433	Pte. Sargeant, Kenmore W.	26 Aug. 1944
K 50954	Pte. Saunders, Henry M.	17 May 1944
K 50954	Pte. Saunders, Henry M.	18 Sept. 1944
D 86066	Pte. Sauve, Wilfred J.	12 Dec. 1943
H 7202	A/Sgt. Sawatsky, John L.	26 Dec. 1943
K 42561	Pte. Sawatzky, Henry	28 July 1943
L 100104	Pte. Saxon, Albert	12 Apr. 1945
L 100104	Pte. Saxon, Albert	8 Dec. 1944
K 68848	Pte. Scales, Walter	19 Oct. 1943
L 102013	Pte. Schadt, Vernon A.	10 Dec. 1943

L154074	Pte. Schaff, Michael	5 Aug. 1943
L154074	Cpl. Schaff, Michael	28 Jan. 1944
L 64022	Pte. Scheirick, Frank	23 May 1944
K 40914	Pte. Schlichenmayer, Edward	25 Mar. 1944
D135996	Pte. Schofield, Charles A.	26 Aug. 1944
K 43505	Pte. Schultz, Kenneth B.	8 Oct. 1943
K 4212	Pte. Scott, Martin J.	12 Apr. 1945
K 48920	Pte. Screpnek, Thomas	27 Dec. 1943
K 53362	A/Sgt. Scriver, Hughie A.	2 Aug. 1943
K 53362	Pte. Scriver, Hughie A.	3 June 1944
C101774	Pte. Searson, Patrick A.	12 Apr. 1944
K 52837	Pte. Seibert, Thomas	23 May 1944
K 52266	A/Sgt. Sellers, Eric F.	28 July 1943
M 10629	Pte. Sewell, Winston F.	12 Apr. 1945
K 50647	Pte. Shaw, Harry P.	14 Dec. 1944
K 50647	Pte. Shaw, Harry P.	18 Sept. 1944
K 71453	Pte. Shaw, John	23 Dec. 1943
D135723	Pte. Sheppard, Eugene A.	18 Sept. 1944
D135723	Pte. Sheppard, Eugene A.	31 May 1944
K 53104	Pte. Shields, Edgar J.	4 Feb. 1945
K 52007	Pte. Shipperbottom, Kenneth N.	28 July 1943
B 43238	Pte. Simmonds, James H.	16 Dec. 1944
K 48470	Pte. Simmonds, John	18 Feb. 1945
K 41329	Pte. Simon, Stanislau	10 Apr. 1944
B 38220	Pte. Simpson, Donald P.	17 Oct. 1944
M 12540	L/Sgt. Sinclair, William G.	4 Jan. 1945
M 12540	A/Cpl. Sinclair, William G.	24 May 1944
K 53515	Pte. Sisson, James H.	28 July 1943
A 82024	Pte. Sitts, Spencer E.	28 July 1943
K 57602	Cpl. Sked, Walter B.	23 May 1944
E 52852	Cpl. Skrzypinski, Frank F.	23 May 1944
K 37548	Pte. Skuzanski, Edward H.	31 May 1944
H195192	Pte. Small, Fred	23 May 1944
H195174	Pte. Small, Nicholas	23 May 1944
K 52216	Pte. Smalley, Frederick C.	21 July 1943
A 10038	Pte. Smashnuk, George	17 Jan. 1945
K 52326	A/L/Sgt. Smith, Allan F.	28 July 1943
B118735	Pte. Smith, Edgar R.	20 Feb. 1945
K 52425	A/Cpl. Smith, Eric	23 Jan. 1944
K 52880	Pte. Smith, Ernest A.	5 Aug. 1943
K 52880	Pte. Smith, Ernest A.	12 Feb. 1944
K 48189	Pte. Smith, Frederick F. G.	8 Oct. 1943
K 52315	A/Cpl. Smith, Harvey R.	15 Dec. 1944
K 53080	Pte. Smith, Hector B.	23 Jan. 1944
K 52475	Sgt. Smith, John	21 July 1943
K 52862	Sgt. Smith, Michael A.	28 July 1943
K 53038	A/Sgt. Smith, Thomas W.	8 Oct. 1943

M 7494	Pte. Smith, William C.	18 Sept. 1944
L 6056	Pte. Smith, William L. M.	18 Feb. 1945
K 67039	Pte. Snow, Donald H.	6 Jan. 1945
M 36398	Pte. Spark, Robert	11 Dec. 1943
K 24134	Pte. Sparrow, Babington C.	11 Apr. 1945
H103785	Pte. Spence, Beverly E.	23 Dec. 1944
K 69673	Pte. Spiers, William L.	31 May 1944
K 40534	Pte. Spirig, Herman B.	25 Feb. 1945
K 99535	Pte. Spooner, Edwin J.	14 Dec. 1944
K 52435	Pte. Squarebriggs, Edgar J.	5 Aug. 1943
K 69748	Pte. Stachowicz, Joseph	23 May 1944
M105024	Pte. Stanton, William	23 May 1944
M105024	Pte. Stanton, William	20 Sept. 1944
M104523	Pte. Star Zachary M.	27 Dec. 1943
H200107	Pte. Stark, Fred	24 Dec. 1943
C120966	Pte. Stark, Frederick E.	1 June 1944
D 86187	L/Cpl. Staszuk, Thomas S.	10 Dec. 1943
H 1035	Pte. Steeves, Jack H.	25 Feb. 1945
B142896	Pte. Steeves, Robert A.	31 May 1944
M 10784	Pte. Stephen, Alexander	20 Sept. 1944
K 52711	A/L/Sgt. Stephenson, Thomas A.	20 Dec. 1943
K 53182	Pte. Stewart, James D.	20 July 1943
K 53401	Pte. Stewart, John	28 July 1943
K 67747	Sgt. Stickels, Elmer G.	18 Dec. 1944
K 52678	Cpl. Stickney, William D.	27 July 1943
K 62756	Sgt. Stiles, Herbert J.	17 Oct. 1944
H 65222	Pte. Stirling, Robert G.	11 Feb. 1945
K 42691	Pte. St. Laurent, John C.	17 Dec. 1943
K 57458	A/L/Cpl. Stolzenberg, Harry	18 Oct. 1943
M107498	Pte. Stordalsvoll, Leif A.	4 Jan. 1945
H 7242	Pte. St. Pierre, Marcial	23 May 1944
M107447	Pte. Strachan, Donald D.	17 Oct. 1944
L105363	Pte. Sullivan, Lawrence P.	31 Aug. 1944
K 46877	Pte. Swanson, John P.	12 Apr. 1945
K 67816	Pte. Swartz, Ernest	5 Aug. 1943
K 52320	A/Sgt. Sweeney, Bernard	20 Dec. 1943
K 57478	Pte. Sweet, Jackson H.	18 Oct. 1943
M101967	Pte. Taggart, Ralph	15 Dec. 1943
K 53926	L/Cpl. Taylor, Barney	26 Dec. 1943
K 65492	Pte. Taylor, Franklin E.	8 Oct. 1943
K 65492	L/Sgt. Taylor, Franklin E.	17 Sept. 1944
K 71019	Pte. Taylor, Frederick W.	22 July 1943
K 43044	Pte. Taylor, Tolbert M.	5 Aug. 1943
K 68840	Pte. Telford, Robert S.	8 Oct. 1943
H 7218	Cpl. Templeton, Robert R.	16 Dec. 1944
H 7218	A/Cpl. Templeton, Robert R.	29 Nov. 1944
L104769	Pte. Tengum, Albert L.	17 Oct. 1944

K 53503	Pte. Tennant, James A.	22 Oct. 1944
K 52631	Pte. Terry, Frederic W.	11 May 1941
M100285	Pte. Thomas, Harold R.	6 Aug. 1943
K 76770	A/L/Cpl. Thomas, Ivor T.	12 Dec. 1943
K 52839	Cpl. Thomas, Roseri M.	23 Dec. 1943
K 42123	A/Cpl. Thomas, William O.	21 Jan. 1944
K 50197	Pte. Thompson, Lloyd N.	23 May 1944
K 74872	Pte. Thomson, John W.	5 Aug. 1943
K 74492	A/L/Cpl. Thorsen, Roy G.	21 Jan. 1944
H 6859	Pte. Todd, George A.	17 Jan. 1945
H 6859	Pte. Todd, George A.	17 Oct. 1944
K 54449	Pte. Tompson, Donald J.	21 Oct. 1944
K 65033	Pte. Tosoff, Theodore M.	23 May 1944
K 53269	Pte. Townsley, Charles	26 Dec. 1943
D 21171	Pte. Tranter, Ralph C.	26 Aug. 1944
K 53054	L/Sgt. Treherne, Francis W.	19 July 1943
K 52416	Cpl. Trenchard, Arthur E.	20 July 1943
B 42582	Pte. Trevena, Robert E.	17 Sept. 1944
K 51242	Pte. Trevison, Robert O.	14 Dec. 1944
M 7567	Pte. Tripp, Thomas E.	27 Dec. 1944
M 7567	Pte. Tripp, Thomas E.	31 Aug. 1944
A 61502	Pte. Tucker, William E.	19 Feb. 1945
K 52413	Pte. Tupper, Charles G. H.	29 July 1943
K 46873	A/L/Cpl. Turner, John T.	6 Oct. 1943
H 70573	Pte. Turner, William J.	6 May 1944
M105492	Pte. Tymchuk, Nicholas	11 Apr. 1945
M105492	L/Cpl. Tymchuk, Nicholas	22 Oct. 1944
M105492	A/Cpl. Tymchuk, Nicholas	15 Jan. 1945
M105492	A/Cpl. Tymchuk, Nicholas	9 Feb. 1945
C 52949	Pte. Upper, Morgan M.	12 Apr. 1945
G 28538	Pte. Vail, Sterling F.	16 Sept. 1944
B 52364	Pte. Vanos, John H.	18 Oct. 1944
K 4332	Pte. Van Peborgh, Albert	4 Jan. 1945
K 4332	Pte. Van Peborgh, Albert	25 Feb. 1945
L 10059	Pte. Viher, John	17 Sept. 1944
K 29178	Pte. Villman, Robert	18 Oct. 1943
K 52690	Pte. Vincenzi, Louis E.	21 July 1943
M105439	Pte. Visscher, John	21 Jan. 1944
K 52878	Pte. Vosper, Llewellyn V.	22 Dec. 1943
K 51303	Pte. Wadsworth, Ervin	26 Aug. 1944
M102479	Pte. Wagner, Carl J.	28 July 1943
M105963	Pte. Walenchik, Henry E.	11 Apr. 1945
M105963	Pte. Walenchik, Henry E.	5 Sept. 1944
K 70952	Pte. Wallin, Stanley E.	22 Oct. 1944
K 53183	Pte. Walter, Frederick R.	13 July 1943
K 52101	Pte. Walters, Frederick B.	22 July 1943
K 52101	Pte. Walters, Frederick B.	6 Sept. 1943

M102525	Pte. Warawa, Steve	23 May 1944
K 50379	Pte. Ward, Raymond G.	17 Oct. 1944
K 50379	Pte. Ward, Raymond G.	23 May 1944
K 53122	Pte. Ward, Robert	4 Jan. 1945
M105304	Pte. Warner, Harold H.	27 Dec. 1943
K 62384	Pte. Warren, Norman L.	14 Dec. 1944
K 52281	Pte. Watson, John	17 Jan. 1945
K 51274	Pte. Watson, Peter A. R.	2 Sept. 1944
K 50123	Pte. Watts, Frederick	23 May 1944
K 68929	Pte. Webber, George I.	14 Apr. 1945
K 76078	Cpl. Webster, Frederick	17 Sept. 1944
K 76078	Cpl. Webster, Frederick	22 Oct. 1944
K 54398	A/Cpl. Webster, Joseph A.	12 Jan. 1945
K 54398	L/Cpl. Webster, Joseph A.	6 Aug. 1944
M102651	Pte. Weiss, Benjamin	10 Dec. 1943
M 52597	L/Cpl. Westwell, Norman	8 Oct. 1943
M106243	Pte. Whale, Alfred W. T.	17 Dec. 1943
M107302	Pte. Wheele, Fredrick H.	17 Jan. 1945
M107302	Pte. Wheele, Fredrick H.	14 Feb. 1945
K 66434	Pte. Whiffin, Ronald G.	11 Dec. 1943
K 71708	Pte. White, Frank E.	4 Jan. 1945
K 71708	Pte. White, Frank E.	31 Aug. 1944
M 12215	Pte. White, Frederick H.	22 July 1943
K 49751	Pte. White, James G.	18 Dec. 1944
K 49751	Pte. White, James G.	4 Jan. 1945
K 70725	Pte. White, William A.	12 Jan. 1945
M106338	Pte. Whiteford, Clifford	15 Apr. 1944
K 75320	Pte. Whiting, Jack S.	5 Aug. 1943
E 52714	Cpl. Whitticks, Walter J.	1 June 1944
M102889	Pte. Wickham, Kenneth A.	21 July 1943
K 49010	Pte. Wicks, Roy	31 May 1944
K 52409	A/L/Cpl Wignes, Kenneth G.	23 May 1944
K 70371	Pte. Wilcox, Gerald I.	4 May 1944
K 53715	Pte. Wilkinson, George A.	20 July 1943
M103953	Pte. Williams, Ernest C.	12 Apr. 1944
M103836	Pte. Williams, James A.	15 Dec. 1944
K 72941	Pte. Williams, Joseph A.	5 Apr. 1944
K 72941	L/Cpl. Williams, Joseph A.	9 Jan. 1945
M 38531	Pte. Williams, Leonard M.	4 Jan. 1945
K 50579	Pte. Williams, Roy	16 Sept. 1944
K 53224	Pte. Williamson, Alexander	25 Dec. 1943
L 66363	Cpl. Williamson, Henry P.	23 May 1944
K 53550	Pte. Willman, John C.	27 Dec. 1944
K 53550	Pte. Willman, John C.	16 Sept. 1944
L 93711	Pte. Wills, Gordon J.	22 Jan. 1944
K 49571	Pte. Wilson, Gordon A.	3 Feb. 1945
K 49652	L/Cpl. Wilson, Hartley A.	24 Feb. 1945

K 49652	Pte. Wilson, Hartley A.	28 Aug. 1944
K 76370	Pte. Wilson, John	19 July 1943
K 76370	L/Cpl. Wilson, John	23 May 1944
M106263	Pte. Wilson, John R.	23 May 1944
K 69884	Pte. Wilson, John W.	26 Dec. 1943
D139995	Pte. Wilson, Richard J.	15 Dec. 1944
M103204	Pte. Wingo, Oren O.	26 Jan. 1944
K 51930	Pte. Wingrove, James A.	11 Apr. 1945
K 51930	Pte. Wingrove, James A.	11 Feb. 1945
K 62912	A/Cpl Winston, Walter D.	21 Jan. 1944
M105662	Pte. Winter, Arnold E.	23 May 1944
M105985	Pte. Wolff, Arthur	23 May 1944
K 53184	Pte. Wood, Frank L.	26 July 1943
M107029	Pte. Wood, Roland L.	15 Dec. 1944
K 53551	Cpl. Woodward, Russell G.	5 Apr. 1944
K 51489	Pte. Worthington, James H.	25 May 1944
H195083	A/Cpl. Wortman, David R.	26 Aug. 1944
K 53144	Pte. Wotherspoon, Jack C.	19 July 1943
K 53552	Pte. Wright, David	5 Aug. 1943
K 54329	Pte. Wright, Herbert	26 Aug. 1944
D 3662	Pte. Wylie, John	14 Dec. 1944
D 3662	Pte. Wylie, John	1 June 1944
K 46115	Pte. Yamelst, Richard T.	22 July 1943
K 65326	Pte. Yardley, Edward L. A.	29 July 1943
K 46017	L/Cpl Yarwood, Jack D.	11 Apr. 1945
K 46017	Pte. Yarwood, Jack D.	27 Aug. 1944
K 46017	Pte. Yarwood, Jack D.	17 Oct. 1944
K 3331	Pte. Zimmer, Emil	13 Apr. 1945
M106137	Pte. Zolkivski, John	27 Dec. 1943
M103852	Pte. Zwick, Paul D. D.	7 Dec. 1943
M105410	Pte. Zytaruk, Mike	23 May 1944

Seaforth Highlanders of Canada
Repatriated Prisoners of War

		Date taken prisoner
	Lieut. Artindale, William R.	23 May 1944
	Maj. Blair, James W.	5 Aug. 1943
	A/Maj. McBride, Leigh M.	23 May 1944
	Capt. Money, Gordon N.	5 Aug. 1943
	Lieut. Moore, Victor C.	13 Feb. 1944
	Lieut. Pretty, Jonathan A.	23 Oct. 1944
H041100	Cpl. Andersen, Hans	23 May 1944
K 048465	Pte. Bagstad, Ernest A.	23 May 1944

L 003037	Pte. Barry, Wilfrid	17 Oct. 1944
L 009871	A/Cpl. Bentz, Philip	23 Oct. 1944
M102901	Pte. Bietz, Frederick	24 July 1943
K040202	Pte. Bissett, Lawrence	23 May 1944
M106211	Pte. Branton, Kenneth	16 Apr. 1944
K067378	Cpl. Brown, Cecil L.	6 Oct. 1943
M103815	Pte. Brown, Walter L.	23 May 1944
B046980	Pte. Browne, William G. M.	23 May 1944
L 086785	Pte. Cairns, Thomas R.	23 May 1944
H075183	Pte. Campbell, Earl H.	17 Sept. 1944
M106838	Pte. Chiesa, Vitalino	23 May 1944
K016345	Pte. Chipman, Blake R.	16 Apr. 1944
M056787	Pte. Chisholm, Richard	23 May 1944
K053671	L/Cpl. Clason, George F.	23 May 1944
L101278	Pte. Darjes, Carlyle W.	23 May 1944
K050471	Pte. Devine, Henry	25 Jan. 1944
M105659	Pte. Doherty, Gordon A.	17 Sept. 1944
K053254	Pte. Donohue, Robert J.	26 Dec. 1944
K042853	Pte. Dyck, Joseph B.	23 May 1944
K068561	A/L/Cpl. Elnicky, James	23 May 1944
M067679	Pte. Enders, Louis C.	17 Sept. 1944
K016529	Pte. Ferguson, Charles F.	23 May 1944
M107675	Pte. Flett, Walter N.	23 May 1944
M107161	Pte. Flynn, Patrick J.	23 May 1944
K076814	Pte. Geary, Douglas	23 May 1944
B143554	Pte. Gendron, Joseph R.	23 May 1944
M107212	Pte. Gibson, Fredrick H.	23 May 1944
D083101	Pte. Gordon, Earlston	23 May 1944
M106506	Pte. Guynn, Clarence G.	23 May 1944
M106697	Pte. Harasfm, George	23 May 1944
B116937	Pte. Hardy, Ronald	17 Sept. 1944
H019541	Pte. Harney, Oswald A.	17 Sept. 1944
K062172	Pte. Hill, David	8 Dec. 1943
K049367	Pte. Hills, Harold	23 May 1944
F075931	Pte. Hodder, Harry	23 May 1944
K042326	Pte. Hollingsworth, John A.	16 Apr. 1944
K057118	Sgt. Irving, Stewart W.	23 May 1944
K050081	Pte. Jackson, Lawrence T.	25 Jan. 1944
K050421	Cpl. Jacobsen, Paul F.	23 Oct. 1944
K068609	Pte. Johnson, Ralph H.	23 May 1944
K052912	Pte. Johnstone, Robert M.	23 May 1944
K039635	Pte. Jollimore, Herman G.	23 May 1944
U002144	Pte. Kiely, John M.	17 Sept. 1944
B143819	Pte. Kilbey, Gordon A.	23 May 1944
H009095	Pte. Labossiere, Raymond L.	17 Sept. 1944
B063999	Pte. Lochmanetz, William	17 Sept. 1944
K042641	A/Cpl. MacDonald, Donald R.	23 May 1944

L105384	Pte. MacRae, William J. A.	23 Oct. 1944
K053055	Pte. Marsland, Thomas	26 Dec. 1944
M100469	Pte. McCracken, Wilbur R.	23 May 1944
K050622	Pte. McDonald, George W.	23 May 1944
K052985	Sgt. McGowan, Douglas	23 May 1944
K052530	A/C SM McMullen, Frederick D.	23 May 1944
K041071	Pte. Mercer, Robert J.	17 Sept. 1944
C103094	Pte. Moore, James C. G.	17 Sept. 1944
K001316	Pte. Moore, Raymond A.	17 Sept. 1944
K042692	Cpl. Moore, William J.	23 May 1944
L066274	Pte. Moran, Charlie J.	23 May 1944
H019102	CSM Moss, Walter F.	23 May 1944
K052558	Pte. Murphy, Norman	26 Dec. 1944
K043512	L/Cpl Newell, Cecil W.	23 Oct. 1944
B143644	Pte. Noble, Lloyd B.	23 May 1944
K050514	Pte. O'Brien, Andrew J.	16 Apr. 1944
K052751	L/Cpl. O'Brien, John A.	23 May 1944
M103056	Pte. Osbak, Albert H.	23 May 1944
H009413	Pte. Parmeter, Wallace R.	17 Sept. 1944
K045429	Pte. Powers, George W.	23 Oct. 1944
K038637	Pte. Reid, George A.	17 Oct. 1943
B083361	Pte. Rhude, James T.	23 Oct. 1944
K043045	Pte. Ritchie, Carleton P.	26 Dec. 1944
K092447	Pte. Robertson, John R.	16 Apr. 1944
M104930	Pte. Rooke, Gerald A.	16 Apr. 1944
K050398	Pte. Rosenberg, Arthur E.	6 Apr. 1944
H101341	Pte. Simpson, George W.	23 May 1944
M107725	Pte. Sjoberg, Wallay M.	17 Sept. 1944
K054320	Pte. Speaker, Robert J.	17 Sept. 1944
D081805	Pte. Squires, Edward H.	23 Oct. 1944
L036247	A/Cpl. St. Germain, Alphonse	23 May 1944
K053282	A/Cpl. Swanson, Arnold G.	6 Oct. 1943
M101967	Pte. Taggart, Ralph	23 May 1944
K051503	Pte. Thomas, James O.	23 May 1944
K049379	Pte. Tricker, Ernest D.	23 May 1944
K042787	A/Cpl. Turner, Carl W.	17 Sept. 1944
K020070	Pte. Van Norman, William J.	23 May 1944
L 010803	Pte. Wakefield, Archie	23 Oct. 1944
K051965	Pte. Ward, Harold J.	17 Sept. 1944
M107738	Pte. Wedge, Harry J.	23 May 1944
K045471	A/L/Cpl. Wharton, Wesley E.	10 Dec. 1943
M107664	Pte. Whitten, Donald S.	23 May 1944
K062054	Pte. Wilkin, Frank S.	23 May 1944
K051125	Pte. Williams, Eric H.	23 May 1944
K052567	Pte. Woodtaylor, Richard H.	23 May 1944
B145771	Pte. Workman, William W.	17 Sept. 1944
K054329	Pte. Wright, Herbert	23 Oct. 1944

APPENDIX "C"

Honours & Awards

THE SEAFORTH HIGHLANDERS OF CANADA 1919 - 1965

(The honours and awards listed below were won by the officers, non-commissioned officers and men while serving with the Seaforth Highlanders of Canada.)

VICTORIA CROSS

K52880 Private E. A. Smith

DISTINGUISHED SERVICE ORDER

Acting Major J. C. Allan
Major H. P. Bell-Irving
Honorary Major R. C. H. Durnford (CCS)
Major H. L. Glendinning
Lieutenant-Colonel B. M. Hoffmeister
Major O. H. Mace
Acting Captain J. F. McLean
Major S. W. Thomson

BAR TO THE DISTINGUISHED SERVICE ORDER

Lieutenant-Colonel H. P. Bell-Irving

OFFICER OF THE ORDER OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE

Lieutenant-Colonel H. P. Bell-Irving
Colonel J. D. Forin

MEMBER OF THE ORDER OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE

Captain D. B. Cameron
K489001 W.O. I W. Douglas
K52002 W.O. II Pipe-Major E. Esson
K52530 W.O. II F. D. McMullen
Major E. W. Thomas

MILITARY CROSS

Lieutenant L. J. Bennett
Captain J. J. Conway
Lieutenant W. F. J. Gildersleeve
Acting Captain D. S. Harley
Lieutenant S. Lynch
Captain W. K. McDonald (RCAMC)
Captain J. C. Portnuff (RCAMC)
Captain R. K. Swinton
Lieutenant J. L. Thirlwell
Acting Major S. W. Thomson
Lieutenant T. E. Woolley

DISTINGUISHED CONDUCT MEDAL

K37029 Company Sergeant-Major J. M. Duddle
M37034 Corporal D. Hadden
K53850 Lance-Corporal D. G. Skinner
K53228 Sergeant K. P. Thompson

MILITARY MEDAL

K67094 Corporal C. M. Anderson
K11190 Private G. V. Carrington
K53671 Lance-Corporal G. F. Clason
K46106 Lance-Corporal H. R. Chrishop
K53254 Acting Corporal R. J. Donohue
K52143 Lance-Sergeant H. R. Hammond
K53130 Acting Corporal W. Henderson
K53341 Acting Sergeant G. F. Horan
K53360 Acting Sergeant R. E. Jenkins
K69461 Private W. Kadeniuk
K52518 Private J. G. McBride
K42641 Acting Corporal D. R. MacDonald
K98595 Acting Corporal G. L. McParlon
K53836 Corporal D. Meade
K53544 Private M. Rae
K52299 Lance-Corporal R. R. Story
K42868 Acting Corporal J. H. Teece
K52631 Corporal F. W. Terry
K52839 Corporal R. E. M. Thomas
K76078 Private F. Webster
K53551 Corporal R. G. Woodward

BRITISH EMPIRE MEDAL

K52470 Corporal L. L. Greig

MENTIONED IN DESPATCHES

K54072 Private D. D. Archibald
K52083 Corporal A. Bamford
Lieutenant-Colonel H. P. Bell-Irving (2 MID)
K48022 Private C. I. Birdsall
K67378 Corporal C. R. Brown
B46980 Private W. G. M. Browne
Lieutenant J. A. Charters (2 MID)
Major D. M. Clark
M106838 Private V. Chiesa
K46106 Lance-Corporal H. R. Chrishop
Captain D. I. Fairweather
K53191 Private A. French
Major E. D. Fulton
K52470 Lance-Corporal L. L. Greig
Major J. H. Gowan
K53580 Lance-Corporal T. T. Guest
K50530 Lance-Corporal K. J. Gustafson
Lieutenant G. F. Henderson
M102545 Private W. O. Ladouceur
K52606 Lance-Sergeant R. P. Leon
Acting Major J. E. T. McMullen
Captain R. L. McDougall
Major O. H. Mace
K37067 Sergeant N. W. Massey
Lieutenant V. C. Moore
Lieutenant J. O. Moxon
K57858 Sergeant E. W. Pederson
K52258 Corporal H. Rankin
Captain W. D. Reid
M10930 Private G. A. Rooke
M102910 Private R. H. Storch
Lieutenant-Colonel S. W. Thomson
E52714 Lance-Sergeant W. J. Whitticks
Captain G. F. Williamson
M29183 Sergeant J. Wilson

COMMENDATION

Lieutenant L. O. R. Tucker

BRONZE CROSS (THE NETHERLANDS)

K67063 Sergeant J. A. Bond
K51469 Corporal A. A. Staub

BRONZE LION (THE NETHERLANDS)

K37107 Corporal J. P. Kennedy

CROIX DE GUERRE AVEC ETOILE DE VERMEIL (FRANCE)

Lieutenant-Colonel J. D. Forin

APPENDIX "D"

Honorary Appointments The Seaforth Highlanders of Canada 1919-1965

COLONELS-IN-CHIEF

H.R.H. Edward, Prince of Wales, KG, GCSI, GCMG, GCIE, GCVO, GBE, MC
1925-1936

H.R.H. The Prince Philip, Duke of Edinburgh, KG, KT, GBE, PC
7 April 1967

HONORARY COLONELS

Maj-Gen. J. W. Stewart, CB, CMG; 15 July 1924

His Honour, E. W. Hamber, CMG; 1 October 1938

Col. H. R. MacMillan, CBE; 23 November 1953

Brig-Gen. J. A. Clark, CMG, DSO, VD, CD; 7 August 1957

HONORARY LIEUTENANT COLONELS

Mr. J. A. MacDonnell, 31 March 1911

Brig-Gen. J. W. Stewart, 8 June 1915

Brig-Gen. J. A. Clark, CMG, DSO, VD; 15 July 1924

Maj-Gen. B. M. Hoffmeister, CB, CBE, DSO, ED; 7 August 1957

Lt-Col. C. C. I. Merritt, VC, ED; 6 February 1963

COMMANDING OFFICERS — THE SEAFORTH HIGHLANDERS OF CANADA, 1910-1920

Lt-Col. R. G. Edwards Leckie, 1910-1914

Lt-Col. J. S. Tait, 1914

Lt-Col. G. H. Kirkpatrick, 1914-1915

Lt-Col. J. A. Clark, 72nd Bn. C.E.F., 1915-1918

Major F. E. Leach, 1915-1916

Major R. H. Tupper, 1916-1919

COMMANDING OFFICERS — THE SEAFORTH HIGHLANDERS OF CANADA, 1920-1965

Non Permanent Active Militia

Lt-Col. G. H. Kirkpatrick, DSO; 15 Sep. 1920

Lt-Col. A. D. Wilson, DSO; 1 Aug. 1924

Lt-Col. R. M. Blair, 1 May 1928

Lt-Col. R. W. Brock, 1 Nov. 1933

Lt-Col. J. R. S. Lough, DSO, MC, VD; 18 Aug. 1935

Lt-Col. T. S. Leslie, ED; 1 Apr. 1938

Canadian Active Service Force Battalion

Lt-Col. J. B. Stevenson, ED; 2 Sep. 1939

Lt-Col. C. C. Ferrie, ED; 23 Jan. 1941

Lt-Col. J. M. S. Tait, 24 Jan. 1942

Maj. J. D. Forin (Acting), 31 Jul. 1942

Lt-Col. B. M. Hoffmeister, 11 Oct. 1942

Lt-Col. J. D. Forin, 21 Oct. 1943

Maj. S. W. Thomson, MC (Acting), 11 Dec. 1943

Lt-Col. A. J. Creighton, 30 Dec. 1943

Lt-Col. S. W. Thomson, DSO, MC; 16 May 1944

Lt-Col. H. P. Bell-Irving, DSO; 5 Oct. 1944

Maj. H. Glendinning, DSO (Temporary), 13-27 Jan. 1945

Maj. O. H. Mace (Temporary), 13 Apr. - 7 May 1945

Lt-Col. D. M. Clark, 12 May 1945

Canadian Army Pacific Force

2nd Canadian Infantry Battalion (The Seaforth Highlanders of Canada)

Lt-Col. S. W. Thomson, DSO, MC; 10 Jun. - 5 Sep. 1945

Reserve, Reserve Force and Militia

Lt-Col. A. D. Wilson, DSO, VD; 8 Jul. 1940

Lt-Col. G. H. Kirkpatrick, DSO, VD; 28 Mar. 1941

Lt-Col. H. G. Wright, MC; 27 Sep. 1941

Lt-Col. D. R. Blair, 18 May 1943

Lt-Col. J. D. Forin, OBE; 1 Apr. 1947

Lt-Col. D. M. Clark, 1 Apr. 1947

Lt-Col. A. W. Mercer, 1 Jan. 1950

Lt-Col. C. C. I. Merritt, VC; 10 Sep. 1951

Lt-Col. A. W. Gray, 11 Sep. 1954

Lt-Col. I. M. Bell-Irving, 13 Sep. 1957

Lt-Col. D. I. Fairweather, 23 Jan. 1961

Lt-Col. C. B. Campbell, 2 Sep. 1963

Lt-Col. D. J. Anderson, 1 Aug. 1966

(Ranks and decorations shown are those held at the time of appointment)

APPENDIX "E"

The 2nd (Reserve) Battalion of The Seaforth Highlanders of Canada

When the overseas battalion left Vancouver en route to the United Kingdom, it left behind a well nigh deserted Seaforth armoury. In the orderly room Lt-Col. T. S. Leslie worked away at a pile of paper work while here and there one could see a few subalterns and young other ranks who wandered through the deserted armoury waiting for movement orders.

These conditions continued to exist until late in the spring of 1940 when the Nazi *blitzkrieg* cut through the Lowlands and penetrated deeply into France. The period of the so called "phony war" was over. As a result of the new crisis, the Department of National Defence ordered the N.P.A.M. regiments to bring their battalion up to strength for the emergency. Among the regiments in British Columbia authorized to form a second battalion was the Seaforth Highlanders of Canada.[1]

[1] "On 19 November 1940 an Order-in-Council, PC 6645, was passed and promulgated in GO 273, dated 29 Nov. 1940, which designated the Military Forces of Canada as 'The Canadian Army'. The formations placed on active service were designated 'Active' and all others designated 'Reserve'. The effective date was 7 Nov. 40". (Information supplied by the Directorate of History, Ottawa). In essence the 2nd Battalion, legally, was a continuation of the N.P.A.M. unit.

Lt-Col. A. D. Wilson, D.S.O., the first commanding officer of the 2nd (Reserve) Battalion, immediately set to work getting together a slate of officers and recruiting to fill up the ranks of the unit. During May and June, 1940, a regimental committee screened appli-

cations for commissions. On 16 July, when active recruiting began, so great was the enthusiasm that in one evening the battalion was swamped with applicants beyond its authorized strength.

The recruits were representative of a complete cross section of the business, commercial, industrial, professional and artistic life of Vancouver. Included were doctors, dentists, lawyers, mechanics, plumbers, carpenters, corporate executives, civic aldermen, school teachers, stock brokers, salesmen, concert artists and many others. Many who enlisted had sons or relatives in the overseas battalion; a fair number were veterans of the Great War; still others had served with the regiment as militiamen. Whatever their background or their former military experience, there was in general a strong desire to serve their country in this emergency.

During the latter part of 1940 and early in 1941, when Canada scraped together almost all her available arms to send over to Great Britain which was in desperate need of them, the reserve battalion had hardly any weapons with which to train. Dummy rifles were used until a supply of the old Ross rifle was made available. Mortars were made up by regimental artificers. Small arms were borrowed from cooperative citizens. Private motor vehicles were requisitioned or borrowed for driver training. Even training manuals were in extremely short supply and they had to be copied by hand. It was a period when both officers and men had to stretch their imagination to the limit if they were to benefit from any training except foot drill. In time, however, as Canadian factories began to turn out a mounting pile of weapons and ammunition, the reserve battalion was to become far better equipped and far better trained than the N.P.A.M. Battalion was in 1939.

Training in the reserve battalion during the war was somewhat similar to that of the N.P.A.M. battalion between the wars. There were two evening training parades held each week, with special parades involving company and battalion route marches and exercises on the weekends. The peat fields of Lulu Island, the golf courses of the city, the vacant areas in Burnaby above Deer Lake and the farm areas of the Fraser Valley saw the 2nd Battalion weekend after weekend. There were also innumerable courses to attend for all ranks and in this respect, of course, the battalion benefited from the large number of trained and skilled officers and N.C.Os. in the Canadian Army available from the many new camps erected in the province during

the war. In time, too, the unit was able to borrow or otherwise make use of many of the training films, charts, pamphlets, etc., which had been produced to train troops going overseas.

Like the N.P.A.M. Battalion, the 2nd Reserve Battalion attended annual camps at Nanaimo, Vernon, or at Gordon Head in Victoria. Here the Seaforths trained with other reserve battalions and at the same time they were able to see, examine and use many new items of equipment which were being produced for the Canadian Army as the war continued into its third and fourth years.

It took some time to train all the various specialist platoons such as signallers, mortarmen and driver mechanics, but the initiative and drive of all ranks soon resulted in the Seaforths becoming one of the most efficient reserve units on the Pacific coast. Weapon practice at the indoor armoury range and later, at the Blair Range, brought up the standard of marksmanship to a very respectable level.

When the reserve battalion was first formed in the period when Great Britain stood alone against the might of the Axis Powers, there was a general feeling that the unit might serve overseas with the 1st Battalion. This feeling, or hope, remained for some time. In December, 1941 when Japan struck at Pearl Harbour and then gained victory after victory in Southeast Asia, a further stimulus was given to training in that many felt the Japanese might attempt to raid the Pacific coast. These events kept up everyone's interest and morale in the early years, but even later, when the crises had passed, the battalion's *esprit de corps* remained high. There was a good proportion of young men in the Seaforths who realized that they would soon be of age to go overseas. Many joined the reserve battalion hoping that this early association with the regiment would ensure that they could transfer to the overseas unit. Others welcomed the training with the reserve battalion since it would give them a grasp on military life even though they later joined other arms of the service.

The reserve battalion not only supplied hundreds of reinforcements to the overseas unit, but it carried on the regimental traditions in the Seaforth Armoury. A great many distinguished guests visited the officers' and sergeants' messes during the war and were warmed by Seaforth hospitality. On one well-remembered occasion the unit entertained a large contingent, including the commanding officer, of the Lord Lovat's Scouts which had just finished rugged training in mountain warfare in the Rockies.

This was a sad occasion also. The sergeants had invited the Scouts' Pipes and Drums to their mess, and R.S.M. W. Douglas invited Pipe Major John Gillies to hear the band play. Gillies had first met the Lord Lovat's Scouts during the South African War. Moreover, the Scottish regiment was raised in an area where Gillies had lived as a boy. Gillies gave an excellent brief speech during the course of the reception, and was quietly enjoying the entertainment and smoking his pipe when he collapsed and died. As one Seaforth wrote later:

> Such was the passing of a great soldier and noble and kindly gentleman in whom many of the traditions of the Auld Land and the regiment were centered. He had done a great work in his quiet way and though he had passed from us, his spirit would ever remain. There could be no more fitting farewell than this, sitting in a beautiful mess with . . . many reminders of things he had helped to build up. . . .
>
> R.S.M. Douglas requested Pipe Major Riddle to play "Locharber No More", and as the wail of the lament played by his kin-folk, the Lovat Scouts, echoed through the long corridors . . . , four of the Seaforth Highlanders slowly carried the gallant soldier and friend from the mess.

Throughout the war there was a constant turnover among all ranks as officers, N.C.Os. and men passed through the 2nd (Reserve) Battalion to take a more active part in the fight against Germany. Many whose services were essential to the war effort at home, or whose age or health did not permit them to enlist in the active forces, remained with the reserve battalion throughout the war. They received no official commendation or thanks for their long period of voluntary service. They will remember the summer camps, the manoeuvres, the training, and the comradeship which was engendered through service with the battalion. The music of the Pipes and Drums stirred them every bit as much as it did the members of the overseas battalion.

During its existence the reserve battalion was not called upon to defend Canadian soil from an invader. Had such an occasion arisen, however, there seems to be little doubt that it would have added to the battle honours gained by the regiment in the Second World War.

Captain J. W. Melville

APPENDIX "F"

No. 72 Seaforth Highlanders of Canada Cadet Battalion

The No. 72 Seaforth Highlanders of Canada Cadet Battalion was formed in Vancouver in 1912, as part of their parent Regiment—the 72nd Seaforth Highlanders of Canada. This new Corps, fostered by the Regiment, was to have many illustrious Seaforths pass through its ranks and on into the Regiment, and in addition it was to see many other young men who later distinguished themselves in other branches of the Army, Navy, Air Force and in the business world.

The original officers of the Cadet Corps were Lt. B. W. Browne (later Major-General), Officer Commanding, Lt. I. D. Carson as Second in Command and Lt. (later Major) Stuart Armour as Adjutant and Signalling Officer.

A quotation from a letter written by one of these original officers recites some of the problems faced in the early development of the Cadet Battalion:

> The Seaforth Highlanders Cadet Battalion came into existence in 1912, but as we had no uniforms we were not on parade for the Presentation of Colours to the Parent Regiment on Sept. 19, 1912. The uniforms were paid for largely through the generosity of Jack Stewart (later Major-General and Honorary Colonel of the Seaforths). Since we had only 100 uniforms, the strength of the Cadet Battalion never exceeded that number . . . and the fact that so many of its original members were decorated in the First World War (including one V.C.) would seem to indicate that it was a pretty good unit.

The first parade when the Cadets were in uniform was in February 1913, at Aberdeen School. The first public appearance and parade of the Cadets with their newly formed Pipes and Drums was for

an inspection by the Regiment's first Commanding Officer, Lt-Col. (later Major-General) R. G. Edwards Leckie.

In July 1913 the Cadets proceeded to Sidney, Vancouver Island, where they joined other Cadet Corps. One of the original Cadets, Mr. David Firbank, remembers that it was a one-week Camp —very hot—but the Seaforth Cadets gained the highest marks and placed first. The Cadets trained and drilled on the Aberdeen School grounds and in a garage on Davie Street. Mr. A. N. (Alex) MacKenzie, a Cadet at this time, tells that he and his brother, John, attended the Cadet Camp at Sidney in July 1914. On the return trip to Vancouver they followed a New Zealand Battleship into Vancouver Harbour—and knowing the world state of affairs nearly half of the Cadets immediately "signed-up". One week later, upon the Declaration of War, these Cadets were called to arms.

Mr. Rod Stewart, who joined the Cadets in October 1916, and was to serve in the Regiment at home and overseas until his retirement in January 1963 (45 years, 2 months actively serving as a Seaforth) recounts some of the early days as a Cadet. Training was often carried out at the Seton Street Headquarters and at the Horse Show Building. He particularly recalls the mass Cadet Camp on the "Plains of Abraham", overlooking Spanish Banks, in July 1920. Hundreds of School Cadets also attended. Travel to the camp was by way of the 4th Avenue street car—plus a good hike. He recalls that as a Cadet Corporal he had one of the new but homesick boys in his tent, Cadet (later Major-General) B. M. (Bert) Hoffmeister. One of the main tasks assigned to young Stewart at one stage of the camp was to stop these young school Cadets from running away from the camp to return home!

About this time another young Scottish lad joined the Cadets—in 1919—to remain as a serving Seaforth until mid-1965—serving the last 30 years as the Pipe-Major of the Regiment—Edmund Esson. He was, as he recites, finally able to move from the Cadets to the Battalion by devious means—soon to become a Piper, and later succeeding the beloved John Gillies, the Regiment's first Pipe-Major.

The 1920's and 1930's saw the development of friendships and relationships that would grow and last through into the Second World War. A series of Chronicles maintained by Cadet Sgt. (later Lieutenant) F. D. Thompson during the years 1933-36 recites in great detail many of the interesting events and activities, plus trials and

tribulations, in which they were involved. He recounts the outfitting of the larger Cadets into scarlet and feather bonnets, to bolster and take part in a Vice-Regal Guard for the farewell visit of Canada's Governor-General, Lord Bessborough. Outings to the North Shore for Field Days, sports, etc., now sound like expeditions, compared to present day modes of transportation and accessibility of areas.

On August 29, 1936 the Cadets participated with the Regiment at the formal opening of their new home—the Seaforth Armoury. On this occasion they provided one guard for the inspection and Trooping of the Colours of the Regiment before the new Governor-General, Lord Tweedsmuir.

During the years 1936 to 1940, Capt. (later Major) E. A. S. Chowne, M.M., commanded the Cadets. It was during this period that the Cadet Corps grew in numbers and through its ranks there passed many Cadets trained and equipped to play a prominent part in the strife ahead. In the summers of 1938 and 1939 the Regiment sponsored a camp for the Cadets at Hopkins Landing. During the 1939 camp the Cadets were honoured by a visit by the Duchess of Sutherland, accompanied by many dignitaries. It is interesting to note that four of the officers from the Regiment working with Major Chowne at this camp were to rise to become Brigadiers before completing their Army service—Major A. J. Creighton, and Lts. D. M. Clark, W. Scott Murdoch and E. D. Danby.

In May 1939, on the occasion of the visit of Their Majesties King George VI and Queen Elizabeth to Vancouver, the Seaforth Cadets were used to line the streets on the route the Royal Party travelled. They appeared in several different locations on the first day, and three days later travelled to New Westminster to be viewed again. Following the Royal visit each Cadet on parade received a 1939 silver dollar as a memento.

In 1940 Lt. (later Major) W. L. Waldie was assigned to work with the Cadets, and shortly after assumed command. Before Major Waldie retired from the Regiment and Cadets in April 1946, nearly 1,000 boys passed through the Corps, of whom 499 enlisted in various branches of the Armed Forces for service during the war. The active strength of the Cadets at any one time during this period averaged between 200 and 300. They were in constant demand for public functions, appearances and "war drives". In July 1941 Major Waldie and two bus loads of Cadets travelled to Longacres Race

Track in Seattle for a British War Relief fund drive. The hospitality shown to the Cadets by the Americans was overwhelming.

The training at this time was vigorous, varied and excellent. The Seaforth Cadets were to prove this by winning the Earl Grey Trophy on two occasions, in 1942 and 1945—the award to the best Cadet Corps in Canada. It was a fitting tribute to Major Waldie's leadership and gratifying to him to see his second son, George, serve as a Cadet R.S.M. and receive the Trophy from Maj-Gen. G. R. Pearkes in 1942.

The Cadet Camps were operated by the Cadet Services branch of the Army during and subsequent to the war. In 1941 and 1942 camps were held at Duncan and later at Chilliwack. These were very large camps, made up of Regimental Cadet Corps and High School Cadet Corps. At no time did the Seaforth Cadets take a second place to others. During the late 1940's the camp was moved to Vernon, and Cadets from British Columbia and Alberta were brought together. They were formed into two Battalions—one B.C. and one Alberta, with each large Corps forming separate Companies. From this developed the present Vernon Cadet Trades Training Camp—consisting of from 1,200 to 1,500 Cadets from the four Western Provinces training for nearly two months on various trades, such as Driver-Operator, Signaller, Junior Leader (which qualifies a Cadet as a Corporal in the Militia) and others. At the end of the course each Cadet is paid $100.00.

On June 9, 1950, the Seaforth Cadet Corps, then under the command of Capt. (later Major) H. S. Robertson, was given a singular presentation by the Women's Auxiliary to the Seaforth Highlanders. Mrs. D. M. Clark, the President, presented a Cadet Standard at a ceremony attended by the then Honorary Lieutenant Colonel, Brigadier-General J. A. Clark, the Militia Brigade Commander, Brigadier (later Major-General) J. M. Rockingham, and by the Commanding Officer of the Regiment, Lt-Col. A. W. Mercer and his officers. This Standard is carried by the Cadets on ceremonial occasions, and receives from the Cadets the same courtesies and honour given the Colours of the Regiment.

During the ensuing years the strength of the Cadets seemed to vary in cycles—sometimes as low as 50 or 60. In 1958 Major J. D. Pierce assumed command, and through the vigorous activities arranged by him the strength grew steadily past the 250 mark. They

enjoyed many weekends out on schemes, or at Blair Rifle Range competing, or out training on exercises with the Battalion.

The Cadet Pipes and Drums were also proving to be continuing champions in their own right. The band competes annually at Highland Games in the Pacific North West—Vancouver, Victoria, Nanaimo, Seattle, Portland and Bellingham. Several years in a row they emerged as Pacific Northwest Champions, bringing back many coveted trophies. In 1960 the Cadet Band, massed in with the Militia Pipes and Drums, travelled with the Commanding Officer of the Regiment, Lt-Col. I. M. Bell-Irving and the Officer Commanding the Cadets, Major Pierce, to the Commissioning Ceremony of the U.S. Aircraft Carrier *Coral Sea* at Bremerton, Washington. The Vice-Chief of the U.S. Navy, Admiral Russell was to be present, and with his interest in piping and his Scottish background it was considered appropriate to invite the best Pipes and Drums in the West—that of the Seaforth Highlanders. The welcome and publicity given to the regiment was extraordinary. As a sequel to this visit, when the USS *Coral Sea* visited Vancouver at the invitation of Lt-Col. Bell-Irving and the regiment, the entire Cadet Battalion joined with the Militia Battalion in a parade on the flight deck of the aircraft carrier to be inspected by the Captain of the ship, Captain J. Gray, U.S.N.

June 3, 1962, marked another highlight in the history of the Cadet Corps. The Commanding Officer of the regiment, Lt-Col. D. I. Fairweather, decided that the Cadets would participate in the Presentation of Colours by H.R.H., The Prince Philip, Duke of Edinburgh. The O.C. of the Cadets, Major T. U. O'Neil was to command No. 4 Guard for the presentation and trooping, and in excess of fifty Cadets were outfitted in the green doublets of the regiment and were members of the Guard. The Cadet Pipes and Drums were massed with the Regimental Pipes and Drums, and the remainder of the officers and Cadets not committed to the Guard were employed in handling the large crowd of spectators in the stands and grounds. Following the ceremony each Cadet received a commemorative 1962 Canadian Silver Dollar from the Women's Auxiliary to the Regiment. The strength of the Cadet Battalion reached a maximum of 296—the largest Cadet Corps in British Columbia during this period.

In the Spring of 1963 the Inspecting Officer at the Cadet's Annual Inspection was a former Cadet and now the Area Commander, Brigadier E. D. Danby, D.S.O., O.B.E., C.D. There was a

large group of parents and friends of the Cadets present to witness a fine ceremonial and march-past, followed by demonstrations of various aspects of training. The Honorary Colonel, General J. A. Clark, together with the Honorary Lieutenant-Colonel, Lt-Col. C. C. I. Merritt, V.C., and the Commanding Officer, Lt-Col. D. I. Fairweather, C.D., were also present as part of the Inspecting Party. Following the presentation of annual awards, a series of special presentations—twelve silver bugles, one for each drummer, was made. These bugles were presented by such distinguished persons and organizations as Lt-Col. C. C. I. Merritt, Major J. D. Pierce, Mr. E. J. W. Topp, a former senior Cadet (and now a Lieutenant Instructor with the Cadets), The St. Andrews and Caledonian Society, The Vancouver Gaelic Society, The Powell River Pipes and Drums, The Boy Scouts of Canada, The B.C. Highland Dancing Association, and several Community Associations—each recognizing the efforts of the Cadet Corps, and as a token of appreciation for the efforts and participation of the Cadet Pipes and Drums in various activities and functions throughout the years. It was a fine tribute to the outstanding performances and achievements by a band of nearly thirty Cadets. The Cadet Band now continues under the instruction of the regiment's former Pipe-Major, Edmund Esson, M.B.E.

The Seaforth Cadets continue to serve the regiment faithfully, with many Cadets moving into all parts of the battalion. The present Commanding Officer, Lt-Col. D. J. Anderson, C.D., is a former Cadet R.S.M., and nearly half of his officers are also former Cadets. The unit's Pipes and Drums is also well represented by many former Cadets, including several former Cadet Pipe-Majors.

The second fifty years of the Cadet history will undoubtedly see many prominent citizens of the future pass through its ranks, adding to their stature and memories and to the history of the Cadets—and playing an integral part in the activities and future of the regiment. Prince Philip, now Colonel-in-Chief of the Seaforth Highlanders of Canada, on the occasion of the Presentation of New Colours to the regiment best epitomized the role of the Seaforth Cadets in the regiment when he said, in part:

> The spirit of a regiment has to be built up over the years. It is made up by the service and sacrifices of everyone who has served with it or even been connected with it in peace and war. It is part family, part fighting machine, part club and part brotherhood, in which past, present and Cadet members play an equal part in its being.
>
> *Major T. U. O'Neil*

APPENDIX "G"

The Seaforth Highlanders of Canada Regimental Association

Towards the end of the Great War, it was felt by certain members of the Regiment that there should be a Regimental Association formed, with the main object of promoting and maintaining the comradeship built up over the war years, and to help less fortunate comrades.

With these aims in mind, the Regimental Association was formed under the Presidency of Captain Wilson Herald, M.C., who had served as the battalion's Medical Officer until evacuated sick from France on 11 July, 1917.

When the battalion returned from France in 1918 the Association was handed over as a going concern to Brigadier-General J. A. Clark, C.M.G., D.S.O.

In addition to the aims stated above, it was decided that an Annual Dinner should be held commemorating the Battle of Vimy Ridge, and that the date should be the Saturday closest to 8 April. There was also provision made for the services of a bugler and a piper, if requested, at the last rites of any member.

Membership was initially limited to those with service in France, and for the first few years there were no dues charged. Any monies required were raised through the Christmas Draw, the proceeds from Association dances and from donations. This procedure was carried on for the first few years; however, it became apparent that the Association needed extra funds to carry out its limited projects. With this in view a nominal membership charge was instituted.

The need for an Association to assist less fortunate members soon made itself felt following the Great War, with a recession occur-

ring almost immediately after completion of demobilization at the end of 1919.

It is interesting to note that the gratuity paid on discharge to an N.C.O. or man was $600 for married status, and $420 for single status. There were no benefits for re-training being made available except to those classified as young soldiers, i.e., 18 years of age on enlistment, or alternately, to those who suffered disabilities. In addition the Soldiers' Settlement Board assisted financially those who undertook farming. Unfortunately, inflated prices after the war, followed very quickly by quite heavy devaluation, proved disastrous to many members of the Association.

Thus from the first the Association did yeoman work with what funds were available. While the financial aid could never be more than a pittance, the number of men placed through the influence of those holding responsible positions was remarkably high. Fortunately, the provisions of the Federal Civil Service Act provided a veteran's preference to appointment to the Civil Service and reduced to a great degree the numbers of those who otherwise would not have found satisfactory rehabilitation. The devastating depression increased the load on the Association funds. However, throughout the whole period, there was no letdown in service to members. Jimmy Wellburn's sign painting establishment on Victory Square became almost a Seaforth House for those needing the service.

With the advent of the Second World War the Association carried on as usual and in addition, took on the task of establishing a cigarette fund for members of the overseas battalion, plus the increased load of hospital visiting and welfare work in connection with returning members of the unit.

The return of the overseas battalion was eagerly awaited by the Association as they anticipated a marked increase in membership. Unfortunately at first, all attempts to recruit a goodly portion of the Second World War veterans received scant response. The need for assistance was not as necessary, due to the more adequate assistance available from the government through rehabilitation grants, provisions for assistance under the Veterans' Land Act, or for education assistance. In addition, employment was high and it appeared boom times were ahead.

It took a long time to realize that it was no lack of regimental spirit that was responsible for the lukewarm interest, but rather the

much better conditions enjoyed by the veterans which tended to develop other interests. It would be fitting at this time to say that these much better conditions were eloquent testimony to the arduous efforts of all regimental and veterans' organizations in pressing for fair treatment for all ex-service men.

The pessimism regarding the maintaining of the Association without an adequate membership of the younger men continued for three or four years. However, the original aims were carried out in regard to hospital visiting and giving assistance where required. Gradually the attendance of the younger members at the Annual Dinner increased, as did their interest in Association dances and other functions. At the insistence of the older members, the Executive soon included the younger members and it was not too long until they had almost taken over the running of the Association.

With the implementation of certain ideas such as the monthly News Letter, and the revival of plans for building a Seaforth Home, there was a marked increase in membership.

The Association members continued to turn out on parade for such occasions as the Remembrance Day parade and other regimental parades. They outshone themselves on the occasion of the Presentation of Colours to the Regiment by H.R.H. The Duke of Edinburgh. The President, Matt Black, had over 100 on parade and His Royal Highness took time out to inspect them and remarked on such a wonderful turnout.

Through the years the work of the Association has been carried out by a great number of dedicated members who have served on the Executive and who have given freely of their time; although it is hard to single out individuals, we would be remiss if we did not mention such people as Jimmie Wellburn, J. S. Patterson, Pete Duncanson, Fred Pate, Bob Wyatt, Dick Armstrong, Gordon Money, Jimmy Maitland, Borden Cameron, Matt Black, Don MacLean and of course, General Clark.

As of today the Association is still carrying on with the same basic principles laid down in 1918 and keeping alive the old adage, "once a Seaforth, always a Seaforth".

Lt-Col. D. I. Fairweather

APPENDIX "H"

The Women's Auxiliary of The Seaforth Highlanders of Canada

Four days after the declaration of war the Women's Auxiliary to the Regiment came into being. The initial meeting was held at the home of Mrs. J. A. Clark, wife of the Honorary Colonel, who commanded the Seaforths in the Great War. Officers were chosen from that first small group, and without any time-consuming formalities, the vital work was begun.

The Regiment had been called to provide an active service battalion which would soon be leaving for Overseas. From the very first the Auxiliary's work fell into two major divisions each with its immediate and practical problems. These were (1) to provide for the men such comforts as would make their job as fighting men easier and to provide entertainment for their leisure hours; and (2) to give moral support and practical help to their families at home.

Obviously this programme required money, so immediately a Ways and Means Committee was appointed and, always backed by the earnest support of every Auxiliary member, it set forth into the world of business. In time the Seaforths could boast of having one of the largest Regimental Auxiliaries in Canada. It laboured in a hundred ways to meet the expenditures it counted necessary. In the six years of war a net total of $92,242.68 was raised. All but $3,857 of this sum was produced by the direct efforts of the members, the balance being cash donations. The greater part of this huge sum came from the Annual Seaforth Fairs, which produced $69,814.18. The rest came from such efforts as the making and selling of close to 30,000 thistles and heather sprigs; the selling of thousands of raffle

tickets; and the operation of an armoury canteen where many thousands of cups of coffee passed over the counter during the years of the reserve battalion's drill nights.

The Seaforth Fairs became a tradition of wartime Vancouver, as well as being the culmination of each year's hard work by Auxiliary Members. Always of great help was the unfailing support of all other members of the Seaforth Family: the Second Battalion, the Cadets and the Association. The Fair proved brilliantly every year that there is a Seaforth *ésprit-de-corps* which operated in every Seaforth undertaking.

The sending of comforts overseas involved much organization and many hours of labour. To avoid wasting materials and hours of labour, a high standard was set and rigidly adhered to. No knitted garments could pass without inspection and no type of garment was accepted without first being tested and proved useful. Over 31,000 pairs of socks were made and 6,222 other garments of all types such as sweaters, mitts, helmets and scarves. Only once was there a huge shipment lost. It is typical of the Auxiliary's attitude that when this calamity was announced, the suggestion of calling for outside assistance was vetoed without question and within a month of concentrated effort the loss was replaced.

Beside these comforts many other things were sent to the overseas battalion: reading matter, song sheets, games, movies of the Auxiliary affairs and extra monies for special food when such was obtainable. Over three million cigarettes were sent as well as pipe tobacco, candy, chewing gum, and many such items. Each Christmas tons of provisions were sent including all the traditional trimmings of the season.

The Auxiliary paper, *The Pibroch,* originally intended to keep members informed of the general activities, rapidly grew to a circulation of two thousand and found its way to many men of the Regiment, and to different parts of Europe and the United Kingdom. It carried the Seaforth spirit wherever it went, and won us many friends.

The Adoption Committee was formed to see that no man in the Regiment was left without some personal attention from home in the matter of letters and parcels. This group, which worked with the help of the Padre, was later expanded to include prisoners of war.

A monthly donation was sent to the Imperial Seaforth Association, in appreciation of their kindness to the men of our Canadian

Battalion. A total of $3,449.28 was sent, which included a donation of $150.00 to the Memorial Fund.

The Auxiliary's work at home was also extensive, knowing that peace of mind can mean more to a soldier than his own comfort, every effort was made to keep in touch with the families of the men, to provide them with companionship and interest and to lend them material assistance whenever it was required. A close liaison was maintained with the men through the Padre and the Commanding Officers who, knowing the aims and resources of the Auxiliary, were able to relieve the anxieties of soldiers who were themselves helpless to give personal assistance to their loved ones.

To help maintain the feeling of mutual experience and friendship through these difficult years, the Auxiliary tried hard to keep the families in contact with each other, working and planning together and realizing through their shared effort the strength of the slogan 'Help yourself in helping each other.' Sewing classes, dancing classes, social evenings, picnics, and Christmas parties were held. Christening ceremonies were inaugurated where infants and small children were christened by the Regimental Padre in the Armoury.

When casualties began to come home to the Military Hospital a committee was immediately set up to visit and provide for these men. At the end of 1945 3,325 men of all ranks had been visited and this work is still going on.

As the largest such group in Vancouver, the Auxiliary was called upon for assistance in many causes. Donations were not possible under our Charter, but aid was given freely in other ways. Teams were formed to help the Red Cross Annual Drives for funds, the National War Finance Board, Stamp Day Programme, the Kinsman Milk for Britain Fund, the Merchant Navy Auxiliary, the Military Hospital Auxiliaries, and Flood Relief.

The centre of this network of activities was the Auxiliary Office in the Stock Exchange Building. This office was donated by the building's owners. It was open every day during the war years, and many nights for night-time sessions of work.

With the return of the overseas battalion the Auxiliary faced new problems. Overseas wives were welcomed and helped to establish themselves in their new country. Material assistance was given for the great Homecoming Parade.

From the monies remaining at the end of hostilities a sum of $10,000.00 has been put into a trust fund to be used for the social welfare of Seaforths who served in World War I and II and their families. The balance of these funds are used for Education and general purposes.

The Auxiliary is still functioning on a peace time basis.

Mrs. E. V. MacKenzie

WOMEN'S AUXILIARY RE THE SEAFORTH HIGHLANDERS OF CANADA

STATEMENT OF RECEIPTS AND DISBURSEMENTS

For the period Sept. 11, 1939 to Dec 31, 1945

RECEIPTS	Six Fairs	69,814.08	
	Drawings	9,744.91	
	Thistle and Heather	4,800.00	
	Canteen	2,625.00	
	Donations	3,857.72	
	Dues	1,440.25	
	Bridges	742.82	
	Sales of Brooches	358.75	
	Garden Tour	158.71	
	Little Theatre	201.50	
	Sale of Candy	43.45	
	Sale of Seeds	37.20	
	Bank Interest	418.29	
			$94,242.68
DISBURSEMENTS	Wool	16,167.60	
	Men's Parcels	7,229.95	
	Cigarettes	10,089.13	
	Entertainment	798.96	
	Xmas Parties	2,231.79	
	Picnics	1,417.16	
	Visiting	3,820.07	
	Christening	114.17	
	Operating	2,586.41	
	Adoption & P.O.W.	631.78	
	Pibroch	1,270.78	
	Imperial Seaforths P.O.W.	2,816.49	
	Chocolate and Life Savers	2,272.78	
	Relief and Welfare	14,900.05	
	Hospital Visiting	1,059.57	

Seaforth House	1,503.75	
Seaforth Home Coming	1,265.75	
Furniture and Fixtures	115.50	$70,322.39
		$23,920.29
Cash on hand	10.00	
Current account	1,749.28	
Savings account	22,126.23	
Woodward's account	34.78	
	23,920.29	

Presidents of the Women's Auxiliary of the Seaforth Highlanders of Canada

Mrs. J. A. Clark	September 11, 1939	—	January 1942
Mrs. W. J. MacKenzie	January 1942	—	December 1942
Mrs. Ian Tait	January 1943	—	February 1946
Mrs. W. J. MacKenzie	March 1946	—	March 1949
Mrs. D. M. Clark	March 1949	—	March 1951
Mrs. R. M. Black	March 1951	—	March 1953
Mrs. E. J. Colton	March 1953	—	March 1955
Mrs. D. Cross	March 1955	—	March 1957
Mrs. H. N. Aird	March 1957	—	March 1958
Mrs. L. C. Willoughby	March 1958	—	March 1959
Mrs. I. M. Bell-Irving	March 1959	—	March 1960
Mrs. Walter Kerr	March 1960	—	March 1962
Mrs. W. Sturdy	March 1962	—	March 1964
Mrs. H. Foulds	March 1964	—	May 1965
Mrs. E. S. Tufts	May 1965	—	

APPENDIX "I"

Strength—Seaforth Highlanders of Canada 1921—1939

	Officers	*Other Ranks*
December 1921	28	158
December 1922	25	189
September 1923	25	195
December 1924	26	153
December 1925	26	191
December 1926	29	215
December 1927	26	261
December 1928	27	310
December 1929	30	333
December 1930	34	301
December 1931	35	260
December 1932	32	286
December 1933	32	255
December 1934	31	225
December 1935	31	215
December 1936	28	271
December 1937	33	286
December 1938	28	273
June 1939	31	334

APPENDIX "J"

Regimental Sergeant-Majors and Pipe-Majors of the Seaforth Highlanders of Canada, 1919—1965

REGIMENTAL SERGEANT-MAJORS

NPAM BATTALION

Mr. A. Ewart, 1916-1925

Mr. T. N. Anderson, 1926-1939

CANADIAN ARMY OVERSEAS

Mr. J. Maitland, 1939-1940

Mr. E. Begg, 1941-1942

Mr. J. Nicholson, 1942-1943

Mr. R. H. W. Ireland, 1943

Mr. M. A. T. Black, 1944

Mr. G. M. McMahon, 1944-1945

Mr. B. Sweeney, 1945

2ND (RESERVE) BATTALION AND POST-WAR PERIOD

Mr. W. Douglas, MBE; 1940-1947

Mr. T. Taylor, 1947

Mr. W. G. Ward, 1947-1950

Mr. G. M. McMahon, CD; 1950-1957

Mr. R. Tankard, CD; 1957-1961

Mr. H. Bullock, CD; 1961-1964

Mr. E. Ashby, CD; 1964

REGIMENTAL PIPE-MAJORS

Pipe-Major (W.O. I) J. Gillies, MSM; 1911-1937

Pipe-Major A. J. Duncan, CD; 1965

Pipe-Major (W.O. I) E. Esson, MBE, CD; 1937-1965

2ND (RESERVE) BATTALION

Pipe-Major J. T. McHardy 1940-1945

The Seaforth Highlanders of Canada

Index

"A"

Abbeville: 86.
Accommodation: *See under* Armoury.
Achterveld: 436-7.
Administration: 14.
Administrative personnel: 18.
Adrano: 191-2, 194-5, 198, 201-3.
Advance Party: 59, 66.
Aeldoornisch Canal: 431.
Affiliated regiment: 22, 74. *See also* Seaforth Highlanders and Queen's Own Highlanders (Seaforth and Cameron).
Agira: 180-1, 183-4, 187, 190-1, 246, 409; Battle of: 180-9.
Agusta: 151.
Air Force—
  Desert: 245, 341.
  Royal Air Force Regiment: 148.
  Royal Canadian: 207*n*.
  Tactical: 341.
Air Raid: 92, 112.
Albania: 50.
Albert Head, B.C.: 457.
Alcinous: 161.
Aldershot, Hants: 65, 71, 76, 82, 89.
Aldershot Command: 66.
Alexander of Tunis, Field-Marshal The Rt. Hon. Earl: 233, 321-2, 324, 370, 392.
Alexander, R.Q.M.S. "Tom": 23*n*, 38.
Alice, H.R.H. Princess: 83.
Allan, Maj. J. C.: 296, 298, 302-7.
Allen, Capt.: 277.
Allen, Pte. J. B.: 320.
A.M.G. (Allied Military Government): 204, 277.
Amersfoort: 433, 438.
"AMGOT": 271.
Amsterdam: 433, 438-43.
Amy, Maj. E. A. C.: 245-9.
Ancona: 325, 406.
Anderson, Cpl. C. M.: 298.
Anderson, Lt. D. J.: 462-3.
Anderson, Capt. E. F.: 208, 251.
Anderson, Hans: 199.
Anderson, Sgt. J. D.: 467*n*.
Anderson, R.S.M. T. N.: 23, 48, 51.
Andes, H.M.T.: 60, 62-5, 110, 140, 145.
Anti-tank Guns: 2-pr, 118; 6-pr, 118, 136; Projector, Infantry, 136.
Anzio: 233; Bridgehead, 285, 313, 316.
"Anvil", Operation: 321-2.
Apeldoorn: 419, 424, 429-31.
Aquino: 290, 313.
Argyll, Duke of: 140.
Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, The: 235.
Argyllshire, Scot.: 64.
Arielle River: 250, 257, 278.
Armora: 315.
Armoured—
  British Units—
    Royal Armoured Corps, 145th Regiment: 326, 330, 332, 335, 356.
    Royal Tank Regiment, 4th Battalion: 419*n;* 12th Battalion, 353, 404.
  Canadian Units—
    1st Armoured Car Regiment (Royal Canadian Dragoons): 376-7, 389.
    9th Armoured Regiment (The British Columbia Dragoons): 59, 331, 379-80, 382-4, 386, 388, 432, 450*n*.
    11th Armoured Regiment (The Ontario Regiment): 249, 253, 255.
    12th Armoured Regiment (Three Rivers Regiment): 193-5, 200-1, 435.
    14th Armoured Regiment (The

Calgary Regiment): 245-7, 249-50.
4th Reconnaissance Regiment (Princess Louise Dragoon Guards): 196, 217-8, 439.
Armoury: Accommodation, 13; Artillery, 12; Beatty Street, 13, 27; departure of C.A.S.F. Bn. from, 60; and extra caretakers in 1934-1935, 38; Hoffmeister Building, 11; preparation at, for presentation of colours, 467; poor condition of, 32-3; Seaforth, 34; Seaforth Club used as, 11-2, and Tattoo at, 464; Vancouver Armoury Association, 33-4; Vancouver Club, 11; *other ref,* 461.
Army—
British—
Eight: At El Alamein, 137; invasion of Sicily, 150-1; invasion of Italy, 209; links up with U.S. Fifth Army to form a line from Salerno to Bari, 215; and the Rome-Pescora highway, 233; at the Gothic Line, 325, 329, 333, at the Marano River, 334; and the German Tenth Army, 341; in the Po Valley, 352, 370; Battle of the Rivers, 375; Canadian leave, 409; Senio River, 432; *other refs,* 287, 368.
Canadian—
First: 370, 415, 432.
German: 85-6, 437.
Tenth: 313, 326*n,* 341.
Fourteenth: 313.
Twenty-fifth: 433.
Group, 21st: 415.
Popski's Private: 216.
United States—
Fifth: 209, 215, 233, 375.
Seventh: 151.
Arnhem: 418, 429.
Arno River: 323, 324*n.*
A.R.P.: 67.
Arran, Isle of: 146.
"Artificial moonlight": 377.
Artillery—
Royal Canadian: 147.
1st Searchlight Regiment: 60.
2nd Field Regiment: 243.
3rd Field Regiment: 291, 386.
15th (Vancouver) Coast Brigade: 60.
15th Field Artillery Regiment: 468.
15th Field Brigade: 28.
90th Anti-Tank Battery: 181, 291.
Artindale, Lt.: 296, 297, 299, 302.
Arundel Castle, H.M.T.: 168.
Ashby, R.Q.M.S. Eric: 462.
Assoro: 179*n,* 180.
Assault—
Companies: 160.
Craft: 158-9.
Landing: 150, 153.
Landing Platoons: 159.
Second Wave: 161.
Astor, Lady: 105.
Astor, Lord: 105.
Athlone, Earl of: 83.
Atomic Bomb: 447, 459.
Auchnatra, Scot.: 140.
Ausa River: 341.
Auxiliary Services: 319, 441; Supervisor, 286, 414, 437.
Avignon: 412.
Axis, Berlin-Rome: 44.
Aylesbury: 92.

"B"

Baak: 417.
Baarn: 438.
Badges: *See under* Dress.
Bagnacavallo: 375, 379, 381-3, 386-8.
Balderston Cup: 32.
Baldwin, Lt. J. W.: 137, 162-3, 239.
Balkans: 115.
Bamford, Cpl.: 59*n.*
Bands—
Brass: 16, 25, 47.
Cadet Corps: 19, 463.
Pipes and Drums: and Pipe-Major Gillies, 16; practice on parade nights, 25; at summer camps of 1927, 1929, 27-8; Vancouver's Civic Jubilee in 1936, 47; leading the C.A.S.F. Bn. on route marches, 55; and provision of instruments to take overseas, 59-60; on the trip from Scotland to Aldershot, 65; issued with issue pipes, 73; members of the band had own kilts, 74; Gen. McNaughton's inspection, 21 March 1940, 78; "Retreat" played at Hever Castle, 105; almost hit by air raid at Eastbourne, 129; play "Retreat" at Inverary, 141; during Combined Ops Trg in Scotland, 145; at Agira, 190; at Militello, 205-6; at Ortona, 275; and the North Irish Horse, 317; at Piedmonte d'Alife, 319; at Cattolica, 349; Christmas 1944, 391; at Offida, 407; Divisional Parade at Rotterdam, 442; Seaforth reunion at Catania,

206; at Cuxhaven, 443-4; return to Vancouver, 446; at the recommissioning of *U.S.S. Coral Sea,* 464; at the presentation of new Colours by H.R.H. Prince Philip, 467-8; and trophies won, 32.
Bapty, Lt-Col. W.: 47*n.*
Baragiano: 213.
Baranello: 223-5, 228-32, 235, 286; Battle for, 224.
Bari: 215.
Barker, L/Cpl. Pete: 281-2.
Barkase, Pte. B.: 297, 305.
Barneveld: 431-4.
Barr, Gordon: 56*n.*
Barrett-Lennard, Lt. D. L.: 208.
Baselice: 217.
Basingstoke: 77.
Bassett, Maj. J. W. H.: 395-6, 416, 419-21, 428.
Battalions, Canadian Expeditionary Force—
16th (The Canadian Scottish): 4, 6, 7, 9-10.
29th (Vancouver): 4.
47th (British Columbia): 4.
72nd (Seaforth Highlanders of Canada): 2, 4, 6-9, 105, 110, 129*n,* 207*n,* 372.
231st: 5, 7, 9.
Battle Drill: 121-2, 127.
Battledress: *See under* Dress.
Battle fatigue: 190.
Battle Honours: First World War, 8-11, 35; Italy, 409; on "Company Pennant", 455; Second World War, 466-8.
Battle Honours Committee: 8-10, 466.
"Bazooka": 344.
Beach, Pte.: 59*n.*
Beachy Head: 142.
Beard, Cpl.: 296-8.
Beato Sante: 327.
Beatty Street Armoury: 13, 27.
Beaver Club: 67.
Beeding Hill: 127.
Begg, Lt. E. G.: 172-3.
Belgium: 85, 408, 413.
Belisha, Hoare: 50.
Bella: 213.
Bell-Irving, H. O:. 7*n.*
Bell-Irving, Brig. H. P.: At the outbreak of war, 51; to England on Course, 56; during training in England, 114, 125, 140; as Major and 2 i/c, 144*n,* 215; lands in Sicily, 158*n;* in Sicily, 161, 171, 175*n;* at Leonforte, 177, 179; at Agira, 181-2, 187-8; as part of "Booth Force", 195-6, 199, 201; promoted to Lt-Col., 230; Commanding The Loyal Edmonton Regiment, 341*n,* 343; becomes C.O. of the Seaforth Highlanders of Canada, 350; organizes tank-hunting platoon, 351; and the advance to the Pisciatello River, 353; and the Savio River, 356, 360, 368; and the early plan to capture Ravenna, 375*n;* at the Lamone River, 377; Naviglio Canal, 379, 381; Christmas, 1944, 391*n;* elimination of the Senio salient, 392-7; and the presentation of the D.S.O. to H/Maj. Durnford, 406-7; at the Ijssel River, 416, 419-23; evacuated with malaria, 425; returns to Command on 7 May 1945, 438*n;* at Amsterdam, 439-40; *other refs,* 208, 375*n,* 458.
Bell-Irving, Mrs. H. P.: 119.
Bell-Irving, Lt-Col. I. M.: 461, 463-4.
Benn, Lady: 102*n.*
Benn, Sir Ernest: 102*n.*
Bennett, Lt. L. J.: 427.
Bennett, Rt. Hon. R. B.: 34.
Berlin: 432, 451; "Airlift", 452; -Rome Axis, 44.
Bernhard Line: 232-3.
Berry, Buck: 436.
Bicester: 92.
Biddlecombe, Sgt.: 56*n.*
Biferno River: 215, 226-7, 229; Valley, 223-4.
Biggin Hill: 111-2.
Birds, Maj. S. B.: 13.
Birling Gap: 142.
Biscari: 151.
Black, R.S.M. R. M.: 100, 198, 205, 274.
Blackburn, Capt. D. B.: 250.
Blackburn, Maj. W. D.: 230.
Blackout: 62, 69, 76.
Black Watch (Royal Highland Regiment) of Canada, The: 350*n.*
Blair, Lt-Col. D. R.: 30, 449.
Blair, Lt. J. W.: 96, 158*n,* 159 ,166, 175-6, 182, 186, 196-7.
Blair, Lt-Col. R. M.: 13, 21, 29-30, 34.
Blair Rifle Ranges: 13, 29, 55, 455.
Blair Trophy: 464.
Blaker, C.S.M. Angus: 59*n,* 239.
Bleeker, Rutger D.: 435.
"Blitz, The": 101, 117.
"Bloody Hill": 179-80.
Blystone, Pte.: 435.
Bogert, Brig. M. P.: 350, 372, 389*n,* 392, 407, 425-6, 429-31 ,437.
Bohan, Pte. J. H: 345.
Bologna: 325, 375.

Boncellino: 387.
Bond, Sgt.: 403.
Bonnell, Capt. F. H.: 134, 182, 251, 277, 320.
Bonner, Lt. R. W.: 208, 211, 217.
Booby-traps: 265, 271.
Boomer, Lt. F.: 467*n*.
"Booth Force": 195.
Booth, Lt-Col. E. L.: 195.
Borgo Santa Maria: 330-1.
Bosley, Cpl. R. E.: 130.
Boughton Park: 88-9.
Boulogne: 87.
Bowen Island: 39.
Bowerman, Sgt. A. V.: 274.
Boys anti-tank rifle: 118, 266.
Brammer, Cpl. R. H.: 130.
Bramshot Golf Course: 85*n*.
Bremerton, Wash.: 464.
Bren (Light machine-gun): 56.
Brest: 90.
Brigades—
British: 4th Armoured, 238; 21st Tank, 330*n*; 21st Indian, 244, 405; 113th Infantry, 120; Malta, 191; Special Service, 151, 163.
Canadian—
1st Army Tank: 126.
1st Infantry: Move to France, 87, 91; Vehicle Losses in France, 92; Invasion of Sicily, 151; at Grammichele, 170; at Valguarnera, 171; at Leonforte, 179; at Agira, 180, 185; at Regalbuto, 192; at Potenza, 213; and Highway No. 17, 215; at San Leonardo, 243-5; and the 3rd Parachute Regiment, 257; at the Hitler Line, 290; at the Gothic Line, 326; and the Po Valley, 353; and the Battle of the Rivers, 376-9, 387; at the Ijssel River, 419; at Apeldoorn, 424-5, 430-1.
2nd Armoured: 415.
2nd Infantry: 27, 103, 120, 326.
3rd Infantry: At Brighton, 103, at Valguarnera, 171; Strait of Messina, 209; at Potenza, 213; along Highway No. 17, 215; and the 3rd Parachute Regiment, 257; and the 11th Canadian Infantry Brigade, 278; at the Hitler Line, 290, 305, 308; at the Gothic Line, 326, 329, 334; at San Fortunato, 342-3; and the Savio River, 353, 356; Battle of the Rivers, 376, 378-9, 387; at the Ijssel River, 419; and Apeldoorn, 431; *other refs*, 142, 233.
11th Infantry: 278, 329*n*, 381, 387-8, 440.
14th Infantry (N.P.A.M.): 43.
15th Infantry (Reserve): 448.
23rd Infantry: 8*n*, 19, 23.
25th Infantry: 454.
27th Infantry: 450, 455.
Brighton: 94, 103, 109, 120-1, 129.
Britain, Battle of: 98-102, 112.
British Columbia Area: 448.
British Columbia Dragoons: 59, 331, 379-80, 382-4, 386, 388, 432, 450*n*.
British Columbia House: 67-8.
British Columbia Law Society: 134.
British Columbia Regiment (Duke of Connaught's Own Rifles), 1st: 8*n*, 58, 450*n*.
British Columbia Rifle Association: 29.
British Columbia, University of: 118, 467.
British Empire and Commonwealth Games: 463.
Brightling Park: 126.
Broad, Pte. W. T.: 197.
Brock, Lt-Col. R. W.: 21, 34.
Brock, Lt. T. L.: 48.
Broderick Bay: 146.
Brooke, Gen. Sir Alan: 144.
Browne, Maj-Gen. B. W.: 19.
Brussels: 413, 443.
Bryant, Sgt.: 59*n*.
Buccleugh, Duke of: 88.
Buchanan, Maj. W. H.: 230, 238, 242, 269.
Buchanan, Sgt.: 130.
Budd, Lt. J. H.: 158, 171, 178.
"Buffaloes": 416, 418-21.
"Bulldog", Exercise: 113.
Bullock, W.O.I. (R.S.M.) H.: 467*n*.
Burdyke House: 88.
"Burnedge": 109.
Burns Dinner: 39, 281.
Burns, Gen. E. L. M.: 42, 288, 325, 329, 370*n*.
Busso: 228-9.
Bussum: 438.
Byng of Vimy, Lord: 22.

"C"

Cabar Feidh: 458.
Cadets: 13*n*, 19; Band, 19; Dress, 19; Esprit de Corps, 19; Strength, 19; Training, 19, 25; Contribution to Regiment, 20; *see also* No. 72 The Seaforth Highlanders Cadet Corps.
Calabria: 209.
Calabrian Peninsula: 212.
Calgary Regiment (14th Armoured Regiment), The: 245-7, 249-50.
Caldwell Hugh: 51.

Caltigirone: 169-70.
Cambrai: 412.
Cameron, Capt. D. B.: 267-8, 374, 390.
Campbell, Capt. A. S.: 125.
Campbell, Maj. Bruce: 458.
Campbell, Lt-Col. C. B.: 462, 464-5, 467*n*, 469.
Campbell, Cpl.: 130.
Campbell, Leon: 177.
Campbell, Lt. S. T.: 397.
Campion, Sir William: 120.
Campobasso: 215, 223, 230, 286.
Canada: Declares war on Germany, 10 September 1939, 55, Military Policy, 1950s, 454.
Canadian Army—
First: 370, 415, 432.
Militia: 459*n*.
Occupation Force: 443.
Pacific Force: 442, 445.
Reserve Force: 459*n*.
Canadian Base Reinforcement Group, No. 1: 320.
Canadian Expeditionary Force Battalions: *See Under* Battalions.
Canadian Highland Battalion, 1st: 455-6, 458; Seaforth Company, 455.
Canadian Infantry Division Reinforcement Unit, No. 1: 134.
Canadian Kit Storage Depot, No. 1: 144.
Canadian Military Headquarters: 105.
Canadian Mounted Rifles, 11th: 4.
Canadian Officers Training Corps: 106.
Canadian Scottish Regiment: 9-10, 28, 143, 271, 417, 448, 450*n;* 2nd Battalion, 47*n*.
Canadian Women's Army Corps: 319.
"Cannonshot", Exercise: 418*n*.
Canteen, mobile: 119.
Cape Breton Highlanders, The: 275.
Cape Scaramia: 151.
Carcaci: 196.
Carleton and York Regiment, The: 253, 291, 295, 298, 303, 305, 308, 400, 424.
Carmichael, Cpl. G. J.: 178.
Carrington, Pte. G. V.: 360.
Carrol, Lt. A.: 134.
Carson, Pte. F. L.: 83.
Carter, Capt. (Artillery F.O.O.): 242.
Casablanca Conference: 150.
Casa Berardi: 255-7.
"Casa cruncher": 398, 404.
Casa Pozzi: 382.
Casa Zaboni: 382.
Cashmore, Bandmaster A. V.: 16*n*.
Cassels, Maj-Gen. A. J. H.: 455, 466*n*.
Cassino: 285, 318, 417.
Castigliore de Lago: 322.
Castlefranco: 215.
Castlepagano: 223.
Casualties: Total by 11 November 1918, 1; C.A.S.F. Bn. suffers first fatal, 110*n;* lack of in Sicily landings, 160, 168; at Leonforte, 178-80; in Sicily, 203 ,208; at Hill 1007, 222; from 5 to 13 December 1943, 256*n;* at Ortona, 273; at the Hitler Line, 305, 310; North Irish Horse, 309; at Frosinone, 316; at the Gothic Line, 332; at San Martino, 341-2; at San Fortunato, 348; at the Savio River, 368; in Italy, 409*n;* at the Ijssel River, 424.
Catania: 151, 191, 206; Stadium, 206.
Catanzaro: 212*n*.
Cattolica: 325-6, 331-3, 349-50, 352.
"Cease fire"; 437.
Cemetery Hill: 186.
Centuripe: 196.
Ceprano: 314.
Cercemaggiore: 223.
Cesena: 353-5.
Charamonte Gulfi: 170.
Charters, Lt. J.: 279.
Chartwell Manor: 95-6.
Cheshire Regiment, The, 6th Battalion: 397.
Chilcotin: 457.
Chilliwack, B.C.: 458.
Chowne, Capt. E. A. S.: 31.
Christmas Day: 1939, 63; 1940, 109-10; 1943 at Ortona, 267-9, 389*n*, 409; 1944, 390-1.
Church, Lt. E. J. M.: 159.
Churchill, Winston S.: 91, 95.
Circassia, L.S.I. (L): 145-6, 148-50, 152-3, 155, 157-8, 160.
Civil Defence: 94.
Clapshaw, C.S.M. G. W.: 31.
Clark, Brig. D. M.: Graduate of R.M.C., 48; acting Adjutant, 60; Battle of Britain, 100; as Captain and commanding "C" Coy, 125; as Major and 2 i/c, 276; at the Gothic Line, 334; in hospital, 350*n;* as Lt-Col. and in Command, 440; and the return of the Battalion to Vancouver, 446; reverts to the rank of Major to become 2 i/c of the post-war Battalion, 449*n;* commands the Battalion, 451; promoted Brigadier and Commander of 15th Infantry Brigade, 451*n;* and the Fraser River flood, 453; Infantry Sword Trophy, 459.

Clark, Capt. George: 53.
Clark, Lt-Col. G. S.: 134.
Clark, Lt. H. E. F.: 28.
Clark, Brig-Gen. J. A.: Homecoming arrangements for 72nd Bn. C.E.F., 2*n;* as Commanding Officer of 72nd Bn., 4; and the perpetuation of the 16th Bn., 6-7*n;* on Colours, 8*n*, 9; and Battle Honours, 9-10; as Honorary President of Seaforth Association, 20; as Honorary Lieutenant-Colonel, 21; and the Seaforth Armoury, 34; and officer reinforcements, 118-9; homecoming arrangements for C.A.S.F. Bn., 444-5; his close association with the Regiment, 465-6; and Second World War Colours, 466-8; *other refs.* 134, 276, 469.
Clark, Lt. J. A.: 276.
Clark, Lt-Col. R. B.: 372.
Clark, Maj. R. S.: 125, 360-1, 366-7.
Clarke, Cpl R. McK.: 83.
Clayton Arms (Public House): 120.
Cleve: 417.
Coen, Harry: 251.
Cohen, Capt. (Medical Officer): 208*n.*
Colle d'Anchise: 226.
Colonel-in-Chief: 22-3, 469.
Colours: King's and Regimental presented by Canadian Corps Commander, Lt-Gen. Sir Arthur Currie in April 1919, 2, 8; taken very seriously, 5; Regimental presented by the Duke of Connaught in 1912, 8; King's Silk Union Flag, 9; Trooping of, at opening of Seaforth Armoury, 35; Battle Honours emblazoned on, 35; planning and arrangements for presentation of post-Second World War Colours, 445-6; 466; Colours presented by H.R.H. Prince Philip, 467-9; *other refs,* 9*n*, 23.
Colquhoun, Maj. F. D.: 235*n*, 327.
Comacchio Bay: 401.
Comiso: 151, 170.
Command, Changes in: Pre-War, 21; Maj. C. C. Ferrie as Temp. C.O., 60; Lt-Col. Stevenson to Lt-Col. Ferrie, 105; Lt-Col. Tait, 125; Maj. Forin as acting, 128, 205; Lt-Col. Hoffmeister, 133; Lt-Col. Forin, 215; Lt-Col. Thomson, 276, 288; Lt-Col. Creighton, 276; Lt-Col. H. P. Bell-Irving, 350; Lt-Col. D. M. Clark, 440; Lt-Col. D. R. Blair, 449; Lt-Col. Forin, 449; Lt-Col. A. W. Mercer, 451; Lt-Col. I. M. Bell-Irving, 461; Lt-Col. Fairweather, 464; Lt-Col. Campbell, 464; continuity of, 275.
Committee on Militia Reorganization: 6-7, 11.
Communism: 451.
Communist threats: 454.
Compiegne: 91.
Conca River: 334.
Connaught, H.R.H. the Duke of: 8.
Conscription: 46.
Convoy: 153-5.
Conway, Lt. H.: 134.
Conway, Capt. J. J.: 134, 159, 194, 208, 301-2.
Cooks: 369, 390-1.
"Cootehall": 344.
Coral Sea, U.S.S.: 464.
Cornett, Mayor J. W.: 445.
Cornish, Sigmn. S. G.: 31.
Corps—
British: 5th, 325; 7th, 93, 105, *later see* 1st Canadian Corps; 13th, 170, 209, 290, 314, 322; 30th, 415.
Canadian: 1st: Arrives in Italy, 278; at the Gothic Line, 325; Po Valley, 375; Battle of the Rivers, 375; move to France, 407; rejoins First Canadian Army, 414-5; and the Netherlands, 418, 430, 433-4.
2nd: 415, 418, 432.
French Expeditionary Corps: 314, 322.
German: 30th, 433, 438; 76th, 237*n*, 256; 88th, 433.
Polish: 2nd, 322, 325.
United States: 6th, 313.
Cotignola: 376, 392-3.
Course, Maj. K. J.: 467*n.*
Courtin, Capt. L. J.: 275.
Cove: 71, 74.
Covignano: 343-4, 347.
Crawford, W. M.: 59.
Crecchio: 284.
Creighton, Lt-Col. A. J.: 48, 58, 276, 283-5, 287-8.
Cremona Battle Group: 400.
Crerar, Gen. H. D. G.: 127-8; 278*n*, 415.
Crest Farm: 372.
Crete: 115.
Cromb, Cpl. John: 164, 177*n*, 296-8.
"CROMWELL" (Code-word): 101.
Cross, S/Sgt. D.: 467*n.*
Cross, Sgt. L. L.: 274.
Cross, Capt. R. E. M.: 275.
Croydon: 94, 100, 112.
Crumbles Range: 130.
Cuidich'n: 206*n.*

Cups: Balderston, 32; District Infantry Association Challenge, 31; Dominion Signallers Challenge, 31; Efficiency of Personnel Challenge, 32; J. W. Stewart, 32; Grand Aggregate, 459; *see also* Trophies.
Currie, Gen. Sir Arthur: 7-8.
Customs of Military Life: 57.
Cuthbert, C. S. M. John: 17.
Cuxhaven: 443.

"D"

D-Day: 151-4, 163, 203; France, 317.
D-Day Dodgers, We Are The (Song): 370.
D.F. (Defensive Fire): 282.
"Dagwood": 398-9, 402.
Dalmatian Coast: 232.
Dam Square: 440.
Danby, Lt-Col. E. D.: 105, 110, 372, 455.
Danny Park: 120-1.
Danzig: 50.
Davidson, Lt. D. W.: 60.
Davidson, Mrs. D. W.: 119.
Davidson, Cpl. M.: 165, 178.
Davies, Pte. J. R.: 30.
Dawson, R.Q.M.S. C.: 52.
Day-Smith, Lt. L. C.: 387*n*.
"Dead Horse Square": 268.
DeBanke, Lt. F. T.: 275.
Decorata: 215-7, 220, 222-3; Crossroads, 218, 219*n;* Battle for, 220.
Defence: 44-5; Policy 1937, 46; Policy post-war, 452.
Defence Scheme No. 1: 41.
De Glindhorst: 434, 438.
Delville East Barracks: 66, 71, 142.
DePoe, Lt. N. R.: 373, 393.
Depression years: 22, 36-8, 44, 46, 53.
De Ruiter L/Sgt. Pete: 198.
Desert Air Force: 245, 341.
Deserters: 107, 319.
Deventer: 416, 418.
"Diaper Battalion": 58*n*.
Dickey, Pte. Hugh: 63.
Dickinson, Lt. S.: 345, 362.
Dieppe: 127*n*, 131, 138.
Dieren: 429.
Dijon: 412.
Ditchburn, Pte.: 111.
"Ditchburn's Painkiller": 111.
Ditchling: 123.
Dittaino River: 174.
Divisions—
British—
1st Armoured: 93.
5th Infantry: 209.
7th Armoured: 343.
8th Armoured: 121, 288.
46th Infantry: 353.
49th (West Riding) Infantry: 416, 429, 433.
51st Highland: 151, 169.
52nd (Lowland): 89.
56th Infantry: 353, 392.
78th Infantry: 196, 201-3, 235-6.
Canadian—
1st Infantry: Early training in the U.K., 80; decided to send to France, 89; considered to be strongest after Dunkirk, 92; change in role in defence of the U.K., 93; cross the Strait of Messina, 209; to the Biferno River, 215; Bernhard Line, 233; in reserve, 321; Florence, 322, 324; Gothic Line, 326; in the Po Valley, 352-3; Battle of the Rivers, 375-6; 387, 392, 397; move to France, 407; in the Netherlands, 416, 418, 432, 437-8.
2nd Infantry: 105, 107, 117, 131, 415.
3rd Infantry: 105, 107, 117, 128, 415, 417-8.
4th Armoured: 415.
5th Armoured: 117, 278, 288, 308, 311-4, 329*n*, 376, 401, 407, 416, 432.
German—
1st Parachute: 257, 261-2, 331.
6th Parachute: 418.
15th Panzer Grenadier: 170-1.
16th S.S.: 398.
26th Panzer: 223, 229, 236.
29th Panzer Grenadier: 190*n*, 223.
42nd Jager: 401.
71st Infantry: 327.
90th Panzer Grenadier: 236, 237*n*, 245, 256.
98th Infantry: 379.
114th Jager: 379.
334th: 284.
356th Infantry: 379.
362nd Infantry: 403*n*.
Herman Goring Panzer: 170, 192, 196.
Indian—
8th: 244, 256, 324, 405.
10th: 285, 375.
Italian—
206th Coastal: 166*n*.
New Zealand—
2nd: 323, 353.
Dixon, Cpl.: 59*n*.
Doherty, Cpl.: 260.
Donohue, A/Cpl. R. J. P.: 199-200, 389*n*.

Dore, Pte. H. F.: 299-300.
Douglas, R.S.M. Walter: 35*n.*
Drake, Pte. H.: 82.
Dreimel, Sgt.: 298.
Dress: Patterned after the Seaforth Highlanders, 3; white shell jacket and kilt, 17; Cadet Battalion, 19; during visit of H.R.H. Edward, Prince of Wales, 22; at opening of Seaforth Armoury, 35; change from peacetime to wartime, 52-3; description of badges, 52*n;* scarcity of, 53, 55; "Battledress", 58; issued with second suit of battledress, 73; Officers and members of the Pipe Band had their own kilts, 74; Cap badges as a gift from the Allied Regiment, 74-5; cloth shoulder badges, 74*n,* 275.
Drill Hall and Shed: 12-3, 29.
DuBois-Phillips, Lt. A. B.: 462, 467*n.*
Duddle, C.S.M. J. M.: 274, 302, 304-6.
Duncan, Pipe-Major A. J.: 468*n.*
Duncan, Maj. D. G.: 275, 357, 367, 379, 383.
Duncan, Cpl.: 398.
Dun-cor-Bhile: 146.
Dunkirk: 80, 86, 89, 91.
Dupuis, Pte.: 297, 305.
Durack, Pte.: 298.
Durnford, H/Maj. R. C. H.: Joins Battalion, 134; during Combined Ops Trg in Scotland, 141, 147, 148*n,* his views on a talk by Brig. Vokes, 150*n;* and the drills on board ship, 153; in invasion of Sicily, 168-9, 173-4; using a shepherd's crook, 198; on profanity, 207; at the Hitler Line, 292, 306; his impressions at Cattolica, 332-3; at Riccione, 371-2; at Bagnacavallo, 384; and Christmas 1944, 391; at the Senio, 404; presented with the D.S.O., 406; his impressions of the campaign in the Netherlands, 428; and the entry to Amsterdam, 439; and the consecration of the new Colours, 468.
Dutch Forces: 435.
Dutch people: 417, 433, 437, 440*n,* 441.
Dutch Underground: 435.

"E"

Earl Grey Trophy: 444, 463*n.*
East Blatchington: 143.
Eastbourne: 128-31, 137, 142.
"E" Company: 455.
Eden, Anthony: 65.
Edenbridge: 93-5, 97, 99.
Edinburgh, Scot.: 66.
"Edmonton Journal" Trophy: 459.
Efficiency of Personnel Challenge Cup: 32.
Eggie, Howard: 51.
Eisenhower, Gen. D. D.: 137, 321, 370, 433.
El Alamein: 137.
Elaschuk, C.S.M. J.: 198, 258-60; 274.
Elkins, Col. W. H. P.: 9.
Emmerich: 417.
Empe: 429.
Engineers, Royal Canadian: Training in the U.K., 81; combined ops trg 154; landing in Sicily, 158; at Leonforte, 179; in the Salso Valley, 194; at Hill 1007, 216, 218; at San Leonardo, 238; at Ortona, 278; at the Savio River, 356; and training with at Chilliwack, 458; Band of, plays at the presentation of Colours, 467; 6th Field Company, 59.
Epping Forest: 114.
Epsom: 112.
Equipment: Lack of, during the 1920s and 1930s, 24, 45; training with obsolete, 49; Bren, light machine-gun, 56; after arrival overseas, 73, 82; state of by Christmas, 1940, 107; and changes in 1941, 118; in 1943, 135-6; motorcycles, 136; "Piat", 136; Thompson, sub-machine carbines, 136; "Lifebuoy" flame-thrower, 374; "Wasp" flame-thrower, 374; "Weasels", 374; Post-war, 456.
Esprit de Corps: 5, 48, 57, 82, 275, 349, 443; Cadet Battalion, 20.
Esson, Pipe-Major E.: His background, 32; and the pre-war Military Tournament, 48; takes overseas the nucleus of a first rate pipe band, 59; his version of why the pipe band played so well on the trip to Aldershot, 65*n;* at Agira, 190; Christmas at Ortona, 268; playing in the lines of the North Irish Horse, 317; Beating the Retreat in Offida, 407; Divisional Parade in Rotterdam, 442; leads massed pipe bands in Amsterdam, 443*n;* piping Adm. J. A. Russell on board *U.S.S. Coral Sea,* 464; retires in 1965, 468*n; other refs,* 111, 134, 148*n.*
Establishment: in the 1920s, 18; C.A.S.F. Battalion, 55; War, 59; changed in 1941, 118; revised,

135; reached in May 1940, 87.
"Etna Line": 192.
"Explorer I": 459.

"F"

'F" Company: 455.
F.D.Ls. (Forward Defence Localities): 181, 279.
Fabriano: 325.
Fairweather, Lt. Dave: 281, 328, 336, 380.
Fairweather, Lt-Col. D. I.: 462, 464, 468-9.
Fairweather, Sgt.: 221.
Falmouth: 90*n*.
Farnborough: 76.
Farnham: 76.
Faustpatronen: 344*n*.
"Fearless Fosdick": 430.
Feltrino: 236.
Ferentino: 316-7.
Fermo: 405.
Ferrara: 325.
Ferrie, Lt-Col. C. C.: 13, 60, 65, 79-81, 105, 110, 120, 125.
Field Ambulance—
No. 5: 64, 169.
No. 9: 129.
Field Company, RCE, 6th: 59.
Fieldcraft: 84.
Fieldhouse, Pte. R. E.: 169*n*.
Finnerty, Mr.: 395.
Fiumicino River: 353.
Flags: 8, 35*n*.
Fleet: 76.
Flooding: 453.
Florence: 321-5, 371, 408.
Foggia: 215.
Foglia River: 326, 328-9.
Foiano: 215-8, 220.
Foiano di Val Fortore: 215.
Foligno: 325, 407.
F.O.O. (Forward Observation Officer); 148.
Forin, Col. J. D.: Training in England, 83; his impressions of the Battle of Britain, 99; and battle drill, 122; appointed 2 i/c, 125, 133; as acting C.O., 128; and combined ops trg, 137-8; notes in his diary that 1st Div. going overseas, 143-4; and the invasion of Sicily, 158n, 161-2; at Leonforte, 175, 178; as acting C.O., 215; confirmed as C.O., 215*n;* at Hill 1007, 216, 218-20; at Decorata Crossroads, 220-22; at Barnello, 224-29; promoted Lt-Col. and going to Britain, 230; at San Leonardo, 237-50; wounded, 250-1; reverts to Lt-Col and takes command, 449; *other refs,* 72*n,* 127, 130, 134, 276.
Foro River: 250.
Forsbeck, Sgt. N. C.: 130.
Fort George: 74.
Fosso Vecchio: 379, 387, 392, 394-5.
Fosso Vetro: 400-1.
Foster, Maj-Gen. H. W.: 270*n,* 429.
Foulkes, Lt-Gen. Charles: 370*n*.
Foxcroft, Lt. J. W. D.: 97, 122.
France: 317, 321, 407-9, 411-2.
Francis, Sgt. A.: 274.
Franco, Gen.: 45.
Francs: Belgian, 413; French, 413.
Fraser Delta: 453.
Fraser River: 453.
Freeman, Pte.: 403.
French Expeditionary Corps: 314, 322.
French, "Frenchy": 435.
French, Lt. R. V.: 176.
Frensham: 84.
Freyberg, Lt-Gen. Sir Bernard C., V.C.: 353.
Frockledge, Pte.: 361.
Frosinone: 233, 314-7.
Fuller, Pte. R. D. H.: 110*n*.
Fulton, Lt. D.: 134.
Fulton, Maj. E. D.: 275, 344, 445*n*.
Fusignano: 397, 402.

"G"

Game, Sgt. R.: 304, 320.
Garibaldi Glacier: 465.
Garigliano River: 285.
Garner, L/Cpl. L. M.: 83.
Garret, Lt-Col. F. C.: 468.
Garrioch, Sgt. B. C.: 297*n,* 305, 396.
"Gazelle", Exercise: 458.
Gell, Capt. H. C.: 13, 30-1, 73, 110.
Geneva Convention: 429.
General Headquarters, Home Forces: 88.
George, Capt. R.: 434, 436.
George, Maj. R. N.: 455.
George VI, H.M. King: 75.
Gestapo: 435.
Gibraltar, Strait of: 153.
Gibson, C.S.M. J.: 274.
Gibson, Pte. J.: 83.
Gibson, Sgt. J. G.: 99*n*.
Gibson, Grame S.: 99, 124.
Gibson, Brig. T. G.: 288, 312, 334, 336, 339*n,* 340, 342, 350.
Gildersleeve, Lt. W. F. J.: 231, 267-9, 284, 307*n,* 358, 373.
Gillies, Pipe-Major J.: 15-6, 23*n,* 28, 32, 468.
Gilmour, Sir John: 65.
Ginestreto: 328-9.

Glasgow, Scot.: 65, 146.
Glendinning, Maj. H. L.: 275, 277, 337-8, 345-7, 378*n*, 388, 423.
Glover, Capt. F. R.: 20.
Goch: 415.
Godo: 376, 402.
Godstone: 93, 96, 113, 116, 120.
"Goldflake", Operation: 411.
Gordon Head Officers' Training School: 18*n*, 119.
Gorssel: 418-20.
Gothic Line: 321-2, 325-32.
Gourock: 140.
Gowan, Capt. J. H.: 106, 125, 134, 172*n*, 178*n*, 208.
'Gowdeck': 206.
Grammichele: 169-70.
Granarolo: 392-4, 397.
Grand Aggregate Cup: 459.
Grant, Gen. Sir Charles: 65.
Gray, Lt.: 216-7.
Gray, Lt-Col. A. W.: 450.
Gray, Capt. James: 464.
"Grebbe Line": 433-4, 436-7.
Greece: 115.
Greenglass, Sgt.: 362.
Greig, Cpl. L. L.: 371-2.
Grenadier Guards, The: 16.
Grenadier Regiment, 134th: 314.
Griffin, Maj. M. J.: 23, 48, 128, 134.
Grindlay, Sgt.: 59*n*.
"Grizzly" (Hill feature at Agira): 181, 184-9.
Guilders: 441.
"Gully, The": 250, 252-7; Battle of, 252-7.
Gustafson, Pte.: 304.
Gustav Line: 285, 287-8, 290-1.
Gwatkin, Maj-Gen. Sir W. G.: 6.

"H"

H-Hour: 153, 158, 291.
Hadden, Cpl. D.: 200.
Haddon, C.S.M.: 124.
Halifax, N.S.: 60-1.
Hall, Capt. F. C.: 134, 201.
Hamber, Lt.-Gov. E. W.: 34, 47, 455.
Hamber, Mrs. E. W.: 74*n*.
Hamilton, Scot.: 146, 148; Race Course, 147.
Hamilton, Maj. J.: 13.
Hampden Park: 142.
Hampshire: 112.
Hanbury, Lt. D. C.: 259-60.
"Happy Valley": 204-5, 207.
Harding, Pres. W. G.: 23.
Hardman, Sgt. T.: 31.
Hardy, P.S.M. R. W.: 56.
Harfield, Capt F. H.: 351, 389.
Harley, Capt. D. S.: 172*n*, 173, 235*n*, 254, 258-61, 269.
Harling, Lt.: 182, 187-8, 224.
Harris, A. K.: 81*n*, 239*n*.
Harris, Angus: 162*n*.
Harris, Capt. D.: 208.
Harris, Capt. W. G.: 188, 193*n*, 228.
Harris, L/Cpl.: 341.
Harrod's Camp: 408.
Hastings and Prince Edward Regiment, The: 243-4, 249, 348, 353, 389.
"Haw-Haw, Lord": 88*n*.
Hawkins, Paddy (Leo): 269.
Haxted: 100.
Heal's Range: 28.
Heinkel (Aircraft): 98.
Helin, Pte. L. E.: 104, 116*n*.
Henderson, Pte. William: 302, 304.
Heerenberg: 417.
Hever Castle: 105.
Hicks, Sgt.: 267.
Highland Dancing: 321*n*.
Highland Light Infantry, The, 6th Battalion: 89.
Highlanders of Canada, 48th: 83, 140, 244-5, 250-1, 334-5, 337, 341, 442.
Hill 910: 217.
Hill 1007: 216-20, 222.
Hilversum: 443.
Hitler, Adolph: 44-5, 50, 85, 91, 437.
Hitler Line: Preparations for attack on, 285, 287; defences, 289, 309, 311; defences on Seaforth's front, 291; plan of attack, 290-2; battle of, 293-310; casualties, 305*n*, 309-10; beyond, 312-4; *other refs*, 317, 323, 409, 415.
Hoenderlo: 431-2.
Hoffmeister, Maj-Gen. B. M.: As a P/Lt. in 1927, 23*n*; pre-war occupation, 51; and field exercises with Welsh Guards, 83; appointed C.O., 133; changes he found in the battalion, at Brigade and at Division, 134-5; Sicily plans, 144, 150; landing in Sicily, 158, 160-1, 163; toward Leonforte, 172-4; at Leonforte, 177-8; at Agira, 181, 184, 186-7; awarded D.S.O., 190; along the Salso, 192-4; and "Booth Force", 195, 199; landing in Italy, 209, 211; at Potenza, 213-4; as acting Bde Comd, 218; Decorata Crossroads, 220; Baranello, 224, 228; promoted Brigadier and appointment as Bde Comd confirmed, 230; San Leonardo, 237, 241, 245, 249; Ortona, 257, 262, 276; patrols to nab a prisoner, 283; promoted Major-General and to Command 5th

Armd. Div. 288; Passchendaele dinner in November 1944, 372; Command of the Canadian Army Pacific Force, 442; as Chairman of the Battle Honours Committee, 466; *other refs,* 137, 165, 169, 266*n.*
Hoffmeister Building: 11.
"Hogan's Alley, Mayor of": 372.
Holding Unit: 106, 118-9.
Holmes, Capt. W. D.: 467*n.*
Home Guard: 94, 115-6, 129.
Honorary Colonel: 19, 21-2, 47*n.*
Honorary Lieutenant-Colonel: 19, 21, 276.
Honour, Guard of: 22-4, 463.
Honours and Awards: 1, 5; Battle, *see under* Battle Honours.
Horan, Cpl. G. F.: 247, 266*n.*
Horne, Pte.: 59*n.*
Horse Show Building: 16.
Hoven: 425-6, 428-9.
Houvenne: 413.
Hughes, Sir Sam: 3.
Humber River: 88.
Hummel: 417.
Hunter, Pte. R. H.: 169*n.*
Huntington Trophy: 459.
Hurricane (Aircraft): 98, 100.
Hurstpierpoint: 120.
"Husky", Operation: 150.
Hyndman, Lt. W. R.: 259*n,* 266.

"I"

Ide's Hill: 100.
Ijssel River: 416-7, 419-21, 423, 425-7, 429, 432-3.
Ijsselmeer: 432.
Ile de France, S.S.: 444-5.
Indian Infantry Brigade, 21st: 244, 405.
Indian River: 465.
Irish Fusiliers of Canada, The: 8*n.*
Irish Regiment of Canada, The: 275, 278.
Inter-Regimental Athletic Association: 39.
Instructors, Training: 25.
Inverary, Scot.: 139-42.
Inverary Castle: 145.
Ireland, R.S.M. R. H. W.: 144*n,* 205, 274.
Ispica: 152, 162-4, 167.
Isolationism: 15, 25, 44, 46.
Italy: Landing, 209; Surrender, 212; Partisans, 323-4; Soldiers of, 210; Subordination of the Italian Theatre, 321.

"J"

Jacob's Lake: 458.
Jans, A/C.S.M. W. H.: 320.
Jenkins, Sgt. R. E.: 304, 338, 339*n.*
Johnson, Pte. H .J.: 300.
Johnstone, Maj. D. M.: 51.
Johnstone, Pte E. G.: 130.
Josephy, Pte.: 403.

"K"

Kadeniuk, Pte. Walter: 296.
Kamloops, B.C.: 445.
Keen, Lt.: 81*n.*
Kenley: 112.
Kennedy, Maj-Gen. H. K.: 459.
Kennedy, H/Capt. R S. M.: 468.
Kent: 94-6, 98, 104, 112.
Keppel: 417.
Kesselring, Field-Marshal Albert: 232, 286, 321.
Kettering: 88-9.
King, Lt. T. A. S.: 389.
King, Rt. Hon. W. L. Mackenzie: 46.
King's Colour: *See under* Colours.
Kirkpatrick, Lt-Col. G. H.: 4, 11-2, 14, 17, 21.
Kitsilano Beach: 54.
Klarenbeek: 430-1.
Korea: 461.
Korea, Democratic Peoples Republic of: 454.
Korea, Republic of: 454.
Korean Conflict and War: 450-1.

"L"

Ladner, B.C.: 453.
Lamone River: 375-9, 388, 390.
Lancers, 6th: 324.
Lastucka, Pte.: 59*n.*
La Torre: 238, 243-4, 251, 256.
Laumes, Les; 412.
Laurie Bugle: 29.
Laurillard, Pte. W. M.: 83.
Law, Cpl. A. D.: 31.
Lawrence, A.: 414, 437.
Lawrence, Maj. J. W.: 467*n.*
Lay, Sgt. H.: 243*n.*
L.C.A. (Landing Craft, Assault): 140.
L.C.I. (L) (Landing Craft Infantry (Large)): 408-9, 411.
L.C.M. (Landing Craft, Mechanized): 139.
Leave: Disembarkation, 66; embarkation, 147; to Naples and Rome, 318; leave centres in Rome and Florence, 371; 30 day to Canada, 371; to Rome and Riccione, 402; to the United Kingdom from North-West Europe, 414, 442; to Amsterdam,

Brussels and Paris, 443.
Leckie, Col. J. E.: 6.
Leckie, Lt. L. W.: 208, 237*n*, 275.
Leckie, Maj-Gen. R. G. E.: 1, 3-4, 6.
LeClair, Lt. J. A.: 274.
Leda River: 433.
Leese, Lt-Gen. Sir Oliver W. H.: 170, 325, 348.
Leghorn: 407-9.
Le Grazie: 343, 345, 347.
Leon, Sgt.: 362.
Leonforte: 171, 173*n*, 174 ,176, 179-80; Battle of, 175-9.
Leopold III, H.M. King of the Belgians: 86.
Leslie, Lt-Col. T. S.: 51-2, 55.
Lewendon, Pte. R. E.: 389*n*.
Lewes: 143.
Licodia: 170.
Licata: 151.
"Lifebuoy" Flame-Thrower: 374.
"Lili Marlene" (Song): 370.
Limpsfield: 94, 98, 102, 105, 109-11, 114, 116.
"Lion": 180*n*. (Code name for a ridge).
Lire, Italian: 413.
Liri River: 289, 312.
Liri Valley: 233, 285, 288, 313, 371.
Little, C.S.M. J. A.: 14.
L.O.B. (Left out of battle): 273-4.
Locarno Pact: 44.
Loch Fyne: 140.
Logan, Cpl.: 403.
Lombardy Plains: 332.
London: 66.
London, Lt. G. T.: 31.
Lough, Lt-Col. J. R. S.: 13, 23, 37, 47, 48*n*, 110.
Lovat, Lord: 138.
Low Countries: 85.
Low, Piper J.: 459.
Loyal Edmonton Regiment, The: Training in England, 80, 113; receipt of new equipment, 82; air raid in Eastbourne, 129; Sicily, invasion plan, 152; at Ispica, 163-4; Piazza Armerina, 170; cross the Dittaino River, 174; Leonforte, 178-9; Agira, 186-9; Salso Valley, 192-4; Mount Revisotto, 201; S. Bartolommeo, 216; Baranello, 223-4, 228-9; Moro River, 237; San Leonardo, 241, 244-50; "The Gully", 252; Ortona, 257-8, 261-2, 264-5; Hitler Line, 291, 303; Frosinone, 314-5; Gothic Line, 326-9; Marecchia River, 334; San Martino, 341; San Fortunato, 343, 347; Savio River, 354-6, 365*n*, 366-8; Naviglio Canal, 379-82, 387, 392, 394, 396; Senio River, 404; Ijssel River, 422, 424-5, 428, 432; *other ref*, 96.
L.S.I. (L), (Landing Ship, Infantry (Large)): 145.
Lucera: 215, 286.
Lugo: 375-6, 388.
Lumsden, Capt. A. C.: 13.
Lynch, Maj. Stewart: 282, 323, 361-4, 384*n*, 389*n*, 394, 196-442.
Lyons: 412.
Lytton, Pte: 403.

"M"

M & V (Meat and vegetables): 403.
Maartinsdijk: 443.
Maas River: 415.
Macaulay Point: 27-8.
MacDonald, Capt. Ken: 197, 208.
MacDonald, Cpl.: 297.
Mace, Maj. O H.: Joins Battalion as a reinforcement, 275; at Frosinone, 315; San Martino, 336; Savio River, 365-6; to "A" Coy, 373; Naviglio Canal, 379, 383, 393, 396; as 2 i/c, 423*n*; assumes command of Battalion, 426; Apeldoorn, 431; De Glindhorst, 434; *other ref*, 428.
Machine-gunners: 18, 43.
Mackean, Capt.: 299.
Mackenzie, Capt. Sir Alan G. A. A.: 277, 367, 373, 419-20, 423, 425, 436, 455.
Mackenzie, Capt. I. A.: 13.
Mackenzie, Pte.: 435.
MacKenzie, Maj. W. I.: 53.
MacLeod, Sigm, D. A.: 31.
MacMillan, Sgt. Ian: 30.
Maginot Line: 85.
Mahon Park: 27.
Maitland, R.S.M.: 75.
Malkin, Lt. L.: 105, 124.
Malkin, W. H.: 34.
Malta: 155.
Malta Brigade: 191.
Manoeuvres: 26.
Maple Bay: 28.
"Maple Leaf, The" (Newspaper): 285. 369.
Mara, Lt. J. H. F.: 345.
Maracle, Sgt. S.: 274.
Marano River: 334, 342.
Margaret, H.R.H. Princess: 462.
Marseilles: 411.
Marecchia River: 334, 347.
Marlpit Hill: 99.
Marshall, Pte. William: 64.
Marsland, Pte. T.: 389*n*.
Martin, Capt.: 231.

Massa: 376.
Massey, Hon. Vincent: 65.
Matese Mountains: 223.
May, Pte.: 341.
McAdam, W. A.: 68, 110.
McAdam, Mrs. W. A.: 68.
McBride, Pte. J. G.: 173.
McBride, Lt. K. G.: 208, 224, 242.
McBride, Maj. L. M.: 299-300.
McCafferty, C.S.M. C.: 274, 455.
McCann, Sgt. M.: 467*n*.
McCardle, Cpl. Chris: 195.
McCarter, Jack: 34.
McConnell, Pte: 245.
McCreery, Lt-Gen. Sir Richard L.: 352, 368.
McDonald, Capt. W. K.: 173.
McDougall, Lt. R. L.: 175-6.
McGowan, Sgt. D.: 185, 274, 295.
McGuire, Capt. W. G.: 277.
McIntosh, Maj. W. G.: 13.
McIntyre, Capt. H.B.: 31, 59*n*, 78.
McKay, Pte. A. J.: 168, 183, 420*n*.
McKay, Lt. D. H.: 357-8, 377.
McKee, Sgt. G. K.: 222, 226-7.
McKim, C.S.M.: 395.
McLaughlin, Lt. D. S.: 250, 295.
McLean, Maj. J. F.: 186-8, 197-8. 246-7, 265, 269, 277, 294-7, 306.
McMahon, R.S.M. G. M.: 319, 349, 462.
McMullen, Capt. J.: 134, 208, 218, 221-2.
McMullen, C.S.M.: 295-6.
McNaughton, Gen. A. G. L.: 57, 75, 78, 93*n*, 144.
McNaughton, C.S.M. W. G.: 274.
McNutt, Sgt. H.: 56*n*, 81.
McParlon, A/Cpl. G. L.: 199-200.
McPhather, Pte.: 59*n*.
Meade, Sgt. Denis: 189, 267.
Meals: 369.
Mediterranean Sea: 153.
Meekison, Maj. D. M.: 53.
Melfa River: 313.
Melhuish, Lt.: 235.
Men, "Low and High Point": 443.
Mercer, Lt-Col. Alan W.: 134, 161, 165, 230, 245, 248, 258, 451.
Mercer, Tom: 269.
Merritt, Lt-Col. C. C. I., V.C.: 23*n*, 48, 105, 131, 363*n*, 445*n*, 457-8, 463.
Merritt, Capt. F.W.I.: 113, 134, 171, 178.
Mess: Sgts', 39; Officers', 39.
Messerschmitts (Aircraft): 98, 100.
Messina: 204, 209; Strait of, 209.
Metauro River: 325-7, 329, 332.
Metcalfe, Lt. E. M.:467*n*.
Metcalfe, P. S. M.: 130.
Meuse River: 86.
Mezzano: 400.
Middleton, Capt.: 162*n*, 164.
Mignano: 288.
Miles, Cpl.: 436.
Military Policy: 447-8.
Military Tournament: 47-8.
Militia Group Headquarters: 459; 24th, 459*n*.
Militello: 204-5.
Militia: Reorganization 1919, 6-7; 1920, 11; 1936, 41; role, 43-4; unpreparedness for war, 42-45.
Milne, Sgt. S. H.: 136*n*.
Mines: 264, 271.
Missiles: 460.
Mitchell, Cpl.: 59*n*.
"Moaning Minnie": 249.
Modica: 164-7.
Molson, Moose: 251.
Mombaroccio: 326-8.
Money, Capt.: 183, 201.
Monte Cassino: 289.
Montecicccardo: 328.
Montefalcone: 215-6.
Montelabbate: 330.
Monte Luro: 331-2.
Montemaggiore: 326.
Monte Santa Maria: 328.
Montgomery, Cpl.: 301.
Montgomery of Alamein, Field-Marshal The Viscount: 125-6, 137, 170, 206, 215, 233, 415, 433.
Montone River: 376.
Montreal: 61.
Moore, Cpl.: 299.
Moore, Pte. F.: 130.
Moore, Lt. V.C.: 275.
Morale: 137, 153, 325, 370, 443.
Morey, Pte. H. W.: 23*n*.
Morley, Alan: 61.
Moro River: 233, 236-7, 241-3, 247, 252, 271, 273.
Morrison, Capt. (Medical Officer): 109.
Morrison, Cpl.: 100.
Morval Barracks: 87, 89.
Motorcycles: 136.
Mottl, Sgt. J.: 260.
Mount Basilico: 210.
Mount Blanchard: 458.
Mount Desira Rossi: 174.
Mount Etna: 180, 191, 201, 207.
Mount Hood: 456.
Mount Revisotto: 201.
Mount S. Marco: 216, 219.
Mount Seggio: 201.
"Mouseholing": 270.
Moxon, Lt. J. O.: 208.
Muir, Cpl. J. A.: 110.
Mules: 170, 191.
Murdoch, Capt. K. S.: 106, 208.

Murdoch, Brig. W. S.: 55, 60, 81,101*n*, 266*n*, 371-3, 378*n*.
Muro: 213.
Murphy, Pte. N.: 389*n*, 390*n*.
Murphy, Cpl. V. A.: 389.
Murray, Sgt. J. F.: 315.
Mussolini, Benito: 44, 191, 209.
Mutual Aid Programme: 456.
Myles Castle: 104.
Myles, Cpl.: 435.

"N"

N.A.A.F.I. (Navy, Army and Air Force Institute): 67, 90.
Naples: 209, 287, 318.
National Survival Training: 461.
Nations, League of: 44-5.
Naviglio Canal: 379-80, 387-9, 392-6.
Nebelwerfers: 380.
Neder Rijn: 416.
Netherlands: 85, 415.
Newberry, Lt. J. D.: 31, 73, 106.
Newing, Capt. H. E.: 141, 205, 286.
Newsom, Capt. Don: 208, 225-6.
New Westminster, B.C.: 368.
Nicholson, R.S.M. J. J.: 72, 78, 81, 134, 144*n*.
Nickerson, Pte.: 341.
Nicosia: 191.
Nijmegen: 415, 443; Bridgehead, 416.
Nikerk: 433.
Nissoria: 168, 180.
Normandy Bridgehead: 321.
Normandy Campaign: 415.
Norris Bridge: 77.
Norris, Maj. T. G.: 134.
North Africa: 115, 137.
Northampton: 88.
North Atlantic Treaty Organization: 454.
North Commons: 123.
North Farnborough: 65.
North Irish Horse: 286-7, 291-3, 295, 299, 302-3, 306, 309, 317.
Norwich: 114.
Norway: 82-3, 90.
Nuclear attack: 460.

"O"

O.C.T.U. (Officer Candidate Training Unit): 118, 134, 320.
O'Dare, Pte.: 59*n*.
Officers: Policy re, 106; Cadets, 106-7.
Offida: 405-6.
Olafson Bridge: 378.
Olinek, Sgt. E. E.: 467*n*.
O'Neil, Maj. T. U.: 463, 467*n*.
Ontario Regiment (11th Armoured Regiment), The: 249, 253, 255.
Oosterhuizen: 431.
Ooster Park Kerk: 441.
Organization: Of 72nd Regiment, 2; reorganization of 1919, 6-7; of 1920, 11; in the 1920s and 1930s, 18; C.A.S.F. Bn., 55, 118; Post-war armed forces, 448; reorganization of the Reserve Army, 459; *other ref*, 14.
Ortona: Gen. Montgomery's over-all plan, 233; terrain in the area of the Sangro and, 236; Gen. Voke's plan whilst at San Leonardo, 241, 244; plan of attack, 257; Battle of, 258, 260-72; defences, 263; Street-fighting, 264; unorthodox use of weapons, 266; communications, 267; Christmas dinner, 267-8; "Mouseholing", 270; sense of sadness at burial service, 271; casualties, 273; reinforcements after, 275; clearing up, 278; Burns Night supper, 281; Seaforth leave area of, 286; *other refs*, 283, 288, 389*n*, 406.
Osterio Nuova: 330.
"Otter Committee": 6-7.
Otter, Maj-Gen. Sir William: 6.
"Overflow", Operation: 453.
"Overlord", Operation: 233.
Owen, Lt. D. M.: 208.
Oxford: 92, 98.
Oxted: 93, 102, 110, 113.

"P"

Pachino: 151-2, 159, 162*n;* Beaches, 157.
Padgett, C.Q.M.S.: 429.
Paisley Island: 458.
Palazzolo: 168.
Pantano Longarini: 151, 160.
Panzer Grenadier Regiments: 9th, 226, 229; 15th, 190; 67th, 225, 229; 104th, 180; 211th, 327; 361st, 354*n*.
Parachute Regiment, 3rd: 192, 196, 256.
"Parex", Exercise: 112, 115.
Paris: 90, 412, 443.
Parker, Capt. B. G.: 114, 116*n*, 167, 235*n*, 251, 462.
Partwood, Jack: 104.
Passchendaele Dinner: 372.
Paterson, Maj. H. W. J.: 337*n*, 338.
Paterson, Pte.: 341.
Patrols: From Potenza, 213-4; at Ortona, 265; after Ortona, 278-84; types of, 278-9; at the Arno River, 323; fighting patrols at San Martino, 336; at the Senio

River, 388-9, 397, 401-2; at the "Grebbe Line", 434.
Pay and Allowances: 17, 24, 456.
Pearkes, Maj-Gen. G. R., V.C.: as G.S.O. I at M.D. XI, 27; and inspection on 13 Nov. 39, 57-8; meets Seaforth Highlanders on arrival at North Farnborough, 65; and training in the U.K., 75-6, 80, 86-7, 111, 128; and anti-invasion role, 92-3; promoted Major-General and to Command of 1st Div., 93*n;* returns to Canada, 135; *other ref,* 445*n.*
"Pearkes Pits": 116.
Peck, Col. C. W.: 6-7.
Peebles, Cpl. Bob: 294, 380.
Peebles, Bandmaster J. R.: 16*n.*
Penman, Sgt. Dave: 185-7.
Pennant, Company: 455.
Percival, 2/Lt. Angus: 459.
Perpetuation: 6-7.
Perrett, Lt. F. R.: 237*n,* 322, 373.
Perth Regiment, The: 275, 329.
Perugia: 322, 324-5.
Pesaro: 325.
Pescara: 233, 262.
Petain, Marshal H. P.: 91.
Pets: 79-80.
Pevensey: 137, 142.
Pevensey Castle: 128, 137.
Pevensey Radar Station: 129.
Philip, H.R.H. Prince: 463, 466-9.
"Phoney War": 77, 91.
Piazza Armerina: 170-1.
Piedmonte d'Alife: 317-8, 320.
Pierce, Maj. J. D.: 106, 113, 125, 373, 376, 389-90, 463, 467*n.*
Pieva Sestina: 361.
Pignataro: 288.
Pioneers: 400.
Pirbright: 81.
Pisa: 408.
Pisciatello River: 353.
Pitt Meadows, B.C.: 453.
"Plains of Abraham": 20*n.*
"Plunder", Operation: 415*n.*
Po Valley: 332, 347, 352, 370.
Pofi: 314.
Point 119: 330-1.
Point 479: 327.
Point 394: 327.
Point 735; 226.
Point 763: 224, 226, 228-9.
Policy—
Defence: 1937, 46; Post-war, 452.
Military: in the 1950s, 454; at the close of the 1950s, 460.
Pollard, Lt. W. H.: 392.
Pontassieve: 407.
Pontecorvo: 289, 291, 295, 305, 312.
Ponte della Pietra: 355.
Ponte Olivo: 151.
Poole, Sgt. J. C.: 197.
Pope, Maj. F. N.: 277, 320.
Poppell, Pte. L. B.: 306.
"Popski's Private Army": 216.
Port Coquitlam, B.C.: 453.
Portnuff, Capt. J. C.: 360, 385.
Potenza: 212-5.
Potts, Brig. A. E.: 93*n,* 113, 135.
Pozzallo: 151, 164, 166-7.
Pozzo Alto: 330-1.
Preece, Capt. C. G.: 293, 306.
Priest Hill: 102*n.*
Pringle, H/Capt. the Rev. G. C. F.: 36.
Princess Louise's Dragoon Guards: 196, 217-8, 439.
Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry: Training in England, 78, 80, 113; receipt of new equipment, 87; unmilitary "beach party", 104*n;* Sicily, invasion plan, 152; Modica, 165; Leonforte, 174, 179; Agira, 180-1, 183, 189; Mount Seggio, 201; Decorata Crossroads, 216-18, 220, 222; Vinchiaturo, 223; Baranello, 228; San Leonardo, 237, 240-1, 243-4, 250-1; "The Gully", 253; Ortona, 257; Hitler Line, 291, 303, 305; Frosinone, 315; Gothic Line, 326-8, 330-1; San Fortunato, 334-5, 347; Savio River, 355-7, 367-8; Lamone River, 379; Bagnacavallo, 382, 386-7; Naviglio, 392-3; Ijssel River, 419, 421, 424-5, 430-2; Achterveld, 436; *other refs,* 78, 160, 194, 235.
Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry, 2nd Battalion: 455.
Prisoners of War: Escort back to Canada, 320; captured in Gothic Line, 332; at San Fortunato, 346; at the Savio River, 365, 368; at the Ijssel River, 424, 429.
Pringle, Pte.: 358.
Projector, Infantry: 136. (P.I.A.T.).
Promotions in action: 274.
Provisional School of Instruction: 25-6.
"Pub": 79, 91.
Pugh, Capt. D. V.: 122, 134.
Punjabs, 3rd/1st: 285.

"Q"

Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders of Canada: 61.
Queen's Own Highlanders (Seaforth and Cameron): 467, 469.

"R"
Rae, Pte. Malcolm: 189.
Ragusa: 167-8, 170.
Ramsel: 413.
Range: Blair, 13, 29; Crumbles, 130; Field-firing, 127; Indoor, 29; lack of funds, 36*n*; Richmond, 13, 29; *other ref*, 30.
Rationing: 67-8, 117.
Ravenna: 375-6.
Recruiting: 13, 15-7, 19, 30, 52-4, 450.
Reccione: 350.
Redhill: 116-7.
Reed, Lt. K. W.: 208.
Regalbuto: 191-3, 204.
Reggio Calabria: 209.
Regiment, 50th: 7.
Regimental: Aid Post, 251, 385; Colours, *see under* colours; Dinner, 39; Institute, 12, 26; Motto, 39; Picnic, 39; upkeep, 37*n*.
Regimental Depot, Reserve: 42-3, 55, 58-9.
Regiments, German—
Grenadier: 134th, 314.
Panzer Grenadier: 9th, 226, 229; 15th, 190; 67th, 225, 229; 104th, 180; 211th, 327. Parachute, 3rd: 192, 196, 256.
Reichwald: 417.
Reid, Pte. Albert: 96*n*.
Reid, Pte. G. A.: 160*n*, 226-7.
Reid, Capt. J. M.: 13.
Reid, Lt. W. D.: 208, 266*n*.
Reigate: 111, 117.
Reinforcement: 180, 208, 262, 275-7, 288, 312, 320.
Reinforcement Group, No. 1 Canadian Base: 320.
Reinforcement Unit, No. 1 Canadian Infantry Division: 134.
Renkum: 433.
Reserve Force: 448, 450, 452.
Revenge, H.M.S:. 63.
Rhine, River: 415, 417.
Rhodes, Lt. D. C.: 208.
Riccio River: 278.
Riccione: 334, 371-3, 376, 402.
Rice, Bob: 390.
Richardson, Pte.: 304.
Richmond, B.C.: 453.
Richmond Ranges: 13.
Rifle Association: 13, 38; British Columbia, 29; Ranges, *see under* Ranges; Shooting trophies, 29.
Rifle Company, U.S.M.C. (Reserve), 56th: 465.
Rifles, 11th Canadian Mounted: 4.
Rimini: 325, 332, 334, 347, 376.
Ritchie, Pte. C. P.: 390*n*.
Roaf, J. H.: 34.
Roaf, Capt. W. G. H.: 23,62, 82, 90, 110.
Roberts, Cpl.: 59*n*.
Roberts, H.M. Monitor: 162-3.
Roberts, Maj. W. L.: 277, 354, 416, 467*n*.
Robertson, Capt. A: 64, 101.
Robertson, Lt. Harry: 301.
Robins, C.S.M. D. J.: 467*n*.
Robinson, Lt. A. L.: 213-4, 260.
Robinson, Pte. D. V. F.: 403.
Rocket Fire: 398.
Rocky Mountain Rangers: 59, 448.
Romagna: 347, 352.
Rome: 233, 289, 317-8, 321, 371, 402.
Rommel, Field-Marshal Erwin: 232.
Romselaar: 436.
Ronco River: 368-9.
Rosolini: 168.
Ross, Lt-Col. (R.C.A.): 372.
Ross, Lt-Gov. Frank M.: 466*n*.
Ross, Brig-Gen. J. M.:13.
Ross, Capt. W. C.: 13.
Rotondella: 212.
Rotterdam: 85, 433, 442.
Royal Air Force Regiment: 148.
Royal Armoured Corps, 145th Regiment: 326, 330, 332, 335, 356.
Royal Canadian Army Service Corps: 319.
Royal Canadian Artillery: 147; *see also under* Artillery.
Royal Canadian Corps of Signals: 49; 11th Divisional Signals, 28; 11th District Signals, 60.
Royal Canadian Dragoons (1st Armoured Car Regiment), The: 376-7, 389.
Royal Canadian Engineers: *See under* Engineers, Royal Canadian.
Royal Canadian Mounted Police: 29.
Royal Canadian Regiment, The: 14, 167*n*, 229, 244-5, 248-50, 389.
Royal Marine Commandos: 147; No. 40, 151; No. 41, 151.
Royal Naval Beach Parties: 148.
Royal School of Instruction: 25-6.
Royal Tank Regiment: 4th Battalion, 419*n*; 12th Battalion, 353, 404.
Royal 22e Regiment: 103, 257, 308, 334-5, 343-4.
Rubicon River: 353*n*.
Rugby XV: 112.
Rum Ration: 369.
Russell, Pte.: 305.
Russell, Admiral James A.: 464.
Russi: 375-6, 391, 402.
Rutherford, Capt. Bruce: 453.

"S"
Sacco Valley: 233, 316.
St. Hillaire, H.M.S.: 141-2.
St. John's Church (Vancouver): 8, 35*n.*
Salerno: 215, 232; Gulf of, 209.
Salisbury: 86; Plains, 86.
Sally Ann: 407.
Salmon, Maj-Gen. H. L. N.: 135.
Salso River: 192, 195, 201; Valley, 194.
Salter, Lt.; 396.
Salturno River: 319; Valley, 318.
San Bartolomeo: 216-7.
San Benedetto: 406.
San Croce: 223.
San Fortunato: 334, 340-8, 351.
San Leonardo: 236-41, 243-51, 253, 256, 273; Battle for, 238.
San Lorenzo: 335.
San Lorenzo in Monte: 343-4.
San Martino: 334-42, 347.
San Martorano: 356.
San Severo: 215.
Sant' Agata: 287.
Santa Maria de Scacciano: 334.
Sant' Angelo: 329.
Sant' Apollinare: 237-8.
Santerno River: 375.
San Vito: 236, 283.
Sangro River: 233-6.
Sansom, Col. E. W.: 81.
Sarcee, Alta: 457.
Saskatoon Light Infantry (Machine-Gun): 127, 228, 356-7, 434.
Savignano: 353.
Savio River: 352-3, 355-6, 359-69, 378, 388.
Scheldt River: 415.
Schools—
British Military: 72.
Provisional School of Instruction: 25-6.
Royal School of Instruction: 25-6.
Scicli: 168.
Scotland: 83.
Scots Guards, The: 15, 81.
Scott, Lt. J. C. M.: 178.
Scouts: 18.
Scovil, Pte. W. H.: 30.
Seaford: 143.
Seaforth Armoury: 34-5, 51, 60, 444-6.
Seaforth Association: 11*n,* 20-1, 35, 449, 467; Dinner, 39; British, 74*n.*
Seaforth Club: 2, 11.
"Seaforth Day": 445.
Seaforth Highlanders: 74; 2nd Battalion, 206-7, 443; 5th, 206, 443; 6th, 206-7, 443; 7th, 443; *see also* Queen's Own Highlanders (Seaforth and Cameron).
Seaforth Highlanders of Canada: Organized on the disbandment of the 72nd Regiment (Seaforth Highlanders of Canada), 7; and claims to the Honours of the 16th, 72nd and 231st Battalions, C.E.F., 9; reorganization of 1936, 43.
Seaforth Highlanders of Canada, C.A.S.F.: Recruiting, 52-5; early training, 54-5; organized, 55; strength, 55; Establishment, 55; preparations for going overseas, 59; and departure, 61; arrives in the U.K., 64; U.K., impact on personnel, 66-9; at Salisbury Plains, May 1940, 86; counter invasion role, June 1940, 88, 92, 94-6, 101, 112, 116, 121; experiences its first air raid, 92; anti-parachutist role, 95; inspected by Winston Churchill, 95-6; provide guard on Chartwell Manor, 96; Spitfire fund, 100*n;* defence of Brighton area, 103, 120; turnover in personnel in one year, 105; policy re officers, 106; Manpower "wastage", 106; defence of South Coast, 120, 128-9; spirit of the Regiment at Pachino landings, 158; experience gained in one month, 203; for the period in Italy *see* the General Index; last fight in Italy, 405; Move to France, 407-9; return to Canada, 444; arrival in Vancouver, 445.
Seaforth Highlanders of Canada, 2nd (Reserve) Battalion: 7, 20, 35, 42-3, 444.
Seaforth Highlanders of Canada, 72nd Regiment: Offered for overseas service, 1, 4; and the return from overseas to Vancouver, 2; authorized as 72nd Highlanders of Canada in 1911, 2; redesignated 72nd Seaforth Highlanders of Canada, 3; affiliation with The Seaforth Highlanders, 3; Provides 25 officers and 514 other ranks to the 16th Battalion (The Canadian Scottish), 4; total number of officers and other ranks supplied to the 72nd Battalion, C.E.F., 5; and contribution to the 231st Battalion, C.E.F., 5; on the reorganization of 1919 and perpetuation, 6-7; disbanded and reorganized as the Seaforth Highlanders of Canada, 7; and claims to the Battle Honours of the 16th Battalion, C.E.F., 9; armouries, 11.

Seaforth Company (1st Canadian Highland Battalion): 455.
No. 72 The Seaforth Highlanders Cadet Corps: 19-20, 444, 446, 462-3, 466.
Seaforth Overseas Club: 11.
Seaforth Reinforcement Company: 320.
Seaforths School: 35*n*.
Seaforth Veterans: 446.
Seasickness: 63.
Second Commonwealth Study Conference: 466.
Second Front: 233, 285.
Sedan: 86.
Selection Board: 118.
Sellar, Maj. G.: 458.
Senio River: 375-6, 379, 382, 387-9, 392, 397-405; Dykes, 393, 397, 409.
Serrungarina: 326.
Seyss-Inquart, Reichskommissar: 433, 437.
S.H.A.P.E. (Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe): 455.
Shaw, Johnny: 390.
Shilo, Camp: 445.
Sicily: Invasion plan, 144, 150-2; defences, 157-60; a close look at the Sicilians, 164; invasion meeting unexpected success, 167; Sicilians as seen by H/Maj. Durnford, 168-9; capture of, 204; *other ref*, 155.
Siegfried Line: 417.
Siena: 322, 324.
Signals, Royal Canadian Corps of: 49.
11th District Signals: 60.
11th Divisional Signals: 28.
Seaforth - Signal Platoon: 453; Signal Section, 30-2; Signallers, 18, 24, 28, 30.
Simento River: 201; Valley, 201.
Simonds, Maj-Gen. G. G.: 135*n*, 145, 171, 215.
Simpson, Pte. T. F.: 178.
Sinclair, Cpl. "Postie": 109, 205.
"Sitzkrieg": 437.
Sked, Cpl. W. B.: 294-5.
'Ski Company": 451.
Skinner, L/Cpl. D. G.: 345-6.
Slatter, Bandmaster H.: 15-6.
Smith Pte. E. A., V.C.: 363, 368, 388, 406.
Smith, Fyfe: 34.
Smith, Maj. H. A.: 253.
Smith, Cpl. H. R.: 357-8.
Snyde, Capt.: 110.
Social Activities: 39.
Southampton: 445.
South Downs: 120-1.
South-Eastern Command: 112.
Southern Command: 112.
Southern England: 126; Coast of, 138, 143.
South Nutfield: 116.
South Saskatchewan Regiment, The: 131, 363.
Soviet Union: 452.
Special Force: 455.
Spitfire (Aircraft): 98, 100; Fund, 100*n*.
Spooner, Lt. F. W.: 13.
Sports: 28, 39, 96-7, 143, 207, 214, 456.
"Sputnik I & II": 459.
Squamish, B.C.: 465.
Stanley Park: 47.
Staples, Maj. A.: 272*n*, 275, 316, 359, 394-6.
Starborough Castle: 97.
Stevenson, Brig. J. B.: 13, 52-7, 60-2, 65, 74-5, 81, 96, 105.
Stewart, Brig. J. C.: 57, 60.
Stewart, Maj-Gen. J. W.: 4*n*, 21.
Stewart, J. W.: Cup, 32; Trophy, 464.
Stewart, C/Sgt. R.: 467*n*.
Stewart, Pte.: 299-300.
Stone, Lt. W. M. C.: 378, 401.
Stone, Lt-Col. J. R.: 372, 455.
Storch, Sgt.: 299.
Story, L/Cpl. R. R.: 173.
Strain, Capt. D. H.: 130, 134, 144, 178.
Strength: 1921-22, 16; improvement in the 1920s, 18; Cadet Battalion, 19; as of November 1931, 23*n*; effect on, caused by depression, 37; increases from 1936, 47; of C.A.S.F. Battalion, in September 1939, 55; and changes from landing in Sicily to Ortona, 273; at full strength in February-March 1944, 288; dwindles noticeably after V.E. Day, 442-3; Post-War, 449-50; affected by equipment available, 456; of Regular Army in June, 1955, 459.
Stretcher-bearers: 385.
Strickland, Lt-Col. E. V.: 286*n*, 339*n*, 340.
Submarine lookouts: 62.
"Sugar" Beach: 151.
Summer Camp: 26-8, 48-9, 457-8.
Surrender: Italian, 212; German in Italy, 437; German in North-West Europe, 437.
Surrey: 96, 112.
Sussex: 112.
Sutherland, Hon. D. M.: 34.
Sutherland, Capt. W. H.: 208, 211.
Sutherland Brown, Brig. J.: 27*n*, 33.
Sweeney, R.S.M. B. C.: 441.
Swicki, Joe: 429.

Swinton, Capt. R. K.: 277, 307, 339, 419, 421, 423-4, 428.
Syracuse: 151, 168.

"T"

Taaffe, Lt-Col. F. F.: 13, 51.
Tactical Air Force: 341.
Tait, Ian: 172*n*.
Tait, Lt-Col. J. M. S.: 60, 65, 78, 118*n*, 125-6, 128.
Tankard, R.S.M. L. R.: 462.
Tank-hunting: Company, 373, 392; Group, 380; Platoon, 351, 361-2.
Tanks: 45, 49, 103. *See also under* Armoured, Regiments.
Taranto, Gulf of: 212.
Tarbuck, Capt. C. C.: 81, 93, 366, 372.
"Tattoo, Seaforth": 464.
Taylor, Austin C.: 34.
Taylor, Pte. T.: 51*n*.
Teece, Sgt. J. H.: 242-3, 320.
"Teller" Mine: 264.
Tennant, Pte. James: 363.
Terry, Cpl. F. W.: 185.
Thames River: 88.
Thirlwell, Maj. J. L.: 327, 381, 389, 396*n*, 405*n*, 416.
Thomas, Capt. E. W.: 176-9, 186, 189, 200, 235*n*, 249, 252-4.
Thomas, Cpl. R. M.: 222.
Thompson, Sgt. F. D.: 83.
Thompson, George: 59, 73*n*.
Thompson, Sgt. K. P.: 362-4.
Thompson, Sub-Machine Carbines: 136.
Thomson, L/Cpl. M.: 110*n*.
Thomson, Lt-Col. S. W.: Landing in Sicily, 159; wounded, 167; in Command of "C" Coy, 208; to Foiano, 216; at Hill 1007, 218-9; appointed 2 i/c, 230; assumes Command on wounding of Lt-Col. Forin, 250-1; "The Gully", 253; Ortona, 257, 260, 266, 270; returns to U.K. for Senior Officer's Course, 276; returns as Lt-Col. and assumes command, 288; Hitler Line, 293, 295, 298, 303, 305, 207-8; Frosinone, 315; Arno River, 323; Gothic Line, 325, 327-8, 330-1; San Martino, 334-40, 342; San Fortunato, 344-5, 347-8; leaves to take command of The Black Watch, 350; *other refs*, 211, 235.
Three Rivers Regiment (12th Armoured Regiment): 193-5, 200-1, 435.
Thunder Barrow Hill: 127.
"Tiger" (codename for Ridge): 180*n*. 182, 184*n*, 186.
"Tiger", Exercise: 125-7.
Tilshead Camp: 86-7.
Tobin, Lt-Col. H. S.: 4*n*.
Tod Inlet: 28.
Tonbridge: 96, 100.
Topping, Sgt.: 396.
Toronto Scottish Regiment (Machine-Gun): 103.
Training: Annual camp, 457-8; Cadet Battalion, 19; Depression, effects on, 38; facilities, 13; general, 28; at local HQ, 26, 29; manoeuvres, 26; officers, 29; post-war, 451-2; 1951-1952, 454, 456; 1952-1953, 458; in the 1960s, 465; programme, 72; Signallers, 30-1; strength, 27; summer camps, 26-9, 48-9, 457-8; survival ops, 460-1; tactical exercises without troops (T.E.W.T.), 27; trophies won, 32; Young Soldiers' Training Plan, 461.
Training, C.A.S.F. Battalion: In Canada, 54-5; initial, in U.K., 75-6; night, 76; at night, 77; anti-gas, 77; prior to inspection by Gen. McNaughton, 78; in field engineering, 81; with Welsh Guards, 83-4; in May 1940 and at Salisbury Plains, 86; and changes in, as a result of German methods used in France, 97; exercises with tanks, 103; Manpower "wastage", 106; state of, by Christmas 1940, 107; exercises held in 1941, 112, 114; Exercise "Parex", 112-3; "Bulldog", 113; with Home Guard, 115; changes in method of, 118; Battle Drill, 121-4, 127; monotony of, 133; Combined Operations, 138-9, 142; Exercise "Viking", 139; "Dry-Shod", 139; "Wetshod", 146; Infantry-cum-Tank exercises, 287; at Piedmonte, 320; at a minimum after V.E. Day, 443.
Trasimene, Lake: 323.
Transport Personnel: 18.
Trebisacce: 212.
"Trident", Conference: 208.
Troia: 215, 287.
Troina River: 192, 194-5, 198.
Trophies—
Blair Trophy: 464.
Brigadier D. M. Clark's Infantry Sword: 459.
District Infantry Association Challenge: 31.
Dominion Signallers Challenge Cup: 31.
Earl Grey Trophy: 444, 463*n*.

"Edmonton Journal": 459.
Huntington: 459.
King's Prize and Grand Aggregate, won by Lt-Col. R. M. Blair: 30.
Laurie Bugle: 29.
J. W. Stewart: 32, 464.
Wallace Efficiency: 465.
Wrigley Trophy: 32.
Tuck, Capt. W. D. C.: 294-5, 419, 422, 424, 428, 431.
Tweedsmuir, Rt. Hon. Lord: 36.
Tweedsmuir, Lt-Col. The Lord: 124-5, 372.
Twigg House: 11-2.

"U"

Uckfield: 126.
Uniforms: *See under* Dress.
United Kingdom: Impact on Seaforths, 66-9; Defence of the, 93.
United States of America Forces: Fifth Army, 209, 215, 233, 375; Seventh Army, 151; 56th Rifle Company, U.S.M.C.(R), 465; 161st Infantry Regiment, 48*n*.
University of British Columbia: 118, 467.
Upton, Lt. T.: 422.
Utrecht: 443.

"V"

'V' Day: 439.
"V2": 398, 402.
Valcartier, Camp: 455.
Valenciennes: 412.
Valguarnera: 170-1.
Valmontone: 317, 322.
Valturno River Valley: 288.
Vance, Maj. T. C. B: 56*n*, 134, 215*n*, 228, 230, 239, 265, 269.
Vancouver, B.C.: 47, 444-5, 448.
Vancouver, H.M.C.S.: 28.
Vancouver Armoury Association Limited: 33.
Vancouver Athletic Club Gymnasium: 47*n*.
Vancouver Club: 11.
Vancouver Hotel: 39.
Vancouver Regiment, The: 8*n*.
Vancouver Sun: 61*n*.
Vedder Canal: 458.
Vehicles—
Buffaloes: 416, 418-9.
Changes: in 1941, 118; in 1943, 136, 145.
Holidays: 117.
Post-War: 456.
Sicily: 149, 170.
Signs: 413.
Weasels: 374.
Vernon, B.C.: 49, 457.
Vicars, Capt. H .T.: 125.
Victoria, B.C.: 119.
Victoria Cross: Lt-Col. C. C. I. Merritt, 131; Pte. E. A. (Smokey) Smith, 363, 368, 388, 406.
"Viking", Exercise: 139.
Villa Rogatti: 237, 240, 243-4.
Vimy Day Remembrance: 21; Dinner, 39, 79.
Vinchiaturo: 215, 223, 286.
Vitteaux: 412.
Vizzini: 169.
Vokes, Maj-Gen. C.: Takes over command of 2nd Brigade, 135; notes that morale and efficiency had slipped, 137; Combined Ops Trg, 148; speaks briefly to men on way to Sicily, 150; Sicily, invasion plan, 152; Modica, 166; Leonforte, 178-9; Commands 1st Div. in an acting capacity, 214; promoted Major-General and appointed Divisional Commander, 230; San Leonardo, 237, 241, 243; Service held at Cemetery on 26 May 1944 after Hitler Line, 312; San Fortunato, 343; attends meeting with Gen. Freyberg, 353; leaves 1st Div. to take Command of 4th Arm'd Div. 370*n;* announces 30 day leave for men overseas for five years, 371; attends Passchendaele Dinner, 372; *other refs,* 137, 192.
Vondelspark: 439.
Voorst: 425, 428.
Voorsthuizen: 432.
Votary, Pte.: 435.

"W"

Waal River: 433.
Wainwright, Alta.: 457, 459.
Waldie, Maj. W. L.: 444.
Waldingham: 111.
Wales, H.R.H. Edward, Prince of: 22-3.
Wallace Efficiency Trophy: 465.
Wars: Danger of, 45; "Phoney", 77, 91; Second World War, Declaration of, 50-1; Spanish Civil, 45.
Warfare, Static: 81*n*.
Warner, L/Cpl. J. V.: 300.
Washington National Guard, 161st Infantry Regiment: 48*n*.
Washington State Military Jubilee: 48.
"Wasp" Flame-thrower: 374, 423-4, 427.
"Wastage": 106.
Weapons: Lack of, 45-6, 48; training

with obsolete, 49; issues in the U.K. after arrival, 73; correspond to those in British Divisions, 147*n;* unorthodox method of using at Ortona, 266; "Lifebuoy" and "Wasp" flame-throwers, 374; "V2" and "Dagwood", devices, explosive, used on Senio dykes, 398-9, 402; changes on reaching North-West Eurpoe, 413-4; and disposal after V.E. Day, 443; New, Post-War, 456.
"We are the D-Day Dodgers" (Song): 370.
"Weasles": 374.
Wesel: 415.
Webster, Pte. Frederick: 189, 269.
Weekly, Eng.: 88.
Wellburn, R.Q.M.S. S.: 319.
Welsh Guards, The: 2nd Battalion, 83-4.
Welsh Regiment: 120.
Westerham: 102.
Western Command: 448.
Westham: 140.
Westmeerbeek: 413.
Westminster Regiment, The: 8*n,* 275, 387, 450*n.*
West Nova Scotia Regiment: 99, 253, 255, 291-2, 308, 367-8, 386.
Weston, Cpl. E. S.: 295.
"Wetshod", Exercise: 146.
Wheeler, Pte. L. H.: 403.
White, Sgt-Maj. George: 56*n.*
Whiting, Lt. F:. 277, 302.
Whittaker, L/Sgt. C. E.: 59*n,* 72, 110.
Windsor Squadron, City of: 207*n.*
"Wildwest", Exercise: 465.
Wilkin, Pte. F.: 299.
Williamson, Capt. G. F.: 134, 413.
Willingdon: 142-3.
Wilp: 420-1, 424.
Wilson, Lt-Col. A. D.: 9, 13, 17, 21.
Wilson, Lt. D.: 467*n.*
Wilson, Joe: 430.
Wilson, Lt. Marriott: 182.
Wilson, Lt. R. A.: 175, 252*n.*
Witley: 134.
Wittick, Pte.: 389.
Women's Auxiliary: 109, 205, 369, 445, 449.
Women's Canadian Club of Vancouver: 119.
Wood, Pte. F. L.: 130.
Woodward, Cpl. R. G.: 423-4.
Woodward, Lt-Gov. W. C.: 446.
Woolley, Capt. T. E.: 275, 295, 297, 300, 302, 354.
Wotton Park: 92-3, 98.
Wrigley Trophy: 32.

"Y"

Young Soldiers Training Plan: 461-3.

"Z"

Zutphen: 416, 418, 426.

APPENDIX K

NOMINAL ROLL

"This Nominal Roll of the Seaforth Highlanders of Canada (Canadian Army Overseas) covers the period from 1939 to 1945. It has been taken from the Records Office of the Canadian Army at Acton, England."

OFFICERS

Final Seaforth Rank	Name	Decorations	Service with Seaforths	Later Appointment	Casualties
Lt.	ADAMS, A.J.		20.Oct.44 - 4.Nov.44		
Capt.	ALLAN, J.C.	DSO	14.Nov.43 - 23.May.44	Maj.	W.23.May.44
A/Capt.	ANDERSON, E.F.		7.Sep.39 - 7.Oct.43		W. 8.Oct.43
Lt.	ANDRUNYK, S.F.		23.Jan.45 - 1.Feb.45		
Lt.	ANGLE, H.H.	DSO, ED, MiD	22.Jan.40 - 29.May.40	Lt.Col.Comd. 9 Armd.Regt.	
Lt.	ARCHIBALD, R.E.		16.May.45 - 25.Sep.45		
Lt.	ARTINDALE, W.R.		27.Dec.43 - 23.May.44		W.31.Dec.43
Lt.	ATHEY, J.		12.May.45 - 25.Sep.45		
A/Capt.	BALDWIN, J.W.		8.Sep.39 - 3.Jan.44		W.21.Jul.43
Capt.	BARR, E.J.S.		22.May - 27.Jul.45		
Lt.	BARRETT-LENNARD,D.L.		24.Sep.43 - 18.Oct.43		KIA 18.Oct.43
Lt.	BARTON, K.F.		6.Nov.42 - 12.Dec.43		W.12.Dec.43
Maj.	BASSETT, J.W.H.		19.Dec.44 - 11.May.45		W.12.Dec.43
Lt.	BEGG, E.G.		6.Sep.39 - 24.Jul.43		W.19.Jul.43
Lt.Col.	BELL-IRVING, H.P.	DSO & bar, OBE, MiDx2	2.Sep.39 - 11.May.45	Brig.Comd.10C1B	
Lt.	BELL-IRVING,I.M.		17.Jul.42 - 19.Feb.43	Capt.staff	
Lt.	BENNETT L.J.	MC	8.Feb.45 - 25.Jul.45		W.14.Apr.45
Maj.	BLACKBURN,W.D.		13.Aug.40 - 12.Feb.44		
Maj.	BLAIR, J.W.		2.Sep.39 - 5.Aug.43		
A/Maj.	BONNELL,F..H.	E.D.	30.Nov.41 - 15.Jun.44		W.10.Dec.43
Lt.	BONNER,R.W.		13.Aug.43 - 5.Oct.43	Maj.	W. 6.Oct.43
Lt.	BROCK, P.H.G.		3.Jun.42 - 19.Oct.42		
Maj.	BUCHANAN,W.H.		14.Nov.43 - 26.Jul.44	Lt.Col.Comd. 1 Cdn.LAA.Bn.	
Lt.	BUDD,J.H.		20.Nov.42 - 21.Jul.43		KIA 21.Jul.43
Lt.	BURTON,J.F.		2.Sep.39 - 30.Oct.41		
Capt.	CAMERON, D.B.	MBE	11.Dec.42 - 25.Sep.45		
Capt.	CAMPBELL,A.S.		2.Sep.39 - 1.Aug.42	Maj.	
Lt.	CAMPBELL,S.T.		18.Oct.44 - 12.Jun.45		
Lt.	CANNON,K.J.		30.Nov.41 - 31.Jan.43		W.13.Sep.44
Lt.	CHARTERS,J.A.	MC, MiD	10.Aug.43 - 25.Mar.44		
Lt.	CHURCH,E.J.M.		30.Apr.43 - 3.Mar.44		W.22.Jul.43
Lt.Col.	CLARK,D.M.	MiD	2.Sep.39 - 25.Sep.45		
Lt.	CLARK, J.A.		2.Oct.42 - 23.Mar.44		W.23.Mar.44
A/Maj.	CLARK,R.S.		13.Aug.40 - 23.Oct.44		KIA 23.Oct.44
Lt.	CLAXTON,P.H.		12.Dec.43 - 14.Dec.43		DoW 15.Dec.43
A/Capt.	CLEVELAND,E.A.		4.Jun.45 - 25.Sep.45		
A/Maj.	COLQUHOUN,F.D.		2.Apr.43 - 26.Aug.44		KIA 26.Aug.44
A/Capt.	COLWELL,H.E.		17.Jul.45 - 25.Sep.45		W.22.Oct.44
Lt.	CONSTANT,A.H.		4.Oct.39 - 16.Jul.45		
Capt.	CONWAY,J.J.	MC	15.Nov.40 - 23.May.44		W.23.May.44
Lt.	COOKE,H.A.		13.Jun.44 - 17.Sep.44		KIA 17.Sep.44
Capt.	COURTIN,L.J.		3.Jan.44 - 7.Mar.44		W.19.Sep.44
Lt.Col.	CREIGHTON,A.J.	CBE, ED, Legion of Merit(U.S.A.)	20.Nov.39 - 13.May.44	Brig., staff CAPF.	
Capt.	CROSS,R.E.M.		3.Jan.44 - 8.Feb.44		W. 8.Feb.44
Lt.	DANBY,E.D.	DSO, MiD, C. de G. avec E. de V.	2.Sep.39 - 19.Jul.40	Lt.Col.Comd. Carlton & York & staff	
Capt.	DAVIDSON,D.W.	OBE, MiD	2.Sep.39 - 32.Jul.41		
Maj.	DAWSON,N.C.	MC	5.Aug.45 - 25.Sep.45		
Lt.	DAY-SMITH,L.C.		20.Sep.44 - 16.Dec.44		KIA 16.Dec.44
Lt.	DEBANKE,F.T.		27.Dec.43 - 6.Feb.44		W. 6.Feb.44
Lt.	DE HART,F.G.		12.Sep.40 - 4.Mar.42	Capt.	
Lt.	DE POE,N.R.		21.Aug.44 - 5.Apr.45		
Lt.	DICKINSON,S.		27.May.44 - 22.Oct.44		W.22.Oct.44
P/Lt.	DOMONEY,L.		2.Apr.43 - 28.Apr.43		W.17.Apr.44
Lt.	DUCK,A.J.	E.D.	22.Jun.40 - 23.Jun.40	Maj.	
A/Maj.	DUNCAN,D.G.		3.Jan.44 - 11.Feb.45		
Lt.	EDMONDS,R.		4.Jun.45 - 25.Sep.45		
Lt.	EVOY,H.E.		1.Jan.45 - 14.Jan.45		
Capt.	FAIRWEATHER,D.I.	MiD	18.Sep.39 - 15.Jul.45		W.28.Jan.44

OFFICERS

Final Seaforth Rank	Name	Decorations	Service with Seaforths	Later Appointment	Casualties
Lt.Col.	FERRIE,C.C.	ED	2.Sep.39 - 20.Jan.42	Col.	
A/Capt.	FINLAY,D.H.		9.May.45 - 17.May.45		
Lt.	FINNERTY,M.P.		20.Sep.44 - 4.Jan.45		W.4.Jan.45
Lt.Col.	FORIN,J.D.	OBE, ED, Croix de G.avec E.de V.	2.Sep.39 - 10.Dec.43	Col.	W.10.Dec.43
Lt.	FOULDS,A.		24.Jan.45 - 25.Sep.45		
Lt.	FOXCROFT,J.W.D.		6.Sep.39 - 24.Nov.42		
Lt.	FRENCH,A.V.		19.Sep.40 - 22.Jul.43		W.22.Jul.43 DoW 28.Jul.43
Maj.	FULTON,E.D.	MiD	21.Mar.41 - 28.Oct.44	Staff l Cdn.Div.	
Capt.	GELL,H.C.	MM, ED	2.Sep.39 - 18.Feb.41		
Capt.	GEORGE,R.N.		16.Apr.44 - 19.Jun.45	Maj.	W.23.May.44 W.21.Sep.44 W.17.Jan.45
Maj.	GIBSON,G.S.	ED	2.Sep.39 - 8.Jan.43	Lt.Col.staff	
Lt.	GILDERSLEEVE,W.F.J.	MC	22.Oct.43 - 6.Jun.45		W.24.Oct.44
Maj.	GLENDINNING,H.L.	DSO	3.Jan.44 - 11.Apr.45		W. 4.Apr.44 KIA 11.Apr.45
A/Maj.	GOWAN,J.H.	MiD	21.Sep.39 - 12.Feb.44	Maj. staff	
Lt.	GRANT,D.C.		30.Oct.42 - 30.Mar.43		KIA 7.Dec.43
Lt.	GRAY,A.W.		25.Jul.43 - 12.Feb.44		
Capt.	GRAY,H.K.		18.Apr.45 - 25.Sep.45		
Maj.	GRIFFIN,M.J.	ED	2.Sep.39 - 14.Dec.42	Lt.Col.	
A/Maj.	GRIFFIN,R.L.		21.Aug.42 - 25.Sep.45		
Lt.	HALL,F.C.		3.Apr.42 - 5.Aug.43		W.21.Jul.43 KIA 5.Aug.43
Lt.	HANBURY,D.C.		13.Sep.39 - 19.Mar.44		W.20.Dec.43
A/Capt.	HARFIELD,F.H.		6.Sep.39 - 23.Dec.44		KIA 23.Dec.44
A/Capt.	HARLEY,D.S.		26.Jun.42 - 26.Dec.43		W. 5.Aug.43 W.26.Dec.43
Lt.	HARLING,J.L.		19.Feb.43 - 14.Nov.43		KIA 9.Jul.44
Lt.	HARPER,D.A.		18.Feb.44 - 6.Jun.45		W.30.Dec.43 W.31.Aug.44
Capt.	HARRIS,W.G.		11.Sep.41 - 10.Nov.43		
Capt.	HASSEN,M.S.		22.Nov.44 - 27.Jul.45		
Lt.	HEALY,F.W.		10.Aug.43 - 26.Dec.43		W.26.Dec.43
Lt.	HEISE,H.W.		6.Feb.42 - 9.May.42	Maj.	
Lt.	HENDERSON,G.F.	MiD	1.Jul.44 - 31.Aug.44		W.31.Aug.44
Lt.	HENTIG,J.K.		3.Apr.44 - 23.May.44		W.28.Dec.43 KIA 23.May.44
Capt.	HESKETT,T.P.		22.May.45 - 25.Sep.45		
Lt.Col.	HOFFMEISTER,B.M.	CB, CBE, DSO & 2 bars, ED, MiD x 2, Legion of Merit (U.S.A.)	2.Sep.39 - 31.Oct.43	Maj.-Gen.Comd.	
Lt.	HOLSTEIN-RATHLOU,R.A.		26.Dec.44 - 23.Jun.45		
Lt.	HOTHAM,R.E.		1.Jan.45 - 14.Jan.45		
A/Capt.	HYNDMAN,W.R.		15.Sep.39 - 25.Dec.43		W.25.Jul.43 W.25.Dec.43
Lt.	JAMES,L.C.		17.Jul.45 - 25.Sep.45		
Lt.	JANS,W.H.		14.Nov.43 - 26.Jun.44		
Lt.	JOHNSTON,R.W.	MC	4.Sep.42 - 3.Dec.42	Capt.	
Capt.	JONES,J.M.D.		20.Oct.44 - 10.Nov.44	Maj.	
Lt.	KEEN,R.N.		1.Dec.39 - 28.Apr.41	Capt.	
Lt.	KERSEY, W.G.		30.Nov.41-17.Oct.42		
Lt.	KING,T.A.S.		20.Oct.44 - 23.Dec.44		W.23.Dec.44
Lt.	LALONDE,C.F.		1.Jan.45 - 14.Jan.45		
Lt.	LAROSE,D.H.		20.Oct.44 - 23.Jun.45		W. 9.Dec.44 W.15.Dec.44
Lt.	LECKIE,L.W.		28.Sep.43 - 29.Aug.45		W. 5.Dec.43 W.16.Sep.44
A/Capt.	LECLAIRE,J.A.	OBE, ED	3.Sep.43 - 10.Aug.44	Brigade Maj.	
Lt.	LINDSAY,M.		23.Feb.44 - 6.Jun.45		
Lt.	LUTTRELL,K.C.S.		12.Sep.39 - 25.Sep.45		
Capt.	LYNCH,S.	MC	12.Sep.39 - 6.Jun.45		W. 4.Jan.45
Capt.	McBRIDE,K.G.		13.Aug.43 - 16.Sep.44		KIA 16.Sep.44
A/Maj.	McBRIDE,L.M.		25.Jul.43 - 23.May.44		W. 5.Aug.43
Lt.	McCARTHY,H.R.		14.Feb.45 - 9.Sep.45		

OFFICERS

Final Seaforth Rank	Name	Decorations	Service with Seaforths	Later Appointment	Casualties
Lt.	McCLELLAND,H.A.		25.Sep.39 - 15.Aug.44		
Lt.	McCONNELL,W.S.		26.Dec.44 - 24.Feb.45		W.23.Feb.45 W.24.Feb.45
A/Maj.	McDOUGALL,R.L.	MiD	20.Nov.42 - 25.Sep.45		W.27.Jul.43
Lt.	McGOWAN, J.A.		23.Jun.40 - 23.Jun.40		
A/Maj.	McGUIRE,W.G.		26.Sep.40 - 28.Mar.44		W.28.Mar.44
Capt.	McINTYRE,H.B.	MBE, ED	2.Sep.39 - 29.May.40	Lt.Col.	
Lt.	McKAY,D.H.		13.Sep.39 - 16.Aug.45		
Capt.	MacKENZIE,Sir A.G.A.A.(Bart.)		12.Dec.43 - 31.May.45		
Lt.	MacKENZIE,K.A.W.		25.Jul.43 - 24.Sep.43		
Capt.	MacKINNON,P.E.		6.Sep.40 - 2.Sep.42		
Lt.	McLACHLAN,D.H.		14.May.44 -23.May.44		KIA 23.May.44
Lt.	McLAUGHLIN,D.S.		13.Sep.39 - 10.Dec.43		W.10.Dec.43
Lt.	McLEAN,F.A.		23.Feb.44 - 21.Apr.44		
Maj.	McLEAN,J.F.	DSO	30.Apr.43 - 23.May.44		W.5.Aug.43 W.23.May.44
Lt.	MacLEOD,I.C.		20.Oct.44 - 19.Jul.45		
Lt.	McMULLEN,A.H.		25.May.44 - 15.Dec.44		W.15.Dec.44
A/Maj.	McMULLEN,J.E.T.	MiD	20.Jun.41 - 6.Oct.43		KIA 6.Oct.43
Lt.	McNAMARA,J.R.		22.Dec.43 - 17.Sep.44		W.25.Jan.44 W.13.Feb.44 KIA 17.Sep.44
Lt.	MacRAE,G.		18.Apr.45 - 23.Jun.45		
Maj.	MACE,O.H.	D.S.O., MiD	6.Jan.44 - 14.Jun.45		
Lt.	MADU,A.O.		16.Jul.45 - 25.Sep.45		
Maj.	MALKIN,J.L.		1.Dec.39 - 22.Jun.45		
Lt.	MANAHAN,J.A.		16.May.44 - 16.Sep.44		W.21.Aug.42 W.16.Sep.44
Lt.	MANSON,J.D.		27.Feb.42 - 29.Jul.43	Maj.	
Lt.	MARA,J.H.F.		20.Sep.44 - 14.Feb.45		
A/Capt.	MARTIN,M.A.		30.Nov.41 - 7.Dec.43		W.21.Jul.43
Lt.	MARVIN,W.E.		20.Sep.44 - 17.Oct.44		W.17.Oct.44
Lt.	MATTHEWS,R.H.		14.Dec.44 - 15.Feb.45		DoW 16.Feb.45
A/Capt.	MELHUISH,W.H.		19.Feb.43 - 13.Feb.44		W.25.Jul.43
Capt.	MERCER,A.W.		3.Jul.42 - 20.Dec.43		W.20.Dec.43
Maj.	MERRITT,C.C.I.	VC, MiD	2.Sep.39- 13.Sep.40	Lt.Col.SSR	W.19.Aug.42
	MERRITT, F.W.I.		6.Feb. 44 - 21.Jul. 43		W.21.Jul.43
Capt.	MIDDLETON,F.S.		23.Nov.40 - 31.May.45		
Maj.	MILLAR,A.M.		7.Dec.39 - 30.Jul.40 17.Aug.45 - 25.Sep.45		W.24.Sep.44
Lt.	MILNE,S.H.		13.Sep.39 - 25.Feb.45		W.25.Feb.45
Capt.	MILTON,J.A.		14.Jul.45 - 25.Sep.45		
Capt.	MONEY,G.N.		30.Jan.42 - 5.Aug.43		W.14.Apr.45
Capt.	MOORE,L.C.A.		16.Jul.45 - 20.Jul.45		
Lt.	MOORE,V.C.	MiD	6.Jan.44 - 13.Feb.44		
Capt.	MOORE,W.R.	ED	5.Jan.44 - 21.Jan.44		
Lt.	MORRISON,J.J.F.		19.Sep.39 - 3.Jun.44		
Lt.	MOXON,J.O.	MiD	13.Aug.43 - 25.Sep.45		
Lt.	MURRAY,D.G.		16.Sep.39 - 31.Mar.42		
Capt.	MURDOCH,K.S.		13.Sep.39 - 25.Sep.44		
Maj.	MURDOCH,W.S.	OBE, MiD, Officer of the Order of Orange-Nassau (With Swords)	2.Sep.39 - 8.Dec.44	Lt.Col.staff	
Lt.	NAGELEISEN,D.A.		15.Nov.44 - 12.Apr.45		W.19.Dec.44 KIA 12.Apr.45
Lt.	NESBITT,J.D.	MC, C.de G.	20.Dec.41 - 8.Nov.42		W.12.Aug.44
Capt.	NEWSOM,D.F.		3.Apr.42 - 25.Sep.45		
Lt.	NICOLSON,G.D.M.		20.Oct.44 - 29.Nov.44		W.4.Jan.45
Lt.	O'NEIL,T.U.		16.May.45 - 15.Aug.45		
Lt.	OWEN,D.M.		1.Sep.43 - 15.Dec.43	Capt.	W.15.Dec.43
A/Capt.	PALMER,J.H.		18.Jul.45 - 25.Sep.45		
Capt.	PARKER,B.G.		14.Nov.41 - 10.Dec.43		W.10.Dec.43
Maj.	PATERSON,H.W.J.		24.Nov.39 - 17.Sep.44		KIA 17.Sep.44
Capt.	PATERSON,W.J.		4.Jun.45 - 25.Sep.45		
Lt.	PERRETT,F.R.		15.Sep.39 - 24.Apr.45		W. 5.Dec.43 W.24.Apr.45 DoW 25.Apr.45

OFFICERS

Final Seaforth Rank	Name	Decorations	Service with Seaforths	Later Appointment	Casualties
Lt.	PERRY,F.S.		15.Nov.40 - 26.May.41		
Maj.	PIERCE,J.D.		2.Oct.39 - 2.Jul.45		I.5.Nov.44
Lt.	POLLARD,W.H.		12.Jun.42 - 8.Jun.45		
Maj.	POPE,F.N.		9.Dec.39 - 10.Jun.44		
Lt.	POPPLEWELL,H.	MiD	1.Mar.42 - 15.Apr.42	Maj.HQ.FCA.	
Lt.	PRETTY,J.A.		14.Sep.39 - 23.Oct.44		
Lt.	PRONGER,L.J.		30.Nov.41 - 29.Apr.44		
Capt.	PUGH,D.V.		12.Sep.40 - 28.Aug.42	Maj.1 Can.Scot.	W. 9.Feb.45
Capt.	REED, K.W.		28.Sep.43 - 25.Sep.45		W.13.Dec.43
Capt.	REID,W.D.	MiD	10.Aug.43 - 25.Apr.44		
Capt.	RHODES,D.C.		1.Sep.43 - 28.Jan.45		W.15.Dec.44
Lt.	RICHARDSON,J.E.		27.Jun.45 - 25.Sep.45		W.24.Feb.45
Capt.	ROAF,W.G.H.	OBE, ED, MiD	2.Sep.39 - 12.Jul.40	Brig., staff	
Capt.	ROBERTS,W.L.		14.Sep.39 - 31.May.45		W.23.Jan.44
Lt.	ROBERTSON,H.S.		14.May.44 - 23.May.44		W.23.May.44
Lt.	ROBINSON,A.L.		25.Jul.43 - 20.Dec.43		W.26.Jul.43
Lt.	ROCHFORT,D.T.		2.Sep.39 - 23.Jul.43		
Capt.	ROXBURGH,W.G.		11.Dec.43 - 19.Dec.43	Maj. L.E.R.	KIA 28.Aug.44
Lt.	RUDKIN,W.A.		26.May.44 - 6.Nov.44		
Lt.	RUTHERFORD,B. St.,J.		8.Sep.39 - 6.Jan.45		
Lt.	SALTER,R.W.W.		20.Nov.44 - 25.Sep.45		W.16.Sep.44
Capt.	SANGER,R.R.		22.May.45 - 21.Jun.45		
Capt.	SANSOM,R.T.		8.Nov.44 - 21.Nov.44		
Lt.	SCOTT,J.C.M.		27.Nov.42 - 24.Jul.43		W.21.Jul.43
Lt.	SEMPLE,R.E.		30.Nov.41 - 3.Jun.44		
Capt.	SNIDER,H.E.	ED	2.Sep.39 - 29.May.40	Maj.	
Lt.	SPEIRS,H.M.		25.Dec.41 - 15.Jun.45		W.11.Apr.45
Lt.	STAMER,W.A.J.	ED	21.Dec.41 - 21.Jul.42		
A/Maj.	STAPLES,A.		6.Jan.44 - 4.Jan.45		W. 4.Jan.45
Lt.Col.	STEVENSON,J.B.	ED	2.Sep.39 - 26.Nov.40	Brig., Pac.Comd.	
Lt.	STONE,W.M.C.		20.Oct.44 - 9.Feb.45		
Lt.	STORRS, A.T.		22.Dec.43 - 27.Dec.43		W.27.Dec.43
A/Capt.	STRAIN,D,H.		26.Jun.42 - 21.Jul.43		KIA 21.Jul.43
Capt.	SUTHERLAND,D.		16.Jun.44 - 21.Dec.44		
Capt.	SWINTON,R.K.	MC	7.Sep.39 - 9.Jun.45		W.17.Sep.44 W. 8.Oct.44
Lt.	TAAFFE,J.W.F.		25.Jul.42 - 9.Nov.43		
Lt.Col.	TAIT,J.M.S.	ED	2.Sep.39 - 30.Jul.42		
Capt.	TARBUCK,C.C.		2.Sep.39 - 25.Sep.45		
Lt.	TATER,W.J.M.		2.Sep.39 - 4.Feb.40		
Maj.	THIRLWELL,J.L.	MC	22.Dec.43 - 10.Jul.45		W.23.Dec.44
A/Maj.	THOMAS,E.W.	MBE	2.Sep.39 - 3.Jan.44		
Lt.Col.	THOMSON,S.W.	DSO, MC, MiD	12.Aug.40 - 4.Oct.44	Col.	W.12.Jul.43
Lt.	THURGOOD,M.F.		20.Aug.44 - 20.Sep.44		W.21.Sep.44
Lt.	TISDALL,W.		14.Sep.39 - 23.Jun.45		
Capt.	TORRANCE,T.L.		29.Jul.41 - 28.Sep.42		
Capt.	TUCK,W.D.C.		4.Sep.42 - 9.Jun.45		W.23.May.44
Lt.	TUCKER,L.O.R.		8.Sep.39 - 20.Oct.42		D.25.Oct.42
Maj.	TWEEDSMUIR, Lord	CBE, OBE, CD	Sept.41 - Apr.42	Lt.Col. Attd.from GGFG	
Capt.	UPTON,T.		14.Feb.45 - 12.Apr.45		W.12.Apr.45
A/Maj.	VANCE,T.C.B.		21.Nov.41 - 24.Dec.43		W. 6.Dec.43 KIA 24.Dec.43
Lt.	VICARS,H.T.	MBE	27.Nov.39 - 16.Apr.42		
Lt.	WHITING,F.H.		27.Nov.39 - 23.May.44		KIA 23.May.44
Lt.	WILLIS,N.H.		23.Jan.45 - 25.Sep.45		
Lt.	WILLOUGHBY,L.C.		12.Sep.39 - 4.Mar.42		
Lt.	WILSON,J.D.		8.Nov.44 - 14.Jan.45		
Lt.	WILSON,M.		2.Sep.39 - 28.Jul.43		KIA 28.Jul.43
Lt.	WILSON,R.A.		25.Dec.42 - 10.Dec.43		W. 5.Aug.43 KIA 10.Dec.43
Capt.	WOOD,C.E.		17.Apr.42 - 30.Apr.44		
Lt.	WOODBURN,E.D.		25.Jul.40 - 31.Oct.40		
Lt.	WOODBURN,I.H.		27.Dec.41 - 23.Jul.42		
A/Capt.	WOOLLEY,T.E.	MC	27.Dec.43 - 17.Oct.44		W.23.May.44 KIA 17.Oct.44
Lt.	WOOTTEN,D.O.		20.Nov.42 - 9.Dec.42		
Lt.	YATES,G.A.		16.Jul.45 - 25.Sep.45		

OFFICERS COMMISSIONED FOLLOWING SERVICE WITH THE REGIMENT

Final Rank	Name	Decorations	Service with Seaforths	Final Seaforth Rank	Casualties
Lt.	ARMSTRONG,D.S.		27.Sep.39 - 12.Feb.44	Sgt.	
Maj.	BARNES,M.F.	MiDx2	2.Oct.39 - 31.May.40	A/Sgt.	
Capt.	BEATTY,L.G.		7.Sep.39 - 15.Nov.41	Sgt.	
Capt.	BLACK,A.S.		11.Sep.42 - 23.Dec.42	Pte.	
Lt.	COTTER,J.L.		8.Sep.39 - 8.Dec.39	Pte.	
Capt.	COTTON,P.N.		16.Sep.39 - 10.Jan.42	Pte.	
Lt.	DAVID,J.A.		20.Sep.39 - 4.Mar.42	Sgt.	
Capt.	DE SERRES,A.C.F.	C. de G. avec E de V.	23.Sep.39 - 4.Mar.42	Cpl.	
Lt.	EAKINS,T.K.		12.Sep.39 - 24.Jul.40	Pte.	
Lt.	ESLING,A.J.C.		19.Sep.39 - 20.Jun.40	Pte.	
Maj.	EWART,C.B.	MC	11.May.40 - 2.Feb.43	Cpl.	
Lt.	FAIREY,V.A.		11.May.40 - 11.Jun.40	Pte.	W.30.Sep.44
Capt.	FORTIN,R.L.G.H.		11.Sep.39 - 31.Dec.40	Pte.	
L .	GAME,R.		12.Dec.43 - 16.Jun.44	Sgt.	
Lt.	GRIFFITHS,J.C.		18.Sep.39 - 20.Jun.40	Pte.	W.23.Sep.44
Capt.	GRINDLAY,M.G.		26.Sep.39 - 29.Apr.40	A/Sgt.	
Lt.	GUNN,D.C.		11.May.40 - 6.Jan.43	A/Cpl.	
Lt.	HACKETT,R.L.H.		6.Sep.39 - 20.May.44	Sgt.	
Lt.	HAMBLY,J.F.		11.May.40 - 20.Jun.40	Pte.	
A/Capt.	HARDY,R.W.		6.Sep.39 - 5.Mar.41	P.S.M.	KIA 20.Jun.45
Lt.	HODGSON,F.D.		23.Sep.39 - 29.Nov.43	A/Cpl.	
Capt.	HUTCHISON,A.		3.Oct.39 - 21.Mar.40	L/Cpl.	
Capt.	IRELAND,R.H.W.		15.Sep.39 - 30.Dec.43	CSM (WO ll)	
Capt.	JONES,H.F.		18.Dec.42 - 11.Feb.43	L/Sgt.	
Capt.	KEARY,R.C.	MiD	19.Sep.39 - 2.Feb.43	Sgt.	W.26.Jun.44 W.30.Apr.45
Lt.	KEILLOR,H.F.		21.Sep.39 - 22.Nov.39	Pte.	
Lt.	LAWSON,D.G.		22.Nov.39 - 28.Feb.40	Pte.	
Lt.	MacDONALD,A.J.		13.Sep.39 - 21.Feb.45	A/C.S.M. W.O.ll	W. 8.Dec.44
Capt.	MacDONALD,G.D.		7.Sep.39 - 12.Dec.40	L/Cpl.	
Capt.	McKENDRICK,A.D.		11.Sep.39 - 7.Sep.40	Pte.	
Capt.	MacMLAREN,M.R.		11.May.40 - 27.Oct.41	Pte.	
Lt.	McVEIGH,A.		15.Sep.39 - 4.Mar.42	Cpl.	
Lt.	MARRS,G.G.		19.Sep.39 - 11.Nov.39	Pte.	
2/Lt.	MUIRHEAD,J.W.		11.May.40 - 30.Sep.40	Pte.	
Lt.	NELLES,L.D.		13.Sep.39 - 24.Apr.43	Cpl.	KIA 11.Jul.44
Lt.	NORMINTON,F.H.		13.Sep.39 - 2.Feb.43	R.Q.M.S.	
Capt.	PHILLIPS,M.	MiD	14.Sep.39 - 24.Apr.43	Sgt.	W.14.Oct.44
Capt.	RICHARDSON,R.E.G.		7.Oct.39 - 4.Jul.41	Sgt.	
Capt.	ROBINSON,W.L.	OBE	26.Sep.39 - 29.May.40	A/Sgt.	I.16.Dec.44
Lt.	SCOTT,F.		15.Sep.39 - 24.Apr.43	L/Sgt.	KIA 11.Jul.44
Lt.	SCOTT,R.B.		22.Jun.40 - 26.Feb.44	Sgt.	
Capt.	STRATTON,P.	K.O. of the Order of Orange Nassau (with swords),			
		MiD	16.Sep.39 - 3.Jan.43	L/Sgt., H.Q., F.C.A.	
Capt.	SWORD,J.B.D.		9.Dec.39 - 29.May.40	Pte.	
Lt.	TEECE,J.H.	MM	22.Jul.43 - 26.Jun.44	L/Sgt.	
Lt.	THOMPSON,F.D.		1.Sep.39 - 4.Mar.42	Sgt.	
Lt.	THOMPSON,P.W.		16.Sep.39 - 4.Mar.42	P.S.M.	
Lt.	TRACEY,J.E.		2.Oct.39 - 29.May.40	A/L/Cpl.	D.10.Nov.42
Lt.	TUPPER,C.G.H.		16.Sep.39 - 18.May.44	L/Cpl.	W.29.Jul.43
Lt.	UNDERHILL,F.D.	MM	15.Sep.39 - 23.Nov.39	Pte.	
Lt.	WALLACE,W.L.		24.Nov.39 - 4.Feb.40	Cpl.	

OFFICERS ATTACHED

Rank	Name	Decorations	Corps	Service with Seaforths	Casualties
H/Capt.	ADAMS,G.H.		C.C.S.	12.Jun.45 - 3.Sep.45	
Maj.	ANDERSON,E.H.			2.Dec.43 - 24.Mar.44	
Lt.	ARMSTRONG,D.G.			6.Apr.45 - 25.Jun.45	W.13.Sep.44
Maj.	BOYANER,F.		C.D.C.	14.May.41 - 20.Aug.41	D. 9.Jan.45
Lt.	CADEGAN,P.L.	MC	R.C.C.S.	20.Dec.41 - 28.Jan.42	
H/Capt.	CAMERON,C.M.		C.C.S.	13.Dec.39 - 17.Jan.40	
Capt.	COHEN,A.		R.C.A.M.C.	6.Aug.43 - 25.Aug.43	
H/Maj.	DURNFORD,R.C.H.	DSO	C.C.S.	1942 - 25.Sep.45	
Maj.	EGAN,C.J.		C.D.C.	11.Dec.41 - 19.May.43 30.Oct.43 - 8.Nov.43	

OFFICERS ATTACHED

Rank	Name	Decorations	Corps.	Service with Seaforths	Casualties
Capt.	FITZOSBORNE,D.J.		R.C.A.M.C.	14.Jul.45 - 25.Sep.45	
Capt.	GIBERSON,H.R.G.		R.C.A.M.C.	23.Oct.44 - 5.Nov.44	
Capt.	HUTTON,D.C.		R.C.A.P.C.	2.Sep.39 - 3.Dec.41	
Maj.	LUNDAHL,C.B.		C.D.C.	1.Mar.45 - 21.Jul.45	
Capt.	McCONNELL,F.L.		R.C.A.M.C.	12.Aug.44 - 17.Oct.44	
Capt.	MacDONALD,W.K.		R.C.A.M.C.	29.Sep.42 - 5.Aug.43	KIA 5.Aug.43
Lt.Col.	MANSEAU,P.	MiD	C.D.C.	9.Nov.43 - 11.Dec.43	
Maj.	MILNER,F.J.		R.C.A.M.C.	30.Dec.40 - 2.Feb.41	
Maj.	MINTZ,A.		C.D.C.	27.Jul.41 - 24.Aug.41	
Lt.Col.	MORRISON,R.W.		C.D.C.	28.Jul.40 - 13.May.41	
Lt.	NEWBERRY,J.D.		R.C.C.S.	13.Sep.39 - 12.Sep.41	
H/Maj.	ORME,E.N.P.	MBE	C.C.S.	15.Jan.41 - 10.Jun.42	
Capt.	PARK,A.M.		R.C.A.M.C.	8.May.45 - 10.May.45	
Capt.	PORTNUFF,J.C.	MC	R.C.A.M.C.	18.Oct.44 - 13.Jul.45	W.22.Oct.44
Capt.	PREECE,C.G.		R.C.A.M.C.	25.Mar.44 - 11.Aug.44	
Lt.Col.	ROWLEY,G.W.	MBE	R.C.A.S.C.	15.Aug.41 - 15.Sep.41	
Capt.	SHARPE,C.G.		R.C.A.S.C.	22.May.43 - 17.Aug.43	
Maj.	SMITH,W.H.	ED	C.D.C.	29.Sep.44 - 10.Nov.44	
Capt.	SUTHERLAND,W.H.		R.C.A.M.C.	26.Aug.43 - 18.Nov.43	
Maj.	WELLS,J.P.	ED	R.C.A.M.C.	3.Dec.41 - 31.Dec.41	
Capt.	WILLIAMSON,G.P.	MiD	R.C.A.P.C.	4.Dec.41 - 15.Sep.45	
Supervisor	DARGAN, R.E.		Aux.Services	30.Jun.44 - 9.Oct.44	
Supervisor	HART,W.		Aux.Services	2.Oct.39 - 4.Sep.43	
Supervisor	LAWRENCE,A.		Aux.Services	10.Oct.44 - 5.May.45	
Supervisor	MacKENZIE,A.A.		Aux.Services	21.Apr.44 - 29.Jun.44	
Supervisor	TUTTE,A.H.		Aux.Services	9.May.45 - 31.Jul.45	

OTHER RANKS

Regt. No.	Final Seaforth Rank	Name		Service with Seaforths	Casualties
K65848	Pte.	ABACHERLI,P.F.		22.Jul.43 - 5.Aug.43	
K3915	Pte.	ABBOTT,M.		15.Apr.45 - 21.Jun.45	
H36528	Pte.	ABBOTT,W.R.		4.Jun.43 - 18.Jul.45	
K52043	Pte.	ACHESON,W.H.		7.Sep.39 - 29.May.40	
K52566	L/Cpl.	ADAM,J.M.		20.Sep.39 - 23.Jun.45	W. 5.Aug.43
K69320	Pte.	ADAMS,G.L.		14.Jan.44 - 25.Sep.45	W.28.Feb.44
B52147	Sgt.	ADAMS, L.A.		5.Feb.44 - 27.May.44	
K52042	Sgt.	ADAMS,R.A.		7.Sep.39 - 29.Jul.43	W.29.Jul.43
K2579	Pte.	ADAMS,R.S.		14.Feb.45 - 15.Aug.45	W.15.Apr.45
M52933	Pte.	ADE,W.J.		13.Aug.43 - 14.Oct.43	
K52330	Pte.	AGNEW,J.P.		15.Sep.39 - 23.Nov.39	W. 3.Dec.44
K52729	CQMS	AITKEN,J.		25.Sep.39 - 23.Jul.44	
M16730	Pte.	AJAS,R.R.		23.Dec.43 - 12.Apr.45	W.23.May.44; W.12.Apr.45
K4556	Pte.	AKEROYD, W.		17.May.45 -25.Sep.45	
K53222	Pte.	ALAIN,F.		22.Jun.40 - 15.Nov.41	
K601132	Cpl.	ALCOCK,J.W.G.		25.Jun.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K52045	CSM	ALDERDICE,J.E.		7.Sep.39 - 4.Mar.42	
K52034	Pte.	ALDRED,H.E.W.		7.Sep.39 - 29.May.40	
K76329	Pte.	ALEC.D.R.		12.Aug.44 -22.Feb.45	W.22.Feb.45
D82682	Pte.	ALEXANDER,D.		16.May.44 -23.May.44	
K6254	Pte.	ALEXANDER,D.G.		7.May.45 -21.Jun.45	
K3072	Pte.	ALEXANDER,E.M.		7.May.45 -20.Jun.45	
K65304	Pte.	ALEXY,D.J.		30.Apr.43 - 21.Jul.43	KIA.21.Jul.43
K32707	Pte.	ALFORD,S.D.		9.Dec.39 - 20.Jun.40	
M104383	Pte.	ALLAIN,J.A.		3.Aug.43 - 7.Mar.44	
K52938	Pte.	ALLAN,C.C.		11.May.40 -29.May.43	
K53351	Pte.	ALLAN,D.J.		12.Dec.41 - 26.Dec.44	W.26.Dec.44
K42797	Pte.	ALLAN,D.S.		11.Dec.42 - 19.Dec.44	W.19.Dec.44
K51389	Pte.	ALLAN,J.B.		19.Feb.44 - 3.Feb.45	
K53810	Sgt.	ALLAN,J.W.		22.Dec.43 - 27.Dec.43	W.27.Dec.43
K600864	Pte.	ALLAN,S.E.		7.May.45 -27.Jul.45	
K66512	Pte.	ALLARD, G.W.		12.Dec.43 - 25.Dec.43	W.25.Dec.43
N57241	Pte.	ALLARIE,L.J.		3.Aug.43 - 13.Dec.43	KIA.13.Dec.43
K25149	Pte.	ALLERCOTT,W.H.		21.May.45 -22.Jun.45	
N10613	Pte.	ALLWORTH,J.G.		25.Jul.43 - 4.Jan.45	W.27.Jan.44; W.4.Jan.45
K605292	Pte.	ALONZO,N.		29.Jun.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K45783	Pte.	AMIEL,V.A.		15.Apr.45 - 25.Sept.45	
K67094	Cpl.	ANDERSEN,C.M.	MM	28.Aug.42 - 16.Sep.44	W. 6.Dec.43; W.23.May.44; W,16,Sep,44
K52450	Pte.	ANDERSON, C.H.		16.Sep.39 - 15.Dec.43	W.15.Dec.43
K52339	Pte.	ANDERSEN,E.C.		15.Sep.39 - 5.Mar.43	
H41100	Cpl.	ANDERSEN,H.		10.Apr.42 - 23.May.44	POW.23.May.44; SAFE IN U.K.16.May.45
K62275	Pte.	ANDERSEN,Henry		22.Jul.43 - 28.Aug.43	
K52624	Pte.	ANDERSEN,L.P.		20.Sep.39 - 6.Aug.41	
K607003	Pte.	ANDERSON,A.M.K.		7.May.45 -25.Sep.45	
K607596	Pte.	ANDERSON, A.H.		16.Apr.45 - 18.Jul.45	
H82244	Pte.	ANDERSON,E.		25.Dec.44 - 18.Apr.45	
K52686	Pte.	ANDERSON,G.S.		23.Sep.39 - 14.Feb.40	
K52660	Pte.	ANDERSON,H.T.		21.Sep.39 - 18.Nov.39	
K3736	Pte.	ANDERSON,J.R.		25.Apr.45 - 19.Jul.45	
M105142	Pte.	ANDERSON,K.A.		12.Jan.44 - 8.Jul.44	DECLARED DROWNED 8.Jul.44
K607261	Pte.	ANDERSON,L.J.		16.May.45 -18.Jul.45	
K52866	Pte.	ANDERSON,L.S.		7.Oct.39 - 18.Jun.40	DECEASED 14.Oct.42
K106089	Pte.	ANDERSON,M.M.		17.Jan.44 - 5.Jun.45	W.24.May.44
K52008	P/Cpl.	ANDERSON,P.H.		6.Sep.39 - 29.Feb.40	
K52626	Pte.	ANDERSON,R.H.E.		20.Sep.39 - 29.Jun.42	
K52015	Pte.	ANDERSON,T.I.		6.Sep.39 - 23.Aug.41	
K53295	Pte.	ANDERSON.W.		18.Apr.41 - 13.Jan.42	W.30.Jul.43
K52939	CQMS	ANDERSON,W.A.		11.May.40 -25.Sep.45	
K53082	Pte.	ANDERSON,W.C.		11.May.40 - 8.Jun.43	
K52043	Pte.	ANDERSON,W.H.		7.Sep.39 - 29.May.40	
K74597	Pte.	ANDRE,R.F.		19.Jan.42 - 27.Jul.44	
K52033	A/Cpl.	ANDREW,J.F.		7.Sep.39 - 4.Apr.45	
K52084	Pte.	ANDREW,R.J.		11.Sep.39 - 18.Nov.41	
M65653	Pte.	ANDREWS,G.		31.Dec.43 - 7.Mar.45	W.17.Oct.44; W.8.Dec.44; INJURED 8.Mar.45
R53476	Pte.	ANDREWS,M.R.		23.Jan.42 - 23.Jun.43	
G32024	Pte.	ANDREWS,R.E.		22.Dec.43 - 15.Jun.45	

OTHER RANKS

Regt. No.	Final Seaforth Rank	Name		Service with Seaforths	Casualties
H205056	Pte.	ANDREWSCHAK,W.		13.Aug.43 - 25.Sep.45	
K48829	Pte.	ANDRONIK,S.		22.Jul.43 - 17.Dec.43	KIA.17.Dec.43
K4687	Pte.	ANDRULONIS,F.		20.Feb.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K42967	Pte.	ANSLEY,M.A.		13.Jul.44 - 25.Sept.45	
F33555	Pte.	ANTAL,J.W.		20.Feb.45 - 7.Jun.45	
K22036	Cpl.	ANTHONY,D.M.		4.Jun.45 - 1.Aug.45	
H204418	Pte.	ANTONIUK,B.W.		11.Dec.42 - 9.May.45	
C77878	Pte.	APOSTOLON,P.		25.May.44 -12.Feb.45	
B145052	Pte.	ARCHER,T.E.		16.May.44 -18.Jul.45	
K54072	Pte.	ARCHIBALD,D.D.	MiD	10.Aug.43 - 25.Sep.45	
M103076	Pte.	ARCHIBALD,W.G.		18.Dec.44 - 18.Jul.45	W.17.Jan.45; W.26.Feb.45
L2571	Pte.	ARMSDEN,H.G.		26.May.44 -17.Jan.45	W.17.Jan.45
K52520	Pte.	ARMSTRONG,D.R.		19.Sep.39 - 24.Nov.39	INJURED 25.May.44
D27205	Pte.	ARMSTRONG,E.S.		6.Aug.43 - 25.Aug.43	
C52845	Pte.	ARMSTRONG, H.		20.Feb.45 - 9.Jul.45	
K6421	Pte.	ARMSTRONG,I.		7.May.45 - 9.Jul.45	
K68585	Pte.	ARMSTRONG, R.A.		13.Aug. 43 - 25.Sept. 45	W.11.Dec.43;W.18.Oct.44
K6239	Pte.	ARMSTRONG,R.M.		7.May.45 -15.Jun.45	
K2680	Pte.	ARMSTRONG,T.		21.May.45 -29.Aug.45	
K52318	L/Sgt.	ARMSTRONG,W.B.		15.Sep.39 - 25.Sep.45	
K67699	Pte.	ARNOLD,C.R.		23.Oct.42. - 25.Sept.45	
F77091	Pte.	ARSENAULT,M.J.		20.Feb.45 - 25.Sep.45	
Cl02058	Pte.	ARTHUR,C.		17.Jan.44 - 11.Apr.45	W.23.May.44; W.3.Sep.44; W.22.Oct.44; W.21.Feb.45
K52810	Pte.	ARTZ,A.W.M.		29.Sep.39 - 27.Jun.42	
K53085	Pte.	ASHBY,A.		11.May.40 - 9.Oct.40	
K3750	Pte.	ASHWORTH,A.		4.May.45 -14.Jun.45	
L54709	Pte.	ASK,J.M.		12.Aug.44 - 15.Feb.45	W.17.Sep.44
K12086	CQMS	ASPINALL,P.		18.Jul.45 - 22.Sep.45	
K69003	Pte.	ASSELIN, M.		30.Apr.43 - 21.Jul.43	KIA.21.Jul.43
K71029	Pte.	ATCHISON,G.S.		28.Aug.42 -31.Jul.43	W.22.Jul.43
K53138	Pte.	ATKINSON,A.		11.May.40 - 8.Feb.43	
K51545	Pte.	ATKINSON,E.E.		25.May.44 -17.Sep.44	KIA.17.Sep.44
K52041	Pte.	ATKINSON,G.C.		7.Sep.39 - 22.Nov.39	
K53365	Pte.	ATKINSON,L.D.		6.Jun.44 - 31.May.45	
K606951	Pte.	AUGUSTSON, O.C.		7.May.45 -18.Jul.45	
K603193	Pte.	AULD,H.E.		1.Aug.45 -25.Sep.45	
F76300	Pte.	AULENBACK,L.H.		28.Mar.44 - 14.Apr.44	
H18535	Pte.	AUSTIN,N.A.		15.Nov.44 - 12.Dec.44	
L155642	Pte.	BABCOCK,R.F.		20.Feb.45 - 12.Apr.45	KIA.12.Apr.45
K53376	Pte.	BACH,W.		30.Nov.41 - 14.Feb.45	
K40993	Pte.	BACHMAN,E.P.		28.Oct.44 - 7.Dec.44	KIA. 7.Dec.44
K3088	Pte.	BACK,T.W.		27.Apr.45 - 20.Jun.45	
K53331	Pte.	BACON,A.L.		1.Nov.40 - 29.May.44	
K48612	A/L/Cpl.	BAERG, G.		22.Jul.43 - 20.Dec.43	DoW.20.Dec.43
K48465	Pte.	BAGSTAD,E.A.		22.Dec.43 - 23.May.44	W.26.Dec.43; POW.23.May.44; SAFE IN U.K.10.May.45
K50018	Pte.	BAILEY,J.		12.Aug.44 - 12.Apr.45	KIA.12.Apr.45
K52601	Pte.	BAILEY, J.H.		20.Sep.39 - 11.Feb.45	
K52547	Pte.	BAILEY,L.J.		12.Sep.39 - 19.Jul.40	
K606957	Pte.	BAILEY,S.		7.May.45 -25.Sep.45	
K29017	Pte.	BAILLIE,J.P.		1.Dec.39 - 23.May.44	W.18.Oct.43; W.24.May.44
K52262	A/L/Cpl.	BAILLIE,R.A.	MiD	14.Sep.39 - 11.Feb.42	
K53522	Pte.	BAIN,A.		27.Dec.40 - 18.Mar.44	
K45671	Sgt.	BAIN,D.W.		5.Jan.44 - 13.Jan.45	W.13.Jan.45
K52229	Sgt.	BAIN,E.		13.Sep.39 - 25.Sep.45	
B75108	Pte.	BAIN,K.		13.Apr.45 - 25.Sep.45	
L27737	Pte.	BAIN,W.G.		17.Sep.43 - 24.Jun.45	
H103905	Pte.	BAKALA,N.		3.Aug.43 - 18.Jul.45	W.10.Dec.43; W.16.Sep.44;
D83024	Pte.	BAKER,D.		6.Aug.43 - 2.Sep.44	W. 5.Apr.44; W.23.May.44; W. 2.Sep.44
K69650	Pte.	BAKER,E.P.		9.Feb.44 - 25.Sep.45	
D77953	Pte.	BAKER,H.		16.May.44 -18.Jul.45	W.23.May.44
B15375	Pte.	BAKER,L.A.		12.May.45 -25.Sep.45	
K11189	Sgt.	BAKER,L.G.		7.Jun.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K11221	Sgt.	BAKER, S.H.		19.Jul. 45 - 25.Sep.45	
K9142	Pte.	BALDWIN,E.W.		7.May.45 -12.Jul.45	
H103599	Pte.	BALDOCK,J.L.		22.Jul.43 - 10.Dec.43	KIA.10.Dec.43
K6070	Pte.	BALE,S.E.		15.Apr.45 - 21.Jun.45	
K52080	Cpl.	BALL,G.A.		11.Sep.39 - 6.Aug.42	

OTHER RANKS

Regt. No.	Final Seaforth Rank	Name	Service with Seaforths	Casualties
K53951	Pte.	BALL,L.H.	22.Dec.43 - 9.Feb.44	
K40638	Pte.	BALL.R.E.	14.Feb.45 - 20.Jun.45	
K52377	Pte.	BALLARD,C.D.	15.Sep.39 - 14.Jan.45	W.25.Jul.43
K52030	Pte.	BALLARD,K.W.	7.Sep.39 - 14.Dec.44	W.14.Dec.44
K52978	Sgt.	BALLARD,T.C.	11.May.40 -29.Sep.44	
K52083	CQMS	BAMFORD,A.	11.Sep.39 - 18.Oct.44	W.18.Oct.44
K62078	Pte.	BANISTER,T.	22.Jul.43 - 25.Sep.45	
K3475	Pte.	BANKS,C.F.	15.Apr.45 - 18.Jul.45	
K75568	Pte.	BANNATYNE, G.M.	20.Feb.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K47482	Pte.	BANNISTER,R.	26.Jul.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K52666	Cpl.	BARBER,B.	22.Sep.39 - 5.Aug.43	KIA. 5.Aug.43
K37069	Pte.	BARBER,F.C.	1.Dec.39 - 15.May.43	
K50906	Pte.	BARKASE,B.	19.Feb.44 - 26.Aug.44	W.26.Aug.44; DoW.27.Aug.44
K69649	Pte.	BARKER,G.W.	5.Feb.44 - 11.Apr.45	W.11.Apr.45; DoW.11.Apr.45
L64843	Pte.	BARKER, M.B.	15.Nov.44 - 29.Mar.45	W.12.Jan.45; W.16.Feb.45; INJURED.29.Mar.45
K52941	Cpl.	BARKER,P.F.	11.May.40 - 3.Oct.44	W.13.Feb.44; W.17.Sep.44
C53525	Pte.	BARLOW, J.C.C.	12.Dec.41 - 22.Jul.43	W.22.Jul.43
K42978	Pte.	BARNES,G.R.	5.Mar.43 - 5.Aug.43	KIA.5 Aug.43
M11620	Pte.	BARNES,H.H.	13.Aug.43 - 6.Oct.43	
K42325	Pte.	BARNES,J.W.	21.May.43 -25.Sep.45	
K53273	Pte.	BARNES,R.J.	1.Nov.40 - 22.May.44	W.22.May.44
K52029	Pte.	BARNETT,C.P.	7.Sep.39 - 14.Apr.43	
K53238	Pte.	BARNETT,F.L.	23.Jan.42 - 5.Sep.42	
K76226	Pte.	BARR,D.W.	30.Jan.42 - 11.Dec.43	W.11.Dec.43
K52544	WO 11 CSM	BARR,G.W.	19.Sep.39 - 4.Mar.42	
M105906	Sgt.	BARR,K.S.	1.May.44 -21.Feb.45	W.17.Sep.44
K52048	L/Cpl.	BARRASS,L.W.	8.Sep.39 - 14.Jan.45	
K6719	Pte.	BARRETT,C.J.	23.Apr.45 - 9.Jul.45	
K53820	Sgt.	BARRETT,J.R.	17.Nov.41 - 1.Aug.42	
M36377	Pte.	BARRETT,John R.	22.Dec.43 - 7.Apr.44	
K57770	Sgt.	BARRETT,N.S.	20.Jul.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K52615	Pte.	BARRETT,R.J.	20.Sep.39 - 15.Aug.45	INJURED 16.Aug.40
M11390	Sgt.	BARRETT,R.S.	14.Nov.43 - 16.Dec.43	KIA.16.Dec.43
K69124	Pte.	BARRIE,J.W.	18.Dec.44 - 16.Feb.45	W.16.Feb.45
K59597	Pte.	BARRON,L.W.	23.Apr.45 - 19.Jul.45	
L3037	Pte.	BARRY,W.	16.May.44 -17.Oct.44	POW.17.Oct.44;
K10617	Cpl.	BARTON,E.D.	23.Jul.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K603619	Pte.	BARUZZINI,G.	15.Apr.45 - 25.Sep.45	
D175571	Pte.	BASQUE,E.	16.May.44 -23.May.44	KIA.23.May.44
K605152	Pte.	BASSANI,J.W.	15.Apr.45 - 25.Sep.45	
M105970	Pte.	BATCHELOR,J.G.	12.Aug.44 -26.Aug.44	KIA.26.Aug.44
C63509	Pte.	BATCHELOR, H.E.	28.Jun.44 - 6.Jun.45	
K3901	Pte.	BATEMAN,R.A.	7.May.45 -15.Jun.45	
K46401	L/Cpl.	BATES,F.	15.Nov.44 - 1.Sep.45	W.24.Feb.45
K53789	Pte.	BATES,O.R.	30.Nov.41 -18.Jul.43	KIA.18.Jul.43
K6640	Cpl.	BATH, J.M.	16.May.45 -21.Jun.45	
K65059	Sgt.	BATTERSBY,F.	5.Jul.45 - 25.Sep.45	
H70195	Pte.	BAUDER,E.	7.Nov.44 - 8.Nov.44	
H106695	Pte.	BAUER,W.	17.Jan.44 - 17.Sep.44	W.18.Apr.44
K52843	Pte.	BAXTER, F.G.	2.Oct.39 - 25.Sep.45	W. 4.Jun.44
K67009	CSM	BAXTER,K.	29.Jun.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K53281	Pte.	BAYNES,C.H.	23.Oct.40 - 9.Mar.42	
K604954	Pte.	BAZELL,E.H.	6.May.45 -18.Jul.45	
K52735	Pte.	BEACH,H.	25.Sep.39 - 29.May.40	
K37071	Pte.	BEADS,J.L.	1.Dec.39 - 23.Dec.43	W.18.Jul.43; KIA.23.Dec.43
K37072	Cpl.	BEADS,W.S.	1.Dec.39 - 20.Jul.43	W.19.Jul.43; DoW.20.Jul.43
K42855	A/Sgt.	BEARD,W.K.	19.Nov.42 -18.Oct.44	W.18.Oct.44; POW.27.Dec.44, SAFE IN U.K.15.May,45
B135964	Pte.	BEASLEY,C.G.	5.Jan.44 - 17.Sep.44	W.25.May.44; W.17.Sep.44
E30649	Pte.	BEATON,A.J.	25.Dec.42 - 29.Dec.43	KIA.26.Dec.43
K53821	Pte.	BEATON,F.B.	1.May.42 -10.Dec.43	KIA.10.Dec.43
M104879	Spr.	BEATON,W.	22.Dec.43 - 10.Jun.44	W.4.Sept.44
K589	Pte.	BEATTIE,J.	15.Apr.45 - 18.Jul.45	
M9000	Pte.	BEAUDRY,D.J.	15.Nov.44 - 14.Jun.45	INJURED 9.Jan.45
D46107	Pte.	BEAULIEU,R.M.	5.Sep.44 - 19.Jan.45	W.22.Oct.44; W.19.Jan.45;
K73691	Pte.	BEAVER,E.	21.Apr.44 - 8.Dec.44	

OTHER RANKS

Regt. No.	Final Seaforth Rank	Name	Service with Seaforths	Casualties
K603461	Pte.	BECVAR,A.G.	13.Apr.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K67791	Pte.	BEDFORD,J.E.	6.Aug.43 - 3.Jul.44	
K52443	Pte.	BEECH,S.E.E.	16.Sep.39 - 18.Oct.43	W.18.Oct.43
K50684	Pte.	BEECHMAN,K.L.	5.Feb.44 - 29.Aug.45	
K53139	Pte.	BEEMAN,W.	11.May.40 -29.May.40	
K65694	Pte.	BEET,H.C.	30.Apr.43 - 25.Sep.45	W.19.Jul.43
K53667	Pte.	BEETON,L.G.	1.Nov.40 -20.Nov.42	
K52186	Pte.	BEGG,R.J.	12.Sep.39 - 29.Nov.43	
K52060	Pte.	BEGLEY,G.H.L.	8.Sep.39 - 20.Dec.43	W.10.Dec.43
M106669	Pte.	BELAND, J.L.E.	5.Feb.44 - 25.Sep.45	
K52522	Pte.	BELANGER,R.H.	19.Sep.39 - 21.Apr.41	
K52937	Pte.	BELCHER,E.A.	22.Jun.40 - 19.Jun.42	
M16594	Pte.	BELL,B.S.A.H.	22.Jul.43 - 14.Oct.43	
K62744	Pte.	BELL,G.A.	25.Jul.43 - 24.Sept.43	
H87991	Pte.	BELL,G.H.	20.Feb.45 - 22.Apr.45	W.22.Apr.45
K49206	Cpl.	BELL,J.	17.May.45 -25.Sep.45	
K52881	CQMS	BELL,L.D.	27.Nov.39 - 9.Apr.43	
K42712	L/Cpl.	BELL,R.J.	25.Jun.45 - 25.Sep.45	W.2.Sep.44; W.14.Feb.45; W.27.Apr.45
K52627	S/Sgt.	BELL,S.A.	20.Sep.39 - 4.Nov.40	
K606203	Pte.	BELL,W.O'D.	7.May.45 -25.Sep.45	
K3151	Pte.	BELLAMORE,J.W.P.	18.Dec.44 - 25.Feb.45	W.25.Feb.45
K2213	Pte.	BELLEVILLE,D.A.	7.May.45 -21.Oct.45	W.22.Sept.44;W.9.Oct.45
B25538	Pte.	BELLINGER,E.P.	30.Apr.43 - 10.Dec.43	
K49235	Pte.	BELLOCH,C.	18.Mar.44 - 25.Sep.45	
K2616	Pte.	BELOBABA,C.	20.Feb.45 - 19.Jul.45	
K52163	Sgt.	BELOT,C.T.	26.Sep.39 - 26.Aug.41	
K16392	Pte.	BELOWUS,A.	17.Jan.44 - 25.Sep.45	
K48310	Pte.	BELTON,D.K.	22.Dec.43 - 15.Feb.45	
K40295	Pte.	BELYK,M.M.	29.Jun.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K2651	Pte.	BENDICKSON,O.L.	28.Oct.44 - 12.Jan.45	W.12.Jan.45
K52064	Cpl.	BENNETT,R.J.	8.Sep.39 - 4.May.45	
M4074	S/Sgt.	BENNETT,W.H.	17.Oct.41 - 24.Jul.42	
K16375	Pte.	BENNETT,W.S.	5.Feb.44 - 28.May.44	W.23.May.44; DoW.28.May.44
K52032	WO 11 CSM	BENNETT,W.V.	8.Sep.39 - 27.Jul.43	
K67505	Pte.	BENOIT,D.	17.Oct.43 - 17.Sept.44	W.18.Sept.44
K52581	S/Sgt.	BENSON,H.	20.Sep.39 - 19.May.40	
H11090	Sgt.	BENTSON,J.C.	8.Oct.40 - 18.Jun.41	
L9871	Cpl.	BENTZ.P.	22.Dec.43 - 23.Oct.44	W.23.May.44; POW.23.May.44 SAFE IN U.K.17.May.45
K53216	Pte.	BERARDUCCI,J.M.	24.Jul.42 - 19.Dec.42	
K41406	Pte.	BERCY,L.	5.Jan.44 - 3.Feb.44	KIA.3.Feb.44
K52503	Sgt.	BERG.D.C.	19.Sep.39 - 13.Jan.42	
M1250	Pte.	BERG,L.A.	18.Dec.44 - 14.Apr.45	KIA.14.Apr.45
K53449	Pte.	BERG,S.T.	26.Jun.42 - 30.Jan.43	
L53857	Pte.	BERGER,S.V.	15.Nov.44 - 18.Jul.45	
K69868	Pte.	BERKELEY,K.J.A.	6.May.44 -23.May.44	W.23.May.44
K52382	Pte.	BERKELEY, V.	15.Sept. 39 - 15.Dec.43	W.19.Dec.43
M31479	Pte.	BERKHOLTZ,L.	6.Mar.43 - 4.Aug.43	W.4.Aug.43
K52927	Pte.	BERNARDO,O.	11.May.40 -13.Jan.42	
K42128	Pte.	BERRY,E.	22.Dec.43 - 29.Dec.43	KIA.29.Dec.43
A104918	Pte.	BERRY,J.A.	4.Feb.44 - 18.Jul.45	W.23.May.44
K55133	Pte.	BERRY,T.H.	17.Jan.44 - 25.Sep.45	
M33940	Pte.	BERSTROM,L.A.	21.May.45 -25.Sep.45	
K15335	Pte.	BEST,A.F.	4.Jun.45 - 9.Sep.45	
K70691	Pte.	BEST,C.M.	19.Jul.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K51759	Pte.	BEST,W.M.	6.May,44 -17.Sep.44	KIA.17.Sep.44
K575977	Pte.	BEYNON,W.	29.Jun.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K60438	Pte.	BEZANSON,H.E.	5.May.45 -18.Jul.45	
K548967	Pte.	BIANCHIN,G.	29.Jun.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K52748	Pte.	BICKERDYKE,J.	26.Sep.39 - 29.May.40	
K603219	Pte.	BIDDER,E.J.	13.Apr.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K52059	CSM	BIDDLECOMBE,W.E.	8.Sep.39 - 20.Dec.43	W.20.Dec.43
M107848	Pte.	BIENVENUE,J.	26.May.44 -14.Dec.44	W.14.Dec.44
M102901	Pte.	BIETZ,F.	30.Apr.43 -24.Jul.43	POW.24.Jul.43; SAFE IN U.K.12.May.45
K54039	Pte.	BIGGAR, C.H.	28.Aug.42 - 25.Sep.45	
M102853	Pte.	BIGNELL,F.	6.Jun.44 - 9.Dec.44	W.26.Aug.44; KIA.9.Dec.44
M104154	Pte.	BILINSKY,D.W.	13.Aug.43 -25.Sep.45	W.9.Dec.43; W.23.May.44
H95486	Pte.	BILLINGTON,A.D.	13.Mar.44 - 16.Oct.44	W.31.Dec.43
K53433	Pte.	BILLS,J.R.	20.Sep.40 - 27.May.42	

OTHER RANKS

Regt. No.	Final Seaforth Rank	Name		Service with Seaforths	Casualties
K52224	Pte.	BILOW,C.		13.Sep.39 - 3.Oct.39	
A117055	Pte.	BINGA,B.D.		28.Jun.44 - 11.Jul.45	W.17.Jan.44
K48022	Pte.	BIRDSALL,C.I.	M.I.D.	9.Feb.44 - 1.Nov.44	
K53482	Pte.	BIRRELL,A.		30.Nov.41 - 28.Mar.42	
K52848	Pte.	BIRSS,A.F.		3.Oct.39 - 20.Jun.40	
K42626	Pte.	BISHOP,C.W.		30.Apr.43 - 6.Mar.44	
K42002	Pte.	BISHOP,E.E.		27.Nov.39 - 25.Jul.43	W.19.Jul.43
K6439	Pte.	BISHOP,J.R.		7.May.45 - 21.Jun.45	
K40202	Pte.	BISSETT,L.		16.May.45 - 25.Sep.45	POW.23.May.44; SAFE IN ALLIED HANDS 16.Jun.44
K69168	Pte.	BISSON,R.J.		4.Jun.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K68639	Pte.	BITTLE,F.		13.Aug.43 - 27.Dec.43	W.27.Sept.43
L153010	Pte.	BIYAK,W.		15.Nov.44 - 21.Jun.45	
K8958	Pte.	BIZDVIK,J.		7.May.45 - 17.Jul.45	
M33969	Pte.	BJERKE,H.		25.Jul.- 43- 25.Dec.43	KIA.25.Dec.43
H4567	Pte.	BJORNSON,B.A.		28.Oct.44 - 4.Jan.45	W.4.Jan.45
K54065	Pte.	BLACK,A.W.		28.Aug.42 - 25.Sep.45	W.27.Jul.43
K52296	Cpl.	BLACK,C.V.		14.Sep.39 - 18.Aug.42	
K52498	Pte.	BLACK,I.M.		19.Sep.39 - 2.Oct.39	
K52741	RSM	BLACK,R.M.		25.Sep.39 - 10.Feb.44	
K43510	A/Cpl.	BLACKBURNE,J.S.		30.Apr.43 - 17.Sep.44	KIA.17.Sep.44
M15505	Pte.	BLACKIE,W.D.		8.Sep.40 - 31.Jul.43	W.31.Jul.43
L84732	Pte.	BLACKSTOCK,C.E.		6.Jun.44 - 18.Jul.45	
K52789	Pte.	BLACKWELL,A.S.		28.Sep.39 - 13.Jun.40	
K6518	Pte.	BLACKWELL,R.A.		7.May.45 - 6.Jun.45	
K52264	A/Sgt.	BLACKWOOD,W.F.		14.Sep.39 - 23.Apr.44	
K52869	Sgt.	BLAIN, R.		27.Dec.43 - 19.Apr.45	
K65568	Cpl.	BLAIR,W.A.		29.Jun.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K53899	Sgt.	BLAIR,R.A.		30.Nov.41 - 21.Aug.45	
K52831	Pte.	BLAKENEY,C.K.		2.Oct.39 - 31.Oct.42	
K52036	A/CSM	BLAKER,M.A.		7.Sep.39 - 6.Dec.43	KIA.6.Dec.43
K66048	Pte.	BLAKEWAY,T.E.		22.Jul.43 - 25.Sep.45	
K1330	Pte.	BLAKEY, J.O.		27.Apr.45 - 19.Jul.45	
K4509	Pte.	BLAKEY, R.W.		23.Apr.45 - 21.Jun.45	
K52378	Pte.	BLAKIE,R.J.		15.Sep.39 - 18.Sep.39	
K42903	Pte.	BLANCHARD,C.R.		23.Apr.43 - 31.Jan.45	INJURED.17.Jul.43; W.31.Jan.45
K52593	Pte.	BLAND,C.A.		20.Sep.39 - 3.Mar.43	
K41578	Pte.	BLANEY,A.H.		15.Nov.44 - 25.Sep.45	W.19.Jan.45
K52625	Cpl.	BLEASDALE,J.R.		20.Sep.39 - 29.May.40	
K53041	Pte.	BLEZARD,W.		11.May.40 - 26.Apr.43	W.17.Apr.45
K4271	Pte.	BLYSTONE,R.C.		7.Apr.45 - 21.Jun.45	
K48818	Pte.	BOBB, R.		28.Mar.44 - 15.Jul.45	
M100115	Pte.	BOBOUSKI, J.H.		28.Aug.42 - 16.Feb.45	W.16.Feb.45
D143676	Pte.	BOCKUS,G.A.		20.Feb.45 - 12.Apr.45	W.12.Apr.45
K602029	Cpl.	BODNAR,H.		29.Jun.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K71329	Pte.	BOHAM,J.H.		22.Dec.43 - 20.Sep.44	W.23.May.44; KIA.20.Sep.44
H10255	Pte.	BOLESKY, M.		6.Jun.44 - 27.Aug.44	
K76466	L/Cpl.	BOLTING,A.E.T.		30.Apr.43 - 9.Sep.45	
K52383	Pte.	BOLTON,F.D.		15.Sep.39 - 6.Mar.40	
K53506	Pte.	BOLTON,V.F.A.		15.Aug.41 - 15.Aug.42	
K4330	Pte.	BOLTZ,J.W.		25.Jan.45 - 12.Apr.45	W.26.Dec.44; KIA.12.Apr.45
K53443	Pte.	BOMBARDIER,H.		19.Dec.41 - 1.Jul.42	
K52942	Pte.	BOMPAS,C.B.		11.May.40 - 19.Jul.43	KIA.19.Jul.43
K57063	Sgt.	BOND,J.A.	Bronze Cross	1.May.44 - 15.May.44	
				25.Feb.45 - 25.Sep.45	W.16.Feb.45
K57532	Cpl.	BOND,V.		13.Aug.43 - 25.Apr.44	W.25.Apr.44
K52774	Pte.	BONSER,W.J.		27.Sep.39 - 6.Oct.39	
K75997	Pte.	BOON,A.G.F.		31.Jul.42 - 31.Jan.43	
M106531	Pte.	BOOTH,C.C.		5.Feb.44 - 11.Oct.44	
K52376	Sgt.	BOOTH,G.		15.Sep.39 - 14.Dec.44	
K29132	Pte.	BOOTH,G.C.		11.May.40 - 24.Aug.42	
K41568	Pte.	BOOTH,L.G.		15.Nov.44 - 25.Sep.45	W.14.Apr.45
M106713	Pte.	BORASS,I.O.		6.May.44 - 23.May.44	W.23.May.44
K50748	Pte.	BORG, G.F.L.		25.Dec.44 - 18.Apr.45	
L64618	L/Cpl.	BORGEN,H.L.		18.Dec.42 - 25.Sep.45	
K76475	Pte.	BORSATO,L.		26.May.44 - 9.Dec.44	W.9.Dec.44; DoW.9.Dec.44
K52943	Pte.	BORTHWICK,R.H.D.		11.May.40 - 19.Jul.40	
B42628	Pte.	BORTON,T.B.		16.May.44 - 23.May.44	KIA.23.May.44

OTHER RANKS

Regt. No.	Final Seaforth Rank	Name		Service with Seaforths	Casualties
K3358	Pte.	BOSCOE,P.		28.Mar.45 - 20.Apr.45 29.Jun.45 - 18.Jul.45	
K52149	Cpl.	BOSLEY,R.E.		12.Sep.39 - 13.Jul.43	
K49508	Cpl.	BOTTERILL,S.A.		16.Jul.45 - 25.Sep.45	
D135345	Pte.	BOUCHARD,G.		20.Feb.45 - 14.Apr.45	
L154366	Pte.	BOUCHER,L.A.		14.Nov.44 - 18.Jul.45	
B135810	Pte.	BOUGIE,L.		17.Jan.44 - 17.Sep.44	KIA.17.Sep.44
B155818	Pte.	BOURASSA,H.L.		14.Feb.45 - 18.Jul.45	
K1841	Pte.	BOUSFIELD,J.		15.Nov.44 - 18.Jul.45	W.4.Jan.45
K42741	Pte.	BOUTHELL ,E.B.		6.Jun.44 - 25.Sep.45	
H1495	Pte.	BOWE, M.S.		12.May.45 - 7.Jun.45	
K1764	Pte.	BOWER,F.P.		15.Apr.45 - 1.Sep.45	
K49095	Cpl.	BOWER,H.D.		4.Jun.45 - 9.Jul.45	
K53773	A/Sgt.	BOWERMAN,A.V.		19.Dec.41 - 13.Jan.44	
K54079	Cpl.	BOWIE,G.		25.Jul.43 - 22.Oct.44	W.22.Oct.44
K4366	Pte.	BOWIE,H.		20.Feb.45 - 25.Sep.45	W.14.Apr.45
B57238	Pte.	BOWMAN,O.D.		22.Dec.43 - 29.Dec.43	
K53007	Pte.	BOWSER,L.A.		11.May.40 - 24.Apr.41	
L106198	L/Cpl.	BOYCE,N.W.		18.Dec.44 - 18.Jul.45	W.17.Jan.45
K42011	Pte.	BOYCHUK,S.B.		2.Dec.39 - 2.Sep.42	
K52375	Pte.	BOYD,A.C.		15.Sep.39 - 25.May.40	
K52822	(WO 2) RQMS	BOYD,R.A.		2.Oct.39 - 31.May.45	
L107517	Pte.	BOYDA.A.		9.Dec.44 - 29.Jul.45	
K737	Pte.	BOYER,R.I.		18.Dec.44 - 18.Jul.45	
K49131	Pte.	BOYKO,M.		18.Dec.44 - 16.Feb.45	W.16.Feb.45
K69304	Pte.	BOYLE,D.P.		22.Jul.43 - 24.Dec.43	W.24.Dec.43
K45314	Pte.	BOYLE,J.D.		26.Jun.44 - 25.Sep.45	
M100907	Pte.	BRACONNIER,L.A.B.		28.Mar.44 - 24.Aug.44	INJURED 24.Aug.44
R70425	Pte.	BRADLEY,F.R.		25.Dec.42 - 4.Sep.45	W.23.Jul.43
K333	Pte.	BRADLEY,H.G.		21.May.45 - 29.Jul.45	
K69303	Pte.	BRADSHAW,W.		25.May.44 - 2.Aug.44	
K52466	Pte.	BRAES,W.A.		18.Sep.39 - 28.Jun.41	
K52940	Sgt.	BRAHAN,J.		11.May.40 - 6.Jun.45	
K40120	Pte.	BRAIN,H.		28.Oct.44 - 25.Sep.45	
D145273	Pte.	BRAITHWAITE,H.		14.Feb.45 - 7.Apr.45	W.21.Jul.43
K52540	Sgt.	BRAMMER, R.N.		19.Sep.39 - 21.Jul.43	Presumed Killed 21.Jul.43
K52739	Pte.	BRAND,J.D.		25.Sep.39 - 21.Oct.39	
K4671	Pte.	BRANDOLINI,C.		28.Mar.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K52374	Pte.	BRANDON,J.A.		15.Sep.39 - 31.Mar.42	
K43023	Cpl.	BRANHAM,A.V.		30.Apr.43 - 14.Jan.44	
K53251	Pte.	BRANT,J.		23.Oct.40 - 24.May.44	W.24.May.44; DoW.24.May.44
N106211	Pte.	BRANTON,K.		17.Jan.44 - 16.Apr.44	POW.17.Apr.44; SAFE IN U.K.8.Jul.45
K52824	Pte.	BRAZIL,R.W.		2.Oct.39 - 22.Apr.43	
S94329	Pte.	BREDIN,J.H.		23.Oct.42 - 21.Dec.43	
K76830	Pte.	BREDIN,S.A.		20.Jul.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K43049	Pte.L/Cpl.	BREMNER,D.A.		3.Jul.45 - 6.Sep.45	
K71773	Pte.	BRENNAN,E.W.		7.Apr.45 - 12.Apr.45	
L12635	Pte.	BRENNER,M.		15.Jun.45 - 18.Jul.45	
K53668	Pte.	BRETT.A.		30.Nov.41 - 9.Jun.42	
K70457	Pte.	BRICKWOOD,G.C.		24.Jul.43 - 26.Aug.44	W.26.Aug.44
D135252	Pte.	BRIDGES,D.		26.May.44 - 7.Aug.45	
K52369	Spr.	BRIGGS,F.		15.Sep.39 - 14.Jan.45	W.18.Oct.43
L106925	Pte.	BRIGGS,T.A.P.		29.Nov.44 - 14.Apr.45	KIA.14.Apr.45
K73884	Pte.	BRINDER,R.J.		30.Nov.41 - 24.Aug.45	
M16268	A/Cpl.	BRINK,A.		17.Apr.40 - 9.Nov.43	W.5.Aug.43; KIA.11.Dec.43
K53134	Pte.	BROAD,W.T.		11.May.40 - 6.Aug.43	W.5.Aug.43; DoW.6.Aug.43
K5617	Pte.	BRODERICK,J.		16.May.45 - 15.Jul.45	
K52654	Pte.	BRODIE,D.C.		20.Sep.39 - 29.May.40	
K52602	Pte.	BRODIE,P.B.		20.Sep.39 - 29.May.40	
K53115	Pte.	BROOKER,J.		11.May.40 - 21.Aug.40	
K70979	Pte.	BROOKES,R.G.		24.Jul.42 - 28.Jul.43	
K42003	Pte.	BROOKS,C.F.		27.Nov.39 - 19.Jun.42	
K46968	Pte.	BROOKS,H.G.		12.Aug.44 - 25.Sep.45	
L13774	Pte.	BROOME,F.W.		25.Jul.43 - 15.Dec.43	W.15.Dec.43
M103773	L/Cpl.	BROWN,A.D.		3.Aug.43 - 15.Aug.45	W.11.Dec.43
K29138	Pte.	BROWN,A.Bennet		1.Dec.39 - 14.Dec.40	
K42211	CSM WO 11	BROWN,A.E.		25.Jul.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K83817	Cpl.	BROWN,A.L.		23.Jul.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K67378	Cpl.	BROWN,C.L.	MiD	13.Aug.43 - 6.Oct.43	W.6.Oct.43; POW.6.Oct.43; SAFE IN U.K.15.May.45

OTHER RANKS

Regt. No.	Final Seaforth Rank	Name	Service with Seaforths	Casualties
D144504	Pte.	BROWN,Charles L.	15.Nov.44 - 12.Apr.45	W.12.Apr.45
K53133	Cpl.	BROWN,C.R.	11.May.40 - 9.Nov.43	
K37025	Cpl.	BROWN,D.A.	24.Nov.39 - 27.Dec.40	
K67760	Cpl.	BROWN, D.B.	28.Aug.42 - 28.Nov.44	W. 21.Jul.43; W.28.Jul.43; W.11.Sep.43; W.17.Sep.44
K41613	Pte.	BROWN,E.J.W.	28.Oct.44 - 23.Feb.45	
K604025	Pte.	BROWN, E.M.	16.May.45 - 25.Sept.45	
K53136	Pte.	BROWN,E.R.	27.Dec.40 - 27.Dec.40	
K53900	Pte.	BROWN,E.V.	30.Nov.41 - 23.Mar.45	
K606011	Pte.	BROWN,G.H.	15.Apr.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K603233	Pte.	BROWN,H.L.	25.Jul.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K53689	Pte.	BROWN,J.	30.Nov.41 - 1.Mar.45	W.4.Oct.43; W.12.Apr.44
K52928	Pte.	BROWN,J.C.	11.May.40 - 14.Apr.43	
K52546	Pte.	BROWN, J.E.	19.Sep.39 - 19.Jul.40	
M39540	Pte.	BROWN,J.W.	15.Nov.44 - 16.Jul.45	W.9.Dec.44
K52769	Pte.	BROWN,L.M.	27.Sep.39 - 5.Mar.45	W.20.Dec.43; INJURED 21.Apr.44
M56362	Pte.	BROWN,R.T.	28.Mar.45 - 4.Apr.45	
K52280	Pte.	BROWN, T.C.	14.Sep.39 - 19.Dec.43	
K89715	Pte.	BROWN,W.H.	18.Dec.44 - 11.Feb.45	W.14.Jan.45; KIA.11.Feb.45
K53441	L/Cpl.	BROWN,W.D.	12.Aug.40 - 20.Dec.43	W.20.Dec.43
K601139	Pte.	BROWN,W.J.	21.May.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K103815	Pte.	BROWN, W.L.	25.Jul. 43 - 23.May. 44	POW 27.May.44 SAFE IN U.K. 11.May.45
B46980	Pte.	BROWNE,W.G.M.	14.May.44 - 23.May.44	POW . 23. May.44; SAFE IN U.K.11.May.45
B119823	Pte.L/Cpl.	BRUBAKER,R.C.	25.Dec.44 - 18.Jul.45	
K50389	Pte.	BRUCE,G.C.	26.May.44 - 17.Jun.44	
			18.Oct.44 - 8.Jan.45	
K52077	Cpl.	BRUCKSHAW,W.	11.Sep.39 - 29.May.43	
K78502	Sgt.	BRUNNER,R.H.	17.May.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K2652	Pte.	BRUNTLETT,C.W.	28.Oct.44 - 18.Jul.45	
K53077	Pte.	BRYANT,E.G.C.	11.May.40 - 20.Jun.40	
K52062	Pte.	BRYANT,J.D.	8.Sep.39 - 31.Oct.43	
K52311	Pte.	BRYANT, W.N.	14.Sep.39 - 20.Jun.40	
K52651	Pte.	BRYSON,J.E.	21.Sep.39 - 6.Aug.40	
K52732	A/Sgt.	BUCHANAN,D.	25.Sep.39 - 30.Apr.43	
K53099	L/Cpl.	BUCHANAN,S.L.	12.Sep.40 - 25.Dec.43	KIA.25.Dec.43
K53155	Pte.	BUCK,C.E.	11.May.40 - 29.May.40	W.20.Aug.42; POW.20.Aug.42; SAFE IN ALLIED HANDS 31.Jan.45
K53237	Sgt.	BUCKLEY,D.H.	30.Nov.41 - 4.May.45	W.8.Oct.43
K53970	Pte.	BUCKLEY,W.W.	12.Mar.42 - 28.Apr.44	W.15.Dec.43
K71418	Pte.	BUCKNELL,G.L.	21.May.45 - 27.May.45	W.8.Mar .45
K53161	Sgt.	BUDD,D.R.	1.Nov.40 - 25.Sep.45	
K37070	L/Cpl.	BUKER,H.A.	1.Dec.39 - 19.Jun.42	
D86168	Pte.	BULGER,T.R.	3.Aug.43 - 21.Aug.43	
K1587	Pte.	BULLER,H.C.	25.Dec.44 - 19.Jul.45	W.20.Aug.42; POW.20.Aug.42; W.23.Feb.45 SAFE IN ALLIED HANDS 31.Jan.45
K42046	Pte.	BULLIS,W.R.	16.Jun.43 - 26.Mar.44	
K71510	Cpl.	BULLOCK,H.	20.Nov.42 - 20.Dec.43	
M31152	Sgt.	BUNNACE,A.M.	5.Feb.44 - 13.Feb.44	KIA.13.Feb.44
A110446	Pte.	BURCHIEL,J.W.	14.Feb.45 - 20.Jun.45	
K66714	Pte.	BURDEN,A.A.	19.Jul.45 - 25.Sep.45	W.20.Sep.44
K2587	Pte.	BURKHOLDER,G.	15.Nov.44.- 29.Jul.45	
SM1294	Pte.	BURLEIGH,J.	15.Nov.44 - 20.Jun.45	W.16.Dec.44
K16549	Pte.	BURLINGHAM,H.H.	22.Dec.44 - 17.Feb.45	W.17.Feb.45
K52633	Sgt.	BURNBY,L.	21.Sep.39 - 9.Jan.41	
M104747	Pte.	BURNESS,J.N.	28.Oct.44 - 7.Jan.45	INJURED 7.Jan.45
K49292	Pte.	BURNETT,E.	17.Jan.44 - 3.Nov.44	W.5.Apr.44
L104852	Pte.	BURNETT,G.A.	6.Jun.44 - 21.Jun.45	
E52762	Cpl.	BURNETT,G.A.R.	22.Dec.43 - 25.Sep.45	
K52766	Cpl.	BURNETT,J.D.	27.Sep.39 - 23.Jun.45	
K52825	Pte.	BURNISH,S.J.	2.Oct.39 - 17.Apr.42	
K52692	Pte.	BURNS,J.B.	23.Sep.39 - 16.Sep.42	
H85245	Pte.	BURNS, T.R.	1.Nov.44 - 11.Feb.45	
K66764	Pte.	BUROW,J.K.	20.Sep.44 - 25.Sep.45	
K2990	Pte.	BURR,E.L.	17.May.45 - 15.Aug.45	

OTHER RANKS

Regt. No.	Final Seaforth Rank	Name	Service with Seaforths	Casualties
K91701	Pte.	BURTNICK,R.J.	22.Dec.43 - 25.Sep.45	
L52681	Pte.	BURTON,J.	22.Sep.39 - 20.Jun.40	
L101579	Pte.	BUSBY,R.G.	13.Aug.43 - 7.Oct.43	W.8.Oct.43
K53770	Pte.	BUSH,G.E.	27.Dec.41 - 4.Aug.43	
K52300	Pte.	BUTLER,G.W.	14.Sep.39 - 26.Sep.43	DoW.16.Dec.43
K67348	Pte.	BUTLER,J.F.	24.Jul.42 - 19.Aug.43	
A107908	Pte.	BUTLER,R.	25.Dec.44 - 26.Feb.45	DIED 16.May.45
K52442	Sgt.	BUTLER,T.P.	22.Sep.39 - 23.Nov.42	
A102559	A/Cpl.	BUTLER,V.F.	27.Dec.43 - 11.Feb.44	
K52893	Sgt.	BYATT,W.T.	12.Dec.39 - 23.Apr.44	
H15716	Pte.	BYINGTON,M.L.	26.May.44 - 11.Oct.44	
K66087	Pte.	BYSTERBOSCH,J.	29.Jun.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K49167	Pte.	CAIRNEY,J.	17.Jan.44 - 6.Jun.45	W.25.Jan.44
L86785	Pte.	CAIRNS,T.R.	1.Sep.43 - 23.May.44	W.6.Dec.43; POW.23.May.44; SAFE IN U.K.9.May.45
K52570	Pte.	CAIRNS,V.J.	20.Sep.39 - 17.Jan.40	
K37026	Pte.	CAIRNS,W.	24.Nov.39 - 31.May.44	W.8.Dec.43; W.31.Aug.44
K52238	Sgt.	CALDWELL,H.	13.Sep.39 - 4.Mar.42	
K73570	Pte.	CALHOUN,A.B.	16.Jun.43 - 15.Aug.45	W.25.Aug.44
K75487	Pte.	CALLACHAN,L.J.A.	24.Jul.42 - 16.May.43	
K1317	Pte.	CALLAGHAN, P.N.	1.Nov.44 - 18.Jul.45	W.16.Dec.44
K52457	Pte.	CALLAHAN,A.J.	18.Sep.39 - 9.Feb.42	
K42012	Pte.	CAMERON,A.M.	9.Dec.39 - 11.Dec.42	
K52673	Pte.	CAMERON,A.E.H.	22.Sep.39 - 28.Aug.42	
K37538	Pte.	CAMERON,D.C.	20.Sep.44 - 17.Oct.44	W.17.Oct.44
B38179	Cpl.	CAMERON,D.R.	6.Aug.43 - 23.May.44	W.23.May.44
K52078	P/Cpl.	CAMERON,F.O.	11.Sep.39 - 10.Sep.40	
K53736	Pte.	CAMERON,H.M.	14.Nov.41 - 31.Jan.43	
K52767	Pte.	CAMERON,J.D.	27.Sep.39 - 5.Feb.44	
K52676	Pte.	CAMERON,J.G.	22.Sep.39 - 9.Dec.43	W.9.Dec.43
K71161	Pte.	CAMERON,R.S.	19.Jul.45 - 25.Sep.45	
F58451	Pte.	CAMERON,R.V.	22.Feb.45 - 23.Feb.45	
K53217	Pte.	CAMERON,W.	4.Apr.41 - 14.Dec.43	KIA.14.Dec.43
M37373	A/L/Cpl.	CAMERON,W.H.	17.Jul.42 - 25.Apr.43	
K753	Pte.	CAMP,R.A.	28.Mar.45 - 17.Sep.45	
K52401	Cpl.	CAMPBELL,A.H.	16.Sep.39 - 4.Mar.41	
K46117	Pte.	CAMPBELL,C.C.	21.May.45 - 6.Jun.45	
K53691	Pte.	CAMPBELL,C.S.	22.Dec.43 - 3.Mar.45	
K29140	Pte.	CAMPBELL,D.	1.Dec.39 - 11.Feb.45	
H75183	Pte.	CAMPBELL,E.H.	17.Jan.44 - 17.Sep.44	POW.17.Sep.44;W.17.Sep.44; SAFE IN U.K.10.May.45
K15024	Sgt.	CAMPBELL,G.T.	28.Oct.44 - 17.Dec.44	W.17.Dec.44
L102891	Pte.	CAMPBELL,H.J.	18.Dec.44 - 25.Sep.45	INJURED 31.Dec.44
K52675	L/Cpl.	CAMPBELL.H.L.	22.Sep.39 - 5.May.43	
K74042	L/Cpl.	CAMPBELL,H.	5.Mar.43 - 22.Aug.43	
K53057	Sgt.	CAMPBELL,J.	20.May.40 - 5.Mar.43	KIA.10.Jul.44
M17345	Pte.	CAMPBELL,J.A.	22.Dec.43 - 16.Sep.44	KIA.16.Sep.44
K52944	Pte.	CAMPBELL,J.P.	22.May.40 - 3.Jan.41	
K52403	Pte.	CAMPBELL,J.D.	16.Sep.39 - 31.May.45	
H22219	Pte.	CAMPION,C.V.	14.Feb.45 - 14.Apr.45	W.14.Apr.45
D138076	Pte.	CANEY,T.W.	5.Feb.44 - 18.Jul.45	
K52726	A/Cpl.	CANFIELD,G.W.	25.Sep.39 - 9.Nov.40	
K25561	A/Bdr.	CANNELL,A.T.	30.Jun.45 - 3.Sep.45	
K51653	Pte.	CANNON,I.	26.May.44 - 19.Sep.44	W.19.Sep.44; DoW.26.Oct.44
K66003	Cpl.	CANNON,W.C.	19.Jul.45 - 25.Sep.45	
M43464	Pte.	CARDELL,K.S.	28.Mar.44 - 18.Jul.45	
K604680	Pte.	CAREY,P.W.J.	19.Jul.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K52587	Pte.	CARKENER,M.H.	20.Sep.39 - 25.Sep.40	
M102145	Pte.	CARLSENIUS,L.A.	31.Dec.43 - 14.Apr.45	W.14.Apr.45
K48877	Pte.	CARLSON,A.B.	9.Feb.44 - 26.Sep.45	
K317	Pte.	CARLSON,H.O.A.	18.Dec.44 - 11.Jan.45	KIA.11.Jan..45
K16347	Pte.	CARMICHAEL,B.	5.Feb.44 - 28.Aug.44	W.23.May.44;KIA .28.Aug.44
K52351	Cpl.	CARMICHAEL,G.J.	15.Sep.39 - 21.Jul.43	KIA 21.Jul.43
K53780	Pte.	CARNEY,J.P.	27.Mar.42 - 21.Jul.43	KIA 21.Jul.43
K52055	Pte.	CARPENTER,A.	8.Sep.39 - 3.Oct.42	
M107733	Pte.	CARPENTER,H.J.	12.May.45. - 8.Jun.45	
K53069	Pte.	CARPENTER,J.	20.Jun.40 - 29.Jun.42	
K52056	Cpl.	CARRIE,R.	8.Sep.39 - 29.Dec.42	DoW.8.Aug.44
C22021	CQMS	CARRIER,H.S.	21.Jan.44 - 17.Jul.45	
L64262	Pte.	CARRIER,H.W.	13.Aug.43 - 20.Dec.43	W.20.Dec.43
K4462	Pte.	CARRIER,J.P.E.	28.Mar.45 - 9.Sep.45	

OTHER RANKS

Regt. No.	Final Seaforth Rank	Name		Service with Seaforths	Casualties
H101016	Pte.	CARRIERE,D.		13.Aug.43 - 30.Aug.43	
F44967	Pte.	CARRIGAN, D.P.		31.Jul.42 - 8.Oct.43	
K11190	Pte.	CARRINGTON,G.V.	MM	17.Jul.42 - 21.Dec.44	W.24.May.44;W.21.Dec.44
K53075	Cpl.	CARSELL,D.A.H.		22.May.40 - 26.Dec.43	DoW 26.Dec.43
K53036	Cpl.	CARSELL,Q.L.		22.May.40 - 1.Oct.44	
K52609	L/Cpl.	CARSLEY,H.J.		20.Sep.39 - 23.Sep.42	
K52889	Pte.	CARSON,F.L.	MM	9.Dec.39 - 13.Jan.42	
K48271	Pte.	CARSWELL, C.E.		22.Dec.43 - 6.Jun.45	W.23.May.44
K52607	Cpl.	CARTWRIGHT,B.		20.Sep.39 - 25.Jan.44	
M31218	Pte.	CARTWRIGHT,H.		23.Apr.43 - 25.May.44	W.8.Dec.43;KIA.25.May.44
K46512	Pte.	CARTWRIGHT,L.W.		25.Jul.43 - 25.Sep.45	
K51670	Pte.	CARUSO,G.J.		25.Dec.44 - 21.Jan.45	W.28.May.44;W.9.Sep.44
K6784	Pte.	CARVER,G.R.		12.May.45 - 21.Jun.45	
K40552	Pte.	CASEY,A.D.		15.Nov.44 - 14.Dec.44	W.14.Dec.44
K52674	Pte.	CASEY,H.		22.Sep.39 - 14.Apr.43	
K45302	Pte.	CASIMIR,F.		16.May.44 - 25.Sep.45	
K50116	Pte.	CASPER,E.A.		20.Sep.44 - 18.Feb.45	W.1.Jun.44;W.17.Feb.45
K76558	Pte.	CASTLE,J.H.		21.Jan.45 - 15.Jun.45	
K52599	Pte.	CASTLE,M.D.		20.Sep.39 - 11.Feb.45	
M38524	Pte.	CASTOR,G.		16.May.44 - 18.Jul.45	
K52885	Pte.	CAUGHEY,W.		27.Nov.39 - 29.May.40	
A107982	Pte.	CAULLAY,J.		14.Feb.45 - 7.Apr.45	W.7.Apr.45;DoW.8.Apr.45
K46193	Pte.	CAVE,W.J.		1.Sep.43 - 25.Sep.45	W.23.May.44
K46411	Pte.	CAVEN,J.		13.Aug.43 - 25.Sep.45	
M102579	Pte.	CHALIFOUX,J.		30.Apr.43 - 20.Jul.43	W.17.Jul.43
A117708	Pte.	CHALLEN.W.		27.Dec.43 - 27.Jan.44	KIA.27.Jan.44
K7291	Pte.	CHALLONER,G.W.A.		12.May.45 - 21.Jun.45	
K52422	Pte.	CHALMERS,W.G.		16.Sep.39 - 30.Sep.39	
K49284	Pte.	CHAMBERLAND,L.		5.Feb.44 - 23.May.44	KIA.23.May.44
K52806	Pte.	CHAPMAN,C.R.		29.Sep.39 - 30.Oct.40	
K9174	Pte.	CHAPMAN,H.		15.Apr.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K4467	Pte.	CHAPMAN,V.D.		14.Feb.45 - 25.Sep.45	
L100232	Pte.	CHARBONNEAU, L.J.		28.Oct.44 - 14.Dec.44	KIA.14.Dec.44
M65530	Pte.	CHAREST,G.		12.Mar.42 - 3.Oct.42	
M102904	Pte.	CHARLEY,F.		28.Apr.43 - 25.Sep.45	W.2.Sep.44;W.23.Dec.44
C47169	Pte.	CHARTERS,A.A.		15.Jun.45 - 3.Sep.45	
H55662	Pte.	CHARTRAND,G.		6.Dec.44 - 25.Sep.45	
H101535	Pte.	CHARTRAND,T.		13.Aug.43 - 1.Feb.44	
K3250	Pte.	CHEER,D.		15.Nov.44 - 12.Apr.45	W.10.Jan.45;KIA.12.Apr.45
H102351	Pte.	CHEETHAM,N.A.		28.Mar.44 - 18.Jul.45	
K53450	A/Cpl.	CHENIER,A.H.		30.Nov.41 - 5.Jun.42	
L59689	Pte.	CHEYNE,H.		5.May.43 - 17.Dec.43	W.17.Dec.43
M20874	Pte.	CHIEF,W.		6.Jun.44 - 25.Sep.45	
M106838	Pte.	CHIESA,V.	MiD	23.Jan.44 - 23.May.44	POW.23.May.44; SAFE IN U.K.11.May.45
K53628	Cpl.	CHINN,J.R.		4.Apr.41 - 4.May.44	
K52753	Pte.	CHISHOLM,G.A.		26.Sep.39 - 12.Dec.39	
H56787	Pte.	CHISHOLM,R.		1.Dec.43 - 23.May.44	POW.23.May.44; SAFE. IN U.K.8.May.45
K16345	Pte.	CHIPMAN,B.R.		5.Feb.44 - 16.Apr.44	POW.16.Apr.44; SAFE IN U.K.15.May.45
H77960	Pte.	CHIVERS,E.		1.Sep.44 - 25.Sep.45	W.28.Feb.44
K46106	Cpl.	CHRISHOP,H.R.	MM,MiD	25.Jul.43 - 25.Sep.45	W.17.Sep.44
K52970	Pte.	CHRISMAS,C.H.		22.Jun.40 - 26.Nov.43	
K4759	Pte.	CHRISTIANSEN,A.J.		16.May.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K46194	Pte.	CHRISTIANSON,G.J.		30.Apr.43 - 11.Dec.43	KIA.11.Dec.43
K52353	Cpl.	CHRISTIE,H.		15.Sep.39 - 14.Jan.45	
K45360	Pte.	CHRISTIE,R.B.		20.Feb.45 - 18.Sep.45	
K42379	Pte.	CHRISTIENSON,J.C.		12.Aug.44 - 26.Aug.44	W.26.Aug.44
M230	Pte	CHRISTOLING,M.		5.Feb.44 - 24.Jun.45	
K3434	Pte.	CHRISTOPHERSON,W.J.		17.May.45 - 9.Jul.45	
K603910	Pte.	CININELLI,E.		15.Apr.45 - 25.Sep.45	
M102762	Pte.	CLACK,R.		30.Apr.43 - 28.Jul.43	KIA.23.Jul.43
K73593	Pte.	CLAPPERTON,A.A.		31.Dec.43 - 12.Feb.45	
K52295	P/CQMS	CLAPSHEW,C.W.		14.Sep.39 - 5.Mar.40	
K52950	Pte.	CLARK,C.H.		11.May.40 - 20.Sep.44	KIA.20.Sep.44
K76544	Pte.	CLARK,D.W.		28.Aug.42 - 6.Oct.44	W.10.Dec.43
M66684	Pte.	CLARK,J.		25.Dec.44 - 4.Jan.45	W.4.Jan.45
K68801	Pte.	CLARK, J.E.		19.Jul.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K67217	Pte.	CLARK,R.		8.Aug.41 - 10.Dec.43	
K52286	Pte.	CLARK,R.L.		14.Sep.39 - 18.Oct.40	

OTHER RANKS

Regt. No.	Final Seaforth Rank	Name		Service with Seaforths	Casualties
K52307	Pte.	CLARK, T.		14.Sep.39 - 9.Oct.39	
M107055	Pte.	CLARK,T.G.		16.May.44 - 20.Sep.44	W.23.May.44;W.20.Sep.44
C52809	Pte.	CLARKE,A.A.		15.Nov.44 - 14.Apr.45	W.23.Feb.45;KIA.14.Apr.45
K52545	Pte.	CLARKE.L.		19.Sep.39 - 11.Feb.43	W.2.Oct.43
K15867	L/Cpl.	CLARKE,R.C.		22.Dec.43 - 17.Sep.44	KIA.17.Sep.44
K52070	Sgt.	CLARKE,R.M.		11.Sep.39 - 20.Oct.42	
K52388	Pte.	CLARKE,R.A.		15.Sep.39 - 24.Mar.44	
K69854	Pte.	CLARKE,T.G.		24.Aug.44 - 25.Sep.45	W.19.Jan.45
C42303	Pte.	CLARKE,W.J.		5.Jan.44 - 22.Mar.44	
K70985	Pte.	CLARRICOATES,C.E.		17.Jul.42 - 25.Sep.45	W.28.Jul.43;W.9.Dec.43
K53671	L/Cpl.	CLASON,G.F.	MM	22.Jul.43 - 23.May.44	POW.23.May.44; SAFE IN U.K.11.May.45
M63750	Pte.	CLAVEL,J.L.		30.Apr.43 - 26.Jan.45	
K42037	Pte.	CLAYTON,J.G.		18.Dec.42 - 23.Dec.44	W.23.Dec.44
K52531	Pte.	CLEGHORN,R.D.		19.Sep.39 - 20.Jan.40	
M100293	Cpl.	CLELLAND,F.M.		12.Aug.44 - 25.Sep.45	
K52086	Pte.	CLEMENTS,N.		11.Sep.39 - 5.Sep.42	
K52714	Pte.	CLEMENTS,T.		23.Sep.39 - 7.Oct.41	
F35113	Pte.	CLEVELAND,C.V.		30.Apr.43 - 28.Jan.44	W.17.Aug.43;W.28.Jan.44
K608449	Pte.	CLIFFORD,E.H.		7.Jun.45 - 9.Jul.45	
K52390	Pte.	CLIFFORD,G.R.		20.Sep.39 - 23.Nov.39	
K52389	Pte.	CLIFFORD,H.J.		20.Sep.39 - 2.Apr.40	
U1810	L/Cpl.	CLOUGH,E.		30.Nov.41 - 9.Sep.45	W.19.Jul.43
D86267	Pte.	CLOUGH,R.H.A.		13.Aug.43 - 20.Jan.44	
K75730	Pte.	CLUNAS,A.G.		12.Mar.42 - 25.Sep.45	
K53762	Pte.L/Cpl.	CLYNTON,R.		22.Dec.43 - 28.Jul.45	
K53014	Pte.	COATSWIRTH, R.		22.Jun. 40 - 17.Apr. 42	
K53017	Pte.	COATSWORTH,A.		22.Jun.40 - 17.Apr.42	
L103156	Pte.	COBLER,A.H.		14.Feb.45 - 18.Jul.45	
H106060	Cpl.	COCHRANE,A.M.		31.Dec.43 - 25.Sep.45	
A57050	Pte.	COCHRANE,D.C.		18.Dec.44 - 7.Jul.45	
K100069	Pte.	CODE,D.M.		5.May.43 - 25.Sep.45	W.6.Dec.43;W.20.Apr.44;
K53071	A/Cpl.	COEN,D.C.		11.May.40 - 23.Jun.45	W.8.Dec.43
K52945	WO 11 CSM	COFFEY,W.C.		11.May.40 - 28.Jul.45	
K52742	Pte.	COHEN,N.		26.Sep.39 - 12.Dec.39	
K53053	Pte.	COLCHESTER,J.E.		1.Nov.40 - 9.Nov.40	
M66317	Pte.	COLDWELL,J.A.		13.Sep.44 - 20.Dec.44	W.22.Oct.44;W.20.Dec.44
M8731	L/Cpl.	COLE,D.A.		13.Sep.44 - 29.Aug.45	W.20.Sep.44
K52890	Pte.	COLE.E.G.		9.Dec.39 - 3.Dec.43	
K43541	Pte.	COLEBANK,A.J.		11.Dec.42 - 16.Sep.43	W.2.Jun.44
K2723	Pte.	COLEBANK,P.A.		21.May.45 - 15.Jun.45	W.23.Feb.45
K54696	Pte.	COLK,T.G.		1.Jul.45 - 29.Jul.45	
D132536	Pte.	COLLARD,W.(Jr.)		12.Aug.44 - 18.Jul.45	
K40010	Pte.	COLLETTE,W.J.		20.Feb.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K52634	Pte.	COLLINS,A.		21.Sep.39 - 31.May.45	
K52321	Pte.	COLLINS,D.D.		15.Sep.39 - 8.Apr.43	
K69633	Pte.	COLLINS,G.E.		18.Apr.44 - 6.Jun.45	
K50752	Pte.	COLLINS,G.K.		5.Feb.44 - 23.May.44	KIA.23.May.44
K52340	Pte.	COLLINS,G.H.	MiD	15.Sep.39 - 8.Oct.42	
L7245	Pte.	COLLINS,J.		1.Nov.44 - 22.Feb.45	
K52856	Pte.	COLLINS,R.F.		4.Oct.39 - 15.Dec.44	
K52932	Pte.	COLLINS,R.J.		11.Sep.41 - 12.Feb.45	W.23.May.44
K73079	Pte.	COLMAN,G.		4.Jun.45 - 19.Jul.45	W.10.Jul.44
K53471	Pte.	COLVIN,T.		30.Jan.41 - 9.Nov.44	
K52644	A/L/Cpl.	COMPSTON,R.		21.Sep.39 - 28.Nov.42	
H1413	Pte.	COMSTOCK,W.D.		6.Jun.44 - 2.Sep.44	KIA.2.Sep.44
K67101	Pte.	CONEY, H.B.		13.Dec.39 - 8.Feb.43	
K52768	Pte.	CONROY,H.		27.Sep.39 - 17.Mar.42	
K76499	Pte.	CONSTERDINE,R.J.		1.Sep.43 - 23.May.44	POW.23.May.44; DIED 2.May.45
K52811	Pte.	CONWAY,G.S.		29,Sep,39 - 20.Sep.40	
K4513	Pte.	CONWAY,J.R.		28.Oct.44 - 20.Feb.45	W.28.Feb.45
K29079	Pte.	COOK,G.E.		20.Sep.44 - 23.Jun.45	
K46145	Pte.	COOK,G.L.		13.Aug.43 - 25.Sep.45	W.21.Dec.44
K52649	Pte.	COOK,G.Lewis		21.Sep.39 - 25.Jul.40	
M31256	Pte.	COOK,L.O.		31.Dec.43 - 11.Oct.44	
K53593	L/Cpl.	COOKE,B.B.		24.Jul.42 - 14.Sep.44	W.5.Aug.43;W.9.Dec.43
K52972	Pte.	COOKE,B.W.		11.May.40 - 19.Mar.44	
K52713	Pte.	COONEY,C.T.		25.Sep.39 - 14.Jan.45	
K52452	WO 11 CSM	COOPER,C.B.		16.Sep.39 - 26.Dec.43	W.25.Dec.43;W.1.Aug.44

OTHER RANKS

Regt. No.	Final Seaforth Rank	Name	Service with Seaforths	Casualties
K3549	Pte.	COOPER,C.	15.Apr.45 - 18.Jul.45	
K604848	Pte.	COOPER,E.J.	15.Apr.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K53672	Pte.	COOPER,H.S.	8.May.42 - 6.Dec.42	
M39010	Pte.	COOPER,R.M.	28.Oct.44 - 18.Jul.45	W.14.Dec.44
K42602	A/L/Cpl.	COOPER,J.H.	31.Dec.43 - 22.Jan.44	KIA.22.Jan.44
K52590	Sgt.	COOPER,J.E.	20.Sep.39 - 29.Jul.41	
K52411	Pte.	COOPER,S.	16.Sep.39 - 27.Sep.39	
K22419	Pte.	COOPER,T.H.	23.Apr.45 - 20.Jun.45	
K53484	Pte.	COOPER,W.	30.Nov.41 - 25.Feb.44	
K72655	L/Cpl.	COPE,E.	4.Dec.42 - 28.Jul.45	W.9.Dec.43;W.9.Dec.44
K37027	Pte.	COPE,R.H.	28.Nov.39 - 3.Aug.40	DECEASED 3.Aug.40
K51811	Pte.	COPELAND,C.N.	14.Feb.45 - 25.Sep.45	
C65501	Pte.	CORBETT,L.A.	22.Dec.43 - 17.Sep.44	W.23.May.44;W.17.Sep.44
K52433	Pte.	CORMACK,C.	16.Sep.39 - 29.May.40	
D125505	Pte.	CORMIER,P.S.	17.Oct.43 - 30.Nov.44	
K52106	Cpl.	CORNWALL,H.C.	11.Sep.39 - 3.Jan.42	
M16857	Pte.	CORPAN,J.D.	30.Jan.42 - 23.May.44	W.23.May.44
H46513	L/Cpl.	COSGRAVE,P.A.	12.Aug.44 - 15.Jan.45	W.31.Aug.44
K52461	Pte.	COSS,W.E.	18.Sep.39 - 4.Feb.41	
K11131	Pte.	COSTE.P.S.	12.Aug.44 - 25.Sep.45	
K52404	Pte.	COSTELLO,A.P.	16.Sep.39 - 13.May,40	
K52085	Pte.	COSTELLO,W.E.	11.Sep.39 - 3.Oct.44	
M102984	Pte.	COTE.E.	13.Aug.43 - 25.Dec.43	W.25.Dec.43
K53163	Pte.	COULSON,L.J.	4.Apr.41 - 23.Jun.45	
M105635	Pte.	COURSER,V.S.	17.Jan.44 - 25.Sep.45	
K46686	Cpl.	COUSINS,W.K.	7.Jun.45 - 25.Sep.45	
M105515	Pte.	COUTU,A.	5.Feb.44 - 7.May.44	
K52709	L/Cpl.	COWAN,J.M.	23.Sep.39 - 1.Sep.44	KIA.1.Sep.44
K40580	Pte.	COWIE,A.	15.Nov.44 - 14.Apr.45	W.14.Apr.45
K67882	A/Cpl.	COWIN,W.D.	25.Dec.44 - 9.Sep.45	W.21.Feb.45
K71604	Pte.	COX,J.D.	24.Jul.42 - 26.Dec.43	W.26.Dec.44
M31124	Sgt.	COXE,W.R.	29.Jun.45 - 25.Sep.45	
A490523	Pte.	COYLE,P.J.	29.Jun.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K52659	Pte.	CRACK,F.M.	21.Sep.39 - 20.Nov.39	
K42197	Pte.	CRAIG,A.	11.May.40 - 23.Sep.40	
L9788	Pte.	CRAIG,H.L.	18.Dec.44 - 25.Sep.45	W.21.Feb.45
K52765	Pte.	CRAIG,S.M.	27.Sep.39 - 17.Oct.43	W.21.Jul.43;W.18.Oct.43
K52644	Pte.	CRAIG,W.G.B. MM,Commander-in-Chief Certificate for Gallantry	22.Sep.39 - 11.Sep.40	W.14.Jan.44;W.1.Jun.44;
M105598	Pte.	CRAWFORD,R.M.	5.Jan.44 - 22.Oct.44	W.23.May.44
K57593	Sgt.	CRAWLEY,J.V.	27.Jul.45 - 6.Aug.45	
K70460	Pte.	CRESSWELL,W.G.	17.Jan.44 - 22.Jan.44	
K35413	Pte.	CREWE,F.A.	15.Apr.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K66757	Pte.	CRICHLEY,N.	22.Dec.43 - 18.Apr.44	W.18.Apr.44
K49695	Cpl.	CROCKER,L.W.	20.Sep.44 - 25.Sep.45	W.26.May.44
K52746	Pte.	CROFT,G.	26.Sep.39 - 11.Feb.41	DIED 11.Feb.41
K66317	Pte.	CROLL,D.S.	10.Aug.43 - 25.Nov.44	
K52962	Pte.	CROMB,C.A.	11.May.40 - 21.Jul.43	KIA.21.Jul.43
K52270	Cpl.	CROMB,J.	14.Sep.39 - 19.Jun.44	W.22.Jul.43;W.15.Dec.43
C40833	Pte.	CROMBIE,P.C.	18.Dec.44 - 11.Apr.45	W.11.Apr.45
K52082	Pte.	CROSFIELD,J.A.	11.Sep.39 - 11.Nov.40	
K52068	Pte.	CROSS,D.	9.Sep.39 - 15.Aug.45	W.12.Apr.45
K52065	Sgt.	CROSS,L.L.	8.Sep.39 - 5.Mar.45	
B158341	Pte.	CROSS,L.G.	14.Feb.45 - 18.Jul.45	
K45549	Pte.	CROSWELL,H.W.	13.Aug.43 - 2.Sep.45	
K53031	Pte.	CROWE-SWORDS,E.A.	11.May.40 - 5.Dec.43	W.10.Aug.43
K53582	Cpl.	CROWE-SWORDS,W.E.	5.Sep.40 - 2.Sep.43	
D108040	Pte.	CROWLEY,J.	31.Dec.43 - 16.Sep.44	W.16.Sep.44; DIED 16.Sep.44
L66360	Pte.	CRUICKSHANK,J.W.	11.Dec.42 - 5.Apr.45	
L52657	Pte.	CRUICKSHANK,W.(Jr.)	21.Sep.39 - 27.Mar.41	W.20.Jul.43
L107511	Pte.	CUMBERLAND,J.G.	15.Nov.44 - 4.Jan.45	W.4.Jan.45
K52914	Pte.	CUMMING,L.	1.Dec.41 - 4.Mar.45	
K608934	Pte.	CUMMINGS,H.G.	15.Apr.45 - 29.Jul.45	W.23.Apr.45
M102678	Pte.	CUMMINS,H.	11.Feb.44 - 17.Jan.45	
K57610	A/Cpl.	CUNDY,J.A.	17.Oct.43 - 28.Jul.45	W.26.Aug.44
K52058	Sgt.	CUNNINGHAM,B.F.	8.Sep.39 - 2.Dec.39	
M103806	Pte.	CUNNINGHAM,G.	30.Apr.43 - 18.Jul.45	W.23.May.44;W.24.Feb.45
M38752	Pte.	CUNNINGHAM,R.H.	21.May.43 - 17.Feb.45	
M204549	Pte.	CUPP,L.K.	16.May.44 - 15.Jun.45	W.23.May.44

OTHER RANKS

Regt. No.	Final Seaforth Rank	Name	Service with Seaforths	Casualties
K600791	Pte.	CURLEY,W.	25.Jun.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K48976	Pte.	CURNOW,D.A.	22.Dec.43 - 17.Jun.44	
K15847	Pte.	CURR,R.J.A.	1.May.44 - 25.Sep.45	
K52683	Pte.	CURRIE,D.	22.Sep.39 - 30.Sep.41	
L106776	Pte.	CURRIE,S.K.	1.Sep.44 - 18.Sep.44	KIA.18.Sep.44
M12386	Pte.	CURRIE,W.	18.Mar.44 - 15.May.44	
K67186	A/Cpl.	CURRIE-SMITH,G.J.	22.Dec.43 - 28.Dec.43	W.28.Dec.43
K53693	Pte.	CURRY,R.J.	1.May.42 - 24.Oct.42	
H1464	Pte.	CURTIS,Lindsay	16.May.44 - 18.Jul.45	
K57186	Pte.	CUSHMAN,J.	11.Jun.45 - 19.Jul.45	
M49765	Pte.	CUTHBERT,G.	10.Aug.43 - 17.Oct.43	KIA.17.Oct.43
M106109	Pte.	CWIKULA, N.	16.May,44 - 4.Jan.45	KIA.4.Jan.45
K6808	Pte.	CWIKULA, P.P.	16.May.45 - 21.Jun.45	
H105045	Pte.	DAHL,H.A.	6.Jun.44 - 26.Aug.44	KIA.26.Aug.44
L86626	Pte.	DAHL,W.E.	1.Sep.43 - 23.Dec.43	KIA.23.Dec.43
K45600	Pte.	DAINARD,W.G.	18.Dec.44 - 9.Jan.45	W.9.Jan.45
K62262	Sgt.	DAKERS,G.A.	18.Jul.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K52916	Pte.	DALE,D.H.	22.May.40 - 24.Nov.43	W.17.Jul.43;W.7.Dec.43; DoW 7.Dec.43
K603615	Pte.	DALLA,P.P.	29.Jun.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K53825	Pte.	DALZIEL,A.	12.Mar.42 - 27.Oct.42	
K37028	Pte.	DALEY,T.P.	29.Nov.39 - 31.Mar.45	
A3124	Pte.	DANE,L.C.	10.Apr.44 - 1.May.45	
M104442	Pte.	DANARD,D.A.	30.May.44 - 18.Jul.45	
L41175	Cpl.	DANIELS,A.J.	26.May.44 - 6.Sep.44	
K52679	Cpl.	DARBY,A.W.	22.Sep.39 - 4.May.45	
L101278	Pte.	DARJES,C.W.	21.Apr.44 - 23.May.44	W.23.May.44;POW.23.May, 44, SAFE IN U.K. 20.Apr.45
K52847	Cpl.	DARLING,W.O.	3.Oct.39 - 11.Dec.40	
K52586	Pte.	DARVILL,P.W.	20.Sep.39 - 4.May.45	
K52958	Pte.	DAVEY,F.H.	11.May.40 - 25.Sep.45	
K46997	Cpl.	DAVID,J.A.	4.Jun.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K52620	Pte.	DAVID,R.C.	20.Sep.39 - 25.Sep.45	
K52946	Sgt.	DAVIDSON,J.S.	11.May.40 - 25.Sep.45	
K52798	Sgt.	DAVIDSON,M.	28.Sep.39 - 21.Jul.43	W.21.Jul.43
K49898	Pte.	DAVIES,A.T.	25.Jan.44 - 24.May.44	W.24.May.44
K52918	Pte.	DAVIES,C.	11.May.40 - 21.May.43	
K37074	Pte.	DAVIES,E.D.	12.Dec.39 - 23.Jun.45	
K52505	Pte.	DAVIES,D.J.	19.Sep.39 - 23.Nov.39	W.7.Aug.43
H17521	Pte.	DAVIES,E.	29.May.45 - 18.Jul.45	
K530050	Pte.	DAVIES,F.D.	11.May.40 - 21.May.44	
K52886	Cpl.	DAVIES,J.A.	27.Nov.39 - 4.Dec.43	
K74313	Pte.	DAVIES,John	18.Dec.4 2- 22.Dec.43	W.14.Jul.43
K53528	Sgt.	DAVIES,T.G.	31.Oct.41 - 6.Jun.45	W.26.Dec.43
K1548	Pte.	DAVIES,W.	20.Feb.45 - 1.Jun.45	
K67051	Sgt.	DAVIS,C.E.	22.Jun.40 - 11.Jul.42	
K45436	Pte.	DAVIS,C.M.	22.Jul.43 - 28.Apr.44	
K53024	Pte.	DAVIS,D.B.	11.May.40 - 27.Dec.40	
K3308	Pte.	DAVIS,E.W.	17.May.45 - 6.Jun.45	
H65339	Pte.	DAVIS,F.W.	30.Jan.42 - 6.Oct.43	W.6.Oct.43
K52388	Pte.	DAVIS,J.E.	20.Sep.39 - 10.Sep.40	W.17.Apr.41;DoW.22.Apr.41
M102898	Pte.	DAVIS,O.E.	3.Aug.43 - 9.Dec.43	W.9.Dec.43
K52384	Pte.	DAVIS,W.M.	25.Nov.39 - 31.May.45	
K70038	Pte.	DAVISON,K.V.	7.Jul.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K66225	A/L/Cpl.	DAVY,C.H.	25.Jul.43 - 9.Dec.43	KIA.9.Dec.43
K52555	Pte.	DAWS,A.E.	19.Sep.39 - 3.Jul.42	
K53118	Pte.	DAWS,G.	11.May.40 - 13.Mar.44	W.21.Jul.43
U2217	Cpl.	DAWSON,C.E.	23.Apr.45 - 18.Jul.45	
K52787	Pte.	DAWSON,R.K.	28.Sep.39 - 21.Aug.43	
			20.Sep.44 - 5.Mar.45	W.18.Sep.44
K52420	Pte.	DEAN,L.O.	16.Sep.39 - 1.Dec.39	
K2869	Pte.	DE BAKER,J.	7.Jun.45 - 9.Jul.45	
K547053	Pte.	DE DIASIO,R.	25.Jun.45 - 25.Sep.45	
M67535	Pte.	DECOINE,J.	31.Dec.43 - 15.Nov.44	POW.27.Dec.44; DIED WHILST POW 1.May.45
M107146	L/Cpl.	DEDERER,J.L.	11.Feb.44 - 18.Jul.45	W.23.May.44;W.17.Oct.44
K53384	Pte.	DEERING,R.A.	18.Sep.40 - 26.Aug.41	
K42546	Pte.	DECRAZIO,J.	4.Dec.42 - 25.Sep.45	W.16.Sep.44;W.11.Apr.45
K42547	Pte.	DECRAZIO,M.	4.Dec.42 - 20.Jul.43	W.20.Jul.43
K52588	Pte.	DEION,F.	20.Sep.39 - 31.Jan.43	

OTHER RANKS

Regt. No.	Final Seaforth Rank	Name	Service with Seaforths	Casualties
B74277	Pte.	DEITSCH,L.H.	25.Jul.43 - 31.Jul.43	W.28.Jul.43;DoW.31.Jul.43
K52643	Pte.	DE LA GIRODAY,P.	21.Sep.39 - 30.Nov.39	
C77817	Pte.	DELAHUNT,C.L.	6.May.44 -12.Feb.45	W.2.Sep.44
K52541	Sgt.	DELMAGE,H.S.	19.Sep.39 - 21.Jul.43	W.21.Jul.43
M67497	Pte.	DELORME,D.	22.Jul.43 - 11.Dec.44.	W.8.Oct.43;W.13.May.44; W.14.Dec.44
M7475	Pte.	DEMARCE,R.	6.May.44 - 6.Jun.45	
M107541	A/Cpl.	DEMERIA,E.A.	6.Jun.44 - 12.Apr.45	KIA.12.Apr.45
K74588	Pte.	DEMERSE,P.M.	4.Aug.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K67308	Pte.	DEMPSTER,W.F.	25.Oct.43 - 11.Dec.43	KIA.11.Dec.43
M17387	Pte.	DEPAGIE,P.H.	22.Dec.43 - 22.Oct.44	KIA.22.Oct.44
K53154	Pte.	DERKSEN,A.O.	8.Nov.40 - 23.Jun.45	
C115038	Pte.	DEROCHIE,G.W.	5.Feb.44 - 26.Aug.44	KIA.26.Aug.44
K53428	Pte.	DERRY,M.E.	30.Nov.41 - 23.Jun.45	W.23.May.44
K52661	Pte.	DERRY,S.R.	22.Sep.39 - 29.May.40	
K67871	Cpl.	DERUITER,P.	20.Mar.43 - 3.May.43	W.8.Oct.43;W.26.Dec.43
K54057	Pte.	DERY,A.J.	22.Dec.43 - 25.Dec.43	
C31348	Cpl.	DESBIENS,R.	14.May.44 - 26.Apr.45	W.17.Sep.44
K52971	Pte.	DESCHANE,E.F.	11.May.40 - 3,Sep.45	
K68715	Pte.	DESCHENE,R.	3.Aug.43 - 13.Feb.44	W.9.Dec.43;W.13.Feb.44
K52779	Pte.	DESHARAIS,W.J.	27.Sep.39 - 10.Oct.42	
B91569	Pte.	DESROCHERS,M.J.	20.Sep.44 - 24.Mar.45	
K53093	Pte.	DESROSIERS,G.R.	11.May.40 - 20.Jun.40	
C53127	Pte.	DETLOR,D.W.	26.Mar.43 - 3.Jun.45	
M106755	Pte.	DETTLING,G.W.	25.Dec.44 - 18.Jul.45	
K50471	Pte.	DEVINE,H.	17.Jan.44 - 25.Jan.44	POW.25.Jan.44; SAFE IN U.K.23.May.45
K52598	Pte.	DEVITT,E.	20.Sep.39 - 15.May.42	
B17038	Pte.	DEVOE,J.H.	20.Sep.44 - 8.Jun.45	W.5.Jan.45
K52935	Pte.	DEWHURST,E.P.	21.Mar.41 - 9.Sep.45	
H3529	Pte.	DEZIEL,O.B.	27.Jun.45 - 15.Aug.45	
K52858	Pte.	DIAMOND,W.	7.Oct.39 - 29.May.40	DIED 1.Feb.42
K52210	Pte.	DICK,A.M.	13.Sep.39 - 10.Jun.42	
K4028	Pte.	DICK,W.	7.Jun.45 - 29.Aug.45	W.16.Feb.45
K52437	Pte.	DICKIE,H.A.	16.Sep.39 - 2.Dec.42	
K8825	Pte.	DICKIE,J.G.	4.Jun.45 - 9.Jul.45	
K52131	Pte.	DICKSON,H.J.	11.Sep.39 - 23.Nov.39	W.23.Aug.44
K602078	Pte.	DIDIER, S.D.	17.May.45 - 25.Sep.45	
L2239	Pte.	DIDOW,G.	4.Jun.45 - 3.Aug.45	
K69770	Pte.	DIGGENS,H.O.	4.Jun.43 - 7.Oct.43	KIA.7.Oct.43
M105924	Pte.	DIKES,J.	17.Jan.44 - 23.May.44	KIA.23.May.44
K49784	Pte.	DINETROFF.J.	29.Jun.45 - 29.Aug.45	W.9.Sep.44
K52489	Pte.	DINWOODIE,W.A.	18.Sep.39 - 20.Dec.39	
K53019	A/L/Cpl.	DION,G.	11.May.40 - 5.May.43	
K52097	Pte.	DITCHBURN,T.A.	11.Sep.39 - 22.Oct.42	
K52124	CQMS	DIXON,A.	12.Sep.39 - 5.Mar.45	
K54451	Cpl.	DIXON,D.	1.May.44 - 9.Jun.45	W.24.May.44;W.28.Aug.44; W.25.Jan.45
G50394	Sgt.	DIXON,E.A.	27.Dec.43 - 25.Sep.45	
K48160	Pte.	DIXON,J.	21.May.45 - 5.Aug.45	
L67375	L/Cpl.	DIXON,R.	30.May.44 - 18.Jul.45	
K53153	Cpl.	DIXON,R.L.	1.Dec.41 - 31.May.45	
K52298	Cpl.	DIXON,W.J.	14.Sep.39 - 31.Jan.43	
K52708	Pte.	DOAN,C.H.	23.Sept.39 - 15.Dec.43	KIA.15.Dec.43
A55323	Pte.	DOAN,W.C.	22.Oct.44 - 23.Dec.44	
K46770	Pte.	DOCKRILL,F.E.	18.Oct.44 - 4.Dec.44	
K52308	Pte.	DOCKSTADER,R.A.	14.Sep.39 - 19.Jun.42	
K54433	Pte.	DOCKSTEADER,R.A.	28.Oct.44 - 4.Jan.45	W.4.Jan.45
H77143	Pte.	DODDS,G.M.	3.Aug.43 - 3.May.44	
K4541	Sgt.	DODDS,R.E.	5.Jul.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K2842	Pte.	DODMAN,R.E.	14.Feb.45 - 15.Jul.45	W.12.Apr.45
M105659	Pte.	DOHERTY,G.A.	5.Feb.44 - 17.Sep.44	POW.17.Sep.44; SAFE IN U.K.10.May.45
K53042	A/Cpl.	DOHERTY,J.	11.May.40 - 20.Dec.43	KIA.20.Dec.43
K53001	Pte.	DOIRON,R.J.	22.May.40 - 3,Nov.42	
M102656	L/Cpl.	DOLAN,B.	1.Sep.43 - 15.Aug.44	
K6264	Pte.	DOMBROWSKI,A.B.	7.May.45 - 14.Jun.45	
K67825	A/Cpl.	DONALD,A.F.	28.Aug.42 - 15.Sep.42	
K52759	Pte.	DONALD,W.W.	27,Sep.39 - 5.Mar.45	
M106596	Pte.	DONALDSON,C.S.	16.May.44 - 18.Jul.45	W.23.May.44;W.20.Sep.44

OTHER RANKS

Regt. No.	Final Seaforth Rank	Name		Service with Seaforths	Casualties
K52129	Pte.	DONALDSON,W.		12.Sep.39 - 23.Nov.39	
K52100	P/L/Cpl.	DUNN,J.H.F.		11.Sep.39 - 29.May.40	
K53254	Pte.	DONOHUE,R.J.	MM	6.Sep.40 - 26.Dec.44	W.23.Dec.43;POW.26.Dec.44; SAFE IN U.K. 9.May.45
K48385	Pte.	DORAN,R.J.		5.Feb.44 - 10.Apr.44	
				14.Apr.44 - 25.Sep.45	W.10.Apr.44
K50302	L/Cpl.	DORE,H.F.		16.May.44 - 31.Aug.44	KIA.31.Aug.44
L18327	Pte.	DORCAN,A.R.		13.May.42 - 24.Aug.42	
K53906	Pte.	DORMAN,E.L.		30.Nov.41 - 12.Oct.43	
K49041	Pte.	DOUGALL,N.		13.Aug.43 - 26.Aug.44	W.8.Oct.43;W.23.May.44; W.26.Aug.44
K53399	Pte.	DOUGHERTY,J.		2.May.41 - 20.Jan.42	
K13187	Pte.	DOUGLAS,D.M.		25.Jun.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K52808	Pte.	DOUGLAS,J.R.		29.Sep.39 - 24.Nov.39	
M12280	Pte.	DOUGLAS,W.		25.Jul.43 - 11.Dec.43	W.11.Dec.43;DoW.11.Dec.43
K52128	Pte.	DOUGLAS,W.B.		12.Sep.39 - 27.Sep.40	
K52571	Pte.	DOW,J.		19.Sep.39 - 4.May.45	W.18.Oct.43
M10674	Pte.	DOWDELL,A.J.		18.Mar.44 - 28.Apr.44	
K21011	Sgt.	DOWNIE,H.		7.Jun.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K53629	Pte.	DOYLE,G.F.		28.Aug.42 - 19.Jul.43	W.18.Jul.43;DoW.19.Jul.43
K53508	Pte.	DOYLE,L.A.		1.May.42 - 14.Jul.42	
K52680	Pte.	DRAKE,I.		22.Sep.39 - 24.Dec.43	W.26.Jul.43;W.24.Dec.43; DoW 24.Dec.43
K67878	Pte.	DRAKE,S.J.		28.Aug.42 - 21.May.43	
K76958	Pte.	DRAPE,L.V.		7.Apr.45 - 14.Apr.45	W.14.Apr.45
K16426	Pte.	DRAYTON,R.J.		13.Sep.44 - 19.Sep.44	W.19.Sep.44
K69536	Sgt.	DREAN,Y.		17.May.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K53291	Pte.	DREBITT,S.F.		16.Jan.42 - 26.Sep.42	
M103495	Pte.	DREFXO,A.		9.Feb.44 - 23.Feb.45	W.23.May.44;W.23.Feb.45
K71408	Pte.	DREGER,L.E.		23.Apr.43 - 25.Sep.45	
K52496	A/Sgt.	DREGER,R.		18.Sep.39 - 27.Jul.44	
K42986	Sgt.	DRIENEL,H.E.		16.Feb.44 - 9.Sep.45	W.23.May.44
K605804	Pte.	DRONECK,C.N.		15.Apr.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K57840	Pte.	DRUSKIN,R.		22.Dec.43 - 23.May.44	KIA.23.May.44
M17192	Cpl.	DRYSDALE,G.A.		31.Dec.43 - 8.Jun.45	
K605334	Pte.	DUCLOS,R.M.		29.Jun.45 - 25.Aug.45	
K37029	CQMS	DUDDLE,J.M.	DCM	28.Nov.39 - 11.Feb.45	
M102221	Pte.	DUDLEY,J.		30.Apr.43 - 23.Mar.45	W.21.Jul.43;W.20.Dec.44
L86699	Cpl.	DUDZIACK, J.		1.Sep.43 - 1.Sep.43	W.30.Dec.44
B155733	Pte.	DUFF,G.C.		22,Feb.45 - 12.Apr.45	
M101407	Pte.	DUFF,J.M.		25.Dec.44 - l8.Jul.45	
K51792	L/Cpl.	DUFFUS,S.G.		6.May.44 - 1.Sep.44	KIA.1.Sep.44
K53373	L/Cpl.	DUGAN,C.P.		13.Sep.40 - 32.Oct.42	
K67327	Pte.	DUGGAN,E.		7.Aug.43 - 9.Jun.45	
K2534	Pte.	DUKE,W.I.		15.Nov.44 - 14.Dec.44	KIA.14.Dec.44
H103396	Pte.	DUMKA,A.		1.Sep.44 - 12.Jan.45	W.21.Sep.44;W.l2.Jan.45
K52098	Pte.	DUNBRACK,E.G.		11.Sep.39 - 7.Dec.39	
B54980	Pte.	DUNBRACK,R.M.		22.Dec.43 - 4.Feb.44	KIA.4.Feb.44
M19400	Cpl.	DUNCAN,A.C.		20.Sep.44 - 11.Feb.45	W.13.Jan.45;W.11.Feb.45
K42842	Pte.	DUNCAN,W.C.		20.Sep.44 - 27.Dec.44	
K49683	Pte.	DUNLOP,G.H.		22.Dec.43 - 3.Sep.45	
K53094	Pte.	DUNN,E.		11.May.40 - 15.Sep.42	
K533112	Pte.	DUNN,H.M.	MiD	11.May.40 - 29.May.40	
K73061	Pte.	DUNN,L.B.		23.Apr.43 - 17.Dec.43	KIA 17.Dec.43
K605859	Pte.	DUNN, R.J.		25.Jan.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K52260	A/Sgt.	DUNN,W.R.		14.Sep.39 - 5.Jul.40	
K52868	Pte.	DUNNETT,J.F.		7.Oct.39 - 7.Sep.40	
M106432	Pte.	DUNWOODY,L.A.		17.Jan.44 - 25.Sep.45	
K52565	Pte.	DUPERREAULT,A.A.		19.Sep.39 - 27.Apr.42	
L154035	Pte.	DUPUIS,J.A.		23.Apr.43 - 28.Aug.44	W.18.Dec.43;W.28.Aug.44
B131651	Pte.	DURACK,W.J.		28.May.43 - 6.Jun.45	W.23.May.44
K49799	Pte.	DURRANT,J.A.		26.May.44 - 25.Sep.45	W.22.Oct.44
K49957	Pte.	DUTLI,C.A.		22.Dec.43 - 23.May.44	W.16.Dec.43;W.23 .May.44 DoW 29.May.44
K53933	Sgt.	DUXBURY,J.B.		8.May.42 - 25.Sep.45	W.15.Dec.43
K42853	Pte.	DYCK,J.B.		22.Dec.43 - 23.May.44	POW.23.May.44; SAFE IN U.K.16.Apr.45
K604991	Pte.	DYCKE,N.		16.May.45 - 17.Sept.45	
K3040	Pte.	DYE,F.		12.May.45 - 18.Jul.45	
G4238	Pte.	DYKEMAN,V.R.		23.Apr.43 - 22.Jan.44	
K52471	Cpl.	EADE,J.H.		18.Sep.39 - 23.Jul.44	W.29.Mar.43

OTHER RANKS

Regt. No.	Final Seaforth Rank	Name		Service with Seaforths	Casualties
K49492	Pte.	EAGLES,A.G.		28.Oct.44 - 18.Jun.45	
K67839	Sgt.	EAGLESTONE,F.T.		25.Jul.45 - 26.Sep.45	
M36674	Pte.	EARL,C.E.		25.Jul.43 - 10.Dec.43	W.7.Oct.43;W.10.Dec.43
M102891	Cpl.	EARL,T.S.		1.May.44 - 23.May.44	KIA.23.May.44
K40919	Pte.	EARNSHAW,H.H.		3.Aug.43 - 25.Jan.45	W.30.Jan.44
K66791	Pte.	EASTWOOD,G.W.		29.Dec.44 - 4.Jan.45	KIA.4.Jan.45
K53907	Cpl.	EASTWOOD,W.		30.Nov.41 - 3.Sep.45	
K53289	Pte.	ECCLES,A.E.		22.Jan.40 - 26.Jun.40	
K3968	Pte.	EDDLESTON,D.L.		16.May.45 - 20.Jun.45	
K53165	Pte.	EDGETT,S.L.		27.Dec.40 - 14.Jul.43	
K68544	Pte.	EDGINGTON,E.E.		22.Jul.43 - 11.Dec.43	KIA.11.Dec.43
K42763	Pte.	EDWARDES,E.R.		19.Jul.45 - 9.Sep.45	
K52494	Pte.	EDWARDS,E.G.		18.Sep.39 - 30.Jun.40	
C120195	Pte.	EDWARDS,L.G.		17.Jan.44 - 18.Jul.45	
K65082	Pte.	EELY,R.W.		2.Feb.45 - 25.Feb.45	W.25.Feb.45
M105257	Pte.	EGELAND,N.M.		12.Aug.44 - 25.Sep.45	
K52053	Sgt.	EGGIE,H.J.		1.Sep.39 - 4.Mar.42	
N103423	Pte.	EHRMAN,G.		30.Apr.43 - 23.May.44	W.21.Jul.43;KIA.23.May.44
K53509	WO 11 CSM	ELASCHUK,J.		9.May.41 - 1.Sep.45	
L100678	Pte.	ELIESE,A.		1.Sep.43 - 5.Sep.44	
L154015	Pte.	ELL,M.		3.Aug.43 - 19.Dec.43	W.6.Aug.43
K52656	Pte.	ELLEN,J.M.		21.Sep.39 - 13.Jan.42	
K2648	Pte.	ELLINGSON, H.		20.Oct.44 - 5.Jan.45	
L13775	Pte.	ELLIOTT,L.W.		13.Aug.43 - 9.Dec.44	W.23.May.44;W.9.Dec.44
K69203	Pte.	ELLIS,B.E.		13.Aug.43 - 24.Sep.43	
L52127	Cpl.	ELLIS,E.G.		12.Sep.39 - 3.Aug.43	W.28.Jul.43
K52812	Cpl.	ELLIS,F.A.		29.Sep.39 - 23.Nov.42	
K42004	L/Cpl.	ELLIS,H.W.A.		27.Nov.39 - 5.Mar.45	
K42967	Pte.	ELLIS,J.R.		30.Apr.43 - 25.Sep.45	
K53011	Pte.	ELMER,F.		11.May.40 - 14.Apr.43	
K72914	Pte.	ELMORE.L.R.		4.Dec.42 - 28.Apr.44	W.20.Jul.43
K68561	A/L/Cpl.	ELNICKY,J.		28.Aug.42 - 23.May.44	POW 23.May.44; SAFE IN U.K.10.May.45
M67679	Pte.	ENDERS,L.C.		12.Aug.44 - 17.Sep.44	POW 17.Sep.44; SAFE IN U.K. 8.Jul.45
K57011	Pte.	ENGLAND,L.R.(HART)		28.Apr.43 - 6.Jun.45	
K85494	Pte.	ENGLISH,J.W.		16.Apr.43 - 14.Jan.45	W.9.Dec.43;W.13.Jan.45
K42689	Pte.	ENGLISH,P.G.D.		11.Dec.42 - 15.Dec.44	W.15.Dec.44
K67789	Pte.	ENNS,L.R.		25.Dec.42 - 23.Jun.45	
K52841	Pte.	ENOCH,R.O.		2.Oct.39 - 8.Oct.41	
K53348	L/Cpl.	ENS,I.		4.Jun.41 - 9.Dec.43	KIA.9.Dec.43
K4615	Pte.	EPPLER,G.		15.Apr.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K50372	Pte.	ERICKSON,G.		17.Jan.44 - 25.Sep.45	W.25.Jan.44; INJURED 10.Jun.44
K607471	Pte.	ESAU,P.		15.Apr.45 - 29.Jul.45	
K52158	Pte.	ESSELMONT,J.J.		26.Sep.39 - 22.Feb.45	W.22.Feb.45
K52002	Pipe Major WO 111	ESSON,E.	MBE	1.Sep.39 - 25.Sep.45	
K52447	Pte.	ESTABROOKS,D.H.		16.Sep.39 - 7.Nov.40	
M103113	L/Cpl.	ETUE,W.		22.Dec.43 - 16.Jul.45	
K53255	Pte.	EVANS,C.		11.Jul.42 - 28.Aug.42	
K52126	Pte.	EVANS,H.H.		12.Sep.39 - 30.Jun.42	
K53114	Pte.	EVANS,N.		11.May.40 - 15.Dec.40	
M21142	Pte.	EVANS,W.B.		13.Aug.43 - 23.May.44	KIA 23.May.44
K76514	Pte.	EVANS, W.F.		20.Sep.44 - 25.Sep.45	
K65250	Pte.	EVERSON, R.P.		30.Apr.43 - 25.May.44	W.21.Jul.43;W.25.May.44
K72912	Pte.	EWART,R.A.		30.Apr.43 - 25.Sep.45	W.26.Jul.43
K52265	Pte.	EWEN,I.D.		14.Sep.39 - 16.Feb.40	
K52724	L/Cpl.	EWENS,L.G.		25.Sep.39 - 31.May.45	
K52511	Pte.	FAGERVIK,L.T.		19.Sep.39 - 17.Oct,43	KIA 17.Oct.43
K47944	Pte.	FAIRHOLM,N.		22.Dec.43 - 24.Mar.44	
K29031	Sgt.	FAIRWEATHER,G.		1.Dec.39 - 6.Oct.43	KIA 6.Oct.43
K52090	A/CSM WO II	FARMER,A.		11.Sep.39 - 27.Dec.43	W.19.Jul.43;KIA.27.Dec.43
D82686	Pte.	FARMER,W.C.		3.Aug.43 - 15.Dec.43	W.15.Dec.43
K42013	Pte.	FARQUHARSON,G.H.		2.Dec.39 - 4.Feb.40	W.16.Aug.44;W.20.Sep.44
K42014	CQMS	FARQUHARSON,J.G.		3.Dec.39 - 31.Mar.45	W.4.Dec.44
L65678	Pte.	FARRAR, K.N.		25.Dec.44 - 24.Mar.45	W.22.Feb.45
K40628	Pte./L/Cpl.	FARRELL, G.C.		15.Nov.44 - 18.Jul. 45	
K6920	Pte.	FARRELL,J.E.		25.Jun.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K74361	Pte.	FAST,D.G.		18.Jun.44 - 14.Jun.45	W.2.Sep.44
K65051	Pte.	FAST,W.O.		1.May.44 - 2.Jan.45	

OTHER RANKS

Regt. No.	Final Seaforth Rank	Name	Service with Seaforths	Casualties
K602741	Pte.	FAVERO,A.E.	15.Apr.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K54018	Pte.	FAY,L.M.	30.Nov.41 - 24.Aug.42	
K53308	Pte.	FAYERS,F.J.	7.Nov.41 - 17.Feb.45	
U2021	Pte.	FEDRICK,F.W.	30.Apr.43 - 10.Dec.43	W.10.Dec.43
M60452	A/L/Cpl.	FEENSTRA,T.	3.Aug.43 - 31.May.44	W.6.Dec.43;KIA 31.May.44
K52701	Pte.	FEILBERG,H.F.	23.Sep.39 - 5.May.43	
K606733	Pte.	FELCHLE,V.H.	15.Apr.45 - 22.Aug.45	
K52911	Pte.	FELL,K.B.	11.May.40 - 18.Nov.41	
K80015	Pte.	FELL, L.	11.May.40 - 29.May.40	
K9158	Pte.	FELTIS,A.H.	7.Jun.45 - 16.Jun.45	
M105712	Pte.	FENSKE,J.F.	1.May.44 - 19.Jul.45	W.15.Jan.45
K65268	L/Cpl.	FERGIE,A.L.	30.Apr.43 - 16.Jul.45	W.14.Jul.43;W.26.Aug.44
K53763	Pte.	FERGUSON,A.W.	12.Mar.42 - 7.May.45	W.7.Apr.44
K16529	Pte.	FERGUSON, C.F.	5.Feb.44 - 23.May. 44	POW 23.May.44 SAFE IN U.K. 19.May.45
M38876	Pte.	FERGUSON,D.	25.May.44 - 18.Oct.44	W.18.Oct.44
K53802	Pte.	FERGUSON,J.T.	26.Jun.42 - 21.Jul.43	KIA 21.Jul.43
B119245	Pte.	FERGUSON,L.C.	15.Nov.44 - 12.Apr.45	W.12.Apr.45
K53274	Pte.	FERGUSON,T.	22.Jun.40 - 28.Jul.40	
K2543	Pte.	FERGUSSON,G.R.	20.Feb.45 - 18.Jul.45	
K53256	Pte.	FERNANDEZ,B.F.	15.Dec.41 - 16.Jan.44	W.16.Jan.44
K76246	Pte.	FERRIER,J.N.	1.Nov.44 - 14.Dec.44	W.14.Dec.44
K52948	Pte.	FERRIER,W.A.	11.May.40 - 17.Feb.45	INJURED 17.Feb.45
A104830	Pte.	FERRIS,G.R.	28.May.44 - 18.Jul.45	
M106673	Pte.	FESSLER,C.J.	9.Feb.44 - 18.Jul.45	
L84697	L/Cpl.	FETSCH,J.P.	17.Oct.43 - 18.Jul.45	W.26.Dec.43;W.8.Feb.44
K29146	Pte.	FIELD,H.E.	1.Dec.39 - 5.May.43	
K4168	Pte.	FIELD,W.M.	29.Jun.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K53219	Pte.	FIELDHOUSE,R.E.	14.Nov.41 - 10.Jul.43	KIA 10.Jul.43
K4131	Pte.	FIELDING,L.G.	7.Jun.45 - 25.Sep.45	W.26.Aug.44
M106475	Pte.	FIKE,L.G.	5.Feb.44 -13.Oct.44	
K4895	Pte.	FILLMORE,K.L.	15.Apr.45 - 19.Jul.45	
L74447	Pte.	FILLO,A.S.	1.Nov.44 - 10.Apr.45	
K37030	Pte.	FINCH,J.A.	24.Nov.39 - 29.Feb.40	
K43528	L/Cpl.	FINER,A.R.	29.Apr.43 - 25.Sep.45	W.8.Oct.43
M106677	Pte.	FINLAN,J.A.	25.Jan.44 - 25.Sep.45	W.18.Sep.44
K52882	Sgt.	FINLEY,J.C.	27.Nov.39 - 4.May.45	
K4038	Pte.	FINNAMORE,L.D.C.	20.Feb.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K3507	Pte.	FINSTAD,C.A.	7.Jun.45 - 19.Jul.45	
K604717	Pte.	FISHER,B.J.	23.Apr.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K52482	Pte.	FISHER,F.	18.Sep.39 - 26.Feb.40	
K52723	Pte.	FISHER,H.	25.Sep.39 - 16.Apr.40	
K37054	Pte.	FISHER,S.G.	1.Dec.39 - 25.May.44	KIA 25.May.44
K52887	Pte.	FITTERMAN,H.E.	27.Nov.39 - 5.Dec.39	
K73854	Cpl.	FITZGERALD,B.E.	17.Nov.43 - 26.Dec.43	KIA 26.Dec.43
K15959	Pte.	FITZPATRICK,R.A.	16.Jul.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K4452	Pte.	FITZPATRICK,S.	28.Oct.44 - 25.Sep.45	
M8786	Pte.	FLATT,M.H.	25.Dec.44 - 18.Jul.45	
K70999	L/Cpl.	FLEMING,R.A.	17.Jul.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K52906	A/L/Cpl.	FLEMING,S.	11.May.40 - 27.Aug.40	
K4788	Pte.	FLETCHER,E.M.	13.Apr.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K40109	Pte.	FLETCHER,G.F.	18.Feb.44 - 12.Feb.45	W.23.May.44
K42936	Pte.	FLETCHER, H.B.	22.Jul.43 - 8.Aug.45	
L101576	Pte.	FLETT, D.J.R.	13.Aug.43 - 3.Sept.45	
K52114	Sgt.	FLETT, R.L.	11.Sept.39 - 31.May.45	W.29.Jul.43
M107675	Pte.	FLETT, W.H.	27.Dec. 43 - 23.May.44	POW 23.May.44 SAFE IN U.K. 19.May.45
K43509	Pte.	FLINDALL, R.	4.Jun. 43 - 23.May.44	KIA 23.May.44
K52021	Pte.	FLOCKHART, A.	6.Sept.39 - 10.Jul. 42	
M7192	Pte.	FLORENTINE, H.	1.Sept.43 - 12.Apr. 44	W.12.Apr.44
M102307	Pte.	FLYNN, B.D.	21.May.43 - 14.Jun. 45	
K53135	Pte.	FLYNN, H.	11.May.40 - 24.Nov.40	
M107161	Pte.	FLYNN,P.J.	27.Dec.43 - 23.May.44	POW 23.May.44; SAFE IN U.K.10.May.45
L154086	A/Cpl.	FOLK,M.	23.Apr.43 - 13.Feb.44	W.7.Aug.43;KIA 13.Feb.44
K50666	Pte.	FOLKA,F.J.	23.Jan.44 - 26.May.44	
K3548	Pte.	FONTAINE,R.E.	7.May.45 - 21.Jun.45	
K53531	Pte.	FOOTTIT ,G.	14.Nov.41 - 23.Jun.45	
H7224	Pte.	FORD,F.J.	13.Aug.43 - 25.Sep.45	W.26.Dec.43;W.17.Sep.44
K52405	Pte.	FORDHAM,L.G.	16.Sep.39 - 17.Aug.43	
K66584	Pte.	FOREMAN,R.L.	22.Dec.43 - 4.Jan.45	W.28.Dec.43;W.20.May.44; W.4.Jan.45;DoW.24.Feb.45

OTHER RANKS

Regt. No.	Final Seaforth Rank	Name		Service with Seaforths	Casualties
K1277	Pte.	FOREMAN,R.W.		20.Feb.45 - 18.Jul.45	
B135894	Pte.	FORGETT,R.		22.Dec.43 - 20.Sep.44	KIA 20.Sept.44
K52113	Pte.	FORREST,D.A.		12.Sep.39 - 10.Sep.43	W.9.Dec.43
K52984	Cpl.	FORREST,P.		11.May.40 - 4.Mar.42	
K21029	Pte.	FORRESTER,J.G.		5.May.43 - 29.Dec.43	KIA 29.Dec.43
K52115	Pte.	FORRESTER,R.		11.Sep.39 - 19.Jun.44	W.17.Jul.43
K52851	Pte.	FORSBECK,N.C.		3.Oct.39 - 2.May.44	
K53879	A/Sgt.	FORSEN,I.		30.Nov.41 - 17.Sep.44	W.17.Sep.44
K53057	Pte.	FORSYTH, D.J.		3.Aug.45 - 16.Sept.45	
K53287	Pte.	FORSYTH,D.W.		27,Dec.41 - 13.Jul.43	W.10.Jul.43
K4862	Pte.	FORSYTH,H.W.		15.Apr.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K52096	Pte.	FORSYTH,I.G.		11.Sep.39 - 12.Nov.40	
K76474	Pte.	FORTIER,E.		25.Dec.44 - 25.Sep.45	W.11.Apr.45
K52618	Pte.	FORTIN,P.E.		20.Sep.39 - 8.Feb.43	
K53794	Pte.	FOSTER,A.		30.Nov.41 - 31.May.45	
K53477	Pte.	FOSTER,C.H.		10.Apr.42 - 24.Apr.42	
K52049	CQMS	FOSTER,G.E.		11.Sep.39 - 18.Jan.41	
K53160	Pte.	FOSTER,R.E.		1.Nov.40 - 19.Jan.43	
B143641	Pte.	FOSTER,R.G.		27,Dec.43 - 8.May.45	
K52444	Cpl.	FOSTER,T.		16.Sep.39 - 31.May.45	
K52287	Pte.	FOSTER,T.L.		14.Sep.39 - 5.Apr.40	
K52788	Pte.	FOSTER,W.A.		28.Sep.39 - 20.Nov.39	
K4099	L/Cpl.	FOSTER,W.C.		18.Dec.44 - 18.Jul.45	
B66905	Pte.	FOWLER,H.O.		20.Jul.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K99594	Pte.	FOX,A.W.		7.Jun.45 - 9.Sep.45	
B70410	Pte.	FOX,A.B.		27.Dec.43 - 18.Jul.45	
C123605	Pte.	FOX,E.E.		15.Nov.44 - 14.Dec.44	W.14.Dec.44
K48693	Pte.	FOXCROFT,H.A.		20.Sep.44 - 18.Jan.45	
K53488	Pte.	FRAME,J.L.		31.Nov.41 - 19.Jun.42	
K52112	A/Sgt.	FRANCIS,A.		11.Sep.39 - 4.May.45	
L66352	L/Cpl.	FRANCIS. J.A.		19.Feb.44 - 18.Jul.45	W.30.Mar.44
D71904	Pte.	FRANK,H.		30.Dec.43 - 18.Jan.44	
K249	Pte.	FRANKLIN,F.T.		7.Jun.45 - 29.Aug.45	W.13.Apr.45
K53297	Cpl.	FRANKLIN,H.		30.Apr.43 - 19.Sep.45	
G4593	Pte.	FRASER,A.D.		27,Dec.43 - 15.Dec.44	
K52564	Pte.	FRASER,D.		19.Sep.39 - 18.Nov.39	
M106663	Cpl.	FRASER,F.L.		27.Dec.43 - 25.Sep.45	
M106662	Pte.	FRASER,G.H.		27.Dec.43 - 14.Apr.44	W.14.Apr.44
K604507	Pte.	FRASER,G.C.		7.Jun.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K13179	Pte.	FRASER,J.A.		29.Jun.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K52117	Pte.	FRASER,R.T.		11.Sep.39 - 29.May.40	
K52799	Pte.	FRASER,Robert C.		28.Sep.39 - 17.Mar.42	
F562	Pte.	FRASER,R.A.		22.Feb.45 - 23.Feb.45	
K51785	Pte.	FRASER,T.W.		6.May.44 - 23.May.44	KIA 23.May.44
K53595	Pte.	FRASER,W.C.		31.Oct.41 - 30.Oct.43	
L372	Pte.	FRAZER,W.C.		18.Dec.44 - 23.Jan.45	W.23.Jan.45
K16350	Pte.	FRECHETTE,A.		21.May.45 - 25.Sep.45	W.1.Aug.44
K50446	Pte.	FREDERICK,A.E.		23.Jan.44 - 23.May.44	KIA 23.May.44
K57790	Pte.	FREELAND-CARD,A.J.		31.Dec.43 - 16.Apr.44	W.16.Apr.44
K53555	Sgt.	FREEMAN, P.M.		8.Nov.40 - 3.Jun.45	W.5.Apr.44;W.19.Feb.45
K53191	A/Cpl.	FRENCH,A.	MiD	23.Oct.40 - 24.Apr.45	W.16.Sep.44;KIA 24.Apr.45
K52663	Pte.	FREW,G.		22.Sep.39 - 18.Nov.41	
B42127	Pte.	FREY,N.		27.Dec.43 - 22.Jan.44	
D82925	Pte.	FRIED,C.M.		3.Aug.43 - 7.Apr.44	KIA 23.May.44
K606135	Pte.	FRIEDRICKS,W.		15.Apr.45 - 25.Sep.45	
M107273	Pte.	FRIESEN,A.		27.Dec.43 - 4.Feb.44	W.4.Feb.44
L108159	Pte.	FRIESEN,P.		20.Feb.45 - 14.Apr.45	
M106488	Pte.	FRIEZE,H.R.		26.May.44 - 31.May.44	INJURED 1.Jun.44
M107420	Pte.	FRIGON,R.C.		27,Dec.43 - 28.Sep.44	
K50103	Pte.	FROCKLAGE,A.L.		27.Dec.43 - 25.Sep.45	W.23.May.44
K604449	Pte.	FROESE,P.		15.Apr.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K53412	Pte.	FROLANDER,H.L.F.		8.Nov.40 - 27.Aug.44	
K42445	Pte.	FROLEK,R.		17.Oct.43 - 25.Sep.45	W.23.May.44;W.31.Aug.44
K52509	Pte.	FROME,A.		19.Sep.39 - 22.Jun.40	
B93664	Pte.	FULLER,G.E.		6.Jun.44 - 21.Oct.44	
D93677	Pte.	FULLER,R.O.H.		1.Aug.40 - 28.Jul.41	DIED 6.Dec.41
M105864	Pte.	FULMEK,J.		27.Dec.43 - 4.May.44	
K53181	Pte.	FULTON,W.E.		27.Dec.40 - 1.Sep.43	
K601676	Pte.	FUOCO,J.J.		16.May.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K52174	Pte.	FURLONG, G.W.	MiD	12.Sep.39 - 8.Mar.43	
A105130	Pte.	FURLONG,L.M.		27.Dec.43 - 17.Dec.44	

OTHER RANKS

Regt. No.	Final Seaforth Rank	Name	Service with Seaforths	Casualties
M12439	Pte.	FURNISS,A.	22.Dec.43 - 14.Dec.44	
K604288	Pte.	GADBOIS,G.E.	15.Apr.45 - 25.Sep.45	
C120652	Pte.	GAGNON,W.R.	27.Dec.43 - 27.Jan.44	W.7.Jan.44;DoW 28.Jan.44
B143789	Pte.	GAIRNS,R.M.	27.Dec.43 - 29.Jan.44	
K606218	Pte.	GALICZ,V.	29.Jun.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K604178	Pte.	GALLA,K.	29.Jun.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K53586	Pte.	GALLAGHER,D.J.	12.Dec.41 - 18.Sep.44	W.25.Dec.43;W.17.Sep.44
K53556	Pte.	GALLAGHER,H.G.	1.Nov.40 - 7.Jan.43	
K3853	Pte.	GALLAGHER,L.J.	23.Apr.45 - 6.Jun.45	
C103160	Pte.	GALLIGAN,F.A.	27.Dec.43 - 4.Feb.44	W.4.Feb.44; DROWNED 24.Aug.44
K52066	Pte.	GALLOWAY,L.R.	9.Sep.39 - 14.Jan.45	
K6749	Pte.	GALLOWAY,W.H.	12.May.45 - 21.Jun.45	
K53236	Pte.	GAMBA,L.P.	16.Oct.40 - 23.May.44	W.23.May.44;DoW 23.May.44
E52660	Pte.	GANJOLOUSKI,A.	3.Aug.43 - 6.Oct.43	KIA 6.Oct.43
K602397	Pte.	GARAY,M.	15.Apr.45 - 25.Sep.45	
M11243	Pte.	GARDINER,A.	25.Jul.43 - 23.Aug.43	
K53116	Pte.	GARDINER,G.F.	11.May.40 - 12.May.44	
K52110	P/L/Cpl.	GARDNER,L.M.	11.Sep.39 - 21.Jul.40	
K22028	Cpl.	GARNETT,C.A.F.	23.May.44 - 31.May.44	
H17393	Sgt.	GARRIOCH,B.C.	1.Sep.43 - 25.Sep.45	
M12250	Pte.	GARTH,H.W.	31.Dec.43 - 25.May.44	W.25.May.44
M16524	Pte.	GARVIE,C.H.	10.Nov.43 - 3.Dec.43	
M8541	Pte.	GASCON,E.P.	1.Sep.44 - 14.Jun.45	W.20.Sep.44;W.11.Jan.45
K42988	Cpl.	GASPARD,L.P.	22.Jul.43 - 22.Oct.44	W.26.Aug.44
K50773	Pte.	GAUDREAU,L.D.J.	27.Dec.43 - 23.May.44	W.23.May.44
K53489	Pte.	GAUTHIER,P.R.	25.Jan.45 - 22.Feb.45	INJURED 22.Feb.45
F55754	Pte.	GAUVIN,E.R.	27.Dec.43 - 7.Feb.44	KIA 7 Feb.44
K67643	Pte.	GAWNE,C.C.	4.Sep.42 - 15.Sep.42	
K75134	Pte.	GAWNE,H.K.	24.Jul.42 - 18.May.44	W.5.Aug.43
K76814	Pte.	GEARY,D.	13.Nov.42 - 23.May.44	POW 23.May.44; SAFE IN U.K.April 45
D155567	Pte.	GEARY,M.	18.Dec.44 - 18.Jul.45	
B135644	Pte.	GEDRASIK,W.	12.Aug.44 - 23.Oct.44	W.21.Apr.44;KIA.23.Oct.44
M103955	Pte.	GELIASSEN,O.B.	25.May.44 - 4.Jan.45	W.17.Sep.44;W.13.Dec.44; W.4.Jan.45
L64578	Pte.	GENAILLE,D.	5.Feb.44 - 12.Feb.45	W.23.May.44
M102526	Pte.	GENDREAU,R.E.	22.Dec.43 - 15.Dec.44	W.15.Dec.44
B143554	Pte.	GENDRON,J.R.	27.Dec.43 - 23.May.44	POW 23.May.44; SAFE IN U.K.19.May.45
M104880	Pte.	GEROW,A.B.	27.Dec.43 - 18.Jul.45	W.23.May.44
B9008	A/Cpl.	GERTZBEIN,A.	12.Aug.44 - 11.Apr.45	W.11.Apr.45
M16914	Pte.	GIALET,E.F.	10.Nov.43 - 20.Jan.44	
K98252	Cpl.	GIBBONS,B.W.	26.Jul.45 - 9.Sep.45	
K53720	Pte.	GIBERSON,G.T.	30.Nov.41 - 11.Jul.42	
K53603	Pte.	GIBSON,F.	25.Apr.41 - 17.Jan.45	W.17.Jan.45
M107212	Pte.	GIBSON,F.H.	18.Mar.44 - 23.May.44	POW 23.May.44; SAFE IN U.K.10.May.45
K52102	Pte.	GIBSON,J.	11.Sep.39 - 20.Apr.42	
K52026	A/CSM	GIBSON,J.	7.Sep.39 - 26.Feb.44	
K52018	Sgt.	GIBSON,J.G.	6.Sep.39 - 31.Dec.40	
K11333	Sgt.	GIBSON,K.J.	5.Jul.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K6617	Pte.	GIBSON.W.	17 May.45 - 21.Jun.45	
M107355	Pte.	GIGUIRE,J.A.	14.May.44 - 23.May.44	POW 23.May.44; DIED WHILST POW 1.May.45
K52551	Cpl.	GILBERT,J.	19.Sep.39 - 21.Feb.44	
K42783	Pte.	GILBERT,M.E.	13.Aug.43 - 9.Dec.43	WOUNDED 9.Dec.43
L74394	Pte.	GILBERTSON,R.	15.Nov.44 - 18.Jul.45	
K53018	Pte.	GILCHRIST,J.	11.May.40 - 29.May.40	
K37031	Pte.	GILES,F.B.	24.Nov.39 - 29.May.40	
K54015	Pte.	GILES,R.	1.May.42 - 19.Jul.42	
B52396	Pte.	GILES,R.H.	21.Sep.44 - 16.Sep.45	
K16506	Pte.	GILL,G.J.	27.Dec.43 - 22.Jan.44	W.22.Jan44;DoW.22.Jan.44
B157766	Pte.	GILLARD,W.G.	1.Sep.44 - 15.Dec.44	W.20.Sep.44
K70352	Pte.	GILLEN,E.W.	26.Jun.42 - 17.Oct.44	W.17.Oct.44;W.27.Dec.44
M103571	Pte.	GILLESPIE,G.W.	30.Apr.43 - 13.Jul.43	W.10.Jul.43
K69749	Pte.	GILLESPIE,W.V.	23.Jan.44 - 23.May.44	W.23.May.44
K52462	Pte.	GILLIS,W.F.	18.Sep.39 - 20.Nov.39	
D71915	Pte.	GILMORE,G.S.	22.Dec.43 - 12.Jul.45	W.27.Dec.43
K52156	Pte.	GILMORE,R.G.	12.Sep.39 - 25.Dec.43	W.7.Oct.43;KIA.25.Dec.43

OTHER RANKS

Regt. No.	Final Seaforth Rank	Name	Service with Seaforths	Casualties
K602109	Pte.	GILMORE,R.L.	2.Jun.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K53573	Pte.	GILMOUR,J.	2.May.41 - 21.Dec.41	
K3196	Pte.	GINGELL,L.E.	7.Jun.45 - 16.Jun.45	
D135201	Pte.	GINGELL,R.G.	18.Dec.44 - 12.Apr.45	W.21.Apr.45
K37032	Pte.	GINN,A.F.	24.Nov.39 - 4.Feb.40	
B144028	Pte.	GIPSON,W.I.	27.Dec.43 - 18.Sep.44	KIA 18.Sep.44
H8212	Pte.	GIRARDIN,E.L.	27.Dec.43 - 23.May.44	KIA 23.May.44
K52122	Cpl.	GIRAUD,B.T.	11.Sep.39 - 5.Aug.43	W.5.Aug.43
K52568	Sgt.	GIRLING,W.A.	19.Sep.39 - 11.Feb.45	
K49298	Pte.	GIRODAY,M.J.	28.Oct.40 - 11.Jan.45	W.21.Dec.44
M102405	Pte.	GIRVAN,A.C.	3.Aug.43 - 29.Mar.44	
K52731	Pte.	GIVEN,N.A.	25.Sep.39 - 25.Apr.40	
M106619	Pte.	GLADSTONE,G.L.	27.Dec.43 - 18.Jul.45	INJURED 23.May.44
K53596	Pte.	GLASGOW,F.W.	17.Jul.42 - 12.Dec.43	W.12.Dec.43
B157021	Pte.	GLENN,G.J.	1.Sep.44 - 17.Sep.44	W.17.Sep.44
K48393	Sgt.	GLENNIE,J.D.	5.Jan.44 - 6.Jun.45	
B155873	Pte.	GLOGOWSKI,J.	14.Feb.45 - 18.Jul.45	
M107011	Pte.	GLOVER,E.J.	27,Dec.43 - 18.Jul.45	W.16.Jan.45
K50681	Pte.	GLOVER,.G.R.	27.Dec.43 - 23.May.44	W.23.May.44;DoW.24.May.44
K52009	Pte.	GODBY,L.A.	11.Sep.39 - 12.Dec.39	
K68963	Pte.	GODSON,R.E.	11.Feb.44 - 12.Apr.44	KIA 12.Apr.44
K16315	Pte.	GOERTZEN,I.W.	5.Feb.44 - 24.May.44	W.23.May.44;DoW.27.May.44
K69856	Pte.	GOETJEN,R.V.	22.Dec.43 - 17.Sep.44	KIA 17.Sep.44
K3467	Pte.	GOLAC,B.R.	28,Feb.45 - 20.Jun.45	
B124616	Pte.	GOLBY,E.	27.Dec.43 - 27.Jan.44	
K52091	A/Cpl.	GOLD.A.	11.Sep.39 - 20.Jun.40	KIA 14.Jan.44
K52949	Pte.	GOLDIE,J.H.	11.May.40 - 17.Oct.44	
K1989	Pte.	GOLDSMITH,L.D.	20.Feb.45 - 18.Jul.45	W.25.Feb.45
K45872	Pte.	GOOD,G.A.	30.Apr.43 - 26.Dec.43	KIA 26.Dec.43
K70970	Pte.	GOODELL,F.	4.Aug.42 - 13.Mar.44	W.8.Dec.43
M38468	Pte.	GOODFELLOW,R.W.R.	30.Apr.43 - 8.Jan.44	DIED 8.Jan.44
K52650	Pte.	GOODING,L.M.	21.Sep.39 - 14.Apr.43	
M1268	Pte.	GOODMAN,J.	15.Nov.44 - 18.Jul.45	
H9872	Pte.	GOODMAN,K.	26.Jun.44 - 7.Jun.45	
K53408	Pte.	GOODMAN,W.E.	8.Aug.41 - 28.May.42	
K52981	Pte.	GOODWIN,J.	22.Jun.40 - 8.Jan.42	
K4282	Pte.	GORAL,J.E.	28.Oct.44 - 25.Sep.45	
M106953	Pte.	GORDON,C.W.	27.Dec.43 - 22.Jan.44	W.22.Jan.44
K53758	A/Cpl.	GORDON,C.F.	30.Nov.41 - 18.Jul.43	KIA 18.Jul.43
D83101	Pte.	GORDON,E.	7.Aug.43 - 23.May.44	W.23.May.44;POW.23.May.44; SAFE IN U.K. 8.Jun.45
K53587	Pte.	GORDON,G.E.	8.Nov.40 - 17.May.42	
M103811	Pte.	GORDON,M.G.	27.Dec.43 - 25.Jan.44	KIA 25.Jan.44
K52611	Pte.	GORDON,W.B.	20.Sep.39 - 31.Mar.45	
K52903	Pte.	GORDON,W.T.	11.May.40 - 31.Jan.43	
B143988	Pte.	GORDON,W.M.	28.Oct.44 - 14.Dec.44	KIA 14.Dec.44
K1193	Pte.	GORE,J.	1.Sep.44 - 25.Sep.45	
K18027	Pte.	GORIUK,M.	2.May.41 - 6.Oct.43	W.21.Jul.43
K67669	Cpl.	GORMLEY,J.	17.Jul.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K52639	Sgt.	GORMLEY,T.G.	22.Sep.39 - 14.Feb.45	
K18024	Pte.	GORRIE,J.	11.May.40 - 20.Jun.40	DIED 24.Aug.40
A47614	Cpl.	GOSS,E.L.	22.Dec.43 - 26.Dec.43	W.26.Dec.43
L102228	Pte.	GOSSELIN,A.J.N.	3.Aug.43 - 18.Jan.45	
K52123	Pte.	GOUCHER,W.T.C.	11.Sep.39 - 24.Jul.43	W.19.Jul.43
M107135	Pte.	GOULDIE,J.A.	27.Dec.43 - 27.Dec.43	W.27.Dec.43
K4555	Pte.	GOWER,S.	28.Oct.44 - 25.Sep.45	
K607971	Pte.	GRABER,L.W.	15.Apr.45 - 18.Jul.45	
K53880	Pte.	GRAD,J.	26.Jun.42 - 29.Jul.43	KIA 29.Jul.43
K52688	A/Sgt.	GRAHAM,H.T.M.	23,Sep.39 - 4.May.45	W.8.Dec.43
K65358	Pte.	GRAHAM,J.W.	10.Aug.43 - 3.Sep.45	
K2461	Pte.	GRAHAM,L.H.	30.Apr.43 - 21.Jul.43	W.21.Jul.43
K4543	Pte.	GRAHAM,M.H.W.	7.Jun.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K46215	Pte.	GRAHAM,R.J.	30.Apr.43 - 20.Jul.43	W.20.Jul.43
K53006	Pte.	GRAHAM,T.E.	1.Dec.41 - 25.Sep.45	
M28730	Pte.	GRAHAM,W.E.	19.Feb.44 - 23.May.44	KIA 23.May.44
K52744	Pte.	GRAHAM, W.T.R.	26.Sept.39 - 11.Dec.39	
K42052	Cpl.	GRAHAME.J.	25.Jul.43 - 23.Jun.45	
M56232	Pte.	GRAMIAK, M.J.	30.Apr.43 - 21.Jul.43	KIA 21.Jul.43
K52426	Pte.	GRANGER,L.J.	16,Sep.39 - 3.Apr.41	
K52023	Pte.	GRANGER,W.S.	7.Sep.39 - 23.Jun.40	
K42811	L/Cpl.	GRANT, C.M.	22.Jul.43 - 19.Jun.45	W.20.Dec.43;W.11.Feb.45

OTHER RANKS

Regt. No.	Final Seaforth Rank	Name		Service with Seaforths	Casualties
K52517	Pte.	GRANT,G.D.		19.Sep.39 - 9.Dec.42	
K6752	Pte.	GRANT,G.R.		7.Jun.45 - 9.Jul.45	
K53782	A/Sgt.	GRANT,H.T.	MiD	21.May.45 - 15.Jan.45	W.4.Jul.44;W.10.Apr.45
K69750	L/Cpl.	GRANT,J.W.		27.Dec.43 - 19.Jul.45	W.24.Jun.44
K75686	Pte.	GRANT,R.J.		12.Mar.42 - 14.Jun.45	
K42330	Cpl.	GRANT,W.J.J.		1.Sep.43 - 23.Jun.45	
K52130	Pte.	GRANT,W.D.		12.Sep.39 - 23.Oct.44	W.23.Oct.44
E52740	Pte.	GRATTON,R.P.E.		25.Jul.43 - 30.May.45	
K3852	Pte.	GRAVES,E.A.		7.May.45 - 29.Jul.45	
K50120	Pte.	GRAY,D.R.		29.Jun.45 - 17.Sep.45	W.14.Dec.44
H18119	Pte.	GRAY,L.D.		15.Nov.44 - 19.Jul.45	
K49074	L/Cpl.	GRAY,T.G.H.		1.Sep.44 - 25.Sep.45	
K3701	Pte.	GRAYSTON,K.R.		7.Jun.45 - 19.Jul.45	
K52967	Pte.	GREEN,G.L.		11.May.40 - 27.Sep.40	
C123351	Pte.	GREEN,O.J.		15.Nov.44 - 21.Jun.45	
M104919	Pte.	GREEN,V.L.		6.Jun.44 - 14.Dec.44	KIA 14.Dec.44
K53179	Sgt.	GREENGRASS,R.		27.Dec.40 - 23.Oct.44	W.23.Oct.44
K38638	Pte.	GREENHOUGH, H.B.		28,Aug.42 - 22.Jul.43	W.22.Jul.43;W.27.Dec.43
K43556	Pte.	GREENLESS,R.E.		29.Apr.43 - 10.Dec.43	KIA 10.Dec.43
K53062	Pte.	GREENWELL,E.A.		5.Sep.40 - 14.May.43	
K53078	Pte.	GREENWELL,N.		15.Aug.40 - 21.Jan.45	
G1046	Pte.	GREGG,C.N.		27.Dec.43 - 22.Jan.44	KIA 22.Jan.44
K602405	Pte.	GREGG,J.		15.Apr.45 - 25.Sep.45	
M30936	Sgt.	GREGORY,H.F.		5.Feb.44 - 8.Feb.44	
K53107	Pte.	GREGORY,M.		11.May.40 - 16.Mar.44	W.15.Mar.44
K52469	Pte.	GREGSON,D.J.		19.Sep.39 - 28.Sep.39	
K8941	Pte.	GREGSON,L.H.		29.Jun.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K52470	L/Sgt.	GREIG, L.L.	BEM(Mil.Div.) MiD	18.Sep.39 - 25.Sep.45	
K52781	Pte.	GREIG, N.		27.Sep.39 - 21.Oct.39	
K58065	Pte.	GRIFFIN, A.E.		4.May.45 - 21.Jun.45	
H7039	Pte.	GRIFFIN,D.		1.Sep.43 - 8.Dec.43	W.6.Dec.43
K37059	Pte.	GRIFFIN,D.V.		1.Dec.39 - 20.Jun.40	
K16389	Pte.	GRIFFIN,T.C.		18.Mar.44 - 24.Mar.45	
K53697	Pte.	GRIFFITHS, J.E.		30,Nov.41 - 28.Feb.43	
K52251	S/Sgt.	GRIFFITHS,T.F.		14.Sep.39 - 12.May.41	
K53095	A/L/Cpl.	GRIFFITHS-JONES,P.N.M.J.		11.May.40 - 16.Apr.42	
K3730	Pte.	GRIMOLFSON,O.		15.Apr.45 - 20.Jun.45	
K49750	Pte.	GRINDER,J.E.		14.Jan.44 - 14.Dec.44	W.20.Sep.44;KIA.14.Dec.44
K49749	Pte.	GRINDER,J.J.		21.Feb.44 - 23.Feb.45	
K51130	Pte.	GRINDER,J.F.		27.Dec.43 - 14.Apr.44	W.5.Apr.44;W.14.Apr.44
K52338	Pte.	GROSART.D.M.		15.Sep.39 - 29.May.40	
K608257	Pte.	GROUNDS,H.		15.Apr.45 - 18.Jul.45	
K53283	Pte.	GROVES.C.H.E.		10.Oct.40 - 3.Oct.42	
K46845	Pte.	GROVES,J.W.G.		1.Sep.43 - 28.Dec.44	
K605675	Pte.	GRUBERT,K.		29.Jun.45 - 25.Sep.45	
B144146	Pte.	GRUENIG,E.J.		27.Dec.43 - 23.May.44	W.23.May.44
K1961	Pte.	GUENTHER,F.C.		15,Nov.44 - 12.Feb.45	
K42015	Pte.	GUERIN,W.J.		3.Dec.39 - 5.Mar.45	
K53580	Pte.	GUEST.T.	MiD	27.Dec.40 - 26.Mar.45	
K40242	Pte.	GULBRNSEN,M.		29.Nov.44 - 14.Dec.44	W.14.Dec.44
K2496	Pte.	GUNN,B.W.		15.Nov.44 - 23.Feb.45	W.16.Dec.44;W.23.Feb.45
H59591	Pte.	GUNNERSON,H.G.		23.May.44 - 21.Oct.44	W.21.Oct.44
K38669	Cpl.	GUNTER,E.E.		28,Aug.42 - 20.Dec.43	W.22.Jul.43;KIA.20.Dec.43
K6188	Pte.	GUNTER,N.V.		15.Apr.45 - 21.Jun.45	
K384	Pte.	GURNEY,K.P.		1.Sep.44 - 16.Sep.44	KIA 16.Sep.44
L84625	Pte.	GUSHULAK,B.S.		1.Sep.43 - 23.May.44	
K50530	Pte.	GUSTAFSON,K.J.	MiD	5.Feb.44 - 6.Jun.45	W.17.Oct.44
K603301	Pte.	GUWICK, T.W.		21.May.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K52491	Pte.	GUY,L.G.		18.Sep.39 - 21.Feb.43	
K52094	Pte.	GUY,N.H.		11.Sep.39 - 11.Feb.45	
K52095	Pte.	GUY,N.W.		11;Sep.39 - 12.Oct.40	
M106506	Pte.	GUYNN,C.G.		27.Dec.43 - 23.May.44	POW 23.May.44; SAFE IN U.K.10.May.45
K602705	Pte.	GYURHKOVITS, L.		17.May.45 - 25.Sep.45	
H1651	Cpl.	HACK,F.		27.Dec.43 - 25.Oct.44	
K52302	Pte.	HACKWOOD,H.J.		14.Sep.39 - 1.Feb.41	
K67553	Pte.	HADDEN,A.		28.Aug.42 - 21.Jul.43	W.21.Jul.43
M37034	Sgt.	HADDEN,D.	DCM	17.Jul.42 - 19.Jan.44	W.3.Mar.45
K52247	WO 11 CSM	HADDEN,E.		14.Sep.39 - 31.Jan.43	
K52919	Sgt.	HADDEN,G.C.		11.May.40 - 1.Aug.45	W.25.Jul.44

OTHER RANKS

Regt. No.	Final Seaforth Rank	Name		Service with Seaforths	Casualties
K48806	Pte.	HADDRELL, C.D.		31.Dec.43 - 15.Jun.45	W.1.Dec.44
K73671	Pte.	HAGGARTY,R.		8.Jan.43 - 18.Sep.45	
K75209	Pte.	HAIMES,W.J.		20.Mar.42 - 31.Aug.45	W.5.Aug.43
K76490	Pte.	HAIMES,G.G.		23.Oct.42 - 9.Dec.43	
K59520	Pte.	HAIN, D.		15.Apr.45 - 20.Jun.45	
K1699	Pte.	HALES,R.B.		17.May.45 - 29.Aug.45	
K53533	Pte.	HALEY,J.F.		7.Mar.41 - 17.Apr.42	
K62170	L/Cpl.	HALMED,B.M.		6.Aug.43 - 23.May.44	KIA 23.May.44
M392	Sgt.	HALKO,R.J.		29.Jun.45 - 24.Sep.45	
K2633	Pte.	HALL,E.R.		20.Feb.45 - 18.Jul.45	W.23.Feb.45
M35441	Pte.	HALL,G.H.		27.Dec.43 - 25.Sep.45	
K49304	Pte.	HALL,R.E.		23.Jan.44 - 23.May.44	KIA 23.May.44
K52406	Cpl.	HALL,R.D.		16.Sep.39 - 29.Apr.43	
F56754	Pte.	HALL,R.T.		27.Dec.43 - 17.Dec.44	W.17.Dec.44
K4440	Pte.	HALL,S.G.		20.Feb.45 - 19.Jul.45	
K37055	Pte.	HALL,W.P.		1.Dec.39 - 2.Aug.40	
K3954	Pte.	HALL,W.G.		23.Apr.45 - 20.Jun.45	
K2345	Pte.	HALLER,L.D.		20.Feb.45 - 18.Jul.45	
K2311	Pte.	HALLIDAY,D.C.		1.Sep.44 - 14.Dec.44	W.14.Dec.44
K69944	Pte.	HALLIDAY,J.		1.Sep.44 - 25.Sep.45	W.20.Sep.44
D142542	Pte.	HALLIWELL,A.W.		14.Feb.45 - 5.May.45	
K74749	A/Cpl.	HAMANN,H.R.		4.Dec.42 - 27.Dec.43	W.5.Aug.43;KIA 27.Dec.43
M11601	Sgt.	HAMBROOK, W.H.		1.Jul.44 - 3.Sep.44	
K42005	Pte.	HAMEL,R.C.		27.Nov.39 - 27.Jul.42	
K3528	Pte.	HAMEL-SMITH,D.H.		16.May.45 - 20.Jun.45	
K3773	Pte.	HAMELIN,G.		4.Jun.45 - 29.Jul.45	
K53589	Pte.	HAMER.J.		1.Nov.40 - 1.Jun.44	W.11.Dec.43;W.1.Jun.44
K54077	Pte.	HAMILTON,A.A.		28.Aug.42 - 24.Apr.43	
K52915	L/Cpl.	HAMILTON,D.B.		31.Oct.41 - 4.Mar.42	
K52953	Pte.	HAMILTON,G.E.		11.May.40 - 2.Nov.40	
K53881	Pte.	HAMILTON, I.W.		30.Nov.41 - 9.Apr.42	
K6209	Pte.	HAMILTON, J.T.		15.Apr.45 - 21.Jun.45	
K45462	Pte.	HAMILTON,K.I.		28.Aug.42 - 15.Dec.43	
K53151	Pte.	HAMILTON,R.		1.Nov.40 - 5.May.43	
K52730	Sgt.	HAMILTON,W.E.		26.Sep.39 - 5.Mar.45	
M35246	A/Cpl.	HAMILTON,W.		18.Mar.44 - 30.Apr.44	
K49283	Pte.	HAMILTON,W.G.		22.Dec.43 - 25.Jan.44	W.25.Jan.44
K50623	Pte.	HAMMER,E.		19.Feb.44 - 15.Dec.44	W.15.Dec.44
K63205	Pte.	HAMMOND,H.D.		7.Aug.45 - 25.Sep.45	W.6.Jun.44
K52143	Cpl.	HAMMOND, H.R.	MM	12.Sep.39 - 14.Jan.45	W.30.Jan.44
K52488	A/Cpl.	HAMMOND,L.E.		18.Sep.39 - 25.Jul.40	
K71030	Pte.	HAMMOND,P.		17.Jul42. - 25.Sep.45	
K52109	Piper	HAMON,H.		11.Sep.39 - 5.Mar.45	
K42939	Pte.	HAMPTON,H.		21.May.43 - 28.Jul.45	W.15.Dec.43
K52672	Pte.	HAND,F.J.		22.Sep.39 - 14.Jun.40	
H10256	Pte.	HANDFORD,R.M.		22.Dec.44 - 5.Jun.45	
A17116	L/Sgt.(Pte.)	HANEY,D.W.		27.Dec.43 - 13.Jan.44	
K52160	Pte.	HANINK,S.		26.Sep.39 - 20.Jun.40	
M103884	Pte.	HANKE, H.S.		1.May.43 - 2.Jun.43	DoW 13.Jul.45
M102344	Pte.	HANSON,V.A.		17.Oct.43 - 23.May.44	W.23.May.44
K54838	Pte.	HANKIN,L.		13.Jul.44 - 18.Jul.45	
K11262	Pte.	HANKINS,J.D.		28.Mar.44 - 25.Sep.45	
K66699	Pte.	HANLON, P.F.		12.May.45 - 25.Sep.45	
U2205	Pte.	HANNAH, R.H.		7.May.45 - 18.Jul.45	
L41475	Pte.	HANSON,H.		1.May.43 - 2.Jun.43	
K51566	Pte.	HANSON,H.S.		7.Jun.45 - 25.Sep.45	W.9.Jul.44
K604675	Pte.	HANSON,I.J.		15.Apr.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K6645	Pte.	HANSON,L.N.		23.Apr.45 - 14.Jun.45	
M106697	Pte.	HARASEN,G.		5.Feb.44 - 23.May.44	POW 23.May.44; SAFE IN U.K. 10.May.45
K42990	Pte.	HARASYMCHUK,J.		4.Dec.42 - 17.Sep.44	W.5.Aug.43;W.17.Sep.44; DoW 18.Sep.44
K6508	Pte.	HARDER,J.		7.Jun.45 - 9.Jul.45	
K52485	Pte.	HARDER,H.		18.Sep.39 - 11.Dec.42	
K53209	Pte.	HARDING,E.		10.Oct.40 - 23.Jun.45	W.21.Jul.43
K76955	Pte.	HARDY,E.J.		16.Aug.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K49893	Pte.	HARDY,G.E.		23.Jan.44 - 11.Apr.45	
B116937	Pte.	HARDY,R.		1.Sep.44 - 17.Sep.44	W.17.Sep.44;POW 17.Sep.44; SAFE IN U.K.15.May.45
K429	Pte.	HARGREAVES, J.E.		20.Sep.44 - 18.Jul.45	
K67099	WO 11 (CQMS)	HARKER,A.L.		29.Jan.45 - 25.Sep.45	

OTHER RANKS

Regt. No.	Final Seaforth Rank	Name		Service with Seaforths	Casualties
K40561	Pte.	HARLEY,B.J.		15.Nov.44 - 7.Feb.45	
K52410	A/Cpl.	HARMER,H.E.		16.Sep.39 - 31.May,45	
M102286	Pte.	HARNETT,G.T.		1.Sep.43 - 18.Jul.45	W.26.Dec.43
H19541	Pte.	HARNEY,O.A.		6.Jun.44 - 17.Sep.44	POW 17.Sep.44; SAFE IN U.K.15.May.45
D144280	Pte.	HARPES,L.A.	MiD	1.Nov.44 - 2.Nov.44	POW 27.Dec.44; SAFE IN U.K.15.May.45
K608760	Pte.	HARRIS,A.		15.Apr.45 - 20.Jun.45	
K52632	Pte.	HARRIS,A.K.		21.Sep.39 - 4.May.45	W.10.Dec.43
K65289	Pte.	HARRIS,A.E.		31.Dec.43 - 23.May.44	KIA 23.May.44
K67770	L/Cpl.	HARRIS,A.J.		6.Jun.44 - 23.Jun.45	W.15.Dec.44
K49963	Pte.	HARRIS,B.G.		12.May.45 - 25.Sep.45	W.21.Oct.44;W.14.Dec.44
K52272	CQMS	HARRIS,G.W.		14.Sep.39 - 11.Feb.45	
K54041	Pte.	HARRIS,H.		24.Jul.42 - 26.Aug.43	W.20.Dec.43
K40966	Pte.	HARRIS,R.C.		25.Jan.44 - 25.Sep.45	
K15920	Pte.	HARRIS,V.		14.Feb.45 - 25.Sep.45	W.24.Feb.45
K575945	Pte.	HARRISON,D.I.		7.Jun.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K53597	Pte.	HARRISON,H.K.		15.Oct.40 - 1.Sep.42	
K52763	Pte.	HART,A.H.		27.Sep.39 - 3.Oct.40	
K53445	Pte.	HART,E.		10.Oct.40 - 5.Sep.42	
K52476	Pte.	HART,T.F.		18.Sep.39 - 29.May.40	
K66885	Pte.	HARTLEY,O.I.		3.Aug.43 - 5.Aug.43	KIA 5.Aug.43
SK49782	A/Cpl.	HARVEY,M.T.		17.May.45 - 8.Jul.45	
K52487	Pte.	HARVEY,T.		18.Sep.39 - 12.Dec.39	
K50427	Pte.	HASLETT,F.G.		25.Jan.44 - 23.May.44	KIA 23.May.44
L24011	Pte.	HASSALL,P.G.		3.Aug.43 - 22.Oct.44	W.27.Dec.43;W.22.Oct.44
M10767	Pte.	HASTINGS,J.		14.May.44 - 5.Dec.44	W.31.Aug.44
K53446	Cpl.	HATHAWAY,R.K.		31.Oct.41 - 3.May.45	
K54468	Pte.	HATTON,J.		21.May.45 - 25.Sep.45	W.28.Apr.45
K8986	Pte.	HAUTALA,M.M.		29.Jun.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K52088	Pte.	HAVENMEYER,T.A.		11.Sep.39 - 3.Nov.40	DIED 7.Apr.41
K53047	A/Sgt.	HAWKINS,J.L.		11.May.40 - 14.Jun.45	
K99527	Pte.	HAWTHORNE,R.L.		13.Nov.42 - 6.Feb.43	
F20511	Pte.	HAYES,D.E.		1.Jul.44 - 14.Jun.45	W.26.Aug.44;W.23.Feb.45
K4683	Pte.	HAYES,S.G.		29.Jun.45 - 18.Jul.45	
K69164	A/Cpl.	HAZELTON,J.D.		1.Sep.44 - 25.Sep.45	
L86565	L/Cpl.	HEAD,D.W.		1.Sep.43 - 25.Feb.45	W.16.Feb.44;KIA.25.Feb.45
K52150	Sgt.	HEADLEY,C.A.		12.Sep.39 - 3.Aug.42	
A103764	Pte	HEALEY,J.L.		20.Sept.44 - 7.Feb.45	
K494	Pte.	HEALY,P.L.		27.Jun.45 - 18.Jul.45	W.24.Mar.45
K603003	Pte.	HEALY,R.L.		15.Apr.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K603372	Cpl.	HEBERT,W.A.		29.Jun.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K42789	Pte.	HEDRICK,H.J.		23.Apr.43 - 16.Jun.44	
B55646	Cpl.	HEGGIE,D.B.		19.Feb.44 - 25.Sep.45	W.24.May.44;W.11.Feb.45
M38264	Pte.	HEIMDAL,T.		1.Sep.43 - 6.Sep.44	
M106640	Pte.	HEINS,A.J.		25.Jan.44 - 18.Jul.45	
K52137	Pte.	HELIN,L.E.		12.Sep.39 - 13.Jan.42	
K51086	Pte.	HELKENBERG,J.R.D.		25.May.44 - 15.Dec.44	
K52075	S/Sgt.	HELLIWELL,A.P.		11.Sep.39 - 29.May.40	
D82842	Pte.	HENDERSON,D.		13.Aug.43 - 16.Sep.44	KIA 16.Sept.44
K70341	Sgt.	HENDERSON,E.A.		29.Jun.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K74136	Pte.	HENDERSON,G.F.A.		20.Sep.44 - 18.Oct.44	W.18.Oct.44
K42830	Pte.	HENDERSON,K.G.		22.Dec.43 - 7.Jul.45	
M103491	Pte.	HENDERSON,W.H.		3.Aug.43 - 20.Sep.44	KIA 20.Sep.44
K53130	Cpl.	HENDERSON,W.		11.May.40 - 21.Jan.45	W.14.Dec.43
K76214	Pte.	HENDRICKS,K.C.		1.May.43 - 2.Jun.43	
K606200	Pte.	HENDRICKSON,R.W.		15.Apr.45 - 9.Jul.45	
F56688	Pte.	HENDSBEE,J.L.		27.Dec.43 - 15.Aug.45	W.27.Dec.43
K50468	Sgt.	HENKE,F.D.		25.Jan.44 - 29.Jan.44	
K52436	Pte.	HENNESSY,A.M.		16.Sep.39 - 10.Dec.43	W.18.Jul.43;KIA.10.Dec.43
H100472	Pte.	HENRY,D.M.		13.Aug.43 - 18.Jul.45	W.18.Oct.43
K601279	Pte.	HENTON,J.		15.Apr.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K8767	Sgt.	HERKEL,A.J.		29.Jun.45 - 25.Sep.45	
E52615	Pte.	HERMAN,M.		22.Dec.43 - 18.Jul.45	W.26.Dec.43
K52165	Pte.	HERRON,C.H.		27.Sep.39 - 13.Mar.42	W.22.Jul.44
K53447	Pte.	HICKEY,P.L.M.		30.Nov.41 - 19.Jun.44	
K45084	Pte.	HICKMAN,G.K.		12.May.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K52145	Cpl.	HICKMAN,T.E.		12.Sep.39 - 19.Oct.44	W.16.Jul.43;W.19.Oct.44
K52782	Pte.	HENRY,K.C.		27.Sep.39 - 29.May.40	
K37726	Pte.	HEPWORTH,F.		15.Apr.45 - 25.Sep.45	
D82444	Pte.	HEWSON, P.		10.Aug.43 - 27.Jul.45	

OTHER RANKS

Regt. No.	Final Seaforth Rank	Name		Service with Seaforths	Casualties
K52367	Pte.	HICKS,A.A.		15.Sep.39 - 9.Feb.43	
K53196	Pte.	HICKS,J.F.		8.Nov.40 - 30.Jun.42	
K53005	Sgt.	HICKS, W.J.		11.May.40 - 19.Jan.44	
K53045	Pte.	HIGGINBOTTOM, E.P.		11.May.40 - 19.Jun.42	
K53454	Pte.	HIGGINS, C.T.		12.Nov.40 - 27.Dec.40	
K210	Pte.	HIGGINS,W.J.		15.Nov.44 - 19.Feb.45	
K49132	Pte.	HILL,A.J.		28.Mar.44 - 25.Sep.45	
K52310	Cpl.	HILL,A.F.		14.Sep.39 - 31.Jan.43	
K62172	Pte.	HILL,D.		22.Jul.43 - 8.Dec.43	POW.8.Dec.43; SAFE IN U.K. 13.May.45
K52879	Sgt.	HILL,H.		3.Jul.42 - 22.Oct.42	
K52952	Pte.	HILL,J.S.		11.May.40 - 27.Aug.44	W.5.Aug.43
K52116	Pte.	HILL,N.J.		14.Sep.39 - 30.Oct.42	
K52092	A/Cpl.	HILL,P.G.		11.Sep.39 - 10.Apr.45	W.5.Feb.43
M55782	Pte.	HILL,S.T.		28.Jun.44 - 11.Jul.44	
M7747	Pte.	HILLARY,P.H.		20.Feb.45 - 14.Apr.45	W.14.Apr.45
K15038	Cpl.	HILLIER,J.H.		27.Jun.45 - 25.Sep.45	
SK52028	CSM	HILL-KIRK,R.F.		1.Sep.39 - 28.Aug.40	
K49367	Pte.	HILLS,H.		25.Jan.44 - 23.May.44	POW 23.May.44; SAFE IN U.K.11.May.45
K52490	Pte.	HINDLE,H.		18.Sept.39 - 3.Sep.45	
K67884	Pte.	HITCHCOX,M.L.		4.Sep.42 - 12.May.43	
H19340	L/Cpl.	HITCHENS,L.J.		1.Sep.44 - 25.Sep.45	W.18.Sep.44
B134190	Pte.	HMIEL, S.		27.Dec.43 - 18.Jul.45	W.23.May.44
H18515	Pte.	HNAITH,A.		15.Nov.44 - 12.Apr.45	W.21.Feb.45;W.12.Apr.45
C5394	Pte.	HOAG,G.G.		21.Apr.44 - 22.Sep.45	
K66685	Pte.	HOAG,J.N.		1.Sep.43 - 23.May.44	W.10.Dec.43
K43559	Pte.	HOBBS, C.		22.Jul.43 - 6.Oct.43	
K52474	Pte.	HOBBS,W.		12.Sep.39 - 29.Feb.40	
K52305	Cpl.	HOBBS,W.		15.Sep.39 - 29.May.40	
M106887	Pte.	HOCHACHKA,F.		27.Dec.43 - 22.Feb.44	
K52646	Pte.	HOCKIN,J.F.		21.Sep.39 - 4.Dec.40	
F75931	Pte.	HODDER,H.		27.Dec.43 - 23.May.44	POW 23.May.44; SAFE IN U.K.13.May.45
K3984	Pte.	HODGES,A.L.		7.Jun.45 - 9.Jul.45	
K53016	Cpl.	HODGINS,H.M.		11.May.40 - 5.Feb.44	
K10173	Pte.	HODGKINSON,F.E.		5.May.43 - 9.Aug.44	DoW 9.Aug.44
K53020	Pte.	HODGSON,G.		11.May.40 - 29.Apr.43	
K50669	Pte.	HOFF,W.M.		21.Apr.44 - 23.May.44	W.23.May.44;
L74472	A/Cpl.	HOGANSON,H.L.		30.Apr.43 - 30.Aug.43	INJURED 17.Apr.44 KIA 4.Dec.44
K52622	Cpl.	HOGG,A.		21.Sep.39 - 14.Jan.45	
H101390	L/Cpl.	HOGG,G.W.		1.Sep.43 - 18.Jul.45	W.8.Dec.43
K53015	Pte.	HOGG,J.A.		22.Jun.40 - 17.Apr.42	
K88028	Pte.	HOLDEN,D.C.		23.Oct.42 - 4.Sep.44	W.10.Dec.43;W.4.Sep.44
K52480	Pte.	HOLDEN,H.J.		18.Sep.39 - 1.Oct.44	
K53566	Pte.	HOLLAND,A.B.		23.May.41 - 17.Jan.45	
K4790	Pte.	HOLLAND,L.A.		15.Apr.45 - 26.May.45	
K6698	Pte.	HOLLEY,C.H.		16.May.45 - 21.Jun.45	
K52760	Pte.	HOLLEY,R.A.E.		27.Sep.39 - 12.Dec.39	
K42323	Pte.	HOLLINGSWORTH,F.		30.Apr.43 - 28.Oct.44	W.20.Jul.43;POW.16.Feb.45; SAFE IN U.K.:5.May.45
K42326	A/L/Cpl.	HOLLINGSWORTH,J.A.		27.Nov.42 - 16.Apr.44	W.28.Jul.43;W.11.Dec.43; POW 16.Apr.44; SAFE IN U.K.11.May.45
C121347	Pte.	HOLLYWOOD,H.J.		1.Sep.44 - 17.Sep.44	KIA 17.Sep.44
K52539	Cpl.	HOLMAN,H.S.		19.Sep.39 - 5.Mar.45	W.3.May.44
K52500	Pte.	HOLMAN,J.R.		18.Sep.39 - 28.Sep.42	W.4.Oct.44
K50507	Pte.	HOLMES,C.C.		6.Jun.44 - 25.Sep.45	W.16.Sep.44
K52519	Cpl.	HOLMES,G.O.		19.Sep.39 - 26.Dec.43	W.19.Jul.43;W.26.Dec.43
D86087	Pte.	HOLMES,H.R.		6.Jun.44 - 12.Feb.45	
K3267	Pte.	HOLMES,H.G.		17.May.45 - 18.Jul.45	
H8540	Pte.	HOLMES, J.A.		25.May.44 - 17.Sept.44	KIA 17.Sept.44
M10583	Pte.	HOLMES,L.C.		3.Aug.43 - 19.Sep.43	
K602140	Pte.	HOLSWORTH,F.		15.Apr.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K37034	Pte.	HOMINICK,N.		24.Nov.39 - 16.Oct.41	
M103490	Pte.	HOPALUK,P.		10.Aug.43 - 4.Jan.45	W.24.Dec.43;W 4.Jan.45
K3996	Pte.	HOPKINS,R.G.		12.May.45 - 21.Jun.45	
K52439	Pte.	HOPPING,W.A.		16.Sep.39 - 6.Sep.44	
K53341	Cpl.	HORAN,G.F.	MM	1.Nov.40 - 22.Apr.44	
K52510	Pte.	HORNE,H.A.		19.Sep.39 - 2.Apr.40	

OTHER RANKS

Regt. No.	Final Seaforth Rank	Name		Service with Seaforths	Casualties
K52538	Pte.	HORSWILL,E.A.C.		19.Sep.39 - 29.May.40	
K37035	Pte.	HORTON,R.E.		24.Nov.39 - 10.Nov.40	
A105010	Pte.	HORTOP,J.W.		22.Dec.43 - 11.Feb.45	W.11.Feb.45
K53000	Pte.	HORWOOD,E.H.		22.Jun.40 - 29.Jun.40	
K52842	Pte.	HOSLER,W.		2.Oct.39 - 8.Oct.42	
K52621	Pte.	HOSSACK,R.A.		20.Sep.39 - 23.Jun.45	
B70325	Cpl.	HOUGH,A.I.		27.Dec.43 - 19.Dec.44	W.21.Jan.44;W.17.Dec.44
K54514	Pte.	HOUGHTON,R.F.		12.Aug.44 - 21.Jan.45	W.4.Sept.44
K53156	Pte.	HOURIE,D.A.		16.Jan.42 - 26.Apr.43	W.9.Aug.44;POW.9.Aug.44; SAFE IN U.K.4 Sep.44
D118173	L/Cpl.	HOUSE,J.		22.Dec.44 - 7.Jun.45	W.19.Feb.45
K54056	Pte.	HOUSTON,S.G.T.		28.Aug.42 - 23.May.44	W.23.May.44
K52492	Pte.	HOWARD,R.C.		18.Sep.39 - 26.Sep.39	
K3360	Pte.	HOWARTH,F.H.		17.May.45 - 6.Jun.45	
K53178	Sgt.	HOWE,G.A.		17.May.45 - 28.Jul.45	
K52087	CQMS	Howe,H.C.	MM	11.Sep.39 - 12.Dec.39	
K48798	Pte.	HOWELL,R.G.		21.May.45 - 25.Sep.45	W.17.Oct.44
M12409	Pte.	HOYLE,L.T.		1.Sep.43 - 25.Jan.44	W.6.Dec.43
M103169	Pte.	HRUDEY,M.		1.May.43 - 2.Jun.43	
K52392	Pte.	HUBBARD,S.P.		29.Sep.39 - 8.May.43	
L107085	Pte.	HUBER,H.C.		15.Nov.44 - 25.Sep.45	
K53407	Pte.	HUDSON,C.S.		8.May.42 - 7.Jul.45	
U2055	Pte.	HUDSON,H.A.		22.Dec.43 - 17.Sep.44	W.23.Jan.44;W.27.Feb.44; KIA 17.Sep.44
A37739	Pte.	HUGHES,H.J.		27.Dec.43 - 22.Oct.44	W.5.Jan.44;KIA.22.Oct.44
K69028	L/Cpl.	HUGHES,H.R.		22.Dec.43 - 13.Feb.45	W.24.May.44
K606154	Pte.	HUGHES,J.P.		15.Apr.45 - 25.Sep.45	
D135870	A/Cpl.	HUGHES,R.		10.Aug.43 - 19.Jan.44	W.9.Jul.44
K74682	Pte.	HUGHES,T.		29.Jun.45 - 15.Aug.45	
K52575	CQMS	HUGHES,T.R.		19.Sep.39 - 15.Dec.43	
M106993	Pte.	HUGHES,W.D.		9.Feb.44 - 25.Sep.45	
K52120	Pte.	HULME,E.A.		11.Sep.39 - 31.Jan.43	W.11.Sep.44
M51543	Pte.	HUME,W.F.		18.Dec.44 - 25.Sep.45	
K42417	Pte.	HUML, J.T.		4.Dec.42 - 25.Sep.45	W.10.Jul.43
K30057	Cpl.	HUMPHREYS,A.A.A.		29.Jun.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K53088	Pte.	HUMPHREYS,D.G.		22.Jun.40 - 8.Sep.42	
M55517	Pte.	HUNT,L.J.		20.Sep.44 - 5.Jun.45	W.24.Feb.45
K42526	Cpl.	HUNT, W.A.		6.Aug.45 - 25.Sept.45	W.22.Sept.44
K52563	Cpl.	HUNTER, A.B.		19.Sept.39 - 12.Apr.43	
K46821	Pte.	HUNTER, G.T.		1.May.43 - 24.Jun.43	
K53768	Pte.	HUNTER,G.F.		18.Oct.41 - 18.Mar.42	
K52248	Cpl.	HUNTER,L.E.		14.Sep.39 - 25.Sep.45	
K50414	Pte.	HUNTER,N.A.		25.Jan.44 - 9.Apr.44	
K52527	Pte.	HUNTER,R.H.		19.Sep.39 - 10.Jul.43	KIA 10.Jul.43
K52438	Pte.	HUNTLEY,L.A.		16.Sep.39 - 19.Jul.42	DIED 19.Jul.42
K57433	A/Cpl.	HURFORD,J.R.		16.Feb.44 - 22.Mar.44	
K7206	Pte.	HURREN,F.F.		7.Jun.45 - 18.Jul.45	
L86860	Pte.	HUTCHINSON,J.A.		1.Sep.43 - 20.May.44	
K53235	Sgt.	HUTCHINSON,K.G.		1.Nov.40 - 17.Sep.44	KIA 17.Sep.44
K37036	Pte.	HUTTON,H.R.H.		24.Nov.39 - 19.Aug.43	
K52479	Pte.	HYDE,G.G.		18.Sep.39 - 2.Oct.39	
K52802	Pte.	HYRA,J.		29.Sep.39 - 28.Dec.43	W.28.Dec.43
K38613	Pte.	INGHRAN,E.		1.Sep.43 - 15.Jan.44	
K52412	A/Cpl.	INGLIS,A.R.		16.Sep.39 - 25.Nov.42	
K92381	Pte.	INGLIS,D.N.		7.Apr.45 - 6.Jun.45	
K53936	Pte.	INGLIS,E.R.		27.Dec.41 - 17.Nov.42	
M16812	Pte.	INGLIS,L.		8.Aug.40 - 16.May.44	
K52335	Pte.	INGRAM,C.N.		15.Sep.39 - 14.Nov.41	
K52595	Pte.	INGRAM,H.J.		26.Aug.39 - 30.Sep.39	
K52336	Pte.	INGRAM,L.C.		15.Sep.39 - 1.Nov.40	
K52512	Pte.	INGRAM,R.H.		19.Sep.39 - 7.Dec.39	
K68816	Sgt.	IRONMONGER,G.		3.Aug.43 - 25.Sep.45	W.23.May.44;W.17.Sep.44
K53049	Pte.	IRVEN,C.J.		11.May.40 - 28.Feb.43	
K53347	Pte.	IRVEN,M.A.		23.Jan.42 - 9.Nov.43	
K62237	Pte.	IRVINE,W.		22.Dec.43 - 23.Jul.44	W.27.Dec.43
K65683	Pte,	IRVING,G.		3.Aug.43 - 26.Dec.43	W.26.Dec.43
K57118	Sgt.	IRVING,S.W.		14.May.44 - 23.May.44	POW.23.May.44; SAFE IN U.K. 23.May.45
L35039	Bdr.	IRWIN, G.T.		26.Mar.43 - 21.Aug.43	
L86833	Sgt.	IRWIN,W.G.		17.Oct.43 - 23.Oct.44	W.23.Oct.44;DoW.23.Oct.44
M28637	Pte.	ISAAK,L.		22.Jul.43 - 15.Feb.45	W.8.Oct.43;W.17.Sep.44

OTHER RANKS

Regt. No.	Final Seaforth Rank	Name	Service with Seaforths	Casualties
K52780	Pte.	ISHERWOOD,A.	27.Sep.39 - 5.Mar.45	
K2354	Pte.	IUS,E.J.	28.Oct.44 - 18.Jun.45	
K52394	Pte.	IVANY,A.L.	20.Sep.39 - 29.Apr.43	
K52784	A/Cpl.	JACK,D.	28.Sep.39 - 30.Jun.40	
K50264	Pte.	JACKETT,M.W.	15.Nov.44 - 11.Dec.44	
K57036	Sgt.	JACKSON,F.E.M.	13.Aug.43 - 23.Dec.43	W.23.Dec.43
K52998	Pte.	JACKSON, G.D.	12.Sep.40 - 9.Sep.45	
K52414	Pte.	JACKSON,J.	16.Sep.39 - 20.Jun.40	
K50081	Pte.	JACKSON,L.T.	25.Jan.44 - 25.Jan.44	POW.25.Jan.44; SAFE IN U.K.10.May.45
K605718	Pte.	JACKSON,M.L.	15.Apr.45 - 14.Jun.45	
K52135	Pte.	JACKSON,R.H.	12.Sep.39 - 11.Feb.45	
K52873	Pte.	JACKSON,W.A.	1.Nov.40 - 23.Jun.45	
K4746	Pte.	JACKSON,W.M.	7.Jun.45 - 19.Jul.45	
K53303	Pte.	JACOBS,J.C.	27.Nov.42 - 11.Jan.43	
K70158	Pte.	JACOBSEN,E.S.	15.Apr.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K50421	Cpl.	JACOBSEN,P.F.	31.Dec.43 - 23.Oct.44	W.23.May.44;POW.23.Oct.44; SAFE IN U.K.15.May.45
K6310	Pte.	JACOBSON,R.A.	23.Apr.45 - 31.Jun.45	
C65052	Cpl.	JAMES,B.N.	5.Jan.44 - 25.Sep.45	
K37037	Pte.	JAMES,F.E.	28.Nov.39 - 12.Oct.43	
K37080	Pte.	JAMES,R.W.	1.Dec.39 - 10.Oct.43	
K52719	Pte.	JAMES, V.	25.Sept. 39 - 10.Oct.39	
K52727	Pte.	JAMES,W.F.	25.Sep.39 - 21.Oct.39	
K52521	Pte.	JAMESON,J.B.	19.Sep.39 - 10.Oct.40	
K602147	Pte.	JAMIESON,G.E.	15.Apr.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K52819	Pte.	JANES,J.S.G.	29.Sep.39 - 11.Nov.40	
K69888	Cpl.	JANS,W.E.	25.May.44 - 18.Jul.45	
M36448	Pte.	JANVIER,L.	22.Dec.43 - 4.May.44	
M53028	Pte.	JARVIE,A.S.	30.Dec.43 - 1.Sep.44	KIA 1.Sep.44
K46225	Pte.	JARVIS,W.J.	30.Apr.43 - 12.Apr.44	KIA 12.Apr.44
C40220	Pte.	JEAN-LOUIS,E.C.	14.Feb.45 - 23.Jun.45	
K4301	Pte.	JEATT,J.R.	14.Feb.45 - 20.Jun.45	
H36863	Pte.	JEFFARES, J.	1.Sep.44 - 4.Oct.44	
K608812	Pte.	JEFFERY,G.H.	15.Apr.45 - 18.Jul.45	
K42436	Pte.	JEFFREY,W.R.	11.Dec.42 - 25.Sep.45	
K69322	Pte.	JEFFS,R.C.	20.Feb.44 - 25.Sep.45	
L154033	Cpl.	JELINSKI,E.A.	23.Apr.43 - 18.Jul.45	W.5.Aug.43;W.14.Dec.43
K601689	Pte.	JENKINS,F.M.	25.Jun.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K53360	Cpl.	JENKINS,R.E.	25.Apr.41 - 17.Nov.44	W.7.Oct.43;W.17.Sep.44
K53063	Pte.	JENNER,W.	27.Mar.42 - 31.May.45	
K575927	Pte.	JENNINGS,D.F.	15.Apr.45 - 25.Sep.45	
D117121	Pte.	JENSEN,J.N.	14.Jul.45 - 3.Sep.45	
K604243	Pte.	JEROME,T.G.	29.Jun.45 - 25.Sep.45	
M101876	Pte.	JESKE,E.	30.Apr.43 - 19.Jul.43	W.19.Jul.43
K52495	Pte.	JESS,W.	18.Sep.39 - 29.May.40	
F52082	Pte.	JEWERS,W.D.	27.Dec.43 - 29.Aug.44	W.25.Sep.44
K42918	Pte.	JOHANNESEN,T.	15.Apr.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K53832	Pte.	JOHANSON,A.J.	30.Nov.41 - 27.Jul.44	
K609091	Pte.	JOHNSON,A.L.	23.Apr.45 - 20.Jun.45	
M53104	Pte.	JOHNSON,C.	30.Apr.43 - 19.Jul.43	W.18.Jul.43;KIA.26.Aug.44
K75380	Pte.	JOHNSON,C.W.	20.Sep.44 - 26.Apr.45	
K53717	Pte.	JOHNSON,C.M.	30.Nov.41 - 3.Dec.44	W.23.May.44;W.17.Oct.44
C37865	Pte.	JOHNSON,C.A.	1.Nov.44 - 11.Feb.45	W.11.Feb.45
K53221	Pte.	JOHNSON, E.V.	22.Jun.40 - 8.Jul.40	
K53092	A/L/Cpl.	JOHNSON,G.H.	11.May.40 - 9.Dec.43	KIA 9.Dec.43
K607050	Pte.	JOHNSON,G.M.	17.May.45 - 18.Jul.45	
L91609	Pte.	JOHNSON,H.J.	18.Dec.44 - 25.Sep.45	W.31.Dec.44
H20425	Pte.	JOHNSON,Herbert J.	17.Oct.43 - 23.May.44	W.28.Apr.44;KIA.23.May.44
A22563	Cpl.	JOHNSON,J.A.	27.Dec.43 - 31.May.44	W.8.Feb.44;W.31.May.44
K43535	Pte.	JOHNSON,L.C.	11.Dec.42 - 5.Jan.45	
K6350	Pte.	JOHNSON,L.E.	17.May.45 - 21.Jun.45	
M102471	Pte.	JOHNSON,L.L.	3.Aug.43 - 20.Dec.43	W.20.Dec.43
K2003	Pte.	JOHNSON,L.C.	15.Apr.45 - 18.Jul.45	
K2266	Pte.	JOHNSON,M.C.	29.Nov.44 - 2.Sep.45	
L107883	Pte.	JOHNSON,H.R.	15.Nov.44 - 14.Dec.44	W.14.Dec.44
K37038	Pte.	JOHNSON,O.	24.Nov.39 - 4.Feb.40	
K68609	Pte.	JOHNSON,R.H.	1.Sep.43 - 22.May.44	POW 22.May.44; SAFE IN U.K. 9.May.45
K52671	Pte.	JOHNSON,R.J.	22.Sep.39 - 15.Jul.40	

OTHER RANKS

Regt. No.	Final Seaforth Rank	Name		Service with Seaforths	Casualties
A117593	Pte.	JOHNSON,S.		19.Jul.45 - 31.Jul.45	W.13.Apr.45
M31586	A/L/Cpl.	JOHNSON,V.G.		1.Sep.43 - 11.Dec.43	KIA 11.Dec.43
K16427	Pte.	JOHNSON,W.H.		7.Jun.45 - 15.Jul.45	W.17.Sep.44
K50989	Cpl.	JOHNSTON,H.A.		25.May.44 - 25.Sep.45	W.4.Sep.44
K68547	Pte.	JOHNSTON,H.		28.Aug.42 - 25.Sept.45	W.20.Dec.43;
L106222	Pte.	JOHNSTON,J.H.		19.Feb.44 - 18.Oct.44	W.24.May.44;W.18.Oct.44
K2573	Pte.	JOHNSTON,J.R.		15.Nov.44 - 9.Dec.44	W.9.Dec.44
K52139	A/Cpl.	JOHNSTON,K.K.		12.Sep.39 - 24.Jun.45	
K40971	Pte.	JOHNSTON,N.		21.May.45 - 25.Sep.45	W.8.Mar.45
A76168	Pte.	JOHNSTON,R.B.		27.Dec.43 - 22.Jan.45	INJURED 23.Jan.45
K52381	Pte.	JOHNSTON,R.G.		15.Sep.39 - 20.Nov.39	
K52670	Pte.	JOHNSTON,S.E.R.		22.Sep.39 - 14.Feb.40	
K52136	Pte.	JOHNSTONE,A.E.		12.Sep.39 - 27.Jan.42	
K52173	Pte.	JOHNSTONE,E.G.		12.Sep.39 - 5.Mar.45	
K54047	Pte.	JOHNSTONE,J.G.		30.Apr.43 - 23.Sep.43	
K6598	Pte.	JOHNSTONE,L.W.		17.May.45 - 21.Jun.45	
K98156	Pte.	JOHNSTONE,R.W.		28.Aug.42 - 15.Jul.45	W.22.Oct.44; INJURED 22.Feb.45
K52912	Pte.	JOHNSTONE,R.M.		15.Jul.40 - 23.May.44	POW 23.May.44; SAFE IN U.K.22.Apr.45
K52934	Pte.	JOHNSTONE,S.L.		22.Jun.40 - 29.Dec.42	W.13.Sep.44
K52125	Pte.	JOHNSTONE,W.S.		12.Sep.39 - 8.Jan.42	
F39635	Pte.	JOLLIMORE, H.G.		27.Dec.43 - 23.May.44	POW 23.May.44; SAFE IN U.K.17.May.45
L103542	Pte.	JONES,C.A.		25.May.44 - 5.Jun.45	
K52897	CQMS	JONES,Charles A.		22.Jun.40 - 15.Jul.44	
K53871	A/L/Sgt.	JONES,D.R.		2.Oct.42 - 28.Jul.45	
K52876	Pte.	JONES,E.G.		10.Oct.40 - 13.Jan.42	DIED 1.Aug.43
K605095	Pte.	JONES,H.C.		17.May.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K54823	Pte.	JONES,R.R.		17.May.45 - 29.Aug.45	
H60043	Pte.	JONES,R.O.		28.Feb.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K59535	Pte.	JONES.T.		25.Jun.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K52854	Pte.	JORDAN,J.J.		3.Oct.39 - 14.Feb.40	
M104033	Pte.	JORDON,C.		1.Sep.43 - 22.Jan.45	
K53176	Pte.	JORDON,H.		25.Apr.41 - 17.Dec.43	KIA 17.Dec.43
H67341	Pte.	JOSEPH,G.		22.Dec.44 - 18.Jul.45	
K1493	Pte.	JOSEPH,S.		1.Sep.44 - 13.Feb.45	W.13.Feb.45
K1556	Pte.	JOYCE,F.H.		21.May.45 - 18.Jul.45	
K37912	Pte.	JUDD,G.		30.Apr.43 - 19.Nov.43	
K52823	Cpl.	JUDSON,H.		2.Oct.39 - 22.Apr.43	
K2487	Pte.	KAART,K.		15.Apr.45 - 18.Jul.45	
K54698	Pte.	KACER,G.F.		13.Sep.44 - 14.Jun.45	W.20.Sep.44
K69461	Pte.	KADENIUK,W.	MM	31.Dec.43 - 17.Sept.44	W.24.May.44;KIA.17.Sep.44
K608684	Pte.	KAHUT,P.		15.Apr.45 - 14.Jun.45	
K53409	Pte.	KAIN,J.J.		15.Aug.40 - 13.Dec.43	W.13.Dec.43
B157072	Pte.	KALAPOS,S.		1.Sep.44 - 17.Sep.44	
K52906	Sgt.	KALINAUSKAS,J.		3.Aug.43 - 25.Sep.45	W.14.Dec.44
K65038	Pte.	KALUSIK,L.F.		30.Apr.43 - 9.Sep.45	W.8.Oct.43
K75232	Pte.	KAMBICK, W.R.		21.May.45 - 25.Sep.45	
M103539	Pte.	KANDT,R.		10.Aug.43 - 5.Oct.43	W.5.Oct.43
K602158	Pte.	KARDOS,M.J.		17.May.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K606750	Pte.	KARTNER, K.		7.Jun.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K51347	Pte.	KATASONOFF,T.		25.May.44 - 25.Sep.45	
L66616	Pte.	KAWCHUK,J.P.		1.May.43 - 2.Jun.43	
K71115	Cpl.	KAY,C.F.		25.Dec.44 - 25.Sep.45	W.21.May.44;W.15.Aug.44
K59525	Pte.	KAY,J.W.		17.May.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K46738	Pte.	KAY,L.G.		20.Nov.42 - 19.Jul.43	W.19.Jul.43
K52580	P/L/Cpl.	KAY,N.		20.Sep.39 - 20.Jun.40	
K52691	Pte.	KAZMER,J.		23.Sep.39 - 6.Oct.39	
D83219	Pte.	KEAN,W.S.		10.Aug.43 - 5.Oct.43	
H102996	Pte.	KEAYS,M.W.		30.May.44 - 25.Sept.45	
F919	Pte.	KEEFE,M.		13.Mar.42 - 28.Mar.42	
K69175	Pte.	KEENAN,J.M.		26.May.44 - 17.Jun.44	
K52486	Pte.	KEITH,J.S.		18.Sep.39 - 19.Jun.44	
K53727	Pte.	KELLAWAY,A.		4.Jun.45 - 25.Sep.45	W.17.Apr.45
K602694	Pte.	KELLER,T.P.		17.May.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K42017	Pte.	KELLY,D.T.		3.Dec.39 - 25.Sep.45	
K4606	Pte.	KELLY,E.R.		17.May.45 - 25.Sep.45	
L105180	Pte.	KELLY,G.W.		25.May.44 - 18.Jul.45	W.16.Sep.44
K52572	Sgt.	KELLY,J.T.		19.Sep.39 - 11.Sep.40	
L9857	Pte.	KELLY,L.G.		27.Dec.43 - 18.Feb.44	

OTHER RANKS

Regt. No.	Final Seaforth Rank	Name		Service with Seaforths	Casualties
M57085	Pte.	KELLY,M.		19.Feb.44 - 24.May.44	
D82243	Pte.	KELLY,W.		10.Aug.43 - 12.Dec.43	
K57131	Pte.	KELMAN,A.D.		25.Jul.43 - 27.Aug.43	
H60485	Pte.	KELMURY,F.C.		18.Dec.44 - 6.Feb.45	
H602440	Pte.	KELSALL,J.B.		23.Apr.45 - 22.Aug.45	
K54066	Cpl.	KELTON,R.P.		3.Aug.43 - 26.Aug.44	W.4.Feb.44;W.26.Aug.44
K3903	Pte.	KEMP,W.R.B.		17.May.45 - 21.Jun.45	
K57523	Pte.	KENMARE,H.		22.Jul.43 - 1.Dec.43	
K52560	Cpl.	KENNEDY,G.M.		19.Sep.39 - 31.May.45	W.19.Jul.43
K37107	Cpl.	KENNEDY,J.P.	Bronze Lion	5.Jan.44 - 25.Sep.45	
K4732	Pte.	KENNEDY,R.G.		20.Feb.45 - 18.Sep.45	
K53604	Pte.	KENNEY,L.		10.Oct.41 - 20.Nov.42	
K52720	Pte.	KEOGH,F.J.		25.Sep.39 - 21.Oct.39	
K37039	Pte.	KER,W.J.C.		24.Nov.39 - 4.Feb.40	
L104939	L/Cpl.	KERR,A.		6.May.44 - 18.Jul.45	
L105893	Pte.	KERR,E.L.		25.May.44 - 16.Dec.44	W.16.Dec.44;DoW.16.Dec.44
L100395	Pte.	KERR,J.I.		6.Jan.44 - 4.May.44	
K52535	Pte.	KERR,J.M.		19.Sep.39 - 28.Jun.40	
K42016	Cpl.	KERSHAW,W.T.		3.Dec.39 - 30.Jan.41	W.24.Dec.44
K52177	A/Sgt.	KERVIN,J.E.		12.Sep.39 - 14.Jan.45	
K53072	Pte.	KEYES,J.W.		11.May.40 - 31.May.45	
K53367	A/L/Cpl.	KEYES,J.F.		1.Nov.40 - 10.Sep.42	KIA 5.Dec.43
K53460	Pte.	KIBBE,N.R.		8.Aug.41 - 18.Aug.42	
K607277	Pte.	KIELO, J.W.		17.May.45 - 18.Jul.45	
B64854	Pte.	KIELY,J.M.		26.May.44 - 17.Sep.44	POW.17.Sep.44; SAFE IN U.K. 3.May.45
B143819	Pte.	KILBEY,G.A.		27.Dec.43 - 23.May.44	POW 23.May.44; SAFE IN U.K.11.May.45
A3614	A/L/Cpl.	KILBY,C.A.		25.Nov.41 - 15.Aug.43	
K68661	Pte.	KILBY,F.H.		7.Jun.45 - 16.Sep.45	W.18.Sep.44
K49082	Pte.	KILOH, A.J.		25.Jan.44 - 21.Dec.44	W.21.Dec.44
K69832	Pte.	KINDRED,E.L.		25.Jan.44 - 23.Feb.44	W.23.Feb.44
A37845	Pte.	KING,A.E.		22.Dec.43 - 27.Oct.44	
K53211	Pte.	KING,Arthur E.		4.Apr.41 - 28.Dec.43	W.10.Jul.43;KIA.28.Dec.43
K52022	A/L/Cpl.	KING,L.W.		6.Sep.39 - 10.Dec.43	KIA 10.Dec.43
M28863	Pte.	KING,N.C.		25.Jan.45 - 16.Sep.45	
K53598	A/Cpl.	KING,R.D.B.		21.Mar.41 - 23.Jul.43	W.21.Jul.43;DoW 23.Jul.43
K51230	Cpl.	KING,W.		20.Sep.44 - 15.Sep.45	
K42336	Pte.	KING,Wm.		21.Dec.43 - 28.Jul.45	
G32349	Pte.	KING,W.E.		21.Jul.45 - 22.Sep.45	W.23.Apr.45
K52576	Pte.	KINNEAR,J.		20.Sep.39 - 25.Sep.45	W.19.Jul.43
K52132	L/Cpl.	KINNEAR,W.M.		12.Sep.39 - 31.Mar.45	
K602442	Pte.	KINNISTON,R.M.		29.Jun.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K52231	Pte.	KINNUNEN,E.E.		13.Sep.39 - 14.May.42	
B157989	Pte.	KIRK,D.E.		1.Sep.44 - 17.Sep.44	W.17.Sep.44
K53427	Pte.	KIRKBY,T.J.		5.May.43 - 31.May.45	
M35531	Pte.	KIRKPATRICK,A.		12.Aug.44 - 22.Oct.44	W.17.Nov.43
K603251	Pte.	KIRSCHNER,A.R.		17.May.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K52610	L/Sgt.	KIRTON,P.A.		20.Sep.39 - 23.Nov.39	
M103635	Pte.	KISINGER,E.H.		1.May.43 - 2.Jun.43	
H101292	Pte.	KITCHEN,E.		1.May.43 - 2.Jun.43	
K1279	Pte.	KLASSEN,J.		10.Jul.45 - 29.Aug.45	W.8.Mar.45
K37061	L/Cpl.	KLASSEN,P.H.		1.Dec.39 - 28.Apr.44	W.20.Jul.43
K66489	Sgt.	KLEIN,W.L.		4.Jun.45 - 25.Sep.45	W.4.Jun.44
K2767	Pte.	KLINE,J.		23.Apr.45 - 20.Jun.45	
K57688	Pte.	KLINGER,G.		25.Jul.43 - 9.Sep.45	W.27.Jul.43
K13170	Pte.	KNABKE,F.W.		23.Apr.45 - 21.Jun.45	
K29095	L/Cpl.	KNEUSS,G.E.		11.May.40 - 23.Jun.45	W.12.Apr.45
K66038	L/Cpl.	KNEZACEK,G.J.		4.Jun.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K16464	Pte.	KNIGHT,W.A.		27.Dec.43 - 21.Jan.44	KIA 21.Jan.44
K53257	Pte.	KNODEL,H.		19.Sep.41 - 27.Jul.42	
K51396	A/Cpl.	KNOTTS,W.E.		25.May.44 - 17.Sep.44	W.17.Sep.44
L10551	L/Cpl.	KNUDSEN,A.R.		18.Dec.44 - 18.Jul.45	
D77465	Pte.	KOBELT,J.H.		11.Jan.45 - 18.Jul.45	W.12.Jan.45
M36323	Pte.	KODAK,F.E.		29.Jun.45 - 3.Sep.45	
K74906	Pte.	KOLESAR,S.		10.Jul.45 - 2.Sep.45	
H63056	Pte.	KOROTASH,N.		20.Jan.44 - 19.Jun.44 9.Jul.44 - 9.Sep.45	
K603655	Pte.	KORSAK,A.P.		29.Jun.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K604395	Pte.	KOSHIL,R.		29.Jun.45 - 3.Sep.45	
K607190	Pte.	KOSOVIC, G.		17.May.45 - 18.Jul.45	
L108804	Pte.	KOSTIUK,W.		20.Feb.45 - 21.Jun.45	
B70336	L/Cpl.	KOTOVICH,J.		27.Dec.43 - 20.Sep.44	INJURED 10.May.44 W.20.Sep.44

OTHER RANKS

Regt. No.	Final Seaforth Rank	Name		Service with Seaforths	Casualties
A76037	Cpl.	KRAFCHEK,S.S.		27.Dec.43 - 9.Jan.44	
H11091	Pte.	KRAICHY,N.		20.Feb.45 - 13.Apr.45	W.13.Apr.45
U1582	Pte.	KREM,W.F.		12.Sep.41 - 7.Dec.41	
K50305	Pte.	KRIEGER,W.E.		17.May.45 - 25.Sep.45	
M16292	Pte.	KRIKKEN,J.		10.Nov.43 - 15.Mar.44	
K67830	Cpl.	KRUGER,J.		28.Aug.42 - 25.Sep.45	W.6.Dec.43;W.15.Feb.45
K607041	Pte.	KUSISTO,H.V.		13.Apr.45 - 18.Jul.45	
K50575	Pte.	KUZMA.P.		27.Dec.43 - 31.Jan.44	W.31.Jan.44
K52152	Pte.	KYLE,J.C.		12.Sep.39 - 7.Oct.44	
M102643	Pte.	KYLE,W.E.		1.May.43 - 2.Jun.43	
K52455	Sgt.	KYTE,G.W.		16.Sep.39 - 31.Jan.43	
K52184	S/Sgt.	LABARGE,A.		12.Sep.39 - 2.Jun.42	
K604321	Pte.	LABONTE,O.R.		29.Jun.45 - 25.Sep.45	
H9095	Pte.	LABOSSIERE, R.L.		6.Jun.44 - 17.Sep.44	POW 17.Sep.44; SAFE IN U.K. 11.May.45
K52012	A/Cpl.	LABRIE,P.C.		6.Sep.39 - 28.Jul.43	W.28.Jul.43
K47355	Pte.	LACOUR,P.		4.Dec.42 - 21.Jul.43	W.21.Jul.43
K42556	Sgt.	LADISCLAUS,J.		18.Dec.42 - 25.Sep.45	INJURED 18.Sep.44
M102545	Pte.	LADICEUR,W.O.	MiD	30.Apr.43 - 22.Oct.44	W.6.Dec.43;W.24.May.44; W.22.Oct.44
M105705	Pte.	LAFLEUR,S.N.		5.Feb.44 - 23.May.44	W.23.May.44
K9203	Pte.	LAING,G.A.		4.Jun.45 - 25.Sep.45	
L102801	Pte.	LAING,R.D.		18.Dec.44 - 18.Jul.45	
D86032	Pte.	LAING,W.		1.Sep.43 - 26.Dec.43	KIA 26.Dec.43
K52629	Pte.	LAIRD,D.T.M.		20.Sep.39 - 28.Sep.39	
K52840	L/Cpl.	LAIRD,G.D.		2.Oct.39 - 23.Nov.39	W.3.Jun.44
K52380	A/Cpl.	LAIRD,W.E.		16.Sep.39 - 23.Nov.39	
K53583	Pte.	LALIBERTY,P.		23.Oct.40 - 2.Nov.40	
K52168	Sgt.	LALOGE,E.J.	DCM,MM	12.Sep.39 - 5.Apr.43	
K52749	L/Cpl.	LAMB,A.D.		26.Sep.39 - 29.May.40	
K73848	Pte.	LAMB,G.L.		17.Jul.42 - 8.Nov.43	
K51269	Pte.	LAMB,R.G.		6.May.44 - 25.Sep.45	W.31.Aug.44
K53988	Cpl.	LAMBO,H.C.		12.Jun.42 - 29.Nov.43	
K548546	Pte.	LAMBRIGHT,C.E.		17.May.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K52816	Pte.	LAMBRIGHT,I.L.		29.Sep.39 - 9.Dec.42	KIA 14.Feb.45
K42006	L/Cpl.	LAMOUREUX,H.A.		27.Nov.39 - 19.Jun.42	
M103997	Pte.	LAMY,A.J.		3.Aug.43 - 17.Dec.43	KIA 17.Dec.43
K74377	Pte.	LANDRY,M.E.		1.Sep.43 - 26.Dec.43	KIA 26.Dec.43
K46991	Pte.	LANE,W.		26.May.44 - 28.May.45	
K9202	Pte.	LANEGRAFF,R.C.		4.Jun.45 - 16.Jun.45	
K323	Pte.	LANGEVIN,T.E.J.		7.Jun.45 - 29.Jul.45	W.12.Oct.44
K18046	Pte.	LANGHORN,A.H.		28.Aug.42 - 9.Dec.43	W.9.Dec.43
K9303	Pte.	LANGHORN,E.C.		7.Jun.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K49820	Pte.	LANGHORN,W.J.		25.Jan.44 - 23.May.44	
K52603	Sgt.	LANGLOIS,J.J.		20.Sep.39 - 23.Nov.39	
K53536	CSM	LANGSTAFF,T.W.		21.Feb.41 - 5.May.43	
K52454	Cpl.	LANNIGAN,W.E.		16.Sep.39 - 24.Dec.42	
D125154	Pte.	LAPIERRE,J.C.		3.Aug.43 - 26.Dec.43	W.26.Dec.43
L106859	Pte.	LARANCE,C.A.		13.Sep.44 - 16.Sep.44	W.16.Sep.44;DoW.16.Sep.44
K52477	Pte.	LARKINS,G.R.		18.Sep.39 - 21.Jun.40	
H19610	Sgt.	LAROCQUE,H.A.		17.Oct.43 - 3.May.45	W.17.Oct.44
K53140	Pte.	LAROCQUE,R.		10.Oct.40 - 27.Dec.43	KIA 27.Dec.43
K52153	Pte.	LARSEN,H.		12.Sep.39 - 25.Jul.43	W.21.Jul.43
K71091	Pte.	LARSEN,S.		17.Oct.43 - 6.Mar.45	
K68559	Pte.	LARSON,G.O.		28.Jul.45 - 25.Sep.45	
L103692	Pte.	LARSON,H.		25.May.44 - 25.Sep.45	W.12.Feb.45
M103047	Pte.	LARSON,H.W.		30.Apr.43 - 23.May.44	KIA 23.May.44
M50876	A/Cpl.	LARSON,P.A.		20.Sep.44 - 24.Feb.45	KIA 24.Feb.45
H20554	Pte.	LARSON,W.A.		6.Jun.42 - 7.Aug.43	W.7.Aug.43
K606709	Pte.	LARTER,P.G.		7.Apr.45 - 25.Sep.45	
C65110	L/Cpl.	LARUE, R.B.		22.Dec.43 - 23.May.44	KIA 23.May.44
K76929	Pte.	LAST,W.R.		28.Aug.42 - 27.Jul.43	W.27.Jul.43
K52393	Pte.	LASTUCKA,G.		20.Sep.39 - 29.May.40	
K53574	A/Cpl.	LATTIMER,R.		17.Jul.42 - 25.Sep.45	
K69993	Pte.	LAUGHREN,M.S.		27.Dec.43 - 13.Feb.44	KIA 13.Feb.44
L64202	Pte.	LAURIE,J.A.		1.Sep.43 - 12.Dec.43	
K6974	Pte.	LASKY,M.A.J.		5.Jun.45 - 9.Jul.45	
K52141	Pte.	LAURILLARD,W.M.		12.Sep.39 - 29.May.40	
K51353	Pte.	LAURSEN,A.C.		30.May.44 - 20.Sep.44	W.31.May.44
D125043	Pte.	LAVIGNE,E.J.		11.Jan.45 - 18.Feb.45	KIA 18.Feb.45
K51974	Pte.	LAVINEWAY,B.G.		23.May.44 - 17.Sep.44	W.17.Sep.44

OTHER RANKS

Regt. No.	Final Seaforth Rank	Name		Service with Seaforths	Casualties
K3864	Pte.	LAVOIE,J.R.		15.Apr.45 - 9.Jul.45	
K52986	Pte.	LAVOIE,S.J.		11.May.40 - 21.Jun.40	
K52155	Pte.	LAW,A.D.		12.Sep.39 - 29.May.40	
K53174	A/Cpl.	LAW,W.		4.Jul.41 - 4.May.45	W.19.Jul.43
K52183	Pte.	LAWLEY,J.H.G.		12.Sep.39 - 23.Nov.39	
M15924	Pte.	LAWRENCE,J.H.		6.Jul.44 - 28.Aug.44	W.28.Aug.44
K6734	Pte.	LAWRENCE,J.R.		7.Jun.45 - 18.Jul.45	
K53814	Pte.	LAWRENCE,S.H.		30.Nov.41 - 23.Apr.43	
K52463	Pte.	LAWRIE,J.R.		18.Sep.39 - 31.Oct.39	
K52773	A/S/Sgt.	LAWSON,J.B.		27.Sep.39 - 29.May.40	
G4614	Pte.	LAWTON,G.H.		27.Dec.43 - 26.Aug.44	W.26.Aug.44
K67654	Pte.	LAWTON,L.		28.Aug.42 - 7.Aug.44	W.7.Aug.44,DoW.7.Aug.44
K52395	WO 11 (CSM)	LAY,H.		20.Sep.39 - 21.Oct.44	INJURED 21.Oct.44
G27170	Pte.	LAYE,H.R.		15.Dec.41 - 18.Apr.42	
K7266	Pte.	LAZZAROTTO,R.J.R.		7.Jun.45 - 18.Jul.45	
K52532	P/A/Cpl.	LEADBETTER,R.S.		19.Sep.39 - 21.Mar.40	
L105029	Pte.	LEAS,E.A.		1.Sep.44 - 17.Sep.44	W.17.Sep.44
K40209	Pte.	LEATHERDALE,A.C.		18.Dec.44 - 25.Sep.45	W.7.Jun.44
K37060	L/Cpl.	LEBANS,R.M.		1.Dec.39 - 15.Dec.44	W.4.Aug.43;W.15.Dec.44
K53193	Pte.	LEBEAU,R.G.		2.May.41 - 25.Dec.43	W.31.Jul.43;KIA.25.Dec.43
G28474	Pte.	LEBLANC,A.		6.Jan.44 - 3.Apr.44	
K50420	Pte.	LEBLANC,B.		27.Dec.43 - 23.May.44	KIA 23.May.44
F64792	Pte.	LEBLANC,E.		1.May.43 - 2.Jun.43	W.25.Jul.44;DoW.26.Jul.44
G52260	Pte.	LEBLANC,L.		27.Dec.43 - 16.Aug.44	W.11.Dec.44
H200208	Pte.	LECLAIR,C.H.		1.Sep.43 - 20.Jan.44	
K52857	Sgt.	LECLAIR,F.		5.Oct.39 - 17.Oct.44	KIA 17.Oct.44
K50695	L/Cpl.	LECLAIR,R.J.		30.May.44 - 25.Sep.45	W.31.May.44;W.16.Dec.44
K52427	Pte.	LECLECH, J.		16.Sep.39 - 29.Sep.39	
A50405	Pte.	LEDIET,P.H.		12.Aug.44 - 26.Aug.44	INJURED 26.Aug.44; DoI 27.Aug.44
B117300	Pte.	LEDUC,L.		18.Dec.44 - 12.Apr.45	W.12.Apr.45
K42018	Pte.	LEE,C.R.		2.Dec.39 - 15.Jan.42	W.17.Sep.44
H8952	Pte.	LEE,D.J.D.		18.Dec.44 - 25.Sep.45	
H103484	Pte.	LEE,E.N.		20.Sep.44 - 18.Jul.45	
H11201	Pte.	LEE,J.		6.Jan.44 - 23.Mar.44	INJURED 30.Apr.44
K50667	Pte.	LEE,R.B.		25.Jan.44 - 4.Feb.44	W.4.Feb.44
K2524	Pte.	LEE,R.J.		4.Jun.45 - 15.Jul.45	
K62240	Sgt.	LEEDAM,C.L.		1.Sep.43 - 26.Dec.43	KIA 26.Dec.43
K62241	Pte.	LEEDAM,C.J.		1.Sep.43 - 3.Nov.43	
L102522	Pte.	LEESON, A.		6.Jun.44 - 18.Jul.45	
B157759	Pte.	LEGACY,W.D.		1.Sep.44 - 6.Jan.45	
K52171	Pte.	LEGGAT,M.H.		12.Sep.39 - 29.Feb.40	
K52877	A/Cpl.	LEHBAUER,J.M.		12.Aug.40 - 4.Mar.42	
D86158	Pte.	LEITH,S.H.A.		1.Sep.43 - 6.Oct.43	KIA 6.Oct.43
K2635	Pte.	Le LIEVRE,G.L.		17.May.45 - 20.Jun.45	
H18884	Pte.	LELOND,L.T.		20.Feb.45 - 12.Apr.45	KIA 12.Apr.45
K52579	Pte.	LEMARCHANT,R.		20.Sep.39 - 5.Nov.41	
K606675	Pte.	LEMON,W.E.O.		17.May.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K42803	Pte.	LENOIRE,L.G.		30.Apr.43 - 14.Dec.43	W.26.Jul.43;W.14.Dec.43
K71003	Pte.	LEON,C.		26.Jun.42 - 21.Jul.43	KIA 21.Jul.43
K52606	L/Sgt.	LEON,R.P.	MiD	20.Sep.39 - 11.Feb.45	W.22.Oct.44
K52642	Pte.	LEONARD,J.		21.Sep.39 - 20.Jun.40	
B86954	Pte.	LEONARD,K.C.		18.Apr.44 - 3.Sep.45	W.22.Feb.44
H7107	Pte.	LEROUX,E.		1.Sep.44 - 18.Jul.45	W.11.Sep.44;W.12.Apr.45
K53141	Pte.	LESIEUR,E.		11.May.40 - 7.May.45	
K16438	Pte.	LESLIE,C.O.		27.Dec.43 - 29.Jan.44	KIA 29.Jan.44
K53277	Pte.	LESLIE,J.J.		1.Nov.40 - 12.Apr.42	
K68866	Pte.	LESLIE,W.H.		19.Feb.44 - 25.Sep.45	
K53227	Pte.	LESTER,J.H.		11.May.40 - 28.Nov.42	
K50561	Pte.	LESTER,O.K.		21.Dec.44 - 25.Sep.45	W.24.Sep.44
M103846	Pte.	LEVERINGTON,R.		1.Sep.43 - 17.Dec.43	KIA 17.Dec.43
K1457	L/Cpl.	LEVESQUE,G.		1.Sep.44 - 27.Oct.44	W.15.Apr.45;DoW.15.Apr.45
L64652	Cpl.	LEVINS,D.K.		21.May.45 - 25.Sep.45	W.28.Feb.45
K54629	Pte.	LEVINSKY,J.		21.May.45 - 17.Sep.45	
K53100	Pte.	LEWENDON,R.E.		11.May.40 - 26.Dec.44	W.28.Jul.43;KIA.26.Dec.44
K37081	Pte.	LEWIS,R.		1.Dec.39 - 10.Dec.40	W.15.Dec.43
K53035	Pte.	LEWIS,R.S.		14.Jun.41 - 4.May.43	
K69817	Pte.	LEWIS,R.W.		21.May.45 - 25.Sep.45	W.31.Aug.44
K52954	Pte.	LEWIS,S.W.		26.Jun.40 - 7.Jun.43	
L104189	Pte.	LICK,E.H.		1.Sep.44 - 29.Aug.45	W.17.Oct.44
K607808	Pte.	LIDBETTER,H.G.		21.May.45 - 18.Jul.45	

OTHER RANKS

Regt. No.	Final Seaforth Rank	Name	Service with Seaforths	Casualties
K42227	Pte.	LIDDICOAT, W.A.	29.Apr.43 - 25.Sep.45	
M65783	Pte.	LIDDLE,M.W.	30.Jan.42 - 6.Dec.42	W.1.Mar.45
K52630	Pte.	LIDYARD,J.	20.Sep.39 - 26.Sep.39	
M103525	Pte.	LIKNESS,B.	1.Sep.43 - 17.Sep.45	
K53128	Pte.	LILLIE,C.A.	11.May.40 - 9.Jun.44	
M62424	Pte.	LIMPERT,J.B.	27.Jan.44 - 12.Sep.44	
K50772	Pte.	LINDAHL,H.E.	13.Apr.45 - 17.Sep.45	
H9202	Pte.	LINDAL,O.F.	6.May.44 - 14.Dec.44	W.31.Aug.44;W.22.Oct.44; W.14.Dec.44
K48726	Pte.	LINDBERG,S.U.	29.Jun.45 - 17.Sep.45	
K52396	Pte.	LINDGREN,S.E.	20.Sep.39 - 17.Sep.40	
K42019	Cpl.	LINDSAY,G.O.	2.Dec.39 - 5.Mar.45	
K51808	Pte.	LINDSAY,J.R.A.	20.Feb.45 - 25.Sept.45	
K52185	Cpl.	LINDSAY,P.M.	12.Sep.39 - 19.Mar.40	
K71097	Cpl.	LINGOR,M.	19.Jul.45 - 25.Sep.45	INJURED 18.Sep.44
K50745	Sgt.	LINN,L.C.G.	25.Jan.44 - 25.Sep.45	
K74613	Pte.	LIPSEY,F.G.	17.Jul.42 - 12.Dec.44	W.23.May.44;W.8.Dec.44; W.12.Dec.44
K52965	Pte.	LIVINGSTON,J.	11.May.40 - 23.Jun.45	
K53326	Pte.	LIVINGSTONE,A.G.	16.Oct.40 - 6.Jun.45	
K53318	Pte.	LIVINGSTONE,A.A.	20.Jun.41 - 28.Jul.43	KIA 28.Jul.43
K53056	Pte.	LLOYD,C.W.	11.May.40 - 29.May.40	
K37063	Pte.	LLOYD,R.	1.Dec.39 - 28.Jan.43	
K3828	Pte.	LLOYD,W.S.	15.Apr.45 - 9.Jul.45	
K52074	Pte.	LOBBAN,A.	11.Sep.39 - 3.Oct.40	
K52170	Pte.	LOCHEAD,J.T.	26.Sep.39 - 23.Jun.45	
B63999	Pte.	LOCHMANETZ,W.	26.Jun.44 - 17.Dec.44	POW 17.Sept.44; SAFE IN U.K. 9.May.45
K53248	Pte.	LOCKE,S.L.	27.Dec.40 - 27.Dec.40	
K3139	Pte.	LOCKERBY,H.C.	17.May.45 - 20.Jun.45	
L86713	Pte.	LOCKHART,A.C.	1.Sep.43 - 3.Feb.44	DIED AT SEA 6,Apr.44
K52169	Cpl.	LOCKWOOD,E.G.	12.Sep.39 - 4.May.45	
M31567	Pte.	LOEWEN,A.B.	10.Aug.43 - 8.Jul.45	
M11382	Pte.	LOEWEN,J.J.	1.Sep.43 - 14.Apr.44	W.14.Apr.44
K2697	Pte.	LOGAN,A.W.	28.Mar.45 - 20.Jun.45	
K50076	Cpl.	LOGAN,R.G.	9.Feb.44 - 11.Apr.45	W.9.Jan.45;W.17.Jan.45; W.14.Feb.45;KIA.11.Apr.45
M56932	Pte.	LOGUE,L.J.	25.Jul.43 - 6.Dec.43	W.6.Dec.43
K49912	Pte.	LOHN,E.A.	25.Jul.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K51998	Pte.	LONGSTAFFE.J.H.	15.Nov.44 - 31.Jan.45	
K53630	Pte.	LONSDALE'G.S.	30.Nov.41 - 1.Aug.45	
K65656	Pte.	LORENZETTO,C.	23.Apr.43 - 1.Jun.43	
D98743	A/L/Cpl.	LORIMER,R.J.	4.Dec.42 - 5.Aig.43	KIA 5.Aug.43
K52468	Pte.	LOUDEN,J.	18.Sep.39 - 25.Sep.40	
K3027	Pte.	LOUGHLEAN,E.C.	17.May.45 - 21.Jun.45	
K606621	Pte.	LOUGHRAN,R.V.	21.May.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K52554	Pte.	LOUTIT,W.A.	19.Sep.39 - 20.Jun.40	W.26.Feb.44
K52955	L/Cpl.	LOVELL,S.C.	11.May.40 - 5.May.43	
K3257	Pte.	LOW,B.D.	23.Apr.45 - 9.Jul.45	
K3568	Pte.	LOWE,A.H.	7.May.45 - 6.Jun.45	
K52161	Pte.	LOWE,H.A.	26.Sep.39 - 27.Sep.39	
M56244	Pte.	LOYER,H.K.	6.May.44 - 23.May.44	KIA 23.May.44
K52182	A/Cpl.	LUCAS,D.A.	12.Sep.39 - 5.Aug.43	KIA 5.Aug.43
K48265	Pte.	LUCAS.F.W.	14.May.44 - 25.Sep.45	
M58653	Pte.	LUCAS,G.T.	12.Aug.44 - 18.Jul.45	
B52372	L/Cpl.	LUDDINGTON,L.F.	23.May.44 - 14.Apr.45	W.14.Apr.45
K52179	Pte.	LUGRIN,E.M.	12.Sep.39 - 18.Sep.41	
L36356	L/Cpl.	LUKENBILL, C.C.	16.Jul.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K6292	Pte.	LUMSDEN,J.S.	4.Jun.45 - 24.Jun.45	
K37041	Pte.	LUND,E.E.	24.Nov.39 - 4.Feb.40	
K6609	Pte.	LUND,W.O.	17.May.45 - 21.Jun.45	
K601614	Pte.	LUNDIE, D.N.	17.May.45 - 25.Sep.45	
L153542	Pte.	LUPICHUK,P.	1.Sep.44 - 18.Jul.45	W.14.Dec.44
K2394	L/Cpl.	LUTSIAK,M.	21.May.45 - 9.Jul.45	W.31.Mar.45
M8074	Pte.	LUTZ,G.	1.Sep.44 - 28.Jun.45	
K606103	Pte.	LUZNY,P.	21.May.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K604329	Pte.	LYFORD,W.	17.May.45 - 25.Sep.45	
B53982	Pte.	LYNCH,R.	17.Jan.45 - 14.Apr.45	W.14.Apr.45
K53614	Pte.	LYNGOS,H.	30.Nov.41 - 29.Mar.43	
K53305	Pte.	LYONS,W.F.	2.May.41 - 23.Jun.45	
K85416	Pte.	LYTTON,B.C.	11.Jan.45 - 13.Feb.45	W.13.Feb.45

OTHER RANKS

Regt. No.	Final Seaforth Rank	Name		Service with Seaforths	Casualties
K52187	A/L/Cpl.	McADAM,J.W.		13.Sep.39 - 20.Jan.42	
K62072	Pte.	McALLAN,W.		22.Jan.40 - 28.Sep.42	
K609035	Pte.	McANINCH,J.R.		15.Apr.45 - 18.Jul.45	
K67764	Pte.	McARDLE,P.C.		22.Jan.43 - 24.Dec.43	POW 24.Dec.43; DIED WHILST A POW 25.Dec.43
K50691	Pte.	McARTHUR,R.R.		25.May.44 - 15.Feb.45	
M17154	Pte.	McARTHUR,R.D.		8.Jan.43 - 17.Nov.43	
K52313	Pte.	MacASKILL,D.A.		14.Sep.39 - 29.Jul.43	W.29.Jul.43
K69138	Pte.	MacAULAY,J.M.		30.Nov.43 - 25.Sep.45	W.10.Dec.43
K73791	Sgt.	MacBEAN,J.A.		16.Jul.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K53865	Sgt.	McBRIDE,A.		25.Jan.44 - 19.Jul.45	
K52518	Pte.	McBRIDE,J.G.	MM	19.Sep.39 - 4.May.45	W.19.Jul.43
K52761	Sgt.	McBRIDE,J.C.		27.Sep.39 - 12.Nov.42	
K29159	L/Cpl.	McBRIDE,J.		1.Dec.39 - 4.Mar.42	
K52528	WO 11 (CSM)	McCAFFERTY,C.		19.Sep.39 - 5.Mar.45	
K52815	Pte.	MacCALLUM,A.L.		29.Sep.39 - 6.Oct.39	
K574914	Pte.	MacCALLUM,R.F.		29.Jun.45 - 25.Sep.45	
M107330	Pte.	McCALLUM,W.A.		6.May.44 - 23.May.44	KIA 23.May.44
K3456	Pte.	McCAMMON,J.T.		16.May.45 - 18.Jul.45	
F55624	Pte.	McCANN,A.B.		18.Apr.44 - 19.Jun.44	
K67151	Pte.	McCANN,J.		21.Feb.41 - 5.May.43	
K67355	Pte.	McCANN,M.J.		28.Aug.42 - 23.Jan.45	
K53173	A/Cpl.	MacCAULDER,N.		31.Oct.41 - 31.May.45	
H17050	Pte.	McCAW,D.		21.Dec.44 - 23.Jun.45	
K485	Pte.	McCARTNEY,W.		21.May.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K52523	Pte.	McCLELLAN,W.W.		19.Sep.39 - 3.Mar.43	
K4776	Pte.	McCLELLAND,D.V.		28.Mar.45 - 18.Jul.45	
K52188	WO 11 (CSM)	McCONDACH,H.W.		13.Sep.39 - 21.Jul.43	W.21.Jul.43
K52195	Pte.	McCONNELL,A.C.		13.Sep.39 - 23.Nov.39	W.30.Jan.44;DoW.30.Jan.44
K52134	Pte.	McCONNELL,L.H.		12.Sep.39 - 21.Jul.43	W.22.Jul.43
K52198	L/Cpl.	McCONNELL,Lester H.		13.Sep.39 - 29.Dec.43	W.18.Oct.43;KIA 26.Dec.43
K53090	Pte.	McCONNELL,R.		11.May.40 - 29.May.40	
K3646	Pte.	MCCORKINDALE,D.		23.Apr.45 - 6.Jun.45	
K52350	Pte.	McCORKINDALE,J.R.		15.Sep.39 - 23.Dec.43	
K6687	Pte.	McCORKINDALE,W.A.		7.Jun.45 - 18.Jul.45	
K62752	Pte.	McCORMICK,E.J.J.		6.Aug.43 - 30.Dec.44	
D135864	Pte.	McCORMICK,J.D.		10.Aug.43 - 12.Dec.43	W.12.Dec.43
M106000	Pte.	McCORMICK,L.K.		30.May.44 - 8.Jun.45	
M11413	Pte.	McCOWAN,S.		18.Apr.44 - 18.Jul.45	
K65003	Pte.	McCOY,J.B.		13.Aug.43 - 4.Aug.44	
M100469	Pte.	McCRACKEN,W.R.		13.Aug.43 - 23.May.44	W.18.Oct.43;POW.23.May.44; SAFE IN U.K.10.May.45
K52107	Pte.	McCRAE,G.		11.Sep.39 - 14.Feb.40	
D86285	Sgt.	McCREA,F.K.		10.Aug.43 - 25.Sep.45	W.18.Mar.44;W.4.Jan.45
K605796	Pte.	McCREIGHT,J.W.		23.Apr.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K52398	Pte.	McCRINDLE,J.		20.Sep.39 - 5.Mar.45	
L105005	Pte.	McCUBBIN,W.W.		25.May.44 - 22.Oct.44	W.2.Sep.44;W.22.Oct.44
K52658	Pte.	McCUISH,A.		21.Sep.39 - 19.Jul.43	KIA 19.Jul.43
K29161	Pte.	McCUISH,D.		1.Dec.39 - 31.Mar.45	
K3006	Pte.	McCUISH, N.		23.Apr.45 - 20.Jun.45	
K52408	Cpl.	McCULLOUGH,G.W.J.		16.Sep.39 - 24.May.41	
K52694	Sgt.	MacCULLY,R.H.		23.Sep.39 - 10.Feb.42	
K42007	Pte.	McCURDY,W.N.		27.Nov.39 - 11.Nov.40	
K50698	Pte.	McCUTCHEON,C.G.		1.Sep.44 - 19.Oct.44	W.23.May.44;W.17.Sep.44
K53363	Pte.	McCUTCHEON,H.D.		7.Mar.41 - 2.Apr.43	
K52975	Pte.	MacDONALD,A.F.		11.May.40 - 19.Jul.43	KIA 19.Jul.43
F65815	Pte.	MacDONALD, A.M.		1.May.43 - 2.Jun.43	
K42641	Cpl.	MacDONALD,D.R.		20.Nov.42 - 23.May.44	W.17.Dec.43;POW.23.May.44; SAFE IN U.K. 17.May.45
K52423	Sgt.	McDONALD,E.		18.Sep.39 - 9.Sep.45	
H8340	Pte.	McDONALD,G.		6.May.44 - 25.Sep.45	
K52813	Cpl.	McDONALD,G.S.		29.Sep.39 - 14.Apr.41	
K50622	Pte.	McDONALD,G.W.		19.Feb.44 - 23.May.44	POW 23.May.44; SAFE IN U.K.15.May.45
K52199	Sgt.	McDONALD,H.R.		13.Sep.39 - 4.May,45	
K52860	Pte.	MacDONALD,H.		7.Oct,39 - 19.Mar.40	
K20059	L/Cpl.	McDONALD,H.		7.Jan.45 - 31.May.45	
K52655	WO 11 (CSM)	McDONALD,J.		21.Sep.39 - 1.May.43	
K15234	Pte.	McDONALD,J.V.		26.Jun.42 - 24.Oct.42	W.26.Nov.44
K42032	Pte.	MacDONALD,L.		17.Nov.43 - 11.Mar.44	

OTHER RANKS

Regt. No.	Final Seaforth Rank	Name	Service with Seaforths	Casualties
K6646	Pte.	MacDONALD,L.B.	17.May.45 - 21.Jun.45	
M103649	Pte.	MacDONALD,M.	1.Sep.43 - 24.Sep.45	
K6224	Pte.	MacDONALD,M.R.	23.Apr.45 - 21.Jun.45	
K53103	Pte.	McDONALD,R.E.	11.May.40 - 14.Nov.41	
K54572	Pte.	MacDONALD,R.D.	12.Aug.44 - 15.Dec.44	W.26.Aug.44;W.17.Oct.44
K6444	Pte.	McDONALD,R.	16.May.45 - 9.Jul.45	
K52212	Sgt.	McDONALD,W.J.B.	13.Sep.39 - 4.May.45	W.24.Jul.43
K37058	Pte.	McDONNELL,R.A.	1.Dec.39 - 9.Dec.43	W.8.Oct.43;W.9.Dec.43
K53126	Pte.	McDOUALL, H.J.	11.May.40 - 8.Apr.43	
K52424	Pte.	MacDOUGALL,A.D.	4.Dec.39 - 10.Sep.42	
K52999	Pte.	McDOUGALL,D.H.	11.May.40 - 20.Jun.40	
D81431	Pte.	McELHERON, H.	1.Sep.43 - 17.Nov.44	
K53120	A/Cpl.	McELHOES,S.K.	11.May.40 - 21.Jul.43	KIA 21.Jul.43
C102383	Pte.	McELLIGOTT,B.D.	6.Jun.44 - 25.Sep.45	
B126722	Pte.	McERLAIN,H.P.	14.Feb.45 - 18.Jul.45	
K53070	Pte.	McEWEN,R.B.	11.May.40 - 17.Sep.40	
K54038	Pte.	McEWEN,W.L.	25.Dec.42 - 11.Jan.43	
M36330	Pte.	McFARLANE,D.J.	10.Aug.43 - 14.Sep.43	
K52920	Pte.	McFARLANE,G.K.	11.May.40 - 2.May.43	
K37043	Pte.	McFEE,H.B.	24.Nov.39 - 4.Feb.40	
K8983	Pte.	McGARRY,P.S.	7.Jun.45 - 18.Jul.45	
K52108	Pte.	McGEACHY,A.	11.Sep.39 - 14.Dec.39	
K52874	Pte.	McGEE,A.L.	1.May.42 - 27.Apr.44	
K258	A/Cpl.	McGEE,H.E.	21.May.45 - 15.Aug.45	W.12.Sep.44;W.23.Apr.45
B93567	Pte.	McGHEE,R.	28.Mar.44 - 26.Jul.44	INJURED 23.May.44
D138175	Pte.	McGILL,A.R.	20.May.44 - 17.Jun.44	
K52214	Pte.	McGILLIVRAY,J.A.	13.Sep.39 - 20.Jun.40	
K2959	Pte.	MacGILLIVRAY,K.	21.May.45 - 18.Jul.45	
K48857	Pte.	McGILLIVRAY,S.K.	28.Mar.44 - 18.Feb.45	
K8902	Pte.	McGLADDERY,J.L.	29.Jun.45 - 3.Sep.45	
K52275	Pte.	McGOWAN,C.I.	14.Sep.39 - 14.Apr.43	
K52985	Sgt.	McGOWAN,D.	11.May.40 - 23.May.44	POW 23.May.44; SAFE IN U.K.7.May.45
K73194	Pte.	McGREGOR,D.E.	29.Dec.44 - 6.Mar.45	
H101984	Pte.	McGREGOR,D.G.	25.Jul.43 - 25.Sep.45	
K607525	Pte.	MacGREGOR,I.S.	17.May.45 - 18.Jul.45	
M103878	Pte.	McGREGOR,J.W.	1.Sep.43 - 14.Dec.44	W.14.Dec.44
K52099	Pte.	McGREGOR,W.	11.Sep.39 - 18.Aug.42	
P35162	Sgt.	McGUIRE,L.W.	15.Dec.41 - 12.Jun.42	
K69514	Pte.	McHALLAN, P.B.	1.Jun.44 - 15.Feb.45	INJURED 3.Sep.44
M104742	Pte.	McHARG,O.A.	27.Dec.43 - 17.Oct.44	W.17.Oct.44
K52504	Pte.	McHENRY,D.F.	19.Sep.39 - 13.Dec.43	W.13.Dec.43
C102821	Pte.	McILVENNA,W.J.	26.May.44 - 18.Sep.44	W.31.May.44; KIA.18.Sep.44
K53512	Pte.	McINNES,A.	30.Nov.41 - 4.Dec.43	
K52872	Pte.	MacGILLIVRAY,H.M.	24.Nov.39 - 8.Mar.41	
K63130	CQMS	MacINNES,D.	22.Jul.43 - 25.Sep.45	
K8971	Pte.	McINNES, D.J.	4.Jun. 45 - 25.Sept. 45	
H11000	Pte.	McINNES, J.S.	20.Feb. 45 - 18.Jul. 45	
K53840	L/Cpl.	McINROY, J.N.	30.Nov. 41 - 29.Nov. 43	
K53355	Pte.	MacINTOSH, A.M.	22.Dec. 43 - 29.Jul. 44	W.23.Jan.44
K52193	WO II (CSM)	McINTOSH, D.J.	13.Sept. 39 - 8.Mar. 44	W. 9.Dec. 43
K51360	Pte.	McINTYRE, A.F.	1.May. 44 - 13.Jun. 44	
K50580	Pte.	McINTYRE, A.J.	18.Feb. 44 - 21.Dec. 44	W.21.Dec.44
M31605	Pte.	MacINTYRE, N.	19.Feb. 43 - 9.Jul. 43	
K52464	Pte.	McINTYRE, R.M.	18.Sept. 39 - 23.Oct. 41	
K72762	Pte.	McKAY, A.A.	25.Dec. 42 - 5.May. 44	W.15.Dec.43
K52202	L/Cpl.	McKAY, A.E.	13.Sept. 39 - 31.May. 45	
H70511	Pte.	McKAY, A.J.	22.Jul. 43 - 25.Sept. 45	
K15957	Pte.	McKAY, A.E.	5.Sept. 44 - 6.Jun. 45	
M106936	Pte.	MacKAY, D.F.	23.May. 44 - 20.Sept. 44	W.21.Sept.44
K53051	Pte.	MacKAY, D.C.	11.May. 40 - 2.May. 42	
M12224	Pte.	McKAY, D.S.	17.Oct. 43 - 17.Sept. 44	KIA 17.Sept.44
K52194	Pte.	McKAY, G.	13.Sept. 39 - 13.Jun. 40	DOW 21.Sept.43
K52993	Pte.	MacKAY,J.L.	11.May.40 - 19.Jul.43	
K37096	Pte.	McKAY,J.	12.Sep.40 - 20.Aug.44	
K73862	Pte.	McKAY,J.R.	23.Jul.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K52484	Pte.	McKAY,J.	18.Sep.39 - 27.Aug.40	
K53097	Pte.	McKAY,J.C.	10.Oct.40 - 26.Oct.42	DIED 26.Oct.42
K51157	L/Cpl.	McKAY,J.V.	5.Sep.44 - 7.Apr.45	W.7.Apr.45
L67438	Pte.	McKAY,L.E.	1.Sep.43 - 30.May.44	W.8.Oct.43

OTHER RANKS

Regt. No.	Final Seaforth Rank	Name		Service with Seaforths	Casualties
K2344	Pte.	MacKAY,N.		1.Sep.44 - 17.Sep.44	W.17.Sep.44
K10227	Pte.	MacKAY,R.J.		25.Dec.42 - 17.Jan.45	W.13.Jul.43
D76953	Sgt.	MacKAY,R.		10.Aug.43 - 14.Jul.45	W.26.Dec.43;W.26.Aug.44
K52695	Cpl.	McKAY,V.		23.Sep.39 - 9.Apr.43	
K6227	Pte.	MacKAY,W.S.		23.Apr.45 - 18.Jul.45	
K52203	Sgt.	McKEE,G.K.		13.Sep.39 - 18.Oct.43	KIA 18.Oct.43
B100072	Pte.	McKELLAR,W.C.A.		26.May.44 - 18.Jul.45	W.18.Sep.44;W.12.Apr.45
K42955	Pte.	McKENNA,J.J.		5.May.43 - 28.Jul.43	W.10.Jul.43
K52931	Pte.	McKENZIE,A.		11.May.40 - 29.May.40	
K3950	Pte.	MacKENZIE,A.T.		23.Apr.45 - 25.Apr.45	W.25.Apr.45
K605372	Pte.	McKENZIE,A.W.		29.Jun.45 - 3.Sep.45	
K76893	L/Cpl.	MacKENZIE,C.S.		19.Jul.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K52324	Pte.	MacKENZIE,C.A	DCM, C de G, Mons Star (All from 1914-1918)	15.Sep.39 - 8.Jul.40	
K52529	Pte.	MacKENZIE,C.D.		19.Sep.39 - 31.Oct.39	
K52201	L/Cpl.	McKENZIE,E.L.		13.Sep.39 - 24.Sep.40	
K3505	Cpl.	MacKENZIE,I.		15.Apr.45 - 20.Jun.45	
K53127	Pte.	MacKENZIE,J.S.		11.May.40 - 10.Oct.42	
K40811	L/Cpl.	McKENZIE,M.C.		27.Dec.43 - 25.Sep.45	
K52180	P/A/Cpl.	McKENZIE,R.G.		12.Sep.39 - 27.May.40	
L50133	Sgt.	MacKENZIE,W.J.		15.Jun.45 - 3.Sep.45	
K52181	Pte.	MacKENZIE,W.A.		12.Sep.39 - 10.Jan.44	
C120079	Pte.	McKEOWN,E.D.		26.May.44 - 2.Jan.45	
K50653	Pte.	MacKILLOP,I.A.		30.May.44 - 26.Aug.44	W.26.Aug.44
K43557	WO 11 (CSM)	McKIM,S.A.		21.Jan.44 - 25.Sep.45	
M106449	Pte.	McKINNELL,D.S.		30.Nov.43 - 21.Mar.44	
K16298	Pte.	McKINNON,A.H.		23.Apr.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K3816	Pte.	McKINNON,R.B.		23.Apr.45 - 21.May.45	
K52196	Pte.	McKINSTRY,R.C.		13.Sep.39 - 5.Dec.39	
K52190	Pte.	McKISSOCK,G.		13.Sep.39 - 16.Jan.42	
K53061	Cpl.	McKISSOCK,T.C.		11.May.40 - 23.Nov.42	
C79330	Pte.	McKITTRICK,J.H.		30.Nov. - 7.Dec.43	KIA 7.Dec.43
K6596	Pte.	MacLAGAN,A.C.		17.May.45 - 21.Jun.45	
B137253	Pte.	McLEAN,A.N.		27.Dec.43 - 20.May.44	
K73646	Pte.	McLEAN,C.M.		11.Jan.45 - 23.Jun.45	
K601320	Pte.	McLEAN,C.R.		17.May.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K54482	Pte.	McLEAN,D.C.		16.Mar.44 - 23.May.44	KIA 23.May.44
K52582	L/Cpl.	MacLEAN,D.J.		20.Sep.39 - 4.May.45	W.19.Jul.43
K53279	Pte.	MacLEAN,J.W.		2.May.41 - 23.Jun.45	
L105469	Pte.	MacLEAN,N.R.		23.May.44 - 25.Sep.45	
K48451	Pte.	McLEAN,V.I.		4.Jun.45 - 16.Jun.45	W.31.May.44
L27860	A/Cpl.	McLEAN,W.H.		5.Sep.44 - 24.Jun.45	
B40081	Pte.	MacLEAN,W.A.		1.May.43 - 2.Jun.43	W.4.May.45
K9153	Pte.	McLELLAN,J.E.		7.Jun.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K52562	Pte.	McLELLAN,W.		19.Sep.39 - 9.Oct.41	
F22325	Pte.	MacLENNAN,D.D.		1.May.43 - 2.Jun.43	
K3531	Pte.	McLENNAN,W.N.		23.Apr.45 - 20.Jun.45	
K52166	Pte.	MacLEOD,A.		27.Sep.39 - 5.Oct.43	KIA 5.Oct.43
K46454	Pte.	McLEOD,A.M.		29.Jun.45 - 25.Sep.45	
M106020	Pte.	McLEOD,D.M.M.		30.May.44 - 9.Jan.45	W.9.Jan.45
K52867	Pte.	MacLEOD,H.		7.Oct.39 - 31.Jan.43	
K65205	Pte.	McLEOD,J.		23.Apr.43 - 5.Aug.43	W.5.Aug.43
F22453	Pte.	MacLEOD,J.G.		1.May.43 - 2.Jun.43	
M101975	Pte.	MacLEOD,J.H.		10.Oct.43 - 26.Dec.43	KIA 26.Dec.43
B133633	Pte.	MacLEOD,J.W.		28.May.43 - 21.Jul.43	KIA 21.Jul.43
K52850	Pte.	McLEOD,L.S.		3.Oct.39 - 23.Oct.40	
K52027	Piper	McLEOD,N.A.		7.Sep.39 - 13.Dec.43	
K52301	Pte.	MacLEOD,R.R.		14.Sep.39 - 5.Aug.43	KIA 5.Aug.43
K52046	Pte.	McLEOD,W.O.		8.Sep.39 - 5.Dec.39	
K38544	Pte.	MacLEOD,W.W.		17.Jul.45 - 25.Sep.45	
D139961	Pte.	McLOON,R.G.		26.May.44 - 17.Sep.44	W.17.Sep.44;DoW.19.Sep.44
K52478	RSM WO 1	McMAHON,G.M.		18.Sep.39 - 5.Mar.45	
K9305	Pte.	McMASTER,M.M.		7.Jun.45 - 18.Jul.45	
K65919	Pte.	McMATH,R.A.		18.Dec.44 - 25.Feb.45	W.25.Feb.45
K53002	Pte.	McMILLAN,A.D.		11.May.40 - 21.Dec.40	
K52645	Pte.	MacMILLAN,D.D.		21.Sep.39 - 29.May.40	
K53649	Pte.	MacMILLAN,D.N.		30.Jan.42 - 23.Jun.45	
K52592	Sgt.	McMILLAN,H.C.		20.Sep.39 - 8.Feb.44	
K52589	Pte.	McMILLAN,J.G.		20.Sep.39 - W.13.Feb.44	W.27.Jul.43;

OTHER RANKS

Regt. No.	Final Seaforth Rank	Name	Service with Seaforths	Casualties
K52213	Pte.	McMILLAN,S.O.	13.Sep.39 - 24.Jan.40	
K62184	Cpl.	McMINN,J.B.	21.Jan.44 - 4.May.45	
M30887	A/Cpl.	McMORRAN,R.	1.Jun.44 - 12.Jul.45	
K50383	Pte.	McMOW,J.J.	25.Jan.44 - 11.Nov.44	W.23.May.44;POW 16.Feb.45; SAFE IN U.K.25.May.45
M52725	Pte.	McMULLEN,E.M.	26.Sep.39 - 7.Oct.43	W.8.Oct.43
K52530	A/CSM	McMULLEN,F.D. ? MBE	19.Sep.39 - 23.May.44	POW 23.May.44; SAFE IN U.K.16.Apr.45
K52215	Pte.	McMURCHY,C.St.C.	13.Sep.39 - 13.Nov.41	
K53064	Pte.	McMURPHY,G.J.	11.May.40 - 28.May.40	
K52791	Pte.	McMURRAY,S.	28.Sep.39 - 20.Mar.41	
B59667	Cpl.	McNAB,A.H.	3.Aug.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K4883	Pte.	McNAIR,D.S.	29.Jun.45 - 25.Sep.45	
H20085	WO 11 (CSM)	McNAUGHTON,W.G.	14.Nov.43 - 18.Oct.44	W.Mar.20.44;W.18.Oct.44
K52983	Pte.	McNEIL,A.J.	11.May.40 - 21.Dec.40	
K52762	L/Sgt.	MacNEIL,D.	27.Sep.39 - 4.May.45	
K53166	Pte.	McNEIL,J.M.D.	8.Aug.40 - 8.Aug.40	
K52197	Pte.	MacNEILL,B.	13.Sept.37 - 13.Aug.40	
C80174	L/Cpl.	McNEILL,J.P.	12.Dec.43 - 18.Jul.45	
K52959	Pte.	McNEILL,J.T.	11.May.40 - 20.Jun.40	
D130106	Pte.	McNEILLY,D.A.	26.May.44 - 18.Jul.45	
K52191	Cpl.	McNIE,N.M.	13.Sep.39 - 28.Jul.45	
K602201	Pte.	McNIVEN,J.	15.Apr.45 - 15.Sep.45	
K52821	Pte.	MacNUTT,H.E.	2.Oct.39 - 6.Aug.43	
M30888	Pte.	MacOHONIC,C.	26.May.44 - 18.Jul.45	
K98595	A/Cpl.	McPARLON,G.L. MM	20.Nov.42 - 23.Dec.43	W.5.Aug.43;KIA 23.Dec.43
K51046	Pte.	McPARLON,H.H.M.	21.Feb.44 - 23.May.44	W.23.May.44
K52758	Pte.	McPHATTER,R.G.	27.Sep.39 - 13.Oct.42	
M107020	Pte.	McPHEDRAN,S.	16.Feb.44 - 26.Jul.45	W.4.Jan.45
K74808	Pte.	McPHEE,F.J.	21.Aug.42 - 26.Dec.43	W.20.Jul.43;KIA 26.Dec.43
K52140	Pte.	MacPHERSON,G.E.	12.Sep.39 - 8.May.41	
K52081	Pte.	McPHERSON,J.A.	11.Sep.39 - 11.Oct.39	
K53260	Pte.	MacQUARRIE,J.D.	10.Oct.40 - 2.May.43	
K53987	Pte.	McQUEEN,D.J.	30.Nov.41 - 29.Oct.42	
L105384	Pte.	MacRAE,W.J.A.	23.May.44 - 23.Oct.44	W.31.May.44;POW.23.Oct.44; SAFE IN U.K.11.May.45
K53261	Pte.	McROBERTS,A.R.B.	10.Oct.40 - 29.Jul.41	
K45439	Cpl.	McSTAY,J.A.	18.Apr.44 - 9.Sep.45	
K66704	Pte.	McWILLIAMS,D.A.	30.Nov.43 - 25.Sep.45	W.17.Sep.44
K53195	Pte.	McWILLIAMS,R.	8.Nov.40 - 1.Aug.45	W.8.Oct.43
L59805	Pte.	MADDAFORD,W.F.	18.Dec.44 - 11.Feb.45	
M102381	Pte.	MADDEN,M.E.	1.Sep.43 - 24.Dec.43	KIA 24.Dec.43
K65996	Pte.	MAGEE,R.D.	31.Dec.43 - 25.Sep.45	
K51268	Pte.	MAGEE,R.L.	25.May.44 - 4.Jan.45	KIA 4.Jan.45
F33417	Pte.	MAGLIARO,A.	14.Feb.45 - 18.Feb.45	W.18.Feb.45
K6664	Pte.	MAHOOD,H.W.	16.May.45 - 29.Jul.45	
H67547	Pte.	MAIN,G.A.	1.Sep.44 - 25.Sep.45	
K52239	Pte	MAISEY,S.J.B.	13.Sep.39 - 7.Aug.41	
K52001	Cpl. WO 11	MAITLAND,J.	11.Sep.39 - 29.May.40	
C77815	L/Cpl.	MAJOR,G.H.	26.May.44 - 25.Sep.45	
K605640	Pte.	MAJOSKEY,A.J.	17.May.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K607043	Pte.	MAKI,H.H.	17.May.45 - 18.Jul.45	
K603023	Pte.	MAKSYMIUK,W.J.	29.Jun.45 - 25.Sep.45	
M8099	Pte.	MALCOM,C.R.	18.Dec.44 - 18.Dec.44 16.Jul.45 - 16.Jul.45	
K52103	A/CQMS	MALCOM,H.E.	11.Sep.39 - 29.May.40	
K54086	Pte.	MALCOM,W.P.	30.Apr.43 - 31.Oct.43	
M106645	Pte.	MALINSKY,G.	25.Nov.43 - 21.Jun.44	W.9.Dec.43
K67344	Pte.	MALLETT,F.J.	10.Aug.43 - 24.Dec.43	W.24.Dec.43
K52696	Pay/Sgt.	MALLETT,J.E.	23.Sep.39 - 16.Mar.43	
D140533	Pte.	MALLETTE,R.D.	26.May.44 - 10.Jan.45	INJURED 26.Aug.44
K606699	Pte.	MALMBERG,J.W.	17.May.45 - 21.Jun.45	
K72963	Pte.	MALMGREN,J.	5.Mar.43 - 19.Dec.43	
K52956	Pte.	MALONE,F.	11.May.40 - 11.Nov.40	
D140070	Pte.	MANDIGO,K.I.	30.May.44 - 21.Jul.45	W.23.Dec.44
K52164	P/Sgt.	MANGALL,B.	26.Sep.39 - 15.Dec.39	
K71650	Sgt.	MANGNALL,K.A.	17.May.45 - 25.Sep.45	
U1884	Pte.	MANNH.J.	18.Dec.44 - 21.Feb.45	
K52698	Pte.	MANSBRIDGE,G.D.	23.Sep.39 - 23.Jun.45	INJURED 23.Sep.44
K59562	Pte.	MANSFIELD,R.W.	23.Apr.45 - 6.Jun.45	
M106253	Pte.	MANTIE,E.H.	30.Nov.43 - 8.Dec.43	

OTHER RANKS

Regt. No.	Final Seaforth Rank	Name		Service with Seaforths	Casualties
K53513	Pte.	MANUEL,A.P.		1.May.42 - 28.Jun.44	
K573926	Pte.	MANUEL,E.E.		29.Jun.45 - 25.Sep.45	
L106874	Pte.	MANZUIK,J.		12.May.45 - 3.Sep.45	INJURED 3.Feb.45
C42998	Pte.	MARACLE,A.		26.May.44 - 30.May.44	
K52976	L/Sgt.	MARACLE,S.		11.May.40 - 26.Jun.44	
K605612	Pte.	MARCELLIN,L.		29.Jun.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K52019	Pte.	MARCH,W.E.		6.Sep.39 - 25.Aug.42	
B146036	Pte.	MARECKI,M.		26.May.44 - 14.Dec.44	W.14.Dec.44
K52035	Pte.	MARKEY,J.R.		7.Sep.39 - 14.May.40	
D139020	Pte.	MARKS,E.R.		1.Sep.44 - 12.Oct.44	
K52291	Pte.	MARRS,F.J.		14.Sep.39 - 31.Oct.39	
F65166	Pte.	MARSH,C.A.		22.Feb.45 - 3.Jul.45	
H52584	Cpl.	MARSHALL,G.W.		20.Sep.39 - 8.Mar.44	
B46831	Pte.	MARSHALL,J.H.		12.Dec.43 - 18.Jan.45	
K52220	Pte.	MARSHALL,J.		13.Sep.39 - 31.May.45	
K6362	Pte.	MARSHALL,W.A.		17.May.45 - 21.Jun.45	
K57574	Pte.	MARSHALL,W.E.		25.Jul.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K52219	CQMS	MARSHALL,W.M.		13.Sep.39 - 2.Feb.44	
K53055	Pte.	MARSLAND,T.		11.May.40 - 26.Dec.44	POW 26.Dec.44; SAFE IN U.K.14.May.45
K53066	L/Cpl.	MARSLAND,F.		11.May.40 - 8.Aug.45	W.13.Dec.43
K42020	Cpl.	MARTIN,A.P.		2.Dec.39 - 26.Jun.40	
K6432	Pte.	MARTIN,D.L.		17.May.45 - 29.Jul.45	
K37042	Pte.	MARTIN,E.J.		24.Nov.39 - 5.May.43	
K52783	Cpl.	MARTIN,J.H.		27.Sep.39 - 29.Mar.44	
K50030	Pte.	MARTIN,J.T.		25.Jan.44 - 22.Oct.44	W.22.Oct.44
K53492	Pte.	MARTIN,J.		12.Dec.41 - 6.Jul.44	
K3631	Pte.	MARTIN,L.		25.Apr.45 - 9.Jul.45	
K52884	Pte.	MARTIN,R.C.		27.Nov.39 - 5.May.43	
F22434	Pte.	MARTIN,R.M.		1.May.43 - 2.Jun.43	DoI 16.Mar.45
D71726	Pte.	MARTIN,R.W.		1.May.43 - 25.Sep.45	
B46413	Pte.	MARTIN,W.J.		16.Jul.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K4361	Pte.	MARTINSON,M.I.		7.Apr.45 - 6.Jan.45	
M53206	Sgt.	MARTINSON,N.		29.Jun.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K6400	Pte.	MASICH,W.J.		16.May.45 - 13.Jul.45	
K37067	Sgt.	MASSEY,N.W.		1.Dec.39 - 2.Jun.45	
K51281	Pte.	MASUR,A.		25.May.44 - 25.Sep.45	
K53102	Pte.	MATCHETT,C.L.		11.May.40 - 7.Aug.45	
K53234	Pte.	MATCHETT,W.R.		22.Jun.40 - 17.Nov.42	
K50992	Pte.	MATHERS,R.G.		25.May.44 - 16.Dec.44	W.16.Dec.44
M107605	Pte.	MATHESON,K.M.		27.Dec.43 - 24.May.44	
K53404	Pte.	MATHESON,P.		20.Sep.44 - 23.Jun.45	
M107202	Pte.	MATHESON,W.T.		27.Dec.43 - 25.Sep.45	
K48759	Pte.	MATHEWS,B.		30.May.44 - 25.Sep.45	W.28.Aug.44
K51208	Pte.	MATHIE,D.		25.May.44 - 18.Aug.44	
K52071	Pte.	MATHISON,A.		11.Sep.39 - 5.May.43	
F2595	L/Sgt.	MATTATALL,H.E.		27.Dec.43 - 20.Jun.45	W.23.May.44
K43038	Pte.	MATTESON,J.W.		18.Dec.42 - 4.May.43	INJURED 16.Oct.44
K52820	Pte.	MATTHEWS,D.		2.Oct.39 - 29.May.40	
K50723	Cpl.	MATTHEWS,D.F.		16.May.45 - 20.Jun.45	
C102340	Pte.	MATTICE,W.		26.May.44 - 25.Sep.45	W.27.Dec.44
K52225	Pte.	MAUDSLEY,A.F.		13.Sep.39 - 28.Aug.44	
P7463	L/Sgt.	MAUGHAN,S.		17.Jul.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K65443	Pte.	MAURO,P.		18.Apr.44 - 14.Dec.44	W.14.Dec.44
K52465	Pte.	MAWBY,G.J.		18.Sep.39 - 5.May.43	KIA 16.Dec.44
K52594	Cpl.	MAXWELL,A.V.		20.Sep.39 - 27.May.41	
K49509	L/Sgt.	MAXWELL,D.S.		22.Dec.43 - 31.Aug.44	W.26.Dec.43 KIA 31.Aug.44
M106691	Pte.	MAY,H.L.		27.Dec.43 - 18.Jul.45	
K4578	Pte.	MAY,J.H.		4.Jun.45 - 25.Sep.45	
D141250	Pte.	MAY,R.S.		26.May.44 - 14.Apr.45	W.31.May.44;KIA 14.Apr.45
K3679	Pte.	MAYERS,G.A.		29.Jun.45 - 9.Sep.45	
K52236	Pte.	MAYES,H.W.		13.Sep.39 - 28.Jul.45	
K63161	Cpl.	MAYFIELD,R.		25.Jul.45 - 25.Sep.45	W.9.Jun.44
M101741	Pte.	MAZAR,M.		27.Dec.43 - 27.Dec.44	W.12.Feb.44;W.24.May.44
K53836	Sgt.	MEADE,D.	MM	27.Mar.42 - 25.Sep.45	
G4549	Pte.	MEAN,I.R.		27.Dec.43 - 18.Jul.45	
F52105	Pte.	MEISNER,D.S.		27.Dec.43 - 31.Aug.44	
K52542	Pte.	MELLADO,R.R.		19.Sep.39 - 9.Sep.45	
K52817	Pte.	MELLOR,L.E.		29.Sep.39 - 7.Dec.39	
K8960	Pte.	MELLOR,R.S.		17.May.45 - 29.Jul.45	
K59600	Pte.	MELLOR,S.V.		15.Apr.45 - 19.Jun.45	

OTHER RANKS

Regt. No.	Final Seaforth Rank	Name	Service with Seaforths	Casualties
K47972	Pte.	MELNYK,E.	17.Nov.43 - 25.Sep.45	W.10.Dec.43
M105723	Pte.	MELVIN,N.W.	25.May.44 - 25.Sep.45	INJURED 19.Oct.44;W.14.Dec.44
K52222	Pte.	MENEAR,J.E.	13.Sep.39 - 29.May.40	
K53353	Pte.	MENELAWS,T.	10.Oct.40 - 15.Dec.44	KIA 15.Dec.44
K52278	Cpl.	MERCER,H.	14.Sep.39 - 20.Jul.43	KIA 20.Jul.43
K41071	Pte.	MERCER,R.J.	14.May.44 - 17.Sep.44	W.23.May.44;POW.17.Sep.44; SAFE IN U.K.10.May.45
K52010	Sgt.	MERCER,T.G.	6.Sep.39 - 14.Jan.45	
K42559	Pte.	MERCER,W.R.	25.Jul.43 - 28.Feb.45	KIA 28.Feb.45
M60520	Pte.	MERKLEY,O.M.	14.Nov.43 - 9.Dec.43	W.9.Dec.43
K67233	Sgt.	MERNETT,E.	1.Jul.44 - 9.Jan.45	
K48305	Pte.	MERRICK,L.M.	29.Jun.45 - 25.Sep.45	
G15006	Cpl.	MERRITT,J.H.R.	25.Feb.44 - 7.Jun.45	W.7.Mar.44
K52704	Pte.	MERTENS,G.P.	23.Sep.39 - 25.Aug.42	
K52263	Pte.	MESTON,J.D.	14.Sep.39 - 29.Oct.41	
K52228	WO 11 (CSM)	METCALFE,E.	1.Sep.39 - 7.Oct.42	
K53678	Sgt.	METCALFE,W.A.	11.Jul.41 - 14.Dec.44	W.29.Jul.43;W.22.Jan.44; W.14.Dec.44
L102959	Pte.	MEYERS,H.	24.May.44 - 16.Sep.44	W.16.Sep.44
K666	Pte.	MICHOLUK,L.	27.Jun.45 - 29.Aug.45	
M52932	Pte.	MICKELSON,A.	1.Sep.43 - 27.Aug.44	
K78441	Sgt.	MIDDLETON,J.H.	17.May.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K69789	Cpl.	MIDDLETON,T.H.	22.Dec.43 - 26.Dec.43	W.26.Dec.43
K52399	Pte.	MIGUEZ,J.	20.Sep.39 - 23.May.44	
M55967	Pte.	MILES,F.R.	27.Dec.43 - 20.Nov.44	
K607521	Pte.	MILES,J.R.	17.May.45 - 17.Sep.45	
K52957	Cpl.	MILL,S.	11.May.40 - 27.Dec.41	
K52292	Pte.	MILLAR,A.T.	14.Sep.39 - 23.May.44	W.23.May.44
K53109	Pte.	MILLAR,J.	11.May.40 - 8.Feb.43	
M65640	Pte.	MILLAR,S.G.	18.Dec.44 - 18.Jul.45	W.18.Jan.45
K52828	Pte.	MILLARD,T.W.	2.Oct.39 - 2.Feb.43	
B144690	Cpl.	MILLER,A.A.	27.Dec.43 - 23.Jun.45	
F52354	Pte.	MILLER,C.W.	27.Dec.43 - 18.Jul.45	
D140619	Pte.	MILLER,E.C.	26.May.44 - 20.Sep.44	W.20.Sep.44
K52501	Pte.	MILLER,E.G.	18.Sep.39 - 20.Jun.40	W.6.Jun.44
K51006	Pte.	MILLER,F.	6.May.44 - 5.Sep.44	
K4844	Pte.	MILLER,F.C.	25.Apr.45 - 18.Jul.45	
C117009	Pte.	MILLER,Frank C.	26.May.44 - 31.May.44	KIA 31.May.44
K74805	Pte.	MILLER,F.E.	15.Jul.45 - 25.Sep.45	INJURED,28.Feb.45
K52667	Pte.	MILLER,G.B.	22.Sep.39 - 6.Feb.41	
C121699	Pte.	MILLER,G.L.	26.May.44 - 31.May.44	W.1.Jun.44,DoW 1.Jun.44
B46915	Pte.	MILLER,H.W.	12.Dec.43 - 20.Dec.43	W.20.Dec.43
D175685	Pte.	MILLER,H.	26.May.44 - 16.Apr.45	
K53023	Pte.	MILLER,J.	11.May.40 - 15.Feb.41	
K13156	Pte.	MILLER,J.W.	25.Apr.45 - 21.Jun.45	
K51199	Pte.	MILLER,L.L.	6.May.44 - 23.May.44	KIA 23.May.44
M56643	Pte.	MILLER,R.F.	17.Oct.43 - 18.Jul.45	
D125283	Pte.	MILLER,S.J.	25.Jul.43 - 28.Jul.43	W.27.Jul.43;DoW.29.Jul.43
M31542	Pte.	MILLER,T.E.	26.May.44 - 24.Jan.45	
K52133	Pte.	MILLMAN,R.M.	12.Sep.39 - 27.Jun.40	
K57074	Pte.	MILLOY,C.A.	MM(1914-1918) 21.Aug.40 - 10.Oct.41	
L54910	L/Cpl.	MILLWARD,D.G.	18.Dec.44 - 18.Jul.45	W.17.Jan.45
K602210	Pte.	MILNE,E.G.	29.Jun.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K66206	Pte.	MILNE,J.	20.Sep.43 - 25.Sep.45	
K52583	Pte	MILNE,L.M.N.	20.Sep.39 - 30.Apr.43	
K53914	Pte.	MILNE,W.D.	30.Nov.41 - 4.Sep.45	
B77833	L/Cpl.	MINTY,Wm.Jr.	6.May.45 - 21.Jun.45	
K2183	Pte.	MISKIMAN,F.J.	16.May.45 - 13.Jun.45	
K49090	Pte.	MITCHELL,A.R.	9.Feb.44 - 25.Sep.45	
K52218	Sgt.	MITCHELL,D.B.	13.Sep.39 - 1.Oct.44	
H9258	Pte.	MITCHELL,E.J.	6.May.44 - 23.May.44	KIA 23.May.44
C120192	Pte.	MITCHELL,E.O.	12.Dec.43 - 23.May.44	W.24.May.44;DoW .24.May.44
K67851	Pte.	MITCHELL,G.T.	28.Aug.42 - 23.May.44	W.23.May.44
D71575	Pte.	MITCHELL,J.C.	11.Oct.44 - 18.Jul.45	W.12.Jan.45
K70357	Pte.	MITCHELL,J.K.	26.May.44 - 1.Sep.45	
K53233	Pte.	MITCHELL,L.G.	11.Jul.41 - 24.Jan.43	
K1733	Pte.	MITCHELL,R.A.	5.Sep.44 - 18.Jul.45	W.20.Sep.44
K52721	Pte.	MITCHELL,R.D.	25.Sep.39 - 13.Jun.40	
B143775	Cpl.	MITCHELL,W.D.	27.Dec.43 - 18.Jul.45	W.23.May.44
B156270	Pte.	MOASE,J.D.	22.Feb.45 - 14.Apr.45	W.14.Apr.45
K6410	Pte.	MODIN,M.T.	9.May.45 - 21.Jun.45	

OTHER RANKS

Regt. No.	Final Seaforth Rank	Name		Service with Seaforths	Casualties
M103434	Pte.	MOFFAT,G.E.		20.Sep.44 - 3.Dec.44	
A108080	L/Cpl.	MOFFAT,G.K.		14.Feb.45 - 8.Jun.45	W.19.Feb.45
B43201	Pte.	MOHRMAN,B.F.		27.Dec.43 - 19.May.44	KIA 19.May.44
K67235	Pte.	MOIR,K.		2.May.41 - 4.May.45	W.26.Jul.43; W.31.Dec.43
K66820	Pte.	MOIR,K.D.		28.Mar.44 - 25.Sep.45	
K42021	Pte.	MOIR,R.		3.Dec.39 - 19.Jan.44	KIA 8.Jul.44
K51491	Pte.	MOLLAND,R.H.		6.May.44 - 17.Sep.44	W.23.May.44;W.17.Sep.44
K53089	Sgt.	MOLSON,C.H.		11.May.40 - 16.Aug.45	
F58484	Pte.	MOMBOURQUETTE,W.A.		22.Feb.45 - 9.Jul.45	
H195508	Pte.	MONASTYRSKI,M.		30.May.44 - 8.Apr.45	
K53462	Pte.	MONAHAN,R.S.		14.Nov.41 - 21.Jul.43	KIA .21.Jul.43
D72034	Cpl.	MONK,A.		28.May.43 - 25.Apr.45	
K52493	P/Cpl.	MONKS,R.		18.Sep.39 - 6.Aug.40	
K53319	Sgt.	MONSON,J.O.		10.Oct.40 - 14.Nov.44	
K52852	Pte.	MONTGOMERY,G.E.		3.Oct.39 - 20.Jan.42	
K53605	Pte.	MONTGOMERY,H.W.		7.Nov.41 - 4.May.45	W.11.Jan.45
F82284	Pte.	MONTGOMERY,J.V.		22.Feb.45 - 23.Feb.45	
K52974	Pte.	MONTGOMERY,M.A.		11.May.40 - 23.Jun.45	INJURED,14.Nov.44
K52980	Pte.	MONTGOMERY,R.J.		11.May.40 - 21.Feb.45	
K52809	Pte.	MONTGOMERY,W.		29.Sep.39 - 23.May.44	W.26.Jul.43;W.23.May.44
K52223	Pte.	MONTGOMERY,W.H.		13.Sep.39 - 8.Dec.43	KIA 8.Dec.43
K52899	Pte.	MOODY,E.F.		1.Dec.41 - 28.Sep.42	
D140755	Pte.	MOONEY,C.J.		11.Jan.45 - 19.Jun.45	
K52710	Pte	MOONEY,J.		23.Sep.39 - 4.Sep.43	
K51158	Cpl.	MOORE,A.H.		30.May.44 - 25.Sep.45	
C102840	Pte.	MOORE,C.M.		30.May.44 - 12.Apr.45	INJURED 6.Feb.45; W.12.Apr.45
K52776	Pte.	MOORE,D.		27.Sep.39 - 27.Oct.43	
K52715	Pte.	MOORE,F.		23.Sep.39 - 11.Apr.43	
K42772	Pte.	MOORE,F.F.		23.Apr.43 - 6.Oct.43	KIA 6.Oct.43
D86401	Pte.	MOORE,H.M.		7.Jun.45 - 25.Sep.45	W.13.Apr.45
C103094	Pte.	MOORE,J.C.G.		1.Sep.44 - 17.Sep.44	POW 17.Sep.44; SAFE IN U.K. 4 May.45
K52456	Pte.	MOORE,J.E.		16.Sep.39 - 26.Apr.44	
K65017	Pte.	MOORE,John E.		12.Dec.43 - 13.Dec.43	
K48712	Pte.	MOORE,Joseph		9.Feb.44 - 23.May.44	
K52472	Pte.	MOORE,N.A.		18.Sep.39 - 23.Nov.39	
K1316	Pte.	MOORE,R.A.		13.Sep.44 - 17.Sep.44	W.17.Sep.44;POW.17.Sep.44; SAFE IN U.K.9 May.45
K50254	Sgt.	MOORE,R.L.		22.Dec.43 - 25.Sep.45	
D140069	Pte.	MOORE,W.		26.May.44 - 18.Oct.44	W.1.Jun.44;KIA.18.Oct.44
K42692	Cpl.	MOORE,W.J.		19.Feb.43 - 23.May.44	POW 23.May.44; SAFE IN U.K.14.May.45
K80502	Pte.	MORAES,G.		11.Jun.45 - 25.Sep.45	
L66274	Pte.	MORAN,C.J.		25.Jul.43 - 23.May.44	POW 23.May.44; SAFE IN U.K.11.May.45
K48476	Pte.	MORAN,F.A.		12.Dec.43 - 22.Dec.43	W.22.Dec.43
L105537	Pte.	MORANGE,J.P.		26.May.44 - 13.Nov.44	W.17.Sep.44;W.13.Nov.44
K52233	Pte.	MORETON,A.H.S.		13.Sep.39 - 12.Sep.40	
K52805	P/A/L/Cpl.	MORETON,F.E.		29.Sep.39 - 19.Mar.40	
K52419	Pte.	MOREY,H.W.		16.Sep.39 - 4.May.45	
K52865	Pte.	MORGAN,E.		7.Oct.39 - 31.Mar.45	W.19.Jul.43
K52936	Pte.	MORGAN,W.		11.May.40 - 19.Apr.42	
B621522	A/Cpl.	MORIN,E.		29.Jun.45 - 3.Sep.45	
K52105	Pte.	MORLAND,E.		11.Sep.39 - 31.Oct.39	
K53262	Pte.	MORRIS,F.A.		21.Nov.41 - 19.Jun.44	
D86094	Pte.	MORRIS,H.A.		10.Aug.43 - 6.Oct.43	W.10.Dec.43
K52234	PSM	MORRIS,H.E.		13.Sep.39 - 27.Mar.41	
K52217	Pte.	MORRIS,J.		13.Sep.39 - 29.Apr.44	INJURED 29.Apr.44
K4775	L/Cpl.	MORRIS,L.R.		14.Feb.45 - 18.Jul.45	
D77508	Pte.	MORRIS,S.		26.May.44 - 14.Apr.45	W.14.Apr.45
K42022	Pte.	MORRIS,W.H.	MiD	2.Dec.39 - 12.Nov.42	
K52162	Pte.	MORRISON,J.		26.Sep.39 - 6.Sep.40	
K53885	A/Cpl.	MORRISON,J.S.		30.Nov.41 - 23.Jun.45	
K52232	Pte.	MORRISON,R.E.		13.Sep.39 - 16.Mar.42	
K52415	Pte.	MORRISON,W.D.		16.Sep.39 - 29.Nov.43	
K43061	Pte.	MORRISON,W.S.		11.Dec.42 - 21.Jul.43	DoW.21.Jul.43
K4785	Pte.	MORRISSEY,E.F.		13.Apr.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K52987	Pte.	MORSE,W.H.		11.May.40 - 17.Apr.43	W.7.Oct.44
K50755	L/Cpl.	MORSON,E.		25.Jan.44 - 25.Sep.45	
K6233	Pte.	MORT,F.		16.May.45 - 13.Jul.45	

OTHER RANKS

Regt. No.	Final Seaforth Rank	Name		Service with Seaforths	Casualties
D77434	A/Cpl.	MOSDELL,H.B.		26.May.44 - 7.Jun.45	W.16.Dec.44;W.21.Feb.45
F9600	Pte.	MOSHER,W.A.		22.Feb.45 - 25.Sep.45	
C103506	Pte.	MOSLEY,I.G.		26.May.44 - 6.Jun.44	W.6.Jun.44;DoW.6.Jun.44
K53043	Pte.	MOSLEY,R.G.		11.May.40 - 21.Jun.43	
K4197	Pte.	MOSS,F.G.		29.Jun.45 - 25.Sep.45	
H19102	CSM (WO 11)	MOSS,W.F.	OBE	13.Jan.44 - 23.May.44	POW 23.May.44; SAFE IN U.K.11.May.45
K42023	Sgt.	MOTTL,J.		2.Dec.39 - 20.Dec.43	W.27.Jul.43;KIA.20.Dec.43
K42085	A/Sgt.	MOUNTFORD,G.E.		3.Aug.43 - 23.Jul.44	W.5.Aug.43;W.23.Dec.43
K54052	Pte.	MOWAT,D.A.		24.Jul.42 - 9.Dec.43	
K52648	Pte.	MOWAT,G.M.		21.Sep.39 - 23.Nov.39	W.19.Aug.42;POW.19.Aug.42; SAFE IN U.K.26.Apr.45
C120770	Cpl.	MUCHMORE,L.V.		27.Dec.43 - 21.Jun.45	INJURED 24.May.44; W.22.Oct.44
K53557	A/L/Cpl.	MUELLER,C.W.		12.Aug.40 - 8.Nov.42	
K52104	Pte.	MUIR,G.S.		11.Sep.39 - 6.Jul.40	
K52016	Cpl.	MUIR,J.A.		6.Sep.39 - 4.Mar.42	
K49733	Pte.	MUIRHEAD,D.M.		6.May.44 - 6.Jun.45	
M104375	Pte.	MULLEN,W.		19.Feb.44 - 18.Jul.45	W.17.Jan.45
K51209	Pte.	MULRONEY,C.W.		25.May.44 - 10.Mar.45	
K52913	L/Cpl.	MUNDAY,T.W.		22.Jun.40 - 7.May.44	
G51397	Pte.	MUNN,M.V.		27.Dec.44 - 22.Jan.45	
K37057	Pte.	MUNRO,A.M.		1.Dec.39 - 21.Apr.43	
K52996	Sgt.	MUNRO,G.D.		11.May.40 - 28.Dec.44	W.12.Feb.44
K71359	Cpl.	MUNRO,G.H.		30.May.44 - 17.Sep.44	W.17.Sep.44
K52235	Pte.	MUNRO,H.M.		13.Sep.39 - 7.Aug.43	W.1.Aug.43
L36100	Pte.	MUNRO,M.D.		18.Dec.44 - 6.Jan.45	
K53963	Pte.	MUNRO,R.K.		30.Nov.41 - 7.Jul.45	W.26.Aug.44
K53752	Cpl.	MUNRO,W.		30.Nov.41 - 23.Jun.45	
L1540/44	Sgt.	MURDOCH,G.		5.Jul.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K52973	Pte.	MURDOCK,L.W.		12.Aug.40 - 5.Dec.43	
K40619	Pte.	MURDOCK,M.J.		1.Sep.44 - 23.Feb.45	
K606237	Pte.	MURPHY,E.A.		18.May.45 - 2.Jul.45	
K3414	Pte.	MURPHY,J.A.		25.Apr.45 - 20.Jun.45	
K75991	Pte.	MURPHY,M.P.		30.Jan.42 - 29.Jan.43	
K52558	Pte.	MURPHY,N.		19.Sep.39 - 26.Dec.44	POW 26.Dec.44; SAFE IN U.K.14.May.45
K53087	Pte.	MURPHY,P.J.		11.May.40 - 19.Jun.44	
K52790	Pte.	MURPHY,Patrick J.		28.Sep.39 - 19.Aug.40	
K70964	Pte.	MURPHY,P.R.		17.Jul.42 - 23.May.44	KIA 23.May.44
K49152	Pte.	MURPHY,T.P.		17.Jan.44 - 14.Dec.44	W.16.Apr.44;W.14.Dec.44
K69395	Cpl.	MURPHY,V.A.		13.Aug.43 - 20.Apr.45	W.23.Dec.44
K9137	Pte.	MURPHY,W.J.		7.Jun.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K52144	Cpl.	MURRAY,A.F.		12.Sep.39 - 23.Jul.44	
K50711	Pte.	MURRAY,A.L.		9.Feb.44 - 18.Sep.44	INJURED 18.Sep.44
K52172	Pte.	MURRAY,D.		12.Sep.39 - 25.Sep.45	
M53056	Pte.	MURRAY,D.S.		28.Aug.42 - 22.Oct.44	W.5.Aug.43;W.22.Oct.44
K76939	Sgt.	MURRAY,J.F.		28.Aug.42 - 31.May.44	W.31.May.44
K67909	L/Cpl.	MURRAY,R.F.J.		6.Nov.42 - 22.Dec.43	W.22.Dec.43
K52079	Pte.	MURRAY,S.D.		11.Sep.39 - 18.Nov.39	
M103365	Pte.	MURRAY,W.		30.Apr.43 - 23.Jul.43	W.20.Jul.43
K53426	A/Cpl.	MURRAY,W.G.		27.Dec.40 - 23.Jun.45	W.17.Sep.44
H204724	Pte.	MYHAL,W.		2.Feb.45 - 16.Feb.45	W.15.Feb.45;W.12.Apr.45
F56378	Pte.	MYERS,E.E.		27.Dec.43 - 24.May.44	W.24.May.44
B137837	Pte.	MYLES,E.C.		26.May.44 - 18.Oct.44	KIA 18.Oct.44
K98459	Cpl.	MYLES,J.		5.Sep.44 - 25.Apr.44	KIA 25 Apr.45
H14810	Pte.	MYLES,W.L.		30.Dec.44 - 25.Sep.45	W.14.Apr.45
D72003	Pte.	NADON,G.O.		28.May.43 - 21.Jul.43	W.21.Jul.43
K52040	S/Sgt.	NAFTEL,G.E.L.		2.Sep.39 - 1.Dec.39	
K37056	Pte.	NASH,O.W.		1.Dec.39 - 29.Jan.44	
K26640	Pte.	NEALE,F.E.		21.May.45 - 18.Jul.45	
K605432	Pte.	NEDJELSKI,B.J.		29.Jun.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K37075	L/Sgt.	NEEDHAM,J.G.		1.Dec.39 - 23.May.44	KIA 23.May.44
K52207	Cpl.	NEELY,A.		13.Sep.39 - 5.Mar.45	INJURED 21.Nov.44
K49826	L/Cpl.	NEIL,J.D.		1.Jul.45 - 25.Sep.45	W.13.Apr.45
K75503	Pte.	NEILSON,C.E.		12.Mar.42 - 5.Aug.43	W.5.Aug. 43
K50516	Pte.	NEILSON,J.F.		17.Jan.44 - 25.Jan.44	W.25.Jan.44
H8335	Pte.	NELSON,E.C.		21.Jun.44 - 2.Sep.45	
K49081	Pte.	NELSON,E.G.		12.Dec.43 - 25.Dec.43	W.25.Dec.43
B145221	Pte.	NELSON,E.T.		27.Dec.43 - 18.Jul.45	W.31.May.44
B145195	L/Cpl.	NELSON,I.W.		27.Dec.43 - 28.Aug.45	

OTHER RANKS

Regt. No.	Final Seaforth Rank	Name	Service with Seaforths	Casualties
K52448	L/Cpl.	NELSON,J.H.	16.Sep.39 - 4.May.45	
K42024	Pte.	NELSON,J.R.	2.Dec.39 - 13.Jun.42	
M105529	Pte.	NELSON,M.A.	12.Dec.43 - 21.Jan.44	W.21.Jan.44
L64863	Pte.	NELSON,N.M.	1.Sep.43 - 27.Apr.44	
K52736	Pte.	NESBITT,G.D.	25.Sep.39 - 12.Mar.41	
K52252	Pte.	NESBITT,S.G.	14.Sep.39 - 26.Feb.40	
L10548	Pte.	NEUFELD, H.	6.May. 44 - 18.Jul. 45	
L107786	Pte.	NEUFELD, J.	18.Dec. 44 - 18.Jul. 45	
K53012	Pte.	NEVARD,R.A.	22.Jun.40 - 4.May.43	
K52289	Pte.	NEVIN,H.A.	14.Sep.39 - 9.Dec.44	W.9.Dec.44
K52778	Pte.	NEWBY,G.K.	27.Sep.39 - 26.Jan.41	
K43512	L/Cpl.	NEWELL,C.W.	4.Dec.42 - 23.Oct.44	W.19.Jul.43;POW.23.Oct.44; SAFE IN U.K.15.May.45
K52254	A/L/Cpl.	NEWELL,H.J.	14.Sep.39 - 17.Dec.43	KIA 17.Dec.43
K42057	Pte.	NEWELL,V.T.	29.Jul.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K2361	Pte.	NEWMAN,B.H.	4.Jun.45 - 18.Jul.45	
K4032	Pte.	NEWMAN,E.W.	21.May.45 - 29.Aug.45	W.28.Aug.44; INJURED 3.Mar.45
K52641	Pte.	NEWMAN,H.S.	21.Sep.39 - 29.May.40	
K6119	Pte.	NEWMAN,J.W.	13.Apr.45 - 21.Jun.45	
K53004	Pte.	NEWTON,A.D.	11.May.40 - 29.May.40	
M11773	Pte.	NICHOL,T.W.	25.Jul.43 - 1.Jan.44	
K65006	Pte.	NICHOLAS,T.	6.Mar.42 - 21.Jul.43	KIA 21.Jul.43
K604720	Pte.	NICHOLL,S.	25.Apr.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K52358	Pte.	NICHOLLES,J.S.	15.Sep.39 - 8.Mar.41	
F97651	Pte.	NICHOLSON,A.J.	27.Dec.43 - 27.Dec.43	W.27.Dec.43
K52800	Pte.	NICHOLSON,A.	29.Sep.39 - 29.May.40	
K53149	Pte.	NICHOLSON,G.A.	12.Sep.41 - 2.Oct.42	
K52014	RSM WO 11	NICHOLSON,J.J.	6.Sep.39 - 27.Mar.43	
K52516	Pte.	NICHOLSON,J.W.	4.Jun.45 - 16.Jun.45	
K6074	Pte.	NICHOLSON,S.G.	7.May.45 - 15.Jun.45	
K52665	Pte.	NICKELS,G.W.	22.Sep.39 - 29.Apr.40	
F56482	Pte.	NICKERSON,E.J.	27.Dec.43 - 17.Sep.44	W.23.Jan.44;KIA.17.Sep.44
F87938	Pte.	NICKERSON,H.A.	27.Dec.43 - 6.Apr.44	
M106133	Pte.	NICKIFOREK,N.	12.Dec.43 - 3.Sep.45	W.20.Sep.44
M102929	Pte.	NICKLE,J.	25.Jul.43 - 6.Aug.43	W.6.Aug.43;W.22.May.44
K52875	Pte.	NICOL,A.	1.Nov.40 - 17.Dec.43	W.19.Jul.43;KIA.17.Dec.43
K52616	Pte.	NICOL,J.S.M.	20.Sep.39 - 4.May.45	
K42681	Pte.	NICOL,W.A.	30.Apr.43 - 23.Jun.45	W.17.Dec.43
K52516	CSM WO 11	NICOLL,G.	19.Sep.39 - 25.Sep.45	
K51730	Pte.	NIELSEN,V.	25.Feb.44 - 29.May.44	
K2971	Pte.	NIENI,E.J.	16.May.45 - 21.Jun.45	
B131985	Pte.	NIENI,T.O.	28.May.43 - 22.Jul.43	W.21.Jul.43
K604598	Pte.	NILSEN,A.	13.Apr.45 - 25.Sep.45	
U1721	L/Cpl.	NIMMO,R.E.	11.Jan.45 - 19.Jun.45	W.13.Apr.45
K65024	Cpl.	NIQUIDET,L.F.	15.Jul.45 - 25.Sep.45	W.13.Oct.44
A49964	Pte.	NIVEN,R.	27.Dec.43 - 18.Jul.45	
K52591	Pte.	NIVEN,W.R.	20.Sep.39 - 19.Jul.43	KIA 19.Jul.43
K53117	Pte.	NIXON,A.T.	11.May.40 - 5.May.45	W.23.Dec.43
K53119	Pte.	NIXON,L.	11.May.40 - 31.Jan.42	
K52892	L/Cpl.	NOBLE,A.A.B.	9.Dec.39 - 29.May.40	
A37298	Pte.	NOBLE,E.	27.Dec.43 - 25.Jan.44	W.25.Jan.44;DoW.25.Jan.44
B143644	Pte.	NOBLE,L.B.	27.Dec.43 - 23.May.44	POW 23.May.44; SAFE IN U.K.9.May.45
K6160	Pte.	NOCENTE,O.P.	25.Apr.45 - 6.Jan.45	
K549193	Pte.	NOEVACK,W.G.	16.May.45 - 21.Jun.45	
K605776	Pte.	NORDIN,A.V.	7.Jun.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K65213	Pte.	NORDLING,G.	23.Apr.43 - 20.Dec.43	KIA 20.Dec.43
D95728	Pte.	NORRIS,C.R.	13.Aug.43 - 11.Dec.43	KIA 11.Dec.43
K53137	Pte.	NORRIS,R.F.	25.Dec.42 - 13.Oct.44	
K52359	Pte.	NORTH,C.H.	15.Sep.39 - 20.Jun.40	POW 18.Feb.45; SAFE IN U.K.28.Apr.45
M65376	Pte.	NORTHEY,A.E.	26,Mar.43 - 11.Dec.43	W.20.Jul.43;KIA.11.Dec.43
M65310	Pte.	NORTHEY,L.H.	12.Dec.43 - 20.Dec.43	KIA 20.Dec.43
K62490	Pte.	NORTHEY,R.A.	25.Jul.43 - 27.Jul.43	W.26.Jul.43;KIA.17.Dec.44
M60439	Pte.	NORWEST,L.P.	5.May.43 - 7.Jan.44	
K9188	Pte.	NOTT,A.H.	7.Jun.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K72606	Pte.	NOWELL,N.C.	4.Jun.43 - 11.Dec.43	KIA 11.Dec.43
K51750	Pte.	NOWLIN,H.F.	12.Aug.44 - 25.Sep.45	
K54064	Pte.	NYSCHUK,M.M.	18.Dec.42 - 23.Feb.44	W.27.Dec.43
K3918	Pte.	OAKLEY,E.	25.Apr.45 - 21.Jun.45	

OTHER RANKS

Regt. No.	Final Seaforth Rank	Name		Service with Seaforths	Casualties
K50514	Pte.	O'BRIEN,A.J.		16.Feb.44 - 16.Apr.44	POW 16.Apr.44; SAFE IN U.K.9.May.45
K52751	L/Cpl.	O'BRIEN, J.A.		26.Sep.39 - 23.May.44	POW 23.May.44; SAFE IN U.K.9.May.45
D71599	Pte.	O'BRIEN,J.M.		28.May.43 - 27.Jul.43	KIA 27.Jul.43
K52241	Pte.	O'BRIEN,R.		13.Sep.39 - 21.Jul.43	DoW 21.Jul.43
K3571	Pte.	O'CONNELL,J.A.		25.Apr.45 - 20.Jun.45	
K3999	Pte.	O'CONNOR,J.P.A.		18.Apr.45 - 14.Jun.45	
K49810	L/Sgt.	O'CONNOR,L.C.		9.Feb.44 - 25.Sep.45	
K52743	Pte.	O'DARE,P.		26.Sep.39 - 8.Feb.43	
K67763	Pte.	ODDY,J.E.		23.Oct.42 - 11.Apr.43	
K53226	Pte.	O'DONNELL,C.E.		22.Jun.40 - 22.Jun.40.	DIED 14.Oct.44
E26321	Pte.	O'FARRELL,J.G.M.		25.Jul.43 - 11.Feb.45	W.11.Feb.45
L86603	Pte.	OFSTIE,W.H.		19.Jul.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K52685	Cpl.	OHLING,O.E.		23.Sep.39 - 19.Dec.43	W.25.Jul.43
K16497	Pte.	O'KEEFE,H.D.		16.Feb.44 - 24.Jul.44	
A115763	Pte.	OLIVER,H.F.		22.Feb.45 - 12..Apr.45	W.12.Apr.45
M35088	Pte.	OLIVER,J.H.		21.May.43 - 16.Sep.43	
B54983	Pte.	OLSEN,O.E.		27.Dec.43 - 8.Feb.44	W.8.Feb.44
K74743	Pte.	OLSON,E.O.		4.Dec.42 - 26.Aug.44	W.26.Aug.44;DoW.27.Aug.44
K43534	Sgt.	OLSON,F.L.		25.Jul.43 - 25.Sep.45	W.12.Dec.43
K37045	Pte.	OLSON,H.O.		23.Nov.39 - 4.Feb.40	
K48727	Cpl.	OLSON,M.C.		13.Aug.43 - 25.Sep.45	W.23.May.44
M10653	Pte.	OLYNYK,H.		21.Jul.43 - 6.Oct.43	KIA 6.Oct.43
M11036	Pte.	O'MALLEY,J.F.		26,Jun.44 - 25.Sep.45	
K65084	Pte.	ONDZIK,S.A.		1.Sep.43 - 13.Sep.43	
K12091	Pte.	O'NEILL,T.		18.Jul.45 - 25.Sep.45	W.21.Apr.45
M105216	Pte.	ORLANDO,G.		16.Feb.44 - 17.Sep.44	W.17.Sep.44
K53110	Pte.	ORR,G.B.		11.May.40 - 30.Oct.42	
K52327	Pte.	ORR,J.		15.Sep.39 - 27.Nov.44	
M103056	Pte.	OSBAK,A.H.		1.Sep.43 - 23.May.44	POW 23.May.44; SAFE IN U.K.23.May.45
K65040	Pte.	OSBORNE,H.W.		22.Oct.44 - 24.Dec.44	
B143533	Pte.	OSMUN,W.E.Jr.		27.Dec.43 - 18.Jul.45	W.27.Dec.43;W.24.Jan.45
L27383	Pte.	OSTEPCHUK,S.		21.Apr.44 - 18.Jul.45	
K37044	Sgt.	OSTERGARD,J.C.		1.Dec.39 - 31.May.45	
K609012	Pte.	OSTROWSKI,W.		25.Apr.45 - 20.Jun.45	
E5516	Pte.	OUELLETTE,L.		23.May.44 - 24.Jul.44	
K74626	Pte.	OVERILL,W.J.		27.Nov.42 - 6.Oct.43	KIA 6.Oct.43
B132609	Pte.	OWENS,A.H.		28.May.43 - 3.Dec.43	
D72125	Pte.	OWENS,F.S.P.		19.Feb.43 - 21.Jul.43	W.21.Jul.43
K52421	P/Cpl.	OXENBURY,C.		16.Sep.39 - 5.Dec.39	
H43382	Pte.	PACHKOWSKY,W.		20.Feb.45 - 18.Jul.45	
K52249	Pte.	PADDOCK,W.F.		14.Sep.39 - 21.Jan.43	
K53204	L/Cpl.	PADGET,E.M.		22.Jun.40 - 31.May.45	
K16466	Pte.	PAINE,G.F.H.		12.Dec.43 - 15.Dec.43	W.15.Dec.43;DoW.19.Dec.43
K42026	Pte.	PALMER,F.H.	MiD	2.Dec.39 - 16.Jan.42	
K52244	Cpl.	PALMER,G.E.		13.Sep.39 - 25.Sep.45	
K63062	A/Cpl.	PALMER,G.Elmer		17.Nov.43 - 4.Jan.45	KIA 4.Jan.45
K63064	Pte.	PALMER,L.W.		25.Jul.43 - 4.Jan.45	W.17.Dec.43
B82236	Pte.	PALMER,N.W.		6.Dec.44 - 25.Feb.45	INJURED,8.Apr.44; W.25.Feb.45
K40159	Pte.	PAOLINI,G.		14.Feb.45 - 21.Jun.45	
K52502	Pte.	PARK,H.		18.Sep.39 - 31.Jan.43	
K52807	Pte.	PARK,T.P.		29.Sep.39 - 5.Aug.43	W.5.Aug.43
K52772	Pte.	PARK,W.J.	DCM (1914-1918)	27.Sep.39 - 24.Jun.42	KILLED 2.Jul.44
K48272	Pte.	PARK,W.John		12.Dec.43 - 20.Dec.43	W.20.Dec.43
U1938	Pte.	PARKE,R.T.W.		4.Dec.42 - 28.Jul.43;	W.28.Jul.43
K37805	Pte.	PARKER,H.W.		5.May,43 - 25.Sep.45	
K52677	Cpl.	PARKER,W.A.		22.Sep.39 - 19.Jun.44	
B102183	Pte.	PARKHILL,G.W.		27.Dec.43 - 23.May.44	KIA 23.May.44
K52159	Pte.	PARKINSON,R.K.		26.Sep.39 - 23.Dec.39	
L103210	L/Cpl.	PARKINSON,T.R.		26.May.44 - 29.Apr.45	
H9413	Pte.	PARMETER,W.R.		25.May.44 - 17.Sep.44	POW 17.Sep.44; SAFE IN U.K.11.May.45
K53106	Pte.	PARR,R.		11.May.40 - 4.May.45	W.10.Jul.43
A82227	Pte.	PARROW,F.		28.May.43 - 20.May.44	
K52830	Pte.	PARRY,A.		2.Oct.39 - 5.Aug.43	KIA 5.Aug.43
H43295	Pte.	PASCAL,N.		28.Mar.45 - 17.Jul.45	
K68716	Pte.	PASH,W.J.A.		20.Sep.44 - 25.Sep.45	

OTHER RANKS

Regt. No.	Final Seaforth Rank	Name	Service with Seaforths	Casualties
K42924	Pte.	PASTOR,F.	23.Apr.43 - 28.Jul.43	W.28.Jul.43;KIA.25.Dec.43
K54008	Pte.	PATCH,J.D.	30.Nov.41 - 9.Nov.43	
K50209	L/Cpl.	PATERSON,K.A.	16.Feb.44 - 22.Oct.44	W.23.May.44;KIA;22.Oct.44
K52796	Pte.	PATTEN,P.J.	28.Sep.39 - 14.Feb.43	
E100162	Pte.	PATTERSON,W.	25.Jul.43 - 25.Sep.45	
K53845	Pte.	PATTON,K.M.	17.Oct.41 - 8.Jan.43	
K51450	Pte.	PAUL,D.K.	26.May.44 - 25.Sep.45	
K54076	Pte.	PAUL.H.N.	28.Aug.42 - 25.Sep.45	
K3910	Pte.	PAVLIKIS,N.A.	25.Apr.45 - 21.Jun.45	
K53322	S/Sgt.	PAWLUK,W.	23.Apr.43 - 8.Sep.45	
K57406	Pte.	PAXTON,N.J.	15.Jul.45 - 25.Sep.45	W.23.May.44
K2109	Pte.	PAY,G.L.	18.Dec.44 - 18.Jul.45	
H9500	L/Cpl.	PAYETTE,M.	6.May.45 - 5.Jun.45	
K42288	Pte.	PAYLISS,F.H.	4.Jun.43 - 8.Aug.43	W.5.Aug.43
M104096	Pte.	PAZIUK,H.	1.Sep.43 - 6.Aug.44	
K52446	Cpl.	PEACE,C.M.	16.Sep.39 - 6.Dec.43	W.6.Dec.43;DoW.14.Dec.43
K52513	Pte.	PEACOCK,C.	19.Sep.39 - 14.Feb.40	
K52835	Pte.	PEACOCK,M.M.	2.Oct.39 - 27.Dec.42	
K53371	Pte.	PEARCE,E.C.	12.Aug.40 - 1.Jan.41	
K53479	Pte.	PEARCE,H.T.	30.Nov.41 - 19.Nov.43	
K52317	Pte.	PEARCE,R.E.	15.Sep.39 - 29.Aug.43	
K59512	Pte.	PEARSALL,W.J.	4.Jun.45 - 16.Jun.45	
K52905	Pte.	PEARSON,C.	11.May.40 - 13.Jun.40	
K51562	Pte.	PEARSON,C.E.	1.May.44 - 23.May.44	KIA 23.May.44
K47052	WO 11 (CSM)	PEARSON,D.A.P.	17.Jul.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K54364	Pte.	PEARSON,J.	25.May.44 - 17.Sep.44	KIA 17.Sep.44
M55560	Pte.	PEARSON,John	20.Sep.44 - 14.Dec.44	KIA 14.Dec.44
K2848	Pte.	PEARSON,N.H.	7.Apr.44 ? - 6.Jan.45	
K75767	Pte.	PECK,R.S.	19.Jul.45 - 25.Sep.45	W.20.Sep.44
L21017	Pte.	PEDERSEN,D.N.	20.Sep.44 - 26.Feb.45	W.4.Jan.45
K57858	Sgt.	PEDERSEN,E.W.	1.Sep.43 - 25.Sep.45	
K52246	Cpl.	PEEBLES,R.	14.Sep.39 - 4.Jan.45	W.23.May.44;W.4.Jan.45
D109483	Pte.	PELLETIER,L.G.	12.Dec.43 - 8.Feb.44	DoW 9.Feb.44
K52467	A/Cpl.	PENDLEBURY,W.M.F.	18.Sep.39 - 26.Nov.40	
K58045	Pte.	PENDRY,A.A.	21.May.45 - 18.Jul.45	
K52329	WO 11 (CSM)	PENMAN,D.R.	15.Sep.39 - 22.Oct.44	W.16.Sep.44
K52617	Pte.	PENNY,D.M.	20.Sep.39 - 6.Apr.45	
M103542	Pte.	PERRAS,J.R.A.	17.Oct.43 - 18.Jul.45	W.10.Dec.43
K99545	Pte.	PERRITT,L.G.	13,Nov.42 - 21.Jul.43	W.21.Jul.43
K605392	Pte.	PERRY,T.R.	29.Jun.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K600083	Pte.	PERSON,J.E.	15.Apr.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K52734	L/Cpl.	PETERS,B.O.	26.Sep.39 - 31.Aug.42	
K52237	Pte.	PETERS,B.	13,Sep.39 - 18.May.45	
K2172	Pte.	PETERS,E.J.	14.Feb.45 - 18.Jul.45	
K52451	Pte.	PETERS,R.T.	16.Sep.39 - 17.Jan.40	
K53541	Cpl.	PETERS,R.L.	31.Oct.41 - 11.Apr.45	INJURED 16.Nov.44
K53617	Pte.	PETERSEN,A.	27.Dec.41 - 16.Apr.42	
M12051	A/Cpl.	PETERSEN,H.N.	7.Aug.43 - 7.Jul.45	
K52322	Pte.	PETERSEN,W.F.C.	15.Sep.39 - 27.Nov.44	
K52990	Pte.	PETERSON,H.J.	11.May.40 - 23.Jul.44	
K2320	Pte.	PETERSON,P.J.L.	20,Feb.45 - 18.Jul.45	
K52883	Pte.	PETHICK,H.N.	27.Nov.39 - 14.Jan.45	
K52524	Pte.	PHILION,P.E.	19.Sep.39 - 23.June.45	W.28.Jul.43
			20.Sep.44 - 23.Jun.45	
K52921	Pte.	PHILLION,L.	11.May.40 - 5.May.43	
K52756	Pte.	PHILLIPS,D.J.	26.Sep.39 - 4.May.44	
K49446	A/Cpl.	PHILLIPS,F.J.L.	26.May.44 - 24.Feb.45	W.24.Feb.45
K11207	Pte.	PHILLIPS,G.A.	20.Feb.45 - 5.Jun.45	
D83026	Pte.	PHILLIPS,H.	20.Sep.44 - 12.Jul.45	
K6186	Pte.	PHILP,W.F.	25.Apr.45 - 21.Jun.45	
K53159	Pte.	PICK,L.A.	8.Aug.41 - 7.Jun.43	
K52271	Pte.	PICKARD,R.D.	14.Sep.39 - 22.Sep.39	
K4637	Pte.	PICKERING,A.N.	25.Apr.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K605921	Pte.	PICKERING,Arthur	29.Jun.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K53079	Pte.	PICKWELL,R.A.	22.Jun.40 - 5.May.43	
K42304	Pte.	PICONE,D.	22.Jul.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K67412	A/Sgt.	PIERCE,J.B.	29.Jun.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K29167	Cpl.	PIERCE,N.S.	16.Oct.39 - 1.Feb.44	
K42890	Pte.	PIERREROY,J.P.	5.May.43 - 7.Dec.43	
C120246	Pte.	PIGDEN,W.J.	26.May.44 - 17.Sep.44	W.17.Sep.44
K73746	Pte.	PIKE,B.	12.Dec.43 - 23.May.44	W.13.Dec.43

OTHER RANKS

Regt. No.	Final Seaforth Rank	Name	Service with Seaforths	Casualties
K53380	Pte.	PIKE,N.W.	26.Sep.40 - 13.Jan.42	
K54070	Pte.	PIKE,W.D.	30.Apr.43 - 4.Apr.44	W.5.Aug.43;W.17.Dec.43; W.4.Apr.44
M56529	Pte.	PIMM,L.V.	25.Jul.43 - 6.Dec.43	KIA 6.Dec.43
D71133	Pte.	PINCH,T.	10.Aug.42 - 8.Oct.43	W.9.Oct.43
K52285	Sgt.	PINSON,J.A.	14.Sep.39 - 5.Mar.45	
K68552	Pte.	PION,J.G.	28.Aug.42 - 8.Aug.43	W.28.Jul.43;W.23.May.44
M65588	Pte.	PIPER,P.	12.Aug.44 - 18.Jul.45	INJURED 18.Sep.44; INJURED 15.Dec.44
K52337	Pte.	PIPER,W.E.	15.Sep.39 - 20.Jun.40	
A48552	Pte.	PITBLADO,L.W.	18.Dec.44 - 5.Feb.45	INJURED 14.Jan.45
K57536	Pte.	PITMAN,J.	16.Jun.43 - 2.Jun.45	
K53633	Pte.	PITTMAN,R.C.	12.Mar.42 - 11.Aug.42	
K3575	Pte.	PJEVACH,B.	16.May.45 - 20.Jun.45	
K62617	Pte.	PLANONDON,H.	20.Mar.42 - 5.Jan.43	
M10809	Pte.	PLANT,R.T.	16.Jun.43 - 13.Jul.45	
K986	Pte.	PLASKIN,F.	3,Apr.45 - 28.Jul.45	
K53059	Pte.	PLECAS,P.	30.Nov.41 - 22.Jul.43	KIA 22.Jul.43
K53542	Pte.	PLITT,W.J.	12.Sep.40 - 27.Mar.41	
K52728	Sgt.	PLOWRIGHT,L.G.	25.Sep.39 - 17.Oct.43	
A49518	Pte.	PLUMRIDGE,W.C.	30.Dec.43 - 1.Nov.44	
K37046	Pte.	POIRIER,G.J.	24.Nov.39 - 28.Apr.42	
K1323	Pte.	POIRIER,L.J.	5.Sep.44 - 18.Jul.45	
K40189	Pte.	POLLOCK,W.	4.Jun.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K53213	Pte.	POLLY.G.M.	27.Dec.40 - 2,Jan.44	
K52925	Pte.	PONEDEL,M.	20.Jun.41 - 1.Jun.44	
K52349	Pte.	PONTELLA,R.	15.Sep.39 - 20.Mar.44	
K54073	A/L/Sgt.	POOLE,J.C.	28.Aug.42 - 5.Aug.43	KIA 5.Aug.43
K52738	Pte.	POPPELL,H.	25.Sep.39 - 1.Mar.43	
K52573	Pte.	POPPELL,L.	19.Sep.39 - 14.Jun.45	W.29.Jan.44
K53241	Pte.	PORRITT,R.H.	4.Apr.41 - 15.Jul.45	W.12.Jan.45
K52718	CQMS	PORTWOOD,W.J.	25.Sep.39 - 31.May.45	W.21.Jul.43
K53753	Sgt.	POSTGATE,W.	22.Dec.43 - 15.Jan.45	
K43530	Pte.	POTTER,W.L.	25.Jul.43 - 20.Apr.44	
K69048	Pte.	POTTS,J.T.	21.May.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K53033	Pte.	POULSEN,P.L.	22.Jun.40 - 29.Jan.43	
K46427	Pte.	POWELL,C.F.	3.Jul.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K67092	Pte.	POWELL,N.	13.Dec.39 - 26.Sep.41	
K52379	Pte.	POWER,J.B.	15.Sep.39 - 28.Nov.42	
E38210	Pte.	POWERS,C.	10.Aug.43 - 22.Oct.44	INJURED 8.May.44; KIA 22.Oct.44
K45429	Pte.	POWERS,G.W.	30.Apr.43 - 23.Oct.44	POW 23.Oct,44; SAFE IN U.K.9.May.45
H6984	Pte.	POWNEY,E.J.	22.Dec.43 - 25.Sep.45	INJURED 11.Dec.44
K6127	Pte.	PRATICO,A.G.	15.Apr.45 - 15.Jun.45	
K52752	Pte.	PRATT,A.W.	26.Sep.39 - 21.Jul.43	W.21.Jul.43
K52526	Cpl.	PRATT,R.E.	19.Sep.39 - 25.Sep.45	W.21.Feb.44
K71981	Pte.	PRATTE,L.W,	30.Apr.43 - 3.Sep.43	
K53125	Pte./Cpl.	PREECE,T.S.	11.May.40 - 8.Jun.40	
K2730	Pte.	PRENTICE,T.	25.Apr.45 - 9.Jul.45	
K53008	Pte.	PRESCOTT,W.A.	11.May.40 - 20.Jun.40	
K52294	Sgt.	PRESTON,J.	14.Sep.39 - 14.Jun.45	
K52536	Pte.	PRETTY,O.W.D.	19.Sep.39 - 25.Aug.42	
K49691	L/Cpl.	PRICE,H.V.	20.Sep.44 - 23.Jun.45	
M7459	Pte.	PRICE,J.	19.Feb.44 - 23.May.44	W.23.May.44
M45672	Pte.	PRICE,L.M.	13.Aug.43 - 26.Jan.45	
K53600	Pte.	PRICE,M.G.	30.Jan.41 - 10.Feb.44	W.10.Feb.44
K3218	Pte.	PRICE,W.G.	25.Apr.45 - 20.Jun.45	
K22422	Pte.	PRICE,W.	4.Jun.45 - 25.Sep.45	W.23.Oct.44
K71319	Pte.	PRINCE,R.	29.Jan.43 - 6.Mar.43	
K602901	Pte.	PRINCE,Robert	29.Jun.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K67811	Pte.	PRINGLE,E.A.	28.Aug.42 - 25.Sep.45	INJURED 24.May.44; W.18.Jan.45
H19043	Pte.	PRINGLE,J.G.	26.May.44 - 15.Dec.44	W.26.Aug.44;W.15.Dec.44
H101162	Pte.	PRINGLE,N.H.	18.Dec.44 - 25.Sep.45	W.9.Jan.45
M101414	Pte.	PROCHNAU,A.R.	17.Oct.43 - 3.Aug.44	
K67095	Pte.	PROCTOR,N.C.	29.Nov.41 - 14.Apr.42	
K37235	Pte.	PRODNUK,G.R.	1.Nov.40 - 30.Oct.44	
K49681	Pte.	PROFIT,A.M.	13.Apr.45 - 19.Jun.45	
L533467	Pte.	PROKOSCH,E.W.	21.May.45 - 25.Sep.45	
L66648	Pte.	PRONGUA,C.V.	25.May.44 - 17.Oct.44	W.17.Sep.44;KIA.17.Oct.44

OTHER RANKS

Regt. No.	Final Seaforth Rank	Name		Service with Seaforths	Casualties
K67177	Pte.	PROUDFOOT,A.		14.Aug.42 - 5.Aug.43	W.5.Aug.43
K52242	CQMS	PROUDFOOT,Archibald		15.Sep.39 - 20.Jun.41	
K52849	Pte.	PRUDHOMME,F.L.		3.Oct.39 - 31.Jan.43	
K50365	Pte.	PRYGROOSKI,B.		27.Dec.43 - 22.Oct.44	W.22.Oct.44
G54549	Pte.	PURVIS,D.G.		11.Jan.45 - 18.Apr.45	
C100922	Pte.	PYE,J.W.		26.May.44 - 17.Sep.44	KIA 17.Sep.44
K6355	Pte.	QUAAS,W.		21.May.45 - 21.Jun.45	
K75196	Cpl.	QUEEN,J.M.		28.Aug.42 - 16.Aug.43	
K10188	Pte.	QUICK,G.		20.Sep.44 - 18.Apr.45	
K98149	Pte.	QUISSY,E.		25.Jul.43 - 18.Oct.44	W.18.Oct.44
K52428	Pte.	QUOVADIS,G.T.		16.Sep.39 - 23.Nov.39	KIA 21.Feb.45
L100876	Pte.	RABBETZ,M.		25.May.44 - 19.Dec.44	
K52497	Cpl.	RADFORD,C.H.		18.Sep.39 - 24.Nov.41	
K42700	Pte.	RAE,A.		30.Apr.43 - 4.Feb.44	
K53544	A/L/Cpl.	RAE,M.	MM	8.Mar.42 - 17.Oct.43	
K66583	Pte.	RAE,R.		30.Apr.43 - 22.Jul.43	W.22.Jul.43
K52221	Pte.	RAFFA,F.		13,Sep.39 - 31.May.45	
K602549	Pte.	RAKNERUD,E.A.		29.Jun.45 - 25.Sep.45	
M106411	Pte.	RANDALL,W.F.		5.Sep.44 - 20.Sep.44	W.21.Sep.44
K52258	Cpl.	RANKIN,H.	MiD	14,Sep.39 - 14.Jan.45	W.23.May.44
K16507	Pte.	RAWLICK,J.M.		27.Dec.43 - 23.Jan.44	
K52288	Pte.	READ,A.H.		14.Sep.39 - 17.Apr.42	
B134371	Pte.	REDDING,G.D.		26.May.44 - 11.Oct.44	
K65950	Pte.	REDDINGTON,T.J.		13.Aug.43 - 18.Jan.45	W.23.May.44;W.18.Jan.45
K53060	Pte.	REID,A.J.		11.May.40 - 8.Aug.43	
K52961	Pte.	REID,A.B.		11.May.40 - 9.Mar.44	
K52460	A/L/Sgt.	REID,D.		18.Sep.39 - 9.Nov.40	
K76326	Pte.	REID,D.G.		20.Feb.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K38637	Pte.	REID,G.A.		23.Oct.42 - 17.Oct.43	POW 17.Oct.43; SAFE IN U.K.13.Apr.45
K52429	Pte.	REID,G.Y.		16,Sep.39 - 4.Apr.40	
K62730	Sgt.	REID,J.S.		27.Dec.43 - 30.Jan.44	W.25.Jan.44
M36975	Pte.	REID,M.O.		25.Jul.43 - 27.Jul.43	W.27.Jul.43
K49539	Pte.	REID,R.		21.May.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K53327	Pte.	REILANDER,T.		22.Jun.40 - 25.Sep.45	
K68833	Pte.	REIMER,W.A.		13.Aug.43 - 6.Oct.43	KIA 6.Oct.43
K6140	Pte.	REITH,W.G.		16.May,45 - 6.Jun.45	
K46659	Pte.	REMMEM,G.		19.Jul.45 - 25.Sep.45	W.16.Sep.44
K42025	Pte.	REMPEL,F.		2.Dec.39 - 25.Jul.40	
K52700	A/Sgt.	RENDLE,H.		23,Sep.39 - 7.Aug.42	
K52917	Pte.	RENNIE,E.		11.May.40 - 8.Feb.41	
K52312	Cpl.	RENNIE,D.W.		14.Sep.39 - 17.Sep.44	KIA 17.Sep.44
K92364	Bdr.	RENSTROM,S.		17.Jul.45 - 25.Sep.45	
E49607	Pte.	RETIFF,M.		28.May.43 - 9.Dec.43	W.8.Dec.43;DoW.9.Dec.43
K42378	Pte.	REYNOLDS,F.E.		16,Jun.43 - 4.Sep.45	
K52261	Pte.	REYNOLDS,J.		14.Sep.39 - 5.Dec.39	
K52712	Pte.	RHIND,C.W.		23,Sep.39 - 4.Oct.40	DIED 2.Dec.43
B83361	Pte.	RHUDE,J.T.		14.Sep.43 - 23.Oct.44	POW 23.Oct.44; SAFE IN U.K.11.May.45
K53246	Pte.	RICE,R.R.		13.Feb.42 - 23.Jun.45	
G18357	Pte.	RICHARD,M.J.		10.Aug.43 - 6.Dec.43	
D71266	Pte.	RICHARDSON,D.J.		28.May.43 - 20.Oct.43	W.22.Jul.43;W.20.Oct.43
M3247	Pte.	RICHARDSON,E.M.		6.May.44 - 17.Sep.44	KIA 17.Sep.44
C117018	Pte.	RICHARDSON,R.		26.May.44 - 18.Oct.44	KIA 18.Oct.44
K52814	Pte.	RICHARDSON,W.A.		29.Sep.39 - 10.Jul.42	
K52548	Pte.	RICHARDSON,G.E.		19.Sep.39 - 20.Sep.43	
K53025	Pte.	RIELLEY,C.W.		11.May.40 - 20.Jun.40	W.1.Sep.44
K52737	Pte.	RIGBY,R.D.		25.Sep.39 - 14.Feb.43	
K37077	Pte.	RILEY,G.		1.Dec.39 - 1.Aug.43	KIA 9.Dec.43
K53290	Pte.	RIMMER,O.A.		31.Oct.41 - 11.Dec.43	W.11.Dec.43
B38115	L/Cpl.	RINK,A.R.		5.Feb.44 - 18.Jul.45	W.31.Aug.44
K6174	Pte.	RINTOUL,A.M.		9.May.45 - 19.Jun.45	
D91740	Pte.	RIOPEL,P.		20.Feb.45 - 29.May.45	DIED 29.May.45
K62956	Pte.	RISELEY,J.		17.Oct.43 - 25.Feb.45	W.6.Dec.43;W.22.Oct.44; W.25.Feb.45
K43045	Pte.	RITCHIE,C.P.		13.Aug.43 - 26.Dec.44	W.23.May.44;POW.26.Dec.44; SAFE IN U.K.14.May.45

OTHER RANKS

Regt. No.	Final Seaforth Rank	Name		Service with Seaforths	Casualties
K69651	Pte.	RIVERS,C.A.		3.Aug.43 - 25.Sep.45	
C121141	Pte.	ROACHE,G.R.		25.May.44 - 18.Jul.45	INJURED 14.Dec.44
K53188	Pte.	ROBERTS,E.K.		8.Nov.40 - 22.Jul.43	W.22.Jul.43;W.27.Dec.43
E52888	Pte.	ROBERTS,J.		28.May.43 - 25.Dec.43	
K52267	WO 11 (CSM)	ROBERTS,T.		14.Sep.39 - 31.May.45	W.21.Dec.44
K52273	P/Sgt.	ROBERTS,W.A.		14.Sep.39 - 29.May.40	
K53760	Pte.	ROBERTSON,A.		14.Aug.42 - 25.Sep.45	W.6.Oct.43
K52982	Cpl.	ROBERTSON,D.L.		11.May.40 - 23.Jun.45	
H100251	Pte.	ROBERTSON,E.		1.Sep.43 - 6.Oct.43	KIA 6.Oct.43
K65501	Cpl.	ROBERTSON,G.C.		6.Jun.44 - 25.Sep.45	
K52600	Pte.	ROBERTSON,J.W.		20.Sep.39 - 10.Aug.42	
K72738	L/Cpl.	ROBERTSON,J.R.G.		28.Aug.42 - 7.Jul.45	
K92447	Pte.	ROBERTSON,J.R.		19.Feb.44 - 16.Apr.44	W.5.Apr.44;POW.16.Apr.44; SAFE IN U.K.14.May.45
B133114	Pte.	ROBERTSON,R.		28.May.43 - 7.Mar.44	
K52901	Cpl.	ROBERTSON,W.B.		11.May.40 - 4.May.45	W.14.Dec.44
H43065	Pte.	ROBINSON,C.A.		21.May.45 - 7.Aug.45	W.26.Mar.45
K52561	Pte.	ROBINSON,C.D.		19.Sep.39 - 8.Aug.43	DIED 12.Aug.43
K52257	Pte.	ROBINSON,C.E.		19.Sep.39 - 4.May.45	W.21.Dec.44
B144333	Pte.	ROBINSON,D.J.F.		26.May.44 - 13.Feb.45	W.13.Feb.45;DoW 13.Feb.45
K52775	Pte.	ROBINSON,L.C.		27.Sep.39 - 5.Mar.45	
K52277	Pte.	ROBINSON,P.L.		14.Sep.39 - 26.Feb.40	
M105525	Pte.	ROBINSON,R.J.		9.Feb.44 - 18.Jul.45	
K52260	Pte.	ROBINSON,R.T.		14.Sep.39 - 26.Aug.44	W.26.Aug.44
M12611	L/Cpl.	ROBINSON,R.E.		23.May.44 - 18.Jul.45	
K52309	Pte.	ROBINSON,S.S.		14.Sep.39 - 16.May.41	
K53344	Pte.	ROBINSON,W.A.		10.Oct.40 - 5.May.41	
K53546	Pte.	ROBINSON,W.H.		8.Nov.40 - 20.Nov.41	
K53143	Pte.	ROCHE,J.P.		22.Jun.40 - 26.Jun.40	
P7425	A/Sgt.	ROCHFORD,C.N.		12.Aug.44 - 23.Jun.45	
K52138	Pte.	ROCHFORT,E.P.		12.Sep.39 - 21.Jun.40	
K37073	Pte.	ROCK,T.F.		1.Dec.39 - 31.Mar.45	
C103253	L/Cpl.	ROCKBURN,J.J.		26.May.44 - 28.Aug.45	
C10579	Pte.	ROCKBURNE,L.		12.Dec.43 - 20.Dec.43	
K47	Pte.	RODGERS,R.R.		22.Jul.43 - 31.Oct.43	
K1708	Pte.	ROE,A.G.		13.Sep.44 - 21.Oct.44	
K52297	Pte.	ROGERS,E.H.V.		14.Sep.39 - 2.Feb.43	
K52304	Pte.	ROGERS,F.A.		16.Sep.39 - 29.Feb.40	
K71575	Pte.	ROGERS,N.		16.May.45 - 25.Sep.45	
L74638	Pte.	ROGERS,R.C.		1.Sep.43 - 3.Sep.45	
K4154	Pte.	ROGERS,S.F.		4.Jun.45 - 19.Jul.45	
K69707	Pte.	ROLSTON,H.		25.Nov.43 - 23.May.44	W.9.Dec.43;KIA.23.May.44
H204589	Pte.	ROMANOW,D.		20.Sep.44 - 18.Jun.45	
C75054	Pte.	ROMBOUGH,E.W.		26.May.44 - 22.Jun.44	
K51240	Pte.	ROMERO,G.W.		26.May.44 - 28.Nov.44	W.16.Sep.44
M104930	Pte.	ROOKE,G.A.	MiD	28.Mar.44 - 16.Apr.44	POW 16.Apr.44; SAFE IN U.K.11.May.45
M105541	Pte.	ROPCHAN,M.G.		25.Nov.43 - 28.May.44	INJURED 28.May.44; DIED 30.May.44
H8636	Pte.	ROSE,C.M.		25.May.44 - 18.Jul.45	
K50398	Pte.	ROSENBERG,A.E.		9.Feb.44 - 6.Apr.44	POW.6.Apr.44; SAFE IN U.K.14.May.45
K76836	Pte.	ROSOMAN,H.W.		28.Aug.42 - 23.Dec.43	W.23.Dec.43
K67913	Pte.	ROSS,D.W.		9.Feb.44 - 25.Sep.45	W.12.Apr.45
K52148	Pte.	ROSS,E.J.		12.Sep.39 - 17.Dec.43	KIA 17.Dec.43
K607684	Pte.	ROSS,H.D.		25.Apr.45 - 18.Jul.45	
K51667	Pte.	ROSS,J.S.		19.Feb.44 - 25.Sep.45	W.26.Dec.44
K52702	Pte.	ROSS,J.		23.Sep.39 - 27.Jul.43	
K50863	Pte.	ROSS,J.M.		6.May.45 - 12.Jun.45	
A103224	Pte.	ROSS,J.W.		30.Dec.43 - 23.May.44	KIA 23.May.44
K42807	Pte.	ROSS,M.C.		20.Nov.42 - 25.Sep.45	W.22.Jul.43
K1535	Pte.	ROSSITER,J.W.		18.Dec.44 - 18.Jul.45	
K53943	Pte.	ROSSO,J.		21.Aug.42 - 1.Aug.45	
H10806	Pte.	ROTMARK,L.		14.Feb.45 - 18.Jul.45	
M12234	Pte.	ROWAN,H.		25.Nov.43 - 8.Dec.43	KIA 8.Dec.43
K604766	Pte.	ROWAN,W.D.		29.Jun.45 - 25.Sep.45	
B149489	Pte.	ROY,A.H.		4.Jun.45 - 25.Sep.45	W.12.Apr.45
K52804	CQMS	ROYLE,G.V.		29.Sep.39 - 5.May.43	
K52992	Pte.	ROYSTON,R.A.		22.Jun.40 - 19.Jun.42	
M106429	Pte.	RUCKA,M.		1.May.44 - 8.Jan.45	W.13.Dec.43;KIA.8.Jan.45

OTHER RANKS

Regt. No.	Final Seaforth Rank	Name	Service with Seaforths	Casualties
K4777	Pte.	RUOTSALA,A.	28.Mar.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K4119	Pte.	RURKA,J.	16.May.45 - 8.Jun.45	
H195151	Pte.	RUSHOWIC,P.	25.May.44 - 1.Sep.44	KIA 1.Sep.44
K50967	Cpl.	RUSNAK,W.	19.Feb.44 - 25.Apr.45	INJURED 6.Jan.45
M107720	L/Cpl.	RUSSELL,D.	20.Sep.44 - 18.Jul.45	W.14.Dec.44
K69669	Pte.	RUSSELL,G.F.	6.May.44 - 23.May.44	KIA 23.May.44
K3390	Pte.	RUSSELL,J.H.	15.Apr.45 - 9.Jul.45	
K62201	Pte.	RUSSELL,J.A.	25.Jul.43 - 13.Nov.43	
K52569	Pte.	RUTHERFORD,F.P.	19.Sep.39 - 25.Oct.41	
K49910	Pte.	RUTHIG,N.W.	30.Nov.43 - 26.Aug.44	W.23.May.44;KIA.26.Aug.44
K68532	Pte.	RUTLEDGE,H.G.W.	17.Nov.43 - 24.Feb.45	W.20.Dec.43;W.24.Feb.45
M105676	Pte.	RUTTENFUSSER,W.J.	12.Dec.43 - 14.Feb.44	
K37047	Pte.	RYAN-LEWIS,B.	1.Dec.39 - 22.Jul.43	W.22.Jul.42
K53499	Pte.	RYDINGS,G.S.	30.Nov.41 - 25.Aug.42	
K51564	Pte.	RYMER,G.B.	6.May.44 - 25.Sep.45	W.23.May.44
K50621	Pte.	RYSSTAD,O.	26.May.44 - 25.Sep.45	
K49545	Pte.	RYTER,W.	30.Nov.43 - 21.Jan.44	
M38918	Pte.	RYZNAR,J.	20.Feb.45 - 16.Jul.45	
K52269	Pte.	SABBLUT,J.	14.Sep.39 - 21.Aug.40	
B155383	Pte.	SABOURIN,J.G.	22.Feb.45 - 18.Jul.45	
K52397	Pte.	SADLER,D.S.	20.Sep.39 - 13.Mar.43	W.25.Apr.45
K573521	Cpl.	SAFARIK,N.E.	25.Jun.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K52276	Pte.	SAGER,C.B.	14.Sep.39 - 3.Oct.39	
K52574	Pte.	SAGER,N.F.	19.Sep.39 - 5.Dec.43	KIA 5.Dec.43
M31052	Pte.	SAGMOEN,M.S.	17.Nov.43 - 11.Dec.43	KIA 11.Dec.43
K605296	Pte.	SALAMANDYK,P.J.	29.Jun.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K2206	L/Cpl.	SALLOWS,L.J.	11.Jan.45 - 20.Jun.45	
K6255	Pte.	SALLOWS,W.H.	16.Jul.45 - 23.Jul.45	
K52391	Pte./Cpl.	SALTER,A.F.	20.Sep.39 - 25.Jun.43	
K52991	Cpl.	SALTMARSH,J.W.	22.May.40 - 8.Nov.43	
K52668	Pte.	SALTWELL,D.G.	23.Sep.39 - 5.Dec.39	
K67515	Pte.	SALZBORN,E.	25.Jul.45 - 2.Sep.45	
K49991	Pte.	SAMPSON,A.D.	25.May.44 - 25.Sep.45	W.22.Feb.45
B115097	Pte.	SAMPSON,C.Jr.	14.Feb.45 - 14.Apr.45	W.14.Apr.45
M52740	Cpl.	SANDMAN,J.L.	19.Feb.44 - 4.Jun.45	
K53291	Pte.	SANSEVERINO,J.	8.Nov.40 - 4.May:45	W.21.Jul.43
L86904	Pte.	SARANCHUK,E.	14.May.44 - 30.Sep.44	
K50433	Pte.	SARGEANT,K.W.	10.Jan.44 - 14.Jun.45	W.26.Aug.44
K71002	Pte.	SAUL,A.	22.Jul.43 - 27.Jul.43	KIA 27.Jul.43
K50954	L/Cpl.	SAUNDERS,H.M.	25.Feb.44 - 13.Oct.44	W.17.May.44; INJURED 18.Sep.44
H9918	Pte.	SAUVE,A.	20.Sep.44 - 18.Jul.45	
D8606	Pte.	SAUVE,W.J.	10.Aug.43 - 31.May.44	W.12.Dec.43
K42561	Pte.	SAWATZKY,H.	23.Apr.43 - 28.Jul.43	W.28.Jul.43
H7202	A/Sgt.	SAWATZKY,J.L.	3.Aug.43 - 23.May.44	W.26.Dec.43;W.23.May.44; DoW 24.May.44
K52577	Pte.	SAWYER,I.	20.Sep.39 - 27.Sep.42	
L100104	Pte.	SAXON,A.	28.Oct.44 - 12.Apr.45	W.8.Dec.44;W.12.Apr.45
K52859	A/Cpl.	SCAIFE,R.	7.Oct.39 - 8.Oct.40	
K68848	Pte.	SCALES,W.	1.Sep.43 - 19.Oct.43	W.19.Oct.43
M65200	Pte.	SCARGALL,J.T.	12.Mar.42 - 25.Aug.43	
L102013	Pte.	SCHADT,V.A.	1.Sep.43 - 10.Dec.43	W.10.Dec.43
L154074	A/Cpl.	SCHAFF,M.	23.Apr.43 - 18.Jul.45	W.5.Aug.43;W.28.Jan.44
D86183	Pte.	SCHEFFER,J.	10.Aug.43 - 1.Jan.44	
K46040	Cpl.	SCHEKK,J.C.	1.Sep.43 - 25.Sep.45	
L64022	Pte.	SCHEIRICK,F.	1.Sep.43 - 28.Sep.44	W.23.May.44
K40914	Pte.	SCHLICHENMAYER,E.	25.Feb.44 - 25.Mar.44	W.25.Mar.44
M106426	Cpl.	SCHMIDT,O.R.	25.May.44 - 25.Sep.45	
D135996	L/Cpl.	SCHOFIELD,C.A.	1.Sep.43 - 18.Jul.45	W.26.Aug.44
K69656	Pte.	SCHRETLEN,A.	27.Jun.45 - 25.Sep.44	
K43505	Pte.	SCHULTZ,K.B.	11.Dec.42 - 25.Sep.45	W.8.Oct.43
K62832	Pte.	SCHULZ,P.	25.Jul.43 - 25.Sep.45	
K52640	Pte.	SCHUSTER,H.	21.Sep.39 - 29.May.40	
K27201	Pte.	SCHWARTZ,F.J.R.	25.Apr.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K607001	Pte.	SCHWARZ,F.A.	7.Jun.45 - 18.Jul.45	
F9191	Pte.	SCOTT,A.B.	11.Nov.43 - 18.Jul.45	
K52458	Pte.	SCOTT,D.C.	18.Sep.39 - 23.Nov.39	
K71113	Pte.	SCOTT,L.L.	21.May.43 - 8.Nov.43	
K4212	Pte.	SCOTT,M.J.	20.Feb.45 - 12.Apr.45	W.12.Apr.45
D140631	Pte.	SCOTT,M.	11.Jan.45 - 18.Jul.45	
K52146	Pte.	SCOTT,R.	12.Sep.39 - 4.Mar.42	

OTHER RANKS

Regt. No.	Final Seaforth Rank	Name	Service with Seaforths	Casualties
K66322	Pte.	SCOTT,R.H.	15.Nov.44 - 16.Dec.44	W.16.Dec.44
K52325	Pte.	SCRANTON,A.W.	15.Sep.39 - 1.Mar.43	
K48920	Pte.	SCREPNEK,T.	12.Dec.43 - 27.Dec.43	W.27.Dec.43
K53362	Pte.	SCRIVER,H.A.	1.Nov.40 - 4.May.45	W.2.Aug.43; INJURED 3.Jun.44
K45825	Cpl.	SCRUTON,J.W.	4.Jun.45 - 25.Sep.45	
L153566	Pte.	SEARL,J.M.	20.Feb.45 - 31.May.45	
K53314	Pte.	SEARS,W.H.	12.Sep.40 - 5.May.43	
C101774	Pte.	SEARSON,P.A.	12.Dec.43 - 12.Apr.44	W.12.Apr.44
C94238	Pte.	SEGUIN,L.	8.Jun.45 - 17.Jul.45	
K52837	Pte.	SEIBERT,T.	2.Oct.39 - 25.Sep.45	W.23.May.44
K53323	Pte.	SELCHEN,S.	30.Jan.41 - 9.Nov.42	
K46163	Pte.	SELFE,R.C. MiD	21.May.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K52266	Cpl.	SELLERS,E.F.	14.Sep.39 - 25.Dec.43	W.28.Jul.43;KIA.25.Dec.43
K52332	Pte.	SERVICE,R.N.	15.Sep.39 - 1.Feb.41	
H2548	Sgt.	SEWELL,R.F.	12.Jun.42 - 25.Sep.45	
M10629	Pte.	SEWELL,W.F.	20.Feb.45 - 25.Sep.45	W.27.Aug.44;W.12.Apr.45
H67476	Pte.	SEXSMITH,E.C.	12.Aug.44 - 15.Aug.44	
K42062	Pte.	SEYMOUR,G.H.	25.Jul.43 - 6.Apr.45	
K3285	Pte.	SHAMLEY,J.A.	25.Apr.45 - 20.Jun.45	
G53944	Pte.	SHANNON,G.W.	13.Sep.44 - 28.Sep.44	
D71887	Pte.	SHANNON,J.H.	8.Oct.43 - 4.Jun.44	
K52363	A/Cpl.	SHANTZ,A.L.G.	15.Sep.39 - 29.May.40	
K52360	Pte.	SHANTZ,E.L.E.	15.Sep.39 - 3.May.40	
K52869	Pte.	SHARP,J.	7.Oct.39 - 25.Apr.43	
M65208	Pte.	SHARRATT,L.B.	6.Feb.42 - 8.Oct.43	
K74858	Pte.	SHAVER,D.M.	7.Jun.45 - 15.Jul.45	
K42027	Pte.	SHAW,E.P.	2.Dec.39 - 14.Feb.40	
A3084	A/Cpl.	SHAW,E.	25.Nov.41 - 29.Jan.44	
K42576	Pte.	SHAW,G.C.	4.Oct.44 - 22.Oct.44	KIA 22.Oct.44
K50647	Pte.	SHAW,H.P.	23.May.44 - 14.Dec.44	W.18.Sep.44;W.14.Dec.44
K71453	Pte.	SHAW,J.	25.Dec.42 - 25.Sep.45	W.23.Dec.43
M103369	Pte.	SHAW,R.C.	5.May.43 - 27.Aug.43	W.29.Dec.43
K69755	Pte.	SHAW,R.L.	9.Feb.44 - 25.Sep.45	
K52605	Pte.	SHEARD,C.B.	20.Sep.39 - 18.Oct.39	
K4915	Pte.	SHEARER,W.G.	29.Jun.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K74992	Cpl.	SHEPHERD,A.A.	3.Jul.45 - 3.Sep.45	
K65276	Pte.	SHEPHERD,H.	23.Apr.43 - 20.Jul.43	
D135723	Pte.	SHEPPARD,E.A.	26.May.44 - 18.Sep.44	W.1.Jun.44;W.18.Sep.44
K63077	Cpl.	SHEPPARD,R.P.	1.Sep.43 - 25.May.44	KIA 25.May.44
K3633	Pte.	SHERIDAN,G.M.	7.Jun.45 - 15.Jul.45	
K52794	Pte.	SHERLOCK,N.	28.Sep.39 - 21.Oct.39	
K52716	Pte.	SHERMAN,J.	23.Sep.39 - 15.Feb.44	
K71117	Pte.	SHERO,J.A.	20.Sep.44 - 14.Jun.45	
K53104	Pte.	SHIELDS,E.J.	11.May.40 - 11.Apr.45	INJURED 4.Feb.45; W.11.Apr.45;DoW.11.Apr.45
K52770	Pte.	SHIELDS,T.A.	27.Sep.39 - 11.Oct.39	
K52007	Pte.	SHIPPERBOTTOM,K.N.	6.Sep.39 - 30.Jul.43	W.28.Jul.43
K52024	P/PSM WO 111	SHIPPERBOTTOM,R.W.	7.Sep.39 - 31.Jan.43	
K603679	Pte.	SHIPWAY,A.H.	7.Jun.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K52864	Sgt.	SHORT,E.N.	7.Oct.39 - 19.Oct.44	
M104846	Pte.	SIEBLS,A.J.	18.Mar.44 - 23.May.44	KIA 23.May.44
K604686	Pte.	SILBERNAGEL,A.A.	29.Jun.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K37289	Pte.	SILLERS,W.J.B.	1.Nov.40 - 21.Jul.43	KIA 21.Jul.43
B43238	L/Cpl.	SIMMONDS,J.H.	26.May.44 - 18.Jul.45	INJURED 16.Dec.44
K48470	Pte.	SIMMONDS,J.	22.Jan.45 - 18.Feb.45	W.18.Feb.45
F52063	Sgt.	SIMMS,L.	27.Dec.43 - 7.Feb.45	
K41329	Pte.	SIMON,S.	12.Dec.43 - 6.Jun.45	INJURED 10.Apr.44
B38220	Pte.	SIMPSON, D.P.	12.Aug.44 - 17.Oct. 44	W.17.Oct.44
K2140	Pte.	SIMPSON,E.	28.Mar.45 - 18.Jul.45	
K42942	Sgt.	SIMPSON,E.I.	30.May.44 - 25.Sep.45	
H101341	Pte.	SIMPSON,G.W.	1.Sep.43 - 23.May.44	POW 23.May.44; SAFE IN U.K.14.May.45
K42028	Pte.	SIMPSON,H.A.	2.Dec.39 - 25.Jul.40	
H101340	Pte.	SIMPSON,J.R.	1.Sep.43 - 14.Jul.44	
K53579	Cpl.	SIMPSON,K.R.	1.Nov.40 - 23.Jun.45	
K53601	Pte.	SIMPSON,T.F.	26.Sep.40 - 21.Jul.43	KIA 21.Jul.43
K54061	Pte.	SIMPSON,W.	28.Aug.42 - 26.Aug.44	KIA 26.Aug.44
K53294	Pte.	SIMPSON,W.W.	4.Apr.41 - 9.Dec.43	
K67345	Pte.	SINCLAIR,T.J.	15.Jul.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K52834	L/Sgt.	SINCLAIR,W.	2.Oct.39 - 9.Sep.45	

OTHER RANKS

Regt. No.	Final Seaforth Rank	Name		Service with Seaforths	Casualties
K605840	Pte.	SINCLAIR,W.B.		19.Jul.45 - 25.Sep.45	
M12540	Cpl.	SINCLAIR,W.G.		31.Dec.43 - 4.Jan.45	W.24.May.44;W.4.Jan.45
K48864	Pte.	SINGBEIL,L.		17.May.45 - 6.Jun.45	
K53190	Pte.	SIONS,G.M.		26.Sep.40 - 8.Dec.40	
K602960	Pte.	SIRVIO,A.		29.Jun.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K53515	Pte.	SISSON,J.H.		17.Jul.42 - 31.Jul.43	W.28.Jul.43
A82024	Pte.	SITTS,S.E.		28.May.43 - 28.Jul.43	W.28.Jul.43
K69476	Pte.	SIVECKI,J.		20.Sep.44 - 9.Jun.45	
M107725	Pte.	SJOBERG,W.M.		6.Jun.44 - 17.Sep.44	POW 17.Sep.44; SAFE IN U.K.9.May.45
K57602	Sgt.	SKED,W.B.		5.Feb.44 - 23.May.44	W.23.May.44
H8919	Pte.	SKENE,C.		6.May.44 - 2.Jul.45	
K49271	Pte.	SKILLEN,R.W.		19.Jul.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K53850	D.C.M.	SKINNER,D.G.		1.May.42 - 19.Apr.45	
K53664	WO 11 (RQMS)	SKINNER,F.E.		21.May.45 - 25.Sep.45	W.10.Jul.44
K73728	Pte.	SKINNER,G.W.		7.May.45 - 7.Jun.45	
K53983	Pte.	SKINNER,L.A.		30.Nov.41 - 16.Apr.42	
E52852	Cpl.	SKRZYPINSKI,F.F.		13.Aug.43 - 23.May.44	W.23.May.44
K51392	Pte.	SKUZANSKI,B.		22.Dec.44 - 21.Jul.45	
K37548	Pte.	SKUZANSKI,E.H.		26.May.44 - 31.May.44	W.31.May.44
K53561	Pte.	SLABY,C.L.		1.Nov.40 - 13.Jan.42	
K48384	Pte.	SLAUGHTER,A.W.		17.Oct.43 - 23.May.44	
K52757	Pte.	SLOAN,O.S.		27.Sep.39 - 2.Dec.41	
K71762	Pte.	SLOPER,M.M.		4.Jun.45 - 25.Sep.45	
H195192	Pte.	SMALL,F.		1.Sep.43 - 21.Feb.45	W.23.May.44
H195174	Pte.	SMALL,N.		1.Sep.43 - 23.May.44	W.23.May.44
H35684	Pte.	SMALL,S.T.		21.Jun.44 - 18.Jul.44	
K45012	WO 11 (CSM)	SMALLENBERG,E.		5.Feb.44 - 9.Jul.45	
K52216	Pte.	SMALLEY,F.C.	BEM	13.Sep.39 - 21.Jul.43	W.21.Jul.43
K62952	Pte.	SMALLEY,J.V.		10.Aug.43 - 23.Jun.45	
K52371	Pte.	SMALLEY,J.L.		15.Sep.39 - 12.Nov.42	
A10038	Pte.	SMASHNUK,G.		18.Dec.44 - 18.Apr.45	W.17.Jan.45
K63106	Pte.	SMEDLEY,L.H.		25.Nov.43 - 25.Sep.45	
B133366	Pte.	SMELTZER,B.C.L.		28.May.43 - 21.Jul.43	KIA 21.Jul.43
K54081	CQMS	SMIRLE,J.D.		13.Nov.42 - 13.Jul.45	
K49357	Pte.	SMITH,A.E.J.		25.May.44 - 20.Sep.44	W.20.Sep.44;DoW.20.Sep.44
K3900	Pte.	SMITH,A.		25.Apr.45 - 18.Jul.45	
K52326	Cpl.	SMITH,A.F.		15.Sep.39 - 28.Jul.43	W.28.Jul.43
K52578	Pte.	SMITH,A.W.		20.Sep.39 - 20.Mar.42	
K52499	Pte.	SMITH,A.R.		18.Sep.39 - 20.Jun.40	
K52293	Cpl.	SMITH,B.M.	MiD	14.Sep.39 - 3.Dec.42	
H53001	Pte.	SMITH,C.R.		7.Jun.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K52067	Pte.	SMITH,C.		9.Sep.39 - 8.May.41	
L84569	Pte.	SMITH,D.J.		20.Sep.44 - 25.Sep.45	
B118735	Pte.	SMITH,E.R.		18.Dec.44 - 29.Aug.45	W.20.Feb.45
K52425	Pte.	SMITH,E.		16.Sep.39 - 26.Jan.44	W.23.Jan.44
K52880	Cpl.	SMITH,E.A.	VC	31.Jan.41 - 15.Dec.44	W.5.Aug.43;W.12.Feb.44
K54693	Pte.	SMITH,E.R.		25.Apr.45 - 11.May.45	
K48189	Pte.	SMITH,F.F.G.		10.Aug.43 - 6.Oct.43	W.8.Oct.43
K52682	Pte.	SMITH,F.G.		22.Sep.39 - 18.Jan.42	
K53653	Pte.	SMITH,G.		12.Aug.40 - 31.Jan.43	
K67737	Pte.	SMITH,G.A.		28.Aug.42 - 15.Dec.43	
K50710	Pte.	SMITH,G.M.		6.May.44 - 26.Jun.45	
K52361	Pte.	SMITH,H.J.		15.Sep.39 - 6.Oct.41	
D138079	Pte.	SMITH,H.W.		16.Feb.44 - 14.Sep.44	
K65828	Pte.	SMITH,H.		27.Jun.45 - 15.Aug.45	
K52315	Pte.	SMITH,H.R.		15.Sep.39 - 16.Dec.44	W.15.Dec.44
K53080	L/Cpl.	SMITH,H.B.		26.Dec.40 - 5.May.45	W.23.Jan.44
B145029	Pte.	SMITH,J.A.		26.May.44 - 9.Apr.45	
K52111	L/Sgt.	SMITH,J.M.		11.Sep.39 - 25.Sep.45	
K52475	Sgt.	SMITH,J.		18;Sep.39 - 11.Feb.44	W.21.Jul.43
K603378	Pte.	SMITH,John		29.Jun.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K62268	Pte.	SMITH,J.E.		21.Jan.40 - 18.Mar.41	
K52354	Pte.	SMITH,J.M.		15.Sep.39 - 31.Jan.43	
K52445	Pte.	SMITH,J.R.L.		16.Sep.39 - 1.Apr.44	
K52862	Sgt.	SMITH,M.A.		7.Oct.39 - 28.Jul.43	W.28.Jul.43
K52119	Pte.	SMITH,R.A.		11.Sep.39 - 23.Nov.39	
K52362	Pte.	SMITH,R.M.		15.Sep.39 - 11.Feb.45	
A42408	Pte.	SMITH,R.W.		12.Aug.44 - 26.Aug.44	KIA 26.Aug.44
K42008	Pte.	SMITH,R.E.		26.Nov.39 - 3.Sep.40	
M35114	Pte.	SMITH,S.A.		21.May.43 - 20.Oct.43	

OTHER RANKS

Regt. No.	Final Seaforth Rank	Name	Service with Seaforths	Casualties
K3194	Pte.	SMITH,S.C.	7.Jun.45 - 16.Jul.45	
K53038	Pte.	SMITH,T.W.	11.May.40 - 6.Oct.43	W.8.Oct.43
K52853	Sgt.	SMITH,W.C.	3.Oct.39 - 23.Jun.45	
K52549	Cpl.	SMITH,William	19.Sep.39 - 6.Jan.43	
H102183	Pte.	SMITH,W.Charles	17.Oct.43 - 17.Sep.44	KIA 17.Sep.44
M7494	L/Cpl.	SMITH,W.Clarence	25.Feb.44 - 18.Jul.45	INJURED 18.Sep.44
H101498	Pte.	SMITH,W.G.	17.Oct.43 - 27.Dec.43	
L6056	Pte.	SMITH,W.L.M.	11.Jan.45 - 18.Feb.45	W.18.Feb.45
K71562	Pte.	SMITH,W.M.	16.Jun.43 - 13.Jan.44	
M105392	Pte.	SMITH,W.O.	6.May.44 - 13.May.44	W.13.Sep.44;W.26.Dec.44
K52797	Pte.	SMOLOCK,A.	28.Sep.39 - 4.Apr.43	DIED 28.Sep.44
K37064	Pte.	SMULAND,A.P.	1.Dec.39 - 28.Jun.41	DIED 6.Feb.45
K52559	Cpl.	SNIDER,A.K.	19.Sep.39 - 16.Nov.44	
K2237	Pte.	SNODGRASS,J.K.	3.Apr.45 - 18.Jul.45	
K52717	Pte.	SNOOK,E.F.	25.Sep.39 - 28.Feb.43	
K67039	Pte.	SNOW,D.H.	1.Nov.40 - 31.May.45	W.6.Jan.45
K52245	Sgt.	SNYDER,E.E.	26.Aug.39 - 4.Mar.42	
K8792	Pte.	SOMMERFELD,A.	7.Jun.45 - 9.Jul.45	
M8719	Pte.	SOUND,J.	13.Sep.44 - 13.Oct.44	
K52888	Pte.	SOUTHWICK,F.C.	29.Nov.39 - 18.Dec.41	
K213	Pte.	SPALDING,W.S.	4.Jun.45 - 21.Jul.45	
M36398	Pte.	SPARK,R.	25.Jul.43 - 18.Jul.45	W.11.Dec.43
K53547	Pte.	SPARKES,S.W.	8.Nov.40 - 9.Nov.43	
K74720	Pte.	SPARKS,L.	19.Feb.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K24134	Pte.	SPARROW,B.C.	3.Apr.45 - 25.Sep.45	W.11.Apr.45
D166941	Pte.	SPEAK,E.R.	28.May.43 - 15.Dec.43	
K54320	Pte.	SPEAKER,R.J.	6.Jun.44 - 17.Sep.44	POW 17.Sep.44;
H103785	Pte.	SPENCE,B.E.	18.Dec.44 - 7.Jun.45	W.23.Dec.44
H22461	Pte.	SPENCE,C.A.A.	11.Jan.45 - 29.Apr.45	
B38456	Pte.	SPENCE,C.M.	20.Jan.44 - 7.Apr.44	
K53124	Pte.	SPENCE,J.	11.May.40 - 8.Oct.40	
H103025	Pte.	SPENCE,L.	25.May.44 - 25.Sep.45	
K65022	Pte.	SPENCER,H.R.	19.Jul.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K59527	Pte.	SPERLING,A.J.	29.Jun.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K52314	Pte.	SPERRING,C.P.	15.Sep.39 - 11.Nov.43	
K53636	Pte.	SPICER,L.W.	24.Mar.44 - 24.Jan.45	
K69673	Pte.	SPIERS,W.L.	6.May.44 - 11.Dec.44	W.31.May.44
M106633	Pte.	SPINKS,H.A.	12.Dec.43 - 17.Sep.45	
K40534	Pte.	SPIRIG,H.B.	21.Jan.45 - 18.Jul.45	W.25.Feb.45
K53205	Pte.	SPOONER,A.R.	23.May.41 - 2.Dec.42	
K99535	Pte.	SPOONER,E.J.	5.May.43 - 8.Sep.45	W.14.Dec.44
K52604	Pte.	SPRACKLIN,E.A.	20.Sep.39 - 1.Oct.44	
M15802	Pte.	SPRACKLIN,J.S.	8.Aug.40 - 26.Jul.44	
K11280	Pte.	SPROULE,G.G.	4.Jun.45 - 21.Jul.45	
K52652	Pte.	SQUAIR,J.J.	21.Sep.39 - 25.Apr.45	
K52481	Sgt.	SQUAREBRIGGS,E.H.	18.Sep.39 - 3.Nov.43	
K29058	Pte.	SQUIRE,J.H.J.	11.May.40 - 23.Dec.43	KIA 23.Dec.43
K52435	A/Cpl.	SQUARE-BRIGGS,E.J.	16.Sep.39 - 6.Aug.43	W.5.Aug.43;
D81805	Pte.	SQUIRES,E.H.	20.Sep.44 - 23.Oct.44	POW 23.Oct.44; SAFE IN U.K.11.May.45
L36247	A/Cpl.	ST.GERMAIN,A.	25.Jul.43 - 23.May.44	POW 23.May.44; SAFE IN U.K.16.May.45
K42691	A/Cpl.	ST.LAURENT,J.C.	10.Aug.43 - 14.Jun.45	W.17.Dec.43
L12799	Pte.	ST.LOUIS,G.H.	1.Sep.43 - 4.Feb.44	
H7242	Pte.	ST.PIERRE,M.	1.Sep.43 - 23.May.44	W.23.May.44
B88414	L/Cpl.	STACEY,G.W.	25.Aug.42 - 1.May.45	
L103613	Pte.	STACEY,K.G.	25.May.44 - 18.Jul.45	
L104779	Pte.	STACEY,M.H.	20.Sep.44 - 18.Jul.45	
K69748	Pte.	STACHOWICZ,J.	25.Jul.43 - 23.May.44	W.23.May.44
K6320	Pte.	STADNYK,A.S.	16.May.45 - 6.Jun.45	
K52209	Cpl.	STAFFORD,G.E.	13.Sep.39 - 4.May.45	
K40816	L/Cpl.	STAGLIANO,J.	6.Jun.44 - 11.May.45	
B46924	Pte.	STAHLBAUM,E.J.	22.Dec.43 - 30.Jan.44	
K52157	CQMS	STAINES,H.L.	27.Sep.39 - 14.Jan.45	
K54582	Pte.	STANFORD,H.J.	18.Dec.44 - 9.Jun.45	
K46889	Pte.	STANLEY,W.	19.Jul.45 - 25.Sep.45	
H46265	Pte.	STANTON,L.C.	10.Jul.45 - 19.Sep.45	W.3.Mar.45
M105024	Pte.	STANTON,W.	17.Oct.43 - 18.Jul.45	W.23.May.44;W.20.Sep.44
H102977	Cpl.	STANTON,W.H.	1.Sep.43 - 18.Jul.45	
C102968	Pte.	STANZEL,E.A.	26.May.44 - 20.Mar.45	

OTHER RANKS

Regt. No.	Final Seaforth Rank	Name		Service with Seaforths	Casualties
M52096	Pt				
M104253	Pte.	STAR,Z.M.		1.Sep.43 - 27.Dec.43	W.27.Dec.43
H200107	Pte.	STARK,F.		17.Oct.43 - 2.May.45	
C120966	Pte.	STARK,F.E.		26.May.44 - 17.Sep.44	W.1.Jun.44
K607230	Pte.	STARZYK,W.		7.Jun.45 - 18.Jul.45	
D86187	Pte.	STARZUK,T.S.	MiD	1.Sep.43 - 10.Dec.43	W.10.Dec.43;W.28.Jan.45; W.17.Apr.45
B79805	Pte.	STATHAM,A.H.		26.May.44 - 18.Jul.45	
K51469	A/Cpl.	STAUB,A.A.	Bronze Cross, (Netherlands)	6.May.44 - 21.Jun.45	
M105316	Pte.	STEADMAN,D.M.		25.Feb.44 - 23.May.44	KIA 23.May.44
K43544	Pte.	STEADMAN,G.		28.Aug.42 - 15.Sep.42	
K66380	Pte.	STEEL,M.A.		1.Sep.43 - 11.Dec.43	W.11.Dec.43;DoW 19.Dec.43
K52243	Pte.	STEELE,C.		13.Sep.39 - 12.Jul.40	
H1035	Pte.	STEEVES,J.H.		22.Dec.44 - 24.Feb.45	W.25.Feb.45
B142896	Pte.	STEEVES,R.A.		26.May.44 - 31.May.44	W.31.May.44
K606823	Pte.	STEINHAUER,H.		7.Jun.45 - 25.Sep.45	
L104162	Pte.	STEINKE,E.M.		25.May.44 - 26.Aug.44	
K52623	Pte.	STENNER,F.W.		20.Sep.39 - 16.Dec.40	
M10784	Pte.	STEPHEN,A.		26.May.44 - 20.Sep.44	W.20.Sep.44
K52662	Pte.	STEPHEN,L.		21.Sep.39 - 24.Nov.41	
K52506	Cpl.	STEPHEN,N.H.		19.Sep.39 - 1.Dec.43	
K4612	Pte.	STEPHENS,J.C.		7.Apr.45 - 25.Sep.45	
A115668	L/Cpl.	STEPHENSON,D.E.		28.Oct.44 - 7.Jun.45	
K52792	Pte.	STEPHENSON,F.K.		28.Sep.39 - 4.May.45	
K43068	Pte.	STEPHENSON,F.L.		5.Aug.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K52711	L/Sgt.	STEPHENSON,T.A.		23.Sep.39 - 20.Dec.43	W.20.Dec.43
K53013	Pte.	STEPHENSON,W.		11.May.40 - 2.Jun.45	
K51880	Pte.	STERLING,F.		4.Jun.45 - 25.Sep.45	W.26.Aug.44
K53052	Pte.	STERLING,R.S.		1.May.42 - 9.Jul.42	
K53397	Pte.	STEVENS,G.L.		26.Sep.40 - 10.Dec.40	
K52803	Pte.	STEVENSON,K.		29.Sep.39 - 5.Jun.45	
K53265	Pte.	STEVENSON,M.N.		12.Jun.42 - 12.Sep.42	
M8190	Pte.	STEVENSON,R.		28.Mar.45 - 14.Apr.45	
K57179	Pte.	STEWART,D.W.		5.Nov.43 - 4.Sep.45	
A54601	Pte.	STEWART,E.J.		21.Aug.42 - 20.May.43	
D86189	Sgt.	STEWART,H.A.		10.Aug.43 - 10.May.44	
K53524	Pte.	STEWART,J.		16.Jul.45 - 25.Sep.45	W.6.Jun.44
K52534	Pte.	STEWART,J.A.		20.Sep.39 - 29.May.40	
K53182	Pte.	STEWART,J.D.		8.Nov.40 - 20.Jul.43	W.20.Jul.43
K48296	Pte.	STEWART,J.T.		14.May.44 - 4.Jul.44	
K53401	Pte.	STEWART,John		10.Oct.40 - 31.Jul.43	W.28.Jul.43
K53501	Pte.	STEWART,R.F.		21.Nov.41 - 25.Sep.45	
K52039	Cpl.	STEWART,Roderick		7.Sep.39 - 23.Aug.43	
G50700	Pte.	STEWART,W.L.		13.Sep.44 - 10.Jan.45	DIED 2.Sep.46
K53502	Pte.	STIANKE,W.		27.Dec.41 - 24.Jul.44	
L107613	Pte.	STICKLEY,D.W.		13.Sep.44 - 17.Sep.44	KIA 17.Sep.44
K52678	Pte.	STICKNEY,W.D.		22.Sep.39 - 31.Jul.43	W.27.Jul.43
K62756	CQMS	STILES,H.J.		21.Jun.44 - 8.Jun.45	W.17.Oct.44
K53091	Pte.	STINSON,R.M.		11.May.40 - 8.Sep.45	
H65222	Pte.	STIRLING,R.G.		18.Jan.45 - 11.Feb.45	W.11.Feb.45
K53105	Pte.	STIRRAT,R.		11.May.40 - 17.Sep.42	
L155789	Pte.	STITTLE,C.R.		29.Jun.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K607569	Pte.	STITTLE,K.L.		7.Jun.45 - 18.Jul.45	
K37048	Cpl.	STODARD,A.R.		24.Nov.39 - 4.Feb.40	
K54453	Pte.	STOKER,W.P.		28.Mar.45 - 18.Jul.45	
K53925	Sgt.	STOKES,C.H.		30.Nov.41 - 25.Sep.45	
K16449	Pte.	STOLZENBERG,E.W.		20.Feb.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K57458	Pte.	STOLZENBERG,H.		1.Sep.43 - 11.Oct.44	W.18.Oct.43
K52418	CSM	STONE,J.A.		16.Sep.39 - 29.Sep.42	
M105324	Pte.	STONE,K.G.		25.May.44 - 27.Aug.44	
K42613	Pte.	STONESON,D.J.		21.May.43 - 25.Sep.45	
M102910	L/Sgt.	STORCH,R.H.	MiD	13.Aug.43 - 25.Sep.45	
M107498	Pte.	STORDALSVOLL,L.A.		26.May.44 - 4.Jan.45	W.4.Jan.45
K52635	Pte.	STOREY,W.G.		21.Sep.39 - 23.Nov.39	
K53247	Pte.	STORREY,J.E.		22.Jun.40 - 7.Sep.42	
K52299	A/L/Cpl.	STORY,R.R.	MM	14.Sep.39 - 29.Jul.43	KIA 29.Jul.43
M107447	Pte.	STRACHAN,D.D.		25.May.44 - 18.Jul.45	INJURED 17.Oct.44
K53518	Pte.	STRACHAN,J.		8.Nov.40 - 31.Jan.43	
K69787	L/Cpl.	STRACHAN,W.F.		16.May.44 - 25.Sep.45	
K52963	Pte.	STRANGEWAY,R.W.		11.May.40 - 21.Jul.43	KIA 21.Jul.43

OTHER RANKS

Regt. No.	Final Seaforth Rank	Name		Service with Seaforths	Casualties
K3597	Pte.	STRAW,J.P.		11.Jun.45 - 27.Jan.46	
K52319	Pte.	STREET,L.J.		15.Sep.39 - 23.May.44	W.23.May.44;DoW.23.May.44
K71281	L/Cpl.	STROHMAIER,W.J.		7.Jun.45 - 25.Sep.45	W.15.Apr.45
M106492	Pte.	STROMSMOE,W.R.		6.Dec.44 - 12.Apr.45	KIA 12.Apr.45
K52785	Pte.	STRON,L.H.		28.Sep.39 - 14.Feb.40	
K52689	Pte.	STRONG,J.B.		23.Sep.39 - 23.Aug.40	
K53267	Pte.	STUART,F.G.H.		27.Dec.40 - 1.Oct.44	
D86040	Pte.	STUART,V.R.		10.Aug.43 - 25.Sep.45	
K37049	Pte.	STUBBS,D.		23,Nov.39 - 4.Feb.40	
L154072	Pte.	STUBEL,E.		30.Apr.43 - 18.Jul.45	
M11114	Pte.	STURM,A.G.		1.Sep.43 - 18.Jul.45	
K42910	Pte.	SUDEN,J.		17.Jul.42 - 18.Oct.44	KIA 18.Oct.44
L105363	Pte.	SULLIVAN,L.P.		25.May.44 - 31.Aug.44	W.31.Aug.44
K52250	Pte.	SULLIVAN,T.		14.Sep.39 - 6.Oct.39	
K76459	Pte.	SUMMERS,S.J.		12.Aug.44 - 3.Sep.45	
K53749	Pte.	SUNDQUEST,J.A.C.		30.Nov.41 - 16.Jun.43	POW 17.Jan.44; SAFE IN U.K.23.May.45
K52370	Pte.	SUTHERLAND,A.		15.Nov.39 - 18.Nov.39	
K52316	Pte.	SUTHERLAND,J.D.		15.Sep.39 - 29.Jul.40	
K75246	Pte.	SUTHERLAND,J.S.		4.Jun.45 - 15.Jul.45	
K52334	Sgt.	SUTHERLAND,J.R.		15.Sep.39 - 11.Feb.45	
K658	Pte.	SUTHERLAND,M.A.		13.Sep.44 - 18.Sep.44	KIA 18.Sep.44
H1087	Pte.	SUTTON,G.C.		6.Jun.44 - 16.Dec.44	
K37062	Pte.	SUTTON,W.F.		1.Dec.39 - 17.Sep.44	KIA 17.Sep.44
K70987	Pte.	SWAN,R.H.		21.May.45 - 1.Sep.45	
K53282	Pte.	SWANSON,A.G.		31.Oct.41 - 6.Oct.43	POW 6.Oct.43; SAFE IN U.K.17.Apr.45
K53354	L/Cpl.	SWANSON,B.A.		10.Oct.40 - 19.Jul.43	KIA 19.Jul.43
K46877	Pte.	SWANSON,J.P.		28.Mar.45 - 24.May.45	W.12.Apr.45
K67816	Pte.	SWARTZ,E.		25.Jul.43 - 5.Aug.43	W.5.Aug.43
K52320	A/WO 1 RSM	SWEENEY,B.		15.Sep.39 - 25.Sep.45	W.20.Dec.43
K57478	Pte.	SWEET,J.H.		25.Jul.43 - 9.Dec.43	W.18.Oct.43;KIA.9.Dec.43
K70769	Pte.	SWEET,O.J.		25.May.44 - 8.Aug.45	
K52703	Pte.	SWEET,R.L.		23.Sep.39 - 27.Aug.40	
K65620	Pte.	SWEEZEY,S.F.		25.Jul.43 - 23.Dec.43	
K52969	Pte.	SWORDY,R.R.		31.Oct.41 - 21.Jul.43	KIA 21.Jul.43
D82004	Pte.	SYMMERS,J.S.		13.Aug.43 - 18.Oct.44	KIA 18.Oct.44
D86070	Cpl.	TABRETT,J.H.		22.Dec.43 - 21.Feb.45	
M101967	Pte.	TAGGART,R.		17.Oct.43 - 23.May.44	W.15.Dec.43;POW.23.May.44; SAFE IN U.K.9.May.45
K53123	Pte.	TANGUAY,A.A.J.		11.May.40 - 5.Jan.43	
K53147	Pte.	TAPLEY,C.L.		2.May.41 - 21.Jul.43	KIA 21.Jul.43
K50361	Pte.	TAUNTON,H.W.		20.Feb.45 - 5.Apr.45	
K53926	Cpl.	TAYLOR,B.		30.Nov.41 - 8.Jun.45	W.26.Dec.43
K52372	Pte.	TAYLOR,E.		15.Sep.39 - 29.May.40	
K65492	L/Sgt.	TAYLOR,F.E.		23.Apr.43 - 17.Sep.44	W.8.Oct.43
K71019	Pte.	TAYLOR,F.W.		23.Apr.43 - 25.Sep.45	W.22.Jul.43
K52795	Pte.	TAYLOR,J.		28.Sep.39 - 17.Mar.43	
K52910	Pte.	TAYLOR,L.M.		14.Nov.41 - 2.Jun.43	
K52069	CSM	TAYLOR,T.E.		11.Sep.39 - 29.Oct.42	
K43044	Pte.	TAYLOR,T.M.		30.Apr.43 - 5.Aug.43	W.5.Aug.43
K62860	Pte.	TEBBUTT,J.M.		12.Mar.42 - 18.Jun.45	
K3304	Pte.	TEGART,A.J.		20.Feb.45 - 9.Jul.45	
K13182	Pte.	TEIT,T.N.		25.Apr.45 - 6.Jun.45	
K68840	Pte.	TELFORD,R.S.		1.Sept.43 - 13.Jul.45	W.8.Oct.43
H7218	L/Sgt.	TEMPLETON,R.R.		1.Sep.43 - 15.Jul.45	INJURED 29.Nov.44; W.16.Dec.44
L104769	Pte.	TENGUM,A.L.		26.May.44 - 17.Oct.44	W.17.Oct.44
K53503	Pte.	TENNANT,J.A.		16.Oct.40 - 22.Oct.44	W.22.Oct.44
K45624	Pte.	TENNANT,R.A.		22.Jul.43 - 25.Sep.45	
K53504	Pte.	TENNANT.W.		11.Jul.41 - 27.Feb.42	W.12.Jul.43
K40590	Pte.	TEREPOCKI,B.		28.Mar.45 - 11.Apr.45	KIA 11.Apr.45
K65067	Pte.	TERRY,D.E.		30.Nov.43 - 25.Sep.45	
K52631	A/Cpl.	TERRY,F.W.	MM	20.Sep.39 - 28.Jul.43	KIA 28.Jul.43
K53747	L/Sgt.	TESSARO,H.		30.Nov.41 - 23.May.44	KIA 23.May.44
M104756	Pte.	TESTAWITCH,P.		25.Jul.42 - 18.Jul.45	
K73694	Pte.	TETREAU,L.R.		7.Jun.45 - 15.Aug.45	
K53201	Pte.	THACKER,J.W.		12.Sep.40 - 31.Jan.43	
K37050	Pte.	THEW,F.W.		24.Nov.39 - 5.Dec.42	
K53474	Pte.	THIBODEAU,D.A.	Bronze Cross (Netherlands)	12.Sep.41 - 9.Jun.42	INJURED 24.Mar.45

OTHER RANKS

Regt. No.	Final Seaforth Rank	Name		Service with Seaforths	Casualties
K51809	Pte.	THICKE,R.B.		20.Feb.45 - 25.Sep.45	
B88549	Sgt.	THIRD,H.A.		1.Oct.42 - 22.Jun.45	
K52093	Pte.	THOMAS,C.V.		12.Sep.39 - 13.May.40	
K602606	Pte.	THOMAS,D.E.		29.Jun.45 - 15.Aug.45	
K69261	Pte.	THOMAS,G.D.		20.Feb.45 - 25.Sep.45	
M100285	Pte.	THOMAS,H.R.		28.Aug.42 - 6.Aug.43	W.6.Aug.43
K76770	Pte.	THOMAS,I.T.		28.Aug.42 - 12.Dec.43	W.12.Dec.43
K51503	Pte.	THOMAS,J.O.		6 May,44 - 23.May.44	POW.23.May.44; DIED WHILST POW 2.May.45
K52839	Cpl.	THOMAS,M.M.		2.Oct.39 - 23.Dec.43	W.23.Dec.43
K42029	Pte.	THOMAS,R.T.		2.Dec.39 - 19.Oct.40	
K42123	Pte.	THOMAS,W.O.		22.Jul.43 - 23.Jun.45	W.21.Jan.44
K72724	Pte.	THOMPSON,A.C.		13.Nov.42 - 8.Feb.43	
U2218	Pte.	THOMPSON,B.		25.Apr.45 - 21.Jun.45	
K3372	Pte.	THOMPSON,G.A.		16.May.45 - 14.Jun.45	
L101358	Pte.	THOMPSON,G.E.		1.Sep.43 - 9.Dec.43	KIA 9.Dec.43
K52898	Sgt.	THOMPSON,J.I.		13.Jun.41 - 1.May.42	
K52433	Pte.	THOMPSON,J.E.		16.Sep.39 - 12.Nov.40	W.1.Sep.44
K53228	Sgt.	THOMPSON,K.P.	DCM	11.May.40 - 31.Jul.45	
K53394	Pte.	THOMPSON,K.F.		18.Oct.40 - 23.Jun.45	
K50197	Pte.	THOMPSON,L.N.		14.May.44 - 17.Sep.44	W.23.May.44;KIA.17.Sep.44
K2350	Pte.	THOMPSON,R.S.		21.May.45 - 5.Jul.45	
K52827	Pte.	THOMPSON,T.		2.Oct.39 - 2.Jun.41	
K48735	Sgt.	THOMPSON,W.I.		18.Apr.44 - 25.Sep.45	
K52282	Pte.	THOMPSON,W.B.		14.Sep.39 - 18.Jun.41	
H19216	L/Cpl.	THOMSON,A.		3.Aug.43 - 14.Dec.43	KIA 14.Dec.43
K52977	Pte.	THOMSON,A.T.		11.May.40 - 14.Jan.42	
K50065	Pte.	THOMSON,A.A.		28.Mar.45 - 25.Sep.45	
M17591	Pte.	THOMSON,G.		17.Nov.43 - 13.Dec.43	
K52508	Pte.	THOMSON,J.H.		19.Sep.39 - 7.Dec.39	
P7496	WO 11 (CSM)	THOMSON,J.		29.Jun.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K74872	Pte.	THOMSON,J.W.		27.Nov.42 - 16.Dec.44	W.5.Aug.43;KIA.16.Dec.44
K52771	A/L/Cpl.	THOMSON,M.		27.Dec.39 - 9.Dec.40	DIED 10.Dec.40
K52432	Pte.	THOMSON,R.K.		16.Sep.39 - 16.Sep.41	
K52366	Pte.	THOMSON,W.S.		15.Sep.39 - 17.Oct.40	W.28.Aug.43
K52844	A/Cpl.	THOMSON,W.W.		2.Oct.39 - 3.Oct.40	
K100139	Pte.	THORLEIFSON,P.C.		18.Dec.44 - 18.Apr.45	
K52175	Pte.	THORNE,H.A.		12.Sep.39 - 29.Jul.42	
K52697	Pte.	THORNTON,W.G.		23.Sep.39 - 27.Dec.42	
K74492	Cpl.	THORSEN,R.G.		10.Aug.43 - 21.Jan.44	W.21.Jan.44;W.11.Jan.45
K53162	Pte.	THRASHER,C.C.		15.Aug.41 - 19.Nov.44	
F41627	Pte.	TIBBETTS,J.S.		16.May.43 - 17.Jan.44	
H6859	Pte.	TODD,G.A.		27.Sep.44 - 17.Jan.45	INJURED 17.Oct.44; W.17.Jan.45
K50053	Pte.	TODD,G.W.		19.Jul.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K70737	Pte.	TODD,R.H.		25.Jul.43 - 25.Sep.45	
K52434	Pte.	TOMKINSON,H.A.		16.Sep.39 - 29.May.40	
K53003	Cpl.	TOMLINSON,J.A.		11.May.40 - 17.Oct.40	
K54449	Cpl.	TOMPSON,D.J.		6.Jun.44 - 21.Jun.45	W.21.Oct.44
B133834	Pte.	TOOMER,V.W.		13.Aug.43 - 7.Oct.43	KIA 7.Oct.43
C79228	A/Sgt.	TOPPING,L.A.		25.Nov.43 - 18.May.45	
K52279	Pte.	TORGET,N.S.		14.Sep.39 - 20.Jun.40	
K65033	Pte.	TOSOFF,T.M.		22.Dec.43 - 19.Sep.45	W.23.May.44
K6330	Pte.	TOUTANT,F.		17.Jul.45 - 29.Jul.45	
K6363	Pte.	TOUTANT,G.C.		25.Apr.45 - 19.Jun.45	
K53269	Pte.	TOWNSLEY,C.		14.Jun.41 - 17.Sep.44	W.26.Dec.43;KIA 17.Sep.44
K52777	Pte.	TOYNBEE,J.		27.Sep.39 - 29.May.40	
D86190	Pte.	TRACEY,D.B.		10.Aug.43 - 13.Feb.44	KIA 13.Feb.44
D21171	Pte.	TRANTER,R.C.		26.Jun.44 - 29.Oct.44	INJURED 20.May.44; W.26.Aug.44
K53054	A/Cpl.	TREHERNE,F.W.		22.Jun.40 - 4.May.45	W.19.Jul.43
K52365	Cpl.	TREICHEL,F.A.		15.Sep.39 - 20.Nov.41	
K73889	Pte.	TRELENBERG,D.		5.May.43 - 2.Aug.44	
K52637	Pte.	TREMAINE,A.V.		21.Sep.39 - 23.Nov.39	KIA 20.Feb.44
K52416	Pte.	TRENCHARD,A.E.		16.Sep.39 - 29.Mar.45	W.20.Jul.43
K52205	Pte.	TRENTHAM,S.A.		13.Sep.39 - 11.Dec.41	
B42582	Pte.	TREVENA,R.E.		14.May.44 - 18.Jul.45	W.17.Sep.44
K51242	Pte.	TREVISON,R.O.		30.May.44 - 14.Dec.44	W.14.Dec.44
K49379	Pte.	TRICKER,E.D.		24.Mar.44 - 23.May.44	POW 23.May.44; SAFE IN U.K.10.May.45
M7567	L/Cpl.	TRIPP,T.E.		25.May.44 - 8.Jun.45	W.31.Aug.44; INJURED 27.Dec.44

OTHER RANKS

Regt. No.	Final Seaforth Rank	Name	Service with Seaforths	Casualties
B94188	Pte.	TROOP,D.	24.Feb.45 - 24.Jun.45	
K6236	Pte.	TRSTENSKY,S.	25.Apr.45 - 6.Jun.45	
K29005	Pte.	TRUAX,G.G.	1.Dec.40 - 14.Feb.41	
C20589	Pte.	TUCK,G.R.	13.Aug.43 - 15.Oct.43	
K6318	Pte.	TUCK,J.E.	25.Apr.45 - 14.Jun.45	
A61502	Pte.	TUCKER,W.E.	14.Feb.45 - 18.Jul.45	W.19.Feb.45
K52047	Pte.	TUFTS,E.S.	8.Sep.39 - 31.Oct.42	
K52706	Pte.	TUFTS,T.C.	8.Dec.39 - 2.Jun.45	
B38389	Pte.	TULLY,F.G.	20.Feb.45 - 18.Jul.45	
K71506	Pte.	TULLY,T.D.C.	5.Mar.43 - 29.Dec.43	
K54496	Pte.	TURFF,C.A.	20.Sep.44 - 22.Oct.44	KIA 22.Oct.44
K2395	Pte.	TURMAN,M.	25.Apr.45 - 14.Jun.45	
K52608	Pte.	TURNER,A.C.	20.Sep.39 - 9.Apr.43	
K42787	A/Cpl.	TURNER,C.W.	30.Apr.43 - 17.Sep.44	POW 17.Sep.44; SAFE IN U.K.17.May.45
L50185	L/Cpl.	TURNER,G.L.	12.Aug.44 - 15.Jun.45	
K68605	Pte.	TURNER,G.E.	20.Feb.45 - 25. Sep.45	
K46873	Pte.	TURNER,J.T.	30.Apr.43 - 6.Oct.43	W.7.Oct.43
K2063	Pte.	TURNER,J.	25.Apr.45 - 6.Jun.45	
K6343	Pte.	TURNER,L.J.	7.May.45 - 6.Jun.45	
H70573	Pte.	TURNER,W.J.	6.May.44 - 18.Jul.45	W.6.May.44
K547657	Pte.	TURTLE,F.	29.Jun.45 - 3.Sep.45	
K48187	Pte.	TWEEDHOPE,D.N.	25.Jul.43 - 25.Sep.45	
K52211	Pte.	TWEEDIE,R.L.	13.Sep.39 - 31.Jul.40	
L104748	Pte.	TWOFOOT,A.N.	25.May.44 - 5.Aug.44	
K52230	Pte.	TWYFORD,P.A.	13.Sep.39 - 23.Dec.43	
M105492	Pte.	TYMCHUK,N.	5.Jan.44 - 25.Sep.45	W.22.Oct.44;W.15.Jan.45; INJURED 9.Feb.45; W.11.Apr.45
K604705	Pte.	TYMCHYSHYN,M.	7.Jul.45 - 25.Sep.45	
L84096	Pte.	UNCLES,R.	6.May.44 - 25.Sep.45	
K43515	Pte.	UNDERDOWN,E.H.	25.Jul.43 - 31.Mar.44	
K43514	Pte.	UNDERDOWN,G.P.	25.Jul.43 - 11.Sep.43	KIA 30.Dec.43
K52793	Pte.	UNDERHILL,F.W.	28.Sep.39 - 5.Dec.39	
C52949	Pte.	UPPER,M.M.	15.Nov.44 - 12.Apr.45	W.12.Apr.45
A287	Pte.	URKOSKY,W.W.	8.Jun.44 - 14.Jan.44	
G28538	Pte.	VAIL,S.F.	12.Aug.44 - 14.Jun.45	W.16.Sep.44
K52514	Pte.	VALENTINE,V.G.B.	19.Sep.39 - 18.Oct.39	
C101369	Pte.	VALLIANT,H.J.	6.Jun.44 - 21.Aug.44	
K74873	Pte.	VANBERGEN,A.	27.Nov.42 - 4.Sep.45	
K52533	Sgt.	VANCE,E.H.	19.Sep.39 - 31.Aug.42	
K67448	Pte.	VAN DE GEER,J.	28.Aug.42 - 23.Dec.43	
K52407	Pte.	VANDRICK,R.A.	16.Sep.39 - 4.Dec.41	
K53613	Pte.	VAN EVERY,L.L.	21.Nov.41 - 15.Jan.42	
K20070	Pte.	VAN NORMAN,W.J.	16.Feb.44 - 23.May.44	W.29.Dec.43;POW.23.May.44; SAFE IN U.K.9.May.45
B52364	Pte.	VAN OS,J.H.	23.May.44 - 7.Dec.44	W.18.Oct.44
K4332	Pte.	VAN PEBORGH,A.	22.Nov.44 - 25.Sep.45	W.4.Jan.45;W.25.Feb.45
K59516	Pte.	VAN RUYSKENSVELDE,G.	19.Jul.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K62814	Pte.	VANSTONE,D.W.	1.Sep.43 - 27.Dec.43	W.27.Dec.43;DoW.22.Jan.44
K53032	Pte.	VAUDRY,R.E.	22.Jun.40 - 16.Oct.41	
K605026	Pte.	VAUGHAN,K.R.	15.Apr.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K52722	L/Cpl.	VENABLES,F.N.	25.Sep.39 - 6.Oct.42	
K47952	Pte.	VENUS,C.	29.Nov.43 - 25.Sep.45	
K53369	Pte.	VERMILYEA,B.A.	23.May.41 - 10.Aug.41	
K37068	Pte.	VERNON,C.N.	1.Dec.39 - 27.Aug.40	
L10059	Pte.	VIHER,J.	12.Aug.44 - 15.Jun.45	W.17.Sep.44
K29178	Pte.	VILLMAN,R.	11.May.40 - 4.May.45	W.18.Oct.43
C36085	Pte.	VILLNEFF,W.W.	6.Jun.44 - 13.Jul.44	
K602616	Pte.	VINCENT,E.G.	29.Jun.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K923	Cpl.	VINCENT,V.B.	3.Jul.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K52690	Pte.	VINCENZI,L.E.	23.Sep.39 - 11.Feb.45	W.21.Jul.43
M105439	Pte.	VISSCHER,J.	12.Dec.43 - 18.Jul.45	W.21.Jan.44
K53029	Pte.	VIVASH,N.	22.May.40 - 29.May.40	
K62256	Pte.	VOGEL,J.P.	6.Aug.43 - 28.Feb.45	KIA 28.Feb.45
L107942	Pte.	VON ESCHEN,G.O.	18.Dec.44 - 26.Feb.45	W.25.Feb.45;DoW.26.Feb.45
K52878	L/Cpl.	VOSPER,L.V.	16.Oct.40 - 4.May.45	W.22.Dec.43
C123736	Pte.	VOTARY,G.F.	15.Nov.44 - 25.Apr.45	KIA 25.Apr.45
K6525	Pte.	VULCANO,E.J.	16.May.45 - 18.Jul.45	
M3699	Pte.	WACHTER,L.J.	30.Apr.43 - 20.Apr.44	
M29211	Pte.	WADDELL,R.	22.Nov.44 - 25.Sep.45	

OTHER RANKS

Regt. No.	Final Seaforth Rank	Name		Service with Seaforths	Casualties
K51303	Pte.	WADSWORTH,E.		6.May.44 - 28.Jul.45	W.26.Aug.44
K52687	Pte.	WADSWORTH,G.		23.Sep.39 - 5.May.43	
M102479	Pte.	WAGNER,C.J.		30.Apr.43 - 28.Jul.43	W.28.Jul.43
K52348	P/L/Cpl.	WAGSTAFF,A.S.		15.Sep.39 - 23.Nov.39	POW 29.Sep.42; SAFE IN U.K.26.Apr.45
L10803	Pte.	WAKEFIELD,A.		20.Sep.44 - 23.Oct.44	POW 23.Oct.44; SAFE IN U.K.9.May.45
D82061	Sgt.	WAKELING,W.E.		10.Aug.43 - 12.Dec.43	KIA 12.Dec.43
M105963	Pte.	WALENCHIK,H.E.		12.Dec.43 - 11.Apr.45	W.5.Sep.44;W.11.Apr.45
K57021	S/Sgt.	WALKER,A.F.		29.Jan.43 - 25.Sep.45	
K52259	Pte.	WALKER,J.		14.Sep.39 - 2.Jun.45	
H10623	Pte.	WALKER,James		26.May.44 - 18.Jul.45	
H18476	Pte.	WALKER,J.P.		28.Mar.45 - 18.Jul.45	
K29066	Pte.	WALKER,N.A.		22.Jun.40 - 8.Sep.42	KIA 18.Jul.43
K48756	Pte.	WALL,H.J.		4.Jun.45 - 25.Sep.45	W.8.Apr.45
K53225	Pte.	WALL,J.L.		11.May.40 - 28.Dec.41	
K53364	Pte.	WALLACE,A.		23.Oct.40 - 26.Dec.41	DIED 26.Dec.41
M104855	Pte.	WALLACE,C.C.		12.Dec.43 - 18.Jul.45	
K50329	Pte.	WALLACE,E.M.		16.Feb.44 - 17.Oct.44	KIA 17.Oct.44
K549523	Pte.	WALLACE,H.W.		29.Jun.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K49345	Pte.	WALLACH,D.L.		3.Apr.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K70952	Pte.	WALLIN,S.E.		30.Apr.43 - 7.Feb.45	W.22.Oct.44
K3375	Pte.	WALLSMITH,R.J.		25.Apr.45 - 20.Jun.45	
E52694	Pte.	WALSH,L.		13.Aug.43 - 1.May.44	
K53183	Sgt.	WALTER,F.R.		8.Nov.40 - 5.Sep.45	W.13.Jul.43
K52101	Cpl.	WALTERS,F.		13.Jun.41 - 8.Feb.44	W.22.Jul.43;W.5.Sep.43
M102525	Pte.	WARAWA,S.		1.Sep.43 - 25.Sep.45	W.23.May.44
M39546	Pte.	WARD,E.		15.Nov.44 - 3,Jan.45	
U1904	Pte.	WARD, F.H.		4.Sept. 42 - 12.Jun. 44	
K51965	Pte.	WARD,H.J.		28.Mar.44 - 17.Sep.44	POW 17.Sep.44; SAFE IN U.K.14.May.45
K50379	Pte.	WARD,R.G.		6.May.44 - 25.Sep.45	W.23.May.44;W.17.Oct.44
K53122	Pte.	WARD,R.		28.Mar.41 - 4.May.45	W.4.Jan.45
U1635	Pte.	WARD,S.C.		31.Oct.41 - 23.Jun.45	
M105304	Pte.	WARNER,H.H.		22.Dec.43 - 27.Dec.43	W.27.Dec.43
K53419	L/Cpl.	WARNER,J.V.		29.Apr.43 - 23.May.44	KIA 23.May.44
K53549	Pte.	WARNICA,G.		27.Dec.40 - 21.Jul.43	W.21.Jul.43;DoW.21.Jul.43
K62384	Pte.	WARREN,N.L.		23.Apr.43 - 28.Jun.45	INJURED 14.Dec.44
K53037	Sgt.	WARRINGTON,A.J.		11.May.40 - 25.Sep.45	
A109165	Pte.	WASHBURN,C.G.		1.Nov.44 - 16.Dec.44	W.16.Dec.44;DoW.17.Dec.44
D82500	Pte.	WATCHORN,E.H.		6.Aug.43 - 26.Jan.45	
K53270	Cpl.	WATERS,J.		24.Jul.42 - 23.Nov.42	
K53361	Pte.	WATKINS,C.		30.Nov.41 - 13.Mar.42	
K25456	Sgt.	WATSON,A.P.		17.Jul.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K52786	Pte.	WATSON,G.T.O.		28.Sep.39 - 19.Oct.39	
K52346	Pte.	WATSON,J.A.		15.Sep.39 - 20.Nov.39	W.17.Mar.44; DIED 31.May.44
K52281	Pte.	WATSON,John		14.Sep.39 - 17.Jan.45	W.17.Jan.45
M38526	Pte.	WATSON,J.G.		26.May.44 - 17.Sep.44	KIA 17.Sep.44
K68555	Pte.	WATSON,J.M.		28.Aug.42 - 21.Jul.43	KIA 21.Jul.43
K51274	Pte.	WATSON,P.A.R.		6.Jun.44 - 2.Sep.44	W.2.Sep.44
M104906	Pte.	WATSON,R.E.		12.Dec.43 - 29.Apr.44	
K3292	Pte.	WATSON,W.J.		16.May.45 - 6.Jun.45	
K52355	Pte.	WATT,J. W.		15.Sep.39 - 1.Dec.39	
K67849	Pte.	WATT,R.		4.Sep.42 - 15.Sep.42	
K50123	Pte.	WATTS,F.		15.Mar.44 - 23.May.44	W.23.May.44
K59583	Pte.	WATTS,J.H.		25.Jun.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K605825	Pte.	WAYLAND,E.		19.Jul.45 - 25.Sep.45	
M28262	Pte.	WEAR,S.E.		22.Jul.43 - 22.Oct.43	
K53469	Pte.	WEAVER,F.		31.Oct.41 - 19.Jul.43	
H3143	Pte.	WEAVING,R.		30.Apr.43 - 3.Jun.45	
K52431	L/Cpl.	WEBB,E.F.		18.Sep.39 - 8.Jun.43	
M107254	Pte.	WEBB,J.R.		6.Jun.44 - 18.Jul.45	
K52684	Pte.	WEBBER,D.L.		23.Sep.39 - 26.Apr.44	
K68929	Pte.	WEBBER,G.I.		5.Feb.44 - 25.Sep.45	W.14.Apr.45
K85383	Sgt.	WEBER,V.P.	MiD	21.Jul.45 - 1.Aug.45	
K76078	Cpl.	WEBSTER,F.	MM	6.Feb.42 - 22.Oct.44	W.17.Sep.44;W.22.Oct.44
K54398	A/Sgt.	WEBSTER,J.A.		25.May.44 - 6.Jun.45	W.6.Aug.45;W.12.Jan.45
K67167	Pte.	WEBSTER,R.N.		29.Aug.40 - 19.Feb.44	
K53202	Pte.	WEBSTER,T.		8.Nov.40 - 12.Jan.43	
M107738	Pte.	WEDGE,H.J.		6.May.44 - 23.May.44	POW 23.May.44; SAFE IN U.K.17.May.45

OTHER RANKS

Regt. No.	Final Seaforth Rank	Name		Service with Seaforths	Casualties
K53030	Pte.	WEIR,C.R.		11.May.40 - 14.Oct.42	W.10.Dec.43;DoW.11.Dec.43
K52550	Pte.	WEIR,G.A.		19.Sep.39 - 29.May.40	
K57428	Sgt.	WEIR,R.		17.Jul.45 - 25.Sep.45	
M102651	Pte.	WEISS,B.		6.Aug.43 - 10.Dec.43	W.10.Dec.43
M38609	Pte.	WEISS,E.		1.Nov.44 - 22.Jun.45	
K59567	Pte.	WEISZBECK,J.		15.Apr.45 - 15.Jun.45	
K52050	WO 1 RQMS	WELLBURN,S.		8.Sep.39 - 25.Sep.45	
M106707	Pte.	WELLS,C.E.		12.Dec.43 - 27.Dec.43	KIA 27.Dec.43
K1393	Pte.	WELLS,E.		21.May.45 - 18.Jul.45	
K53349	Pte.	WELLS,G.E.		1.Dec.41 - 1.May.43	
L27826	Pte.	WELLS,J.J.		17.Oct.43 - 20.Dec.43	KIA 20.Dec.43
K37052	Pte.	WELLS,V.W.		24.Nov.39 - 24.Apr.42	
K3446	Pte.	WERNIUK,S.		19.Mar.45 - 12.Apr.45	KIA 12.Apr.45
K51051	Pte.	WERSTA.E.G.		17.May.45 - 29.Jun.45	W.5.Sep.44
K76495	Pte.	WEST,A.F.		30.Apr.43 - 3.Jan.45	
K6247	Pte.	WEST,J.P.		25.Apr.45 - 14.Jun.45	
K54355	Pte.	WESTCOTT,C.A.		4.Jun.45 - 18.Jul.45	
M30844	Pte.	WESTCOTT,J.L.		15.Dec.43 - 1.Jan.44	
L84594	A/Cpl.	WESTFALL,C.W.		11.Nov.43 - 6.Feb.44	
K52333	Pte.	WESTLUND,R.E.		15.Sep.39 - 23.Aug.41	
D166168	Cpl.	WESTON,E.S.		10.Aug.43 - 23.May.44	KIA 23.May.44
K52597	Sgt.	WESTWELL,N.		20.Sep.39 - 4.May.45	W.8.Oct.43
K51927	Pte.	WESTWOOD,W.		26.May.44 - 4.Jan.45	KIA 4.Jan.45
M106243	Pte.	WHALE,A.W.T.		25.Nov.43 - 17.Dec.43	W.17.Dec.43
K45471	A/L/Cpl.	WHARTON,W.E.		6.Aug.43 - 10.Dec.43	POW 10.Dec.43; SAFE IN SWITZERLAND 21.Jan.45; REPATRIATED TO CANADA 25.Jan.45
M107302	Pte.	WHEELE,F.H.		12.Aug.44 - 2.Jul.45	INJURED 17.Jan.45; INJURED 14.Feb.45
K42030	Pte.	WHEELER,H.J.M.		2.Dec.39 - 10.Jan.41	
K66434	Pte.	WHIFFIN,R.G.		25.Jul.43 - 11.Dec.43	W.11.Dec.43
M11867	Pte.	WHITE,A.R.		26.May.44 - 31.Aug.44	KIA 31.Aug.44
K52556	A/L/Sgt.	WHITE,D.		19.Sep.39 - 23.May.44	W.23.May.44;DoW.23.May.44
K71708	Pte.	WHITE,F.E.		26.May.44 - 25.Sep.45	W.31.Aug.44;W.4.Jan.45
M12215	Pte.	WHITE,F.H.		25.Jul.43 - 31.Jul.43	W.22.Jul.43
K69799	Pte.	WHITE,G.		4.Jun.43 - 15.Dec.43	
K53271	Pte.	WHITE,Graham		28.Aug.42 - 27,Jul.44	
K49751	Pte.	WHITE,J.G.		26,May.44 - 4.Jan.45	W.18.Dec.44;W.4.Jan.45
K52801	Pte.	WHITE,John E.		29.Sep.39 - 1.Dec.39	
K53862	Pte.	WHITE,K.M.		6,Feb.42 - 28.Jul.42	
E52895	Pte.	WHITE,L.F.		1,Sep.43 - 18.Jul.45	
C103178	Pte.	WHITE,S.E.		25.May.44 - 18.Jul.45	
K52557	Pte.	WHITE,S.		19.Sep.39 - 10.Nov.41	
K70725	Pte.	WHITE,W.A.		20.Sep.44 - 25.Sep.45	W.12.Jan.45
K52614	Pte.	WHITEFIELD,S.A.		20.Sep.39 - 29.Jul.42	
M106338	Pte.	WHITEFORD,C.		12.Dec.43 - 15.Apr.44	INJURED 15.Apr.44
K6076	Pte.	WHITEHEAD,H.		16.May.45 - 18.Jul.45	
M38493	Pte.	WHITELOCK,H.E.		20.Sep.44 - 20.Jun.45	
K52025	Pte.	WHITESIDE,A.H.		7.Sep.39 - 25.Sep.45	
K53448	Pte.	WHITING,E.T.W.		8.Nov.40 - 24.Apr.42	
K75320	Pte.	WHITING,J.S.		23,Oct.42 - 5.Aug.43	W.5.Aug.43
B8209	Pte.	WHITLEY,J.A.		27.Jun.45 - 22.Aug.45	
K602298	Pte.	WHITTAKER,V.A.		29.Jun.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K52341	Cpl.	WHITTEKER,C.E.		15.Sep.39 - 22.Apr.41	
M107664	Pte.	WHITTEN,D.S.		6.May.44 - 23.May.44	POW 23.May.44; SAFE IN U.K.9.May.45
E52714	L/Sgt.	WHITTICKS,W.J.	MiD	3.Aug.43 - 25.Sep.45	W.1.Jun.44
M104482	Pte.	WHYTE,D.C.		13.Sep.44 - 17.Oct.44	KIA 17.Oct.44
K3847	Pte.	WHYTE,J.A.		25.Apr.45 - 15.Jun.45	
M16481	Pte.	WAITT,T.	MiD	2.Aug.45 - 9.Sep.45	
M102889	Pte.	WICKHAM,K.A.		23,Apr.43 - 13.Jun.44	W.21.Jul.43
K49010	Pte.	WICKS,R.		26.May.44 - 31.May.44	W.31.May.44
M7950	Pte.	WICKSTROM,A.W.		20.Sep.44 - 18.Jul.45	
H8146	Pte.	WICKSTROM,R.H.		18.Dec.44 - 18.Jul.45	
H10048	Pte.	WIENS,P.K.		25.May.44 - 5.Aug.44	
K53293	Pte.	WIESE,A.		8.Nov.40 - 17.May.42	
K52409	Pte.	WIGNES,K.G.		16,Sep.39 - 27.Nov.44	W.23.May.44
C756	Pte.	WILBY,O.V.		26.May.44 - 17.Sep.44	
K70371	Pte.	WILCOX,G.I.		18.Apr.44 - 25.Sep.45	INJURED 4.May.44
K3874	Pte.	WILEY,C.R.		9.May.45 - 21.Jun.45	

OTHER RANKS

Regt. No.	Final Seaforth Rank	Name	Service with Seaforths	Casualties
K52342	Pte.	WILHELM,R.	15.Sep.39 - 16.Jan.42	
K62054	Pte.	WILKIN,F.S.	6.May.44 - 23.May.44	POW 23.May.44; SAFE IN U.K.9.May.45
K53715	Pte.	WILKINSON,G.A.	30.Nov.41 - 25.Jul.43	W.20.Jul.43
K4662	Pte.	WILKS,J.G.	20.Feb.45 - 14.Jun.45	
E42737	Pte.	WILLETT,O.	3.Apr.45 - 18.Jul.45	
K604737	Pte.	WILLIAMS,A.H.	7.Jun.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K69593	Pte.	WILLIAMS,D.J.	4.Jun.43 - 6.Oct.43	KIA 6.Oct.43
K51125	Pte.	WILLIAMS,E.H.	27.Dec.43 - 23.May.44	POW 23.May.44; SAFE IN U.K.15.May.45
M103953	Pte.	WILLIAMS,E.C.	12.Dec.43 - 12.Apr.44	W.12.Apr.44
A23052	A/Cpl.	WILLIAMS,G.K.	30.Apr.43 - 24.Dec.43	KIA 24.Dec.43
K52995	Sgt.	WILLIAMS,G.L.	11.May.40 - 25.Sep.45	
C36721	Pte.	WILLIAMS,G.R.	12.Aug.44 - 19.Oct.44	
M103836	Pte.	WILLIAMS,J.A.	26.May.44 - 16.Dec.44	W.15.Dec.44
K72941	Pte.	WILLIAMS,J.Adolph	16.Feb.44 - 9.Jan.45	W.5.Apr.44;W.4.Jan.45
M38531	Pte.	WILLIAMS,L.M.	25.May.44 - 18.Jul.45	W.4.Jan.45
K98	Pte.	WILLIAMS,M.	18.Dec.44 - 16.Jun.45	
K65914	Pte.	WILLIAMS,P.	6.Oct.44 - 25.Sep.45	
K50579	Pte.	WILLIAMS,R.	6.May.44 - 16.Sep.44	W.16.Sep.44
K42428	Pte.	WILLIAMS,W.J.	4.Dec.42 - 12.Sep.44	
K50714	Pte.	WILLIAMS,Wm.J.	25.May.44 - 9.Sep.45	
K52836	Pte.	WILLIAMSON,A.V.	2.Oct.39 - 14.Feb.41	
K53224	Pte.	WILLIAMSON,A.	11.May.40 - 23.Jun.45	W.25.Dec.43
K52619	Pte.	WILLIAMSON,Andrew	20.Sep.39 - 29.Sep.39	
K51381	Pte.	WILLIAMSON,A.R.	17.May.45 - 25.Sep.45	W.23.Jan.45
L66363	Cpl.	WILLIAMSON,H.P.	6.May.44 - 23.May.44	W.23.May.44
K73564	Cpl.	WILLIAMSON,O.W.G.	7.Jun.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K52344	Pte.	WILLIS,H.E.	15.Sep.39 - 23.Nov.39	
K53550	Boy/Pte.	WILLMAN,J.C.	26.May.44 - 25.Sep.45	W.16.Sep.44; INJURED 27.Dec.44
K53121	Pte.	WILLS,G.	11.May.40 - 23.Jun.45	
L93711	Pte.	WILLS,G.J.	27.Dec.43 - 12.Feb.45	W.22.Jan.44
K52926	Pte.	WILLSHER,H.	11.May.40 - 20.Apr.42	
B146169	Pte.	WILMSHURST,R.F.	26.May.44 - 18.Jul.45	
K66262	Pte.	WILSHIRE,M.H.	22.Dec.43 - 23.May.44	KIA 23.May.44
K52638	Pte.	WILSON,A.	21.Sep.39 - 3.Jan.42	
K49571	Pte.	WILSON,G.A.	16.Feb.44 - 3.Feb.45	W.3.Feb.45
K49652	Pte.	WILSON,H.A.	6.Jun.44 - 24.Feb.45	W.28.Aug.44;W.24.Feb.45
K4778	Pte.	WILSON,J.F.	20.Feb.45 - 18.Jul.45	
K52449	Pte.	WILSON,J.R.	16.Sep.39 - 23.Nov.39	
K76370	Pte.	WILSON,John	28.Aug.42 - 23.May.44	W.19.Jul.43;W.23.May.44
K43034	Pte.	WILSON,J.C.	30.Apr.43 - 8.Dec.43	KIA 8.Dec.43
K62658	Pte.	WILSON,John P.	1.Sep.43 - 10.Dec.43	KIA 10.Dec.43
K22111	Pte.	WILSON,John R.	3.Jun.45 - 25.Sep.45	
M106263	Pte.	WILSON,John Robert	27.Dec.43 - 23.May.44	W.23.May.44
K69884	Pte.	WILSON,J.W.	12.Dec.43 - 23.May.44	W.26.Dec.43;KIA.23.May.44
M29183	Sgt.	WILSON,Joseph	5.Mar.43 - 8.Jun.45	
K1562	Pte.	WILSON,L.C.	12.May.45 - 14.Jun.45	
K52352	Pte.	WILSON,N.C.	15.Sep.39 - 7.Aug.43	
K601191	Pte.	WILSON,Norman	25.Jun.45 - 25.Sep.45	
A82268	Pte.	WILSON,N.W.	14.Jul.44 - 18.Jul.45	
D139995	Pte.	WILSON,R.J.	25.May.44 - 15.Dec.44	W.15.Dec.44
K52507	Pte.	WILSON,Roy F.	19.Sep.39 - 15.Jan.42	
K52343	Pte.	WILSON,S.M.	15.Sep.39 - 21.Oct.40	
K52402	Pte.	WILTON,H.A.	16.Sep.39 - 8.Apr.41	
K67334	L/Cpl.	WINCHCOMBE,A.V.	13.Dec.39 - 2.Jun.45	
K53854	Pte.	WINCHESTER,A.J.	6.Mar.42 - 31.Jan.43	
K52596	Pte.	WINCKLER,W.B.	20.Sep.39 - 12.Mar.42	
M103787	Pte.	WINCZURA,A.	25.Jul.43 - 14.Sep.43	W.2.Mar.44
K54024	Cpl.	WINDRAM,J.	10.Aug.43 - 25.Sep.45	
M103204	Pte.	WINCO,O.O.	25.Jul.43 - 26.Jan.44	W.26.Jan.44
K51930	Pte.	WINGROVE,J.A.	26.May.44 - 25.Sep.45	W.11.Feb.45;W.11.Apr.45
K52585	L/Cpl.	WINNING,G.	20.Sep.39 - 5.Mar.45	
M16575	Pte.	WINSHIP,T.O.	13.Aug.43 - 29.Aug.43	
K67550	A/L/Cpl.	WINSTANLEY,O.	22.Jul.43 - 13.May.44	
K62912	L/Cpl.	WINSTON,W.D.	25.Jul.43 - 21.Jan.44	W.21.Jan.44
K52755	Pte.	WINTER,A.F.	26.Sep.39 - 9.Jan.41	
M105662	Pte.	WINTER,A.E.	12.Dec.43 - 23.May.44	W.23.May.44
K52347	Sgt.	WINTER,W.J.	15.Sep.39 - 27.Oct.41	
H9338	Pte.	WINTONIW,J.	29.Dec.44 - 18.Jul.45	

OTHER RANKS

Regt. No.	Final Seaforth Rank	Name		Service with Seaforths	Casualties
K52441	Sgt.	WIPER,C.		16.Sep.39 - 22.Oct.42	
K573997	Pte.	WIPER,T.		29.Jun.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K69380	Pte.	WIPFLI,C.W.		28.Mar.45 - 18.Jul.45	
H8575	Pte.	WISE,C.S.		27.Dec.43 - 5.May.44	
K52552	Pte.	WISEMAN.A.		19.Sep.39 - 23.May.43	W.2.Apr.45
K74901	Cpl.	WISEMAN,I.M.		20.Jul.45 - 25.Sep.45	
H63965	Pte.	WISHART,W.E.		1.Sep.43 - 18.Jul.45	
M105089	Pte.	WITEK,J.W.		12.Dec.43 - 5.Mar.45	
K606063	Pte.	WITT,R.		29.Jun.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K53040	Pte.	WOLFE,J.		21.Feb.41 - 16.Sep.41	
H8696	Pte.	WOLFE, J.P.		23.May. 44 - 18.Oct. 44	KIA 18.Oct.44
K37887	Pte.	WOLFE,L.J.		27.Jun.45 - 31.Aug.45	
M105985	Pte.	WOLFF,A.		12.Dec.43 - 23.May.44	W.23.May.44
L103832	Pte.	WOOD,A.J.		20.Feb.45 - 18.Jul.45	
K2631	Pte.	WOOD, A.R.		20.Feb. 45 - 23.Jun. 45	
M107343	Pte.	WOOD,C.		26.May.44 - 31.May.44	KIA 31.May.44
K53028	Pte.	WOOD,F.C.		11.May.40 - 23.Jun.45	
K53184	Pte.	WOOD,F.L.		22.Jun.40 - 27.Jul.43	W.26.Jul.43
M102046	Pte.	WOOD,H.L.		25.Jul.43 - 26.Aug.43	
K37065	Pte.	WOOD,J.D.		31.Dec.39 - 1.Feb.45	
K16372	Pte.	WOOD,L.P.		12.Dec.43 - 15.Feb.44	
K15086	Pte.	WOOD,R.S.		11.Jan.45 - 2.Jun.45	
M107029	Pte.	WOOD,Roland L.		16.Feb.44 - 15.Dec.44	W.15.Dec.44
K52861	Pte.	WOOD,W.F.		7.Oct.39 - 5.Mar.40	
K52303	Pte.	WOOD,W.G.		14.Sep.39 - 25.Sep.45	
K37053	Sgt.	WOODARD,F.E.	MM	24.Nov.39 - 4.Feb.40	
L67727	Pte.	WOODBRIDGE,A.H.		28.Mar.45 - 21.Jun.45	
B116596	Pte.	WOODCOCK,K.B.		14.Feb.45 - 4.Apr.45	
K52089	PROV/L/Cpl.	WOODFIELD,H.J.		11.Sep.39 - 5.Dec.39	
K59534	Cpl.	WOODS,H.J.		29.Jun.45 - 1.Sep.45	
K52567	Pte.	WOOD-TAYLOR,R.H.		19.Sep.39 - 23.May.44	POW 23.May.44; SAFE IN U.K.11.May.45
M104853	Pte.	WOODWARD,R.D.		12.Dec.43 - 3.Jan.45	
K53551	Cpl.	WOODWARD,R.G.	MM	26.Sep.40 - 4.May.45	W.5.Apr.44
K52345	Pte.	WOODWORTH,J.L.		1.Sep.39 - 1.Dec.39	
K53203	Pte.	WOOLRICH,J.		12.Sep.41 - 14.Apr.43	
B145771	Pte.	WORKMAN,W.W.		26.May.44 - 17.Sep.44	POW 17.Sep.44; SAFE IN U.K.11.May.45
K4817	Pte.	WORRALL,R.H.		29.Jun.45 - 31.Jul.45	
M106705	Pte.	WORSULAK,G.		12.Dec.43 - 28.Sep.44	
K51489	Pte.	WORTHINGTON,J.H.		14.May.44 - 7.May.45	INJURED 25.May.44
H195083	Pte.	WORTMAN,D.R.		1.Sep.43 - 15.Jul.45	W.26.Aug.44
K52826	Sgt.	WORTON,W.		2.Oct.39 - 27.Jul.45	
K53144	Pte.	WOTHERSPOON,J.C.		20.Mar.42 - 19.Jul.43	W.19.Jul.43
K697	Pte.	WRATHALL,K.E.		28.Mar.45 - 29.Jul.45	
M36366	Pte.	WREN,W.J.		20.Sep.44 - 18.Oct.44	
K53552	Pte.	WRIGHT,D.		1.Nov.40 - 31.Mar.44	W.5.Aug.43
K52904	Pte.	WRIGHT,H.R.		31.Oct.41 - 26.Oct.42	
K54329	Pte.	WRIGHT,H.		25.May.44 - 23.Oct.44	W.26.Aug.44;POW.23.Oct.44 SAFE IN U.K.11.May.45
K51773		WRIGHT,H.J.		25.May.44 - 25.Sept.45	
M52913	Pte.	WRIGHT,R.B.		25.May.44 - 3.Sep.45	
K602302	Pte.	WRIGHT,W.D.B.		9.May.45 - 25.Sep.45	
L67494	Pte.	WULFF,W.		30.May.44 - 18.Jul.45	
K52896	Pte.	WYCHERLEY,O.L.		8.May.42 - 7.Aug.42	
M17764	Pte.	WYLIE,H.R.		1.Sep.43 - 10.Mar.44	
D3662	Pte.	WYLIE,J.		26.May.44 - 14.Dec.44	W.1.Jun.44;W.14.Dec.44
E52751	Cpl.	WYND,G.B.		25.Jul.43 - 27.Jul.43	KIA 27.Jul.43
K46115	Pte.	YAMELST,R.T.		23.Apr.43 - 28.May.44	W.22.Jul.43
K52385	Pte.	YAMPOLSKY,M.		18.Sep.39 - 4.Feb.41	
K65326	Pte.	YARDLEY,E.L.		23.Apr.43 - 24.Sep.44	W.29.Jul.43
K46017	L/Cpl.	YARWOOD,J.D.		25.May.44 - 16.Jun.45	W.27.Aug.44;W.17.Oct.44; W.11.Apr.45
B118614	Pte.	YATEMAN,J.A.		14.Feb.45 - 18.Jul.45	
K53215	Pte.	YATES,N.		25.Apr.41 - 22.Dec.43	KIA 22.Dec.43
K67263	Pte.	YATES,R.		13.Dec.39 - 19.Aug.40	
M102005	Pte.	YELLOWFLY,G.		5.May.43 - 27.Dec.43	KIA 27.Dec.43
K52997	A/Cpl.	YEOMANS.W.G.		11.May.40 - 4.Dec.43	
A61740	Pte.	YOTT,E.D.		28.May.43 - 23.May.45	
K42370	WO 11 (CSM)	YOUNG,H.T.		17.Jul.45 - 25.Sep.45	

OTHER RANKS ATTACHED

Regt. No.	Final Rank	Name		Corps.	Service with Seaforths	Casualties
G45202	Sgt.	ARNOLD,R.D.		CDC	14.May.41 - 24.Aug.41	
C31827	Pte.	AUBREY,B.		CDC	9.Nov.43 - 11.Dec.43	W.26.Dec.43
P16124	S/Sgt.	BELL,R.G.		RCOC	21.Nov.40 - 16.Oct.41	
L64534	Cpl.	BENJAMIN,R.S.		RCASC	15.Nov.42 - 25.Jan.43	
C3555	Pte.(L/Cpl.)	BROWN,W.H.		RCSigs	26.Jun.42 - 23.Oct.42	
F76657	Sgt.	BUTLER,E.A.B.		CDC	27.Jul.41 - 24.Aug.41	
D51015	Sgt.	CHAMPOUX,J.M.		CDC	17.Jun.41 - 26.Apr.43	
F76778	Pte.	CROWE,D.E.		CDC	29.Sep.44 - 26.Jan.45	
B83757	Sgt.	ELLIS,E.		CDC	16.Mar.43 - 19.May.43	
H16799	Cpl.	ELSEY,R.		RCCS	23.Oct.42 - 26.Nov.42	
B26334	L/Cpl.	FITZGERALD,R.S.		CDC	30.Oct.43 - 8.Nov.43	
K84811	Sgt.	FRASER,C.P.		CDC	26.Feb.41 - 21.Aug.41	
H3138	Sgt.	FRYER,R.F.		CDC	28.Jul.40 - 13.May.41	
D77696	Pte.	GLAZIER,K.		RCSigs	23.Oct.42 - 13.Feb.43	
B72853	Pte.	HALDANE,J.D.		Aux.SERVS	12.Jul.44 - 23.Jul.44	
A2130	Sgt.	HALDANE,K.G.		RCSigs	4.Sep.41 - 22.Nov.41	
H11099	S/Sgt.	HARDWICK,C.S.		RCAMC	21.Oct.42 - 10.Feb.43	
B89087	Pte.	HARGREAVES,F.		Aux.SERVS	3.Mar.44 - 30,Apr.44	INJURED 30.Apr.
D105095	Cpl.	HEBERT,J.B.S.		CDC	9,Nov.43 - 11.Dec.43	W.26.Dec.43
C5622	Pte.	HOUGHTON,A.J.		RCSigs	11.Aug.41 - 28.Aug.41	
D105073	Sgt.	HOYT,H.R.		CDC	20.Jan.43 - 10.Nov.44	
C12037	Sgt.	HURRY,R.L.	MM	RCEME	6.Mar.45 - 7.Mar.45	INJURED 4.Feb.45
M65819	Pte.	IMPEY,G.F.		CDC	20.Jan.43 - 19.May.43	
B87035	Pte.	JARVIS,L.		CDC	29.Mar.43 - 5.Apr.43	
P28150	Pte.	McDONALD,G.R.		CDC	18.Nov.40 - 8.Feb.41	
D124508	Pte.	MITCHELL,M.		CDC	6,Oct.42 - 12.Jan.43	
E26344	Cpl.	MOREAU,P.H.		CDC	9.Nov.43 - 8.Dec.43	
A27029	Sgt.	MURLEY,R.G.		CDC	6,Aug.41 - 24.Aug.41	
L13378	Pte.	MURRAY,W.N.		RCASC	22.Jun.42 - 30.Jul.42	W.8.Aug.44
M28613	Cpl.	NIXON,W.A.		CDC	1.Mar.45 - 9.Jul.45	
L7450	Pte.	O'BRIEN,T.		RCASC	26.Jan.43 - 9.May.43	
B87877	Cpl.	O'NEILL,P.G.		RCASC	22.Jun.42 - 30.Jul.42	
D21451	L/Cpl.	PALMQUIST,B.C.		RCSigs	11.Apr.42 - 19.Apr.42	
D105033	Sgt.	PARKES,E.C.		CDC	9,Nov.43 - 11.Dec.43	W.26.Dec.43
H3124	Sgt.	PAUL,A.W.		CDC	10.Jul.45 - 21.Jul.45	
F76742	Pte.	REEDY,J.A.		CDC	1.Mar.45 - 21.Jul.45	
D24113	Pte.	REID,C.F.		CDC	6,Oct.42 - 20.Jan.43	
B88668	Pte.	ROCHFORD,J.J.		RCASC	26.Sep.42 - 14.Nov.42	
B33275	Pte.	ROY,H.		RCSigs	2.Dec.42 - 4.Feb.43	
B28155	Cpl.	RUSSELL,H.W.		Aux.SERVS	5.Jul.44 - 30.Jan.45	
G45225	Sgt.	RYDER,G.P.		CDC	14.May.41 - 21.Aug.41	
C5639	Sgt.	SMELT,R.N.		RCSigs	11.Aug.41 - 28.Aug.41	W.4.Jan.45
B33076	L/Sgt.	SMITH,A.E.		RCSigs	4.Sep.41 - 22.Nov.41	W.10.Dec.44
G45229	Pte.	THOMPSON,K.R.		CDC	26.Jul.41 - 21.Aug.41	
M62002	Pte.	WATERMAN,W.H.		CDC	17.Apr.42 - 21.Sep.42	
H3107	Pte.	ZINK,G.O.		CDC	28.Jul.40 - 13.May.41	

OTHER RANKS

Regt. No.	Final Seaforth Rank	Name	Service with Seaforths	Casualties
B162010	Pte.	YOUNG,R.J.	14.Feb.45 - 18.Jul.45	
K602650	Pte.	YOUNGER,J.O.	29.Jun.45 - 25.Sep.45	
L21043	Pte.	YOURK,W.	20.Feb.45 - 13.Jun.45	
K70522	Pte.	ZABLOSKY,J.I.	6.Aug.43 - 25.Sep.45	
K49034	Pte.	ZACHARIAS,E.K.	21.May.45 - 9.Jul.45	
K49404	Pte.	ZAPOTICHNY,H.A.G.	12.Dec.43 - 6.Nov.44	
K25492	Pte.	ZARKO,G.D.	1.Nov.44 - 20.Dec.44	
M106712	Pte.	ZARUMA,S.J.	12.Dec.43 - 2.Feb.44	
K52964	Pte.	ZELISNEY,W.A.	11.May.40 - 11.Jun.42	
K8984	Pte.	ZELLER,A.E.	29.Jun.45 - 25.Sep.45	
K53288	Pte.	ZELLEY,W.J.	11.Jul.41 - 2.Jun.45	
Kll164	Pte.	ZEYHA,M.D.	19.Jul.45 - 25.Sep.45	W.18.Mar.44
K3331	Pte.	ZIMMER,E.	7.Apr.45 - 20.Jun.45	W.13.Apr.45
M106137	Pte.	ZOLKIVSKI,J.	12.Dec.43 - 27.Dec.43	W.27.Dec.43
K52473	Pte.	ZORN,A.E.	18.Sep.39 - 23.Nov.39	
K37066	Cpl.	ZOTOFF,N.	1.Dec.39 - 16.Jan.42	
M103852	Pte.	ZWICK,P.D.D.	25.Jul.43 - 7.Dec.43	W.7.Dec.43
M105410	Pte.	ZYTARUK,M.	12.Dec.43 - 23.May.44	W.23.May.44